Lola v. Skadden Arps

143845Lolav.Skadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS1FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT2

____________________34

AugustTerm,201456

(Argued:May29,2015 Decided:July23,2015)78

DocketNo.143845cv910

____________________1112

DAVIDLOLA,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,131415

PlaintiffAppellant,1617

v.1819

SKADDEN,ARPS,SLATE,MEAGHER&FLOMLLP,TOWERLEGAL20STAFFING,INC.,21

22DefendantsAppellees.23

24____________________25

26Before:POOLER,LOHIER,DRONEY,CircuitJudges.27

28DavidLola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,appeals29

fromtheSeptember16,2014opinionandorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt30

fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Sullivan,J.)dismissinghisputative31

Case 14-3845, Document 89-1, 07/23/2015, 1560411, Page1 of 19

collectiveactionseekingdamagesfromSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom1

LLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.forviolationsoftheovertimeprovisionofthe2

FairLaborStandardsAct,29U.S.C.201etseq.(FLSA),arisingoutofLolas3

workasacontractattorneyinNorthCarolina.Weagreewiththedistrictcourt4

that:(1)state,notfederal,lawinformsFLSAsdefinitionofpracticeoflaw;and5

(2)NorthCarolina,astheplacewhereLolaworkedandlived,hasthegreatest6

interestinthislitigation,andthuswelooktoNorthCarolinalawtodetermineif7

LolawaspracticinglawwithinthemeaningofFLSA.However,wedisagreewith8

thedistrictcourtsconclusion,onamotiontodismiss,thatbyundertakingthe9

documentreviewLolaallegedlywashiredtoconduct,Lolawasnecessarily10

practicinglawwithinthemeaningofNorthCarolinalaw.11

Vacatedandremanded.12

____________________13

14D.MAIMONKIRSCHENBAUM,Joseph&15KirschenbaumLLP(DeniseA.Shulman,onthe16brief),NewYork,NY,forPlaintiffAppellantDavid17Lola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarly18situated.19

20BRIANJ.GERSHENGORN,Ogletree,Deakins,21Nash,Smoak&Stewart,P.C.(StephanieL.22

2


Aranyos,onthebrief)NewYork,N.Y.for1DefendantsAppelleesSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher2&FlomLLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.3

4POOLER,CircuitJudge:5

DavidLola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,appeals6

fromtheSeptember16,2014opinionandorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt7

fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Sullivan,J.)dismissinghisputative8

collectiveactionseekingdamagesfromSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom9

LLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.forviolationsoftheovertimeprovisionofthe10

