l.

h • '

r alnt~ eu t e do•tnaat tn Uncer~alatj tn ~h•rJ.•· Unc uatnt.y all 69 yeu: l• t erorarlly tndiepoa d or fatally 111.

h4 conoetc o d fnrtun of 1983 c a b tncert lnty abo~t the futura cour of the

the Untt d Stat • -- vbe h r lt 111 be • dovnu rd or chan courae and lead to oae ort

Uncertalaty whether th Soviet Oaloa baa f tta po er and nov both alllt rlly and ta b~gtnnln& a loaa alld •

2. The follovtac para&rapba ara an atteap to place our elvea la Sovtet hoea, to look at the vorld ae ~look at lt Of cou~••• 1t 1a o~ly ahortbaad to apeak of they• or •t e Krealta•. la fact, each of the laade~ briaaa a peculiar perapectlve to the ossa•· internal and lateraat!onal affaire. For xaaple, tt eee.e r aaoaable to aa•o•• that the youn er lead 1'1 have a aor~ optlatat1C Yie of the 0Sit'e proapecte baa deacrlbed belov, eapeclally if th older eaerattoa oald jaat 1 t out of the ay aad let thea deal vitb RuaaSa a pro~l•••·

bat follo a then te a co•po•lt• that ould ~epre eat eo•etblat like the oa•ea ua coalas oat of cba ~olitbaro, blea41a& tbe •tffer at ~s va of tte •aabere.

it alva7a b .. laa o the lea4n• t•

i•n I

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Polttbu~o nd olh ~ ft u~ tn b 1 rtaln\ hA e b p~eo ~upl d for •ttoo of A"d~opov'• poo b alt and for • oth• to

e pr~or~upt~d 1th pol1tlr 1 • n uv 4 eplactua o ropo or p~ p rlns to d~ ao. ~old

~lt teal ov•• on hl• part would lt 17 provo rnal oofltct aod add to uac rtalot7 about be futu~ • 1tns•~ tn po r fr qu atl ln aparlt t d ad uoabl to advan

'Ill proaraa, th drift and enaul of 11r ~:'luu 'a 1• t J ar qul 11

111 ~cturn to the r altn.

Th~

6. Curr ot ~oaoalc perfo~aaace la th the r alia vlndov. Aft r a v ral Jeara o econo 1 aaeaa to th aldat of an econoatc r bouad to arov tbla 1 ar b7 ).5 to 4 p rc at -- alaoa t ~ vth Ia 1981 aad 1912· 411 aajor ••ctora of th

dolo b ter thta Jear haa la 1982&

7. r ro nla

A rlcalture Ia perleactna 1 ara of lltt1• or ao arovth 1

barv at to fl ,.-ra and ar at r aa1 oth r tl•• 1a Sovlat h atOTJ

Growth of loduatrial produ loa S l p rc nt fo the J ar

rood upp11 • val ab the flrat al aontha of ssa taada a ood ~bane o

capS coo ••ptloa of a at

e h

2

t h

ro

9. Por ~be b 1 nee of the decade, at 1 aat fou~ other factor• tll add to loa& r ranae coaoatc pro le••= reatlJ reduced aunual tncre• at• to the le or force •• a cooaequ ace of d aoaraphlc factora; the coo tau d atzabl prtorltJ c a • of tb allttarJ oo aatertala, taveato nt aad traaspo~t tloo• ace 1erate4 pr .. aure oa eaterprteea to ecoaoalz oa all r aourc• lop•t• alaultaaeoualy; and luceat1v• acbeoea of Jyaaottoe co plealtJ• The lopoalttoa of dlac1plla bJ Aadropo~ ••1 ba bad a a ora e ottial aff ct, but aucb taettc• p~obablJ caooot c ~c.. b

loa& raaae ta k of aolvlDS cbroalc p oducti• tJ p bl odeed, evea lf aajor &J&t .. lc r for.. ra ooc .. ald

be uall lJ to boost ta4uat~la1 sro th ••• pro4 ~ 1

1 ara•

Soae Sovi t leadete

• e Ro elalll

Aa r1cac s

ada v1~ t e

• ~ ··s

ad dt rscult. rr • th ssa.

