LICERALDE NOTES.pdf

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEWPart I

byMIGUEL B. LICERALDE SR.University of the Cordilleras

Chapter I.

A. INTRODUCTION1. Political lawdefined [Macariola v. Asuncion, 114

SCRA 77]

That branch of public law which deals with the organizationand operations of the gov ernmental organs of the State and

defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its

territory.

Macariola v. Asuncion

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

114 SCRA 77

The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibitsjudges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging inbusiness within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts ispolitical in nature and therefore, said provision was deemedabrogated when there was a change of sovereignty fromSpain to the United States at the turn of the century. Politicallaws are deemed abrogated if there is a change ofsovereignty and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign,the same is without force and effect.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against JudgeAsuncion with acts unbecoming a judge. The judge apparentlybought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was

involved in a civil case decided by him; and on 31 Aug 1966, theAsuncion couples conveyed their share and interest in the saidproperty to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to be aviolation of pars 1 & 5, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce whichprohibits judges in active service (among others) to do so withinthe limits of the place where they discharge their duties.

HELD:Art 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug1888) of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges fromengaging in commerce was political in nature and so wasautomatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in thecountry (Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession,1898).

2. Scope of Political Law

Constitutional Law

Administrative Law

Law of Public Officers

Law on Municipal Corporations

Election Law

3. Constitution-defined and classified.

That written instr ument enacted by direct action of thepeople by which the fundamental powers of th e government

are established, limited, and defined, by wh ich those pow ers

are distributed among the several departments for th eir safeand useful exercise for t he benefit of the benefit of the body

politic.- Sir Liceralde, (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law,p.6)

Kinds of Constitution

UnwrittenConsists of rules, which have not been integrated into a

single concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such asstatutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions,

commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions and certaincommon law principle.

WrittenOne whose precepts are embodied in one document or set

of documents.

Conventional

Enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite timeand place following a conscious and deliberate effort taken by aconstituent body or ruler.

CumulativeThe result of a political evolution not inaugurated at any

specific time but changing by accretion rather than by anysystematic method.

RigidIs one that can be amended only by a formal and

usually difficult process.

FlexibleIs one that can be changed by an ordinary legislation.

4. Parts of a written constitution

Constitution of libertyConsists of series of prescriptions setting forth the

fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposinglimitations on the powers o government as a means of securingthe enjoyment of those rights. (Articles III, II, IV. V and XII)

Constitution of governmentSeries of provisions outlining the organization of the

government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rulesrelative to its administration and defining the electorate. (ArticlesVI and XI)

Constitution of SovereigntyConsists of provisions pointing out the mode or procedures

in accordance with which the formal changes in the fundamentallaw maybe brought about and change. (Article XVII)

5. Interpretation & construction of the Constitution;

a. Self-executing & non self-executing (ManilaPrince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408[1997].

A provision w hich lays down a general princip le, such

as those found in A rt. II of the 1987 Constitution is usu ally

not self -execut ing. But a provision, wh ich is c omplete in

itself and becomes operative without the aid ofsupplementary or enabling legislation, or that which

suppl ies suff ic ient rule by means of which the right it

grants m ay be enjoyed or protec ted, is self-executing. Thusa constitution al provision is self-executing if the nature and

extent of the right conferr ed and the liability imposed are

fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be

determined by an examinat ion and construct ion of its

terms, and there is no language indicating t hat the subject

is referred to the legislature for action.

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to

the privatization program of the Philippine Government underProclamation 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sellthrough public bidding 30% to 51%of the issued andoutstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only two biddersparticipated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipinocorporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or15,300,000 shares atP41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, whichbid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, orP2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration ofRenong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the


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execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bidprice of P44.00per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter toGSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent amanagerscheck to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhapsapprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of thematching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC maybe hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,

Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition andmandamus. The next day the Court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining the respondents from perfecting andconsummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

Issue(s):

1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularlyArticle XIISection 10, are self-executing.

2. Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held:

The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XII Section 10 provides: TheCongress

shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of thePhilippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty percentum of whose capitalist owned by such citizens, or such higherpercentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation andoperation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned byFilipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessionscovering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall givepreference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate andexercise authority over foreign investments within its national

jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals andpriorities.

b. Art. II provisions generally not self-executingprovisions (Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA540)

Facts:a. Result of GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona)- invalidatedcontract of lease between Phil .Charity Sweepstake Office (PCSO)and Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)

i. To be in violation of the charter of PCSO

b.Jan 25, 1995- parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement(ELA) for lease of online lotteryequipment and accessories

i. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSOat which in no case be lessthan an annual rental

computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercialoperation.ii. Rent is computed bi-weeklyiii. Term is 8 yearsiv. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can

purchase the equipment at P25M

c.Petitions declared ELA as invalid

i. Amended ELA is null and void being the same with theold lease contract

ii. Assuming ELA is materially different from the old leasecontract, it is still inconsistent with the PCSOs charter

iii. Amended ELA is null and void for being violative of thelaw on public bidding, it has not been approved bythe President and it is not most advantageous to the govt.

d.PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments:

i. ELA is a different lease contract with none of thevestiges in the prior contract

ii.ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in theexception provided in EO No. 301

iii. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in theBOD of PCSO

iv. Lack of funds of PCSO cannot purchase the its ownonline lottery equipment

v. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade

vi. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because theywere not parties to the contract

Issues:a. Does the petitioners have legal standing?

b. Is the ELA valid?

Held/Ratio:

a. NO. Petitioners do not have a legal standing.

STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous rulingsustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure fromthe settled rulings on real parties in interest because no

constitutional issues were actually involved. Also, LAW OF THECASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply.Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannotbe in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. Theparties are the same but the cases are not.

RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTcannotstill apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon anddetermine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question inany future action between the same parties involving a differentcause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law atleast when substantially unrelated claims are involved. Whenthe second proceeding involves an instrument or transactionidentical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with inthe first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceedingto make an independent examination of the legal matters atissue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decisiondoes not preclude determination of the petitionersstanding.

Accordingly, STANDING is a concept in constitutionallaw and here no constitutional question is actually involved. Themore appropriate issue is whether the petitioners areREALPARTIES in INTEREST.

b.YES. ELA is valid. It is different with the prior leaseagreement:1. PCSO now bears all losses because the operationof the system is completely in its hands ii. Fixing the rental rateto a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is

not inclined to review. iii.Rental rate is within the 15% netreceipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt isdiscussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.).

In the contract, it stated that the parties can change theiragreement. Petitioner states that this would allow PGMC tocontrol and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court heldthat the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction ofstatutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, thegovernment has acted in good faith. The doctrine that thepossibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.

