LOCGOV_Digest10

7/28/2019 LOCGOV_Digest10

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OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. The Law on Local Governments

2006-33060 Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Casino vs. CA

December 2, 1991 | Regalado

Facts: The Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (Coliseum for

short), owned by petitioner and located in Gingoog City, was a

licensee of a cockpit under the Revised Administrative Code.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed

Resolution No. 49 which classified certain areas as residentialzones, declaring the site of Coliseum as such. This lead to the

cancellation of petitioners license to operate the cockpit.

Article 10, Section 6.44 of the Resolution No. 49

provides that the change in the zoning ordinance will be

treated as an amendment, provided that any amendment to the

zoning ordinance or provision thereof shall be carried out

through a resolution of 3/4 vote of the Sangguniang

Panglunsod. Said amendments shall take effect only after

approval and authentication by the HSRC.

Subsequently, Resolution No. 378 reclassified Block

125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending

Resolution No. 49. Out of the 9 members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, 4 voted for the amendment, 4 voted against, and 1abstained. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the

deadlock by voting for the amendment.

The resolution was transmitted to the city mayor for

approval which the latter returned to the the sangguniang

panlungsodsaying that his approval was not necessary since it

didnt involve a disposition of the city government funds. The

succeeding mayor issued the permit need to operate a cockpit.

Respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc. protested the

operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl

Commission (PGC), claiming that there was no certificate of

registration issued by the PGC. PGC eventually sent a

telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the

Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC.Gallera filed an action for prohibition and mandamus alleging

that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning

Ordinance No. 49, is invalid.

RTC declared the mayors permits null and void and

ordered the petitioner to desist in operating the said cockpit.

Issue: WON the mayors permits are valid

Held:NO. Resolution No. 378 was declared invalid by the CA

for failure to comply with the required votes necessary for its

validity. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the

LGC require only a majority for the enactment of an

ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by

the resolution in question without complying with the

categorical requirement of a vote incorporated in the very

same ordinance sought to be amended.

In other words, Section 6.44 of said ordinance

regarding amendments thereto, is a specific and particular

provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a

different number of votes. Where there is in the same statute a

particular enactment and also a general one, which in its most

comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the

former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the

general statement must be taken to affect only such cases

within its language as are not within the provisions of the

particular enactment.

In the instant case, although the general law on the

matter requires a mere majority, the higher requisite vote in

Resolution No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are

in a better position to determine the evils sought to be

prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular

provisions in enacting a particular statute.Since the amendment of Resolution No. 49 didnt

comply with the required number of votes, Block 125, where

Coliseum is located, remains classified as a residential area,

hence the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited.

Gamboa vs. Aguirre

July 20, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago

Facts: Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr

and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta

were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and

SP members, respectively. The governor designated petitioner

as Acting Governor for the duration of the formers officialtrip abroad until his return. When the SP held its regular

session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner and

asked him to vacate the Chair which petitioner refuse to do. 7

members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue

presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention.

Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief in

the lower court. The Governor already re-assumed his office

Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared

petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over

the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting

Governor.

(The case is already moot and academic since the

terms of office of the local officials involved have alreadyexpired.)

Issue: WON an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently

the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)

Held: NO. The Local Government Code of 1991, provide that

the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In

addition to such function, he become(s) the Governor and

assume(s) the higher office for the unexpired term of his

predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. When

the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor

shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain

limitations) and perform the duties and functions of the

Governor.

When the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and

duties of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume the

latter office. He only acts as the Governor but does not

become the Governor.

Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position

and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting

Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers

and duties of the higher office.

For purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives

and powers, the Vice-Governor is deemed as a non-member of


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the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the

provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially

executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial

board perform functions partaking of a legislative

character. This is because the authority vested by law in the

provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some

legislative powers of Congress. Unlike under the old Code,

where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive,but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body, the

new Code delineated the union of the executive-legislative

powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in

the Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of

the power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a

member thereof. This is clear from the law, when it provides

that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP, which

is the legislative body of the province, and enumerates

therein its membership (Section 48 of the LGC).

Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor

is deemed excluded applying the rule in legal hermeneutics

that when the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannotcontinue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter

office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor

call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.

Garcia vs. COMELEC

September 30, 1994 | Puno

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan

of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye

1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of

the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No.

7227. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on

the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission.Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under Sec.

122, par. (b) of R.A. No. 7160. They started to solicit the

required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said

resolution.

Unknown to them, the vice mayor and presiding officer of the

Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter to the executive

director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for

local initiative and referendum.

The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition

for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a

resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance."

The COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial

Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of

signatures being gathered by petitioners.

Issue:(1) WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the

Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of

an initiative.

(2) WON COMELEC was correct in denying the petition for

local referendum on the ground that its merely a resolution

and not an ordinance

Held:

(1) YES. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances

but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.

Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The

Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of

initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,

whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or

approve or reject any actor law or part thereof passed by the

Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An actincludes aresolution.

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e.

resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was

implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No.

6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and

Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its

section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of

initiatives on local legislations.

The interpellations on Conference Committee

Report confirm the intent that resolutions are proper subjects

of local initiatives.

Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code

cited by respondents merely defines the concept of localinitiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of

a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend

any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or

matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section

124 of the same Code which does.

The principal author of the LGC of 1991, former

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, wrote in his book that all sorts of

measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long as

these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact.

The subject matter of the resolution of the

municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people

of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or

government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the SubicSpecial Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the

governance of its people.

(2) NO. The case at bench is of transcendental significance

because it involves an issue of first impression delineating

the extent of the all important original power of the people to

legislate.

The framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the

value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the

people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and

they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an

initiative, the people were given the power to amend the

Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides

"Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at

least twelve per centum of the total number of registered

voters, of which every legislative district must be represented

by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein."

Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with

the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local

legislative body (Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI).

Also, petitioners were denied due process. They were

not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of vice mayor to the

respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for

a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. Worse,


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respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording

petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC

September 26, 1996 | Panganiban

Facts: March 1992: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227

(The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), whichamong others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special

Economic Zone. (Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. -

Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang

Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and

Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and

Free-port Zone)

RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the

declared national policy of converting the Subic military

reservation into alternative productive uses. Petitioner was

organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which

was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the

Philippines.November 1992: The American navy turned over

the Subic military reservation to the Philippine

government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the

implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the

seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other installations left

by the American navy.

April 1993: The Sangguniang Bayan of

Morong, Bataan passed aPambayangKapasyahan Bilang 10,

Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as

required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special

Economic Zone. They later on submitted itto the Office of the

President.

Respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companionsfiled a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong

to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the

petition of respondents by promulgating Pambayang

Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the

Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227.

Not satisfied, respondent resorted to their power of

initiative under the LGC.

Respondent COMELEC EB denied the petition for local

initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the

subject thereof was merely a resolution and not n ordinance.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

in SC to set aside the COMELEC resolution denying the

initiative.

COMELEC then issued another resolution providing for

the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the

referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10,

Serye 1993.

Issues:

(1) WON the petition seeks to overturn a decision/judgment

which has long become final and executor which is Garcia v.

COMELEC (NO)

(2) WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating the resolution which governs the conduct of the

referendum (YES)

(3) WON the local initiative covers a subject within the powers

of the people of Morong to enact (still at the proposal stage so

not yet an approved law)

Held:

(1) The only issue resolved in the earlierGarcia case is

whether a municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an

ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or

referendum.

In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the

propriety of municipal resolution as the form by which these

two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly

exercised. What is at issue here is whetherPambayang

Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in

form and substance for submission to the people for their

approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and

juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No2848.

(2) To begin with, the process started by private respondents

was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made

preparations for a REFERENDUMonly.

There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between

a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and

Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the

other, thus:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose

amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact

legislations through an election called for the purpose.There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a

petition proposing amendments to the

Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition

proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to

a petition proposing to enact a regional,

provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,

resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people

through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative

body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or

reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It

may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a

petition to approve or reject an act or law, or

part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a

petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or

ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and

local legislative bodies.


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Initiative Referendum

Entirely the work of the

electorate

Begun and consented to by

the law-making body

Process of law-making by the

people themselves without the

participation and against the

wishes of their elected

representatives

Consists merely of the

electorate approving or

rejecting what has been

drawn up or enacted by a

legislative body

Process of voting is more

complex

Yes or no in the ballot

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for

the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its

authority thereon extending not only to the counting and

canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or

act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language

so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the

electorate.

(3) The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is

not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then therewould be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when

the people have voted for it and it has become an approved

ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be

enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely

a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere

conjecture or possibility.

While regular courts may take jurisdiction over

"approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the

Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative

powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar

as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier;

and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or

parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity ofthe local legislative body to enact.

Ortiz vs. Posadas

March 3, 1931 | Malcolm

Facts: Seven of the thirteen members present, including the

president, of the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in

favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits, and six

members voted against the ordinance, with three members

absent.

One CFI judge held it was valid while another

declared it invalid.

Issue: WON the ordinance is valid?

Held: NO. Sec 224 of the Administrative Code1 is clear and

only needs application. It is also mandatory; therefore

Ordinance No. 25 is void. The ayes and noes are taken upon:

1 The ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of allordinances upon all propositions to create any liability against themunicipality, and upon any other proposition, upon the request of anymember, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The affirmativevote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall benecessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition

1. the passage of all ordinances

2. all propositions to create any liability against the

municipality

3. any other proposition, upon the request of any member

The affirmative vote of the majority of all the

members of the municipality shall be necessary. Creating

indebtedness refers to proposition and not to ordinance.

