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Light infantry in Airland Battle Future - organizing for success. (1991)
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Light Infantry in AirLand Battle Future Organizing for Success
A Monograph by
Major Charles H Jacoby Jr
Infantry
School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth Kansas
First Term AY 90-91
Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL
Major C h a r l e s H J a c o b y Jr
T i t l e o f Monograph L i g h t I n f a n t r y I n Ai rLand B a t t l e
F u t u r e O r g a n i z i n g F o r S u c c e s s
Approved by
Monograph D i r e c t o r a l o n e 1 J a m e s Y M o o d y MSBA
Director S c h o o l o f w n e l Gordon F A t c h e s o n MA Advanced M i l i t a r y
S t u d i e s
Director G r a d u a t e P h i l i p J B r o o k e s PhD D e g r e e Program
A c c e p t e d t h i s - Pld d a y o f $2 1 9 9 1
LIGHT INFANTRY IN AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS by MAJ Charles H Jacoby Jr USA 57 pages
This monograph proposes an app r cp r r a t e o r q e n i z a t t o n a l t-uctlue fJ~irJrt i n f a n t rv biigdfS in s upp c r t of tr(2
o o e r a t i o o a l co nc eo t jer-ied fCJ il-Land 8attl ~-U~UI E
Tlf2 f o Ll o w 011 op e r a t i o re l c o nc ep t to )ll-Lad Eattic ~
e ~ pee ted t 0 add res s non 1 i n ear c0 en bat 0 per a t i 011 S i CI t 1 to 2 (I U -t
timeframe Nonlinearitv the extended battlefield post CalJ War threats and limited resources have generated an operational concept that calls for innovations and flexibility in force design As of now there have been no proposed changes for light infantry organizations Light infantry forces originally designed purely for t o t ab i 1 ity lOJ hav2 t1E r be e tr u t urer ariap r lhan=e o r s c o
i~Imiddot3~d en 1 (JpL~-3f~orlal iuncept CDlg1131 to ~~~i middot latd
Tri nono q r e on 1 -i e nr-i2S t12 CL~I-ll ~ lCjIIS
infantry structure to discover insights to its organizational development and to provide a basis for later structural comparisons Next ashort discussion of the significant world and national political and military trends sets the stage for an analysis of the AirLand Battle Future operational concept AirLand Battle Future is presented as an o c e r a t t orie I concept and 3nc1ly~ed to df0 1 e r- mi n e f u t u r o ~ c 1 3 f (J 1 ~ ~ i2 1 i q I t i ~ f a 1 ~ ~y J i t hi t r1 ~t 0 C) ( r 3 t i 01 a 1 con~pt (~i iilel~i-EtL~311y b a s cd e or c r r t e rt a is U-(0shy
eloped to dlulte a ltern a t r v e b-icaJe fo- ji~lIs
T h ) c r i I 0 i i is ~ I~ ted i 13 n) n a Lysis of Ih e I U 1- 1- 0 n 1 ~ 1
brigade structure Several alternative light brIgade structures are
evaluated using the criteria These alternative organizations were selected for analysis based on their applicability to the AirLand Eattle Future operational concept A synthesis of the resulting analysis formed the proposed structure for the light infantry brigade in AirLand Future The Light Regimental Combat Team is the proposed structure and answers the research question by suggesting an appropriate brigade structure for successful employment on the AirLand Battle Future battlefield
I INTRODUCTION 1
I I bull CURREfJT LIGHT I NF -4fHr=U bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
I I I bull FORCES OF CHAfltIGE 1 (J
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE bullbullbull bullbullbull 13
V 110DELS bulllt 19
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE bull 2CJ
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGADE bull 30
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 33
I I
APPEIID I XES
A Criteria Model bull (+ 1 B Current Light Brigade Structure bullbull 42 C Alternative Organizations bull 44 D Light Regimental Combat Team 47 E Deployability and Lethality Tables bull 48 F Thoughts On The Light Division 49
~ENDNOTES bullbullbullbull 5
B I Bl_ IOGRAPHY Sb
I bull I rITRJDUCT IOfJ
One of the most significant developments in US Army force
structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
infantry division The light division ~oncept was born in
controversy and developed and implemented in an environment of
misconception and acrimony In the end the light force concept
was adopted and came to represent a large proportion of the
the 1 i g h teo n C 2 P t IN a s the d i f f i u I t Y rn any sol dier s h a d m3 t c t- 1 11q
the prolific light tactical organizations with the perc2iv~d
heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine Now that the Ar~y
has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for the 21st
century it is time to reexamine the light infantry organization
fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical
organizations in a manner that is appropriate to the doctrines
operational concept
[ am tEfnptrj indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t IltJrater doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now the have got gtJrong I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOES not nattl- t n s t they have got it wl-ong What does matte- is t h oi r c ap ac i t- 0 ltJet it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~bull rt is this fleiblll~
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime 1
These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military
historian Sir Michael Howard provide an excellent starting
poin~ for placing an Armys tactical organizations in the proper
context with its doctrine
81~tpmy qf E~~lUC(_jl_YiU-- posit that the most l-emiddotvealing SOUI-C
of military failure is organizational dysfunction 2 In
1
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL
Major C h a r l e s H J a c o b y Jr
T i t l e o f Monograph L i g h t I n f a n t r y I n Ai rLand B a t t l e
F u t u r e O r g a n i z i n g F o r S u c c e s s
Approved by
Monograph D i r e c t o r a l o n e 1 J a m e s Y M o o d y MSBA
Director S c h o o l o f w n e l Gordon F A t c h e s o n MA Advanced M i l i t a r y
S t u d i e s
Director G r a d u a t e P h i l i p J B r o o k e s PhD D e g r e e Program
A c c e p t e d t h i s - Pld d a y o f $2 1 9 9 1
LIGHT INFANTRY IN AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS by MAJ Charles H Jacoby Jr USA 57 pages
This monograph proposes an app r cp r r a t e o r q e n i z a t t o n a l t-uctlue fJ~irJrt i n f a n t rv biigdfS in s upp c r t of tr(2
o o e r a t i o o a l co nc eo t jer-ied fCJ il-Land 8attl ~-U~UI E
Tlf2 f o Ll o w 011 op e r a t i o re l c o nc ep t to )ll-Lad Eattic ~
e ~ pee ted t 0 add res s non 1 i n ear c0 en bat 0 per a t i 011 S i CI t 1 to 2 (I U -t
timeframe Nonlinearitv the extended battlefield post CalJ War threats and limited resources have generated an operational concept that calls for innovations and flexibility in force design As of now there have been no proposed changes for light infantry organizations Light infantry forces originally designed purely for t o t ab i 1 ity lOJ hav2 t1E r be e tr u t urer ariap r lhan=e o r s c o
i~Imiddot3~d en 1 (JpL~-3f~orlal iuncept CDlg1131 to ~~~i middot latd
Tri nono q r e on 1 -i e nr-i2S t12 CL~I-ll ~ lCjIIS
infantry structure to discover insights to its organizational development and to provide a basis for later structural comparisons Next ashort discussion of the significant world and national political and military trends sets the stage for an analysis of the AirLand Battle Future operational concept AirLand Battle Future is presented as an o c e r a t t orie I concept and 3nc1ly~ed to df0 1 e r- mi n e f u t u r o ~ c 1 3 f (J 1 ~ ~ i2 1 i q I t i ~ f a 1 ~ ~y J i t hi t r1 ~t 0 C) ( r 3 t i 01 a 1 con~pt (~i iilel~i-EtL~311y b a s cd e or c r r t e rt a is U-(0shy
eloped to dlulte a ltern a t r v e b-icaJe fo- ji~lIs
T h ) c r i I 0 i i is ~ I~ ted i 13 n) n a Lysis of Ih e I U 1- 1- 0 n 1 ~ 1
brigade structure Several alternative light brIgade structures are
evaluated using the criteria These alternative organizations were selected for analysis based on their applicability to the AirLand Eattle Future operational concept A synthesis of the resulting analysis formed the proposed structure for the light infantry brigade in AirLand Future The Light Regimental Combat Team is the proposed structure and answers the research question by suggesting an appropriate brigade structure for successful employment on the AirLand Battle Future battlefield
I INTRODUCTION 1
I I bull CURREfJT LIGHT I NF -4fHr=U bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
I I I bull FORCES OF CHAfltIGE 1 (J
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE bullbullbull bullbullbull 13
V 110DELS bulllt 19
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE bull 2CJ
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGADE bull 30
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 33
I I
APPEIID I XES
A Criteria Model bull (+ 1 B Current Light Brigade Structure bullbull 42 C Alternative Organizations bull 44 D Light Regimental Combat Team 47 E Deployability and Lethality Tables bull 48 F Thoughts On The Light Division 49
~ENDNOTES bullbullbullbull 5
B I Bl_ IOGRAPHY Sb
I bull I rITRJDUCT IOfJ
One of the most significant developments in US Army force
structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
infantry division The light division ~oncept was born in
controversy and developed and implemented in an environment of
misconception and acrimony In the end the light force concept
was adopted and came to represent a large proportion of the
the 1 i g h teo n C 2 P t IN a s the d i f f i u I t Y rn any sol dier s h a d m3 t c t- 1 11q
the prolific light tactical organizations with the perc2iv~d
heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine Now that the Ar~y
has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for the 21st
century it is time to reexamine the light infantry organization
fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical
organizations in a manner that is appropriate to the doctrines
operational concept
[ am tEfnptrj indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t IltJrater doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now the have got gtJrong I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOES not nattl- t n s t they have got it wl-ong What does matte- is t h oi r c ap ac i t- 0 ltJet it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~bull rt is this fleiblll~
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime 1
These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military
historian Sir Michael Howard provide an excellent starting
poin~ for placing an Armys tactical organizations in the proper
context with its doctrine
81~tpmy qf E~~lUC(_jl_YiU-- posit that the most l-emiddotvealing SOUI-C
of military failure is organizational dysfunction 2 In
1
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
LIGHT INFANTRY IN AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS by MAJ Charles H Jacoby Jr USA 57 pages
This monograph proposes an app r cp r r a t e o r q e n i z a t t o n a l t-uctlue fJ~irJrt i n f a n t rv biigdfS in s upp c r t of tr(2
o o e r a t i o o a l co nc eo t jer-ied fCJ il-Land 8attl ~-U~UI E
Tlf2 f o Ll o w 011 op e r a t i o re l c o nc ep t to )ll-Lad Eattic ~
e ~ pee ted t 0 add res s non 1 i n ear c0 en bat 0 per a t i 011 S i CI t 1 to 2 (I U -t
timeframe Nonlinearitv the extended battlefield post CalJ War threats and limited resources have generated an operational concept that calls for innovations and flexibility in force design As of now there have been no proposed changes for light infantry organizations Light infantry forces originally designed purely for t o t ab i 1 ity lOJ hav2 t1E r be e tr u t urer ariap r lhan=e o r s c o
i~Imiddot3~d en 1 (JpL~-3f~orlal iuncept CDlg1131 to ~~~i middot latd
Tri nono q r e on 1 -i e nr-i2S t12 CL~I-ll ~ lCjIIS
infantry structure to discover insights to its organizational development and to provide a basis for later structural comparisons Next ashort discussion of the significant world and national political and military trends sets the stage for an analysis of the AirLand Battle Future operational concept AirLand Battle Future is presented as an o c e r a t t orie I concept and 3nc1ly~ed to df0 1 e r- mi n e f u t u r o ~ c 1 3 f (J 1 ~ ~ i2 1 i q I t i ~ f a 1 ~ ~y J i t hi t r1 ~t 0 C) ( r 3 t i 01 a 1 con~pt (~i iilel~i-EtL~311y b a s cd e or c r r t e rt a is U-(0shy
eloped to dlulte a ltern a t r v e b-icaJe fo- ji~lIs
T h ) c r i I 0 i i is ~ I~ ted i 13 n) n a Lysis of Ih e I U 1- 1- 0 n 1 ~ 1
brigade structure Several alternative light brIgade structures are
evaluated using the criteria These alternative organizations were selected for analysis based on their applicability to the AirLand Eattle Future operational concept A synthesis of the resulting analysis formed the proposed structure for the light infantry brigade in AirLand Future The Light Regimental Combat Team is the proposed structure and answers the research question by suggesting an appropriate brigade structure for successful employment on the AirLand Battle Future battlefield
I INTRODUCTION 1
I I bull CURREfJT LIGHT I NF -4fHr=U bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
I I I bull FORCES OF CHAfltIGE 1 (J
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE bullbullbull bullbullbull 13
V 110DELS bulllt 19
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE bull 2CJ