It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO doesnot have the power to enter into any contract which wouldinvolve it in any form of collaboration, association, or joint

venture for the holding of sweepstakes activities. This onlymentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activitiesthat would compete in their own activities.

It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement whichdoes not compete with their own activities. The Court held thatis also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show thatthe transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and itspersonnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.

E.O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only tocontracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment


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and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases is onlyfor privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use orof govtowned buildings or spaces for private use.

In a nutshell, petitioners have no standing. ELA is a validlease contract. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction isdismissed.

6. Historical background:a. Malolos Constitutionb. American Organic Actsc. 1935 Constitutiond. 1973 Constitutione. 1985 snap presidential election

The Philippines has had a total of six constitutions since theProclamation of Independence on June 12, 1898. In 1899, theMalolos Constitution, the first Philippine Constitutionthe firstrepublican constitution in Asiawas drafted and adopted by theFirst Philippine Republic, which lasted from 1899 to 1901.

During the American Occupation, the Philippines wasgoverned by the laws of the United States of America. Organic

Acts were passed by the United States Congress for theadministration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. Thefirst was the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, which provided for aPhilippine Assembly composed of Filipino citizens. The secondwas the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which included the firstpledge of Philippine independence. These laws served asconstitutions of the Philippines from 1902 to 1935.

In 1934, the United States Congress passed the PhilippineIndependence Act, which set the parameters for the creation of aconstitution for the Philippines. The Act mandated the PhilippineLegislature to call for an election of delegates to a ConstitutionalConvention to draft a Constitution for the Philippines. The 1934Constitutional Convention finished its work on February 8, 1935.The Constitution was submitted to the President of the UnitedStates for certification on March 25, 1935. It was in accordancewith the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. The 1935Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people through a nationalplebiscite, on May 14, 1935 and came into full force and effect onNovember 15, 1935 with the inauguration of the Commonwealth ofthe Philippines. Among its provisions was that it would remain theconstitution of the Republic of the Philippines once independencewas granted on July 4, 1946.

In 1940, the 1935 Constitution was amended by the NationalAssembly of the Philippines. The legislature was changed from aunicameral assembly to a bicameral congress. The amendmentalso changed the term limit of the President of the Philippines fromsix years with no reelection to four years with a possibility of being

reelected for a second term.During World War II the Japanese-sponsored government nullifiedthe 1935 Constitution and appointed Preparatory Committee onPhilippine Independence to replace it. The 1943 Constitution wasused by the Second Republic with Jose P. Laurel as President.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the 1935Constitution came back into effect. The Constitution remainedunaltered until 1947 when the Philippine Congress called for itsamendment through Commonwealth Act No. 733. On March 11,1947 the Parity amendment gave United States citizens equalrights with Filipino citizens to develop natural resources in thecountry and operate public utilities. The Constitution, thereafter,remained the same until the declaration of martial law onSeptember 23, 1972.

Before President Marcos declared Martial Law, aConstitutional Convention was already in the process ofdeliberating on amending or revising the 1935 Constitution. Theyfinished their work and submitted it to President Marcos onDecember 1, 1972. President Marcos submitted it for ratification inearly January of 1973. Foreseeing that a direct ratification of theconstitution was bound to fail, Marcos issued Presidential DecreeNo. 86, s. 1972, creating citizens assemblies to ratify the newlydrafted constitution by means of a Viva Voce vote in place ofsecret ballots. Marcos announced that it had been ratified and infull force and effect on January 17, 1973. Although the 1973

Constitution had been ratified in this manner, oppositionagainst it continued. Chief Justice Roberto V. Concepcion in hisdissenting opinion in the case ofJavellana v. ExecutiveSecretary, exposed the fraud that happened during the citizensassembly ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January, 10 15, 1973. However, the final decision of this case was that theratification of the 1973 Constitution was valid and was in force.

When democracy was restored in 1986, PresidentCorazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, suspendingcertain provisions of the 1973 Constitution and promulgating inits stead a transitory constitution. A month later, President

Aquino issued Proclamation No. 9, s. 1986, which created aConstitutional Commission tasked with writing a new charter toreplace the 1973 Constitution. The commission finished itswork at 12:28 a.m. of October 16, 1986. National Plebiscite washeld on February 2, 1987, ratifying the new constitution. OnFebruary 11, 1987, by virtue of Proclamation No. 58, President

Aquino announced the official canvassing of results and theratification of the draft constitution. The 1987 Constitution finallycame into full force and effect that same day with the President,other civilian officials, and members of the Armed Forcesswearing allegiance to the new charter.

f. READ: concurring opinion of J. Puno inRepublic v. Sandigan, 407 SCRA 10

I t is an established rule that the State cannot be

estopped by th e mistakes of its agents.

States right to due process of law; Double jeopardy; dismissalof a criminal case based on Demurrer to evidence---whether itcould be the subject of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 bythe PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

g. Nature of government after Feb. 25, 1986 up tothe proclamation (No. 3) of the FreedomConstitution on March 24, 1986 (REPUBLICv. Sandigan, 407 SCRA 10)

FACTS: P e t i t i o n e r R e p u b l i c , t h r o u g h t h ePresidential Commission on Good Government( P C G G ) , r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f t h eS o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ( O S G ) , f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners o u g h t t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h ea g g r e g a t e am ou nt of US$ 35 6 m il li on ( no westimated tob e m o r e t h a n U S $ 6 5 8 m i l l i o n i n c l u s i v e o f interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gottenwealth. The funds were previouslyheldb y t h e f o l l o w i n g f i v e a c c o u n t g r o u p s , u s i n g

v a r i o u s f o r e i g n f o u n d a t i o n s i n c e r t a i n S w i s s b anks . In addi t ion, the pet i t ion sought thefor fe i tureof US$25 million and US$5 million int r e a s u r y n o t e s w h i c h e x c e e d e d t h e M a r c o scouples salaries, other lawful income aswella s i n c o m e f r o m l e g i t i m a t e l y a cq u i r e d property.T h e t r e a s u r y n o t e s a r e f r o z e n a tt h e Central Bank of the Philippines by virtue of the fr ee zeorder issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set forpre-trial, a General Agreementa n d t h e S u p p l e m e n t a l A g r e e m e n t d a te d D e c e m b e r 2 8, 1 9 9 3 w er e e x e c u t e d b y t h e Ma r c o s c h i l d r e n a n d t h e n P C G G C h a i r m a n Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets ofthe Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the

inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to beowned by the Marcos family under the conditions containedtherein.

ISSUE: WON the Swiss funds can be forfeited inf a v o r o f t h e R e p u b l i c , o n t h e b a s i s o f t h eMarcoseslawful income.

HELD:NO.

