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PART III
III. Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions
Sec. 39-75 LGC
a. Elective Officials
i. Qualifications
Abella v COMELEC 1991
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in
fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was
already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest
votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of
the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the positionof governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE
is more on the principle ofINTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did
not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS
REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years,
although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when
the candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, thefact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was
a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI (Faypon v. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence
or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The
party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-
ponderantly such abandonment or loss.) In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What
is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a residenttherein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor
present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to
continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly
resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents and purposes we have
already transferred our residence to other places.
Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is
such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on
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Nov 25, 1987, and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by
registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (Feb 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte. )
We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre
cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among
these are:
The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to bemisplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of
Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope;
The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9,1988;
The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election
Registrar or anybody else;
The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day,
allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;
All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision of the voter's list was
made as of 5:00 PM
The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered
the application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed;Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed
to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct
17 concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was never submitted in evidence.
The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from
the serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct.
The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the
same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing that there were only 9 additional registered voters in
Precinct 17, petitioner was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the election day
that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the names
of the Larrazabals and the second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the
Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an
alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy forthe position of governor of the province of Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the
following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless,
considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter
prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the
prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a
prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the
province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do
not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside
the supervisory power of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the
province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be
voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on
Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City
which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered
voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with
the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the
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provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two
prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official."
The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong English"
since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective
office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased
"Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used
after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of theprovincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not
entitled to vote."
The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.
In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction andbetween the phrase shall not be qualified and entitledto
vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the
election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte."
Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second division is null
and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of
the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991. Commissioner Flores was
appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he
exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating
when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his term expired onFebruary 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional provision that the terms of office in
the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office
until February 15, 1991 has a color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to
February 15, 1991, are considered valid.
Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by virtue of Section 6 RA 6646
Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him
these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were
petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the
respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be
unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for materialmisrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that since under section 6
of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted.
The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted
making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as
regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004.
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy
of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of
February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate.
The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is
that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases,
this is precisely the reason why the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not
allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of
mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that in
the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume the vacated
position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and
directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a
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candidate for the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No.
88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case ofLabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition,
can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case,
the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who wasdisqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, with three dissenting
and another two reserving their vote. One was on official leave.
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained thesecond highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter,
if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not
be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of
the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion
Labo v COMELEC (1989)
FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian
citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.
Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen.However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his
ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.
According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an
Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an
oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person
over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text
of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.
Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer,
Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office
on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.
ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence theCOMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to
rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding
public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.
Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?
Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?
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HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately
pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding,
which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal
immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the
Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the onebeing decided in this case.
Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the
Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of
Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.
Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The
Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.
The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino
citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of
that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his
Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The
earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been
politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship.
Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was
elected.
Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because
he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to
take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.
*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable
that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo
should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as
Mayor during the pendency of the case.
Labo v COMELEC (1992)
Facts: petitioner Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated
therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Ortega presented the decision of thisCourt in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.
Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only on May 5,
1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.
COMELEC: cancelled Labos COC. May 10, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on
May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5)
days from promulgation. Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for
City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is
elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved,
motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of
Baguio.
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May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May
9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy. After an exchange of pleadings, respondent
Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No.
105111) earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before this Court.
I. GR 105111
Petitioner faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him
adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for
hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding
a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned resolution on May 9, 1992.
SC: records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed
by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner
Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due
process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City
Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No.
92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else.
Petitioner (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and
preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous maintenance and
holding of Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the
Labo v. Comelec
SC: No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and supervening events are
to preclude the application of the Labo decision. The Commission is bound by the final declaration that
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. The fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case anyevidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or the
Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in
cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our
ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively
mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since
the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.
SC: In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,
to wit:Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
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Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of
votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence before the
Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner Labo's status has not
changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His
election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable
requirement for holding public office. Mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
II. GR 105384
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May
9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has
already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
SC: At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had already become final
and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on
the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this
Court. The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen
having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio
City. To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the
Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As
mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines."
The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with thenext highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.While Ortega may have garnered
the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of
the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the
belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does
not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning
rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case,
which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by
ten members of the Court. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
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The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity
and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which
case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that
petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known
of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992
denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the
final outcome of this case.
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This
should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code
Frivaldo v COMELEC 1996
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The Leagueof Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation onthe ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted
the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.
Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect
of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment orelection or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as
earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos
government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship.
Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship.His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject
to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the
petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the
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impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship
despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality
which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it
dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is
involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The
sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws,regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory,
conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law
who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the
petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which
may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person
who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo
warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional.
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have
been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the
filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions
against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of
such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings
against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where theSolicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto
proceedings, the Court should allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective
public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the
disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-
day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final
decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the
petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure
pro hac vice.
Mercado v Manzano 1999
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and todeclare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor of Makati City . Important details on Edu
Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents.
On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo
B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was
suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that
Manzano was an American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according
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to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought to
intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was
unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the
Second Divisions ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation ofManzano as winner, saying:
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws underprinciple ofjus soli (basis is place of birth).
Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution and laws under principlejus sanguinis (the right of blood).
Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American
passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of
allegiance to the USA.
Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine
law, he no longer had US citizenship.
Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.
ISSUES:WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to intervene granted.
WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-
REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest
to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot beproclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final
and executory judgment.This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, there had already been a proclamation of the election
results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the
petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the race when he sought to
intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEConly applies when the election of the respondent is contested, and thequestion is WON the second placer may be declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so was
Mercado, being a rival candidate.
Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the
private respondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment
rendered. Failure of COMELEC en bancto resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamountto denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government
Code (which declares as disqualified from running for elective local position Those with dual-citizenship),Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to holdelective office.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual
allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by somepositive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a
question of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. InSec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence,
dual citizenship in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean dual allegiance. Ther efore,persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have elected
their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondents certificate of
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candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998 : I am a Filipino citizenNatural-
born. I am not a permanent resident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country. I am eligible for theoffice I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed torenounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-
citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that By laws of the United States Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government. Therefore, petitioner Mercados contention that the oath of allegiance contained inprivate respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of his Americancitizenship. Also, equally without merit is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have
been made upon reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be
made upon majority age.
Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used for his last travel to
the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an American
passport was simply an assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar v.
COMELEC).
Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here, received his education here, andpracticed his profession here, and has taken part in past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his electionof Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications prescribed.
Coquilla v COMELEC (2002)
Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the
COMELEC, ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the
position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002,
of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Special Civil Action in the SC.Certiorari
Facts: February 17, 1938 Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up andresided there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after
his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the U.S.
October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the U.S. the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August
5, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was approved Nov. 7, 2000
Nov. 10, 2000 oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of
Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three days after
November 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by Election
Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
February 27, 2001 filed certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, EasternSamar for "two (2) years."
March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarezrespondent, incumbent mayor of Oras and reelectionistsought
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a materialmisrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won
over private respondents by 379 votes.
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May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently
took his oath of office.
July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis the respondents frequent or regular trips tothe Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be
added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in
days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. The 1-yrresidency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January
30, 2002. Hence this petition.
Issues:
WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration by petitioner.
Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissed cause his motion for reconsideration was denied
for being pro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition, pursuant to
Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, so and since the resolution was received on July 28, 2001 and
the petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filedlate and should be dismissed.
Petitioners MFR and petition for certiorari were filed within the prescribed periods. 5 -day period for filingMFR under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from receipt of decision, resolution, order, or ruling of COMELEC. In
this case, petitioner received a copy of COMELECs Second Division July 19, 01 resolution on July 28, 2001. 5
days later, on Aug. 2, 01, he filed his MFR. On Feb. 6, 02, he received a copy of the order, dated Jan. 30, 02, ofthe COMELEC en banc denying his MFR. 5 days later, on Feb 11, 02, he filed this petition for certiorari.
Contention that petitioners MFR did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because themotion was pro forma and, thus, petition shouldve been filed on or before Aug 27, 01 is not correct. It wasactually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. The MFR was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the
period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of
the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise,
the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.
In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held becauseit was a second motion for reconsideration, or
it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,or
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or
the adverse party was not given notice thereof.
Petitioners MFR suffers from none of these defects, and COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioners MFR waspro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise
"new matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition
in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of
petitioner.R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be
voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant,
the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of
their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for
the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should
continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
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In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC the SC, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second,
reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that
the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.
WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections
held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
No.First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides: An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal residence the place where a partyactually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the pla ce where the childs parentsreside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the
U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, 00, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner
was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowedhim to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
If immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in
that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines (Caasi v. CA), much more does
naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines, as was the case
with the petitioner.
Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their
Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which
provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his
Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired it until November
10, 00
Second, petitioner did not reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for
the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantlydeclaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status
of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine
citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident.
On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended,
or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of
Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on Oct and Dec 98, Oct99, and June 00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration () Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As
for his entry on Aug 5, 00, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay." Under 2 of R.A. No.6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled,
among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (3(c)). It would appear
then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status
as an alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, 00 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under
R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras
Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Bengson as
residency was not an issue in these.
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Third, petitioners contends that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 isconclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter
must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. But, registration as a voter does not bar the
filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency (Nuval v. Guray).Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed
to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a
formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since
he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the
COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitionersclaim, are complete and intact in the records.
WON COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the
statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samarfor "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true.
Yes. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation.
Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any materialrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office forwhich he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy inthis case is thus fully justified.
Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on
Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
Japzon v COMELEC 2009
Facts: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for
the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14May 2007. Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition 5 to disqualify and/or
cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his
Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipinoto spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas
Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28
March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant
of any foreign country.
In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make
trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover,although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign
citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003
Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with
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the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California,
USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines
was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was approved
and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and
signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated
that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July
2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ty won pending resolution of the case. COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Although
[Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held
on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy
Issue: WON Ty is DQ-ed
Held: No
Ratio:
On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.16At this point, Ty still held dual
citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his Americancitizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his
rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at
all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic
Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship
decides to run for public office.Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, whoreacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he
must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
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That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."18
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents
reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In
Coquilla,19 the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must
establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then
he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as
his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still
retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to
return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been
an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court
of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled
the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in thePhilippines.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous.