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGADE bull 30
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 33
I I
APPEIID I XES
A Criteria Model bull (+ 1 B Current Light Brigade Structure bullbull 42 C Alternative Organizations bull 44 D Light Regimental Combat Team 47 E Deployability and Lethality Tables bull 48 F Thoughts On The Light Division 49
~ENDNOTES bullbullbullbull 5
B I Bl_ IOGRAPHY Sb
I bull I rITRJDUCT IOfJ
One of the most significant developments in US Army force
structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
infantry division The light division ~oncept was born in
controversy and developed and implemented in an environment of
misconception and acrimony In the end the light force concept
was adopted and came to represent a large proportion of the
the 1 i g h teo n C 2 P t IN a s the d i f f i u I t Y rn any sol dier s h a d m3 t c t- 1 11q
the prolific light tactical organizations with the perc2iv~d
heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine Now that the Ar~y
has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for the 21st
century it is time to reexamine the light infantry organization
fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical
organizations in a manner that is appropriate to the doctrines
operational concept
[ am tEfnptrj indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t IltJrater doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now the have got gtJrong I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOES not nattl- t n s t they have got it wl-ong What does matte- is t h oi r c ap ac i t- 0 ltJet it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~bull rt is this fleiblll~
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime 1
These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military
historian Sir Michael Howard provide an excellent starting
poin~ for placing an Armys tactical organizations in the proper
context with its doctrine
81~tpmy qf E~~lUC(_jl_YiU-- posit that the most l-emiddotvealing SOUI-C
of military failure is organizational dysfunction 2 In
1
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
I INTRODUCTION 1
I I bull CURREfJT LIGHT I NF -4fHr=U bullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbullbull
I I I bull FORCES OF CHAfltIGE 1 (J
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE bullbullbull bullbullbull 13
V 110DELS bulllt 19
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE bull 2CJ
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGADE bull 30
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 33
I I
APPEIID I XES
A Criteria Model bull (+ 1 B Current Light Brigade Structure bullbull 42 C Alternative Organizations bull 44 D Light Regimental Combat Team 47 E Deployability and Lethality Tables bull 48 F Thoughts On The Light Division 49
~ENDNOTES bullbullbullbull 5
B I Bl_ IOGRAPHY Sb
I bull I rITRJDUCT IOfJ
One of the most significant developments in US Army force
structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
infantry division The light division ~oncept was born in
controversy and developed and implemented in an environment of
misconception and acrimony In the end the light force concept
was adopted and came to represent a large proportion of the
the 1 i g h teo n C 2 P t IN a s the d i f f i u I t Y rn any sol dier s h a d m3 t c t- 1 11q
the prolific light tactical organizations with the perc2iv~d
heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine Now that the Ar~y
has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for the 21st
century it is time to reexamine the light infantry organization
fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical
organizations in a manner that is appropriate to the doctrines
operational concept
[ am tEfnptrj indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t IltJrater doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now the have got gtJrong I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOES not nattl- t n s t they have got it wl-ong What does matte- is t h oi r c ap ac i t- 0 ltJet it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~bull rt is this fleiblll~
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime 1
These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military
historian Sir Michael Howard provide an excellent starting
poin~ for placing an Armys tactical organizations in the proper
context with its doctrine
81~tpmy qf E~~lUC(_jl_YiU-- posit that the most l-emiddotvealing SOUI-C
of military failure is organizational dysfunction 2 In
1
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
I bull I rITRJDUCT IOfJ
One of the most significant developments in US Army force
structure in the last decade has been the advent of the light
infantry division The light division ~oncept was born in
controversy and developed and implemented in an environment of
misconception and acrimony In the end the light force concept
was adopted and came to represent a large proportion of the
the 1 i g h teo n C 2 P t IN a s the d i f f i u I t Y rn any sol dier s h a d m3 t c t- 1 11q
the prolific light tactical organizations with the perc2iv~d
heavy nature of AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine Now that the Ar~y
has embarked on the development of a new doctrine for the 21st
century it is time to reexamine the light infantry organization
fighting provides a unique opportunity to reshape tactical
organizations in a manner that is appropriate to the doctrines
operational concept
[ am tEfnptrj indeed to declaf-e d cqme tt c a Ll v t n a t IltJrater doctrine ~he Armed Forces are ~o~king or now the have got gtJrong I am also t ernp t e d to d e c l a r e t h a t it dOES not nattl- t n s t they have got it wl-ong What does matte- is t h oi r c ap ac i t- 0 ltJet it right quickly when the moment al-l-iYe~bull rt is this fleiblll~
both in the minds of the armed forces and in their organization that needs above all to be developed in peacetime 1
These oft quoted remarks of the eminent British military
historian Sir Michael Howard provide an excellent starting
poin~ for placing an Armys tactical organizations in the proper
context with its doctrine
81~tpmy qf E~~lUC(_jl_YiU-- posit that the most l-emiddotvealing SOUI-C
of military failure is organizational dysfunction 2 In
1
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
particular an organizations inability to learn ant~cip+tl- ind
adapt are often the most important sources of such dysfuncxion
This analysis directly supports the above thoughts of Howard and
forces consideration of the question of whether the Army is ready
and able to adapt its doctrine and organizations to the changing
realities around it
Defined by John Shy doctrine is simply the general
colsens2s among mil itary le~ders on how to wage wal- 3 amp h G
Zefin t ion ALE is c l ~ a r l y the 3cc~pted and entt-enched doc ~-ile ~f
tl~US Army Organizations and wespons have been fieldamp that
support ALB doctrine and refinements have taken place as the
result of validating experiences such as the National Training
Center (NTC) and the Eattle Command Training Program (BCTP) and
c--- -l EXEI- i enie~iscch a G etdamp anc Paim KYFv I
t3is cime the Army is i n he process a f a com~etirisie r ~ j j j i
of ALB doctrine in an effort to adapt to the changing world
situation and to anticipate conditions on future battlefields
This revision known as AirLand Battle Future (ALE-F) hopes to
aid the ~irqanizaiioa-a1 a- o r dsfln=tions that c o ~ ~ l d -7 7-
2-3$gi-grl gtmfortable Du zut J date ~ G Ct - i n e nd t - ~
- iltctica ilrmations incp x e d o y i l- n t c tha reltr cz-tlrv
This paper will propose an appropriate light iniantr~
brigade organization for employment in the ALE-F operational
concept The proposed structure will be based on an analysis of
the the following factors the development and structure of the
current LIB the forces that have led to a reshaping of the Army
as a whole the ALS-F operational concept and alternative
-infantry brigade oi-gailizaio1~ he analysis of cur-rnt fo~-c~+
d~sigil ax1 a ternative mooels dill he ailed ty a therr~-etica
f-anewo-kchampt captares the crltrcal ~esign ps-arneeegt-scF GL3--F
-Ihis franewol-k will pr-odide th basis =01 a - lea -- ~i~werina sirn~
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
gt- - i tel-j bar l~eac~i 3 5 - i 8 - i c8 + ~ ~ p l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ ~ p ~ - z ~ s
organizatios (AiPEN2IX A gt A syotheis of t a lc analtic~l
process wlll lsad to a proposed b-igade organi-atiosl that F i t 5
the criteria for ALB-F With the flexibility of mind and
organization called for by Howard the light infantry can be
fully and properly integrated into the total Army force structure
and oi-~anized for success on future battlefields
L
[ i CCfRFrT I- G-T XEISAD
IT lta-ayiy a-r2111l)k 3 - ~r gtJ-o f t br~gtdpIS~
r e ~ i e so i - i t5 prcass of dzclopment H G ~re hrzd~ s io+j
srganized is a di-ect reflect on O F tnis process ~t ~ich
En -3G t I_h_qreNoLieaa~1E_n~u9hI P ~ W ~ E The Case-Pf US
LigbtEnfantr)( is the title of a recent SampPS monograph that
j th re-a +Gip5 3- c i -+ - lt - 7
l l - -etnss 3f TC-lCGi J L + gt
light infantry division and its enphasls on deplcyability is
beset by organizational and mission paradoxes These problems
There is an American t1-adition for this approach to light
infantry During World War 11 the dichotomy between what Scott
McMichaels calls the European view of light ~nfantry is vividly
contrasted with what would became an American concept of i3ht
infantrv The differ-ence berween these tws views is scbscancia
t-- to the tininiiatr~ i t is ofzn an a-ii-er-t f
sJoti2tes
3
I
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
The Eu-op~an view aef ices a 1ght forces by its taticai
style as exemplified by German Jaegers In this glew the iqht
infantryman is a breed apart from the common soldier He is self-
reliant independent of fixed lines of communication and a part
of his environment This tradition of light infantry emphasizes
the moral domain of battle and perhaps presents a model of the
ethic required of the warrior on the nonlinear battlefield In
-3~trasz t h ~ Arne-icar view oi i ght ~ i l - 21-an3-id aa- I T
to t h ~ ~ r e ~ e n t is more all organizaticnal view Light indeed
means light in tel-ms of equipnent and fit epcwer I t is a i-elatvz
term to express the difference between light conventional and
mechanized infantry The greatest benefit of light infantry in
this view is its strategic mobility 5
-h Js iclii lnf a ~ - t - ~z gtIcl-$ ~Ja-1 + t ib L-j E sc s
this emphasis o- scr~tegic mobility in an effor to i-zucc clr
burden on scarce shipping resources experiments were conducted
to reduce the infantry division force structure to save ship
bottoms 6 After the Hunter-Ligget field maneuvers of 1944 the
US abanzonc+d the igbt division corcepz 3 1 5 was -- --- a A~ n e+
be=aire - di i zios c ~ ~ l d eciie he gt r ica l ms s 1-3 e
te stanzard inantry ivisir~i 6fier-a i l i R ~hu - r specif-
criticism wac- that strategic mcbility was inot oarticular-ly 1-seful
if the unit was not effective in battle 7 This World War I 1
interpretation of the utility of light infantry places the
quality of strategic mobility before method of tactical
employment Almost forty years later this interpretation was
resurrected In npri 1984 Wickham Chluf o f -General 3chn A =aff c f
the A - m y o c ~ b lished his tihi te gapor dil-ect i n ( ] the e~e1zplreit c f
thr IS i isht a t v i s f i I h 1 f - - lche
divisisn in the force structure had beel- identified a y Senera
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
premise that threats outside of the central front in Eut-opi
required a different force structure from the heavy one designed
specifically for Europe General Wickhams five light divisions
met several additional goals that had little to do with how the5~
divisions might fight
Today the light d i v i s ~ o n is strongly estaolisied but tre~ e
is still a need to clarify its role and to justify its portion of
the Armys combat strength Besides the 82d Airborne Division and
Infantry Division orjanzatcns alre unique pccduct- 3 f Cne ~ ~ X I - Y E -
structure experiments of the 1930sThese five light d l v ~ s i o n s
meet the arbitrary strategic lift criteria of under 500 C - 1 4 1
equivalent sorties with no outsized equipment requiring C - 5 l i f t
assets 10
As demonstrated the light divisiois of the 1990s were
born from the same strategic mobility impetus of the 1940s
rcerimrns bct Armv eaders sough t avoid the p t f d i 1s
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
tactical apprcach to l i ~ n t Forces 111the 1 9 ~ 7Light I f a n t l - y
Battalion doctrinal manual F M 7-72 the emphasis placed on the
moral domain and the light fighter himself is clearly evident
The light infantry soldier is a powerful combat weapon on the modern battlefield He fights at night in rough terrain in bad weather and by stalking he survives by stealth and by being a master of field craft and land navigation He is physically strong emotionally tough and highly motivated 1 1
This is a tactical concept that goes beyond that o f
transcend th2 rattier artificial deployabi lity cri tei-i+
eccablished for the organ~zation Two pages later the manual i s