FairLaborStandardsAct,29U.S.C.201etseq.(FLSA),arisingoutofLolas11

workasacontractattorneyinNorthCarolina.Weagreewiththedistrictcourts12

conclusionthat:(1)state,notfederal,lawinformsFLSAsdefinitionofpractice13

oflaw;and(2)NorthCarolina,astheplacewhereLolaworkedandlived,has14

thegreatestinterestinthislitigation,andthuswelooktoNorthCarolinalawto15

determineifLolawaspracticinglawwithinthemeaningofFLSA.However,we16

disagreewiththedistrictcourtsconclusion,onamotiontodismiss,thatby17

undertakingthedocumentreviewLolaallegedlywashiredtoconduct,Lolawas18

necessarilypracticinglawwithinthemeaningofNorthCarolinalaw.Wefind19

thatacceptingtheallegationsaspleaded,Lolaadequatelyallegedinhis20

3


complaintthathisdocumentreviewwasdevoidoflegaljudgmentsuchthathe1

wasnotengagedinthepracticeoflaw,andremandforfurtherproceedings.2

BACKGROUND3

LolacommencedthisFLSAcollectiveactionagainstSkadden,Arps,Slate,4

Meagher&FlomLLPandTowerLegalStaffingInc.Inhisfirstamended5

complaint,LolaallegedthatSkadden,aDelawarelimitedliabilitypartnership,is6

basedinNewYorkCity.HeallegesthatTowerisaNewYorkcorporationthat7

providesattorneysandparalegalsonacontractbasistovariouslawfirmsand8

corporatelawdepartments.LolaallegesthatSkaddenandTower(together,9

Defendants)werejointemployerswithinthemeaningofFLSA.10

Lola,aNorthCarolinaresident,allegesthatbeginninginApril2012,he11

workedforDefendantsforfifteenmonthsinNorthCarolina.Heconducted12

documentreviewforSkaddeninconnectionwithamultidistrictlitigation13

pendingintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofOhio.14

LolaisanattorneylicensedtopracticelawinCalifornia,butheisnotadmittedto15

practicelawineitherNorthCarolinaortheNorthernDistrictofOhio.16

LolaallegesthathisworkwascloselysupervisedbytheDefendants,and17

hisentireresponsibility...consistedof(a)lookingatdocumentstoseewhat18

4


searchterms,ifany,appearedinthedocuments,(b)markingthosedocuments1

intothecategoriespredeterminedbyDefendants,and(c)attimesdrawingblack2

boxestoredactportionsofcertaindocumentsbasedonspecificprotocolsthat3

Defendantsprovided.Appxat2028.LolafurtherallegesthatDefendants4

providedhimwiththedocumentshereviewed,thesearchtermshewastousein5

connectionwiththosedocuments,andtheprocedureshewastofollowifthe6

searchtermsappeared.Lolawaspaid$25anhourforhiswork,andworked7

roughlyfortyfivetofiftyfivehoursaweek.Hewaspaidatthesamerateforany8

hoursheworkedinexcessoffortyhoursperweek.Lolawastoldthathewasan9

employeeofTower,buthewasalsotoldthatheneededtofollowanyprocedures10

setbySkaddenattorneys,andheworkedunderthesupervisionofSkadden11

attorneys.Otherattorneysemployedtoworkonthesameprojectperformed12

similarworkandwerelikewisepaidhourlyratesthatremainedthesameforany13

hoursworkedinexcessoffortyhoursperweek.14

Defendantsmovedtodismissthecomplaint,arguingthatLolawasexempt15

fromFLSAsovertimerulesbecausehewasalicensedattorneyengagedinthe16

practiceoflaw.Thedistrictcourtgrantedthemotion,finding(1)state,not17

federal,standardsappliedindeterminingwhetheranattorneywaspracticing18

5


lawunderFLSA;(2)NorthCarolinahadthegreatestinterestintheoutcomeof1

thelitigation,thusNorthCarolinaslawshouldapply;and(3)Lolawasengaged2

inthepracticeoflawasdefinedbyNorthCarolinalaw,andwasthereforean3

exemptemployeeunderFLSA.Lolav.Skadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom,LLP,4

No.13cv5008(RJS),2014WL4626228(S.D.N.Y.Sept.16,2014).Thisappeal5

followed.6

DISCUSSION7

Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsdismissalofacomplaintforfailureto8

stateaclaim,acceptingallfactualallegationsinthecomplaintastrueand9

drawingallreasonableinferencesinplaintiffsfavor.Freidusv.BarclaysBank10

PLC,734F.3d132,137(2dCir.2013).11

PursuanttoFLSA,employersmustgenerallypayemployeesworking12

overtimeoneandonehalftimestheregularrateofpayforanyhoursworkedin13

excessoffortyaweek.29U.S.C.207(a)(1).However,employeesemployedina14

bonafide...professionalcapacityareexemptfromthatrequirement.Id.15

213(a)(1).Thestatutedoesnotprovideadefinitionofprofessionalcapacity,16

insteaddelegatingtheauthoritytodosototheSecretaryoftheDepartmentof17

Labor(DOL),whodefinesprofessionalemployeestoincludethose18

6


employeeswhoare:1

(1)Compensatedonasalaryorfeebasisatarateofnot2lessthan$455perweek...;and3

4(2)Whoseprimarydutyistheperformanceofwork:5

6(i)Requiringknowledgeofanadvancedtypeina7

fieldofscienceorlearningcustomarilyacquiredbya8prolongedcourseofintellectualinstruction;or9

