Local Government Digests

8/10/2019 Local Government Digests

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TITLE: Victorino B. Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S. Fajardo,Julio G. Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada,petitioners,vs. Commission on ElectionsTOPIC: Creation and Abolition of MunicipalCorproationsPONENTE: Carpio, J.

AUTHOR: K. GuevarraNOTES / QUICKIE FACTS:District apportionment laws are subject to review by thecourts. Compliance with constitutional standards on thecreation of legislative districts is important because the"aim of legislative apportionment is 'to equalizepopulation and voting power among districts.

Antecedent Facts

The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative Districtcomprised of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district forthe city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162(later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. Thepopulation of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact. However, there is no dispute that House Bill No.3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that"the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the populationgrowth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."

Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 isunconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representationin Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinanceappended to the 1987 Constitution.

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress' use of projectedpopulation is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislatureto determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]."

FACTS:This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislativedistrict for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for thecreation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was representedin Congress through four legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (laterconverted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of

Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 bythe year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

ISSUE:Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacanis unconstitutional as petitioned.Whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

HELD:1. Yes. It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative ofSection 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000population.

2. No, MalolosRATIO:

1. Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, wasdeclared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue theCertification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by PresidentFidel V. Ramos, which provides:

2.

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the National


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Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have beendeclared official by the NSCB.

3. The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in whichcase, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

a.

Certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declaredofficial by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).

b.

Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator orhis designated certifying officer.

c.

Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

4. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issuedby Director Miranda was undated.

5. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolospopulation of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

6.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointmentis to equalize the population and voting power among districts.


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015

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corportations; Land Area

Requirements

PONENTE: Peralta, J.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, andRENE O. MEDINA,

Petitioners,vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of

the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE

PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of

Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,

representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.

AUTHOR: Yayie

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:

G.R. No. 180050

February 10, 2010

Its a long case and there are other issues

that were discussed, but I just focused witthe land area requirements.

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as AnAct Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.

FACTS:

1. The mother province of Surigao del Norte is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City;

(2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island.

2. Section 461 The Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7610): a province may be created if:

a. it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department ofFinance, AND

b. a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, OR a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 squarekilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau.

The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do notcontribute to the income of the province.

3. The special census conducted by Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte with the assistance of an NSO District Census

Coordinator, yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province.

The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census. Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for

all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,5764. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands forcalendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12square kilometers.

5. The Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was

approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

6. A plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affectedapproved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502

negative votes.

7. The Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct provincewas ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

8. July 1, 2007: the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporateexistence.


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PETITIONERS:

Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina

taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and

unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and richresources from the area.

CONTENTIONS:

the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with eitherthe population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.

Dinagat Islands has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory requirement of at leas2,000 square kilometers.

the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is apopulation of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which states that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where theproposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The preceding italicized provision contained in the ImplementinRules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461 of theLocal Government Code.

assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails

RESPONDENTS:

contend in their respective Memoranda that the Province of Dinagat Islands met the legal standard for its creation. Annual income of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002-2003 was P82, 696, 433.25. though the land area of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands;

thus, it is exempt from the required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Code.

the number of inhabitants in the Province of Dinagat Islands as of 2003 was 371,576. respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial

Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003 was never certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was conducted

with the aid of a representative of the NSO. He alleged that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence ofNSO officials, who testified during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, and whoquestioned neither the conduct of the special census nor the validity of theresult.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUE: whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution?

HELD: YES.R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed inSec. 461 of the Local Government Code.

RATIO:

1. As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at least 2,00square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprise

two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.

If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does territory, under Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, includnot only the land mass above the water, but also that which is beneath it?

TAN V. COMELEC:the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of

the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence

thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area

and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
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Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact;(b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed.,

p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes

physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute

may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs.Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the"territory" the physical mass of land area.Therewould arise no need for the legislators to use the wordcontiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial

waters.It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to besynonymous with "land area" only.The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intendedby the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction

2. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portioabove stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, thonly instance when the territorial or land area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance witthe population requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from

such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law

and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond thterms and provisions of the basic law.

Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that [t]he land area requirement shall not apply where thproposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands is null and void.

3. R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of eighty thousand twhundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km.,more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47islets x x x. R.A. No. 9355,therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certifieby the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands a

of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which

yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreoverespondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao

del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the newprovince.

Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated November 24, 2005 did not object t

the result of the provincial governments special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an NSO district censucoordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not certified by the NSO, which is the requirement of the LocaGovernment Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinaga

Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the official

thereof are declared NULLand VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Loca

Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the p roposed province is composed of one (1) o

more islands, is declaredNULLand VOID.


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015

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corportations; Land Area

Requirements

PONENTE: Nachura, J.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,

Petitioners,VS.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the

Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT;House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR

ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;

GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Provinceof Dinagat Islands, Respondents,CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE,

HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.

CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.

AUTHOR: Yayie


G.R. No. 180050April 12, 2011

(Resolution)

FACTS:

1. On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered it decision which declared:

R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of aprovince under the LGC.

the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that,

[t]he land area requirement shall not apply wherethe proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for beingbeyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.

2. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration ofthe Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Court denied the said motions.

3. Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration,accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually noted without action by this Court inits June 29, 2010 Resolution.

4. The movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion forReconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.

Alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790 :If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election,the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous

status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for thesame reasons given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives,First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte

(with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its

previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted fogovernor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the FirstLegislative District of Surigao del Norte.

as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear andstrong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District ofSurigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that:(1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured;(2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated;(3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and

(4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued.


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In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rightswould be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.

In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challengethe Resolution, namely:

(1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;

(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption

from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and

(3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

5. July 20, 2010: the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideratioof the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to thsound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

6. October 5, 2010: the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and

executory on May 18, 2010.

7. Movant-Intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and praying that the Court (a) recall the entry ojudgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 201

Resolution.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 9(2) of the IRR of the Local Government code is valid?

Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 is valid?

HELD: YES. Article 9(2) of IRR-LGC is valid and RA 9355 is CONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO:

With respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation o

municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e

income, population, and land area, are provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exemp

from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to bcreated is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for th

creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. Ifact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islandwould form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infe

that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for componen

cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressl

provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of th

LGCand to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2)

the LGC-IRR.

This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy.

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity anminimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desireresults. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outrigh

absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, i


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themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimumland area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply wit

the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress haopted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate thgreater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to thconstituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a provincis scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.

Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose olocal autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together wit

territorial contiguity.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts mayresort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules an

regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principleArticle 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive

and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate

and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of thisCode, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and countrysiddevelopment. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991

which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption fromthe land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to th

creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respectiv

Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the lanarea requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, bu

unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGCIRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the

LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of societand considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. Undoubtedly, thiamounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative construction a

well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the OversighCommittee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to

implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately

translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledgeprovince, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation oprovinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congres

breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No

9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such ac

of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the lanarea requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the

LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.


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What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing thaDinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, a

certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 fothe creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than

looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accomplicircumstances which cannot operate i

favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;

2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANTthe Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to

Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution datedJuly 20, 2010;

3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolutionis RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) ormore islands, is declaredVALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declareas VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof

are declared VALID; and

4. The petition is DISMISSED.


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016League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs Comelec et

al. ( GR No. 176951, 177499, 178056 ) Nov. 18, 2008

TOPIC: Creation of Municipal Corporations is a legislative

matter

PONENTE: Carpio, J.

DOCTRINES: 1. As providec by Sec. 10, Art. X of the 198Constitution, Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for th

creation of a city (or any other political units) in the LocaGovernment Code (LGC) and not in any other law, includin

Cityhod Laws.

2. The clear intent of the Constitution is to ensure that the creatio

of cities and other political units must follow the same uniformnon discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC, the criterifor the creation of cities and other political units must follow th

guidelines provided by the Equal Protection Clause of thConstitution

FACTS

1.

Petitioners : League of City of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, also in h

capacity as Mayor of City of Calbayog and in his personal capacity as taxpayer

2.

Respondents: Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province

Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Su

Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon.

3.

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did

not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RepubliAct No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code byincreasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Aftethe effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which soughto exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were noapproved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 andforwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following thadvice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Th16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million incomrequirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate alsapproved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood billlapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The CityhooLaws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of th

conversion of their municipality into a city.4.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X othe Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversioof municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities wilshare the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

5. Respondents contend that the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Furthermore, threspondents invoke the principle of non retroactivity of laws to prevent the application of RA 9009 on the 16 Cityhood Billthat stood to be affected by RA 9009.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUE: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; an2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

a.

Applying the P100 million requirement in RA9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, becausRA9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

b. Constitution requires that Congrss shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and

not in any other law, including Cityhood laws.

c.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the nationataxes to local government units.

d.

The intent of the members of the 11 thCongress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained aintent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

e. Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption woulstill be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

f. The deliberations of the 11th or 12thCongress or unapproved blls are not considered as extrinsic aids in interpreting a law


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passed in the 13thCongress. Congress is not a continuing body, any unapproved cityhood bills are co nsidered as mere scrapof paper with any hearings and deliberations becoming worthless upon adjournment of Congress.

2. Yes. The exemption provisions in the Cityhood Laws contain no classification or guidelines to differentiate the supposedly

exempted municipalities from other municipalities in general. The exemption therefore, would be based solely on the fact tha

the 16 of the municipalities had Cityhood Bills pending in the 11 th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. There is nsubstantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did nohave pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish on

municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. This is not a valid classification to entitle an exemptiofrom the increased income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine th

level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lowe

annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion merependency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscallnon-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

RATIO/RELEVANT LAWS

Sec. 450 Requisites for creation (a) a municipality or a cluster of barangays maybe converted into a component city if it ha

locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance of at least One Hundred Million peso(100,000,000.00) for the last two consecutive two (2) years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the followin

requisites;

i. A contiguous territory of 100 square kilometers , as certified by the Land Management Bureau; orii. A population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creatio

to less than the minimum requirements prescribed therein.

b. the territorial jurisdiction of the newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement o f lan

area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not bcontiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

c. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds , transfers, and no

recurring income.


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017 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs.COMELEC, 608 SCRA 636 (2009)

TOPIC: Creation of municipal corporation is alegislative matter. (Sec. 14, LGC)

PONENTE: Velasco, JR., J.

AUTHOR: Christy Amor Lofranco

NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration

QUICKIE FACTS: The constitutionality of the 16 cityhood laws werchallenged by the LCP for violation of Article X, Section 10 of the 198

Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except iaccordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, anthe equal protection clause under Article III, Section 1.

NOTE: 16 Cityhood Laws Constitutional.

FACTS:

Petitioners: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP)

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and 16 Municipalities

Background:

1. This controversy has its origins in the 11th Congress when thirty-three (33) laws converting 33 municipalities into cities wereenacted into law. Throughout, twenty-four (24) other bills converting 24 municipalities into cities were not passed. At th

time, the annual income requirement for a municipality to become a city was 20 million pesos under the Local GovernmenCode.2.

During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 was enacted, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code bincreasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from 20 million pesos to 100 milliopesos.

3. As a result of the increased annual income requirement under R.A. No. 9009, the 24 municipalities could no longer qualifunder the increased annual income requirement. The House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint ResolutioNo. 29 seeking to exempt the remaining 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills had not been approved during the 11thCongress from the 100 million-peso income requirement; this exemption did not materialize as the Senate did not join thresolution.

4. During the 13th Congress, Joint Resolution No. 1, reiterating the sentiments of Joint Resolution No. 29 under the 12tCongress, was adopted by the House of Representatives and forwarded to the Senate for approval; again, the Senate failed toapprove the exemption sought underJoint Resolution No. 1.

5.

Sixteen (16) municipalities filed individual cityhood bills, all of which contained a common provision exempting all the 16municipalities from the P100 million income requirement under R.A. No. 9009.6.

These cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without thePresidents signature. The 16 cityhood laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites tdetermine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion.

7. The 16 cityhood laws were challenged by the League of Cities of the Philippines.Petitioner LCP:

1. That the 16 cityhood laws were unconstitutional for violation of Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, whichprovides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and thequal protection clause under Article III, Section 1.

Art. X, 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or it

boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the loca

government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in thpolitical units directly affected.

Art. I I I , 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any perso

be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 othe LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009.

2. That these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.3.

That the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities inthe Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec285 of the LGC of 1991.

4.