again confronting the light infantry conundrum
Light infantry battalions are organized to fight successful operations in close terrain in the low to mid intensity spectrum cf ccnf 1 ict On the Girl-and hatefitlrj they provide Lh-3 l-F-ny versatii aiyd str3Cegic feltibilitv th-)uc~ heir- st-la for rapid deployment It is the doctrine for success on the nonlinear battlefield 12
Clearly US light forces have been able to come up with an
operational concept that matched their austere organizational
requirements As Edward Luttwak describes it tbe ligit divic-ions
have attempted 20 cCfset an imnosed a c f tactica mnbii d
5 -a 1 -enower with what- he feels t~ be tile more ino-cant
determinants of combat power tactical skill and opeiaticnsl
ingenuity 13 Hand-in-hand with this tactical concept for the
employment of light infantry were other serious steps taken to
enhance the moral element of the force At the Infantry School at
Ft Benning light fighter courses for junior leaders and an
emphasis on light fighter attendance at Ranger School are two
examples of this trend In addition the ill-fated COHCRT uni
manning system and the regimental affiliation system were
des~ansa to help generat the tipa o f zohesioc and unit esorit
necessary for the 1 iyht forces IHowever the adopt ion of a isfit
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
c~pe~ratlanalconcept has not e n d ~ d he overtcrm~-il the I-ole 0-
the light infantry in the Army for-ce structure
Problems still exist for the force structure despite the
seemingly happy state of affairs in the light community itself
The most significant concerns revolve around the role of the
light force in what remains the Armys principle theater of
interest Europe The Army can sinply not afford the large
perce)iaqc of 1 tz fsl-ce s t l -~~c tu r -e -e resc~n t~ d f--ci 1 lE 1 i q z b
ts c e inappropriate acrosx 3 broan range c the cz~-atc-ia
cot 1nucm Thus shortly after the deveapment uf t ~ i q h t
concept there began a furious effort tofind a way to use light
forces successfully on the European or other mid- to high-
intensity battlefields This effort has resulted in what is
ci lev C ~ G hesvy 1 ighk m i x ccicet
I k c h ink has b e e r skiIec over heavyiih inci~d-~g
heavylight considerations iri the latest tactical manuals F M 71-
100 Di~i_s_l~n-Os_eratll~r~and F M 71-3 Bliwde o~er_ tLem More
importantly heavylight operations have been incorporated into
the milo3- ti-ainirlg certer-s Extensiu~ eff2rts habe b ~ e 1 made ic
~dpirk iii i ~ 5 5 i i j 11(a-red fl-om lcsa h~i~~y
ltIn casz the asgt fif iLtht oi-re 111 a gt A - t ~f~~F-iki~~
scenario was a foregone conciclsion beo-e the testing c-f th
concepts really got underway Light forces could not escape a
role in Europe or other potential mid- to high-intensity
theaters the question was how best to employ the unique
capabilities of one third of the active force
The value of light forces for their deployahilitv aione is
a mute p o ~ n t for the European theater Light divisions a r e no
more deployable than the men schedued to fail in n n POMCIS s l te
all-pad located in Eu-ope Light forces re~resc-nt no rrlcrr- o f a
cmmitment or a -1eterrent effect than the executicn o f the paii
r$tc-33
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
for the reinfocement of Ger-man Sther des canc-n1irj thz
appropriate role of light forces on the high - intensity
battlefield generally fall into one of two camps The two broad
categories for the employment of light forces are to use them in
light specific scenarios or to augment admittedly undermanned
heavy formations
Light infantry purests wish to reserve the light force for -
- 1 ichr s p e c l ~17 missions and sccnar ios Th~c- scc-rial- ics inc ludc
3efe-6s of urban and forested tzrrain re3r -ea operatio s
offensive operations in close terrsin or during period of
limited visibility air assault operatidns throughout the depth
of the battlefield and as stay behind forces to disrupt enemy
command and control (C2) and combat servicesupport (CSS)
activities A l i of these operations a r e to 1e cs~ein nnti~-
-as descr iked h ltenral Jaylie A Ooxni nq L-a pa-ese- tiec s s
light infantry essence Light infantry commanders will hake to
guard against the tendency to load down light infantry battalions
with so-called essential heavy equipment to fight in Europe 1 4
This school of thouqht puts a premium on the unioue tactical
ciills c f t h ~1 i c h t infantry and szeks tc pt-a-- - A = qua t
z-t I -3m discolut ion thrcugr misuse 31 sandarvI I - Fn
excellent example of this tyoe of abuse 0f Light infgtitrv is t h e
destruction of the the ranger force attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division at Cisterna in 1944 In this example three lightly
armed ranger battalions were decimated while attempting to lead a
division attack against a dug-in enemy possessing tanks and
indirect fire support 15 The light infantry purest rejects the
use of a light force like the rangers in a conventional role
such as he attack at Cic-ts-na Further the purest rejects thc
notion that the light force invalved in a m i d - ta h7gh-
intensity operat ions can simply be augmented wi h sddi t ionai
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
fimiddotECtJmiddot1J2- ~A(~3il-Il21 aiJimiddotl~itl 31G atlC=-li nfilimiddot ~-lj
p e rfo r rn the -0112 of slaaal-cj i nfen brv This school of -loLqht
emphasizes the unique tactical capabilities and lilnitatiolls 0f
the light force and stubbornly decries any addition to the
spartan TOampE 16
The advocate of the heavylight mix at the tactical level
looks for complimentary use of both types of forces on the sane
middot-otaticns dt tre rTCs --af lJo~middotec -tcr lt3 ltY~if~rmiddotCJ1~J Cmiddotmiddot--ert shy
r c oc ornb i na t a o n of the ~Ja fOI-CE tpes 17 ~ o rrs i e r ao Le l-=-sin
learned effort has led to the publication of several to~-to
packets from both the NTC and JRTC Out of the contest between
the light purests and the heavylight mix advocates the Army has
~JJ S t - ~
light fighter General Wickham has added little to -he deoate by
articulating a position that embraces the spectrum of ideas 18
Field Manual 71-100 pi_ltisi9 Op=-ations reflects that position
~e 3ilitmiddot~ cmiddotr tIEgt ll OiV1J(middot1 c c mrna nr lt3n~ rc~cCJl -c t r - li~
r c ~-r-c1rji]y 3CC~~t d~re~itJ1 f-~-~- ~-nI- tlt~ shy
tri v -=)It3--~Ol f middot m 10 t c ~il(jl i+r-nty c2middot(~i-~3 1t
fo~c -tI-middot~middot=t1-~- t11P middot~~nt gt L r f- - c shy
~L8 doctrine nas been a slo~ ana pa~nf~i ~rocess TIe li]ilt
infantry style of fighting dtld philosophy of conbat readily 11ests
with the tenets of ALB yet its force design does not match with
a doctrine clearly intended for a high intensity environment
This painful process of adaptation is on-going It remains
essential because the light c~mmunity continues to ~ake ue a
~ignificdnt portio0 of thO overall force structlJre ~cw2vel- ~s
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
ied to the initiating of the ALD-7 operational ~otcep agiii
raise the question of the appropriateness of the light force
organization
1 1 1 FORCES O F CHANGE
Just as the changed nature of the world and the perception
of the threat in the post-Vietnam world shaped the development of
ALR doctrine ALB-F and its resulting organizations will be
shaped by the inomentcus hc3qes in tcdays wGrld sit~at im 15
the concomitant changec perception of the threat Bzforti
develcping the concepts in A L S - F and then prcposing appr-opr-iltc
organizations a review of the most relevant catalysts of change
is required
Perhaps the most striking event of thepost World War I 1
enormous consequences across the range of human activities The
political economic and military calculus that has dominated
world events for the last fifty years has been completely
disr81pted But there -ko~lc b o no mitalcigtq that ths 9-pie
The cold war was grounded in the Soviet Unions will to empire and its use of force - symbolized by the tanks that subjugated Budapest in 1956 and Praque in 1968 The abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and of the effort to control Eastern Europe by force marks the end of the cold war 20
The end of the Cold War calls for a complete rethinking of
lot only force structure and doctrine but far the underlying
assumptions behind US national security as we1 1 Theodo8-E
Sorenson writing in Foreign Affairs magarlne states
7 ne touchstcne for OIL nations szcux-i ty c s ~ c e p t - the containment of Soviet militarv and ideolnsical power - is ltore The primary threat cited over fol-ty years il-I justification for
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
General Meyer in the summer of 1989 was already renewiny his
call for a reduced military presence and a force structure change
to a lighter high-tech model This has significant implications
for USAREUER and 9LB doctrine 22 Indeed the entire US Army
focs sirce tbe Vetnam must bz rcxami ned
ii3kpr sf -- i s a cbe erd 2 I
i a i s the eret-qcnze o f l-risnll isz~ei nca th tcp o r
national secul-ity concer-11s Since Goroachev launched the Sodie
Union on its new path there have been no new Soviet client
states 23 In house revolutions and regional conflicts
lec=ndpnfr j f wicerI-p- nicCIina~s ar-c- flt r n ~ r pl i r r r 3
_ _ J- l~l~tEi r3el s~81t~-f~c7c L gt+gt [c Ld -
provocation and confrontation through surrogates 2ecent eentr
in the Persian Gulf serve to underscore this point The example
o f the IraqKuwait crisis also underscores a further point
- f l icn l gowe-s thol~gh ciassi ied as thi-c dorld csl ~ 0 5 ~ 5 5 5
a- gtc -h - i -- - --- - lte-fJ -ltI dF--- -3 rnZE t72i lt- j- gt 1 7 1--lt37
= LalGlc q t r- c c rc7i - ltIlt i lt a 1 s t 7 -3 2 - -
- - 7I E uono tas a i r t l 31tthsrz II-P o or^ tlis2d ltzzi-
developing nations with over a thousand main battle tan1s
Besides drastic changes in the polltical world another
facet of human activity proceeds at an even greater perhaps
revolutionary rate of change - technological development As much
a proddct of Cold War competition a s a descr~ptor of it the
heilcons technology trace dill mo5t ikey continuz at the cirrent
breakreck psis hhrther h a is a- or- nnt Indced s
Leeral ilepr has ai ~lt23 t b i 3q bi~e~i-ol dlipcr l
2ICbJi714lip lOCkEd tO (35 3 i3y L C SZL fen ( j ~ d - j I amp ice
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
of redi~czd threat The pr-~cedel-~ce sirfoi- this tpe secur-i t b
thinking is best described in A J Bacevichs hePqntomicEz
In his analogy a beleaguered Army of the 1950s sought to justify
its existence by emphasizing the impact of changing technologies
on war and the Armys ability to capitalize on its promise 24
Whether the Army misapplies technology or fails to articulate its
role in national security great technological breakthroughs that
will help shape future battlefields are just around t he rrrner
The above I-ev1ecj of the changing world realities p r - w d i i - i ~
key insights to the imperatives that will shape the Rrmy in the
next century In response to what historians will inevitably
regard a s the dramatic events of the late 19805 the most
fundamental change in the Army will be that it gets smaller The
r oc i in i ilt3 Saiampt threat wi 1 1 (10 13813e- serve as L1O - ~ 1 1 ~ - G
The 1argc peacetiino nil ltt-y esiabllshment th yci~i---titr - i s =
Threat considerations aside current US budget deficit problems
preclude maintaining the current force structure The nations
political leaders are understandably anxious to spend the elus i ve
peace r j i v idend Fowevei- General Vuono and o t h ~ r mi itat-
lsaJr =a~tic-i t-at thp S ~ L G ~ j(lggs~-~ampt --4 -A --31-flox-2d 1-2 - -
cJn the sc-ap heap if history 25 The firny fiiids iLself i5 i i
did in the 1950s mired in a11 identity crises Despite hz
rhetoric concerning the still dangerous Soviet bear the Army
under Vuonos leadership is vigorously striving to redefine its
role
The heart of the Army effort to adapt to the new
environment is the articulation of the Armys role a s a strategic
force General Vuoiios challenge is to package what has always
been an important Army fux-ction but not ci be1 1 definid r r j
that of qnhal police fol-ce S i npl put the $-my -a l o q e r the
l ~ n d componeit of contanment must sell itsel as tne global
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
- -(- sf 25 inizl-er-tzTile GIrn~ c~sixlj~ the t-gtatrrt s
be found thl-oughout the post-Cold Jar won-d dc7termilc- ikeway 1 t
will fight to accomplish the implied missions and design forres
to accomplish those missions
General Vuono has chosen six imperatives to serve as a
compass heading for this reorientation of the Army The six
imperatives include keeping a quality force maintaining a
- a - 0 - - 7 3 scuqh -ea istl Igt- 7G
nataini~q t t e force milt cnltl~~cap~r-c~--late mcc ~ - r ~ i u
-and tie 4evclopment o f qua i t y lea3ers c6 hiat is 6rr l~edf - rs ~
this approach is a vision of an Army that is significantly
different than the Cold War deterrent model The new base case
for the Army will be global contingency operations These
rclt--al-ij ri clt lt CCl-l(igtti i =-L-tz -g-j~ -
h T I 3 j jE5 T i C I c T L sf h -l d P L
based Overseas troops wil present a smaller forward presence as
opposed to being a forward deployed deterrent force The Army
will continue its post-war tradition of substituting high
