Limits and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics

8/4/2019 Limits and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics

1/29

The Limits and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics for Democratic TheoryAuthor(s): David IngramSource: Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 294-321Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191818 .

Accessed: 27/06/2011 07:22

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/stable/191818?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sagehttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/191818?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage


2/29

THELIMITSANDPOSSIBILITIESOF COMMUNICATIVETHICSFOR DEMOCRATIC HEORY

DAVIDINGRAMLoyola University

ROUSSEAU'S BELIEFTHAT olitical ationalityequiresemocraticparticipationappearsquaintby the lights of contemporary ationalchoicetheory.Democracy,we aretold, seldomif ever generatesrationaloutcomesor uniquelyconsistent,maximal rankorderingsof preferencesof the sortrequiredby a volont6gdnerale.' Against this view it may be objectedthatdemocraticrationality esideselsewhere,namely, n its salubrious ffects onthedevelopmentof rational acultiesfoundationalorsocial choicegenerally.Arguments for extending democracy to all levels of life, including theworkplace,have usually followed this line of reasoning.Yet as Jon Elsternotes, it is unlikely that the developmentof rationalfaculties could be theprimaryaimof politicalaction, which,if it is oriented owardanythingatall,is orientedto the efficientpursuitof more mundanegoals.2Compoundingtheproblem s thepenchantof democratic ocialists schooled in theMarxisttradition o stress laboras the vehicle of self-development.3The appealtolaborplaysintothehandsof rationalchoice criticsof democracyby presum-ing an instrumentalism hatprivileges scientific managementover demo-cratic decisionmakingandneglectsthepeculiarrationaleauthorizingpolit-ical rights.4

I arguebelow thatself-realizationcan function as the primaryrationaleunderlyingdemocraticparticipationo long as policy goals can be pursuedin anminimallyeffective way.Tosee how this is possible,I proposethat weturn o Habermas'suse of communicationheory narticulatinghedynamicsof moralself-development.Communication thicsis said to embody an ideaAUTHOR'SNOTE: The author is gratefulto TracyStrong,James Bohman,George Trey,andJulia Simon-Ingramor readingearlierdraftsof thisessay.POLMCAL HEORY,ol.21 No.2, May1993294-321C 1993 Sage Publications, nc.294


3/29

Ingram COMMUNICATIVE THICS/DEMOCRATICHEORY 295

of democratic procedural ustice that provides a universal basis for civil,political, and social rights.'This accomplishmentdispenses with the usualappeal to rationalchoice theoremscommonly associated with social con-tractarianapproachesin that it ties the interpretationand validation ofspecific rights to democraticconsent. Here, one must be careful not toconstrueconsent(consensus)as acriterion pecifyingtrueor ustoutcomes-a precaution hatHabermasdoes not alwaysheed. What is decisive in thelegitimationof laws and policies is not that they are chosen as the mosteffective means for satisfying generalinterestsbut thatthey are adopted naccordancewith an approximatelyairprocedure.So long as partiesto thedebate haveroughlyequal opportunitieso influencepublic opinionand aregenuinely motivatedby concern for the public good, the compromiseout-comes thattypicallyarise in game-theoretic ituationswill satisfy minimal(if not maximal)conditionsof social rationalityand fairness.Because legit-imate outcomes areimperfectexpressionsof social choice, they cannot bemorally binding n thestrongsense suggested by Habermas.I concludethata properlyqualifieddiscourseethics defines the scope ofdemocraticparticipationmore broadlythan either Habermasor his criticsrealize.6Habermas's ejection f "simple ecipesof workers'elf-management"in light of the requirements f a government-regulatedmarketeconomy-aview thatstrangely esonateswith rational hoice criticsof democracy-mayappear o manyas a retreat romthe democratic deal.7YetI think it can beshownthat workerdemocracysatisfies conditions for rationalchoice betterthan massplebiscitarydemocracywhile alsoprovidingnecessarysocial andculturalconditions for democraticustice.

COMMUNICATIONTHICSAS MORALPROCEDUREIf only formalconceptionsof morality ive up to the universalistic xpec-

tations of a modernconceptionof reason, the sphere of moral rationalitywould be restricted o thejustificationof particularmaxims of action in lightof abstractprocedures of universalizability.A classic example is Kant'scategorical mperative.In Kant'stheory,universalizability esidesin a pre-establishedharmonyamongisolatedagents who possess the same rationalfaculties.Consistency testingrules out maxims whose general application,from the subjective standpointof private moral conscience, is either self-contradictory r incompatiblewithrationalagency.8In Habermas'sopinion, Kant's exclusion from the domain of moralreasoning of any considerationof consequences as these bear upon the


4/29

296 POLITICALHEORYMay1993

happinessof those affected imits anddistorts heuniversalization rocedure,so that the latterendsup legitimizinglaws and normsthataredetrimental othe interests of some persons. This defect is ostensibly remedied by acommunicativeethic in which "onemustbe able to test whethera normor amodeof action could be generallyacceptedby those affectedby it, such thattheiracceptancewould be rationallymotivatedand hence uncoerced."9ToparaphraseThomasMcCarthy,t shifts theemphasisfromwhat each personindependentof any considerationof historical interests can will to be ageneral law to whatall in agreementwith othersonsuch interestscanacceptas a universallybindingnorm.

This formulation uggeststhatrationalconsensusreplaceslawfulconsis-tencyasacriterionof moralright,animpression hat s reinforcedby anearlyessay of Habermas's n which he virtuallyequatestruthand moralvaliditywith consensus.10 uch an equation,however, appears nconsistentwith thedemocraticthrustof his discourse ethic. Consensus functions as a criteriononly if it is conceived as the outcomeof a perfectlyrationaldialogueunderideal conditions,namely,conditionsof perfectlytransparentommunicationunlimitedby time andspace. However,even if an unlimitedcommunityofpast, present,and futurespeakerswould reachagreementunderconstraint-and context-freeconditions, therebyreducingthe universalizabilityproce-dureto thehypotheticalchoice of a single,ideal"speaker,"onsensus wouldbe a sign of truthonly if we furtherassumedthat all participantspossessedcomplete knowledgeof themselvesand theirworld." Hencethetrivialityofa consensustheoryof truth.

Not surprisingly,Habermashas backedaway fromregardingconsensusas a criterion of truth. He now holds that consensus is a condition ofwarrantedassertibility.Assertion of nontrivial ruthclaims is warranted nthe condition that others could accept them pending rational ustification.Some of thereasonsoffered njustificationwill includespecific truth riteriathatarethemselvespotentially alsifiable.Thuswe maysaythat he adoptionof natural aw principlesby eighteenth-century olitical theorists was war-rantedgiven theirpeculiarcriteriaof rationality ndscientifictruthbutwouldnot be so warrantednlightof today'scriteria,whichprohibit he commissionof naturalisticallacies.'2If consensus warrantsassertion of fallible truthclaims, then it can nolonger provide a strong criterion or identifyingideological claims. As ourexampleof natural aw shows, assertionscan be accepted as warranted, hatis, as nonideologically motivated,only on the basis of truthcriteriathat inthe long runmight not be so warranted.Unless Habermas dentifies war-rantedassertibilitywith aninfallible notionof rationalustification-a movetantamount oretrievingaconsensus heoryof truth-he willhave to concede


5/29

Ingram COMMUNICATIVE THICS/DEMOCRATIC HEORY 297

thatreasonableclaimsmightbe ideological. Indeed, fwe acceptHabermas'sstrongnotion of ideology as any belief or practicethat is shaped by powerrelations,butwhich masksthis fact behind anuncriticallyaccepted validityclaim, we must conclude that because some such beliefs and practicesinevitably influence the language in which we reason, all our reasonableclaims are at least ideologicallytainted.To summarize,Habermasmust be carefulnot to define the counterfactualconditionsof rationalacceptance warranted ssertibility)oo stringentlyesthe reintroduce consensus criterionof truth.Assertibleare those claims thatwe could accept given ourpresenttruthcriteria; t is againstthe counterfac-tual expectations implicit in these-and not in some infallible notion ofperfect, transparentnsight-that we judge particular laims to be deluded,ideological, and so forth.Moreover, n manyinstancesthe criteriathatwedeploy will be inseparable romdiscourse,practices, nstitutions,and tech-niques.These will be shaped by power relations. So the questionwe mustnow addressis how can democraticdiscussionbe structured o as to bestcriticize power relations inherentin current scientific paradigms (Kuhn),ethicalregimes,andnormativepractices n which truthandreasonareatstake(Foucault)?Habermas's esponseto thisquestion s to constitutemoral discussion asa public spherethatmakes universalconsentthegoal underlyingattempts oresolvemattersof publicconcern.TheresponseIwilldefend,however,urgesthe establishmentof democracy n theworkplace,wherepowerrelationsaremoredirect, ocal,andpersonal.However,beforeaddressing hisissue it willbe helpful to reexamine the role that universalconsent (universalizability)plays in moralreasoning.

Habermasdefends a rigid distinction between deontological questionsconcerninguniversalright (justice)and teleological questionsconcerningpersonaland social good. To the formerhe assignsthe rational ustificationof obligatorynorms, o the latter heprudent hoice of norms.Here,practicalreason(Moralitdt) s equatedwithcompetenciesrequisitefor the discursiveadjudicationof conflicts, ethical evaluation (Sittlichkeit)with the artful"know-how" Klugheit)requisite orjudgment(DE, 104).