R A 1 3 7 9 r a i s e s t h e p r i m a f ac i e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p r o p e r t y i s u n l a w f


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u l l y a c q u i r e d , h e n c e s u b j e ct t o f o r f e i t u r e , i f i t samount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salaryand other lawful income of the pub li c off ice r who own s it .The followingf a c t s m u s t b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n o r d e r t h at forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits maybe effected:

(1) ownership by the public officer

o f m o n e y o r p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d d u r i n g h i s i nc u m b e n c y , w h e t h e r i t b e i n h i s n a m e o r o the r w i s e , a n d

( 2) t he ex t en t to wh ic h th e amount of that money orproperty exceeds,i.e . , i s g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o , t h e legitimate income of the public officer.

T h e s p o u s e s F e r d i n a n d a n d I m e l d a M a r c o swere public officials during the time material to the present casewas never in dispute.

T h e s p o u s e s a c c u m u l a t e d s a l a r y o f $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of the

Marcoses since they did not file any Statement of Assets andLiabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worthcould be determined. Besides, under the1 9 3 5 C on s t i t ut i o n , Fe r d i na n d E . M a r co s a s P r es i d e n t c o u l d n o t r e c e i v e

" a n y o t h e r emolument from the Government or any ofits subdivisions and instrumentalit ies".

L i kew ise ,under t he 1973 Cons t i t u t i on , Ferd inand E. Marcos as President could "not receive duringh i s t e n u r e a n y o t h e r e m o l u m e n t f r o m t h eGovernment or any other source."T h e i r o n l y k n o w n l a w f u l i n c o m e o f $304,372.43 can the ref ore leg all y and fai rl yserve as basis fordetermining the existence of a p r im a f a c i e c a s e o ffor fe i ture o f the Swiss funds . The Republ ic d id notfail to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of theSwiss deposits.

T h e S w i s s d e p o s i t s w h i c hw e r e t ransfer red to and are deposi ted in escrow atthe Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregateamount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plusinterest, were forfeited in favor of the Republic.

h. Freedom Constitution

Freedom Constitution overtook the 1973 constitution asthe constitutional convention led by the late Cecilia Munoz Palmain drafting the new constitution.

By the order of the president, Proclamation No. 9 createda constitutional Commission composed of 50 members to beappointed by her. Took effect on Feb 2, 1987, the date of itsratification. (covers pending cases during the FreedomConstitution).

B. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION-1. Adoption and ratification on 02 Feb. 1987; its effectivity

(De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602)

Facts: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and otherpetitioners won as councilmen of barangay Dolores, taytay, rizal.On February 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedateddecember 1, 1986signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra,

february 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new captainby authority of minister of local government and similar memosigned February 8, 1987,designated new councilmen.

Issue:Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when itwas signed. So, February 8, 1987and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. Butprovisional constitution was no longer inefffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and itstransitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previousconstitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, itwas the constitution in effect. Petitioners now acquired security

of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has beenfixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

2. Supremacy of the Constitution(Manila Prince Hotelvs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997];

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for thegovernance and administration of a nation. It issupreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable exceptby the authority from which it emanates. It has beendefined as the fundamental and paramount law of thenation. It prescribes the permanent framework of asystem of government, assigns to the differentdepartments their respective powers and duties, and

establishes certain fixed principles on whichgovernment is founded. The fundamental conception inother words is that it is a supreme law to which allother laws must conform and in accordance with whichall private rights must be determined and all publicauthority administered.

Under the doctrine of constitutional suprem acy, if

a law or contract violates any norm of the

const i tut ion that law or contract whether

prom ulgated by the legislative or by the executive

branch or entered into by private persons for

pr ivate purposes is nul l and void and without any

force and effect. Thus, since the Constituti on is the

fundam ental, paramount and su preme law of the

nation, it is deemed written in every st atute and

contract.

3. exception-Lawyers League for a Better Philippinesv. Aquino, GR 73748, 5/22/86; In re: Bermudez

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquinoissued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and VicePresident Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25,1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the

Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the"new government was installed through a direct exercise of thepower of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino islegitimate.

HELD:Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciablematter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people arethe judge. The Court further held that:

1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is ineffective control of the entire country;

2.It is not merely a de fact on government but in fact and law a de juregovernment; and

3.The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of

the new government.

A. PREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of almightygod, in order to build a just and humane society and establish agovernment that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,

promote the common good, conserve and develop ourpatrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity theblessings of independence and democracy under the rule of lawand a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace,do ordain and promulgate this constitution.


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a. 1987 Preamble compared with the 1973,1935

Changes in the Preamble of the Philippine Constitution:

Rolando Suarez: Introduction to Law.

1. Just like the 1935 and the 1973 preamble, the 1987preamble is not a source of rights or obligations. It is

merely an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguousprovisions in the body of the constitution.

2. Imploring the aid of Divine Providence now appearimploring the aid of Almighty God to make the referenceto God more personal and direct. And consonant withFilipino religiosity.

3. The words general welfare now read common goodthe word general being indicative of exceptions.

4. The words patrimony of the nation now read ourpatrimony to make it more emphatic.

5. The words blessings of democracy now readsblessings of independence and democracy tounderscore the importance of true independence even inthe presence of democratic beliefs and practices.

6. The last portion of the preamble contains new words

such as rule of law truth freedom and love. There isa need to assert the need for love in the face of varyingpolitical and social beliefs. Freedom includes freedomfrom fear and from want. TRUTH emphasizes the needto act on the basis of real facts and figures

Changes if the Preamble as discussed by Fr. Joaquin Bernasin the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary2003 ed.

1. Guidanceto aid- as the more all-embracing term.2. Enhanceto conserve and develop3. Addition to more dynamic word aspiration to the

passive sounding ideals.4. general welfare to common good- intended to project

the idea o social order that enables every citizen toattain his or her fullest development economically,politically, culturally and spiritually. The rejection ofthe phrase general welfare was based on theapprehension that the phrase could be interpreted asmeaning greatest good for the greatest number, toavoid discrimination, persecution of the minority andmob rule.

5. rule of law was inserted instead of the words rule orregime

6. Love- it serves as a monument to th elove thatprevented bloodshed in the February Revolution of1896.

7. Truth is a protest against the deception thatcharacterized the Marcos regime.

8. Truth Justice freedom love captures a stream inCatholic thought which sees peace as the fruit of theconvergence of these words.

b. Function of the preamble. Is it a source of rights? Whatare its purposes and effects?

The preamble is not a source of right but a source of lightbecause it sets down origin, purpose and scope of theConstitution, which is useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaningof ambiguous provisions of the body of the Constitution.

The preamble bears witness to the fact that the Constitutionis the manifestation of the sovereign will of the Filipino people.