That the cityhood laws exempting the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009offend the Constitution.


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2008 Decision:

1.

In its first decision, the Court declared the 16 cityhood laws unconstitutional on the ground that they violated Article XSection 10 and the Equal Protection Clause under Article III, Section 1. In essence, the Court held that since thmunicipalities did not meet the P100 million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, aamended by R.A. No. 9009, the cityhood laws converting the 16 municipalities into cities were unconstitutional.

Respondent LGUs motions:

1.

Motion for reconsideration denied per Resolution dated April 28, 2009.2.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED and Motion for Leave to AdmiAttached Petition in Intervention also DENIED per Resolution dated May 14, 2009.

3.

Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached 'Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 182008' as expunged per Resolution of June 2, 2009.

4. Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUE: Whether or not the cityhood laws violate

(1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and

(2) the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. Declared as CONSTITUTIONAL the 16 cityhood laws, thus converting the 16 municipalities into cities.

***Earlier Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

Art. X, 10 In accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code Clause

1. The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause " in accordance with the criteria established in the locagovernment code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria.

2.

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a 35 consolidated set of laws or a muchsimpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in thlocal government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformityCongress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earliecodified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codifieincome requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is ndifferent from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from thcriteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

3. The Court said that based on Congress deliberations, the clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood billwould be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of P100 million and that R.A. No. 9009 would not have anretroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

Ar t. I I I , 1 Equal Protection Clause

4.

No deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP's claim that the IRA of itmember-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not sufficto bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities toalready stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, themunicipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutionaprotection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not itproperty as such.

5. The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. The Courstressed that the 16 municipalities were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 and to impose othem the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would be unfair. The reasoning behind was thafairness would dictate that the 16 municipalities be given a means by which they could prove that they had the necessarqualifications for cityhood under the old law, the Local Government Code of 1991, and not R.A. No. 9009.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7


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018 League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC,

628 SCRA 819 (2010)

TOPIC: Local Government Code as basis for the creation,division, merger, abolishment or alteration of the boundary ofany province, city, municipality, or barangay

PONENTE: J. Carpio

AUTHOR: Cielito Mateo

NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS: LCP assailed constitutionality of 1

Cityhood Laws

FACTS:

-Petitioners in this case are the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) represented by LCP National President Jerry P. TreaaMayor of City of Iloilo; Mel Senen S. Sarmiento, Mayor of City of Calbayog.

-Respondents in this case are the Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipalit

of Carcar, Province of Cebu; and Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.

-Petitioners-in-intervention in this case are the City of Tarlac, City of Santiago, City of Iriga, City of Ligao, City of Legazpi, City oTagaytay, City of Surigao, City of Bayawan, City of Silay, City of General Santos, City of Zamboanga, City of Gingoog, City o

Cauayan, City of Pagadian, City of San Carlos, City of San Fernando, City of Tacurong, City of Tangub, City of Oroquieta, City o

Urdaneta, City of Victorias, City of Calapan, City of Himamaylan, City of Batangas, City of Bais, City of Cadiz and City of Tagum

-The petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention seek the following in this case:

a. ad cautelam motion for reconsideration

b. motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by the petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et.al.

c. ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City

Cadiz City and Oroquieta City

- On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10

Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.

- 31 March 2009- Supreme Court En Banc again by majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration.

-28 April 2009- Supreme Court En Banc, by split vote, denied 2nd motion for reconsideration of respondents. 18 November 200Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

-Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motion for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstated the 18 November 200declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. Section 10 Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, excepin accordance with the criteria established in the local government codeand subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in

plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Codand not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Loca

Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congres

cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws


16/64

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 millionfor the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment theLocal Government Code required tha

any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the LocaGovernment Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requiremen

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills werpending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitl

exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amende

by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. Tbe valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the CityhooLaws.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to it

declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en bancResolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court enbancresults in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court's prior majority action on the main decision

stands affirmed.

[4]

This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Courten banc

,which includes not only casesinvolving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, " all other caseswhich under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc."

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en bancon the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion

for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote

cannot result in any court order or directive.The judgment stands in full force. Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the

prior majority en bancDecision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en bancResolution of 31 March 2009

denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision

where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.

Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because thereremain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the Court en banc concurred indeclaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009

Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc,are not reconsidered but stand

affirmed.These prior majority actions of the Court en banccan only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote

because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact

in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en bancreiterated that no further

pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment is made in due course.

The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with

precedential value."

Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority - a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority

lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents'second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.

RATIO: Local Government Code should be the only basis for the creation, division, merger, abolishment or alteration of th

boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barangay.


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019

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP)

v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Municipal Corporations >

Creation of Municipal Corporation is a Legislative Matter

PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:

AUTHOR: FREDERICK MAYUGA


Sixteen Republic Acts (collectively known as the Cityhood Lawswas passed, converting 16 municipalities into component citie

The constitutionality of the conversion of these municipalities intcomponents was questioned the petitioner League of Cities of thPhilippines.

In its Decision on 18 November 2008, the Supreme Coudeclared the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

Subsequently, multiple motions for reconsideration and motions tamend resolutions have been filed by the responden

LGUs/municipal corporations.

Consequently, the Supreme Court declared, in its Resolutiodated 21 December 2009, the Cityhood Laws valid an

constitutional.

As such, the LCP filed a motion for reconsideration. In iResolution dated 24 August 2010, the Supreme Court reinstate

its Decision on 18 November 2008, declaring the Cityhood Law

unconstitutional.

The respondent LGUs/municipal corporations filed a new motion

for reconsideration. In its Resolution dated 15 February 2011,

the Supreme Court:

a. granted the respondents Motion for Reconsideration,b. reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010; andc. declared the 16 Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

In turn, the LCP files the instant Ad Cautelam Motion forReconsideration.

PARTIES:

G.R. No. 176951

PETITIONERS:

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of

Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer

RESPONDENTS:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province oWestern Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar;

and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon


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G.R. No. 177499

PETITIONERS:

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP),

City of Calbayog; and

Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,

RESPONDENTS:


Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan,

Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of DavaoOriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental

G.R. No. 178056

PETITIONERS:

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP);

City of Calbayog; and

Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,

RESPONDENTS:


Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of ElSalvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management

FACTS:

1. In its Resolution dated 24 August 2010, the Supreme Court reinstated its Decision on 18 November 2008, declaringunconstitutionality of the 16 Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

2. The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.3. In its Resolution dated 15 February 2011, the Supreme Court:

d. granted the respondents Motion for Reconsideration,e. reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010; andf. declared the 16 Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

4.

Hence, the petitioners filed its Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration.

PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS:

1. the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution2. the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause,3. the Cityhood Laws violate the ight of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.


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ISSUE:

1.

WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution2.

WON the Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause3.

WON the Cityhood Laws violate the right of local governments to a just shared in the national taxesHELD:

1. No. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coveragof Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9009.

2. No. The increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survivand remain viable as a component city.

3. No. The allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease.

RATIO:

1.

With respect to the issue on Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in

accordance with the cri teria establi shed in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the politicalunits directly affected.cr

The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the incom

requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 millio

under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimente

during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there wer

municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th

Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No

2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that thpertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11 thCongress was in session, and th

conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 900would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11 thCongress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12 thCongress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislativintent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House oRepresentatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied iBills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to ac

on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No

1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed tapprove Joint Resolution No. 1.

It is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seekingconversion into cities from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million inincome of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they

received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.

The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. TheHouse wants the Senate to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that,

en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specificallyconverting them into cities.


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My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what theywant to do regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant

to the requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt

certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code to

become cities, by all means, let them do their thing.

In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to thissubterfuge is being undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying

that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create

cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do

it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to

make certain exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate

as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.

Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, anwere all unanimously and favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills, whe

forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show

that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clealegislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in th

exemption clauses.2. With respect to the issue on the Equal Protection Clause

Considering the Cityhood Laws are exempt respondents from meeting the new minimum income requirement oPhp100 million, the petitioners further contend that:

a. such income requirement is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; andb. there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, bee

converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (RA No 9264), Navotas (RA No. 9387) and San Juan (RA No9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite (RA. No 9723), and Bian in Laguna (RA No 9740)

However, as indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 tpost an average annual income of Php100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 200

by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply wit

the Php100 million threshold income five years after RA No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarrantefor the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of Php100 million from local sources under RA No. 9009was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of Php100 million, no research or empirical databuttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. A

already mentioned, even the danger the passage of RA No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While th

Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendmenimminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countrysid

development, and the concomitant national growth.


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3.

With respect to the Right of Local Governments to just share in the national taxesIt suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC

not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land are(25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number ocities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, it should be noted that the allocation by thNational Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becomin

entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city wi

decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessarconsequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated the

viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they hapreviously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have t

share with only around 120 cities.


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020 League of City of Philippines v Comelec (2011)

TOPIC: Creation of municipal corporation is a legislative matter

(Sec. 14, LGC)

PONENTE: Justice Bersamin

AUTHOR: Dann M.


PARTIES:

GR 176951:

PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.

Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personalcapacity as Taxpayer,

RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;

MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN

SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON

GR177499:

PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.

Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personalcapacity as Taxpayer

RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;

MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSANDEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF

DAVAO ORIENTAL; AND MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL

GR 178056:

PETITIONER: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personalcapacity as Taxpayer,

RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSANDEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR,PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL; MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU; and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT


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FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP

City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting thmunicipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Election(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down theCityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration.

On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, which denied the second motion fo

reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.

In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civ

Procedure which provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shal l bentertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion foreconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the

Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the secondmotion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In

effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion forreconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturnthe 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for

reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.

Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the

Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion fo

Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion fo

Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and OroquietCity, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision x (Cityhood law unconstitutional). Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.

Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 1

Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of thResolution dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court

No arguments referred to for this case. Probably, the same arguments propounded on the previous cases were reiterated.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html - fnt7

ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for failure to comply with RA 9009 which amended the LGC and nowrequires a locally generated income of P100million for at least 2 consecutive years, as compared to its wordings before amendmenwhich was average annual income of P20million for the last 2 consecutive years

HELD: No, they are constitutional because the aforesaid cityhood laws, at the time they were pending, which contain exemptinprovisions from RA 9009, were recognized as an embodiment of the intention of the legislature to exempt them from the effect of thamendment.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_149926_2005.html#fnt7


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RATIO: Article X, Section 10 provides

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its

boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code andsubject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The tenor of theponenciasof the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemptioclauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.

Section 450.Requisites for Creation.a) A municipality or a cluster of barangaysmay be converted into a component city iit has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Peso(P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive yearsbased on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites

x x x x

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special

funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the

Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant

prices.

Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bilfiled for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11thCongress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills werenacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted into componencities through the Cityhood Laws.

The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on SenateBill No. 2157, to wit[paraphrase ko na kasi mahaba] Due to the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into citiehe is apprehensive that before long the Philippines will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.What has been happeninis that the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Interna

Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear that practicallall municipalities in this country would qualify to become cities.

While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion

bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component citieswhich qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of

Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus [summarized and paraphrased dahilmahaba] it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills thatare pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.However,they do not think it is necessary to

put an [exempting] provision because they were saying during the intertepllation will form part of the

interpretation of this bill. Furthermore, if there is no retroactivity clause, they do not think that the bill would

have any retroactive effect.So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber

will not be affected.

Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the11thCongress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No.

9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent ofthe law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.

Notwithstanding that both the 11thand 12thCongress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and inten

of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13 thCongress, when the Cityhood Laws werenacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondenmunicipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.


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Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot b

denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requiremenimposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to becomcomponent cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points o

convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In th

regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz[mahaba kaya icucut ko na; pero eto yunlisting ng mga naging cities] 1. Batac, Ilocos Norte;2. El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, 3. Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte; 4Borongan, Eastern Samar; 5. Lamitan, Basilan; 6. Catbalogan, Samar; 7. Bogo, Cebu;8. Tandag, Surigao del Sur; 9. Bayugan

10. Agusan del Sur; 11. Carcar, Cebu; 12. Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; 13. Tayabas, Quezon; 14. Tabuk, Kalinga; 15Baybay, Leyte; 16. Mati, Davao Oriental;and 17. Naga, Cebu.

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority

under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.[10] The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people itheir original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislativ

power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civ

government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitutiohas lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces asubjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.[11]

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the CityhooLaws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of loca

government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to thconversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computeonly from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedlimposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust othe LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic

growth in their respective provinces

Documents

Local Government Digests