Recently,Habermashassuggested hat he above distinction s softerthanhe hadpreviously ndicated.First, he assessmentof moralnorms mplicatesan aesthetic evaluation and transformation f specific needs and goods.Second, Habermasallows thatspeakers n practicaldiscoursecombine theroles of prudentactor andimpartial pectator, o thatthey bring with themtheir own experiences as actors and judges in comparing the potentialconsequencesof normsforhypothetical ituations.Validnormsmust satisfygeneral intereststhroughappropriate pplication o a range of foreseeable


6/29

298 POLITICALTHEORY May 1993

situations."3 ctors and udges likewise engage in internally imulated"dis-courses of application," n which the moralprincipleof universalizabilitymandates the considerationof "all relevantaspects of a case" (MC, 207).Moral argumentationhus involves balancing principlesand conventionalresponses to situations in a manner approximatinga Rawlsian state ofreflectiveequilibrium.

AlbrechtWellmer alludes to this feature of moralargumentationn hisdiscussionof the inherent imits of universalization.Moralargumentsarisein concreteaction contextsand almost nvariablyconcernthejustificationofexceptionsto generallyacceptedrules. Hencethey bring ntoplay situation-boundinterpretations f particular ontexts, needs, motives, and identities.Thismeansthat, nsofaras it appliesto humanrealityatall,universalizabilitycannot be understoodas positively mandating he general observance ofnorms in the mannersometimes assertedby Kant and Habermas.14Whatmakes thegeneralobservanceof normspossiblein a realmof endsoranidealspeech situation-the elimination of all contextual constraints(temporal,geographical,and deological)thatwould otherwisepresentopportunitiesorconflict and reinterpretation-does not obtain in an imperfect,above all,modem world, where ambiguitiesand dilemmas are the order of the day.Given the fact that there are exceptions to every valid rule, a strict uni-versalizability est couldgenerateonly an unconditional bligation o refrainfromfollowing rules-such as a universalpermission(orobligation)to lie,steal, kill, and so on-the universal compliance with which would beinconsistentorcontraryo what allrationalpersonscould want."5Obviously,this use of consensus (as an ethicaluniversalizationprocedure)contributeslittle to the criticalunderstanding f a given society,institution,practice,orpower relation. To see how the notionof consensus figures in the criticalassessment of local, context-boundconfigurationsof interest, power, andmotivation,we will have to examine Habermas'sapplication of it to thedomain of law andpolitics.

COMMUNICATIVETHICSANDLEGITIMACYDetermination of the moral permissibility of an action must not beconflated with the determinationof the legitimacy of a law. Habermashimself notesthat thefallibility of moral udgment,theuncertainty f moralmotivation,and the absence of clear proceduralguidelines regulating theachievementof moralconsensus pose risks that can be mitigated only bymeans of coercive law.16This social contractarianustification of law as


7/29

IngramCOMMUNICATIVETHICS/DEMOCRATICHEORY 299

coordinatingmechanismandsafeguard or freedomdoes not itself legitimateany de facto authority.Habermas never argues that we have a generalobligation to obey political authority(indeed, there may well be no suchobligation).'7Heonly argues hatone has an obligation o obey laws to whichone could rationallyconsent.Now, to say that one has an obligationto obey laws to which one couldrationallyconsent is problematicbecause it suggests that one justifiablymightbe forcedto obey a law againstone's will on thegrounds hat one wasmistaken about what one really wanted. As Isaiah Berlin observed,Rousseau's paradoxof forcing persons to be free presupposesa peculiarconception of positive freedom grounded in a counterfactualnotion ofrationalagency."8Habermas uccumbsto thisparadox n some of his earlierwritings, where he defines legitimacy in terms of a hypotheticalconsentgrounded in a counterfactualnotion of generalizableinterests and thenproceeds to argue hat egitimacyso construed ntailsa correspondingmoralobligation.In more recent formulationshe defines legitimacy in termsofprocedural ustice, therebycircumventing he paradox.However,he still-wrongly, in my opinion-assumes that recognitionof a law's legitimacyentails a correspondingdutyto obey it.Despite this failing, Habermas s generallyattentive to differences be-tween legal andmoralauthority.Unlike moralnorms, aws arepromulgatedby predesignatedauthorities,apply to specific jurisdictions,and have thebackingof punitivesanctions ED, 115-22;LM,244). By contrast, heprimafacie obligation to obey any particular aw (or legal system) rests on itsimpartiality.Habermashere argues against legal positivists like Hart andKelsen that constitutionalrules alone do not ensureimpartiality LM, 229).He notes that the rules governing electoral representation,parliamentaryprocedure,and dueprocessarenecessarilyconstrainedby traditional rece-dents,de facto authorities,adversarial elationships, emporalandjurisdic-tionalrestriction,andimperfectdecisionprocedures.Totheextent that suchrules are impartial, t is with respectto their rationalpotential for guidingdebate towardthe resolutionof therightnessand truthof generalprinciplesof justice. But the proper groundof impartialityies deeperthan the rulesgoverning rational debate within legislative and administrativebodies. Itultimately rests on the informal conditions and procedures requisite forgeneratinga rational,public consent.

Consentis not to be understoodas mereassentto legal agendasdictatedby political elites. To the contrary,Habermassubmits that the public (orpublics) oughtto generate he agendasandpolicy rationalesguidingadmin-istrators.'9The idea behind this model of legitimation s communitarianninspirationonly.20Habermas ealizesthat,giventhepluralityof interests, he


8/29


proceduresand conditions of rationalcommunicationmust serve as proxyfor an antecedentharmonyof substantiventerests; hegeneralwill mustbeachievedin rationalconversation, f it is to be achievedat all. By conceivingdemocracyin this way-as a medium for the critical formationof opinionandwill, henceas a medium n which citizens constitute heirownindividualautonomy n solidaritywith others-Habermas seeks to show how problemspertaining o majoritarianyrannyand the rankorderingof preferencescanbe mitigatedfromwithintheconfinesof discoursewithoutappeal o anteced-ent natural ightsor rationaldecisionprocedures."

Habermas s not advocatinga model of participatory emocracythat isincompatiblewith the stateor withindependentadministrative genciesthatinterpretand apply the policy rationale(s)generatedby the public sphere.Even if therewere no distinctpolitical obligationto obey a given state (oragency), therewould be a moralobligationon the partof membersof anyassociation to assure that the laws to which they consented were appliedimpartially. n keeping with this view of rights,Habermasarguesthat theseparationof powers is not an externallimit to the democratic deal as heonce believed. Consensus without due process is tyranny; aws that are notalso legitimatedby extant udicial machineryare not laws (VaV,28ff.).22If we understand ationalconsensus as warranting he acceptance of alaw's legitimacy, then, according o Habermas,we arecommitted o accept-ing the following propositions:"recommendationX is legitimate"means"recommendationX is in the general (orpublic) interest" LI); and "recom-mendationX is in the public interest"means"X is accepted by all affectedasjustified"(L2).23 roblems mmediately umpto mind withthisdefinitionof legitimacy.X mightbe acceptedbythepublicas in theircollectiveinteresteven if they know that X does not satisfy the interests of each personindividually.Maximizingthe greatesthappiness or the greatestnumber orchoosing a policy that will improve the general condition of all citizenspresentandfuture),a richutilitarianmightsupporta soak-the-rich axstatutedesigned to generaterevenue for an egalitarianhealth care system whosebenefits to her, her family, or her immediate circle of associates will notoutweigh the costs. Or,to take anotherexample, a communityof environ-mentalists and industrialworkersmightaccept a compromisepollutionbillas in the public interest not because it satisfies either of their particularinterests-each party, we will assume, believes that her own interest isidenticalto thepublic interest-but because t avoids a public evil (e.g., civilwar) or facilitates a mutuallybeneficialalliance (againstcapitalists).Given Habermas'srecentacknowledgement hat strategiccompromisesof this sort are the normaloutcomes of political negotiations in liberaldemocracy, t is bestto view his insistenceon thegeneralizability f interests


9/29


as specifying a very weak conception of the common good, one that mightbe acceptableto all simply owing to the absence of an agreementon someothergood that each of the negotiatingpartiesfeels is rationallypreferable.We need only recur to rational choice theory to confirm the theoreticalpossibilityof agreements hat ail toproduceaconsistent-let alonemaximal-ranking of preferences.Paradoxesof rationalchoice do not speak againsta consensus theory oflegitimation, so long as the theory allows for compromise and stressesrationality of process over outcome.24Of course, if democracy failed tosatisfy minimal conditions of instrumental ationality, o that it repeatedlygenerated nconsistentand/orsubmaximalpreferencerankings-thus mak-ing goal-orientedpolitics meaningless-there would be no good reason toprefer it, developmentaladvantagesnotwithstanding.Democracy may notbe the most economic vehicle for selecting public policy, but it usuallysatisfiesminimalstandards f rationality ufficienttojustify retaining t as avehicle of rational evelopment. ndeed,nsmall-scaledemocracies onsensus-orienteddiscussionprobablymitigatesconflicts(differences)among prefer-ence rankingsthat generate paradoxesof rational choice. However, oneshould not insist on strict generalizabilityof interests for legitimation,otherwise one comes dangerouslyclose to presuminga model of rationalchoice that is incompatiblewith democracy.The procedureof ideologycritique that Habermasoutlines in LegitimationCrisis suffers from thisdefect. There,Habermasargued hat the social criticshouldhypotheticallyimagine how the membersof a social system

would ... at a given stage in the developmentof productive orces, have collectivelyandbindingly interpretedheir needs (andwhich norms(they would) have acceptedasjustified) if theycould and would have decided on an organization f social intercoursethroughdiscursivewill-formation,with adequateknowledgeof the limitingconditionsand functional mperativesof theirsociety. (LC, 113)As formulatedabove, the procedure nvites us to calculate the conse-

quencesof certain nstitutions or the satisfactionof needs-a ratheruncer-tainundertaking.ts maindrawback,however,resides n itspresumptionhata rankorderingof preferencescan be rationallyascertained.Althoughthepossibility of such an orderingbecomes increasinglyremote as societybecomes morecomplex andpluralistic, he presumption hat theremustbesuppressedgeneralizable nterestscould be used tojustify thelegitimacyoflaws thatwe (therationalelite) hypothesizewould or could be accepted bythose affectedif theypossessed transparent nowledgeof theirtrue nterests.Combined with Habermas'sclaim that the binding characterof a norm