technclsqv combat capahi l i t i~sfor -aimber-tf t-ops ail
gs-emj Svnri~ltup ch a - c- - lt- FL - Tp gt- $53 j -7 -2 e gt - I
fc--~f trrlte i 3 1(eeal Jon-ljl foci5ec c =-c_c
character ist itc fersati l 1 c y acror-s he oerxlioril rsnc i1d1i37
deployability and lethality 27
IV AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE
The dynamic changes outlined above set the broad parameters
for the AirLand Battle Future operational concept General John
W Foss Commander of TRADOC has played a leading role in
r-ecoqnizing the forces o f chapge and the11- implicaticns for-
CL-rerit AL3 coctr-ne I1th=~~ 53t~-fierjwi th t~ cnrt sued
i-z5Janrlof te tcrets of A L 3 Ce-e-a1Fss fee -hit zl3ri~
tr-rids 3n5 new capabilities refnaic a neA ioov a tl-e $ ~ n ~ s
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
warfighting concepr hence ALE-F 23 The new warfighting concept
will generate important considerations for the organization and
missions of tactical units
General Fosss ideas for the development of ALB-F as a
warfighting concept start with the notions espoused earlier by
General Vuono of the future Army as a CONUS based contingency
force This connotes a force with an additional emphasis on
eployability At the thsater icv+l smaller fo-ce =t~-lct~-er- for
both frierdly and threat forces will mean the 1i~eliliood I+
nonlinear ex tended bzt t lef ield Nonlinearity is seen as the ie~
battlefield reality that drives tactical concepts and
organizational changes Emerging technologies will be utilized ail
the nonlinear battlefield to find target and destroy enemy
Combat Developments Robert L Keller
The challenge is to identify a tactical concept which enables us to capture the benefits of our new technology and at the same time accommodate the changed threat while complying with the evolvinq fisral and political constl-dints A nonlineal- csnc~pt i ~ 3 cat-jidatc for this ta- ~ t a concett 3
es t ab 1islizd f o r ~LJZUI- forces versatility 5tl-3ki3 A r m y ii
deployability and lethality
As an operational concept ALE-F combat is conceived as a
cyclical process The process itself has implications for future
force design The operational concept as envisioned consists of
four phases The first phase is long range acquisition and
surveillance of appl-oachinq or static enemy forces This phase
puts a premium on inteligence assets providing near complete and
fires phase Tarqetlng ths forces accjui-ed and h-acked i l l tl
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
significant numbers of enemy combat and combat support forces
Phase three is the maneuver phase In this phase highly age
maneuver forces complete the destruction of enemy remnants and
follow up with pursuit or exploitation operations The final
phase is reconstitution Following hard but short battles lean
maneuver forces will be reconstituted through a robust and
mareuver-or itz-ited past lo~jist itrs system 31 Th i r cyci i-31
pattern n C combat is seen a a vjiid 7czess not ci f t ~
corps but d o w n to the s m a l l e ~ t maneuver uniz
The above operational concept produces important design
parameters for force reorganization to meet the demands of ALB-F
The nonlinear operational concept and the subsequent cyclical
c z t tei- 9 c c m p a t cai j-hqnlv a lt lamppe vs -f ~ - T --e-
to obtaiti the req~li-k deg-ee f arilty yet e aii i h
necessary lethality requires smaller more effective fighting
units The initial design guidance emphasizes combined arms
brigades that are interchangeable with all the other brigades in
+st-fercr force pwg- - Tiis dill alioki or i-apldly tiluril)le
FF lt slt gt F ( T s m 5 s 35 3 lcaye c z - ~ lt j ~ 5 L g - + ~ l e
much more a k i n til the ~01-3 o ~ - q s ~ i z a i ~ n gta- I T iii Wc-llj
logistic emphasis wiil be foc~ised ac the corps and br-ijade ievei
This makes the brigade a more independent self-sustaining force
The maneuver battalions will be lean with only the bare minimum
logistics capability required All of these organizational
design parameters required by the operational concept stress the
need for a high degree of tactical mobllity and eduaily mobile
logistic elements Azcording to LTE Leon E Salomon iogisic in
a nonlinear battlf must not weigh down the battalion or d i v s i o n
commander- 3
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
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McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
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US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
In the examination of the structuring of light infantyy
brigades the first step is to determine what types of missions
within ALE-F the light formations may be expected to perform The
principle mission for CONUS based light infantry forces is
strategic deployability Strategic deployability has lonq been
the the critical element in determining the structure of light
forces Ironically during the 19805 while the Army drove full
seed ahead with the inplementation of a heavy 4L8 doctrine i t
was forced to proceed with the concurrent development (of the
rapid deployment force The press of world events forced the
development of forces to deal with the less threatening though
more likely contingency scenarios exemplified by Grenada Panama
and Desert Shield The nature of current and future means of
strateqic nobility will continue to place a prenurn a fci-cez
thst are specifically tailolsd for e efficient use o f those
means However- the dilemma over how to rbd1y place a cjedibLe
fighting force on the ground remains Often the preemptive effect
of US forces is gained primarily by the political will
ure-ation gct5 to the heart o f the problem by a-~1yiiq h ~
characteristics of contingency operations
In these operations a Corps must be prepared to - Task organize or tailor a force for rapid deployment andor combat deploy the force rapidly to deter a possible conflict - Plan for the simultaneous deployment and employment of the force fighting may well begin before the whole force can be in position 33
The bottom line is that contingency operations will co~itinua to
be the principle light mission in 4L3-F
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
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S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
I 1 a - c a lthr a coiiitncy f~$-cs tiin i
immature theater or as reinforcement for a For~uard pl-~sencr CIS
force the light force will be expected to operate tactically i n
the ALB-F cycle of combat
In a mature theater where a mix of forcesexists to fight
high- or mid- intensity battles the light fdrce can be placed in
the detection zone during Phase I Specifically the concept
1 - I - inLditr-yt be c a r t of the ~-c~~r~i-~eilln
lt s s romoilpr ~I-TS T P ~ in= y m~ssion k L S i ~ f i 5f~re PI- a c s
to monitor and target tnreat fol-ces rnealt- ~rinciple alti- - l ~ t ~ c t i
of approach The emphasis is not on combat capabilities However
some counter reconnaissance may be conducted In conjunction with
aerial recon forces forward detachments will be engaged Light
i l l - i s 5 2 i - 3 gt 3llty)c -Egtyinct-t2 ~~IyjIuclt
-L C --rai ~ i t h o u t 3eccli11~ deii-ivey eqaqei c )a t cf I (i
force in the detection zone light infantry forces cac expect to
act as C2 for other RS elements in the zone This requirement
will demand a robust C2 downlink and fusion capability to
3srgtlniate real tize inhc-mat ion 34
2 -i $bs F-25 -a5= 1 yt I-f372ltyp 2 - f- - - gt ---2 -
p dsr-2ct lnn ai u i l bt -qul-a~ tc nailtsi - L L k Ic--
enemy u7its to continue the targeting process Lght brlgades or
battalions may also be used during the fires phase as strike
assets against enemy soft targets such as C2 and artillery Use
as a strike asset presumably envisions airmobile or light
motorized raids 35
In the maneuver phase licht brigades like other maneuver
units will be dispersed il-i tactical assembly arias i ~
preparatlcri for o-ffznsive operations or to ~~-otsltt assets75
TSese maneuvi- forces wil rapid1 y c m e koetgter to fom
appropl-iate combinations 501- the o v p l e t z dectrac lor1 ~ fthe
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
enemy forces that have survived the fires phase G~iirlel ines fcr
ALE-F have important force design implications for maneuver
brigades
General Foss feels the combined arms nature of the brigade
is the critical element in tactical success In stressing this
point he has used as an example the necessity of permanently
attaching a brigades direct support artillery battalion
Brigades must be organized for simplicity and feibility as
weli 36 In the battle area maneuver brigades to include l l ~ h t
fol-ces available for this role must be able to mass forces
quickly to destroy enemy forces by direct fire They must be able
to conduct hasty attacks and meeting engagements with enemy
forces that are handed off from the detection zone Agility of
the fat-ce is smphasizod T h i conce~t of agility includes the
abiiity to nova rapidly on mui tiple I-oiltes aind the optimll and
rapid force tailoring of brigade packages As General Foss has
emphasized agility includes the mental agility of the commander and the streamlining of logistics 37
The final phase of the combat cycle is reconsticution This
-phasz aiso has implicatio~ fol- light i n i r i n r y forr e r-sgi I - -
nonlinear bat t ief ield present ltone particularly troubl i riq
problems for the logistician Logistics over the ages has lent
itself to linearity Jomini and others developed elaborate
geometric relationships to demonstrate the efficacy of lines of
communication (LOCs) perpendicular to the front of advance
Linearity provides simplicity for support and built-in security
for LOCs Uncovering or threatening your enemies LOCs is a
classic military maneuver at the strategic operational and
tactical level 38 On the nonlinear battlefield those LOCs b y
necessity will be exposed and vulnerable The distances between
battle areas on the extended battlefield only exacerbate the
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
pi-cblems o f s~ipport li the PLS-F cancep i x i IT~TE-JYPI- j131- --i)cs
will seek logistic independence The focus o f support will be
placed at the brigade level within the forward support battalion
and at the corps Division will become a logistics coordinator A
brigades logistical assets will be expected to maneuver with the
unit instead of dragging along behind i t like a fouled anchor 39
From the brief analysis of the ALB-F umbrella concept it
is cear that there are siqriifica~it ixpliiations ir A f
A~rmy 3 It salso ciear- tht rzCtac~ical organ~zac~o~ mpc~-
fluestions are raised concernir~g tle CLAI-reiiti i q h t L~iy~de
structure and its viability within the ALE-F concept The ight
infantry brigade will be expected to perform important functions
The brigade will be expected to fulfill the previously discussed
t-glr d~-iloyabiIiy his clisik t - i i I --ni5-i T-
mst have suTf icient ishality to c-ect~re itszlf tk12 dbiii i
area and support the introduction of heavier forces as requ~red
Secondly the light brigade must be adaptable enough to
participate in the manner prescribed for it in the ALR-F cycle of
cornhat Snccific~liv t3e brigade nlJct be able to f~ctv~ asc
f th =nbi f-j-ci I thl L I I 1 2 ledil-iih -zrr~n j p = r L - -
w ~ ~aigr-c~r a b l e eferie I N i 3te i t muclt 3n to ine~~-ae
rapidly with orher maneuver brgades to destroy Enemy f c i c z s in
the battle area
V A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
To make an assessment of the light brigades organizational
compatibility with the ALE-F operational concept it is necessary
to establish a framework for analysis and a criteria for
evaluation A set of criteria can derive fundamental validity
iro7 sound theoretical cinserpinninc5 A 1 ilkacjf I th tlcm-
ins-s that changzs 111 ltoctrine orca~iiratinnc and natric 3c
at st-ay dangerously from I filndamenta o funder-~jts~idlnc tLe
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
nature of war In the analysis of the llght b r i g ~ d e this
theoretical linkage will be established by crafting a framework
for analysis in terms of an acceptable theoretical mpdel In this
case the model will be the domains of combat as articulated by
Army theoretician James Schneider This model represents three
fundamental components of the combat environment that shape
events on the battlefield the physical domain the cybernetic
domain and the moral domain
The physical domain compr-ises the natural assects of rsmbat
such as the terrain and weather and also encompasses technology
and logistics The cybernetic domain consists of C2 and
information The moral domain deals with the human dimension of
conflict and the intangibles such as cohesion and morale 40 The
next step is to cast the domains in terms that provide a ~ z f ~ l
-Tramcwork for the analysis of oi-qanlzations in the corte t of
A L B - F
AirLand Battle Future organizational design imperatives can
be derived from the earlier analysis of the A L B - F operational
concept The essential design pai-ame tei-5 can the b e gro~ped
within th donains of comoat FGI- the pu-pus25 3 f hi pizt ir ti)
analysis will be limited to the ohysical and the mcral ilampnains
In the case of the physical domain ALB-F requires rapld
strategic deployability sustainable and interchangeable brigade
packages and lethality expressed in terms of firepower and