READ: Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 20I

It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy bothreligious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government,from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support anddefend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respectthe constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherentlimitations and recognized implications. It should be stated thatwhat is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, notmere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandateis not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is notdenial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a professionof faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to hisCreator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the mindsthe purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt andhighly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble oftheir Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in

order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote thegeneral welfare, and secure to themselves and their posteritythe blessings of independence under a regime of justice, libertyand democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Himwho guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevatinginfluence of religion in human society is recognized here aselsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions areindiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

Facts:The petitioner (Gregorio Aglipay) is the Supreme Head of

the Philippine independent Church that seeks the issuance fromthe court of writ of prohibition preventing the respondentDirector of Post (Ruiz) from issuing and selling a

commemorative stamp of the 33rd International EucharisticCongress as enacted and appropriated under RA 4052.

The petitioner contented that RA 4052 is unconstitutionalas it violated Article VI Section 29 (2) stating that no publicmoney shall be appropriated, applied or paid to any sect, churchor any system of religion including its priests preacher etc

The law in question appropriates P60, 000 for printing thenew commemoration stamps. (The stamp design is suggestiveof Roman Catholicism i.e chalice)

Issue:Does RA 4052 unconstitutional as it violates the provision

of the constitution specifically Article VI Section 29 (2)?

Held:No. RA 4052 does not violate the provision of the

constitution as alleged by the petitioner.In the case at bar, the commemorative stamp are not

issued and sold to appropriate or pay the Roman CatholicChurch but its purpose is to advertise the Philippines and attracttourist in the Philippines. The proceeds are not for any religiousinstitution but for the interest of the public.

ARTICLE II.- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATEPOLICIES-

Generally not self-executing provisions(KILOSBAYAN V.MORATO, 246 SCRA 540)

Supra.

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanates from them.

III. PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

a. State defined; distinguished from nation Collector vs.Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 [1971]

State is a legal or juristic concept, while nation is an ethnicor racial concept.

Facts: The respondent is the administrator of the estate of thedecease Maria Cerdera located in Tangier, Morocco. Afterdeliberation and assessment, the petitioner demands therespondent a sum of money as inheritance and deficiencyestate tax.

The respondent insisted that the estate of Maria Cerdera isexempt from such taxes as provided under Section 122 of theNational Internal Revenue Code. As an answer, the petitionercontested the grounds of the respondents stating that Tangier isnot considered foreign country as prescribed and that it is notreciprocal under the same Code thereby not exempt from taxes.


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Issue: Does Tangier can be considered as a foreign countryunder Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code therebyexempting the estate of the deceased Maria Cerdera from taxes?

Held: Yes. Tangier is foreign country and thereby the estate ofthe decedent should be exempted from taxes. It is also reciprocalto the provisions under the NIR Code.

Foreign country refers to the government of that foreign

power, which, although not an international person in the sense ofinternational law, does not impose transfer or death taxes uponintangible personal properties of our citizen not residing therein,or whose law allows a similar exemptions from such taxes,therefore, the law on Tangier is reciprocal to that of the provisionon the National Internal Revenue Code.

It does not necessarily to have international personality forTangier to be considered as foreign country.

b. Elements of State (people, territory, government, sovereignty)

As held in COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23, theelements of a state are:

1. people;

2. territory;3. sovereignty; and4. government.

1). PEOPLEa). As inhabitants-Sec. 1,Art. XIII; Sec. 15, Art. II; Sec. 2,

Art. III

ARTICLE XIIISOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to theenactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of allthe people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and politicalinequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusingwealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,use, and disposition of property and its increments.

ARTICLE II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATEPOLICIES

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to healthof the people and instill health consciousness among them.

ARTICLE IIIBILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied theequal protection of the laws.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall beinviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched and the persons or things tobe seized.

b). As citizens- Preamble; Sec. 1 & 4, Art. II; Sec. 7, Art. III

PREAMBLEWe, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of

Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,and establish a Government that shall embody our idealsand aspirations, promote the common good, conserve anddevelop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and ourposterity, the blessings of independence and democracyunder the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain andpromulgate this Constitution.

ARTICLE IIDECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

PRINCIPLESSection 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanates from them.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve andprotect the people. The Government may call upon the peopleto defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizensmay be required, under conditions provided by law, to renderpersonal, military or civil service.

ARTICLE IIIBILL OF RIGHTS

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters ofpublic concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,transactions, or decisions, as well as to government researchdata used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded thecitizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

c). As electors- Sec. 4, Art. VII; Sec. 2, Art. XVI; Sec.25, Art. XVIII

ARTICLE VIIEXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall beelected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years whichshall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following theday of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, sixyears thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and hasserved as such for more than four years shall be qualified forelection to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of timeshall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of theservice for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election forPresident and Vice-President shall be held on the secondMonday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province orcity, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to thePresident of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates ofcanvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirtydays after the day of the election, open all the certificates in thepresence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in

joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination ofthe authenticity and due execution thereof in the mannerprovided by law, canvass the votes

The person having the highest number of votes shall beproclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equaland highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith bechosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of bothHouses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing ofthe certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge ofall contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ofthe President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rulesfor the purpose.

ARTICLE XVIGENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for thecountry, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall all betruly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditionsof the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratificationby the people in a national referendum.


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ARTICLE XVIIITRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement betweenthe Republic of the Philippines and the United States of

America concerning military bases, foreign militarybases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the

Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by theSenate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by amajority of the votes cast by the people in a nationalreferendum held for that purpose, and recognized as atreaty by the other contracting State.

2) TERRITORY; ARTICLE I- National TerritoryARTICLE I

NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with allthe islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territoriesover which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including itsterritorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and

other submarine areas. The waters around, between, andconnecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of theirbreadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of thePhilippines.

a). What is the scope and how is the national territory definedunder the 1935, 1973, 1987 Constitution?

b). Reasons for constitutional definition of national territoryunder the 1935, 1973 & 1987 constitution.

c). Changes in the definition of the national territory under 1987Constitution. Effects?

Under the 1935 Constitution :

The Philippines comprises all territory ceded to the United Statesby the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States andSpain on the tenth day of December, eighteenth hundred andninety-seven, the limit of which is set forth in Article II of saidtreaty, together with all the islands in the treaty concluded atWashington, between the United states and Spain on the seventhday of November, nineteen hundred, and in the treaty concludedbetween the United States and Great Britain on the second day ofJanuary, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over whichthe present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises

jurisdiction.

The article gave four points of reference of the determination

of Philippine territory.

1. Treaty of Paris on December 10. 1898.2. The Treaty of Washington on November 7, 19003. The treaty between the United States and Great Britain

on January 2, 19304. all territory over which the present government of the

Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.

Under the 1973 Constitution

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all otherterritories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legaltitle, including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the

seabed, the insular shelves and the other submarine areasover which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction.The waters around, between and connecting the islands ofthe archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and dimensions,form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

The national territory of the Philippines under th e 1973

const i tut ion is divided into three groups:

1. The Philippine archipelago2. Other territories belonging to the Philippines3. Philippine waters, air space and submarine areas

Thus, the Philippines under this constitution has ahorizontal reachconsisting of lands and waters, upward reachconsisting of air space over the land and waters and adownw ard reachconsisting of submarine areas.

Reason for constitutional definition of the nationalterritory.

A territorial definition of the territory was necessary for thepreservation of our national wealth, for national security,and as a manifestation of our solidarity as a people

1987 Constitution:It merely removed language possibly offensive to an

ASEAN neighbor and achieved a more logical sequencing of theelements that make up the territory but preserved everythingelse found in the 1973 constitution.

The 1987 constitution retained the territorial concepts ofPhilippine archipelago, internal waters, terrestrial, fluvial andaerial domains. Removed concepts of acquisition of territoriesby historic or legal rights, which provides conflicts to claims in

Sabah.

d). Archipelagic doctrine-Elements & Methods in fixing thebase line

What is the arch ipelagic doctrine or archipelago theory?

A principle brought up by the adoption of the straightbaseline method and internal waters forming the territory of thearchipelago.

It is the 2ndsentence of Section 1, Art. I of the Constitutionwhich states that the waters around, between and connectingthe islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth anddimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Internal water(Archipelagic waters in the 1987 constitution byvirtue of the UNCLOS):

Consist of all parts of the sea landwards from the baselineas well as inland rivers and lakes.

Consists of All waters around) Which are subject to theterritorial sovereignty of the coastal state. But are not subject tothe right of innocent passage by other states.

Territorial sea:

Consists of marginal belt of maritime waters adjacent tothe baselines extending 12 nautical miles outward. Outsideterritorial seas are high seas.

Territorial seas are subject to rights of innocent passage.

According to the UNCLOS, the result of the 12 mile ruleimplementation is an overlapping of adjacent states, thus itprovided rules that, implementation of equidistant rule or thedividing line is a median line equidistant from the oppositebaselines. Not applied if in cases of historical or legal rights.Other measurements will be required.

Insular Shelf:

Consists of a) seabed and subsoil of the submarine areasadjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea, to a

depth of 200 meters or beyond that limit, to where the depthallow exploitation and b) the seabed and subsoil of areasadjacent to islands.

The coastal state may then have the right to explore andexploit minerals and resources therein, install installations andsafety zones. But the right does not affect the right of navigationof other state.

Straight Baseline Method:

Instead of following the sinuosities of the coast, straightlines are drawn connecting selected points on the coast without


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appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast.(Adopted in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case)

It was upheld under the RA 3046 amended by RA 5446,defining the baseline territory of the territorial sea of thePhilippines.

Normal Baseline method:

Line drawn following the low water line along the coast asmarked on the large-scale charts officially recognized by theCoastal state.

e). Read: RA 9522 defining the archiplegic baselines; PD1596 - June 11, 1978- Annexing Kalayaan Islands asmunicipality of Palawan; PD 1599 - June 11, 1978-Declaring the 200- mile Economic Zone; UNCLOS

Conflict arising from UNCLOS vis--vis the PhilippineNational territory: as discussed under UNCLOS and itsImplications on the Territorial Sovereignty of the Philippinesby Prof. Merlin Magallona:

Main Argument (is it favorable: NO!!!)

The UNCLOS raises fundamental questions, which beardirectly on the security and integrity of the Philippine State. Theimpact of the UNCLOS on the Philippine situation is nothing shortof reorganizing the countrys entire territorial regime, with theresult that Philippine sovereignty becomes unrecognizable as itestablished under its Constitutional system.

The Philippine Territory in accordance to its provision under theConstitution.

The political boundaries of the Philippine territory wasdefined under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, thus, plottingthe Philippine territory under such treaty, there is a hugerectangular shape surrounding the Philippines, having 600 mileswidth and 12, 000 miles in length. Eastern boundaries of 300 milesfrom the tip of Luzon and 150 miles west from the tip. RA 3046,states that the political boundaries of the Philippine archipelagomight extend beyond the treaty limits defined under Article II of theTreaty- subject to the rights of innocent passage.

The United States rejects such interpretation contending thatterritorial boundaries should be defined under principles ofinternational law and not on treatises. Thus, they assert the 12mile rule of territorial sovereignty of every state having entities ofinternational status.

The UNCLOS and its implication to the Philippine territory:

The Philippines will then be recognized as an Archipelagicstate and will adopt the straight baseline method.1. The territorial sea of the Philippines will then be

measured up to 12 nautical miles without exceeding.Within these territory, the Philippines can exercisesovereignty subject to the right of innocent passage.

2. From the 12-mile territorial boundary, it can draw another12 nautical miles wide to be its contiguous zone. Thisarea has only jurisdictional rights to the extent necessaryto enforce its custom, revenue, immigration or sanitarylaw. The Philippines do not have full sovereignty of thesaid area.

3. And the Philippines can then draw a line from itsbaselines 200 nautical miles as an exclusive economiczone where the state can explore and exploit minerals.

Beyond these zones are high seas. However, no statecan claim any exercise of sovereignty in this area.

EffectsAccording to the l imits defined in the Treaty of Paris and of

the RA 3046, the total territory of the Philippines would have been520,700 sq. mi., but the implementation of the UNCLOS, thePhilippine territory reduces into only 230, 000 sq. mi. or areduction of almost 50%.

Other effects to the Philippine territory by the UNCLOS

Archipelagic watersUnder the constitution of the Philippines, its internal or

national waters are defined as waters around, between andconnecting the island of the archipelago, regardless of itsbreadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of thePhilippines and within the internal waters, the Philippines have

full territorial sovereignty as it was in its land territory.

Under the UNCLOS, the internal waters is changed intoArchipelagic waters and its sovereignty is watered down withsome conditions.

1. UNCLOS regulates the rights of innocent passage ininternal waters, such that all foreign ships includingwarshipswill enjoy the rights of innocent passage andis allowed to navigate through the Philippine waters.

2. the Philippine, within its Archipelagic waters willrecognize traditional fishing rights and activities of itsneighboring states.

3. the Philippines shall recognize and respect the existingsubmarine cables laid by other states and passing

through its waters, including repairs and replacements.

Thus, what has been regarded under the constitution thatthe Philippines enjoy full sovereignty over its internal waters areradically reduced by the UNCLOS. It was subjected into morerestrictions that its territorial sea,.