10/29


consists in its validity (LC, 104), this presumption ould be used to justifythe impositionof valid normson persons againsttheir will-an implicationthatHabermashimself once entertained.25A consensus theoryof legitimacy,then,must not be construed oo coun-terfactually; hatis, it must not make the satisfactionof universal nterests(LI) a necessarycondition for a law's legitimacy.However,we shouldnotethat a weaker definitionof legitimacystressinguniversalagreement L2) isequally problematic. mentionedabove that such agreementwouldhave tomake allowancesforcompromises,or agreementswhich none or only someof the partiesbelieved satisfied common interests.But whatif some of theparties simply refused to compromise?Could a law be legitimateto whichonly some personsconsented?Standarddemocratic theory holds that something less than universalconsensus-the preferenceof a majorityor plurality-is sufficient to legiti-matelaws, so long as those who dissent(theminority)have anequalchanceto vote and marshalsupportagainstthem. In most cases, majorityrule ismorally preferable o rule by unanimousconsent, as the latter would givemorevalue to the voice of a lone dissenter hanto the combined voice of themajority, herebyviolatingthe principleof equality.If we rejectuniversal-ization (as I suggest we do), the legitimacy of the results could only beguaranteedby thefairnessof theproceduresregulating hedemocraticgame.Habermashimself sometimes suggests thatproceduresare the decisivefactorsin legitimating aws. If consensus continuesto play a role here, it isas a proceduralguideline:all partiesto the discussionshould strive to reachagreementon a commongood as disinterestedlyas possible (a qualificationthat by no meansprecludesthe assertionof particularnterests).26 ecauseHabermashimself declares that "compromisespossess a wholly undimin-ished worth"-indeed, he chides extremists within the Green Party forrefusing to compromise with organizedlabor and the Social DemocraticPartyonenvironmental eforms-he mustspecify proceduresby whichsuchagreementsmay be acceptedas legitimate.27Presumably, uch procedureswill also explainwhy minoritiesacceptthe legitimacyof laws to whichtheydissented. For acceptanceof the legitimateform of a law, which ostensiblyfollows from acceptance of the rules of the democratic game, must bedistinguished romacceptanceof its content.Habermas hus concedes that faircompromises,or strategicagreementsin which conflictinginterestsare harmonizedn a balanceof power,may belegitimate without satisfying generalizableinterests or being universallyacceptedby all.However, awsregulatingdisputesthatappear o strikea faircompromisebetween irreducibilyopposed interestsmight be illegitimate.Habermasclaims that such laws can be criticizedon the groundsthatthey


11/29


reflectpseudo-compromises.A compromise hatemergedoutof a discussionslanted n favor of one of the parties (e.g., the wealthierand morepowerful)would be invalidatedon proceduralgrounds LC, 111 f.). However,a com-promisethatconcealeda "suppression f generalizablenterests"would alsobe invalid. Indeed,the two defects are closely linked in Habennas's viewbecausethe closer thatnegotiationsapproximatehe conditionsobtaining nideal speech, the less likely generalizableinterestswill be suppressed.Itfollows thatcompromisesare validonly if theparties n questionhave failedto reach consensuson generalizable nterests n impartialdialogue.We noted above how difficult(if not impossible) t is to determinea rankorderingof preferences,even understringent ounterfactual onditions.Forthisreason,the suppressionof generalizablenterests s not a usefulconceptfordetermining he fairnessof a compromise.Thereforewe would be betteroff to focus on what Habermashas to say abouttheprocedural equirementsfor reachingcompromise,such as the balance of power requirement.It would be difficult to deny that n pluralisticsocieties some irreduciblyparticularnterestswill be morepowerfulthanothers-quite apart rom thedistorting nfluence of money, power,and ideology. Any compromisebal-ancingthe interestsof animalexperimentation dvocates andanimalrightsactivists would likely favor the interestsof one of these parties,no matterhow fairlyit was achieved.Moreover, t is unlikelythat controlsregulatinghumaneanimalexperimentationwill be regardedby all animalrightsactiv-ists as fairly balancing heir nterestsagainsttheiropponents'.

Habermas'sdiscussion of civil disobedience suggests what his responseto this case might be. Germanpeace advocates,he argues,have a right tocommitacts of civil disobediencebecausestrategicdecisions have not beenprocessed throughdemocraticchannels thatpresent both sides with equalchances for influencing eaders andpublic opinion. However, he also notesthatdecisionsprocessed naccordancewithfair democraticprocedureoughtnot to be irreversible.Minoritiesrecognize the legitimacy of majoritydeci-sions only to the extent thatthey are reversibleand, therefore,only to theextent thatthey canpressure or fair compensationor faircompromise.28It may be objected that in zero-sum games (weapons or no weapons;animalexperimentation r animal iberation) he scope for faircompromiseor compensationis limited at least as far as the most militant of interestgroups is concerned. When the majority s not likely to be reversed in thenear future (as in the case of animal experimentation), here no longerremainsanybasis-on Habermas's ccount-for recognizing he legitimacyof the compromise.But this result appears counterintuitive.Should winners feel morallycompelledtocompensate osers in ademocratic ontest?Perhaps hey should


12/29


if they are indifferent o the outcome (andthe losers are not). But perhapsthey shouldn't if the losers areextremistswho representviews the winnersfind morally repugnant.Here there is no room for compromise.We can imagine Habermas'sresponse to this objection:If losers don'thave to be compensated, f theirviews don't have to enter nto compromiselegislation, and if the decision againstthem doesn't have to be reversible,how cantheybeexpectedto concede thelegitimacyof theiropponent's aw?They can-because recognitionof the legitimacyof the law does not entaila commitment o abideby it.29A militantanimalrightsadvocatemightagreethat the law she refuses to obey was processed in accordance with fairdemocraticprocedure,despite its being morallyflawed. The decision foraccepting its legitimacy would be based on recognitionof the fact that apreponderanceof public opinion-a preponderancesufficient to violateHabermas's airbalance of powercondition-would likely supportat leastsome animalexperimentationorgood reasons,quiteapart romideologicaldistortions.Although one's moral convictions should be tempered by thereasonable voice of an opposingmajority, he absenceof decisive groundsfavoringeitherpositionwill entitle the animalrightsactivist to questionthemoralrightnessof any compromisefavoringthe majority,perhapseven tothe pointof justifyingsome sort of civil disobedience.30

DISCURSIVEPROCEDURESAS INSTANTIATIONSFRIGHTS

Theabove considerations uggestthatneithergeneralizability f interestsnorgeneralizabilityof consentis suitablefor testing the rightnessof moralactions or the legitimacy of laws. It may be moreprofitable,therefore,tolocate the aspect of universalityin the proceduresgoverning democraticdiscussion. As Seyla Benhabibputs it, "The core intuitionbehindmodemuniversalizabilityprocedures s not thateverybodycould or would agree tothe same set of principles,butthat theseprincipleshave been adoptedas aresult of a procedure,whetherof moralreasoningor publicdebate, thatweare ready to deem reasonableand fair."In particular, he holds that theprinciple of universal moral respect, which permitseveryone capable ofspeech toparticipatendiscourse,andtheprincipleofegalitarianreciprocity,which stipulatessymmetrical peech rights, are "quiteadequate o serve astheonly universalizabilityest."31Assessing thisclaim will involve examin-ing Habermas's heoryof communicativeaction.Habermashinkshis theoryprovidesa bettergrounding orrightsthan social contractarian lternatives.


13/29


He also believes that it establishes a linkbetween individualautonomyanddemocraticsolidarity, hereby meetingboth liberaland communitarian b-jections. Most important,however,he maintains hatit offers an account ofrightsthatavoidsanyreduction o naturalaw or convention.Thisis no meanachievement,for in Habermas'sopinion, natural aw theories short-circuitdemocraticself-determinationn their nvocationof transcendent eason(ornature),whereasconventionalist heories ack rational oundationsnecessaryfor anchoringuniversalrights.

