G.R. No. L-10520             February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs.MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.

FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be  dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being

raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

GANCAYCO V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 177807 (2011)

FACTS:

In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land in (EDSA), Quezon City. Sometime in 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled “An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.

An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.

Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00

Under this particular ordinance, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance was amended several times and as a result some properties were exempted from the construction of arcades. The ordinance covered the property of

Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued a Resolution “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s Resolution.  The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to “clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.”[8]

On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the “wing walls,” of the ground floor structure. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.

On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property.

 In his Petition he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of

Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.

The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.

The RTC rendered tis decision in favor of Gancayo by holding the assailed ordinance as unconstitutional. Upon appeal, The CA, partly granting the appeal, upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

ISSUE/S:

1.      WON the issuance of Ordinance No. 2904 is a valid exercise of police power.

2.      WON the wing wall of justice Gancayco’s Building is a public nuisance.

3.      WON MMDA legally demolished the property of justice Gancayo

HELD:

1.      Ordinance no. 2904 is a valid exercise of Police power. It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which states:

“To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.”

Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.

2.      The “wing walls” of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se.  The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.

3.      MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco’s property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.

However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished.  The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official.

Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment. The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES V. ESPINAS G.R. NO. 174156

Better make sure that your vehicle registration is updated. The Supreme Court found the registered owner of a vehicle vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver, even though the driver was employed by another person.

In Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas (G.R. No. 174156, 20 June 2012), the victim of a hit-and-run sued the owner by using the license plate of the vehicle as reference. The company which owned the car disclaimed any liability and said that it assigned the vehicle to its corporate secretary, who in turn employed the driver responsible for the accident. Both the company and the corporate secretary distanced themselves from the negligence of the driver saying that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties.

The Court held that the company which owned the vehicle is deemed the employer of the driver and is thus vicariously liable under the Civil Code. Under the law, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the

employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee. In the Filcar case, however, even if the company’s employee was not driving the vehicle that caused damage to the victim’s car, in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the driver, and is made liable for the tort committed by the latter.

The objective of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification.

For the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is therefore not required. 

In this case, the company was not permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the blame to the person whom it assigned the car. The assignment of the motor vehicle does not bind the victim who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only basis for recourse was the motor vehicle registration. 

The company can always go after the employer of the driver under the principle of unjust enrichment so that it can be indemnified in the same amount that it may be required to pay the victim. The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner but the inconvenience cannot outweigh the more important public policy in indemnifying the victims of reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.

NELIA G. PONCE and VICENTE C. PONCE vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and JESUSA B. AFABLE [G.R. No. L-49494 May 31, 1979]

90 SCRA 533 – – Mercantile Law – Negotiable Instruments Law – Negotiable

Instruments in General – Sum Certain in Money – RA 529

In 1969, Jesusa Afable and two others procured a loan from Nelia Ponce in

the amount of $194,016.29. In June 1969, Afable and her co-debtors executed a

promissory note in favor of Ponce in the peso equivalent of the loan amount which

was P814,868.42. The promissory note went due and was left unpaid despite

demands from Ponce. This prompted Ponce to sue Afable et al. The trial court ruled

in favor of Ponce. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the trial court but it later

reversed its decisions as it ruled that the promissory note under consideration was

payable in US dollars, and, therefore pursuant to Republic Act 529, the transaction

was illegal with neither party entitled to recover under the in pari delicto rule.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Ponce may recover.

HELD: 

Yes. RA 529 provides that an agreement to pay in dollars is null and void and

of no effect however what the law specifically prohibits is payment in currency other

than legal tender. It does not defeat a creditor’s claim for payment, as it specifically

provides that “every other domestic obligation … whether or not any such provision

as to payment is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged

upon payment in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for

public and private debts.” A contrary rule would allow a person to profit or enrich

himself inequitably at another’s expense.

On the face of the promissory note, it says that it is payable in Philippine

currency – the equivalent of the dollar amount loaned to Afable et al. It may likewise

be pointed out that the Promissory Note contains no provision “giving the obligee the

right to require payment in a particular kind of currency other than Philippine

currency, ” which is what is specifically prohibited by RA No. 529.  If there is any

agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than Philippine legal tender, the

same is null and void as contrary to public policy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 529,

and the most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation in Philippine currency.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. NO. 190529. APRIL 29, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:x  x  x  x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.  Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law(1)  Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2)  Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)(1)  Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution].  The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.  The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x  x  x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1)  No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.  It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court.  That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.  The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general.  Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling.  Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.