1. Archipelagic Sea Lanes: the International Highways

The UNCLOS, provides Archipelagic sea lanes, in effect,the Philippines are forced to provide sea lane passage and airroutes, suitable for the navigation of foreign ships and aircrafts.These lanes are drawn across

There are two elements a) right of passage of all ships and b)right of over flight of all aircraft. These passages, the Philippinesdont have the capacity to exercise its sovereign powers.

MAGALLONA vs. ERMITA, GR 187167, 8/6/11

FACTS OF THE CASE:The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing ofRepublic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate themaritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passedRA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined newbase points of the archipelago. Moreso, it has identified the Kalayaan IslandGroup and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own

maritime zones. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA9522. To their opinion, the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of thecountry. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitionersalso worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritimebaselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse thePhilippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the statessovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in noway will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferredto agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah.Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waterswithin the rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treatystill has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in theperspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it.Thus, this case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before thecourt, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522.

THE COURTS RULING:The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made

it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zonesand continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III.Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islandssuggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment ofterritorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and theScarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remainedeven with the adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantlystressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III toprecisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family


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of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement ordiminution of territories. With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, theCourt did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the politicalbranches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competentsecurity measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since the Courtemphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, it also believesthat no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern

states. In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required theimposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entirewaters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to berecognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.

3). Government-defined

The agency or instrumentality through which the will ofthe state is formulated, expressed, and realized. (US v. Dorr, 2Phil. 332)

a). Govt. of the Philippines-definedsee- Sec. 2, Revised Adm. Code

A term refers to the corporate governmental entity through whichthe functions of the governments are exercised throughout thePhilippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears fromthe context, the various arms through which political authority ismade effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the centralgovernment or to the provincial or municipal branches or otherform of local government.

b). Functions of government: constituent (governmental) andMinistrant (proprietary) Bacani v. Nacoco, 100 Phil468[1956]

Constituent:Compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of

society. As adopted in the Bacani vs. NACOCO Case by Pres.Wilson:

1. The keeping of order and providing the protection ofpersons and property from violence and robbery.

2. The fixing of legal relations between man and wife andbetween parents and children.

3. The regulation of the holding, transmission andinterchange of property, and the determination of itsliabilities for debt or crimes.

4. The determination of contract rights between individuals.5. The definition and punishment of crimes.6. The administration of Justice in Civil Cases.7. The determination of political duties, privileges and

relations of citizens.8. Dealing of the sate with foreign powers. The preservation

of the state from external danger or encroachments and

the advancement of its international interest.

Ministrant Functions:

Optional functions of the government intended for achievinga better life for the community.

1. For public welfare which private capital would notnaturally undertake.

2. Those things where the government is better equipped toadminister public welfare than those from a privateentities.

Note:Such distinctions became obsolete because of the growing

complexities and increasing social challenges by which the

government is bound to satisfy. The ACCFA and CUGCO Case.

Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation100 Phil 468

Facts:The National Coconut Corporation (respondent) requested

copies of stenographic notes from the stenographers of Branch VIof Court of First Instance of Manila Bacani and Mateo (petitioners).

Upon delivery of the requested stenographic notes, the latter(petitioners) charges the former (respondent) one-peso per pagefor the 714-page notes.

Upon the inspection of the Auditor General of theCorporation, he disallowed the payment and sought therecovery of the amount paid contending that NACOCO isexempt from such payment under the Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt, since the corporation is a government institution underthe Revised Administrative Code, performing a constituentfunction.

Issue:Does NACOCO a government entity under the Revised

Administrative Code and thus exempted from the payment ofthe stenographic fees?

Held:No. NACOCO is not part of government as defined by

the Revised Administrative Code. As provided by the sameCode, the Government of the Philippine Islands is a term whichrefers to the corporate governmental entity through which thefunctions of the government are exercised throughout thePhilippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears fromthe context, the various arms through which political authority ismade effective is said Islands, Whether pertaining to the centralGovernment of to the provincial or municipal branches or other

form of local government.NACOCO was a corporation with personality distinct from

the government, therefore cannot avail exemptions frompayment. Thus it does not fir to the definition given even thoughit performs some functions of the government.

Note:Constituent functions of the government(compulsory functions which constitutes the

very bonds of society). AS provided by US PresidentWilson

The keeping of order and providing the protection of personsand property from violence and robbery.

The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife andbetween parents and children.

The regulation of the holding, transmission and interchange ofproperty, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or forcrime

The determination of contract rights between individuals.

The definition and punishment of crime.

The administration of justice in civil cases.

The determination of political duties, privileges and relations ofcitizens.

Dealings of the state with foreign powers; the preservation ofthe state from external danger or encroachment and theadvancement of its international interest.

Minisrant functions are optional functions of governmentintended for achieving a better l ife for the community.

public welfare, public works, regulation of trade and industry

c). Distinction has become obsoleteACCFA v, CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649(agricultural credit);

Are the two-fold function of government as enumerated by theSupreme Court in BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468(Ministrant [merely directory] and Constituent [Mandatory]Functions) still applicable today?

No more as held in ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649. Thisis due to complexities of the changing society, the two-foldfunction of the government as classified by President Wilson isno longer relevant as a result of the changing society whereinwhat are considered merely ministrant functions of the Statebefore are now considered constituent , or vice versa.


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NHC vs. JUCO, 134 SCRA 172, (1985) (housing);

Facts: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint forillegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the laborarbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and

jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal,the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the

labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to theSC

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, aGOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or bylaws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivisionand instrumentality of the Government, including everygovernment owned and controlled corporation.

The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil serviceshows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loopholewhich allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil

service system. All offices and firms of the government arecovered.This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 isunequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil serviceand subject to civil service requirements."Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This caserefers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firmstaken over by the government in foreclosure or similarproceedings.

xxxFor purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt-owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law orformed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, notthe Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlledby the govt may be created by special charter does not mean thatsuch corps. not created by special law are not covered by the CivilService.xxxThe infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting thecircumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B,Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministryof govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Codefunded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could createseveral subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy thebest of two worlds. Their officials and employees would beprivileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required bythe Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Theirincomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the

open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil serviceemployment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps.could be created, no longer by special charters, but throughincorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendmentincluding such corps. in the embrace of the civil service wouldcease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot beallowed For more case digests and law school notes visitlizajamarga.com.

(Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 2/27/91-GR 55963 (water irrigation).

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a governmentagency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of theson of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or

negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it isnot liable for the act of its driver because the former does notperform primarily proprietorship functions but governmentalfunctions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damagescaused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporatepersonality separate and distinct from the government, because itscommunity services are only incidental functions to the principalaim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with

proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liablefor actions of their employees.

