LOWER MISSOURI RIVER BASIN DAM AND LEVEE FLOOD FIGHT

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21st Century Dam Design

Advances and Adaptations

31st Annual USSD Conference

San Diego, California, April 11-15, 2011

On the CoverArtist's rendition of San Vicente Dam after completion of the dam raise project to increase local storage and provide

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Lower Missouri River Basin 1233

LOWER MISSOURI RIVER BASIN DAM AND LEVEE FLOOD FIGHT LESSONS LEARNED

Willem H. A. Helms1 Eugene J. Kneuvean2 Stephen J. Spaulding3 William B. Empson4 Jared D. Mewmaw5 Rexford G. Goodnight6

ABSTRACT

After the Midwestern flood of 1993, the lower Missouri River Basin entered a relatively dry period without major flooding. As a result of that extended period of relatively stable water levels, experience in flood fighting, flood recovery and support to local communities became stagnant. Local knowledge of Federal assistance that can be provided to protect life and property also faded during this period. Numerous changes also occurred in the regulatory, funding and water management environment in which emergency responses are conducted. As a result of flooding in 2007, 2008 and 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District developed renewed expertise in moderate flood fight operations on dams and levees and local best practices in emergency operations leadership, organization, equipment, reporting, community outreach and response and risk communication. Equipment used to save an overtopping levee in 2010 is discussed. EOC leadership through the use of Battle Captains to manage the response is presented. Use of helicopters to obtain real time situational awareness to guide flood fight response is presented. An overview of general situations under which Federal assistance can be provided to local districts, sponsors and private individuals to protect life and property is also discussed.

INTRODUCTION The great Midwestern Flood of 1993 was a definitive moment in governmental response to a flood of great magnitude, undoubtedly a result of the wide geographic area of impact. From the late 1990s until 2007, flood responses of such magnitude were not again accomplished by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the lower Missouri River Basin. Throughout the organization, many other priorities were established, most notably the Global War on Terrorism and a spike in military construction as a result of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). In 2007, the floods that occurred throughout the summer resulted in a thorough analysis of flood response efforts culminating in a vast knowledge of flood response tools and efforts. The USACE response to flooding on the Missouri River during May 2007 included over 200 Corps employees, several technical 1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected]. 2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected]. 3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected]. 4 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected]. 5 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected]. 6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, 635 East 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106, [email protected].

21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations 1234

assistance requests from local entities, the issuance of over 1 million sandbags, and 38 flood damage reduction projects damaged and requiring rehabilitation to pre-flood conditions at a cost of over $20 million. Through subsequent events up to 2010, the Kansas City District affirmed that a proactive approach and interaction with levee districts and local and state governments before and during response operations increases resiliency and often results in preventing significant loss of life and property. Additional best practices include event leadership, organization, equipment, reporting, risk communication, and public outreach. This paper will focus on the invaluable tools formed throughout the emergency management cycle, culminating in the response efforts conducted during June through August 2010. Public Law 84-99 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has authority under Public Law 84-99, Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE) (33 U.S.C. 701n) (69 Stat. 186) for emergency management activities. Under PL 84-99, the Chief of Engineers, acting for the Secretary of the Army, is authorized to undertake activities including disaster preparedness, Advance Measures, emergency operations (Flood Response and Post Flood Response), rehabilitation of flood control works threatened or destroyed by flood, protection or repair of federally authorized shore protective works threatened or damaged by coastal storm, and provisions of emergency water due to drought or contaminated source. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District is responsible for PL 84-99 response for the Lower Missouri River Basin.

The Kansas City District The Kansas City District (Figure 1) largely encompasses the lower 500 miles of the Missouri River and its tributaries, encompassing portions of Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri. This area of operation includes over 1,030 miles of levees, 18 flood damage reduction reservoirs and numerous civil works projects. Military construction provides support to five military installations in Missouri and Kansas. Environmental restoration projects encompass 6 states. The districts civil works program impacts the Nation on a daily basis through the commerce created by the Missouri River, ports and harbors; hydropower; water supply; recreation opportunities; environmental programs; and public safety infrastructure.


Figure 1. The Kansas City District (Civil Works) operational area.