One of the presumed advantagesof Habermas'sdiscourse ethic is itscapacitytoexplainmoralobligation.Most socialcontract heories,he argues,depart roma notion of rationality hat s eithertoo abstract r too narrow oprovide a basis for rights and duties. If the model of rational choice iseconomics,we are asked to imagine enlightenedegoists entering ntoagree-ments aimed at maximizingpersonalpreferences.Because Hobbesiancon-tractorsare temptedto make exceptions for themselves, and agreementsunderconditionsof actualinequalityalwaysfavor the mostpowerful,suchcontractscannot be morallybinding.32Social contractarians f Kantianbenttryto ensure that moral incentivesprevailin the social contractby buildingside constraints ntoproceduresofeconomic deliberation.Rawls, for example, imposes a "veil of ignorance"on the knowledge that parties in an original position of choice possessregarding their personal circumstances and preferences (TJ, 152). Thisapproach,Habermascontends,cannotexplain why self-interestedpersonswould be motivatedto imaginethemselvespartyto the original positioninthe firstplace, norcanit explain why-in the absenceof someknowledgeoftheir personal good-they would necessarily adopt a maximin decisionprocedure avoring ust those substantiveprinciplesof justice stipulatedbyRawls(JS, 37). However,whenRawls claims that henormativeassumptionsunderlying he constructionof the originalposition and its choice bias standin a relationshipof reflective equilibriumwith respect to shared moralinstitutions hat formthe basis for (as he now puts it) "model-conceptions"of "themoralperson"and "thewell-ordered ociety,"he nowhereshows whythese conventional nstitutionsshould have any special claim on US.33Whyshould libertiesnormallyprotected n "theconstitutionsof the democraticstates . . . which have worked so well" exemplify liberties chosen in theoriginal position?34Habermas summarizesthe difficulty with normativeapproachessuch as Rawls's accordingly:eitherthey adducespecific rightsfrom abstract deals of the lone theorist or they adduce them from sharedvalues whose validity is merely takenfor granted.Habermas'salternativecircumvents this impasse by showing how our minimalcommitments,re-


14/29


flected in the moral point of view, are necessitated,whereasour concreteinterpretations f themin thepublicassessmentof rationalneeds arenot.Habermas'sdeontologicalethicdeparts rom theKantianpremisethatthestructureof intentionalactionalonegroundsmorality.Contrary o Gewirthandotherswho depart romthe samepremise,Habermas following Mead)insists thatthis structure an yield moralconstraintsonly when it is placedwithin the priorcontext of communicative nteraction.Communicative n-

teractionoccurs whenevertwo or morepersonstry to reachagreementondisputedclaims for purposesof coordinating heir actionsfreely.It is priorto noncommunicative orms of interaction n that it is the primarymediumin whichpersonal dentity tself is shaped.Theindividual nternalizes ocialroles and sharedmeanings hrough ulfillmentof roleexpectationsbuiltintoeverydayspeech actions.These includemutualexpectationsregardingper-sonal accountability or one's actions,needs,andidentity.Individualauton-omy thereforedoes notprecedepublicdiscourse,as freedomfromprejudiceis securedonly throughcriticalresistanceby others.Habermas's reatmentof reciprocity s complicatedby the fact that heregards t as botha necessaryconditionfor communication social interac-tion) and a normativefeature of morality.As a necessary condition forcommunicationt denotesthecapacity o exchangespeakerand istenerrolesrequisitefor a shared understanding f meaning.This minimalreciprocityinforms communicationbetween masters and slaves as well as betweencriminalsandtheirvictims.However, n addition ocommunicative eciproc-ity,Habermas likeKohlberg)distinguishes hree evels of reciprocity,whichinstantiatesix successive stages of moral development.Preconventionalreciprocity s motivatedby self-interest,withoutregardfor the rightnessofthetransaction r forthewell-beingof the other.Conventionalreciprocity scharacterizedby conformity o norms hatareregardedasrightformembersof a localcommunity.Postconventional eciprocity,by contrast, s character-ized by adherence o universalprinciplespremisedon an identificationwiththe abstracthumanityof the other.Here,the rightnessof a normhinges onweighing each person's needs equally, as given. In Habermas's opinion,discourseethics articulatesa seventhstage of moral development, n thatitmandatesa criticalinterpretation ndrevisionof privateneeds for the sakeof reachingconsensuson norms hatarein the realinterestsof everyone(theprincipleof universalization, r U).Now Habermas laimsthat hecoordination,ntegration, ndsocializationof persons nhabitingmodernsocieties dependson rationalcommunication.In the event of communication ailureor disagreement,confidence can berestoredonly throughrationalargumentation,which embodiespostconven-tionalmoralreciprocity.He reconstructs his structureby appealingto both


15/29


the shared-but largely implicit-assumptions of competent speakers andthe theoreticalhypotheses of philosophers ike Stephen Toulmin, who de-fends a pragmaticaccount of argumentative alidityas a moreviable alter-nativeto deductiveor inductiveapproaches.Viewed from this perspective,conversations,or what Habermas calls discourses, replace propositionalinferences as the primaryconcernof logic.It is axiomaticfor Habermas hatdiscoursestypicallyarise wheneverthejustice of a norm,the sincerityof an expressedintention,or the truthof acognitivebelief is disputed.Claims tojustice andtruthareof specialinterestto him because wheneverwe assertthatsomething s trueor rightwe implythatall otherpersonswouldagreewith us after mpartial xaminationof theevidence. Consensus,notdeducibility, unctionsas the touchstone orjusti-fication.It is consensus thatbridgesthe gap between is andought,and it isconsensus that enables us to escape the nihilism plaguing rationalism'sinsistence on deriving meaningful prescriptions rom underivable moralaxioms. Just as the principleof induction,appliedunder controlled condi-tions,enablesscientiststo agreeon the factualnecessityanduniversalityofcausalrelations,so too,undercontrolledconditionsapproximating ompleteimpartialityandfairness,moraldiscussionenablescitizens to reach factualagreementon the rightnessof norms in an equally binding-albeit condi-tional-manner.35

Adopting the recommendationof RobertAlexy, Habermasformulatesthese conditionsof discourseas pragmatic ules:1. Every subjectwith thecompetence o speakand act is allowedto take part n

discourse.2. Everyone s allowed to questionanyassertionwhatever.Everyone s allowedto introduceany assertion nto thediscourse.Everyone s allowed to expresshis attitudes,desires,andneeds.

3. No speaker may be preventedby either internalor external coercion fromexercisinghis rightsas laiddownin (1) and (2). (DE, 89)

Habermas'sargumentthat postconventionalmoral reciprocity adheres indiscourseowes a greatdeal to Karl-OttoApel's observation hat herelation-shipobtainingbetween discourseand moralreciprocity s neitherdeductivenor inductivebutcogent in a manner hatcanbest be capturedby the idea ofa performativecontradiction.Using an argument irst articulatedby JaakoHintikka,who noted thatutterances uch as "IdoubtthatI exist" involve aperformativecontradictionbetween a speech act and its pragmaticpresup-position, Apel maintained hat heskeptic'srefusal o acknowledge heclaimto universalvalidityinherent n his factualutterancesand moral assertions,


16/29


as well as his refusalto acknowledgebasic speech rights,is belied by hisattempt o persuadeothersrationally.Therefore,basic conceptsof universalvalidityas well as basic notionsof freedomand equalityare not ideas thatparticipants n discourse could elect to reject, without contradictingthepragmaticpresuppositionsof their own behavior.Although there is nocontradictionon the partof the skeptic who refuses to engage in certainjustifactorypractices,thereis a kindof weakconsistency,if and so long ashe desires to maintain himself in a rational identity whose stability ismaintained hroughmutualrecognition(DE, 102). By the same token, therelativistwho attempts o defendtheradical ncommensurability f substan-tive,context-dependentchemesof rationality anonlydo so by successfullytranslatingthem into a common language, which will be governed byhigher-order, ostconventionalproceduresof communicativereason.36In Apel's opinion, this demonstrationproves that U "belongs to thosetranscendental-pragmaticresuppositionsof argumentationhat one mustalways (already)have accepted, f the languagegameof argumentations tobe meaningful."37 abermas avorsa weaker nterpretationf the argument.U is not constitutiveof butonly regulativefor argumentation;n failing tolive upto thecounterfactualxpectations mplicit n U,one is notnecessarilyceasingto arguemeaningfully.Stateddifferently, f U weretranscendentallynecessaryfor argumentation,t would constrainus, but then it would lacknormative orce.On theotherhand,whatevernormative regulative) orceitpossesses is not simplyprescriptiveeither (see below). Finally,if by "tran-scendentar'we also mean"knowablewith reflexive (a priori) certainty,"Uwouldnot be transcendental, t leastnoton Habermas'sview of philosophy.His conception of postmetaphysicalphilosophy-what he calls rationalreconstruction-is as muchempiricaldescriptionandcollective interpreta-tion as it is phenomenological ntuition.So conceived,philosophyis at bestcapableof generatingclaimsthatarefallibleanduncertain,howeveruniver-sal theirscope (DE, 96).Before proceeding to our primarytopic-the groundingof rights andproceduresnecessaryfor legitimation-I will brieflynote some difficultieswith Habermas'sgroundingof postconventionalmoralreciprocity.Tobeginwith,theargument ppeals oaninsufficientlydevelopeddistinctionbetweencommunicativeand strategictypes of action. The rationalityof the latter,which consistsof game-theoretic alculationsaimedatcoordinatingnterac-tion for purposesof successfullyrealizing personalgoals, is wronglychar-acterizedby Habermasas manipulative, goistic, andatomistic,as opposedto the openness, impartiality, ndconsensualityof communicativerational-ity.Eventheunconstrainedforce f thebetterargument ucceedsinpersuad-ing only to the extent that the arguersuccessfully anticipatesthe possible