tactical mobility In the moral domain A L B - F and its basic
assumptions concerning the nonlinear extended battlefield and the
contingency base case generates extraordinary demands on unit
cohesion and the warrior ethic of the light fighter The physical
and moral domains as defined abcve can now be ied as a fl-amewot-2
for applying the criteria that evaluates the appropriate
organization for light infantry brigades in ALB-F
The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
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The crizra Far bclqing an 31-rjanizatior il-i tlt~-nc gt-
operational concept under which i t wi11 be employd is
straightforward The criteria can be posed as two questions The
first question is whether the organization is structured so that
it can accomplish the principle mission envisioned for it The
next quetion is whether that organization is as suggested by
Michael Howard at the beginning of the piece flexible enough to
aicongtTlisthe crucial susidia- ~isios tha h3ve tei
identlfid for it The dornai refined in terms i t-iii 31-2-i
design par-aneters wi 1 1 provide the nececsary ~EoI-E~c~1 v
grounded analytical framework for the evaluation of current and
proposed light infantry brigade organizations by the simple
criteria just established (APPENDIX 6 )
T L ~ c~-tes t o f the c r t e - l a w i 1 be t-c tl r - - if t ~
1 i n f d n t - y structcrs aga1nt i t The cti-i-c ig-c FIC y
brigade structure and its generic task organized variant are
reflected in to APPENDIX B-1 In the physical domain the light
brigade is certainly the most deployable brigade sized element in
the rm A srandard 1i~nt blicade packaqe ~~itlrlttro~-i-di~icic-al
= Ef[~ (gt Iamp be ~7~~(- lt y c c- it+ stgt- i C 5 I ltixEyigtI Ycgt
E ) L J i t the advP7- of t E C - 1 cedLilcd l iT5 +i I
program buy o f 210 aircraft his number should hc neat-ly ha vi
to just over 103 sorties 41 Recommended augmentation packages
from heavylight lessons learned more than doubles the strategic
lift requirement As a final note the brigade lacks a forced
entry capability Capable of worldwide deployment to undeveloped
theaters the brigade must nevertheless airland in a secure
airhead This is a sevee limitation
An analvsic of t liqht bt-icjade i the nyscal dr$nalc
Co7 b - i v i l c - s 1 i Tampinalso re~eas t ~ initeri -u-tsiiment cjo~i
The 1 i g h t ~ r i g a d e ainot zltpect to sustain itsel 50- mot- th31-
48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
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Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
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48 ~OUI-s to mid- intensity environment 42in a OW- The most
critical CSS shortage is in organic transportation assets
Without augmentation the brigade must rely on expedients such as
helicopter resupply and airdrop to provide sustainment functions
to dispersed elements Foraging and caches are also options
However these methods are of limited utility in mid- to high-
intensity environments Foraging is only realistic for CL I and
111 Caches are a tremendous coordination and p1anniiq prcbiem
and can have the same stultifying effect on ope-ations a= 1 9 c t t
century magazines and depots In the heavylight experiences at
the NTC general lessons learned reveal that sustainment issues
are paramount Light brigade sustainment capabilities are not
adequate to support the attachment of heavy forces Lightunits
attached to heavy units reauire frecuent resupply ma kin^
zxtensive use of the push sytem This can create a strai8-r 01-m
heavy sustainment capabilities perhaps out of proportion to the
combat power the attached light forces represent 43
Combat power is a complex term that interacts with all of
thf domains In the physical domain a subset of combat nnwer is
ietnalit Lethality will be narrcwiy defined in terms z f
firepower and tactical mobility In terms of firepower the
lethality of the light brigade is clearly limited by the demands
of strategic mobility Tank killing weapons systems and tube
artillery require large numbers of airframes compared to light
fighters The light brigade package being discussed can only put
12 TOW -antitank systems on the ground This a weapon that is best
employed in wide open spaces and at maximum range A method of
employment that is not necessarily the best for light infantry
The only other significant elements of firepower are 1 8 - 105mm
howitzers APPENDIX E) Though relatively gtnobile their limited
ranges and types of munitions limit the value of these systems
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
7 lic3ht -For-re ht3c solight to offset it llticl 0 irepgtwi-
through its unicue tactical style As described by Luttwak the
light force will avoid the grinding attrition struggle by
targeting elements of the enemies CSS C2 and morale instead of
his heavy combat systems The light force uses close terrain and
environmental conditions to its advantage to gain a relative
firepower advantage over its enemy 44 In terms of tactical
msk i 1 i ty the 1 i ~ h 51-i g ~ d e eschews 0)-ganic tranjro-ta l c asY
2nd seeks a5 ii claes ~ i t hfir-poiier to gain d reaiva talcamp
mobility adv~ntage through the carefdl selection af tc-r-3i i ~ c d
its tactical style 45
In the moral domain the light brigade offers its greatest
strengths Light infantry forces have been able to captt~re the
oe=J sc-1 lt- icgtpFic-th3 3CC-Uilslt ii t thi l- i
- - tkemsagt e i b i t i
i
iZ fL gt d r
superior skills Xhat also fosters sdperior cohesion is that the
light style of fighting emphasizes the small unit and reinforces
the concept that the greatest cohesion is gererated within the
stn~ect primary ro~os f+i Asc within the 1dr-3ia1no i c t
t y - t7t s re3tL ltp A t gt- - 1 5 =
T e1 i ~ h tfcrcfs err1- - - - - I~X~LEh 5kiL uf k 7 ind~d~cuac ~
his self-reliance ingenblzy stamilia aid courage 6s McZichael
puts it this warrior ethic gives the light fighter a distinct
psychological advantage over his enemy 47 Finally in the moral
domain the disadvantage of fighting with extensive augmentation
must be considered For any but the lowest level of conflict i t
has been shown that the light brigade requires extensive
augmentation In practice this means constantly shiftinq
relations3ips within the briqade zombat team Aujmertatin kits
are slmply nct going 70 shcw tip at liht bl-igade hedequert~-5
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
imbued with the same war-riar- ethic and outlook on the battlerield
as the light fighter
Having analyzed the current light brigade structure
according to the ALB-F framework it is now possible to apply the
criteria to determine the viability of the organization For the
first question concerning the ability of the light brigade to
accomplish its strategic deployability mission the answer is a
qualified yes As described above the light brigade as
structured is inherently deployable but is effeckive in c ~ y he
most permissive of environments The brigade provides a deterrent
effect only if its capabilities are not seriously tested The
brigade requires significant augmentation in firepower and
sustainment if its deployment is contested This augmentation
itself rapidly degrades the briqaces de3loyability 3dv3nt39e5
In rzgard to che second question the light brigade is lo
currently structured to adapt to the secondary missions
envisioned for it within the ALB-F operational concept Although
well suited in the moral demain for the demands of the nonlinear
battlefield the light brigade falls well short iai tke physical
aonaiii Only wit signif-icant and pe~rhapj Jebi itdt ic
augmeniation cal-I the licjht brigade sustain itself in tho detii-
of the detection zone Neither does it have the tactical mcbilit
nor the firepower to maintain contact with enemy forces without
being decisively engaged and destroyed The extended battlefield
meansincreased time and space factors and the complete reliance
on foot mobility and terrain advantages Richard E Simpkins
universal net concept and Franz Uhle-Wettlers German sponge
defense for central Europe could prove dangerously
inappropriate 48
Finally the lighi br igades comb ination of firepower
mobility and sustainment problems make it unsuitable as a
24
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
interchanqed with other ma-euve$- brigades to mass for- engaqements
in the battle area Therefore it must be concludad that there are
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of the current
light brigade organization for ALB-F
If the current light structure is inappropriate for ALB-F
the next step is to examine other brigade organizations in terms
gf the cr i tsi-ijLo dstermine ~f thn-e arc eistiig so l l tiis LC
199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) and the British nirborne
Brigade Each of these organizations offer unique design features
Brigade Other than airborne units the NEB is perhaps the light
divisions greatest competitor for the nations strategic
-Lccl-ntrzl operarional conct for employLig t ~3 ir gtasrri -
the doctrine tnat Mal-jie Vcgt-iecare nost effectiie iti -art w h s
employed as a strategically mocile combined-arms air-gr-ound combat force possessing its own CSS all under a single commander Organized and employed in this manner Marine forces fight according to the Marine Corps basic combat doctrine which incorporates the principles of maneuver warfare 49
As part of the physical domain the NEB has been carefully
designed for its strategic deployability role The Navy has
Z F L$lcient amphibious shipping t3 deploy an entire M E 3 in both
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
world The Marile nircraft Group associatad with each ME8 is
self-deployable In addition the amphibious MEBs all contain
forced entry capability by either amphibious or air assault
operations The major limiting factors for the MEB is that the
crisis area in a contingency operation must be near suitable
landing beaches or within range of helicopter lift assets The
MPS brigades must be introduced in a permissive environment in
order to off-load what are essentially non-amphibious commercial
cargo shlps
Also in the physical domain the ME3 is fully sustained b y
its brigade service support group Sustainment up to a certain
point is dependent on the Navy shipping requiring over the beach
sustainment or less efficient helicopter resupply of the force
The MER i z deployed with 30 days of supply
I t is in terms of lethality as defincd by mobiliti 2ld
firepower that the MEB far exceeds the light brigade A MEBs
firepower consists of a broad range of armored vehicles anti-
tank missiles and field artillery In the air group the MEB
commander receives dedicated close air support from 2C AV-SB
Harriers 24 A-IS and LO 2-6 ail-c-aft For incai 1 i t y gte XE9
commander can simultaneously mcve two of hi th-ee iiiFantr~
battalions with his own assets which include one battalion by
helicopter and one battalion by Armored Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)
Finally in the MEB there are 36 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
which will eventually have a mix of TOW 25mm and assault gun
systems The LAV provides the NEB commander an agile survivable
and deployable recon and security vehicle of great worth 50
In the moral domain the Marine Corps has consistently
provided the nation with a highly cohesive and dedicated force
This force is trained and focused to fight in the conditions
expected in nonlinear warfare Tradition and organizatioi ccmbine
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
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US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
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Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
to foster a lhiqh lpvel cf unit esprit ri7e 338n~11rrtk
relationships of the the integr-ated Marine Air-Grou~ld Task Fzrces
help offset the problems associated with ad hoc augmentation
support packages
In looking at the two fundamental questions of the
criteria the example of the NEB can provide insights for future
light brigade organizations The ME8 is in fact highly deployable
although i t i3 tied to seal ift t a sdcti ir exten thi i
prevented from becomiis khe p-incioie OS contirlyeocy rs-c~ ( i s
gr-eat advantage far the MEY is ts fcrcc6 eitry capability by
either amphibious or air assault The second advantage is that it
can get CS and CSS assets into the fight simultaneously with its
maneuver forces making i t a far more credible deterrent than a
Ight 5-gad[ D y it very n a ~ r i l the M L )nsac - r -
~yecond qursiiori cantre--nincj adapiabil i t v t c -ecoiida R i i i - Fy
missions in the detection zone and in the battle area in terms
of sustainment the brigade is a viable self-contained entity The
fire power and mobility the brigade and its air group are
eminent 1 aczeptablc for the OiS-F c o ~ r a t z -~ctp I-lwev--lona t
- is cjcp---ia- ES 3t-Eturi-) I --a i 2 7 p iz 1-1 oe-core a-d too csnpiei I isi-rad is 11sa ---I no lt~l
for the l i ~ h t brigade 51 All of the extra welght white
efficiently carried by ship would be prohibitive for transport by
air
In conclusion it is in the interaction between the moral
and the physical domain that the NEB provides its most important
lessons for the light brigade There is certainly no drop cff in