The Missouri River Basin

The Missouri River basin encompasses an area of 529,000 square miles, including about 9,700 square miles located in Canada. The basin is bounded on the west by the Continental Divide, formed by the Rocky Mountains; on the north by a less conspicuous elevation separating it from the Hudson Bay drainage; on the east by the Red and Mississippi River drainages; and on the south by the Ozark Uplift and a east-west ridge across the central Kansas, separating it from the Arkansas and other lower Mississippi drainage. This total area spans 10 states, including all of Nebraska, most of Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota and South Dakota, about half of Kansas and Missouri, and smaller parts of Iowa, Colorado and Minnesota. Due to its mid-continent location, the basin experiences temperatures noted for wide fluctuations and extremes. Winters are relatively long and cold over much of the basin, while summers vary from mild to hot. Spring is normally cool, humid and windy; autumn is normally cool, dry, and fair. The basin experiences temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer to below -20 degrees Fahrenheit in winter. Average annual precipitation ranges from a low of 8 inches just east of the Rocky Mountains to about 40 inches in the southeastern part of the basin, and in parts of the Rocky Mountains at higher elevations. The normal season maximum precipitation is observed throughout the basin during the spring and early summer months. Precipitation during the late summer and fall months is usually of short duration thunderstorms with small centers of high intensity, although widespread general rains do occasionally occur, especially in the lower basin. Winter precipitation occurs in the form of snow in the northern and central portions of the basin. In lower basin states, it may occur as either rain or snow or a


mixture of both. Average annual snowfall ranges from 20 inches in the lower basin to 30 inches in the eastern Dakotas to near 50 inches in the high plains areas in the west. High elevation stations in the Black Hills and in the Rockies along the western edge of the basin receive in excess of 100 inches of snowfall.

The Kansas City Districts area of responsibility consists of the southeast or lower portion of this watershed. This portion of the watershed comprises the northern half of Kansas, the southern third of Nebraska, the south western third of Iowa and half of Missouri in the northwest and central regions. Omaha Districts area of responsibility includes the remainder of the basin starting area just upstream of Rulo Nebraska.

Emergency Management Cycle in the Kansas City District

To adequately frame the response efforts of summer 2010, discussion of emergency management within the Kansas City District is necessary. Four phases of the emergency management cycle include mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Haddow, 2006). Through various events, beginning with the Midwestern Floods of 1993, it was determined that as an emergency management organization, the Kansas City District should accomplish each of these phases. The following outlines how each of the phases are accomplished within the district.

Mitigation: Mitigation is minimizing the effects of a disaster or more specifically ensuring resiliency, the ability to, bounce back. For the Kansas City District, this principle is paramount to its dam and levee safety programs. Routine annual inspections, are a critical component of a flood damage reduction project safety program and focus on the operation and maintenance of the project. Annual inspections verify the project sponsor operates and maintains the project in a way to achieve the maximum benefits that the project was designed to provide in accordance with the projects operations and maintenance manual. Periodic inspections, conducted every five years, are the next level of rigor in the program and includes a more detailed and consistent evaluation of the condition of the project and is conducted every five years. Activity under the periodic inspection includes routine inspection items; verifies proper operation and maintenance; evaluates operational adequacy, structural stability and, safety of the system; and compares current design and construction criteria with those in place when the project was built. The final periodic inspection rating is based upon the routine inspection items, and will include an acceptable, minimally acceptable or unacceptable rating. Preparedness: Preparedness is the cycle which encompasses the majority of the effort within the district. Past lessons learned have highlighted the importance of a training and exercise program. For example, Kansas City District personnel attend joint flood fight training with levee district personnel and conduct an annual flood fight orientation. An additional preparedness tool includes an annual spring flood assessment. This assessment determines the potential flood risks for the upcoming season and identifies available resources including pumps, sandbags, sandbag machines, and other equipment necessary to conduct a flood fight response. Processes, including routine inspections and response operations, are clearly outlined in preparedness plans. A key component of the Kansas City Districts preparedness plans include an all hazards operations order, emergency