17/29


reactionsof herinterlocutor(s). ndeed, f language s mostly conventionandconventionis mostly coordinationrule aimed at stabilizing strategiccalcu-lations, thenstrategicrationality-replete with itsgame-theoretic onfigura-tion of the free riderproblemand the Prisoner'sDilemma-will necessarilysuperveneon communicativerationality.38Second, there areproblemswith Habermas'saccount of therelationshipbetween discourse and morality. The universalizationprinciple enjoinsagainst considering naturaland cultural differences in specifying who ispermittedto participatein discourse. Yet this does not appear to be apresupposition f argument s such. Some Greekphilosophers, orexample,had no difficultyrestrictingdialogic participationo theirfellow male citi-zens. Concedingthispoint,Habermasnow claims that"ofthemselves hesenormativeobligationsdo not extend beyond the boundariesof a concretelifeworld of family,tribe,city,ornation."Suchboundaries,he adds,"canbebroken hroughonly in discourse,to the extent thatthe latter s institutional-ized in modem societies"(JS, 48).A furtherdifficultywith Habermas'sargumentconcernshis relianceondevelopmentalpsychology to supporthis claim that the achievement ofpostconventionalmoralcompetenciesareirreversible.There is now a sub-stantialbody of literaturedevoted to the formidableconceptualdifficultiesattendingthis claim: Is it possible to defend a homology between socialevolution and ndividualdevelopment?Canone abstract universal ypologyof moraldilemmas thatcan be translatedrom thesociolinguisticcontext ofone culture nto thatof another? f not,howcan theuniversalityof thetheorybe cross-culturally stablished?Does it makesense, in general,to talkaboutincreasedproblem-solving apacity outcourt,ratherhan ncreasedproblemsolvingrelative o someculturally pecific, context-bound et of problems?39Habermas s awareof the magnitudeof these difficulties, but he has yetto concede thattheyareinsuperable MC,21ff.). The lackof strongevidenceconfirmingKohlberg's ixthstageof moraldevelopmentdoes not, he insists,count againstthe logical superiorityof universalisticmoral theories gener-ally. Nor,he believes, does the incidenceof moralregressionandrelativismamong test subjects. Ultimately,he thinks that these difficulties can beexplained away in terms of a disjunctionbetween levels of attainedmoralconsciousness and levels of motivation or between levels of justificationand levels of application(MC, 171ff.). Most important,HabermasrejectsKohlberg'scontention hatthehighest stagesof conflictresolutionpossess a"hard"or "natural"tatus(JS, 33ff.). Lower stages of cognitive and moraldevelopmentcan be empiricallyconfirmedas highly probablebecause thecompetenciesin questionareorganicallybased. This appears o be the casewith respect to the coordinationof social perspectives and the ability to


18/29

310 POLITICALHEORY/May1993

perceive objects as invariant hroughperspectivalchanges in theiraspects.Such is not thecase, however,withpostconventionalmoral stages.'Empiricalpsychologyalonecannotarticulate he different evels of com-petence that obtain at this stage because they revolve around a reflectivecapacity to draw distinctions-between the abstract dea of a universalistic

moralityand various nterpretationsf it orbetweenfundamental rinciplesofjustice andspecificrulesandapplications-that arethemselvesphilosoph-ical. Even neo-Arsitotelianism ndskepticism corresponding, espectively,to conventionalstages4 and 4.5 on Kohlberg'sscale) findpostconventionalarticulations t thephilosophical evel. Consequently,Habermas s reluctantto grantpostconventional tagesa natural tatus. nstead,he tellsus, we haveto view utilitarian, ocialcontractarian,nddeontological heoriesasprovid-ing differentinterpretations f a more basic idea: the moralpoint of view.Which of these ultimately proves most satisfactory n accountingfor ourmoral institutionsis a matter to be decided in practical and theoreticaldiscoursesbetweenspecialistsand estsubjects CD,260). Suchundecidabil-ity mightalsoexplainthepreferencegivento utilitarian aluesin democratictheorythat was revealedearlierherein the examinationof consent.

Let us leave these difficultiesaside andreturn o a more basic question:How does Habermas'sgroundingof apostconventionalmoralpointof viewsuggest a justification for democraticrights and proceduresthat avoidsconventionalismand rationalism?Thequestiondemandsa response n lightof Habermas'stendency (noted above) to define justificationin terms ofeither a real or hypothetical (ideal) consensus. If Habermas claims thatdemocraticrightsandproceduresarejustifiedbecausepersonsjust happento agree thatthey satisfy common interests,his justification succumbs toconventionalism.Aside fromcommittinga naturalisticallacy,thisresponsegenerates self-referentialdifficulties: what legitimates the agreementonrights and duties would be proceduralrights and duties regulating thereachingof agreement,and whatlegitimatesagreementon theseproceduralrights and duties would be agreementon the proceduralrights and dutiesgoverninghatagreement,ndso on adinfinitumLC,110).41 One way toavoid this infiniteregress (or circle)is to appealto the idea of a hypotheticalconsensusof the sort favoredby KantandRawls. However, this mannerofproceeding merely conceals a rationalchoice behindthe imaginary acadeof collective agreement-a procedure, noted, that s rejectedby Habermas.Habermas'sway out of this dilemmais to split the differencebetweenmoralideas implicated n argumentandpolitical rightsdemocratically ho-sen withoutentirely evering heirconnection.As notedabove,the moral deasunderwriting emocracyare unconditionally alid in a quasi-transcendentalsense. Their validityand force cannotdependon rationalconsentbecause


19/29


rational consent alreadypresupposesthem. Their violation would not in-fringe thesovereigntyof ageneralwill so muchasit wouldentailapragmaticcontradiction.As Habermas uts t,becausethereare"noalternatives otheserulesof argumentation,"heythemselves neednotbejustified (DE, 95).

Strictlyspeaking, then, it makes no sense to talk about the rightnessorlegitimacy of postconventionalmoralreciprocityor the ideas of autonomy,equality,and universality mpliedtherein. At most, we might questionthetheoreticalunavoidability ndsignificanceof this moral act. Suchquestion-ing cannotcease to be regulatedby moralreciprocity o long as it takes tselfseriouslyas a rationalundertaking.By the sametoken, however, t makes nosense talk about the rationalnecessity of prescriptiverights. Prescriptiveprinciplescanonly bejustifiedas morallybinding n practicaldiscourse.AsHabermashimself notes, even the principleof discourse ethics is too sub-stantivelyprescriptive o be contained n theprincipleof universalrecogni-tionregulatingdiscoursesgenerally (DE, 93).

Not only are the formalrules of discourse oo abstract o provideconcreteguidance in the institutionalizationand organizationof democratic dis-courses, any attemptto use them in this way would again involve thecommissionof anaturalisticallacy (EzD; 156).Thisdoesnot meanthatrulesof discourse areonly facts or necessaryconditionsof humanagency and,assuch,devoid of normative orce. Neither hesemanticdistinctionbetween isand ought nor the formal logical injunction against inferringprescriptiveimperatives romdescriptivestatementsprecludesa qualifiedmoralrealismwith respect to the regulativeforce of these rules. Like Kant, Habermasdescribes them as a fact of reason. As a fact of reason implicit incommunicativeaction,such rulespossess a regulativeforce, expressive ofpostconventionalmoralreciprocity, hat s morecompellingthanthemerelyobligatory orce of freelychosenprescriptiveprinciplesbut less compellingthan the transcendental ecessityof constitutiverules.Indeed, t is preciselybecausetheyoccupyaspacebetween ranscendentalonditionsandprescrip-tive rightsthattheycanprovidean anchor or the latter.To paraphraseHabermas,our communicativecommitmentscompel us(however weakly and conditionally) to establishequal democratic rights,even if they do not compel the establishmentof any particularnstitutionalembodimentof them.Thesecommitmentsarenottotally devoidof content.Although they aretoo abstract o enable us to infer directly the priorityof,say, council democracyover other forms of democracy, hey clearly favorthe adoptionof institutions hatpromoterather han obstruct he equal andeffective rightof eachpersonto public speech and association(CES, 186).In conjunctionwith otherfacts abouthumanfreedom and withHabermas'sown analysisof the developmentaldynamicsunderlying he welfare state,


20/29


they mightwell compel-more strongly hanHabermashimself hashithertoindicated-the adoptionof some kind of workerdemocracy.

COMMUNICATIVETHICSAS AREGULATIVEDEA FORDEMOCRATIZATIONI haveargued hatHabermas'sdiscourseethic defineslegitimacy n termsof an idea of democraticproceduralustice.AlthoughHabermas ometimes

says the generalizabilityof interestor of agreement s necessaryfor demo-cratic egitimation, hisemphasison outcome s fraughtwith seriousdifficul-ties and is belied by his own claim that what is decisive for a minority'srecognitionof a law's legitimacyis thatthe law be processedthroughfairprocedure.To be sure,the will of themajority s not identicalto reason. Yetthe procedureby which such a will is generated mplies an anticipationofreason(Vermutung er Vernunft)VaV,20) that s reflected n fallible,finitediscussionsoriented owardreachinguniversalagreementon what s rightorin the commongood (VaV,19).The idea of democraticproceduralustice isgroundedneither n conventionnor in transcendent easonbutin a commu-nicative practice incorporatinga process of collective interpretationandmorallearning(the developmentof rational aculties).Despite Habermas's nsistence thatthe determination nd validation ofinstitutionalarrangements e procuredhroughdemocratic onsent,he notesthat the democratic dea limits the rangeof acceptableoptions (ME, 203).Therules of discoursealready mplybasicrights o freethought,speech,andassociationthat transcendconvention andrequirefor theirenforcement, fnecessary, internationalmilitary intervention.42 urthermore,Habermas'sown account of the evolution of the social welfare state proves thatthesepolitical rightscan only be procured hroughsocial rights.Most important,he nowholds thatallrightsdependon thesolidarity osteredbya democraticculture.Imperfectdutiesthatenjoincommissionof beneficentactions are noless privileged than perfect duties that enjoin forbearance rom injuriousactions.43

Habermas's iew that ndividual reedom justice)anddemocraticwelfare(solidarity)areequiprimordialhusservestocounter womisleading mpres-sion of his moraltheory: hat t stressesabstract ightsover othervalues, suchas care for others as distinct persons, and that it provides no safeguardsagainst the tyranny of the majority."Because, in Habermas's opinion,individuation nd socializationarecomplementaryommunicative rocesses,each has an interest in preserving he integrityof the life context that one