10(ii)Requiringinvention,imagination,originality11

ortalentinarecognizedfieldofartisticorcreative12endeavor.13

1429C.F.R.541.300.Theserequirements,however,donotapplytoattorneys15

engagedinthepracticeoflaw.29C.F.R.541.304(d)(Therequirementsof16

541.300andsubpartG(salaryrequirements)ofthispartdonotapplytothe17

employeesdescribedinthissection.).Instead,attorneysfallunder29C.F.R.18

541.304,whichexemptsfromtheovertimerequirement:19

Anyemployeewhoistheholderofavalidlicenseor20certificatepermittingthepracticeoflawormedicineor21anyoftheirbranchesandisactuallyengagedinthe22practicethereof[.]23

24Id.541.304(a)(1).WhileitisundisputedthatLolaisanattorneylicensedto25

practicelawinCalifornia,thepartiesdisputewhetherthedocumentreviewhe26

allegedlyperformedconstitutesengaginginthepracticeoflaw.27

7


I. Practiceoflaw.1

Lolaurgesustofashionanewfederalstandarddefiningthepracticeof2

lawwithinthemeaningofSection541.304.Wedeclinetodosobecausewe3

agreewiththedistrictcourtthatthedefinitionofpracticeoflawisprimarilya4

matterofstateconcern.Lola,2014WL4626228,at*4(citationomitted).5

InKamenv.KemperFinancialServices,Inc.,500U.S.90(1991),theSupreme6

Courtexaminedwhether,inanactionbasedonafederalstatute,federalcommon7

lawshouldincorporatestatelaw.There,theissuewaswhetherthecontoursof8

thedemandfutilityrequirementoftheInvestmentCompanyActof1940mustbe9

discernedbyreferencetostatelaworbyreferencetofederallaw.Id.at9798.The10

KamenCourtexplainedthatacourtshouldendeavortofilltheintersticesof11

federalremedialschemeswithuniformfederalrulesonlywhentheschemein12

questionevidencesadistinctneedfornationwidelegalstandards,orwhen13

expressprovisionsinanalogousstatutoryschemesembodycongressionalpolicy14

choicesreadilyapplicabletothematterathand.Id.at98(citationomitted).15

Otherwise,theCourtcontinued:16

wehaveindicatedthatfederalcourtsshould17incorporatestatelawasthefederalruleofdecision,18unlessapplicationoftheparticularstatelawinquestion19

8


wouldfrustratespecificobjectivesofthefederal1programs.Thepresumptionthatstatelawshouldbe2incorporatedintofederalcommonlawisparticularly3stronginareasinwhichprivatepartieshaveentered4legalrelationshipswiththeexpectationthattheirrights5andobligationswouldbegovernedbystatelaw6standards.7

8Id.(internalcitation,quotationmarksandalterationsomitted).9

Applyingtheseprinciples,theSupremeCourtexplainedthatwhereagap10

inthefederalsecuritieslawsmustbebridgedbyarulethatbearsonthe11

allocationofgoverningpowerswithinthecorporation,federalcourtsshould12

incorporatestatelawintofederalcommonlawunlesstheparticularstatelawin13

questionisinconsistentwiththepoliciesunderlyingthefederalstatute.Id.at14

108(emphasisomitted).Thus,theKamencourtconcludedthatthescopeofthe15

demandrequirementmustbedeterminedbythelawofthestateof16

incorporation.Id.at108.17

DeSylvav.Ballentine,351U.S.570(1956),isalsoinstructiveindetermining18

whetherstateorfederallawshoulddefinethesweepofafederalright..InDe19

Sylva,theSupremeCourtexaminedthequestionofwhetheranillegitimatechild20

wasachildwithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct.Notingthat[t]hescope21