Marine cohesion esprit and individual warrior othic because i t
is associated with large n u ~ ~ e r s of sophisticated weapons
~sttmrLight experts lie iuttwa ljhie-Lletter and Stzvcn I
Canby Should taIe not of h c w ths arine Corps has trar-scendd
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
the aleged unmaily eirfectr of machines of war 52 T h e Pa- isle
Corps in Tact dominates its machines in order to embrace maneuver
warfare and the imperatives of the nonlinear battlefield
B SEPARATE MOTORIZED BRIGADE
The next structure tobe studied is the 199th Separate
Motorized Brigade (SMB) This brigade is wkat remains of the 9th
High Technology Light Division (HTLD) created by General Meyer in
te early 19ROs (APPENDIX C-2i The HTLD was to gtea
middleweight force to field a hard hitting and agile fs-ce that possessed greater strategic mobility than heavy divisions
yet was vastly more tactically mobile than the light division
53 After years of neglect in the late 19805 the HTLD was
reduced to a motorized brigade and the assault gun system gt)as
- - - 17 1 --=rlc - gt - I- -
dcj i G l k I C 9~ gt gt 2 sslc Lltss gt - - -
the light infantry brigade when i t is analyzed through the ALB-F
framework and the criteria applied
In the physical domain the SMB offers important advantages
over the light brigade The parent organia-ion HTLD L+s ae to
eplo~s 01 a little cvel- 13C C--lr -o-tis rlp SVIB j - l -z - t l
dcoloyaal on 350 sorties and vith the C - l 7 1) s~i-vicethi
number will be cut in half 54 This cocpares favorably with a
much less capable light brigade task force The 199th SMB
possesses no forced entry capability The SMB has a significant
self-sustainment capability However the great increase in
antitank weapons and vehicles create important Class I 1 1 and V
problems in a contingency role The SMBs lethality in terms of
firepower and mobility is greatly enhanced over the light
brigade The entire force is mobile with its organic asseks
In the inoral dcmaii the 107th is subject to the saxe
negative dynamics of the US persocne system as all units
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
ij]wev=gt 3 ~ti-e uillqljE 11Jtal-e 3 tile CI-qa17 at lCT STlt kt dlCd~gt
of the mission all of the inqredients are present for dynamic
leadership to build cohesive combat teams and unit esprit The
combined arms nature of the brigade obviates the problems of ad
hoc augmentation
When the criteria is applied the SMB compares favorably
with the light brigade The SMB is very deployable and provides a
far narc itha sustaina2le ant crecit le ~itrcrthe~-efor~l
fc-ce GI the g r c ~ n d 1i ts c-i tical sutjsidilt~-gt -Ilt=--ZISZ L L gt ~ ~-
by ALD-I= the SMB has add tional advaiitages The 5x2 is
specifically designed to thrive on the nonlinear battlefield Its
more robust nature makes it ideal for the quasi-cavalry role
envisioned for the combined arms recon force in the detection
cne 55 Thz q~-jatpl- lethj y i n term ]f ta k j i ~ q5 z-s
2nd a l - t i lei y p i u s the o-=--- 8 1actlca 13b L i t 3 f tll 513 gtr
lend itself to combat missions in the battle area However the
extreme lightness of the systems demand that the SMB not be
confused with a mechanized or armor force The organic support
capabi 1 i t y and the weapcns systemc makc t h ~ SMD 2 F a r b~kt r
- 7 c i s C3E)-t uiiI c b)-sasj L tt+ gt=-
sre3 ad rnc-o lt3mpat~tle wit tgteA L 9 - F ycl~ - - n A
Ry anshering the CI-iteria i t seems thas the SME (lay b a
natural model for a light organization in ALB-F Evaluations of
9th Division units at the NTC seem to validate the concept of the
middleweight force 56 However there are several negatives that
should be emphasized THe SMB has a paucity of infantry which was
part of the argument for lightening the force structure to beqin
with The ALB-F concept envlsicns an SMD assigned ta each = ~ r p z
in CI-der to increase the nurnbzr of infantrymer i t can )ut on tigt--
91-0u1~dSecond y t h e numbel- o r vvhic les anC hea y s~e-pons
s y s t ~ m s cotaned i1 the Si19 dces in fact c ~ t dcwn t h ~n-Sility
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
of the SPlB in classic 1 ight in-Fantry terrain wcii a 3 - - - - c cL-JU
mountains and thick jungles This can be a problem in the moral
domain if the force allows itself to become so wedded to its
vehicles that it does not dismount Vehicle and weapons density
can hurt the force in terms of stealth deception and OPSEC all
important light force characteristics Finally the independence
of the entire unit is diminished by its increased reliance on
Class 1 1 1 V and IX
C BRITISH AIRBORNE BRIGACE
Before synthesizing the results of the above analysis and
proposing a structure for a light brigade designed for ALB-F it
would be a mistake not to look briefly at some of the appropriate
features of a contingency brigade from another Army In this case
the Br-itish Airborne Brigade serves as a usefc~l organirati2n fc
analysis using the ALD-F f~ramework (APFENDIX C-3) Thc 3-i t ih
Airborne Brigade analysis must however be done in the proper
context The brigade serves as the strategic contingency force of
the United Kingdom and in this respect shares mission types with
the US light forces However the British airborne brizjad~ i rat
petted to perform missioi~ in coijunciol- rl th tizavy frcs
There is no specific role envisioned far th use o f th bl-ltad
in the central European battlefield It should also be nated that
consistent with US operational concepts in ALE-F the British
feel that brigade level is the first appropriate level to form
combined arms organizations With these matters in mind the
brigade structure can be analyzed and the criteria applied
In the physical domain significant differences from
previous models are quickly revealed In terms of deployability
all eouipment in the brigade i = specifically designed for
strategic air transpor tab i l i tv to include the 1 ight tracked
vehicles in the armored reccc regiment The brigade possesses a
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
f-r-ced eri~-~ s ~ ~ s t j ~ 1 i ~ i 3~amp1 1 z ) ii its tco -1-anc i-jcljtr
battalions These parachute 11if-antry battalions are suapo-ted by
appropriate airborne slices in the CS and CSS elements of the
brigade Sustainment of the force is provided by an organic
support battalion that deploys with seven days of supply for the
brigade Not listed as part of the support structure but
available for that use are the organic helicopter squadrons
ctiiity aii-cl-a-it This suznort st-ctui-e gives thc b-iilc a
ei f--us~aiimc-nt capagti it that exceed the aiistc-I-e IJS IG~
brigade This zupport pack~lge 6150 lends itse f tc creati~ -1
more flexible and interchangeable brigade Lethality as expressed
in terms of firepower and mobility demonstrates another area of
difference with the US structure Although the four infantry
katta icc jrp psspt ia y f-- c 3j 3-x~~ + -7 e - h A I - 2-gt
dops at ir fa- ~f-liia- I n re--c r(~~inr~t~ ~ ~ o t i - 112
there are 150 tracked and wheeled vehicles This gives the
brigade a fair degree of agile tactical mobility allowing for
more timely and effective recon and security work These systems
aso ircreace - LIthe orgznic firepower 0f thc b-i--do pa-tiria-ly
t n t 75mj- qLin chp Sri)+p a-lt A-neCiz7--- I--gt -ir rj
2-ler-y -er imr7t o f light [gt5npl hcwity~y- ji~d p=ec_ r 3
iiumbe- of mediun antitai weauo~is such as the Mlan Resldcs
these advantages in the physical domain the brigade also offers
unique organizational pluses in the moral domain
In the moral domain the framework focuses on unit cohesion
esprit and the warrior qualities of the individual soldier This
is-perhaps the strong suit of the British Airborne Brigade There
is perhaps no personnel system as respected for buiding cchesion
and esprl t as te El-i cisi rfg imental system Tie li f e t imc
~ s 5 c cat ion of tgte oiiicc-s a-3d PJC3s cf the 411-5c-eBrlade
prcvide an iciea environment fo- the fliit-c~-lijof t h ~ coir-o-
3
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
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n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
required for both contingency operat ions and the nonlinear
battlefield What the regimental system does for the group is
described by Kellet
cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards they enforce and the objectives they promote are linked with the requirements of formal authority The regimental system with its powerful normative demands has traditionally transmitted such requirements very effectively despite its isolationist tendencies 57
The regimental system alzc promotes unit esprit of he t y p e
required by the RLB-F operational concept
There were battalions that were more than usually resistant to the corroding effects of strain and battleThese men had resolved to do nothing to besmirch the name of their Regiment however fearful they might be in their hearts They would rather have gone out than own defeat 58
the bounds of unit cohesion and soldierly values
The permanent combined arms nature of the brigade greatly
reduces the requirement for augmentation in most scenarios As
discovered earlier this is an important consideration for the US
light system The combined arms nature o f the brigade also
r e f l e c t s th Sritish belief simila~- to the US a-ine-that h+
mfra presence of vehicles and heavier equipment in the SOLE does
not mean that the unit has betrayed the essence of the light
infantry The British believe in a greater battlefield
imperative the old wisdom that you fight like you train and
therefore the organization should reflect the concept of how you
plan to fight If they have the transport and the METT-T
analysis determines vehicles would be handy then the British
want them in the TOLE and will deployed them Like the US
Marines the Sritish do not believe their rather large and heavy
brigade is too complex Luttwak who likes to p a i n 3 0 the
British as an effective role model is critical of the heavy and
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
conplex b-iqace arqarli zaicn - IIF 91I hGwzve- are
comfortable with the span cf co~ntrol and the nature of th
organization They believe it reflects the way they are most
likely to fight 59
Applying the criteria the British Airborne Brigade
provides a useful model for comparison with the current US light
brigade The brigade appears to be strategically deployable
aticugh tt add ticnal veCIcls ZP-tainly creap q-eatra- i s t
requirements a- Class I I I A[ J pr-oblems The inher-en Io ced
entry ca~dbiiy is a plus T ~ E 3-igade also ends itsvli ti CLE-
F missions expected of light infantry in the detection zone and
the battle area Increased firepower and tactical mobility assist
in the cavalry-like role in the detection zone The self-
silrtzirnrfni carabil i tl-c ri tle b-qaltr rc j - i t i ] --si gt-
ntfrcargeabu i n t f c r the battle area fight
VI LIGHT REGIMENTAL CCMRAT TEAM
The light brigade organization proposed in this paper is
the Light Regimental Combat Team (LRCT) This proposal is a
theught piece based on t h ~ above 3ncllysis cf the cb3cq17q iail-e
~ ftCp w- LC the fiL5-F conczpt ~ c b L gt g-c-ati~nal (+-- - gt 7
the a tcrpat e eamales of the iEFl te 3 3 a i d k h 3~ i Isf
Air-borne 9-igade Tile oroposed str-ucture iicor~cratz~ fdtues
that enhance its strategic deployability and deterrent effect
Deterrence is created by both a demonstration of intent and by
true force capability The LRCT structure will increase the light
forces capability to deploy sustain and fight in the manner
demanded by the most challenqing contingency scenarios The
structure also Dossesses the orqanizaticnal characteristics
iecessal-y for adapting the 2-iampade to oa-tici9at~ to a ini tec
extent in th 5ubsidia1-y missi3ns of t k ~ AL3-F c-cncct Tie PC
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
wlll meet the criteria required of a light brigade in PLS-F
(APPENDIX D)
Evaluating the LRCT in the physical domain demonstrates
marked changes to the light brigade structure Concerning
deployability the LRCT can be deployed as a whole by 129 C-17
sorties or by just over 245 C-141B sorties This compares
favorably with the current light brigade structure With the
addition of a parachute battalion the LRCT gains an important
organic forced entry capability The addition of the light
cavalry squadron and its air cavalry troop give the LRCT an
important capability of getting firepower on the ground quickly
to secure a lodgment for follow on forces It also allows the
LRCT to project forces rapidly out of the airhead for what
Luttwak might call coup d z mai t y ce missions The L 3 C T r ~ p 0 1 3 1 - k
battalion after the Marine and Sritish mode is tacticslly
mobile and capable of sustaining the LRCT for close to seven days
in mid-intensity combat To this end the support battalion is
greatly assisted by the assault helicopter company which can
supply distant sub-elements o f the force throughout the extended
batt1rField
All of the analysis to this point ha5 to demonstt--ate t h e
complex interaction of the various domains This is par1icuiariy
true in the case of lethality The LRCT trades a certain amount
of strategic deployability to gain the invaluable firepower and
tactical mobility advantage of the light cavalry squadron and
the assault helicopter company With regards to the cavalry the