action plans, critical surveillance plans, flood fight standard operating procedures, and flood fight training materials. The all hazards operations order specifies procedures and team structure necessary to accomplish a wide spectrum of contingencies. A key component of the all hazards operations order is that it outlines a five phase response effort to include activation, deployment, execution, recovery, and closeout. The operations order outlines the structure of a crisis management team led by the district commander or his deputy and includes senior leadership of the district. The district commander designates the chief of emergency management as the operations officer responsible for the oversight of contingency operations and manages allocation of resources. The chief of the emergency management, in turn, identifies and recruits a crisis action team, led by a battle captain, who manages the specific contingency, most often a flood fight event. The Emergency Action Plans (EAP) outline response activities directly correlated to specific action triggers. The emergency action plan (EAP) is intended to assist personnel in safeguarding lives and reducing damage to property in the event of flooding by large operational releases or failure of a dam structure. It is intended to direct personnel in deciding on and implementing preventative actions by: assuring that project personnel are trained to recognize potential emergency situations; assuring that project personnel properly observe and report critical areas to allow maximum time for remedial measures which may prevent a serious condition from progressing; assuring that should a critical condition develop, and failure of the dam is imminent, this plan provides procedures to follow so that the public is given the maximum time to evacuate. The EAP contains inundation maps to show the responsible downstream local emergency management officials of the critical areas for action in case of an emergency. The dam surveillance plan establishes inspection and monitoring procedures to be followed by the reservoir project manager and staff in the operation of the project to ensure dam safety. Each of the 18 flood damage reduction projects (reservoirs) in the district includes a unique dam surveillance plan. Selected project features require continuous monitoring to ensure the dam is functioning as designed under normal and abnormal conditions. The dam surveillance plans clearly specify that project personnel should be watchful for any unusual events or strange conditions. Alertness and attentiveness on the part of individuals are crucial in identifying potential dam safety problems. The dam surveillance plans include progressive levels of surveillance, to include routine, increased and critical surveillance. Surface water elevations determine the levels of surveillance. Increased surveillance levels require more intensive surveillance of each structure. Stresses on structures increase as the water surface elevations increase. The purpose of the flood fighting standing operating procedure is to establish duties, policies, and responsibilities applicable to flood fight and response efforts of the Kansas City District. Team structures, specific to a flood fight, are outlined in the standard operating procedures and include mobile liaison teams and technical response teams. Mobile liaison teams are considered the initial surge of the flood response and coordinate with the levee districts and/or local government entity on specific areas of concerns. During a flood event, the technical response teams respond directly to the technical assistance requests from the levee


districts and/or governmental entities. Additional flood fight preparedness materiel includes a flood fight training manual which outlines standard flood fight techniques and other useful information. Response: All emergency operations response activities are structured, analyzed and managed through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), located in Kansas City, Missouri. Risk communications is an important response tool to ensure stakeholders and general public are duly informed of flood damage reduction project safety concerns or risks. Risk communication is accomplished through media access to subject matter experts and regularly scheduled conference calls with congressional delegations and stakeholders. A vital tool for response personnel includes geographic information system (GIS). GIS is able to allow spatial analysis of vast amounts of data. The data is systematically gathered and organized, analyzed, and displayed electronically or on paper maps (Blanchard, 2007). Responders are able to analyze and execute their missions using the same critical information and are able to achieve greater response efficiencies. The Kansas City District has used GIS to effectively create a spatial flood information platform. This platform allows response personnel to identify potential levee overtopping areas and efficiently concentrate response efforts. A crucial flood fight reconnaissance tool is the use of aerial surveillance. Based upon lessons learned from 2007, the Kansas City District determined that the use of fixed wing and rotary assets offered a distinct advantage in real-time surveillance of the flood fight area. Aerial surveillance offers the opportunity to identify hot spots and thus concentrate flood fight resources in the approximate area. Previous flood responses led to the use of battle captains to accomplish specific mission management objectives in accordance with specific event characteristics. Battle captains, used in 2007 and further refined during the 2010 flood response, are invaluable in managing information flowing through the emergency operations center. Subsequent response actions, as tasked through the crisis action team members, are expedited. The battle captains are responsible for compiling event information and briefing crisis management team members during scheduled briefings. Informing senior leadership on a routine basis has proven to be invaluable in affirming a sense of urgency, thus ensuring a devoted district workforce to the flood fight effort. Battle captains allow the districts emergency management staff to remain focused on coordination with levee, local, and state governmental agencies to ensure a strategic and comprehensive flood fight response. Recovery: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may provide assistance in the rehabilitation of flood damage reduction projects for the purpose of ensuring community recovery. From May 2007 through May 2010, Kansas City District has been in an almost continuous cycle of flood recovery. Flooding in the lower Missouri River and its tributary system damaged more than a third of the levee systems within Kansas City Districts Rehabilitation and Inspection Program. For 2010, the majority of the levee repairs and rehabilitation will occur within the state of Missouri, but also includes Kansas and Nebraska. Total expected damages may exceed $10 million. District personnel remain engaged during