ofafederalrightis,ofcourse,afederalquestion,butthatdoesnotmeanthatits22

9


contentisnottobedeterminedbystate,ratherthanfederallaw,id.,thecourt1

alsoobservedthat[t]hisisespeciallytruewhereastatutedealswithafamilial2

relationship;thereisnofederallawofdomesticrelations,whichisprimarilya3

matterofstateconcern.Id.TheCourtthenreliedonstatelawtodefinechild4

withinthemeaningofthefederalCopyrightAct.Id.at581.5

Justasthereisnofederallawofdomesticrelations,herethereisno6

federallawgoverninglawyers.Regulatingthepracticeoflawistraditionallya7

stateendeavor.Nofederalschemeexistsforissuinglawlicenses.Asthedistrict8

courtaptlyobserved,[s]tatesregulatealmosteveryaspectoflegalpractice:they9

settheeligibilitycriteriaandoverseetheadmissionprocessforwouldbe10

lawyers,promulgatetherulesofprofessionalethics,anddisciplinelawyerswho11

failtofollowthoserules,amongmanyotherresponsibilities.Lola,2014WL12

4626228,at*4.TheexemptioninFLSAspecificallyreliesontheattorney13

possessingavalidlicense...permittingthepracticeoflaw.29C.F.R.14

541.304(a)(1).TheregulationshistoryindicatesthattheDOLwaswellawarethat15

suchlicenseswereissuedbythestates.SeeWageandHourandPublicContracts16

Divisions,U.S.DepartmentofLabor,ReportandRecommendationsofthe17

PresidingOfficeratPublicHearingsonProposedRevisionsofRegulations,Part18

10


541,at77(1949)(notingthattheexemptionforattorneyswasbasedinparton1

theuniversalrequirementoflicensingbythevariousjurisdictions).Inrejecting2

aproposaltoexemptlibrariansfromtheovertimerules,theDOLnotedthat3

statesdonotgenerallylicensethepracticeoflibraryscience,sothatinthis4

respect...theprofessionisnotcomparabletothatoflawormedicine.Id.A5

similardistinctionwasdrawninadiscussionofextendingtheexemptionto6

architectsandengineers:7

Thepracticeoflawandmedicinehasalonghistoryof8statelicensingandcertification;thelicensingof9engineersandarchitectsisrelativelyrecent.Whileitis10impossibleforadoctororlawyerlegallytopracticehis11professionwithoutacertificateorlicense,many12architectsandengineersperformworkinthesefields13withoutpossessinglicenses,althoughfailuretoholda14licensemaylimittheirpermissibleactivitiestothoseof15lesserresponsibilities.16

17Id.Wethusfindnoerrorwiththedistrictcourtsconclusionthatweshouldlook18

tostatelawindefiningthepracticeoflaw.19

II. Choiceoflaw.20

Weturntothequestionofwhichstateslawtoapply.Wherejurisdiction21

isbasedontheexistenceofafederalquestion...wehavenothesitatedtoapply22

afederalcommonlawchoiceoflawanalysis.Barkanicv.Gen.Admin.ofCivil23

11


AviationofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,923F.2d957,961(2dCir.1991).The1

federalcommonlawchoiceoflawruleistoapplythelawofthejurisdiction2

havingthegreatestinterestinthelitigation.InreKoreag,ControleetRevisionS.A.,3

961F.2d341,350(2dCir.1992).Here,therearefourpossibleforumstates:North4

Carolina(whereLolaworkedandlived);Ohio(wheretheunderlyinglitigationis5

venued);California(whereLolaisbarred);andNewYork(whereSkaddenis6

located).7

[W]henconductingafederalcommonlawchoiceoflawanalysis,absent8

guidancefromCongress,wemayconsulttheRestatement(Second)ofConflictof9

Laws.EliLillyDoBrasil,Ltdav.Fed.ExpressCorp.,502F.3d78,81(2dCir.2007).10

TheRestatementprovidesinrelevantpartthat:11

Thevalidityofacontractfortherenditionof12servicesandtherightscreatedtherebyaredetermined,13intheabsenceofaneffectivechoiceoflawbythe14parties,bythelocallawofthestatewherethecontract15requiresthattheservices,oramajorportionofthe16services,berendered,unless,withrespecttothe17particularissue,someotherstatehasamoresignificant18relationshipundertheprinciplesstatedin6tothe19transactionandtheparties,inwhich[]eventthelocal20lawoftheotherstatewillbeapplied.21

22Restatement(Second)ofConflictofLaws196(1971).Here,theserviceswere23

12


renderedinNorthCarolina.Moreover,asthestatewhereLolaresides,North1

CarolinapossessesastronginterestinmakingsureLolaisfairlypaid.Wefindno2

errorinthedistrictcourtsdecisiontoapplyNorthCarolinalaw.3

III. DefinitionofpracticeoflawunderNorthCarolinalaw.45

NorthCarolinadefinesthepracticeoflawinitsGeneralStatutes,Section6

842.1,whichprovidesthat:7

ThephrasepracticelawasusedinthisChapter8isdefinedtobeperforminganylegalserviceforany9otherperson,firmorcorporation,withorwithout10compensation,specificallyincluding...thepreparation11andfilingofpetitionsforuseinanycourt,including12administrativetribunalsandotherjudicialor13quasijudicialbodies,orassistingbyadvice,counsel,or14otherwiseinanylegalwork;andtoadviseorgive15opinionuponthelegalrightsofanyperson,firmor16corporation....17

18N.C.Gen.Stat.842.1.NorthCarolinacourtstypicallyreadSection842.1in19

conjunctionwithSection844,whichdefinestheunauthorizedpracticeoflawas20

follows:21

Exceptasotherwisepermittedbylaw,...itshall22beunlawfulforanypersonorassociationofpersons23exceptactivemembersoftheBar,fororwithoutafeeor24consideration,togivelegaladviceorcounsel,[or]25performfororfurnishtoanotherlegalservices....26

27

13


Id.844;seeN.C.StateBarv.Lienguard,Inc.,No.11cvs7288,2014WL1365418,1

at*67(N.C.Super.Ct.Apr.4,2014).2

TheNorthCarolinaGeneralStatutesdonotclarifywhetherlegal3

servicesincludestheperformanceofdocumentreview.Nevertheless,theNorth4

CarolinaStateBarissuedaformalethicsopinionsheddinglightonwhatismeant5

bylegalservices.1Thequestionconsideredintheethicsopinionwas:Maya6

lawyerethicallyoutsourcelegalsupportservicesabroad,iftheindividual7

providingtheservicesiseitheranonlawyeroralawyernotadmittedtopractice8

intheUnitedStates(collectivelyforeignassistants)?Initsopinion,theBars9

EthicsCommitteeopinedthat:10

Alawyermayuseforeignassistantsforadministrative11supportservicessuchasdocumentassembly,12accounting,andclericalsupport.Alawyermayalsouse13foreignassistantsforlimitedlegalsupportservicessuch14asreviewingdocuments;conductingduediligence;15draftingcontracts,pleadings,andmemorandaoflaw;16andconductinglegalresearch.Foreignassistantsmay17notexerciseindependentlegaljudgmentinmaking18decisionsonbehalfofaclient....Thelimitationsonthe19typeoflegalservicesthatcanbeoutsourced,in20

1 Theethicsopiniontechnicallyreferredonlytolegalsupportservices.NothingintheopinionorintherelevantNorthCarolinacaselawsuggeststhatthereisanymeaningfuldifferencebetweenlegalservicesandlegalsupportservices.

14


conjunctionwiththeselectionandsupervisory1requirementsassociatedwiththeuseofforeign2assistants,insuresthattheclientiscompetently3represented.SeeRule5.5(d).Nevertheless,when4outsourcinglegalsupportservices,lawyersneedtobe5mindfuloftheprohibitionsonunauthorizedpracticeof6lawinChapter84oftheGeneralStatutesandonthe7prohibitiononaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw8inRule5.5(d).9

10N.C.StateBarEthicsCommittee,2007FormalEthicsOp.12(Apr.25,2008).11

Thedistrictcourtfoundthat(1)underNorthCarolinalaw,document12

reviewisconsideredlegalsupportservices,alongwithdraftingcontracts,13

pleadings,andmemorandaoflaw[,]andconductinglegalresearch;(2)the14

ethicsopiniondrawsaclearlinebetweenlegalsupportservices,likedocument15

review,andadministrativesupportservices,likedocumentassembly,16

accounting,andclericalsupport;and(3)byemphasizingthatonlylawyersmay17

undertakelegalwork,theethicsopinionmakesclearthatdocumentreview,like18

otherlegalsupportservices,constitutesthepracticeoflawandmaybelawfully19

performedbyanonlawyeronlyifthatnonlawyerissupervisedbyalicensed20

attorney.Lola,2014WL4626228,at*1112(alterationintheoriginal).Thus,the21

districtcourtconcluded,anylevelofdocumentreviewisconsideredthepractice22

oflawinNorthCarolina.Id.at12.Thedistrictcourtalsoconcludedthatbecause23

15


FLSAsregulatoryschemecarvesdoctorsandlawyersoutofthesalaryandduty1

analysisemployedtodiscernifothertypesofemployeesfallwithinthe2

professionalexemption,afactintensiveinquiryisatoddswithFLSAs3

regulatoryscheme.Id.at*13.4

Wedisagree.Thedistrictcourterredinconcludingthatengagingin5

documentreviewperseconstitutespracticinglawinNorthCarolina.Theethics6

opiniondoesnotdelveintopreciselywhattypeofdocumentreviewfallswithin7

thepracticeoflaw,butdoesnotethatwhilereviewingdocumentsmaybe8

withinthepracticeoflaw,[f]oreignassistantsmaynotexerciseindependent9

legaljudgmentinmakingdecisionsonbehalfofaclient.N.C.StateBarEthics10

Committee,2007FormalEthicsOp.12.Theethicsopinionstronglysuggeststhat11

inherentinthedefinitionofpracticeoflawinNorthCarolinaistheexerciseof12

atleastamodicumofindependentlegaljudgment.213

14

2 Wereitanoption,wemighthaveoptedtocertifythequestionofhowtodefinepracticeoflawtotheNorthCarolinacourts.SeeAGIAssocs.LLCv.CityofHickory,N.C.,773F.3d576,579n.4(4thCir.2014)(Alackofcontrollingprecedentonthestateruleofdecisioncanmeritcertificationoftheissuetothestateshighestcourt.TheStateofNorthCarolina,however,hasnocertificationprocedureinplaceforfederalcourtstocertifyquestionstoitscourts.).

16


Althoughthepartiesdonotcite,andourresearchdidnotreveal,acase1

directlyonpoint,twodecisionsoftheNorthCarolinacourtsthatrelied,inpart,2

ontheexerciseoflegaljudgmenttosupportafindingofunauthorizedpracticeof3

lawalsosupportsuchaconclusion.Lienguard,2014WL1365418,at*911(lien4

filingserviceengagedinunauthorizedpracticeoflawinpreparingclaimsof5

lien);LegalZoom.com,Inc.v.N.C.StateBar,No.11cvs15111,2014WL1213242,at6

*12(N.C.Super.Ct.Mar.24,2014)(notingthatthescrivenersexceptiontothe7

unauthorizedpracticeoflawallowsunlicensedindividuals[to]record8

informationthatanotherprovideswithoutengagingin[theunlicensedpractice9

oflaw]aslongastheydonotalsoprovideadviceorexpresslegaljudgments).10

Moreover,manyotherstatesalsoconsidertheexerciseofsomelegal11

judgmentanessentialelementofthepracticeoflaw.See,e.g.,InreDisciplineof12

Lerner,197P.3d1067,106970(Nev.2008)(exerciseoflegaljudgmentona13

clientsbehalfkeytoanalysisofwhetherapersonengagedintheunauthorized14

practiceoflaw);Peoplev.Shell,148P.3d162,174(Colo.2006)([O]neofthe15

touchstonesofColoradosbanontheunauthorizedpracticeoflawisan16

unlicensedpersonofferingadviceorjudgmentaboutlegalmatterstoanother17

personforuseinaspecificlegalsetting);Or.StateBarv.Smith,942P.2d793,80018

17


(Or.Ct.App.1997)(Thepracticeoflawmeanstheexerciseofprofessional1

judgmentinapplyinglegalprinciplestoaddressanotherpersonsindividualized2

needsthroughanalysis,advice,orotherassistance.);InreDiscipio,645N.E.2d3

906,910(Ill.1994)(Thefocusoftheinquiryintowhetherpersonengagedin4

unauthorizedpracticeoflawis,infact,whethertheactivityinquestionrequired5

legalknowledgeandskillinordertoapplylegalprinciplesandprecedent.);In6

reRowe,80N.Y.2d336,34142(1992)(authoringanarticleonthelegalrightsof7

psychiatricpatientswhorefusetreatmentdidnotconstitutethepracticeoflaw8

because[t]hepracticeoflawinvolvestherenderingoflegaladviceandopinions9

directedtoparticularclients).10

ThegravamenofLolascomplaintisthatheperformeddocumentreview11

undersuchtightconstraintsthatheexercisednolegaljudgmentwhatsoeverhe12

allegesthatheusedcriteriadevelopedbyotherstosimplysortdocumentsinto13

differentcategories.Acceptingthoseallegationsastrue,aswemustonamotion14

todismiss,wefindthatLolaadequatelyallegedinhiscomplaintthathefailedto15

exerciseanylegaljudgmentinperforminghisdutiesforDefendants.Afair16

readingofthecomplaintinthelightmostfavorabletoLolaisthatheprovided17

servicesthatamachinecouldhaveprovided.Thepartiesthemselvesagreedat18

18


oralargumentthatanindividualwho,inthecourseofreviewingdiscovery1

documents,undertakestasksthatcouldotherwisebeperformedentirelybya2

machinecannotbesaidtoengageinthepracticeoflaw.Wethereforevacatethe3

judgmentofthedistrictcourtandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwith4

thisopinion.5

CONCLUSION6

Forthereasonsgivenabove,thejudgmentofthedistrictcourtisvacated,7

andthismatterremanded.8

9

10

11

12

13

19


United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE

CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: July 23, 2015Docket #: 14-3845cvShort Title: Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher

DC Docket #: 13-cv-5008 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)DC Judge: Sullivan

BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS

The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill ofcosts is on the Court's website.

The bill of costs must:* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;* be verified;* be served on all adversaries; * not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, acover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in NewYork, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.


United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE

CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: July 23, 2015Docket #: 14-3845cvShort Title: Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher

DC Docket #: 13-cv-5008 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)DC Judge: Sullivan

VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS

Counsel for_________________________________________________________________________

respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk toprepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the________________________________________________________________

and in favor of_________________________________________________________________________

for insertion in the mandate.

Docketing Fee _____________________

Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

Costs of printing brief (necessary copies ______________ ____) _____________________

Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

(VERIFICATION HERE)

________________________ Signature


14-384589 Opinion FILED - 07/23/2015, p.189 Bill_of_Cost_Itemized_Notice_1 - 07/23/2015, p.2089 Bill_of_Cost_Itemized_Notice_2 - 07/23/2015, p.21

Documents

Lola v. Skadden Arps