PEA V. Yujuico,351 SCRA 280[2001] (roads)

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari is anoffshoot of this Courts final and executory decision in PublicEstates Authority (PEA) v. Jesus S. Yujuico and Augusto Y.Carpio (2001 PEA Case)which settled the issue on overlappingparcels of land between petitioner on one hand, and Jesus S.Yujuico (Yujuico) and Augusto Y. Carpio (Carpio) on the other,by upholding the Compromise Agreement executed by theparties.In the 2001 PEA Case, the Court affirmed the dismissalof PEAs petition for relief from judgment questioning theCompromise Agreement approved by Branch 258 of theRegional Trial Court of Paraaque City, ruling that the petitionwas filed beyond the 60-day period allowed by Sec. 3, Rule 38of the Rules of Court; and that it would not be right to allow amere change of PEAs management to defeat the operation ofthe rules on reglementary period. The crux of the presentcontroversy is the implementation of the Compromise

Agreement which provides that, among other things:

c. The SECOND PARTY is also given the OPTION TOPURCHASE an additional 7.6 hectares of land and CBP1-A. The land subject of the OPTION shall be located andidentified in the area to be agreed upon by the partiesunder a separate arrangement.

i. The OPTION must be exercised within aperiod of three (3) years from the date thisCompromise Agreement has been approved bythe Court and the Compromise Judgment hasbeen issued and become final.

ii. The value of the land subject of the OPTIONshall be based on the fair market value asdetermined by PEA on the date of the exerciseof the OPTION.

iii. The OPTION shall be exercisable inincrements of 5,000 square meters.

iv. In the event that the SECOND PARTY woulddevelop the property at CBP-1A subject of theiroption, through a joint venture agreement or otherbusiness arrangements, the FIRST PARTY shallhave the right of first refusal to develop the same.

v. Within the option period, if the FIRST PARTYwill have an offer to purchase or develop the

property, the SECOND PARTY shall be notified byPEA and shall be required to match the offer. If theSECOND PARTY cannot match the offer, the PEAshall be free to sell or award the development tothe offeror. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On January 26, 1999, respondents informed petitioner of theirintention to exercise the option to purchase.

By Omnibus Motion of June 6, 2002, Yujuico and Carpio,assisted by Benedicto V. Yujuico (Benedicto) acting as theirattorney-in-fact, moved that the trial court issue an Order for,among other things, the appointment of three licensed realestate appraisers who shall submit a report on the fair marketvalue of the subject property on the date of the exercise of theoption to purchase stipulated in the Compromise Agreement;and the suspension of the three-year option period until the trialcourts approval ofthe appraisers report.

By letter of March 26, 2004,however, petitioner set the termsand conditions for respondents exercise of the option topurchase.

Respondents did not heed petitioners imposition of a 122-dayperiod to exercise the option to purchase. Instead, they filedwith the trial court a Supplemental Omnibus Motion praying foran Order directing, among other things:


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(B) PEA and BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO, Attorney-in-Fact of[herein respondents], (aa) to implement the OPTION TOPURCHASE the 7.6 Has. to be taken from PEA-CBP-IA withspecific boundaries delineated by the parties as shown in ANNEXBhereof; (bb) to consider the actual condition of said 7.6 Has.and the prevailing real estate market on or about January 26,1999, the date of the exercise of the OPTION, which wasreiterated in subsequent letters to PEA in determining the fair, just

and bona fidemarket price of said 7.6 Has. by the PEA; and (cc)which exercise of the OPTION is well within the 3-year period fromthe date the Court-approved Compromise Agreement becamefinal as provided in Par. (c)(i) of the said Compromise Agreement.

In its Comment to the Motion,

petitioner contended that thedetermination of the fair market value of the property subject of theoption to purchase had been lodged in it by the Compromise

Agreement; and that the period for the exercise of the option hadexpired, respondents not having exercised the same within threeyears from the date the compromise judgment became final.

By Order of January 11, 2005,the trial court denied respondentsSupplemental Omnibus Motion, holding that, among other things,it is petitioner which has the exclusive right to determine the fair

market value of the land that respondents want to purchasepursuant to the Compromise Agreement.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by Orderdated June 7, 2005,

respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals

via certiorari.

By Decision of August 31, 2007,the appellate court granted

respondents petition. It held that, among other things, theCompromise Agreement stipulated that the price to be determinedby petitioner cannot be any price conceived by whim, but must bethe fair market value, which has acquired a definite meaning inthe world of business; and that it must accordingly determine thefair market value of the property instead of remanding the case tothe trial court in order to put an end to the litigation.

The appellate court went on to set the fair market value atP13,000 per square meter at the time the option to purchase wassought to be exercised, finding that the property was then still rawland and not a ready-to-build site.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied byResolution dated February 20, 2008, i t filed the present Petition forReview on Certiorari.

Petitioner reiterates its position before the trial court, adding thatthe appellate court has no authority to impose upon the parties a

judgment different from the terms of their Compromise Agreement;and that the appellate court erroneously adopted the valuation ofthe appraiser, Royal Asia Corporation, which was hired and paid

by respondents.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that, among other things,the question of proper valuation raised by petitioner is one of fact,and thus prohibited in a petition for review; that the appellate courtcorrectly applied the Compromise Agreement according to itsintent; and that assuming that the Compromise Agreement givespetitioner the sole authority to determine the price of the property,such stipulation is void for being purely potestative and violative ofthe principle of mutuality of contracts.

RULING: The petition must fail.

The present case turns on the pivot of the option to purchaseprovided in the Compromise Agreement which, having been

judicially affirmed, constitutes res judicata upon the parties.

A compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter alreadyunder litigation is a judicial compromise. Having judicial mandateand entered as its determination of the controversy, such judicialcompromise has the force and effect of a judgment. It transcendsits identity as a mere contract between the parties, as it becomesa judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with theRules of Court. Thus, a compromise agreement that has beenmade and duly approved by the court attains the effect andauthority of res judicata, although no execution may be issuedunless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the

litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of theagreement is decreed.

To simply say that, by the earlier-quoted term of theCompromise Agreement respecting petitioners evaluation of theland subject of the option to purchase on the basis of its fairmarket value on the date of the exercise of the option, petitionerhas the exclusive prerogative to determine the purchase price ofthe subject land is a very myopic interpretation.

The proper interpretation of the stipulation is that petitioner isgiven the right to determine the price of the subject land,provided it can substantiate that the same is itsfairmarketvalueasofthedateof theexerciseoftheoption. Theterm fair market value in the stipulation cannot be ignoredwithout running afoul of the intent of the parties. It not beingdisputed that respondents exercised the option to purchase onJanuary 26, 1999, the valuation should thus be based on the fairmarket value of the property on the said date.

Indeed, as the appellate court held, in order to write finis to thecase, the fair market value of the property must be determinedon the basis of the existing records, instead of still remanding

the case to the trial court.