and after the flood event to ensure that a pre flood level of protection is restored prior to the next flood season. The 2010 Flood Event

As Missouri River flows increased toward flood stage in June of 2010, the Kansas City District began emergency response efforts. The event duration spanned from June to August of 2010. Response efforts for Missouri River flooding included deployment of liaison and technical response teams to levees along the Missouri River. Other resources used during flood fight operations included sand, sandbags, sandbagging machines and technical assistance in placement of sandbags. In addition to sand bagging operations relief wells were installed along a levee section that exhibited significant piping of foundation materiel.

Several of the Missouri River tributaries were also above flood stage. The Chariton River was one such tributary and is of particular interest because of the scale of the response effort. As the Chariton River flows increased toward flood stage in July of 2010 the Kansas City District began emergency response efforts. These efforts were in conjunction with flood fight efforts that were ongoing in response to Missouri River flooding. The duration of this effort was from July to August of 2010. Response efforts for the Chariton River flooding included deployment of liaison and technical response teams near Rathbun Lake. Other resources used during flood fight operations included stone, light plants, port-a-dam, sand, sandbags, sandbagging machines and technical assistance in placement of sandbags.

Heavy rainstorms in early and mid-June led to the extensive moderate to major flooding in the Missouri River basin. The large area impacted by this flood event contained both federal and non-Federal flood damage reduction systems. Federal systems within the Kansas City District included both levees and reservoirs. Rathbun, Hillsdale, Melvern, Milford, Tuttle Creek, Perry, Long Branch and Longview Lakes had pool elevations requiring increased surveillance. Rathbun Lake entered into critical surveillance and had some minimal flow out of the emergency control spillway. In addition to reservoirs, flood fight assistance was provided to the Elwood-Gladden Drainage District and Holt County in support of Federal levees R-471-460 and L-497, respectively. These levees are located on the Missouri River. Technical assistance was provided for Federal Levees L-488 and R-512 on the Missouri River. Non-Federal levees supported during this event included Rushville Sugar Lake Levee, Henrietta-Crooked River Levee, Atchison County, Kansas Levee.

Upstream of Kansas City, the second crest around June 23 was generally a little higher than the first crest around June 15. Later storms, particularly those causing major flooding in the Little Sioux River basin in late June, extended the period of flooding, but the subsequent crests were lower than the earlier two crests. The later storms did not extend into Missouri. The Grand River experienced major flooding due to the storms on June 1-2 and again on June 12-15, with the crests at Sumner, Missouri occurring on June 9 and June 17. Combined with the first Nebraska flood crest and the second Grand River


crest, the highest crest on the lower Missouri River occurred during the June 19-21 period. Moderate flooding occurred along many Blue River tributaries, such as at Crete and Mill Creek at Washington, Missouri and in Smoky Hill and Republican River tributaries in north central Kansas, such as at Clay Center. Most of this flooding resulted in agricultural flooding and damages to county roads and bridges. Flood waters from the Republican River are captured by Milford Reservoir, and the Blue River flows into Tuttle Creek Reservoir. Both of these lakes went into increased surveillance (a dam safety consideration not related to any imminent failure) by early July, but total storage is only about 35% of the available flood control pools.

The releases at Gavins Point Dam were at 27,000 cubic feet per second through early June. From June 12 to June 14, the COE Reservoir Control Center (RCC) in Omaha Nebraska was able to reduce releases to 22,000 cubic feet per second. As the pool climbed from 1205 feet towards the top of the gates at 1210 feet, releases had to be increased to 33,000 cubic feet per second. After the pool had been reduced to 1205.2 feet, the RCC was again able to reduce releases to 15,000 cubic feet per second beginning at midnight on June 20, in order to reduce the next Missouri River crest on June 23-24. As the pool again climbed, RCC began increasing releases incrementally June 23, rising to 34,000 cubic feet per second by June 26. The releases continued at that level through early July. The water travel time from Gavins Point Dam to Omaha is about 3 days, to Rulo Nebraska about 4.5 days, to Kansas City, Missouri about 5.5 days, and to the mouth of the Missouri River about 10 days.

The Missouri River at Nebraska City crested at a minor stage of 25.2 feet on June 15 and again at 25.2 feet on June 23. The first crest was directly due to the rainstorms of June 6 to 13 feet. The second crest was due to a combination of the crests from the Platte River and the rainstorms of June 20-23. A long slow crest occurred during the period from June 30 to July 2 at 21.9 feet due to the extended runoff out of the Little Sioux River from the storms on June 26-27. The impacts were mainly to unprotected agricultural lands. A number of Federal levees in the Omaha District upstream of Rulo to Omaha were closely monitored by the Corps. Erosion was reported at a levee near the mouth of the Platte River and on the Missouri side of Nebraska City. The Corps and sponsors planned to dump rock at the erosion sites as a temporary measure. No Federal levees were overtopped.

At Rulo, Nebraska the Missouri River first crested at a moderate stage of 24.8 feet on June 16 and then a record stage of 26.63 feet on June 23 (see figure 2). Rulo is the Kansas City Districts most upstream Missouri River gage. By the time the third crest reached Rulo it only resulted in a flattening of the river hydrograph without an actual rise in the river. Although the crest stage exceeded the previous records in 1952 (25.60 feet) and 1993 (25.37 feet), the river discharge was only about 200,000 cubic feet per second, much less than the approximately 307,000 cubic feet per second in 1993. In both 1952 and 1993, the river flooded the entire floodplain (due to levee breaks in 1993), but the levee system mostly stayed intact with this event, and the river was constrained at a higher level within the levees. Several site visits to R513-512 levee in Rulo, Nebraska were performed. The goal of these visits was to observe levee performance during the


record high water being experienced. Piezometer readings were obtained to provide thresholds of anticipated water levels behind the levee. These readings were compared to the most recent readings available; readings from the 2008 flood, obtained June 6, 2008. At the time of the readings river stages at Rulo, NE were 2.7 feet higher than 2008. Most of the piezometers indicated water levels higher than the ground surface. Relief wells were observed to be flowing and functioning as designed.

Figure 2. USGS graphs show higher flows during this event compared to normal.

As at other points along the Missouri River, as long as levees dont breach or overtop, damages are limited to unprotected agricultural fields between the river and the levees and a few county roads. During this event a number of non-Federal levees, some in the Corps PL 84-99 program, were overtopped or breached. The Corps only has information on the Federal levees and the non-Federal levees in the PL 84-99 program. Others not listed here are known to have overtopped or breached. None of the Federal levees were overtopped or breached.

The Union Township non-Federal levee upstream of Rulo in Holt County, Missouri overtopped and then breached, flooding extensive farmlands. Water also routed down to the small community of Big Lake flooding homes and forcing evacuations. Some residents in Fortescue, Missouri and Craig, Missouri evacuated voluntarily, along with scattered farm homes. Power was interrupted, and for a time the bridge across the river was closed. The Holt County Levee District No. 10 non-Federal levee also overtopped,


contributing to the flooding. Downstream of Rulo, the Canon Drainage District non-Federal levee was overtopped, affecting farmland. Sponsors sandbagged the crests of many levees, along with endangered property, that directly affected the communities of Fortescue and Craig. The state of Missouri specifically request use of an automatic sandbagging machine owned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The sandbag machine benefited the flood fight efforts by providing sandbags at a rate of over 40 a minute. The increased sandbagging efficiency resulted in the use of fewer personnel for filling sandbags, thus freeing up more personnel for the placement of sandbags.