two ground and one air troop will buy the commander a tremendous
increase in his ability to see the ground conduct counter
reconnaissance find and targel the enemy and in loh- and mid-
in-ensity situations deztroy him
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
-he LFCT as 31~ ~z-isb rcrpa-ed i t 5 iizpcb~~r i bdk
antitank and indirect fire systems To k i l l tanks each infantry
battalion has received a company of 12 TOW systems mounted on
HMMWVs In the future this can be improved by the modernization
with ground Hellfire The ground troops of the cavalry squadron
will have a mix of 25mm chain guns and an armored protected gun
system Since the mid 80s there have been several variants of
such a syr_ten in the l r t 5 to 22 ton class T~cc-e ehls15 a
zested fi-om 75mm rapid Fii-e guns up to the veierable ( 5mm ti
gun Rcpor-Ls at the tlme of testinq gave the edge to t te 7rin
system 60 For indirect fire the LRCT retains the 1051nm howitzel-
battalion however a significant effort needs to be made to
improve munitions to include an antitank round Completing the
- dll-er- np~sP G C ~53Ztd10 Nlllijai 3 - I - amp =dC + Flt - -~ -12Inm or-tj-~ os~iar 3ystsr i n I HTL2 1( h i 3 waj L p
proven system in many armies the 120mm mortar promises to
provide rapid and accurate indirect fires for the battalion that
include smart munitions This system fills a fires void on the
extcndez riorlin~ar- battleficd 1 ~ F tt v tne ilritjtici a gt
C5mln h~~ih--It r ~I-ipsw- - t f ti t+iit ltrq
i t tail br eei t h z th ILPCl has been rignific-litly lgtpr-s~-c
without an unacceptable ilct-ease ii weight
As for tactical mobility the brigade remains a light
footmobile force specifically designed and trained to operate in
restrictive terrain of all types However there are important
distinctions With the HMMWV TOWS and the cavalry squadron the
LRCT antitank systems have gained tactical mobility This is
critical for the survivability of basically unprotected systems
The parachc~te battalion nay ir some instances provile a rich
i an+~sioro f 5actical moblii ty T h z assault lei icooter ccv2aiy
the support battalion wi pc-ovde o r ~ a n i c l i f t CAI t u r n i+
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
liqht battalion in two lifts Corps plugs can b e made available
to lift two more battalions if necessary (APPENDIX F )
In the moral domain there is no sacrifice in the cohesion
esprit and the warrior attitudes of the soldiers The soldier
will remain the self-reliant stalking light infantry of the
European interpretation Awareness of unique capabilities and an
aggressive tactical style that stresses ingenuity and
nonlinearity is not compromised with ths addition of more comb-3t
capaSi1itf I t has been demonstrated by the Marine and t ke
Eritish models that this can certainly be the case As recounted
by the commander of the French contingency regiment in Reunion
structure makes no difference it is the leadership of the
officers and the attitudes of the individual soldiers that
-vide5 the f etibi 1 i CJ and spj I- i t recui-ecTor $3 coti7geic~f7
force h i Even Uhe-Ket t ler i-ecogni zes the need fgr 1 is Je--
to adapt more firepower and tactical mobility to there
organization Uhle-Wettler specifically recommends tank
destroyer-like vehicles 62 The LRCT has the potential to create
as cohesive a force as there is in any Army With certain
a-A d - 4 --la1 aclvantayes t =UCC=Sb r r gt csn sui-p255 the ~ ~ r ~ a t a l 2 ~ 3 ~
achieved The biggest advantage the LRCT can gain in the moral domarn
is the formation of an LRCT training battalion This battalion
would be stationed with the LRCT and staffed by officers and NCOs
from the LRCT The battalion would take soldiers after their
initial training and give them a prolonged period of training in
the tactics techniques procedure and traditions of the light
infantry and the regiment With a modicum of personnel management
skills this battalion can be used to turn out company or platoon
sized CCHCRT elements that can be rotated into the LRCT This
would capitalize on the excellent work already done witl the IJS
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
CCiHO2 yitem 2nd the c lr ad~~aCqes the B- i z isi - e t ~ t i l lo F i n ~ n
system The downsizing of the light f-crce wlll make this a xol-e
workable process 63
The LRCTs strength in the moral domain is also increased by
the combined arms nature of the combat team All of the C S and
CSS elements of the LRCT are organic in keeping with the
imperatives of ALB-F This obviates the problems frequently
iiti fiec wi iS the ad hoc t~sorganization sf r i c gt l r - gtltle=
--L iteqi-attld ccmbined arns au-e of tkr LRCT -irs ti-I--nilmber sf iuqmentat ion 51 icil5 4-cquiri(l i n d a1 lows th2 ~ l li
critical advantage of training in peacetime the way it plans to
fight in war The use af corps transportation plugs are not
necessarily a detractor Under the training and supervision of
t ~ 1 i q h c C jvisign i~a~c3-~er wi 1 kctgt gtj 7 125e -t~ ie~i
i habiil -plz~o52 zJi kl t i lt i ~ ~tl- - - - - - L r 2
same manner as the NEBS AAV battalion the vertical take off and
landing aircpaft (VTOL) armored personnel carriers ( A P C ) and
truck transport units can within the constraints of METT-T
proiae imp(-tant fl~ibiity c - the LRCT TCe LTOL ma vsn I+
t fr7t LcwarCs sisI ij c ltgt- Ail
mechanizat icn 64
The LLRCT cstlcept PI-ovides A appropl-iate agtswei ti ti) ~c
fundamental questions concerning light infantry operating within
the ALB-F concept The LRCT is a deployable credible deterrent
force The LRCT can also be an effective additional maneuver
brigade in the detection zone and the battle area of the RLS-F
extended battlefield The LRCT will not be a motorized unit I t
will retain its licjht infantry arientaticn to clse terrain and
ecsnomy of force missions The more rcbust recon and securty
capaoili L y as we as the c-~aic ani l i t y to 1 ift uri tc a - o u ~
the extended battlefirelo wi he of enormous heln to the ccmbined
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
arms recon force The more capable organic suppot structure uli
increase the overall flexibility of the unit making it a more
self-sufficient rapidly tailorable force that is a more
interchangeable partner with the heavier brigades on the
battlefield The obvious moral advantages of the organization
will simply make it the the combat force most comfortable with
nonlinear warfare
VII CCNCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis of the changing world curl-~nt light
infantry force strccture the ALB-F operat ~ o n a l concept ard
alternative force structure models have provided the basis for
the proposal of the Light Regimental Combat Team A s determined
by the analysis this organization represents an appropriate
liqh t i1ifait-yb r igade struc tul-r for AL3-F The anaiycis qai~nec
its vaiidity by using a framework that incorporated the A i 3 - F
design parameters and by applying a simple but effective
criteria
The first key points of the analysis identified explicit
and implicit missicns fcr the light infantry brigade within tbe
ALB-F cpe-at ionai ccncept Tiic5e mlcslons iclbded the it- irw
mission of a rapidly deloyable ccntingency f o r c ~ and subsidi2f
missions as a rapidly tailorable brigade package for tactical
operations in the detection zone and the battle area Analysis of
the current light brigade using the theoretical framework of the
domains found the light brigade deficient The light brigade did
not have a forced entry capability in the contingency force role
The brigade did not possess the sustainability or lethality to
participate in the detection zone or the battle area
In the second part of the analysis a study of alternative
brigade arganizations provided some importavt options for
reorganization The MEBs multiple forced entry capability as we
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
25 ic lethal iy tive ~1-cai11ziti~nal Tzsere atti-~= zltvaraGe5
SMB demonstrated greatly increased tactical mobility without 3
prohibitive decrease in strategic deployability The aritish
Airborne Brigade offered greater tactical mobility a forced
entry capability and a special advantage in the moral domain
with its regimental system All of these organizations
demonstrate the wealth of good ideas and alternatives that exist
i n f i l - ~ t d3-l~ nisioisc l i s ~ fqhilig ltnits y lt - h responsihi 1 i tilsquo
simia- t~ the 1 icjhc infantry b-~gade
T5e LCT PI-o~csal 15 a synthesis of the a n k l v s i ~ t h ~ t
proceeded it It is not intended to be a simple compil~tion of
the best features of other arbitrarily chosen brigade
organizations The light brigade retains its light essence
~mp-oulnrts 3~eue-k 7 5ultp5t(j a j w Cb 11 f i s
- - t z re- ti- ovc -a L pc3$+ irl --ce S t c i ~ ~ L - ~ - 1 S
an organization that connects force struc tur-e wi tli an oper-at iilna
concept (ALE-F) far better than the present light forces have
done with ALB
gidgt- t+ p-- ifi z p - +-
L - - r gt - - gt -
- - - i 2 c q lt i- - - - gt - -gt- PL - I L - 1 - 2 j j ji - c
cows in terms of organizations and ideas Or1 the citt- h a r d he
Army cannot afford to indiscriminately dismantle what is not
broken The Army cannot loose faith in itself or its essential
contribution to national security
Senior Army leaders have been aggressive in recognizing and
reacting to the new economic political and military t-ends
ccnf I-oiiting the Army This does riot kcwever quar~nee hi the
4 c y wi 1 1 iecessari ly n c v h iid r l ~ n t doc li-a ai~i
-st-cianizatinnal direction h e prncess ict- chirjing dir-PC t a n is
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
critical Anaiysis of future crqanizations and doctrines must b e
thoroughly grounded in theory Theory must provide insights into
the fundamental nature of war It is only such insights that can
guide the way through the bewildering maze of predictive force
design and doctrinal development The currently flawed light
force is a painful example of how the process can go astray The
ALE-F operational concept is demanding Mastering the concept
will require the greatest exertions of a professional Arny I
turn the organizations derived fol- its implementat ion canlo t Ce
the product of branch parochialism bureaucratic imperatives or
personal agendas
The correct doctrine for the future may indeed be ALB-F
However as cautioned by Howard it is better to have flexibility
a f mird aid oryanizaticn than to believe bat yoc have -crir-atel
guessed the right doctrine fol- future wal- s an al t c - t - n i i v ~
what has become a rather dogmatic light infantry organizational
mindset the proposed LRCT attempts to bring that flexibility to
the nonlinear battlefield across the operational continuum I t
is an appropriate time to organize the light infantry fcr
succzss The reduced profile of t-e light iifanry in the eve-al
fzrce structure will helu revent the urgency nf janining a -acr~ij
light peg into a square 6LE-F high-intensity hole
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
R P F E H D I X 8 - 1 C U R R E H T L I G H T I H F R H T R Y B R I G A D E
L I G I I T I H F I I H T R Y B R I G A D E
C U R R E W T D I V I S I O H S W I T H T H I S L I B O R G R H I Z R T I O H
6 T H I H F R H T R Y D I V I S I O H 7 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V l S l O H
2 9 T H I H F R H T R Y D l V I S l O H ( H R T I O H R L G U R R D )
S O U R C E LIGHT IHFRHTRY OPERRTIORS B R T T L E B O O K connmm RHD 6 E H E R R L S T A F F C O L L E G E F T L E A V E W U O R T H l K S I 1 9 8 9
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
--
R P P E N D I X 8 - 2 S E P R R R T E L I G t l T I H F R H T P Y E R I G R D E
I 1
1 L T
S P TH It C I H F 3
H E E D E D F O R H V Y L T n l x C R L 8 9 - 2
111 S I G ADA R D H I H
1 RVH GS R R T Y 0 s R R l W I
E H G R T P R H S P O R T R T I O H GS R E D I IVY E Q P EHG
SOURCE H I L I T R R Y R I R L I F T COIIl tRHD R I R L I F T P L R H H I H G G U I D E l H Q RRC P
SCOTT R F B H O V E H B E R 1 9 8 6 RHD US RRHY H E R V Y - L I G H T L E S S O H S
L E R R H E D C O I l D l H E D RPHS C E H T E R C E H T E R FOR RRHY L E S S O N S
L E R R H E D F T L E f l V E H U O R T t l ~ RUGUST 1 9 8 9
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
A P P E H D I X C - 1 H R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H R R Y B R I G R D E lt H E 0 1
R R R I H E E X P E D I T I O H A R Y B R I G R D E ( N E B )
(HOTIOHRL T R S K ORGRHIZRTIOH) R P P R O X
P E R S O H H E L
USHC 1 5 8 8 8 USH 7 8 8
IHRRIHEI 1 1 11 R G T L O D E svc R C GRP L R H D TI S P T GRP
R I R C R R F T L R U H C H E R S HRJOR GROUHD CORBRT E P U I P R E H T
2 8 R V - 8 8 OR 19 f l -4R 1 7 T A H K S 24 1 5 5 ~ ~HOUltT) 2 4 F R - 1 8 OR 2 1 F - 4 2 4 8 1 ~ n I IORTRRS 6 I J S H R HOU(SP) 1 8 R - 6 8 C H - 5 3 E 9 6 DRRGOH T R R C K E R S 6 8 HOYCSP) 1 E R - 6 2 8 C t I - 5 3 D 1 8 TOY L l l U H C l l E R S 2 7 6 8 H O R T R R S~ ~ 4 R F - 4 8 4 8 C I I - 4 6 4 7 R A V 138 58 C R L HG 5 O R - 4 H 1 2 UI4 -1 3 6 L R V 2 5 5 11-60 RG 6 K C - I 3 8 1 2 R I I - 1 I 1 4 n K - 1 9 4 8 n R G R E H R D E L R U H C t I E R S 6 04- 1 8 6 HRUK L R U H C I I E R S 1 5 S T I H G E R T E R H S
L R C T U R L TRSK O R G R H I Z R T I O H F O R H E D TO R C C O H P L I S H S P E C I F I C H I S S I O H S H R Y V A R Y FROH T H E O R G R H I Z f l T I O H SHOUH