The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for running for
public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or
weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found
that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC,
which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court
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Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October
2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines
was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007,
Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his
address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for
and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after
said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi. There is no basis for this
Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident
thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence. In Aquino v. COMELEC,25the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.
Robredo v Tan [2008]
Facts: A Complaint8 dated 16 December 1991 was filed by complainant (herein respondent) Orlando P. Tan
(Tan, for brevity) against respondents (herein petitioners) Jose Lim Robredo alias Jose Chan Robredo
(Jose, for brevity) and Jesse M. Robredo (Jesse, for brevity) for Compulsory Registration as Chinese
Nationals and Deportation filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Tan alleged that
Robredos parents were Chinese (mother is lotus feet) did not naturalized and neither did their children .
Robredos sister even applied for naturalization but Robredo still failed to do so.
Jose misrepresented himself as a Filipino and passed this misrepresentation to his son Jesse, by falsely
registering himself as a Filipino citizen with the Local Civil Registrar; when Jose applied for a Philippine
Passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs, he concealed the fact that he has personal knowledge of the
fact that his Record of Birth is intact and on file with the Records Management and Archives Office; by this
falsity, Jose was granted by the DFA with Philippine Passport
Case was elevated to the Board of Special Inquiry for further proceedings.12 Respondents Robredo filed their
Motion to Dismiss13 dated 11 April 1992 and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss14 dated 18 March 1992
praying that the case be dismissed, they being Filipino citizens and the Board of Special Inquiry has no
jurisdiction over the case and over their persons. MTD was denied even on appeal. Tan then filed petition to
reconstitute records of the case mssing and lost. After protracted hearings and resolutions on the matter,
the petition was eventually granted. Thus Office of the President ruled - The issue of jurisdiction aside, we
agree with DOJ Acting Secretary (now Ombudsman) Gutierrez that respondents' citizenship is best settled by
the Board of Special Inquiry in a proceeding for that purpose after the parties have reconstituted the\ records
of the case. Under the principle of equity, respondents must be given a chance to prove their true citizenship
and controvert whatever evidence that complainant would present. This case should be remanded back to the
Bureau of Immigration and/or Board of Special Inquiry for reception of evidence and reconstitution of the
records.
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Petitioners contend that: the ruling of the Office of the President, if implemented will result in disregarding an
elementary tenet in the law of procedure, i.e., a judgment or ruling which has attained finality cannot be
disturbed; from the issuance of the 20 April 1995 Order of the Bureau of Immigration up to the time that the
respondent filed his Petition to Reconstitute Records and to Re-Open the Complaint for Compulsory
Registration as Chinese Nationals and Deportation for Further Proceedings on 14 March 2000, almost five (5)
years or 1,778 days had already passed, thus, the decision has already acquired finality and becomes
immutable and unalterable.
Petitioners posit that: the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
reconstitution and reopening of the Complaint for further proceedings despite failure of the respondent to
comply with the mandate of Act. No. 3110, which is applicable in supplementary character and despite his
lack of personality to initiate the same; no notice of loss was issued by the office of the clerk having custody of
the records of the case D.C. No. 92-736 and neither was such notice published in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation.
In support of their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioners basically argues that
the continuation by the Bureau of Immigration of its reconstitution of records and the reopening of the case
against them will work injustice to the petitioners and the people of Naga City as petitioner Jesse is serving
them as their duly elected local chief executive.
Issue: only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Office of the President erred in directing the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration to take immediate action for the reconstitution of the records in
Deportation Case
Held: No
Ratio:
It is worthy to note that the whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or
destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage
where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.40 The matter concerning petitioners'citizenship is not an issue to be passed upon or resolved by Us in the instant Petition but by the Bureau of
Immigration in D.C. No. 92-736. As aptly stressed by the Office of the President, the controversy devolves
solely upon the issue of reconstitution of the records in said D.C. No. 92-736. Thus, without reconstitution of
the records in said deportation case which was filed against petitioners, no further proceedings can be had.
As found by the Office of the President, x x x the Board did not conduct any proceedings thereon as the
records of the case mysteriously disappeared and (c)omplainant was later informed ofthe missing records
The reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as the defense43 and the mysterious disappearance
of the records is an event which weighs equally against all. The said reconstitution cannot be considered as a
filing anew of the complaint but it is merely the reproduction and replacement of the missing or lost records
in D.C. Case No. 92-736.
The Bureau is the best agency that can best determine whether petitioners violated certain provisions of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.47 Petitioners insist that respondent failed to comply with the
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mandate of Act No. 3110 with respect to the notice and publication requirement. We are not persuaded. Act
No. 3110,48 is the general law that governs the reconstitution of judicial records. Clearly, it can be gleaned
from the foregoing, that the notice and publication requirements of Act 3110 pertain only to judicial
reconstitution of records and not to the reconstitution of records of a pending deportation case before the
Bureau of Immigration.
ii. Disqualifications
Section 40.Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Election Code on Disqualifications
Caasi vs. CA 1990
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the
local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo
Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not
qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not
of Bolinao.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.
prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in theU.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of
that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to runfor said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of anothercountry during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 6