21/29


shareswithothers.Indeed,one's individual reedomnotonly dependson thewell-being of particularpersons for whom one cares, it depends on thewelfareof one'sentiresociety (JS, 47). Conversely,becausesolidarity ostersrespectforthe uniquenessof theconcreteother, t cannotrequiredemocraticlegitimationof all privateneed interpretations,ust those that aregenerallyacceptedas havinga public impact.45

Aside from Habermas's eluctance o specify the particularnstitutionalformsthatpolitical rightswould take,there is anotherreason,rootedin histheoreticalapproach, hataccounts orhis failure o enumeratea list of basicrights beyond (formal) political rightsand social entitlements. That is hisemphasison formalpropertiesof communication.As notedabove,he insiststhat the regulative force of universalcommunicationprocedurescannotextend toaction; heyneither egulateactionnorprescribemoralandpoliticalobligations.' Now, if hehad nsteadapproachedhematterof rightsfromthestandpointof ethics rather hanepistemology,he could have addressed hesubstantiveconditionsfor realautonomyrather han the formal conditionsfor possible autonomy.Following this excursion into political ethics, onecould show that the conditionsfor free action cannot be restrictedto theproceduralnormsgoverningrationalcommunicationbut anticipatea moreradicaltheory,one thatwouldtrulybe a theoryof participatory emocracy.47

By free actionI mean bothnegativenoninterference ndpositivechoice.These two termsconditioneach other:capacityfor choice presupposesbothfreedom romarbitrarynterference, nderstood s directphysicalandmentalcoercionand freedomfrom less overt forms of domination,rooted n powerrelationsstructuring conomic, social, and culturalpractices(discourses).Italsopresupposesaccessto materialandeducational esources hat urther hecultivationof rationaldeliberationand the imaginationof possible alterna-tives. Conversely, hecapacityto avoid situations n whichourfreedom willlikely be interferedwith or constrained s proportional o our access tomaterialand educationalsources. Conceivedin this way, free action cannotbe separatedromself-realization, ractivityaimedatenhancing hecapacityfor free action as such. Social interactionandcommunicationare necessarybut not sufficient for self-realization.Otherconditions include work andconsumptionactivities.Habermasdoes not deny that the structuringof the workplace and thesocial distributionof costs, benefits,and resources mpinge on the capacityof individuals to realize themselvesas distinctpersonsand rationalagents(despitethefactthathe attributes his more to communication hanto labor).However,he hesitates to draw whatappears o me to be an obvious conclu-sion from this fact, namely,that each worker(consumer)ought to have an


22/29


equal rightto determinecollectively how his or her work is structured ndhow benefits,costs, andresourcesare to be distributed.One argument or this claim runs as follows: If there is no good reasonwhy one person'sfreedomshouldbe worthanymorethananother's, here sno good reason why one personshouldbe more privilegedin this respectthan another, hatis, have fewer arbitrary indrances o andmore positiveresourcesfor the exercise of collective choice involving matters hat affecthim (her). Assumingthatall personsought to have equalrights,it followsthatthey ought to have equalrightsto the conditionsfor exercisingrights.Furthermore, ecause (a) only citizenscan determineconcretelywhat theseconditions are, (b) such determinationgenerally presupposesdemocraticdiscussionsregarding he structuring f the workplaceand the distributionof benefits and burdens,and(c) the aboverequirementswould be violatediftheir satisfactionwas madecontingenton some externalauthority e.g., thebenevolenceof a factoryowner),it follows thatconsumersandproducersofgoods oughtto have a primafacie rightto participaten democraticdiscus-sions regardingthe productionand distributionof goods requisitefor themaintenanceof their own freedom.Radical critics have conceived the democratic right to participateindecisions aboutthe productionanddistributionof materialresourcesrequi-site for full democraticparticipationn threeways. Some (e.g., Markovic)have conceived thisrightto entailthe abolitionof an autonomousmarketaswell as the abolitionof privateownershipof the means of production.Onthismodel,democratically tructured roductionunits andcommunityasso-ciationswould elect representativeso centralplanningboards.Others(e.g.,Gould) have conceived participationas functioningwithin democraticallystructured conomic units that areprivatelyowned (by the workers them-selves) andthat interact n accordancewith relatively autonomousmarketdemands.Finally,some have conceivedparticipation longsome intermedi-arypath,namely,asinvolvingacombinationof councildemocracy, egulatedmarkets,and public control.8 I shall arguethat discourse ethics requiresdemocraticparticipationn this thirdsense.Now itis tempting oregardHabermas's kepticismabout"simplerecipesof workers'self-management"as indicatinga generalindifferencetoward,or even dismissalof, all types of workplacedemocracy.This assessmentispremature.First,Habermas's kepticism s directedagainstromanticconcep-tions of workplace democracy that envision the abolition of economicmarketsand/oradministrativebureaucracies-an eventualitythat appearscontrary o rationalefficiency,self-realization,and mpartialustice.Second,becausehe believes thattheabolitionof labormarketsandculturalprivilegesassociatedwith class arepreconditions or a fully democraticstate,he could


23/29


be expected to favor a decentralized,worker-controlledconomy.49Third,Habermasrecognizes thatsegmented aborprocesses thatseparate ntellec-tual management from manual labor contribute to a "fragmentationofconsciousness" n which "the need for normativelysecuredor communica-tively achievedagreement s decreasedandthescopeof tolerance or merelyinstrumentalattitudes,indifference,or cynicism is expanded"(CD, 281).Finally,Habermas'spositive receptionof Foucault's nsightsregarding helocal, relational,andstrategicmanner n whichpoweris exercised suggestsa further easonwhy he would want to institutedemocracy n theworkplace:the criticalexposureof powerrelationsthatideologicallyconstraindiscur-sive practicesmustbe undertakenn the first nstanceattheoccupationalanddomestic level.

Againstthis line of reasoningone could pointout thatHabermasdesig-nates the public sphere,not the workplace,as the primary ocus of radical,participatory emocracy.Thisdesignation ollows from two considerations.On the one hand, Habermasassigns public spheresto a communicativelystructuredife-worldandeconomicunitsto a media-steered ystem.Because,as I havearguedelsewhere,the distinctionbetween life-worldandsystemonwhichthisassignmentrests is untenable, his considerationneed notconcernus.50On the otherhand,the universalizationprincipleunderlyingdiscourseethicsrequires hateachpersonpotentiallyaffectedby any politicaldecisionhave the opportunity o participaten its formulationand resolution."1nas-muchas economic decisions affect us all, they should not be left entirelytothe producers hemselves.

Habermas'socation of participatory emocracy n the informalassocia-tions that compromise the public sphere in no way speaks against thedemocratization f the workplace. t does, however, speak againstprivatelyownedandcontrolleddemocraticcooperatives hat eave no room forpublicparticipationn decisionsregardingproductionanddistribution.Regardlessof whether the sources for fundingcooperativesare privateor public, thecoordinationandplanningof acomplex economywill require omegovern-mentregulation, he rationales orspecific policies comingfromoverlappingpublic spheres (community associations, consumer and environmentalgroups,etc.). 52 By the same token, because we inhabitoverlappingpublicspheres,enforcementof universaldemocratic ightswill opposeademocraticcentralismbasedexclusivelyoncorporate i.e., occupational) epresentation.ForHabermas, he distinctadvantageof amassdemocratic ystemorganizedalongparty ines residespreciselyin its capacity o provideassociativebasesthat transcendeconomic, ethnic, and regional boundaries.53 o offset thedisadvantagesof the party system-its tendency,as an extension of thegovernment,to manipulatepublic opinion and obscure social antagonism


24/29


behinddilutedprograms-he looksto thespontaneousproliferation f infor-mal, unincorporated, rass-rootsassociations.This concession to the anar-chist andpopulisttradition,he thinks, providesthe only guarantee hat theissues and arguments hat elected representativesbringto bear in debatingthe public utilityof law will reflect anautonomous-if notwhollyrational-set of needs.

To conclude, a political system structuredn accordancewith discourseethics must consist of bothparticipatoryorganizations, omprisingnonoc-cupationalpublicspheresandeconomicunits,and ormallyorganizedmasspartyorganizationsandstatebureaucracies.Democracyandrationalitywillvary depending on featurespeculiarto these structures:more orientationtowardconsensusandprocedural qualityat thelocal andoccupationalevel(and hence more social rationality);more compromiseandprocedural n-equalityat thelevel of partypoliticsandadministrationandhenceless socialrationality).54

NOTES1. Cf. K. Arrow,Social Choiceand IndividualValues New York:Wiley, 1951);andW.Riker,LiberalismAgainstPopulism:A ConfrontationBetween the Theoryof Democracyandthe Theoryof Social Choice(SanFrancisco:W. H. Freeman,1982).2. J. Elster,Sour Grapes(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983), chap.2; and"TheMarketand the Forum:ThreeVarietiesof PoliticalTheory," n Foundationsof SocialChoice Theory,edited by J. Elster and A. Hylland(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986).3. This position is closely identified with the Praxis School, whose most prominentrepresentatives reMihailoMarkovie,GajoPetrovic,andSvetozarStojanovic.4. Cf. J.Habermas,ThePhilosophicalDiscourseofModernity:TwelveLectures, ranslatedby F.Lawrence(Cambridge:MITPress, 1988), 75-82.5. For asamplingof theliterature ncommunicative thics,see TheCommunicative thicsControversy, ditedby S. Benhabiband F. Dallmayr Cambridge:MITPress,1990).6. Cf. C. Gould, RethinkingDemocracy:Freedomand Social Cooperation n Politics,Economy,andSociety(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988), 16-18, 124-27.7. Cf. P.Dews, Habermas:Autonomy, nd Solidarity. nterviewswith JiirgenHabermas