The contention that only ordinances creating indebtednessrequire the approval of a majority of all the members of the

municipal council, is devoid of merit.

McLean v City of East St Louis: The law requires that

the yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all

ordinances, and the concurrence of a majority of the legislative

body is necessary to their passage.

Hibbard Co v City of Chicago: If a proposition not in

form of an ordinance creates any liability or provides for the

expenditure or appropriation of money, the requirement is the

same, while as to other propositions, whether the yeas and

nays are entered upon the journal or not, the majority of a

quorum is sufficient.

City of Manila vs. Bagui et al

April 12, 2005 | Tinga, J.

Facts:The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)built and opened Victoria Court. The City Council enactedOrdinance No. 7783 prohibiting the establishment or operation

of business that provide certain forms of amusement

entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area

MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer

for a Writ of Injunction with the lower cour, seeking that the

Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its

prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and

unconstitutional.MTDC advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and

unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City

Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels but

only the power to regulate, (2) The Ordinance is void as it is

violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which

specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a

commercial zone with certain restrictions, (3) The Ordinance

does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the

compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable

relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be

protected, (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law

by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a

legitimate business prior to its enactment, (5) The Ordinance

violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is

confiscatory, (b) the City Council has no power to find as a

fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have

the power to extrajudicially destroy it, and (6) The Ordinance

constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no

reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels

and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or

creating indebtedness; but other measures, except as otherwisespecially provided, shall prevail upon the majority vote of themembers present at any meeting duly called and held.


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other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business

in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7783 is null and void.

Issue: WON Ordinance No. 7783 is valid

Ratio: NO. To successfully invoke the exercise of police

power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, andto free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not

only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class, require an

interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be

reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident

that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose

less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation

must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the

means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the

guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and

those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be

arbitrarily invaded.Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the

police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion

into private rightsa violation of the due process clause.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. It

must not only be within the corporate powers of the local

government unit to enact and must be passed according to the

procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the

following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene

the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or

oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must

not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and

consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be

unreasonable.Ordinance No. 7783 violates the constitution

a. It violates due process. Granting for the sake ofargument that the objectives of the Ordinance are

within the scope of the City Council's police powers,

the means employed for the accomplishment thereof

were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The

objectives can be attained by reasonable restrictions

rather than by an absolute prohibition.

b. It violates equal protection of laws. There are nosubstantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension

houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar

establishments. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on

substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation

to the purpose of the Ordinance. Also, there is no

logic for prohibiting the business and operation of

motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of

this area.

c. It is repugnant to general laws and is ultra vires.The Ordinance is in contravention of the

Code as the latter merely empowers local government

units to regulate, and not prohibit. The City of Manila

also cannot seek cover under the general welfare

clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without

judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance

per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of

persons and property and may be summarily abated

under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be

said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,

health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate

business.

The Ordinance also runs counter to the

provisions of P.D. 499. The statute had already

converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into acommercial area allowing the establishment and

operation of all kinds of commercial establishments

The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to

have force and effect, it must not only be within the

powers of the council to enact but the same must not

be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

d. All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamentalpersonal and property rights and impairs personal

privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance

contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and

unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently

detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the

enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,the City Council under the Code had no power to

enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null

and void.

V. Perez vs. De la Cruz

March 28, 1969 | Castro

Facts: Petitioner Virginia Perez is the vice mayor of the City

of Naga. In 1968, in a private conference held among the seven

city councilors and the vice mayor with the latter presiding, the

matter of selecting the secretary of the municipal board of said

city as well as the chairmen of various committees came up for

discussion. At the indication by the four Nacionalista Partycouncilors (herein private respondents) to vote for a particular

person, Perez expressed her intention to vote, on the

deliberation on such matters, to create a tie vote and thereafter

exercise her power as presiding officer to break such deadlock.

Later, in another conference, reiterated the same

intention to vote twice, and such statement was radiocast.

A week after said conference, the four Nacionalista

councillors filed with the CFI a petition for prohibition seeking

to prevent Perez from casting her vote in the selection of the

secretary and other committee chairs except in the event of a

tie vote. Said councillors allege that the vice mayor of Naga

City is not a member of the municipal board but only its

presiding officer, and that pursuant to the Rules of Procedure

of said board, the chairman of the board cannot vote except in

the case of a tie. They claim that they are entitled to the relied

of restraining the vice mayor from voting on legislative matters

and acts and proceedings of the municipal board, because such

proposed actuations, unless restrained, would engender an

anomalous situation which could cause great and irreparable

damage, among others.

