Literature in the Sociologies of Intellectuals and Interventions

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John King / Literature in the sociologies of intellectuals and interventions / 1

Literature in the sociologies of intellectuals and interventions

The sociology of intellectuals

Louis Sebastien Merciers description of the role of scholars in society, written in

1797, will already be familiar to contemporary social scientists:

The good books are dependent on the enlightened people in all classes of the nation;

they are an ornament to truth. They are the ones that already govern Europe; they enlighten

the government about its duties, its shortcoming, its true interest, about the public opinion to

which it must listen and conform: these good books are patient masters, waiting for the

moment when the state administrators wake up and when their passions die down.

(Habermas 1991, pp.95-96).

Questions of scholarly autonomy and allegiance are central to works in the classical

sociology of intellectuals. Positioned between a state which sought to bring them under royal

patronagein the French case through the institutions of theAcadmie Franaise and the

Acadmie des Sciences (Jennings 2003)and a critical public sphere which revolved

around the salons of France, reading societies of Germany and coffee houses of England,

scholars quest for autonomy from political or religious control was founded on the

valorization of disinterestedness and rationality (Sapiro 2012). Within the universities, the

higher faculties (applied sciences) of theology, law and medicine trained ministers, judges

and doctors, and were subject to control by the state; the lower faculties, represented by

philosophers, were directed by pure reason alone and were independent of government.

Universities were briefly the centre of a public sphere constituted not merely of scholars and

subtle reasoners but also of business people or women (Kant 1956; in Habermas 1991,

p.106) which held openly critical discussions before the government and the people. In salons

and bourgeois homes, philosophers engaged in arguments with mixed participants,

supporting civic engagement in the rational communicative processes of opinion forming

(Habermas 1991).

The division of expert labour in the nineteenth century saw the emergence of

specialists and the exclusion of laymen (Sapiro 2012). Scholars quest for autonomy from

religious or political control entailed the construction of boundaries (Gieryn 1983) which

demarcated spaces for activity unencumbered by stateand consequently, by the public. By

defining science as that which incorporates certain intellectual practices, methods,repositories, and values, a strong social boundary could be drawn to distinguish its


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practitioners from non-scientists. When technical advances enabled the development of mass

media, the public sphere became divided into minorities of specialists who put their reason

to use nonpublicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but

uncritical (Habermas 1991, p.175). The imposition of boundaries, which secured the

professional status of knowledge work, required participants in the now divided public sphere

to adopt one of two postures: withdrawal to the ivory tower and scholarship for its own sake,

or engagement to support or protest the actions of the state (Sapiro 2012).

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie had become established

within society to the extent that they had lost their sense of having a mission to fulfil

(Habermas 1991); the Dreyfus affair offered to fill the void. The affair the catalyst for a

group of novelists, artists, academics and journalistsprofessions which by now had little

in common and were socially dispersedto come together with a mission to intervene

publicly in support of Dreyfus in the name of justice and equality (Baert & Booth 2012).

Derided as the intellectuals by their opponents, this label was adopted by the group and

used as a device to bring about the creation of a new heroic and informed public which

claimed reason as its own (Bauman 1987; Eyal & Buchholz 2010; Jennings 2003). As radical

social critics involved with revolutionary movements, intellectuals were accused of

interfering with matters which were not within their competence, an accusation foreshadowed

by Napoleons denunciation of ineffectual theoreticians ungrounded in practical affairs

(Kellner 1995).

The sociology of intellectualswritten by intellectuals themselves in need of a

myth of origin or meta-history to explain to themselves who they were and where their

allegiances lay (Eyal & Buchholz 2010, p.122)examines the historical development of

intellectuals as a distinct social group and laments their apparent decline, as they became

reintegrated into the machinery of the state. The fundamental question for this sociology

(which is reviewed by Eyal & Buchholz (2010) and includes works from Benda, Mannheim,

Schumpeter, Gramsci and Gouldner) was to what or to whom did intellectuals owe their

allegiance to. A determination of whether truth, class, tradition, value or cause was the

primary motivation for intellectuals formed the centre of structural-functionalist analyses of

intellectuals attitudes and positions. Classical definitions of intellectuals shared four broad

criteria: intellectuals were a distinct social type in opposition to laypeople, politicians and

technical experts in a single domain; their work was abstract and is not aimed toward the

accomplishment of practical ends; they were committed to universal values; and they werepolitically engagedin sum, the political agency of the prototypical intellectual was a


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capacity to use abstract knowledge to intervene in the public sphere in the name of universal

values (Eyal & Buchholz 2010).