• CU h Vl'

b atd­rentlat 4• 1J at ra

1 • Th' a~trt ••• ln tbla Pt td a~ • for•ldabl adver"ar~ an~ rhey prea nt J app •r to eap ct (ao~ doubtl ••

re tl f•ar) that he ill be r elect d. Tbla v 11 •••a not odlJ a ~oa taua to~ of US defeoae aud foralaa poltetea chall ogSo& o s t t l~terwata but alao will repreaent a r ••••rtioo of the atabtllt of the a rfcao polltlcal •1• .. -- •eaaloa hat for tbr lr t tts eincc 1960 poltcl a ~eo be euataio d for •ore than • f ~r 1r•r tera. Th dana r poead b7 pollttea111 atroaa, detrr tned end hoatll US Adwlota ration creat a areat uacrrtaia for the Sovteta aboQt vhat the future holds.

17. Fr • tbe Soviet w ata&e point th Ul te aa rtio fta po rr •nd laflu ~ce aaalaat tb U&Sa lo •• rr realoa E•aa tbouab c.b ay:-a_a haa ·tta ova ualfllll pl ca S:a So•f.•t 7 a over ~he• all loo•• the A•ar~c•• ah dov pervaelv lJ 1DtrYdlaa vhcr w~r the USSR haa eat ita a abta.

Europa. Aa aoted abov tbe deplo,aaD of TaP repr•aeata a aajor po~l leal aad atra eslo a tback for th Soviet Vatoa. ot oalJ doaa I VIS& with a aev atlitarJ altuatloa that ay theJ vtll have to flsht • ••~ la larop • r .. fflroatioa l~ the • •-1980 • of vtabllltJ of the 8ATO a1ltaac which vaa a prtacipal objective o

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1stan i ~ t-.e Sttv1t"t5 t 1 11 er. ~er the oa teTe h •tz~re o: tnation o! au hittortc o j~~tlv :

stand~ 1 t, 1 is an t-vort nt 1t • ~. r er tero, lt 1 l aiat~~m a contlnul for

t eir for ea •ee• to do vor• the tneur nt • aato, thlt sovi t s fi Ill!

• nd of the vntted St t • •bind the per or the ia~urgenta and kn that the US is bleedin t e• to t at countrY• hile the politic 1, buoaa nd l14DCl&l c •t• aTe relative1f lo and tolerable, right a ~ h •ueetaas are loslDI• l~•u•e d feat la uathinkabl , the l~•d~rahip •u t do vhat la necessary to av rt it.

Afric& aad Latta Aaerlca. aare too tbe vl froa o co aust be one of uac r alatf and concern. ~hat appeared for a half a do&en years aft r Yietn•• to be a ooe-atded ad aace ts turnio& into a coatlJ and di fi ult co petitlODo Putatl•e soviet alltea D An ol •

ozaabique and .tcaraaua fad tha•aelvea na d tn bloody coafllct aaataat Jaauraeata aupported et her bJ tbe US or tea frtenda. aeporta abound of so~1 c ell ota la £thlop1a, Aaaola, Hosa•biqaa aad elaa h re e~pr •• aa unhap,taeaa ltb the~r So•let and Cubaa ,atroaa ad tnter~•t ta •tern cono•te •• The So tat e for o

auae trouble for the US tn lta o ackJeTd la be C•rlbbean aad Latta A• rica •• b a ae throu t~Adf at US auppor for be o n e of 1 1 ado

sad Hondur a aad tb US lot ~ Gr n i adlll8 a troaa

I!TS vblle I' YO U

auat coaalde th

rotentle 0 Central Africa (Zalr ) Chad be Ph tppiaea •

~· •a •• a n ln tlatlwe and r Andro ow • trou le4 Stan-US r latloaablp ha

The Sowtet Union l un tllln e nda la Af&~anl aa, VI tnae,

olta or aloaa the Stno-So•let bord r. h!le ther haa b eo ao• taprov • at in th• at•oaph riel of 1 r 1 tlo~hlp durtna rhe paa year, th Sepr~e• at haa

a ov rah doved by th wtatta t~ leljia& of the A•ertcaa Seer ary of D feaa , tb potea al for US htah t chnolo&J ••porta to Chtaa, aad tbe 1•p adl wialt la the prln& of t A• ricaa Pr••1d a •

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n

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I f IIII I& f f II I'"

tlm a ~ th n J,- 1' tullY c vtur h 1 C"urltY th

t ndol wl t h

SS1l on on h oth r

r r 8 tn ~u~op • th r• w p c t ha8 r ~r• •nd n arly o,ooO .n~• oppoaed by oldi ra vlth 2~,000 tank•· Th• Chinese