Fair market value has acquired a settled meaning in law andjurisprudence. It is the price at which a property may be sold bya seller who is not compelled to sell and bought by a buyer whois not compelled to buy, taking into consideration all uses towhich the property is adapted and might in reason be applied.The criterion established by the statute contemplates ahypothetical sale.

Given this yardstick, the Court found no cogent reason todisturb the factual finding of the appellate court that the propervaluation of the property is P13,000 per square meter as ofJanuary 26, 1999. As it correctly explained, the value wasarrived at through the market data approach, which is based on

sales and listings of comparable property registered within thevicinity; and that the property was classified as raw landbecause there were yet no houses and facilities like electricity,water and others at the time of the exercise of the option.

The rule is well-established that if there is no showing of error inthe appreciation of facts by the appellate court as in the presentcase, the Court treats it as conclusive.

A word on petitioner. Its bad faith is abundantly clear. It did notrespond to respondents notification of their intention to exercisethe stipulated option to purchase until after more than fouryears, or on March 26, 2004, when it surprised respondents withan exorbitant price for the property and gave them only 122days within which to purchase the same. Undeniably, it is

enfeebling the Compromise Agreement under the guise ofenforcing it, which the Court will not sanction.

SHIPSIDE, INC. vs. CA, GR 143377 2/20/01- (specialeconomic zone)

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing therequisite certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attachproof that the person signing the certification was authorized todo so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits amotion for reconsideration which attached a secretaryscertificate attesting to the signatorys authority to signcertificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner.When the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought

relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition ofShipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. TheSC revised the decision of CA recognizing the belated filing ofthe certifications against forum shopping as permitted inexceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reasonshould a petition be given due course when this incorporates acertification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the


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person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory andthe petitioner subsequently submits a secretarys certificateattesting to the signatorys authority in its motion for consideration. The court allows belated submission of certifications showingproof of the signatorys authority in signing the certification offorum shopping.

d). De Jure and De Facto governments

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez, 75 PHIL 113

As held in CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113,the three (3) kinds of de facto governments are:

The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, isthat government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, byforce or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governmentsand maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as thegovernment of England under the Commonwealth, first byParliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.

The second is that which is established and maintained bymilitary forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy inthe course of war, and which is denominated a government of

paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which wasreduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico,Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of theUnited States.

And the third is that established as an independentgovernment by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrectionagainst the parent state of such as the government of theSouthern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present casewith the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of defacto governments.

"But there is another description of government, called alsoby publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, bemore aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Itsdistinguishing characteristics are

(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power withthe territories, and against the rightful authority of an establishedand lawful government; and(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters byprivate citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submissionto such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, forthose acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightfulgovernment.

e). What is thenature of the government underthe FreedomConstitution-Letter of Justice REYNATO PUNO, 210 SCRA589,598[1992];

Facts: The petitioner Justice of the Court of Appeals, ReynatoPuno wrote a letter to the SC seeking for correction of his seniorityranking in The Court of Appeals.

After a reorganization of the Judiciary after the 1986 EDSARevolution, by virtue of the BP 129 as amended by the EO 33, thepetitioner was appointed by the Screening Committee assigned toreorganize the Judiciary in to rank eleven (11) as AssociateJustice of the CA. After it was signed by Pres. Aquino during theFreedom Constitution, the petitioners seniority rank changed andfell into rank 26.

The petitioner now argues that the President violated theprovisions of the EO 33 and that she complied with his own EO 33

to reorganize the Judiciary, by appointing a different set of ranks.

The petitioner also argued that the Freedom Constitutionproclaimed by the president still recognize the ungratified 1973constitution and that all the rights under the latter should still bepresent under the Freedom Constitution, and thus the petitionerranking should not fall but changed into rank 5.

Issue: Does the President under the then enforced FreedomConstitution has the power to modify any seniority ranking in theCA, in this case provision of EO 33 amending BP 129?

Held:Yes. Under the Freedom Constitution, the government ofthe President is revolutionary in nature such that it can exercisethe powers of the Executive and Legislative. Thus, it can modifyeven her own EO 33 such that revolutionary powers candisregard any precedence or seniority rank.

Thus, the President was free to appoint to the new Courtof Appeals in the order of precedence she wanted as part of hisrevolutionary powers.

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, 5/22/86

supra.

f). What is the legal distinction betweenEDSA PEOPLEPOWER I and EDSA PEOPLE POWER II? Estrada v.

Arroyo GR. No. 146738. March 2, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondentOmbudsman from conducting any further proceedings in anycriminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after theterm of petitioner as President is over and only if legallywarranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for

judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbentPresident of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unableto discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent tohave taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of thePresident, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisionsof the Constitution.

HELD:

FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the properinterpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, andthe allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article

VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope ofpresidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correctcalibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrinehas been laid down that it is emphatically the province and dutyof the judicial department to say what the law is . . .

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power Iand EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of thepeople power of revolution which overthrew the wholegovernment. EDSA II is an exercise of people power offreedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition thegovernment for redress of grievances which only affected theoffice of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and thelegitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be

the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutionaland the resignation of the sitting President that it caused andthe succession of the Vice President as President are subject to

judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA IIinvolves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitionerresigned as President.

a. The proposal for a snap election for president in Maywhere he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitionerhad intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted onlyfive-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open thesecond envelop to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave byMonday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko namasyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more ofthisits too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy,the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.


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The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitionerhas resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x

Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words ofresignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitionerwas treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that timewere the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and

after transition period.

d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leavingMalacaang. In the press release containing his final statement,(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent asPresident of the Republic albeit with the reservation about itslegality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat ofthe presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin thehealing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving thePalace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assumethe presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) heexpressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to servethem. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunitygiven him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that hewill not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in

the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to afuture challenge after occupying the office of the president whichhe has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him inthe promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity could not be attained if he did not give up thepresidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, hisfinal act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimateauthority under the Constitution to determine whether thePresident is incapable of performing his functions. Both housesof Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 HouseResolution No. l75 which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSINGTHE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TOTHE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENTGLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITSCONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FORHER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENTOF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. TheSenate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states:RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability ofpetitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearlyrejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can provethat he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he isa President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable togovern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congressand the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure Presidentmade by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed bythe Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot

be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in theimpeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitionerEstrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by theevents that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001,the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing thatthe Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since theImpeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable forpetitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and thenconvicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted,would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates inthe Constitutional Commission make it clear that whenimpeachment proceedings have become moot due to the

resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil casesmay already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbentPresidents are immune from suit or from being brought to courtduring the period of their incumbency and tenure but notbeyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that theimpeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted

and

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