Concerned to reestablish the romantic notion of the radical, autonomous intellectual,

authors stretched the definition of the intellectual away from its prototype and made

arguments for an allegiance to certain causes, often on normative grounds. Gramsci, critical

of intellectuals who placed themselves above and apart from the influence of class interests,

promoted the ideal of the purposeful organic intellectual who pursued working class interests

as constructor, organizer, permanent persuader and not just a simple orator (in Crick

2006, p.129). Sartre propounded a vision of the total intellectual who, like the Dreyfusards,

was willing to intervene in a wide range of political affairs; he later worked for revolutionary

causes and founded radical newspapers (Kellner 1995). The romantic notion of the radical,

revolutionary intellectual was not to survive, however.

Hudson (2003) identifies two mid-twentieth century epochal shifts which influenced

the position of contemporary intellectuals. First, the approach of the end of ideology, as the

grand contest about how society should be organised is resolved in favour of the market;

second, the related consumerisation and mediatisation of the public sphere, originally

identified by Habermas. A bohemian set of intellectuals, positioned as outsiders, saw the

complacency in this assertion and argued for the contingency of knowledge upon power.

Foucault argued against Sartres grand programme forthe universal intellectual,

recommending instead that intellectuals restrict themselves to intervening in the public sphere

only where they are competent to do so (Kellner 1995; Baert & Booth 2012). Rather than

appealing to a sovereign epistemic standpoint which is in some way outside of the conflicts

it is used to adjudicate, Foucault argued that to make a claim to knowledge is to try to

strengthen some epistemic alignments and to challenge others; criticising power means

participating in alignments which provide alternatives to those of the status quo (Rouse

1994). Determining that the specific intellectual uses his knowledge, his competence and hisrelation to truth in the field of political struggles, Foucault (in Eyal & Buchholz 2010,

p.119) shifted attention away from who the intellectual isas a category of personand

toward her political agency and the context of her intervention: in his view, intellectuals

should make situated interventions to draw attention to particular problems.

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not

exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So

my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the


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ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger.

(Rouse 1994)

Hudson (2003) argues that epistemological relativism in the manner of Foucault

celebrates the fragmentation of the public sphere into a thousand specialised discourses and

supports not oppositional intellectual positions, as its proponents claim, but the maintenance

of the status quo; the problem is not that intellectuals lose their critical distance through

prolonged exposure to institutions of the state, but that their stance prevents them from

engaging a wider public in the first place. Combined with the activist intellectuals addiction

to revolutionary causeswhich following the fall of communism and fascism appears

naive, and damaged the reputation of Sartrean intellectuals (Jennings 2003)the absence of

any serious challenge to the prevailing ideological consensus left few grounds upon which to

oppose the assertion that the fundamental problematic of society has been resolved, with all

that remains being to solve narrow technical issues.

In America the publication of Jacobys The Last Intellectuals in 1987 (Jacoby 1987)

ignited a debate about the decline of the public intellectual a (redundant) neologism

attributed to Jacoby but in fact used thirty years earlier by C. Wright Mills (McLemee 2007).

Intellectuals were accused of having become domesticated into to the comfortable suburban

life of the university and consequently of losing their ability to converse with the public

(Baert & Booth 2012). In a nation which possesses universities proud of their long tradition

of public service, such an accusation reverberates. What is the role of intellectuals in the

contemporary knowledge society (Stehr 1994) if public life no longer celebrates general

intellectual authority (Small 2002) based on the traditional authoritarian and elitist model

(Cummings 2003)? The answer, as Eyal & Buchholz suggest, may more likely be found in a

sociology of interventions than in a sociology of intellectuals. What matters is to understand

the movement by which knowledge acquires value as public intervention (Eyal &

Buchholz 2010, p.119): the activities, substances, rationales, methods and desired outcomes

of interventions through which intellectuals change society (Osborne 2004).