ITHE F O R C E SHOUH E D U A L SRVIRTIOH UREH ADDED T O RH n P s F O R C E LIST R P P R O X I R R T E L Y l J OF THE T O T A L A C T I V E R V I R T I O H F O R C E R S S E T S T H I S F O R C E I S HOT I D E R L (FOR E X R R P L E 2 4 R T T R C K H E L O S R R E T H E R E C O G H I Z E D n ln lnun T O P R O P E R L Y S U P P O R T A HEB)
SOURCE H R V Y H R R I H E CORPS 2 7 1 8 9 H R R I H E R I R - G R O U H D T R S K F O R C E S
( R R S T F S ) H e U S R C URSHIHGTOH Dc 28 n R Y 1 9 8 5
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
R P P E H D l X C - 2 1 9 9 T N S E P A R f l T E H O T O R I Z E D B R I G A D E ( S H E )
L I G H T R T T R C K B H L C O I I B I H E D R R H S B H ( L I G H T ) H C O I I O I H E D R R H S B H ( H E R V Y )
S O U R C E D E S I G N C A P R B I L I T I E S R N D H O U - T O - F I G H T U H l T E P A P E R 1 9 9 T H
I H F A H T R Y B R I G A D E ( H O T O R I Z E D ) F T L E U I S U R S J U H E 1 9 9 8
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
R P P E H D I X C - 3 UK R I R B O R H E B R I G R D E
H P 8 S I G SOU
(LT GUN) E H G R G T -)
S I G T P
+i Ci8 F L D R R B L P R O C O Y lt - )
euroi00 T P T SOH O R D COY F L D U K S I i P
T P T - T R R H S P O R T o R D = o R D H R H C E F L D U K S H P = F I E L D U O R K S H O P F L D R R B L = F I E L D R R B U L A H C E P R O - P R O V O S T P C D E T = P O S T R L C O U R I E R
S O U R C E S T R F F O F F I C E R S HRHDBOOK U K S T R F F C O L L E G E C A H B E R L Y I 1988
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
R P P E H D I X 0 L I G H T R E G I n E H T R I C O n S t l T T E R M ( L R C T )
H l l C S OF T I I E I H F R H T R Y O n l T f l L l O H S I t n V E H n n n v S C O U T P L R T O O H S R H O T O Y E D 4 - G U H 1 2 0 M l ORTRR P L R T O O H S
t T H E L I G H T R U M O R E D C R V f l L R Y S O U R D R O H l l R S R L R V V R R I n H T S C O U T V E l l I C L E F O R I T S S C O U T S r n THE IIHT R S Y E L L A S R 1 2 8 ~ ~ L R VH O R T R R P L R T O O H UITH V R R I R H T S THE T U O G R O U H D T R O O P S H R V E R L l G l l l T R O O P W I T H 2 5 M H C l l R I H
R R H O R E D GUH S Y S T E R GUH A H D R w n v y T R O O P U I T H 7 5 ~ ~ TIIERIR T R O O P H R S O H 5 8 - D R H D R H - 6 4 H E L I C O P T E R S
+ + ( 1 5 ) U H - 6 8 C O M P R H V U I T H R E G I M F W T R L A V I R T I O H M R I H T S E C T I O I I RMD P R T H F I H O E R D E T R C H H E H T
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
--
T n B L E I R I R T R R H S P O 2 T R B I L I T Y
k V Y n r ( i u ) R E G G R T Y
C G T RRY
f i V Y H O K T r i
- T n r ( x s ( n b s )
L R V ( 2 5 )
n r r r t 1 ~ 1 o
HK 1 9
S C U R C E nnc PLRHHII IB G U I D E n a v n c 2 7 a I I R G T F S UK S T F c O L
S T F O F C R S I IRHDBf lOK CGSC O R T T L E ktllC R H D 199711 IlF B D E s
V l I T E P A P E R
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
In devising a more appropriate organization for the
light brigade the role and structure of the light division
must be briefly addressed Speculating on the the future
T
ideas of ALB-F the light dLvi310n ~ea~qu~rte~s C~G be
greatly reduced or perhaps done away with completely The
realities of airlift restrictions and recent historica~
r _ I
-
- - ~ ~
p c c age ~or stl-ateglc c o ri t i rrc e ric i e ss I adJi t i c n )1 t I) =
high intensity battlefield and in heavylight ltcenal-ios
most critics from Luttwak to General Downing feel the
brigade i3 t~e most ef~2ct~ve sze el~me~t far t~~
~ - I
~
KM by 150 IltM In this type of scenal-io the c ur r e nt liyht
division could not even talk to it3elf let alone conduct RS
operations The light OISCOM OIVARTY and separate
battalions are hold-over structures conceived in branch
parochialism and wedded to l rnear t bv They c o n-s t i t ut e 3
waste of v a Luao l e airframes 70 the c onb-a t f c r c e s amiddotj t~c~ C=
~ ~r ~ ~- f bull ~ ~ - - ~ - I
d o o s loved as become b l a c kiv i s i em~ SUC-i ~ould ~ol-=lt ths t
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
consu~nned corps assets while operating in 1 imi ted economy $ G F
force roles As the Army downsizes it cannot afford the
extravagance of so many excellent yet narrowly applicable
division sized units Though it is beyond the scope of this
paper to expand the analysis of this argument the following
force realignment is consistent with the ALB-F operational
concept and supportiv2 of Gsnera1 Vuonc s sic i r n ~ p i - dt i l
tor thz Cu i~-e Armv
The 1iqh t divisidr headrla31-ters should be -educed J
lean deployable and robust C2 headqusrters The number o f
light division headquarters should be reduced and one placed
under each corps These headquarters elements will as
required synchronize the tr-aininq o f the geographicay
jgt-pf+Cseltj-ltlt z j ~ ~ ~ lt c ~ ~ -rTy rh gt 1 6 7 5
responsible for overseeing corps piug assets that are
routinely required by the LRCTs Though the number o f corps
plugs are greatly reduced by the LRCT structure lift assets
at corps for carrying light battalion sized elements should
+-j51 There shc~ld 3 t i t sgta Iie cf t i i ~ ~ ~
i7c1-tracked 01- w heei~ PC2 2nd aiju i x L- - i i -e l --)=- 2
the futt i i -e GI- airrra-iihe tri V-22 may pcb a comi~~aci-
role on the battlefield and would be an appropriate asset
for the corps Fastself-deployable possessing helicopter
flight characteristics and increased internal and sling
loaded payloads the VTOL may be the wave of the future
Fewer light divisions and the organization of LRCTs will
free up a large portion of the force structure Co b u ~ i la
capable middleweight force as describd by LTC Herrlv his
72-c is needed to bc-idge the va~ni~ teiwee the ea gp
and 1 i g h t Yorcs structire In cambat the l~ht rivisicjn
headquarters can follow otle or more LHCTs d~ployed for a
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
c o n L i n ~ e n c y Joex-ztio iCTs 2 1 1 ~ioilcw-on illdrJlweioh (2 -
heavy forces can be 3rigaded together a s circumstanczs
dictate In any case the opportunity for fixing the light
force exists in ALB-F A s described in this study the
balance in the force mix needs such a n adjustment
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
1 Sir Michael Howard Military Science In An Aye Of Peace Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture 3 October 1973
2 El iot A Cohen and John Gooch ~11itary Thefli5fgr_tunes Anatomy Of Failuy-JnWar - - - (New York The Free Press 90) pp 21-28
+ iJilliam H Caldweil I(Mo-t L i g h t Enou T o Gzt TI+~
NqtHavy EnughTp Cas_eO allt~JiTie The UEi Light i ~ f MonographSchool of Advanced Military Studies USCGSC 1987
7 Edward N AndProjecticLuttwak An Histqr-irralP_n_a_l~si~
11 U S Army Field Manual 7-72 LlghtIn_fant_ry B~tlliprgt (Wash DC 16 March 1987) p i
12 Ibid p
13 Edward N Luttwak Light Infantry The Armys Most I Important 1 ~i tiat iv~ ermed Fc~rcesJ~rizlIiternaiio~ai
May 1987 p 8
l t Wayne iDow~liny L i g h t infant-y Integr3tio~1 r i C2nr-l ELl-ope x I i tar y R E ~ Ie w S c p temS(~1amps 2 9
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
17 William W Hartzog and John D Hohard HeavyLlght Operat ions Pilitary R e v e w Apr i 1 1987 p 31 18 John A Wickham Light Infantry Divisions NAT05 Sixteen Nations FebMar- --- 1985 pp 100-107 --- -
19 House p 45
20 Jeane Ki~rkpatrick9~yrnc The Cold Llar Fore7o _ l l
a L 70 5 1
22 Edwin C Meyer Central European Securitv Forsigneff airsSummer 1989 p 32 23 Michael Nandelbaum Ending The ColdWar F_oreign Rffair5 Spring 1989 p 18
25 Car 1 E Vuollo TheU n it-St+ts StratecicFrciArmy E~r~-Ihe-_1990s~_rd (Washington DC H Q D9 JanuaryBeyon 1990) p 6
25 Ibid pp 3-4
29 US Army Combined Arms Center RirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Stud7Phase 1 26 February 1790 p I -2(Hereafter all of the Base Case Studies will be reTerred to by there Phase number)
30 IJS Army Cnmbined 91-insCenter Airl3nd 9z tl iltl~-e Lmbrel a C0ncept (DRAFT) Jine 199C p 32 31 Phase 4 p Id-
33 G S F I ~ r m y Field Ilanual l gt(gt- q 133rss Zperafiqns (Washington DC September i989) 3 R-
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
34 U S Army Combined Arms Center A jrLandBattl_efutur umbrela Conc~eettttt~D~9ETT- Julie 1990 P 4 35 Ibid p 5
36 Phase 5 p 11-2
37 Ibid
38 Baron de Jomini The AytOfWar (Philadelphia JB Lipplncott amp Co 13621 pp 104-1l
32 US i earA-my Ccmbirxd Arms Center NGII Con---icierat u-iions Foi- AirLand Bat t e Future (Craft) 1 1790 p i3
40 Patrick Neky Environment Of Combat (Unpuplished Draft Revision) Field Manual 100-5 O ~ e r a U o ~ September 1990 pp 1-2
4 1 McDonnel Douglas gSAF C-G71 Navember 1987
43 US Army Center For Army Lessans Learned egavyLiqht LessonCcsayned august 1989 PP 12-15
L 5 Stsven L Canhy Light Infantry In Perspective Infartry July-R~gusc 73 p 31
49 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 6-1 Groynd Combat Opwatjgns HQ USNC CDC January 1988 p 1-3 ---
50 Navy Marine Corps 2710 Ma_rjne-eircjround-TaII_Foyces HO USMC May 1985 p 1C
p 9 i-uttwak Light Infantry 51
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
53 199th lnfantry 8riqade (Motcrlred) Des a ~ How-TqFight Pper (Ft Lewis WA d White
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
56 Herrly p 55
57 Kellet p 112
59 interview wih Col Pol-ter Sritish Liaison O f f i ~ e r Eo the USArmy Combined Arms Center 6 November 1970
ii Interdiew with Col J
P Raffenne French Liaison lt - - - - l ltgtgt 2 Igt- il
7 9
62 Uhle-Wettler p C
63 Interview with M a j Elliot Rosner Director initial 8 2 d Airborne Division COHORT project 1 1 October 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
Bacevich A J The Pentamic Era TheUSP_rm teen Korea Vietnam- WashingtonAnd The National Defense University Press 1986
lt- 7- a r k A s j es a eel T C Q c f p n - e l i p c r n gt $ l i b a t ~ ~~r- Aiayis a I he ohns - onk rs gnversi t Press i984
Kel let Anthony CqmbatMotivati- The Be5avior of S~dieys in Battle Boston Kluwer-Nijhhoff P u b l i s h ~ n a 1785
S i m p k in Richard E RAC To The ~ w i F $ _ T h o + g h t sCln
Firs3Cntur)(Wayfare iondon Srassey 5 Defence Pubishers 1985
Boylan Peter J Power Projection Q i s k A n d T i e Liqht Fgrce Mi 11amp3~yPv low Vav 1982 pp 62- 73
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
O f A Eliianced Fcrce r-y J u n e 19d9 PF32C + l Downing Wayne A Light Infantry Integraticn In Ceqtral
Europe September 1986Il1litaryfieview pp 10-29
Hartzog William W and Howard John D HeavyLight Operat ions Mi_1~tary-Review Apr i 1 1987 PP 24-33
Herrly Peter F Middleweight Forces and the Armys Deployability Dilemma Parapeter= September 1989 pp 46-57
Huddleston Louis D Light Infantry Division Azimuth Check ~~~~~~~~~~~~Review September 1985 PP 14-21
1mpo1-tant ini tiat iue7 rned Frce Jo+ly~+i Intwriit io~ial May 1987 p 8
Mandelbaum Michael Ending The Cold War Forei-qn effairsSpring 1989 pp 16-36
Wass de Czege Huba Three Kinds Of Infantry infantyy July-August 1985 pp 11-13
Wickham John A Light Infantry Divisions IgTOr FebMar 1985 pp 100-107
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
Mi 1 itary Air 1 ift Command 4lrlif t Plann-i_nq-G~ideHo MAC Scott AFBNovember 1986
McDonnell Douglas USW C-17Report No MDC K0282C Long Beach CA November 1989
McM ichae1 Scott R ~Histp_rica~~~PPe_~s~ecc~ivve_e_aannnnLi q h t Infantry Combat Studies Institute Command and - General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas 1987
Nav Marine Corpz 2710 Marine a i r - G r g u n c j T p s k T o - c e s (iYrAGTFS) 1Jahiinrton DC -IP Clni ted S t ~ t e s rlar Corps 28 May IYES
Neky Patrick Eiyirinmnt Q Conbat Craft Revison F M G 3 - - 5 Upeyatrlonq September 1990
S -my Coabined Arms I)~ts-Air-indD 3 t 1 F~k i - ~ 4 1ternate Base Case S c u z y P3isz 1 iFart Lra~nwa-Kansas 26 February 1990
US Army CombinedAi-ms Center AirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 2 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 30 March 1990
US Army Combined Arms CenterAirLand Battle Future Alternate Base Case Study Phase 3 Fort Leavenworth Kansas 19 April 1990
US Army Combined Arms Center AirLand Battle Future hiternate Base Case Study Phase 4 Fort Leavenworth Kansas I+ June 1900
US Ai-my Combired Arms Ze~tr- airl-and Eatt F~ture -3 l sernate Base Case Study Ptase 2 Fort Leavenwcr h Kansas 18 June 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
US Ormy Fiela anca 7-2 Lj-lht1faytry Bttalgt s l y
Washington DC HQ Department Of The Army Marc11 1787
US Army Field Manual 71-100 Djvisi~~Ope~aamplqns Washington DC HQ Department Of The ArmyJune 1990
vuono Car 1 E Thelnited ForceStates4rw AStr+tea_Lc For The 1990s And B e p a Washington DC HR - - --- -Department Of The Army January 1990
149th Infan)-y Br iqade (Mororlec D=siqc2 Cspazi i i ti 7 2 - L I J i -
Caldwell John FW Forced Entry Does The Current Airborne Division Still Retain This Capability Under The Light Infantry Tables Of Crganization and Eauipment Ilororj-aph School cf Advaricerl Pi 1 ka1-v gttutlec SESX J ~ n ~ a i - ~I
Campbell Cbarles C Light Infantry anti The Heavy Force A Marriage O f Convenience 3r Necessity Monograph USCGSC 2 December 1985
Peddy Charles A The Light Infantry Division No Tool For The Tactical Commander Monograph USCGSC 2 Term 88-87
Tamlin Harry A 0rganizat~ona1 Desgn Of 1-ight Fores 2 Str-ucti~rei o i - A i Seasons Mrogrlph USCGSC 8--3
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
R o s n e r E J C-~+l-Jntey_vlewJacoby Charles Ii JI- 1 1 O c t o b e r 1990