At St. Joseph, Missouri, the first crest was at a moderate stage of 24.5 feet on June 17 and the second at 26.17 feet on June 25. The Federal levees at L497 upstream of St. Joseph and at R470-461 on the Kansas side just downstream of St. Joseph at Elwood, Kansas, experienced some sand boils behind the levees, but preventive measures were taken and the levees were never in imminent danger either of breaching or overtopping. Through training and use of the flood fight training manual, levee district personnel and Kansas City District personnel were able to appropriately observe and identify several sand boils between levee stations and, while water was not cloudy, material appeared to have been transported. Sand boils were concentrated in an area of weakness on the levee, south of the relief wells and north of an underseepage berm. This observation prompted the sponsor to request a technical response team. Upon arriving, the geotechnical engineer recommended immediate sandbagging of sand boils.

Sand boils were ringed with sandbags until water flowing out of the boils was clear. A sandbag machine and two operators were sent to assist in the sandbagging operations. The local sponsors and Kansas City District representatives were successful in stopping the movement of levee material through the boils with the placement of ring dikes. Filter fabric and 10 of sand were placed over a 20 by 30 area to cap a buoyant area. A Kansas City District in-house drilling team was used to install three temporary relief wells designed to relieve seepage pressures in this area as a precautionary measure.

At Atchison, KS, the first crest was at a moderate level of 28.0 feet on June 17 and the second at 29.8 feet on June 25. On the Missouri side, the Rushville Sugar Lake non Federal Levee overtopped on June 25, but the sponsor continued to sandbag the crest and overflow was minimal, limited to mainly agricultural damages. For this particular floodfight, another automatic sandbag machine was loaned to the levee district. Again, the timely rate of sandbags allowed the sponsor to produce large numbers of sandbag in a short amount of time, crucial during an overtopping event to prevent further levee foundation damages.

The Missouri River reach through Kansas City is protected by Federal levees and high agricultural levees. The NWS flood stage of 32 feet is higher than the stages recorded during this event, although some undeveloped lowlands and some parkland above the normal bank line were flooded.

The Missouri River at Waverly crested at a minor stage of 28.47 feet on June 18 and then 26.67 feet on June 26. The second crest faded out entirely below Miami and the Grand River confluence. The Waverly gage is important as an index gage not just for local


levee districts, but also for control of releases from the Kansas River system of flood control reservoirs. In general, releases from the lakes are restricted to minimum levels when Waverly is above flood stage. Releases take up to 6 days from Milford Lake, the upstream reservoir, and releases can be timed accordingly to fill in on the recession side of the hydrograph.

Just above Waverly, the Baltimore Bend non-Federal Levee failed (breached). The water flowed downstream along a lower portion of the farmlands and then back into the river through an intentional breach in the Belcher-Lozier non-Federal Levee.

The Grand River at Sumner, Missouri. crested at a moderate stage of 36.55 feet on June 17. Extensive field flooding throughout the Grand River basin occurred with this event, but most of this area had already been flooded at least twice earlier in the year. The Grand River is subject to frequent flash flood events.

The Missouri River at Glasgow crested at a major flood stage of 33.81 feet on June 20. The City Park, sewage lagoons, and the approach to the US 240 bridge west of Glasgow were reported flooded. Figure 3 shows that the 2007 and 2008 floods were also significant events on the Missouri River, more so in 2007 than in 2010.

Figure 3. USGS comparison of historical flood events at the Glasgow River Gauge.

Rathbun Lake is located on the Chariton River in southern Iowa. The Chariton River drains south through Missouri and enters the Missouri River upstream of Glasgow. Maximum releases from the lake are 1500 cubic feet per second and do not contribute significantly to the Missouri River flows. The primary objective for its operations is the Chariton River itself. Like other rivers in Iowa, the Chariton River flooded frequently in June and July. Rathbun Lake filled to a crest of 926.77 feet (about 99.9% full) July 24. Surveillance for Rathbun Lake is elevated from increased to critical when the pool elevation rises above 923.0 feet as established in its Critical Surveillance Plan. Previous Rathbun Lake high pool elevations include 925 feet in 2008 and its record pool was at 927.2 feet in July 1993. High pool levels combined with high inflows resulted in releases of 3,000 cubic feet per second for several days. The prolonged period of high outflows required the placement of supplementary outlet protection stone. Over 1,000 tons of stone was sourced and placed from local quarries and the on-site emergency stockpile.