Intellectual fields

Bourdieu constitutes fields as sites of discursive struggle between actors occupying

varying relative positions conferring greater or lesser levels of symbolic capital. Rather than

indurately owing the entirety of their allegiance to the cause of truth or to material interests,

each actor within the field possesses complex networks of allegiances and oppositions whilst


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a general tendency toward autonomy or heteronomy is maintained at the level of the field.

Eyal & Buchholz (2010) identify three main strands of literature which employ intellectual

field analysis: works which investigate the genesis, structure and transformation of

intellectual fields which pay particular attention to the autonomy of the overall field

(Bourdieu 1988; Ringer 1992; Kauppi 1996) and the effects of media exposure (Jacobs &

Townsley 2011); works which analyse how individual intellectuals or models of intellectual

emerged in the French literary field, their success and failure, and the way they conduct their

interventions (Charle 1990; Boschetti 1988; Sapiro 2003), or which widen their focus to

examine intellectuals operating in the interstitial world of think tanks (Medvetz 2012) or

compare the intellectual fields of European nations (Sapiro 2009a); and works which move

further away from analysing the allegiance of intellectuals or the autonomy of their field to

examine the forms of engagement practised by intellectuals (Sapiro 2009b; Eyal 2000;

Posner 2009).

Sapiro's modes of intervention

Sapiro (2009b) utilises three dimensions of intellectual fieldssymbolic capital,

autonomy and specificityto explain the distribution of modes of political intervention.

Position within the intellectual field, dominant or dominated, is signified by symbolic capital.

Those who occupy a dominated position within the field must carry on their struggle against

orthodoxy by politicising their protest and drawing upon others for collective or institutional

support. Conversely, dominant intellectuals may universalise their interests in a depoliticised

form, for example by introducing formal quantitative methods. The second dimension refers

to the intellectuals independence from external influences; Gramscis organic intellectual

subordinates their own interests to those of their cause. The third dimension is the degree to

which the activity of the intellectual is specialised; at one end, the applied sciences, at the

other, the literary field. The result is a matrix of eight idealtypical modes which incorporate

several existing models of the intellectual (organic, specific, etc.); Sapiro emphasises that

intellectuals may move from one posture to another.

Generalist Specialist


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Autonomy Heteronomy Autonomy Heteronomy

Dominant universalisticcritical intellectual

moralising

defender of the

established order

specialised critical

intellectual

(Foucauldian

specific

intellectual)

specialist

advising thegovernment

(expert)

Dominated

universalistic

critical intellectual

collective

(vanguard or

collectives

defending a

universal cause)

generalist

institutional

intellectual

specialised critical

collective

(Bourdieusian

collective

intellectual)

specialised

institutional

intellectual

The sociology of interventions

Eyal & Buchholz (2010) draw together two bodies of literature to outline a sociology

of interventions: Bourdieusian works on the sociology of intellectual fields, and a sociology

of expertise which encompasses work from the social studies of science and technology

(SSST), Foucauldian work on governmentality (the art of government), and international

relations literature on epistemic communities. In their view the transition from the sociology

of intellectuals to the sociology of interventions entails not only decentering the agency of

intervention [by distributing agency across multiple actors and performative systems] and

multiplying the modes of intervention, but also reenvisioning the space along which the

movement of intervention proceeds (Eyal & Buchholz 2010, p.132). Because interventions

take place in an interstitial domain with ambiguous boundaries, situated between the world

of ideas and the world of political action, the principal challenge for a sociology of

interventions is to reconcile the notion of action in fuzzily bounded interstitial domains with a

seemingly incommensurable field analysis founded upon a conception of (relatively)

autonomous fields with (relatively) distinct boundaries.

