No. 2. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) vs. COURT OF APPEALS331 SCRA 267, April 28, 2000FACTS:The land in dispute, 19.4 has., was owned by Ulpiano Mumar since 1917. He sold it to respondent Cajes in 1950 for which tax declarations wereissued in 1950, 1961, and 1974.In 1969, unknown to Cajes, Jose Alvarez obtained registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468 sq. m. in his name, on June 16, 1969, which included the 19.4 has. Occupied by Cajes.

In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to Sps. Beduya who, like Alvarez, were never in possession of the property. Sps. Beduya then obtained a loan from petitioner DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) for P 526,000.00 and mortgaged the land.

In 1978, another mortgage over the land was executed by SAAD Investment Corp. represented by G. Beduya and Sps. Beduya in favour of DBP for P 1.43 million.

In 1985, mortgage on the property was foreclosed. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder.

It appears that respondent Cajes had also applied for a loan from DBP in 1978, offering his 19.4 has. as security for the loan which was approved. However, after the release of the loan, DBP found out that the land mortgaged by Cajes was included in the land mortgaged by the Sps. Beduya.

Petitioner DBP cancelled the loan & demanded payment from Cajes. Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by petitioner’s representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent Cajes was occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent Cajes wasinformed that petitioner had become the owner of the land he wasoccupying, & he was asked to vacate the property. As private respondentrefused to do so, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession withdamages against him, invoking that it was an innocent purchaser for value.The Regional Trial Court-Tagbilaran City rendered a decision declaringPage24petitioner DBP the lawful owner of the entire land on the ground that thedecree of registration was binding upon the land.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.ISSUES:1. Whether or not petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith?2. Whether or not petitioner bank can can be considered an innocentpurchaser for value?HELD :

No. At the time of the constitution of the mortgagee, the mortgageebankfailed to conduct an ocular inspection. While an innocent mortgagee isnot expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of themortgagor’s title, in the case of banking institutions, a mortgagee mustexercise due diligence before entering into said contract. Judicial notice istaken of the standard practice for banks, before approving a loan, to sendrepresentatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral & toinvestigate who are the legal owners thereof. Banks, having been impressedwith public interest, are expected to exercise more care & prudence thanprivate individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands.Petitioner was already aware that a person other than the registeredowner was in actual possession of the land when it bought the same at theforeclosure sale. “A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact whichwould create a suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocentpurchaser for value.” It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot closehis eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, & thenclaim that he acted in goof faith under the belief that there was no defect inthe title of the vendor.”Judgment AFFIRMED in toto.5. TURQUESA vs. VALERA322 SCRA 573FACTS:More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land locate d in Abra. Rosario Valera, private respondent, presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought lot 1 from Cristeta Trangued and heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in concept of owner and continued to pay tax thereon in her name.

The Director of Lands, together with petitioners and other personsopposed the application of private respondent. In the course of the hearing,the oppositors (except the director of lands) averred that their lands wereincluded in lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name.Oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correctboundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, but the same wasdenied.On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant has a registrabletitle.Oppositors appealed. On 15 March 1966, the CA set aside the appealeddecision and remanded it to the lower court.In accordance with the CA directive, three (3) commissioners were

appointed by the Trial Court to conduct ocular inspection. The observationsand findings were the following:(1) the claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shownin the original survey.(2) the claims of other petitioners appeared in the original surveyalthough three of these claims bear different identifying names.(3) the “Calle para Collago” maintained by the oppositors to be theextent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the south side isexisting and still is the existing boundary on the south and on the southeastside as shown in the sketch plan.Page16However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering theregistration of the lot in the name of applicant Rosario Valera.ISSUE:______________________________________________________________________________Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question?HELD:No. She doesn’t have a rightful claim over the land.The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on theapplicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simpleof the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to overcome thepresumption that land sought to be registered forms part of the publicdomain.Even if petitioner/s (Partolan) was excluded by the order of generaldefault and (Baltar) did not appeal from the trial court’s decision of April 23,1956. The applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrablerights over the land, which must be grounded on incontrovertible evidenceand based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration of the applicantthat the land applied for has been in the possession of herpredecessor-ininterestfor a certain period, does not constitute the “WELL-NIGHINCONTROVERTIBLE” and “CONCLUSIVE” evidence required in landregistration. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over realproperty, the Torrens System of registration can confirm or record nothing.It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of land is not thesize or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laiddown, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific

portions of Lot.

No. 7. THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. COURT OFAPPEALS & AQUILINO CARINO324 SCRA 757, February 7, 2002FACTS:On May 15, 1975, private respondent A. Carino filed for the registrationof some 43,614 sq. m. lot located at Cabuyao, Laguna. According torespondent, the subject land was originally owned by his mother TeresaLauchengco who died in 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of hisfive sisters and brothers after the death of their father in 1934.Private respondent’s statements were confirmed by the report of theLand Investigator of the Bureau of Lands. It further stated that the land wasagricultural in nature and improvements thereon were sugarcane, bambooclumps, etc.; That the land subject for registration was outside any civil ormilitary reservation, etc. and that the same land was free from claim andconflict; That Carino had been in open, continuous and exclusive possessionof the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceasedmother.ISSUE:Whether or not the decision of Court of Appeals which affirmed theRTC’s decision ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name ofRespondent Carino was valid?HELD:No. The petition for land registration at bar is under the LandRegistration Act which requires that he who alleges in his petition orapplication, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title sincethe Spanish times, such as Titulo Real, or royal grant, a Concession Especialor special grant, a Composicion Con Al Estado or adjustment title, or a titulode compra, or title through purchase; informacion possessoria or adjustmenttitle, which would become a titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title.

No. 8. REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL295 SCRA 359, September 10, 1998FACTS: Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same.

Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol.

Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (1959-1991).

ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.

“The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler.

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired” (Solicitor General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over theland in dispute.