The CFI issued an order granting the prayer for

preliminary injunction and commanded the Sheriff to restrain

the respondent from casting her vote in the selection of the

Secretary of the Board. In response, Perez filed a motion to

dismiss and/or dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction,


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assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the suit

and alleging that the complaint stated no cause of action. She

further assailed the issuance of the writ as undue interference

in matters purely legislative in character. The CFI denied the

motion to dismiss. Upon petition to the appellate court, the CA

issued a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the

writ.

Subsequent to the order by the CA, Perez and theLiberal councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of

Procedure of the municipal board granting the chairman

thereof the right to vote as a member, and as presiding officer

the right to vote again in case of a tie vote.

A few months later, the CA rendered a decision

dismissing Perez petition for certiorari and dissolving the

restraining order issued by it. Hence the present petition for

certiorari and prohibition. Giving due course to the petition,

the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. As matters now

stand, Perez has been allowed to sit in the municipal board as

member and presiding officer.

Issues:(1) WON the vice mayor of Naga, besides being presiding

officer of the municipal board, is also a member thereof

(2) WON the CFI have jurisdiction to issue the writ of

prohibitory injunction against Perez

Held:

(1) NO. There is absolutely nothing in the charter of the City

of Naga which provides that the vice mayor is a member of the

municipal board thereof. In the absence of any statutory

authority constituting the vice mayor as member of the

municipal board, in addition to being the presiding officer

thereof, he cannot be held as one. The cases that petitionerinvokes involve municipalities wherein it is explicitly stated

that the vice mayor shall also be a member of the board. Such

is not the case at bar.

Reliance on the Amended Rules of Procedure is

untenable. The amended rule presupposes that the chairman is

a member of the board, which it is not, and the rule was passed

pendente lite and that without quorum. The proposed

amendment is a complete nullity.

(2) YES. Perez contends that as a legislative official

performing legislative actions, she is not subject to any

prohibitory process, invoking Vera vs. Avelino, wherein it was

ruled that a writ of prohibition refers only to proceedings

exercising judicial or ministerial functions.

Such ruling is inapplicable. The doctrine therein laid

is based on the principle of separation of powers and checks

and balances and is not applicable to local governments.

Moreover, executives at the local or municipal level are vested

with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions, in

addition to their purely executive duties.

By explicit statutory command, courts are given

authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings. It

is the view of the court that in insisting to vote twice in the

municipal board, petitioner acted without jurisdiction and such

may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of

prohibition.

Homeowners Association of the Philippines vs. Municipa

Board of City of Manila

August 30, 1968 | Concepcion

Facts: The Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc.and its President, Vicente A. Rufino filed a petition for

declaratory relief to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of

the City of Manila, which regulated the rentals of lots and

buildings for residential purposes. It provides that the lessors

or sublessors of lands devoted to residential purposes are

prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of

the proportion, percentage wise, in the increase of the assessed

value of the land leased or subleased.

RTC declared the ordinance ultra vires,

unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. It held that the

declare a state of emergency, which may justify the regulation

of house rentals, exclusively pertains to Congress. It also said

that the ordinance disconstitutes an unreasonable andunjustified limitation on the use of private properties and

arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property

owners.

Issue:(1) WON Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is valid (NO)

(2) WON proceedings in the CFI is valid (in relation to Section

4 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court) (YES)

Held: (The Court will not pass on the allegation regarding the

power of the City of Manila to declare a state of emergency or

to acknowledge the existence thereof.)

(1) NO. Individual rights may be adversely affected by the

exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the

extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate

demands of public interest or public welfare. If such demands

are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference

upon individual rights, resulting from the regulations adopted

to meet the situation, must be, by and large, co-extensive, co-

equal or co-terminous with the existence thereof. And, since an

emergency is by nature temporary in character, so must the

regulations promulgated therefor be.

As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the

rights of individuals, to be valid and legal, must be for a

"definite" period of time, the length of which must be

"reasonable", in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis

it seeks to overcome or surmount.

The practical reason for the requirement that a statute

passed to meet a given emergency, should limit the period of

its effectivity is to prevent that which was intended to meet a

temporary emergency from becoming permanent law (since

Congress might not enact a repeal).

(2) The City of Manila did not raise this question or invoke

said Section 4, Rule 64, either in its answer or in a MTD in the

lower court.


7/7



Upon the other hand, the City Fiscal of Manila was

notified therein. In fact, he filed a memorandum, apart from

the memorandum submitted by counsel for the City of Manila.

At any rate, the determination of the question whether

or not the Solicitor General should be required to appear "in

any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance

or executive order, rules or regulation" is a matter left to the

"discretion" of the Court, pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 3 ofthe Rules of Court. Inasmuch as said requirement is not

mandatory, but discretionary, non-compliance therewith and

with Section 4 of Rule 64 the interpretation of which should

be harmonized with said Section 23 of Rule 3 affected

neither the jurisdiction of the trial court nor the validity of the

proceedings therein, in connection with the present case.

Documents

LOCGOV_Digest10