Dreyfusards, the original intellectuals, were a coalition brought together by shared

values and common interests. For Bourdieu, teams of social scientists should act as a

collective intellectual in the public interest by using their knowledge of the operation of


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cultural fields (Swartz 2003; Baert & Booth 2012). Contemporary scholars have sought to

understand the capacity of intellectual networks, or epistemic communities, to support

intervention in public affairs (Haas 1992); the characteristics of expertise which offer

grounds upon which intervention may be legitimated (Collins & Evans 2007); the way

technologies and theoriessuch as economic modelsnot only analyse and predict but

also perform and shape society (Callon 1998); and how political power is conditioned with

certain implicit rationalities and discourses (Foucault 2007; Rose et al. 2006).

Issue networks and epistemic communities

Heclo (Heclo 1978) describes a policy-making process which is increasingly

becoming an intramural activity among expert issue-watchers, their networks, and theirnetworks of networks. These issue networks comprise a large number of individuals who

constantly move in and out of networks. Rather than interests predefining participants

positions on an issue, intellectual or emotional commitment drives participation in a network.

In the postmodern state (Richards & Smith 2002) no one is in control, but policy

communities gather around specific fields and organisations (Stone et al. 2001), with policy-

making distributed across a variety of actors and locations (Ball & Exley 2010).

The concept of epistemic communities in relation to international policy change was

introduced by Haas, but the term was already in use to describe scientific communities

following a paradigm in the style of Kuhn (Haas 1992). Epistemic communities are networks

of professionals who are able to make authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge in a

particular domain by virtue of expertise. Some epistemic communities could perhaps be

characterised as scientific issue networks. They share normative and causal beliefs,

intersubjective criteria for assessing the validity of knowledge and a set of common practices.

Expertise and performativity

The phenomenon of lay expertise, the ability of non-professionals to develop

expertise and generate new knowledge on specific topics, led SSST scholars to refocus their

interest away from the characteristics of experts and towards understanding owhat constitutes

expertise. The paradigm case was that of Cumbrian sheep farmers studied by Brian Wynne,

whose knowledge of the ecology of sheep inhabiting land contaminated by fallout from the

Chernobyl disaster was ignored by government scientists (Collins & Evans 2002). The sheep

farmers had sufficient local expertise to be able to contribute to the science, but neither the


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farmers nor the scientists possessed interactional expertise of a kind which would enable such

a contribution to be realised. In this case the expertise was not possessed by any individual or

group but was a potentiality in a scientist-farmer network which could propose, legitimate

and verify the contribution, yet in the event failed to materialise.

The performativity literature also attributes effects to networks, but what constitutes a

network is more broadly defined. With roots in an Actor-Network Theory which refuses to

privilege the human and so includes within the network construct non-human actors such as

scientific theories, economic models, tools and techniques, materials and computer programs,

the locus of agency in a performative analysis is located not in a particular expert or

community but in an assemblage of all of the above (Callon 1998; Eyal & Buchholz 2010).

The visibility of economists in recent years as policy advisors and media commentators has

ensured that economics has been of particular interest to performativity scholars (Fourcade-

Gourinchas 2003; Fourcade-Gourinchas 2009; Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).

Governmentality

The concept of governmentality was introduced by Foucault during the 1970s in the

course of his investigation of the birth of liberalism and its adoption by the state (Rose et al.

2006). As a certain mentality of government linking political ideas with action,

governmentality is an ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and

reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit

complex form of power (Foucault 1979; in Rose et al. 2006, p.86). Governmentality

approaches a similar problematic to that of performativity, the question of how knowledge is

injected into society and with what effects, but from an opposite direction: rather than asking

how theory shapes society, it asks how government becomes permeated with particular

modes of thought (Eyal & Buchholz 2010).

Gordon, in his Afterword toPower/Knowledge (Foucault 2007) differentiates three

concepts from Foucaults approach: technologies, locally applicable techniques, such as

insurance, which may be applied to a population;strategies, rationales and theories, such as

the concept of social security, which sufficiently format reality to enable specific and

coherent activities; these areprograms, thepractices and instruments of government, such as

social work or family allowances (Rose et al. 2006). Studies of governmentality offer

accounts which explain the behaviour of government in terms of the roles of ideas,

ideologies, and innovations, such as the practical technologies of economics, which move,


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perform and format individuals to think and behave in certain ways. They address the

transition of ideas and systems across boundaries and networks; in Governing the Soul(Rose

1999) Nikolas Rose addresses the contribution of the human and social sciences to the

strategies, technologies and programs of government.

Configuring the user

Acceptance of an idea relies upon more than the inherent features of the idea itself; it

means buying into a new configuration of social relations with the producing

organization/organizers (Woolgar 2004). Woolgar discusses how organizations configure

the user to accept a new idea by giving them a sense of ownership over it (Woolgar 1991).

Merely acknowledging that an idea exists means accepting certain claims about howknowledge is produced, and going further to adopt an idea requires a reconfiguration of social

networks and an acceptance of certain structures of expertise and authority (Woolgar 2004).

Woolgar terms this a constitutive perspective on ideas: in opposition to essentialist

perspectives which imbue ideas with intrinsic characteristics that enable them to act on

people (a romantic perspective), sometimes requiring support for their successful passage

(modified romanticism), the constitutive perspective argues that ideas are constituted in

and through the processes of their articulation and representation (Woolgar 2004, p.452); as

academic texts persuade and ultimately configure (or fail to configure) their readers to accept

the ideas expounded within them, the acceptance of academic ideas outside the academic

sphere means in some way bringing the recipient into some sort of alignment with the

language-game from which the idea originated.

Vehicular ideas and epistemic forms

McLennan & Osborne introduce the concept of vehicular ideas such as the ThirdWay or knowledge society(McLennan & Osborne 2003) which are inclusive rather than

divisive and move things along by carrying people with them. Vehicular ideas are open,

mobile, somewhat ambiguous and capable of local reinterpretation, enabling their proponents

new types of intellectuals who Osborne (2004) dubs mediators to successful transit

ideas across boundaries. Vehicular ideas are contrasted with oracular or ocular ideas, the

product of a different type of intellectual or political actor, the legislator (or classical

intellectual) who specifies how things are and how things will be. Osborne (2004) draws

upon Zygmunt Baumans distinction between modern and postmodern intellectuals to outline


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a typology of epistemic forms and styles of intervention which constitute repertoires

employed by individuals in the course of their intellectual work: to Baumans authoritative

legislators who arbitrate between opinions, and the more postmodern interpreters who

translate statements between knowledge-systems, Osborne adds the technical expertwhose

specialist expertise is autonomous from yet ancillary to the work of government, andafter

Deleuzethe mediator, the intellectual worker as enabler, fixer, catalyst and broker of

ideas (Osborne 2004, p.440), who intervenes to get things moving. Each epistemic form

entails that intellectuals frame their subjectivity in a certain manner relative to their

problematisation of the world and the role of ideas within the world; Osborne compares this

to Foucaults concept of ethical technologies which format the manner in which one ought

to form oneself as an ethical subject (Foucault 1990), drawing upon four dimensions of

differencein short, the what, why, how and desired outcome of a particular manner of

conductto describe the activity and subjective alignment of each form.


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ActivitySubstance

(what)

Rationale

(why)

Stylization

(how)

Strategy

(outcome)

Legislator

Making

authoritative

statements

which arbitrate

in controversies

Politico-

cultural

programmes

To bring

about

intellectual

order

Cultivation of

a rational

discipline

Wider social

and political

order

Interpreter

Translating

statements from

one tradition to

another

Texts

To translate

between

cultural

frames

Cultivation of

conversational

disciplines

(judgement

and

discernment)

Understanding

amidst the

clash of

cultures

Expert

Servicing

knowledge

which is

ancillary to and

autonomous

from

government

Statements

from

particular

factual

domains

To provide

true useful

knowledge,autonomous

from

contamination

By being a

virtuoso of

detail

Gradual

accrual of

information

which

eventually

modifies

government

Mediator

Getting things

moving by

enabling,

fixing,

catalysing and

brokering ideas

Produce or

aid the

productionof usable

ideas

To innovate

Juxtaposing

different ideas

and differentpersons

together

Culture where

ideas matter

For Osborne the demise of grand ideologies opened up a space in which vehicular

ideas and mediation can thrive, but the requirements of each epistemic form differ: the

legislator can legislate on his own; the expert needs a field; the interpreter needs a study full


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of texts; but the mediator needs others and produces in relation to others and for this reason

mediation is necessarily a public, collective and interactive activity (Osborne 2004, p.443).

Academics as intellectuals

When scientific knowledge production became increasingly diversified and

specialised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, academic disciplines and their local

manifestations as university departments became the dominant organisational forces.

Knowledge producers working within the academy structure are required to produce results

that are novel and notable whilst maintaining compatibility with existing data, priorities and

procedures. Academic work consequently generates high levels of task uncertainty andcannot be monitored procedurally; scientists are therefore afforded considerable freedom as

to how they complete their work (Whitley 2000). Quality and integrability of output is

instead ensured by a normative pressure which results from the inculcation of a strong

orientation to the opinion of other scientists; academics have adopted a reputational form of

work organisation that differs from the organisation of industry or of the professions.

As the labour market status of scientists is defined by their reputation within a

discipline (Whitley 2000), evidenced by their publication record and bestowed by their

department, the disciplinedepartment nexus is a powerfully entrenched custodian of

training, employment and reputation. The stance academics adopt towards fulfilling the

demands of their department and discipline may affect their ability to secure influence and

progress in their careers. Reaching the top of a discipline usually confers membership of

elite institutions which legitimate access to the higher echelons of government, but the degree

to which academics are publicly active earlier in their careers may be expected to be strongly

related to the norms and networks established within each discipline. Support may be

provided by departments in the form of access to sources of funding and support to run

events, set up a research unit or journal, or locally and informally by senior academics who

act as mentors and role models, brokering access to networks of policy-makers and

imprinting their norms and behaviours on their research group (Gktepe-Hultn 2008).

Intermediary structures such as research centres and institutes may increase the flow of

knowledge and stabilise the interfacebetween academic disciplines and wider society: by

responding to social demands for relevant knowledge . . . [research centres] have served to


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buffer the academic core of the university from the distortions that those demands would

undoubtedly cause if they had to be met within a departmental context (Geiger 1990, p.17).

Academic motivation

University researchers express four different types of intentions of academic practice:

to fulfil the requirements of an academic role, to become well known, to solve intellectual

puzzles or to make wider contributions to society (kerlind 2008). Lam (2011), exploring the

relationship between scientists stances towards the separation of science and commerce and

their motivation to conduct research, found four orientations towards commercial science:

pure traditional, pragmatic traditional, hybrid and entrepreneurial and three

motivations, knowledge/curiosity (puzzle), funding/networking (ribbon) and income(gold).

Debates within social science disciplines

Every social science discipline has debated its relationship with the world outside the

academy, and such debates are characteristically polarised; one camp is concerned to ensurethe discipline stays relevant to the concerns of society, and another warns against

politicisation and consequent delegitimisation.

[ Insert analysis of each soc ial science field here]

Institutions and institutional work

[I think that a sociology of interventions would benefit from being integrated

with the inst i tut ion al l i terature, but this w ork remains to be done]

Institutional entrepreneurs

Institutions enable and constrain action and rationality by preselecting the

opportunities and choices which actors are able to perceive (Barley & Tolbert 1997): asorganisational practices are the way things are done within organisations, institutions are


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the way things are in society, prohibiting actors from recognising that there are alternatives.

Institutions can be modified through the action of individuals or organizations: Barley (1997)

offers the acquisition of suffrage and the dismantling of apartheid as examples.

Institutional entrepreneurs are agents who act strategically to commit resources to

support existing institutions or create new institutions (Beckert 1999). The concept of

institutional work recognises that the practices of institutional maintenance or change are

undertaken by a wider range of actors than institutional entrepreneurs (Lawrence & Suddaby

2006). Institutional work encompasses activities such as advocacy, constructing identities and

networks, connecting, theorizing, enabling and policing practices.

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Literature in the Sociologies of Intellectuals and Interventions