Releases in excess of 1,500 cubic feet per second result in negative downstream impacts. To mitigate these impacts, 1,100 feet of Port-a-dam (temporary floodwall) was installed to protect downstream facilities. An alternate EOC was established to coordinate flood fight operations with local officials. 200,000 sandbags, 8 light plants and one sandbagging machine with support personnel were provided. Flood fight efforts protected the pump house (sandbags) for the Rathbun Rural Water District facility located along the right descending bank of the Chariton River downstream of the Rathbun Lake outlet works. Response activities were coordinated with Appanoose County EM and Iowa DHS. Another successful risk communication strategy for the Chariton River flood response effort involved the use of a joint press conference between local, state, and federal officials. The press conference was well attended by local and state media and offered a great opportunity to appropriately vet public safety issues and concerns with the pertinent public safety officials.

At Hermann, the Missouri River crested at a moderate stage of 27.24 feet on June 21. The lower river had actually fallen below flood stage over the July 4th weekend, but the rainstorms on July 4-5 resulted in a minor rise above flood stage, with the crest date July 10. Damages were minimal, although some county and state roads were overtopped and some lower elevation businesses were either closed or were operating with restricted access.

SUMMARY Mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery are the four phases of emergency management of which the Kansas City District utilizes to effectively complete its mission. Ensuring quality flood damage reduction projects/infrastructure is accomplished during the mitigation phase through rigid inspection criteria. Plans, training, and exercises are accomplished during the preparedness cycle. Proactive communication and response efforts combined with innovative flood fight tools have proven invaluable during the response cycle. Restoring damaged infrastructure is then accomplished through the recovery cycle. Lessons learned during the 2007 and 2008 flood events have allowed the Kansas City District to provide a better response to the 2010 flood event. The Kansas City District used proactive communication to adequately communicate critical infrastructure risk to its stakeholders and public. Proactive communication with stakeholders and public resulted in positive public perception and improved working relationships with local stakeholders. In 2010 communication with levee board representative occurred early in the flood event. As Missouri River levels began to rise, Kansas City district personnel contacted levee board representatives. Communication aimed to understand concerns and determine courses of actions for affected levee boards or drainage districts. Early communication allowed district personnel to better respond to levee districts needs. Congressional delegation calls provided current, accurate and reliable information to congressional delegations and stakeholders within the impacted area regarding flooding and flood fight operations. The conference calls occurred throughout the flood fight with varying frequency, but occurred daily during periods of critical river stages. The calls provided updates on general conditions, reservoir conditions, levee conditions, flood fight


operations, navigation, EOC status, recovery actions and an opportunity for questions. Participants in the calls included congressional delegations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the state emergency management agencies for Kansas and Missouri, the Reservoir Control Center, and the National Weather Service. The Kansas City District also produced press releases, responded to media queries, participated in radio and television interviews and held press conferences with subject matter experts. These efforts provided situational awareness regarding flooding flood fight response to the public.

Additional best practices included the extensive use of GIS products for response personnel, both EOC and field team personnel. GIS products offered the opportunity to identify specific areas of concern. Once identified, efficient dispatching of fixed wing and rotary assets occurred to adequately identify appropriate flood fight response efforts. Liaison teams served as the ground reconnaissance and upon coordinating with levee district personnel further identified the problematic areas. Technical response teams were then dispatched to provide technical assistance and identify the most appropriate flood fight measure.

Points along the Missouri River and its tributaries reached record stages during this flood event, however proactive communication and implementation of lessons learned from 2007 and 2008 led to an improved 2010 flood fight effort. Efforts of individuals from the Kansas City District and local stakeholders combined to produce an effective flood fight and better prepare for the next event.

REFERENCES Alexander, David (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management. Oxford U. Press. Blanchard, B. W. (2007). Background Think Piece for the Emergency Management Roundtable Meeting, EMI, March 5-6, 2007 on What is Emergency Management? and What are the Principles of Emergency Management. Unpublished manuscript.

Haddow, George D., and Jane A. Bullock (2006). Introduction to Emergency Management, 2nd Edition (New York: Butterworth-Heinneman).

Nicholson, William C., ed. (2003). Emergency Response and Emergency Management Law: Cases and Materials (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher).

Waugh, William L., Jr., and Gregory Streib (2006). Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management, Public Administration Review (December).

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LOWER MISSOURI RIVER BASIN DAM AND LEVEE FLOOD FIGHT