1

Z 0,000 to th (ore • oppO lo& the Soviet •nd th w•r av P et h ~· bout the a aae be and t~ansport atrer ft (a little over

1 houah ATO baa 6,000 h ll c op~ers to the 2 650· Th sovle • alao au•t take toto

,600 Chin • co•b• al~craft• bord r alone, th soviets have

11,000 tanka oppoaed by a ol41 ra tb 5,000 tank•• ~ach aide

aircraft alone the borde~·

or •• MATO deploya 43S eoabataate to the 278, tbOU b tb Soviets d plOJ 167 o NATO s 20 • Tb Sovieta •oat alaO take

44 Chla••• coabataata aaa 110 Chloe••

···~ hera ar ••

21· r r•••

II I uf

" u- " tt11 "'" • ut • f• <111ft n l •·

th u • tur• • btl • :rtul aclv•nt lll

wurtl•o•• fro~ t~ ""1 • r la plentliD 1

Uh • •

t "

•I t a••J tn 11

•• JJ of t la • an for lu 11r Sovt l •erJc.,

th4t th Sovlrt l ad ra ••1 a havtu p ak d f ~ r th for~•• bJ d

oa~~•vlat aoae atcJon to • ta ar atlll abl co 4o ao. ~o eJbllfty tha , r.ona(d rins th =•~lv••

uhU r rb ln1 pr aaure end ehalJ n1 d et ••er, urn bv t he US , th• So Jere •lght oneld r rb •••lv • h k d l n ~ • ~orner and leah out dan eroualy.

~lterna lwe.y, end •or llk lL• th• Sovf~t• ••1 ••~ th lon er vt~w end-eGnCTUde th•t preeent adv r tr ad ar •l•ply part of a er~t •• that ~ltfaatel7 bf•tor, ill •• thea prevail ead that tt le only • .. tt r of tf•e until h 1 c•o reeapture the tnttfatt•e •• thaJ did tn the 1d

to lat• 7V•a. Th•y era •were , for •~••Ple, that r~onomfr trenda Ia the Third Vorld Coald pre~tpttate major dl ordera, ••kea US tnfluenc lad create unfor ae n opportuattt a for tb USSI. Tbe7 ••r he¥e •&rooa doubca tha~ th US caa aateta Ita d feae Praar••• or 1ta tlJ to br1na to fruition ita polltjcal ·~d •llttar1 ~atctatf•••· Thue, th~~ vould be coat at to vork their 07 t~rou•b preaent probl•••• •• the n ••••ry aaerttte • to aca7 Ia tbe 1•• , lOt ~belr llr • fa vh ne r aa~ wherever they caa. aad couac oa ac •vee .. , a to coae.

29. ff thta aecoad apprataal of the •te ~ oe Hoeco t• accurate. •n• of the praattcel taptscattoaa are ltk tr o • •• folloua:

Abe ftt Aodropoy roarto1 back froa hta vttb a •~rfea of fra .. t1c ••••• to political So1ctatty htch a -.. &a ltlel, to happ a 4oaae teelly There .,. DO toe rael lovtet prol re olu,too. The to d tah 1 baa aot

chan •• Ia coaoatc policy a a-., ~!::;~i~l;~~~~~~~.;;: 1983'• ecoaoat~ perEoraeoc h ~ to do eo •• r the a t • act~~•••· ·• ar ar

fore tao I k of

lc

r ro I•• r •f •ert • .,J,.. utru tluna ao '(Jot h hu.

ly tba •••• t ~ •• , th Sowta • will aot for a opportunttt • th ~ •••r aod ofr r adYaataa • Tbe7 vtll rr, to •~rlott op•ntn•• to the Tbtr4 World ( •I•. P•rhapa a qualltatl• (haoaa Jo •llttar7 aupport to lf•f•nd tha An1nla r• •••>· Th•1 vtll do all ~bey caa o hrupt or ltlad1 '"11 J, F d•ploya•~at. laclvdtaa

r••u~p San af n aottact~nt If th 1 thlok tr vou14 b lp a hle th t 1011. Th•, pro ahlJ vtll tr1 to hart h Fr•atdaat palltteall1 at hoae thrau ~ actt e •••• rea tucludJaJ propa anda that pataca ht• aad b1a poltct aa ln rr.aa(o th dana r of ar.

Should tb Pr atd•at alao t c rr Jol1 rae peS • of a • rt ue dtalo,_ for all palJtl~ 1. acoao~c aal 811 c ahoYa.