(London:Verso,1986), 187.8. R. M. Harelinks universalization o the semanticprinciplerequiringconsistentusageof predicates n similarcases. Applied to morality, t requires hat a ruleor obligationapplyingin situationX to person P apply to all others in situationscomparable o X. Habermasarguesthatconsistencyrequirementsike this fail to capture he meaningof impartiality.Only whenuniversalization s linked to publicdefendability Gert)andequality of treatmentSinger)doesit approximate he meaning of impartiality.Cf. J. Habermas,"DiscourseEthics:Notes on aProgramof PhilosophicalJustification,"hereafterDE), in MoralConsciousnessand Commu-nicativeAction,translated y C. Lenhardt ndS. Nicholsen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity


25/29


Press, 1990), 64ff. (hereafterMC); R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1952); BernardGert,Moral Rules (New York, 1976); and MarcusSinger,Generalization n Ethics(New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).9. J. Habermas,"Justiceand Solidarity:On the Discussion Concerning Stage6,"' Philo-sophical Forum21 (Fall-Winter1989-90),at 36 (hereafter S).

10. J. Habermas,"Wahrheitstheorien,"n Vorstudienund Erganzungenzur Theorie deskommunikativen andelns(Frankfurt: uhrkamp,1984), 127-83 (hereafterVTKA).

11. ThatHabermashas not entirely ranscendedhe monological methodof ideal role takingis borne out by his claim that,in moral matters trictusensu, that is, "when it is a question ofexamining normswith a genuinely universaldomainof validity,"consensus functions as aregulative dea in the sense thatarguments re"playedout in the 'internal orum'" (JS, 41).

12. J. Habermas,"A Reply to My Critics," n D. Held and J. B. Thompson,Habermas:CriticalDebates (Cambridge:MITPress, 1982), 273ff. (hereafterCD).

13. AlthoughHabermas dentifies ustification Begrundung) ndapplication Anwendung)as two distinct stepsof moralargumentation, is acceptanceof KlausGunther's ormulationofthe universalizability est, which incorporates onsiderationsof contextualapplicability, ug-gests that the two are more closely linked. Cf. J. Habermas,Erlauterungzur Diskursethik(Frankfurt: uhrkamp,1991), 94-96, 137-42(hereafterEzD);D. Wiggins,Needs, Values,Truth(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1987), 82; K.Gunther,Der SinnfirAngemessenheit(Frank-furt:Suhrkamp,1988),23-100; andDavidIngram,"ThePostmodernKantianism f ArendtandLyotard," nd Habermasand the Dialectic of Reason(New Haven,CT: YaleUniversity Press,1987), chap. 11.14. Habermas'sresponseto this criticismhinges on the primafacie statusof normativejustification and obligation in light of ever changing contexts of action. Yet, despite hisrecognitionof the fallibilityof moralargumentation ndthe pluralityof competingsituationaldescriptions EzD, 166), he insists thatsituationsappropriatelyoveredby two or more normsbe adjudicatedby a principleof coherentorderdetermininghe choice of preciselyone correctnorm (EzD, 140ff.). Cf. A. Wellmer,EthikundDialog: Elementedes moralischen Urteils beiKant und in die Diskursethik Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1986), 54-112 (hereafterED); and mycriticism of Habermasn "Dworkin,Habermas,and the CLS Movementon MoralCriticism nLaw,"Philosophyand Social Criticism16 (1990): 237-68.

15. ED, 65-66. Rainer Dobert observes thatneitherperfect moral duties, such as promisekeeping,nor "natural"mperfectdutiesunderwritingmutualself-preservation, uchas helpingothers who are in distress, are decidable by universalization procedures. "Wider dieVernachliissigungdes 'Inhalts' in den Moral-theorienvon Kohlberg und Habermas. Im-plikationen urdie Relativismus/Universalismus-Kontroverse,"n ZurBestimmungder Moral,editedby W.Edelsteinund G. Nunner-WinklerFrankfurt: uhrkampVerlag,1986), 86-106.

16. Habermasarguesthatwe cannot always be expected to act morallyin the absence oflegal safeguardsand other institutional upports EzD, 198). Also cf. J. Habermas,"Law andMorality,"The TannerLectureson Human Values Salt LakeCity: Universityof Utah Press,1988), 244 (hereafterLM).17. Cf. CarolePateman,TheProblemof Political Obligation:A CriticalAnalysisof LiberalTheory (Chichester:Wiley, 1979); Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism New York:Harper&Row, 1970);and RichardFlathman,ThePracticeofPoliticalAuthority:Authority ndtheAuthoritative Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1980).

18. I. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," n Four Political Essays (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1970), 132.19. Therelevanceof discourse thic opublicpolicyplanning s amplydocumentedn J. Forster,ed., CriticalTheoryand PublicLife (Cambridge:MITPress, 1985).


26/29


20. Habermasacceptsthe communitarianritiqueof abstract ndividualismbut decries itsreactive affirmationof strong, raditional ommunities.See, forexample,hiscritiqueof Sandel,Taylor,and Maclntyre(EzD, 18ff., 176-84, 208-17).21. J. Habermas, "Ist der Herzschlag der Revolution zum Stillstand gekommen?Volkssouveranitiitls Verfahren.Ein normativerBegriffderOffentlichkeit?"n Die Ideen von1789 in derDeutschen Rezeption Frankfurt: uhrkamp,1989), 7-36 (hereafterVaV).

22. J. Habermas,LegitimationCrisis,translatedby T. McCarthy Boston: Beacon, 1975),111(hereafterLC).

23. J. Habermas,"LegitimationProblems n the ModemState," n Communication nd theEvolutionof Society,translatedby T.McCarthy Boston:Beacon, 1979), 204 (hereafterCES).24. Cf.J.Bohman,"Communication,deology,andDemocraticTheory,"American olitical

Science Review84, no. 1 (March1990):93-109.25. Cf. J. Habermas ndN. Luhmann,TheoriederGesellschaftoderSozialtechnologie?Was

leistet die SystemforschungFrankfurt: uhrkamp,1971),243ff., cited in LC at 101.26. However, n LCat 109Habermas xpresses he rule of consensus n anmannerhatrequires

the "transfer[ring]f subjectivedesires ntogeneralizabledesires."This formulation f therulecouldbe construedas hostile to pluralism.Conversely,whenmanylaws areregarded s morallyrepugnant ya substantialminority-and thisdespite he fairnessofprocedural afeguards-notonly the stabilityof governmentbutalso its legitimacyis at stake.

27. J. Habermas,Die Neue UniibersichtlichkeitFrankfurt: uhrkamp,1985), 241. Thisconcessionappears o undermine is objection o ErnstTugendhat'snterpretationf agreementas a "commondecision"equilibrating articularnterestsunderconditions of faircompromise(cf. DE, 72). For his critiqueof the GreenParty, ee P.Dews, 182, 215.28. J.Habermas,"ZivilerUngehorsam-Testfall furden demokratischenRechtsstaat.Widerden authoritarischenLegalismusin der Bundesrepublik,"n Die Neue Uniibersichtlichkeit.HabermasadoptsRawls's view thatjustifiable civil disobedience must (1) not endangertheconstitutionalorder hroughactsof violence, (2) haveas its aim the conscientiouscorrectionofanegregiousinjustice,and(3) be undertaken nly after all legal remedieshave been exhausted(p. 83). Moreover,he follows Dworkin in conceiving civil disobedience as an indispensabledevice-along withjudicialreview-for adjusting egal requirementso the demandsof chang-ing politicalinterests n cases where the will of thepeople (andits constitutional mbodiment)is not adequately represented p. 88). As such, civil disobedience symbolizes a potentiallyuniversalizable (legitimate) interest that supersedes the legality of parliamentarydecision,especially when the decision does not reflect public opinion or effects changes that areirreversible, hatis, that createpermanentminoritiesor bind the democratic overeignty of thepeople for an indeterminateduration,as in the case of German-basedAmerican missileinstallations(p. 94). It is interestingto note that Habermasno more than Rawls adequatelyacknowledges ustifiableacts of civil disobedience hatprotestmorally egitimate aws, or lawsthatappear o satisfy ideal as well as real(legal) procedural onstraints.Cf. J. Rawls, TheoryofJustice (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 1971), paras. 55-59 (hereafterTJ); and R.Dworkin, "Civil Disobedience," n TakingRights Seriously(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1977).

29. Indeed,Habermasnotes that even morally ustified norms only obligate on conditionthatthey applyto the situationat hand and do not imposepractically mpossibleexpectations(EzD, 198).30. In the essay on civil disobediencementionedabove, Habermasarguesthatdemocraticproceduresat most warrant ecognitionof the legality of a law, not its legitimacy,which (heargues)still appealsto a hypotheticalgeneralwill.


27/29


31. S. Benhabib,"In he Shadowof Aristotleand Hegel:CommunicativeEthics andCurrentControversiesn PracticalPhilosophy,"PhilosophicalForum,12 (hereafterSAH).

32. AlthoughElsterhas been criticalof democrats ikeHabermaswhoemphasize he virtuesof processvalues over outcomes (see "TheMarketand theForum"),he hasrecentlysidedwithHabermasagainstrationalchoice theorists(esp. David Gauthier)who attempt o derivemoralside constraints rom economic rationality.As he notes,maximizingbehaviorcannotsubstitutefor moral rules in constituting stable, legitimate order because contractsamong economicmaximizers nevitablyfavor the more powerful.Hence it is rational o bear the economic costsof democracyin the name of social justice. See D. Gauthier,Morals by Agreement Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986);and J.Elster,SolomonicJudgements:Studies n theLimitationsof Rationality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989), chap.5.

33. J. Rawls,"KantianConstructivismn MoralTheory,"Journalof Philosophy77 (1980):515-72. Rawls argues hattherangeof socially regulatedgoodsmust be preselected n advanceof the hypotheticaldeliberationsn the originalposition.In A Theoryof Justice (1971), the listof primarygoods is drawnup with reference o generalpsychologicalassumptionsregardingtheprerequisitesorcarryingout a rationalplanof life. However, n "SocialUnityandPrimaryGoods"(1982), they are ustifiedas thosethat "arenecessaryforrealizingthe powersof moralpersonality."Thechange n emphasisfrom a relativelyneutralustificationof primarygoods intermsof rationalchoice to ajustificationbased on a definiteconceptionof moral autonomy-what Rawls, in referenceto a model-conceptionof the person, calls the reasonable-is notinconsequential.For onething, t shows thatconditionsof rational hoicein theoriginalpositionare alreadycircumscribedby moralpresuppositions, ven if the economic rationalityof theparticipantss not.Foranother,becausepersonalityraitsnow take over theburdenof groundingjustice formerlyassumedby the ideal proceduresunderwritinghe original position, it can beargued-as Habermasdoes-that Rawls has abandoned cognitivist philosophical ustificationof moralityin favor of a politically oriented ethics foundedon a partisanview of a "thick"conceptionof the good (EzD, 128ff.).

34. J. Rawls, "TheBasic Libertiesand TheirPriority"n The TannerLectures on HumanValues,vol. 3, editedby S. McMurrinSaltLakeCity:Universityof UtahPress, 1982), 6.

35. Habermas,"Wahrheitstheorien,"65.36. HabermasdirectsDonaldDavidson'sfamoustranscendentalefutationof incommensu-

rable conceptualschemesagainstAlasdairMacIntyre'sdefense of incommensurable chemasof rationality.AlthoughMaclntyre like Kuhn)arguesthatcommunicationbetweenuntranslat-able schemas is possible,he holds thatthis necessitates he conversionto a new way of life-astate,Habermasbelieves, that would entail either a loss of identityor a schizophrenic plittingof identity(EzD, 213-18). Cf. A. Maclntyre,WhoseJustice? WhoseRationality? NotreDame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); D. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a ConceptualScheme,"in D. Davidson, InquiriesInto Truthand Interpretation OxfordUniversityPress,1985), 183-98; andmy critiqueof Davidson in "The CopernicanRevolutionRevisited:Para-digm, Metaphor,and Incommensurabilityn the Historiographyof Science: Blumenberg'sResponseto Kuhn andDavidson," n Historyof the HumanSciences (forthcoming).37. K.-O. Apel, "The Problemof PhilosophicalFoundationsn Light of a TranscendentalPragmatics fLanguage,"nAfterPhilosophy, ditedbyK. Baynes, J. Bohman,andT. McCarthy(Cambridge:MITPress,1987), 277.

38. Cf. J. Habermas,TheTheoryof CommunicativeAction: Vol. 1. Reason and the Ratio-nalization of Society, translatedby T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), 10, 85, 273-74;D. Lewis, Convention:A PhilosophicalStudy (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1969);andJ.Johnson,"Habermas n Strategicand CommunicativeAction,"Political Theory19 (May


28/29


1991): 181-205.For furtherdiscussion of the distinctionbetweenstrategicand communicativeaction, see my essay "Foucaultand Habermason the Subjectof Reason," n GaryGutting,ed.,The Foucault Companion Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993).39. Cf. P. R. Dasen, ed., Piagetian Psychology:CrossCulturalContributionsNew York:Halstead, 1977).

40. See T.McCarthy,"Rationality ndRelativism:Habermas'sOvercoming' f Hermeneu-tics,"in CD, 72-73.

41. See J. Paul,"SubstantiveSocial ContractsandtheLegitimateBasis of Political Author-ity,"Monist 66 (1983): 517-28; Benhabib,Philosophical Forum, 8-9; and Gould,RethinkingDemocracy, 127. Gould accuses Habermasof circularityhere. Benhabib defendsHabermasagainst hischargebutneglectsto mention hat herights o which we arecompelled n discoursearenot, strictly speaking,prescriptiverightsas Alexy's formulation ppears o imply.

42. It was suchanappeal o universal ights Volkerrechte)hat argelyundergirdHabermas'squalified support or a measured,militaryresponse o Iraq'sviolations of Kuwait'ssovereigntyduring the Gulf war. See J. Habermas,"Wider die Logik des Krieges: Ein Pladoyer furZuruckhaltung, ber nichtgegenuberIsrael,"Die Zeit(overseas ed.) 46 (22 Feb. 1991), 16.

43. ForHabermas,he distinctionaccordedperfectdutiesconsists n thefact that hey directlyregulateandreflect the minimalconditionsnecessaryforcommunicativeaction anddiscourse(EzD, 174ff.).

44. Benhabib orone criticizesHabermas'sKohlbergian endency o subordinate he ethicsof solidarity and care to the moralityof individualrights. See S. Benhabib, 'The UtopianDimension in CommunicativeEthics," n CriticalTheory:The EssentialReadings,editedbyDavid Ingramand JuliaSimon-Ingram New York:Paragon,1991), 388-99;and CarolGilligan,In a DifferentVoice Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1979).

45. No set of political principles can assure against tyrannicaloutcomes. Democracygoverned by theprinciplesof discourseethics is no exception,for the demand hat all needs bevalidatedthroughpublic discourse favors the political activist (and orator)over the domesticcaretaker.Cf. J.Fishkin, Tyranny ndLegitimacy:A Critiqueof Political Theories(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1979),andJ. DonaldMoon,"Constrained iscourseandPublicLife,"Political Theory 19, no. 2 (May 1991),202-29.

46. Habermashere criticizes Apel, who expects discourseethics to tell us whywe shouldbehave morally as well as what we should do (EzD, 185-99). Because Wellmer does notadequatelydistinguishApel's positionfromHabermas's,he wronglydirectsHegel'scritiqueofethicalformalismagainst he latter.However,as Habermaspointsout, Hegel's critiqueassumesthat ethical formalismprovides strongcriteria ordeducingsubstantiveoutcomes-a view thatis actuallycloser to Apel's thanto eitherhis or Kant'sdeontologicalethic (EzD,9-30, 135ff.).

47. This line of arguments developedin greaterdetailby Gould (loc. cit.).48. See D. Schweickart,Capitalismor WorkerControl:AnEthical and EconomicAppraisal

(New York:Praeger,1981).49. Habermasdoes not talk aboutabolishing abormarketsper se, but he does mentionthe

elimination of unemploymentas basic to the socialist ideal he defends. See J. Habermas,"NachholendeRevolution und linker Revisionsbedarf:Was heisst Sozialismus heute?" n DieNachholendeRevolution:KleinePolitischeSchriftenVII Frankfurt: uhrkamp,1990), 199.

50. See my Habermasand the Dialectic of Reason, 155ff.51. Nowhere,to my knowledge, does Habermasdevelop a critiqueof corporatismn detail.

Corporatism-"the delegation of negotiating competence to the conflicting partiesand theinstitutionalization f quasi-politicalbargainingprocesses"(LM,231)-is discussed in greatdetail in The StructuralTransformation f the Public Sphere (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1989).


29/29


Here,Habermasnotes thatthe transformation f strategicnegotiationsbetweenprivatepartiesinto mattersof public concernhas not resulted n theirbeing subjectto public oversightanddebate. On the contrary, n conformitywith the "refeudalization" f the welfare state, suchnegotiationsaretreatedas if theywere privatemattersnvolvingcompetingspecial nterestsandbureaucratic overnmentalagencies (pp. 148ff., 197ff.,231ff.).52. Despite Habermas'sclaim that the "argumentabout formnsf ownership has lost itsdoctrinal significance" ("NachholendeRevolution," 198), the argumentremainscentral todiscussions of democracy.As Gould notes, a prima facie case for privateworkerownership(qualifiedby public oversight)can be made on the grounds hatsuch ownership s needed tosafeguardworkerself-managementightsagainstarbitraryureaucraticnterference. chweikartargues,to the contrary, hatpublic ownership s required o ensure even developmentand toprotectagainstthe potential orexploitation nherent nprivatefinancialmarkets.

53. The ideathat massdemocraticpartiesarefunctionallyrequisite orprocuring heloyaltyof the modem state has its moraljustificationin Habermas'sargument hatego developmentinvolves an expansionof role identitybeyond occupations o embracemoreabstractprinciplesand in his futher claim that this sets in motion a certaindecentrationand fluidity in one'sperspectivesand loyalties (CES,95ff.).

54. Cf. JeanCohen,"DiscourseEthics and CivilSociety,"PhilosophyandSocial Criticism,14, no. 3-4 (1989): 315-37.

DavidIngramreceivedhis Ph.D.from UC SanDiego in 1980.He is currentlyProfessorof Philosophy at Loyola. Books include Habermasnd the DialecticReason YaleUniversityPress, 1987); Critical heoryndPhilosophyParagonHouse, 1990); and,as coeditor,Critical heory: heEssential eadingsParagon House, 1991).

Documents

Limits and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics