Liberating seeds

with an Open Source Seed Licence

Johannes Kotschi Klaus Rapf

AGRECOL July 2016

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Editor:AGRECOLAssociationforAgriCultureandEcologyHauptstr.1588379Guggenhausen,Germanywww.agrecol.de

Authors:JohannesKotschiandKlausRapf

Citation:Kotschi, J.andRapf,K. (2016):LiberatingseedswithanOpenSourceSeed(OSS)Licence.WorkingPaper.AGRECOL.Guggenhausen.

Photo: Seedsofparsnipchervil,ARCHENOAH,Schiltern

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons license of the type Attribution - Share Alike 3.0Germanyaccessible.Toviewacopyofthislicense,consulthttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/de/ or send a contact letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900,MountainView,California,94041,USA.

Editorial note: Commons or Commons-based plant breeding has become a topic of significantsocietal relevance and AGRECOL has been committed to this subject for a number of years. Thepresentpaperisbasedonseveralpiecesofwork,aboveallonanexpertreportbyClaudiaSchreider(2015) and a working paper by Johannes Kotschi and Lisa Minkmar: “Liberating seeds with opensourcelicenses“(2015).

Acknowledgements:Thispaper is theresultofa two-yeardialogue.Numerouspeoplehavecon-tributedtotheprocessandwewouldliketothankeveryonewarmly.Inparticular,wewouldliketothank Friedemann Ebener, Michael Fleck, Ursula Gröhn-Wittern, Silke Helfrich, Peter Kunz, JackKloppenburg,MonikaMessmer,LisaMinkmar,MartinPedersen,MichaelPilz,ManuelRuf,GebhardRosmanith,BertholdSchrimpf,ArnevonSchulz,HartmutSpießandOliverWilling.Thisstudywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheirmanysuggestions,objectionsandadditions.

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Preface Weliveinaneraofprivatisation.Whereverpossibleexclusiverightsareasserted,userightsaresold,andgoodsaresubjectedtoeconomicinterests.Thisappliestophysical(ormateri-al)goods,suchaswater,aswellastoimmaterialgoods,suchasscientificfindings,musicandtheatreplays.Itisirrelevantwhethergoodsarescarce,suchasland,orcouldbereproducedandusedbyeveryone,suchasseeds.

Not surprisingly, therefore, resistance to these developments has emerged and there is acounter-movement calling for a return to commons. Debate about the preservation ofcommongoods–orsimplycommons–wasinstigatedbyElinorOstrom.Togetherwithherworking group she has studied countless commons and has confirmed: commons do notcome into existence by themselves, they are made. Commons are the result of complexinteractionsof resources, communitiesandcare taking; that is,of commoning. Inher life-workOstromdefineduniversalrules–whichshecalls“designprinciples”–anddemonstrat-ed that compliancewith these rules guarantees the sustainableuseof commongoods. In2009shewasthefirstwomanawardedtheNobelPrizeinEconomics.

Apioneer inthe implementationof these ideashasbeenthecomputer industry.Softwaredevelopment in the last 30 years hasmeant thatmany computer programmes today are"opensource".Opensourcesoftwarehasbeenwidelyadopted,andisfinancedbybusinessmodelswithoutroyalties.TheLinuxkernel(usedinavarietyofoperatingsystemsandem-beddeddevices)isaprominentexample.

Cansomethingsimilarbedevisedforseeds,ormorespecificallyforsecuringnewvarietiesofbred and cultivated crops?With this question inmind, plant breeders, agronomists, com-monsactivistsandlawyershaveformedaninterdisciplinaryworkinggroupinthesearchforanswers.

ThisworkinggroupislookingforwaystoapplytheinsightsofElinorOstromtoseeds.Atthesametime,itdrawsuponthesoftwareindustry’sexperienceswithlegalprotectionof(opensource) software. On this basis, theworking group has developed a new concept for theprotection of seeds, theOpen Source Seed Licence (OSS Licence). The current results arepresentedinthispaper.

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1. Context and rationale

Over many millennia seeds were a common good and as such were accessible to almosteverybody.Thebreedingandcultivationofcropswasthusacommunityeffort.Recreatingseedsineachproductioncycle,farmersusedtoshare,trade,andcultivateplantsfromtheseseeds.

Thischangedinthesecondhalfofthe19thcentury.ThefindingsofGregorMendelandtheemergence of genetics as a new branch of science formed the basis for scientifically in-formedplantbreedingpractices,whichhavecontributedgreatly toagricultural intensifica-tion. For instance, yields increased several-fold and resistance to plant diseases strength-enedsignificantly.

InGermanytherewereinitiallydifferentorganisationalforms.InnorthernandeasternGer-many, plant breeding was mainly driven by large farm estates and commercial breeders.Individuallyandinworkinggroups,farmscommencedbreedingandsellingimprovedseeds.Thisresultedrelativelyearlyinspecialisedplantbreedingcompanies,whichthengrewintoanindependentsmalltomediumsizedindustrysector.

Inadditiontothesedevelopments,awidevarietyofassociations,organisations,andsomestateinstitutions,includingtechnicalschools,especiallyinsouthernGermany,beganbreed-ingwiththesupportofpublicplant-breedingfacilities.

Verysoonconflictsarosebetweenprivateandpublicplantbreeders.Privatebreedersper-ceivedpublicorpubliclysupportedfarmingsystemsas“unfaircompetition”,anditcametothe firstconflictsover intellectualproperty inseedpropagationandseedsales.As iscom-mon in other sectors, private breeders demanded state guarantees for the protection oftheirvarieties(i.e.investments).Hence,alsorelativelyearly,regulationsandlawsrecognis-ingandprotectingintellectualpropertyinseedswereimplementedinGermany.In1900,thefirst registration system fornewvarietieswas introduced,although itwasnotmandatory.However,in1933theSeedActwasenacted,whichmeantthat"authorisation"andexamina-tionofavarietybecamemandatoryandsubsequentlymanyvarietiesthatwerenotpermit-tedsimplydisappeared.

UPOV, the International Association for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, estab-lishedin1961,wasbasedontheGermanseedactsandlaws.ThroughUPOVthesystemofexclusive ownership of plant genetic material, in the traditional spirit of private propertyrights,hasspreadworldwide.Asaresult,manycountrieshavebeenforcedtoabandontheirownsystemsofpublicseedprovisionandtoprivatisethem.

Inothercountriesitwasforalongtimeprimarilypublicresearchinstitutionsthatperformedplantbreeding;privatebreedersweresuccessfulonlyincertainniches.Aprominentexam-pleofsuchanicheishybridmaizeintheUS1.Apartfromthat,theuseofnewvarieties-formanydecades-remainedfreeofintellectualpropertyrights.Onlyinthe1980sdiditcome

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tomajorchangeswhenthedevelopmentofengineeringprocessesforgeneticmodificationof plants, and the decision of the US Supreme Court (1982) that gene sequences can bepatented,openeduppossibilitiesforthepatentingofseeds.

Eachoftheseapproachestoseeds-UPOVandpatentlegislation-hasincreasinglypromotedprivatisationofplantbreedingandthedevelopmentofseeds,whichinturnhasresultedinmarket concentration.Themarket concentrationof the seed industrybegan in the1970s,when international chemical corporations discovered plant breeding as a synergetic andhighlyprofitablenewbusiness,andconsequentlybeganbuyingupseedcompanies.InGer-manyalone,25%ofexistingseedcompanieswereeitherabandonedorwereboughtupoverthe last 15 years. In 2015, the German plant breeders’ federation had only 58 separatebreedingcompaniesregistered2.Giventhewiderangeofdesirablecropsinagricultureandhorticulture, thenumberof remainingbreedingcompanies isvery lowandthediversity invarietysupplyisinsharpdecline.

Thus,ultimately, theoppositeofwhathadbeenhopedforbysmallandmediumbreedingenterprises has been achieved. With the creation of laws to protect intellectual propertyrights,theprivatebreedingsectorshouldhavebeenstrengthened.Instead,moreandmorebreedingcompaniesaredisappearing.Plantbreedingandseedsupplyhavebecomeinvest-mentfocusesofglobalcorporations;therevolutiondevoursitschildren.

The concentration of companies in the global seed sector, tending to pure monopoly, isthreateningbecauseitleadstothereductionofgeneticdiversityandone-sidednessinagri-cultural production. It also creates a growing dependence of seed users (and society as awhole)onafewcompanies.Asaresult,thesustainabilityofagriculturalproductionaswellasfoodsecurityisatrisk.

Instead of a small number of crops and little choice of varieties within one crop, a largediversityisnecessarybecause:

Onlyinthiswaywillagriculturebeabletoadapttoclimatechangeandprovidefoodsecurity.

Secondly,inordertoproducenutritiousfoodwhileatthesametimereducingenvi-ronmentalimpacts,varietieswithlocal,site-specificcharacteristics,whichrequireon-ly littleornochemical input,areneeded;even ifsuchvarietiesarenotsuitableforlarge-scalecultivationandthereforenotattractive inan“economyofscale”gearedtowardexpansion.

Finally,varietiesthataresuitablefororganicfarmingareneeded.Thisisnecessarytomaintain thriving landscapes that canprovide cleanair, drinkingwater and recrea-tionalspacesetc.

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These tasks concern the provision of general public goods. Private plant breeding, givenmarketdynamics,islessandlessabletoprovidesuchpublicgoods.Especiallymassproduc-tionruncountertosuchprovision,andthe lackof innovationassociatedwithamonopolymarketisbestunderstoodas“institutionalisedmarketfailure”.

Sowearenowataturningpoint.Privateplantbreedingonitsown,itappears,cannotdeliv-er on all accounts necessary for human survival. A non-private, non-profit plant breedingsector is required,which canperform the tasksanddeliver thegoods listedabove. In thepast,statesweretheprovidersofthesegoods,buttheyhaveincreasinglywithdrawnfromplantbreeding.

Inthisvacuum,anon-profit,civilsociety,plant-breedingsectorhasemergedinrecentdec-ades,whichhaslobbiedforchangeandgeneratedpublicawarenessabouttheseproblems,butwhich above all provides a counterpoint to corporate seeds byway of their breedingpractices.

Ratherthanbeingindirectcompetitionwiththeprivatesector,however,civilsocietyplantbreedingismoreofamethodologicallaboratoryforpublicservicebreedingwiththeaimtoincreasethecommongood.Inthiscontext,questionsconcerningthecreationofcommonsarerelevant,sincethecurrentIPRregimeprovidesnosuchpossibilities.

WiththedevelopmentofanOpenSourceSeedlicence,OSSlicence,wehavefoundawaytokeepseeds free fromthe logicsofpatentingandplantvarietyprotection. In the followingsections,wepresent this approach. Specifically,we lookat theopen sourceprinciple thathasinspiredthiswork,thelegalbasisoftheOSSlicence,aswellasthelicenceitselfanditsapplicability.

2. What is open source?

Thetermopensourceisderivedfromcomputerscience.Itreferstofreeandopenaccesstocomputer source code facilitated by a clever hack of intellectual property rights. Opensourceisnotthesameasopenaccess,whichiscompletelyfreeandunlimitedaccess.Essen-tially,opensourceensuresaccess toacommongoodbyprotecting itagainstprivatisationand as such it is a regulated and “protected commons” (Kloppenburg)3. It constitutes, inprinciple,aconceptualframeworkthatcouldbeadaptedtoprotectseeds.

Theopensourceconceptisafurtherdevelopmentofthefreesoftware4principlesfirstartic-ulatedintheGNUGeneralPublicLicence(1989)byRichardStallman,butalreadydeclaredinthe GNU Manifesto (1983). His aim was that developers and users of computers shouldalwaysbeallowedtoinvestigatehowsoftwareworksandbeabletomodifyandsharetheirworkfreelywithothers.Stallmandefinedfourconditions(“freedoms”)requiredforsoftwaretobeconsideredfree5:

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(1) Thefreedomtoruntheprogramasyouwish,foranypurpose.

(2) Thefreedomtostudyhowtheprogramworks,andchangeitsoitdoesyourcompu-tingasyouwish.Accesstothesourcecodeisapreconditionforthis.

(3) Thefreedomtoredistributecopiessoyoucanhelpyourneighbour.

(4) Thefreedomtodistributecopiesofyourmodifiedversionstoothers.Bydoingthisyoucangivethewholecommunityachancetobenefitfromyourchanges.Accesstothesourcecodeisapreconditionforthis.

Inorderforsoftwarenotjusttobefree,butalsoremainfreeinawaythatislegallyenforce-able, the four freedoms of software were articulated in the GNU General Public Licence(GPL),which isa legaldocument that restsonandextends the rightsdefined incopyrightlaw. Inshort, theGPLensures thatany furtherand futuredevelopmentsofsoftwarecode(basedonthefourfreedoms)remainfreeandopensource.Thegeneralmethodofdoingso–usingcopyrighttobuildcommons-Stallmancleverlycalled“copyleft”.

The copyleft principle obliges developers to pass on the same rights as those they them-selvesenjoyedinthefirstplace6.Asweshallseebelow,thisturnsontheGPLasacontractu-alagreementbetweenpartiesinextensionof–asasubclauseto-existingcopyright.Iftherightsarenotpassedon,thefreedomsfallawayandbasiccopyrightcomesintoplay,leavingtheuserwithnorightsofuseandnoaccessatall(apartfrom,ofcourse,theratherminimalrights provided in variants of the so-called fair use clauses, depending on national legaldefinitions).Thus,thecodeandthefreedomsbecomeinseparableandthatprinciple,muchtothedismayofStallman,hasbeencalledthe“viralclause”,becausethefreedoms“spread”withthecodelikeavirus.

Inotherwords,copyleft(“allrightsreversed“)transformstheoriginalpurposeofcopyright(“all rights reserved") toensure software freedom inperpetuity.While copyrightnormallyrequiresnothingoftheauthorandallowstheuserverylittle,copyleftchangesthis.Paradox-ically, perhaps, the concept of copyleft, as briefly mentioned above, rests on copyright7.Usingtherightsoftheauthorenshrinedincopyright,alegallybindingcontract(theGPL)isenteredintobetweenauthorsandusers,wheretheauthorsrelinquishtheirexclusiverighttotheircreation(softwarecode)undercertainconditions(thesoftwarefreedoms,asarticu-latedintheGPL)thatrequiretheusertoreleasetheirmodifiedcodeunderthesamecondi-tions.Thatiswhatisknownastheviralclause.Iftheuserbreachesthatcontract(orifthecontractunderanygivenlegalregimeisdeemedinvalid),thecodeinquestionisautomati-callycoveredandhenceprotectedbycopyright.Inotherwords,torepeat,copyleftdoesnotreplacecopyright,buttransformsittoensurecontinuedfreedom,i.e.accesstothecodeinthefuturebyanyone.Copyleft,then,issimplyanadditional(viral)clausetocopyright,whichisbasedontheexclusiverightsofanauthortodowhatshe/heseesfitwithagivencreation,suchassharingitwiththeworldandcontributetocommons.

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3. The legal basis of the seed licence

Licence agreements regulate contracts between companies, between people or betweenbusinessesand individuals.TheOpenSourceSeed licence(OSS licence), followingtheGPL,differs from traditional licences in that the licensor receives no exclusive rights. Also, therightsanddutiesof the licenseemaybetransferredonlybywayof thesameprivatecon-tract,i.e.theOSSlicence.

The licencewehavedeveloped is not a specifically regulated typeof contract. It containselementsofdifferenttypesofcontracts(rent,lease,purchase,amongothers)andisthusa“suigeneriscontract”.TheOSSlicence,underGermanCivilLaw8,thereforefallsundergen-eral business terms and conditions (Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen, AGB), because itsatisfiestheconditionsofrelevantregulation(§305IBGB):itisliterallyacontract,whichispre-writtenforgeneral,multipleandunilateralusebyonesingleparty,andnotindividuallynegotiated.

The basic properties of the OSS licence are that any user (licensee/contractee), free ofcharge,receivesasimpleuserightontheconditionoffulfillingthedutytomakeavailablefor public use, on the same conditions, any development on or enhancements to theseed/cropthattheymayhavemade.Thatmeans:

(1) “Uponthematerialisationofthelicenceagreement,theLicenseewillbegrantedtherighttousealltheseeds,asheorshehasreceivedthem,underthetermsandcondi-tionsofthislicence.

(2) Theseedsmaybeusedforanypurpose,andbyanyonewhoacceptsthetermsandconditionsofthislicence,inparticularalsoforenhancement.

(3) TheLicenseemaypasson theseeds toothers,propagate them,enhance themanddisseminatepropagatedorenhancedseeds(…).

(4) ThecopyleftprincipleobligestheLicenseetoimposethesamerightsandobligationsonthefutureownersoftheseeds,anyseedspropagatedfromthelatterorenhance-mentsoftheseedsasheorshepersonallyacquiredandassumed.Anylimitationoftherightsintheseedsvis-à-visthirdpartiesgoingbeyondthat,inparticularanylimi-tationbasedonstatutorilygrantedspecialprotectiverights(plantvarietyrights,pa-tentrights,trademarkrights,copyrights,etc.)isprohibitedandillegitimate.”

ThecompleteOSSlicencecanbefoundintheannex.

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4. The object of protection

Timeandagainwehaveaskedourselveswhatisitthatweactuallywanttoprotect–isitavariety,apopulation,asource,orsimplytheseed?Wedecidedontheterm"seed"forthefollowingreasons.

TheOSSlicenceconfersuserightstogetherwiththematerialobject(seed,crop).Giventhetransferofmaterial(seedorotherplantmaterial)acontractisenteredinto,whichensuresthemutual,reciprocalrightsanddutiesassociatedwiththematerialinquestion,aswellasall future developments to thatmaterial, in perpetuity. As such, theOSS licence - and itscontractualnature-implicitlyalsopertainstothegeneticinformationcontainedwithinthegivenseedorcrop.Possiblealternativestodenotetheobjectofprotection,then,wouldbeterms suchas "biologicalmaterial"or "(plant) genetic resources",but theseare likely lessobviouslyunderstoodbylaypeople,than"seed"is.

The term “variety”, however, denotes something immaterial and cannot be subject to amaterialtransferagreement.Inthisrespect,theOSSlicencealsohasafundamentallydiffer-entcharacterthantheplantvarietyprotectionregime.Rightstoavariety– i.e.somethingintangible/immaterial – can only be held by someone who in this variety has intellectualpropertyrights.Suchvarietyprotectioncanbesanctionedbythestate,butavariety(imma-terial)canonlybemarketedasseeds(material)9.

Independentlyofthis,breederscanregisterasavarietyacultivarthathasbeenOSSlicensedanddescribedandnamed, as long as it complieswith the provisionsof theGermanSeedMarketingAct.Thismaybenecessary for thepurposesofmarketing.Butseedsofaregis-teredvarietythatfeaturesinthecatalogueoftheGermanFederalOfficeofPlantVarieties,whichdoesnotenjoyplantvarietyprotection(PVP),canbemarketedbyanyone.

5. Taking note of the licence terms

TheOSSlicenceisaprivatecontract,whichmeansitcancomeintoeffectbywayofwriting,ororallyorsimplybyconductimplyinganintent.However,ifyouwanttosell,giveawayorexchange seeds under the OSS licence, you must – unambiguously – disclose the licenceconditionsofthetransfer.Paragraph§305IIBGB(GermanCivilCode)statesthatauserofGeneralBusinessTerms&Conditions(AGB)-the licensor–mustexpresslypointtheotherparty–thelicensee–tothetermsandconditionsofthelicenceandprovidethepossibilityfor the licensee toperuse these termsandconditions inorder to reasonably comprehendthem.Inaddition,thelicenseemustagreetotheirvalidity.

Aso-called"shrink-wraplicence",inwhichthelicenceconditionsareacceptedbytearingthewrappingwouldprobablyviolatethelegalconditionsofGermangeneralbusinesstermsandconditions (AGB), because specific usage requirements for seeds are not (yet) common

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practice and therefore cannot be supposed as generally known. Therefore, a shrink-wraplicenceisnotcurrentlyinquestion.

Thismeansthatanytransferisvalidonlyifthelicenseeisfullyawareofthetermsandcondi-tionsofthelicence.Theabridgedversionontheseedpackaging–withlinktothefull,onlineversion-shouldbesufficientfortheacceptanceofthetermsandconditions.However,allsignificant terms and conditions of theOSS licence (or contract)must be included in thissummary.

Thisistheabridgedversion:

“Byacquiringoropeningthepacketoftheseplantseedsyouaccept,bywayofanagreement, the provisions of a licence agreement where no costs shall be in-curred toyou.Youespeciallyundertakenot to limit theuseof these seedsandtheirenhancements,forinstancebymakingaclaimtoplantvarietyrightsorpa-tentrightsontheseeds’components.Youshallpassontheseeds,andpropaga-tionsobtainedtherefrom,tothirdpartiesonlyonthetermsandconditionsofthislicence. You will find the exact licensing provisions inside the packet and atwww.opensourceseeds.de/licence. Ifyoudonotwishtoaccepttheseprovisions,youneedtorefrainfromacquiringandusingtheseseeds.”

Forprofessionaltraders,whofor instancesellseeds insmallquantities insupermarketsorgardencentres,itmeansthattheabridgedOSSlicencemustbeprintedonthewrappingoftheseedswithreferencetothefulltext,onlineversion.However,evenashorttextisdiffi-cult toprinton thegenerally relatively small sizeof the seedwrapping,whichalsohas toaccommodate other product information. This could be solved by using larger-than-usualwrapping,orbyaddingaflaptothepackaging.

For individuals and for farmers and other small actors, it means that they (the licensors)mustensurethatacopyoftheOSSlicenceaccompaniesthematerialsbeingtransferred;andthattheymustexplicitlyinformtherecipient(thelicensee)ofthematerialsaboutthetermsandconditionsoftheOSSlicence.

6. The Open Source Seed licence and “the breeders' privilege”

Theopensourceseedlicenceensuresthatnotonlytheseeditselfisprotected,butalsothatanyandall future improvementsanddevelopmentstotheseedremainfreeof intellectualpropertyrightsandthusaccessibletoanyone.TheOSSlicencethusinstantiatesatranslationofthecopyleftprinciple–fromsoftwaretoseeds.Ascopyleftisviral,thelicensingresultsinachainofcontracts,whichmaybranchorforkinvariousdirections.Licenseesbecomelicen-sors: the licensor isalwaystheonewhopassesontheseedandthe licenseetheonewhoreceivesit.

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TheOSSlicencecreatesaparalleluniversetoprivateplantbreeding.TheOSSlicence,ononehand,andpatentsandplantvarietyprotectionontheother,aremutuallyexclusive,or in-commensurable.And,thelicenceentailsconsequencesforexchangeofseedsbetweenthetwosectors.WhileanyonecanuseOSSlicensedmaterial,nooneisallowedtodosoiftheyreleasetheirdevelopmentsbasedonthatmaterialunderplantvarietyorpatentprotectionthat incursa feefor futureusers.Material releasedundertheOSS licenceandanyfurtherdevelopmenttothatmaterial,therefore,cannotlegallybesubjectedtoexclusiveintellectualpropertyrights;andassuchis,ineffect,notfreelyavailableforcorporatebreeding.

This limitation is seen by some as a violation of the so called “breeder's privilege”. Thebreeder's privilege, also known as the breeder's exemption, permits breeders the use ofexistingplantmaterial-otherwiseunderplantvarietyprotection-withouttherightfulown-er’sconsent - for thepurposesofdevelopinganewvariety.Thisprivilegeorexemption iscrucialbecausebreedingisalong-termprocess,andnewvarietiesarebasedonpastbreed-ing.Thepurposeofthebreeder'sexemptionisthereforetopromotebreedingresearchanddevelopmentbypermittingtheuseofprotectedvarietiesforthebreedingofnewvarieties10.

However,noviolationof thebreeder'sprivilege iscausedby theOSS licence,because thebreeders'privilegeisanchored11inplantvarietyprotectionandisdefinedasalimitationoftherightsoftheholderofvarietyprotection.Assuch,theapplicationofthebreeder'sprivi-legeconcernsvarietiesunderplantvarietyprotectiononly.

The limitation on the private appropriation of varieties released under the OSS licence isneverthelesscontroversial.OpponentsarguethatOSSlicensedvarietiesareunattractivetoprivate companies, which rely on royalties. In turn, then, innovationwould decrease, be-causemostbreedingcompaniesfollowthebusinessmodelofroyalties,whichexcludesthemfromusingplantgeneticmaterialcoveredbytheOSSlicence.

But thisargumentcanbe refuted in severalways.Historically,agricultural seedswerepri-marilydevelopedwithoutanassociatedroyaltyscheme.Inmanydevelopingcountriesplantbreedingdoesmostlynotfollowtheroyaltiesbusinessmodel,andevenindevelopedcoun-triesthereareprivatebreedingcompanies,whichdonotrelyfinanciallyonexclusiveintel-lectualpropertyrights.

Big players in the software industry,whosebusinessmodelswerebasedon royalties/IPR,alsoarguedthat inthe1990s.Realityhasunderminedthispositionand it isapparentthatthe coexistence of different business models has not undermined the software industry.Instead,ithasgrownenormouslywhileincorporatingopensourcesoftwareintothemix.

Wesee, therefore, in theOSS licencea futurepotential thatguarantees theprotectionofpublicinterestbreedingandstrengthenstheplantgeneticcommonsbyincreasingthemate-rialsavailableforcollectivebreeding.

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7. Importance of the Nagoya Protocol

UnliketheGPL,whichisbasedoncopyright,theOSSlicenceisbasedontheNagoyaProto-col.TheinternationalNagoyaProtocolisasupplementaryagreementtotheConventiononBiological Diversity (CBD), and was adopted in of 2010. It regulates access to genetic re-sources and the fair andequitable sharingof benefits arising from their use. The interna-tionalobligationsoftheNagoyaProtocolaretobeimplementednationally.InMay2014,theEUadoptedCouncilRegulation511/2014onmeasurestocomplywiththeNagoyaProtocol12andGermanyhasadoptedcorrespondinglawinNovember201513.

Bycontrasttothelimitedscopeofthebreeders’privilege,theNagoyaProtocolappliestoallplantgeneticresources.Itallowsthesovereignrights-holderofageneticresourcetodeter-minetheconditionsoftheiruse-byPriorInformedConsent(PIC)andonthebasisofMutu-allyAgreedTerms (MAT).Mandatorydocumentation,whenusingplant genetic resources,ensurescompliancewiththesetermsandconditions.TheprovisionoftheNagoyaProtocol,whichstatesthattherightsholderofgivenplantgeneticresourcesmaydeterminethecon-ditionsoftheiruse,supportstheOSSlicenceandmakesitlegallyfeasible.InmostEUcoun-tries,thesovereignrights-holderisusuallytheonewhoisinpossessionoftheresource.Attheendofthebreedingprocessthatis,indeed,thebreeder.

TheNagoyaProtocolisastronglevertoenforcetheOSSlicence.CrucialisArticle4oftheEURegulation;thisindicatesthattheuserofaplantgeneticresource(seed)mustdocumentthetimeandplaceofaccesstothatresource;and,whereappropriate,alsoprove“thepresenceor absenceof rights andobligations relating toaccess andbenefit-sharing including rightsandobligationsregardingsubsequentapplicationsandcommercialization.”

8. Implementation issues

InterestintheOSSlicenceisgreat.Especiallyorganiccerealandvegetablebreeders,whoareconsideringwaivingtheirrightstoplantvarietyprotection,arewillingtousetheOSSlicencefortheirnewvarietiesandfirstvarietiesarealreadyproposedforOSSlicensing.Importantinthis context is that comprehensive protection is only guaranteed if all the material thatleavesthebreedingfacilityiscoveredbytheOSSlicence.Thisincludesnotonlythevarietyitself,butallstrainsofthebreedingline;orinshort,allmaterialsproducedintheprocessofbreedingthevarietyinquestion.

ToensureperpetualprotectionofOSSlicensedvarieties-andderivedproducts–itisneces-sarythatnoassociatedplantgeneticmaterial isdistributedwithouttheOSSlicence,whichalsoexcludesgivingsuchplantgeneticmaterial(seedsorplants)tootherbreeders,friendsandacquaintanceswithoutexplicitly informingthemabouttheOSS licenceandunambigu-ouslystatingthattheyenterintoacontractualagreement–or,asitwere,theyjoinacom-mons-iftheychoosetoacceptthegift.WearefullyawarethatthislimitationisabarriertotheadoptionoftheOSSlicence,sinceitchallengesexistingtraditionsandconventions.

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In principle any breeder could develop an individual licence for the publication of a newvariety.Thatwould,however,notbewise,sinceeachincompatiblelicencetextwouldestab-lishaseparatecommons.Theeffortrequiredforthecreationofalicence,butevenmoresoinmanagingtheresultingcommons,shouldnottobeunderestimated.Also,thepotentialforthepublicimpactofOSSlicensedvarietiessuggeststhatacoordinatedapproachisprefera-ble.

WethereforeconsiderthattheadministrationoftheOSSlicencetextanddocumentationoflicensedmaterials,aswellasmonitoringandlegallyhandlingany infringements,shouldbecarriedoutbya jointspecialisedserviceentity14,andwehavethereforedesignedtheOSSlicence for third-party use. This results in a division of labourwhere breeders are free tofocusonthecreationofnewvarieties,whiletheserviceentityhandlesbureaucraticaspects,including legal proceedings, documentation, public relations and user support. To get theballrolling,AGRECOLshouldtakeontheroleastheOSSlicenceserviceentityfornow.

ThesearetheservicesandtasksthatAGRECOLshouldprovideandperform:

Settingupandmaintainingapublicdatabase for thedocumentationofall licensedvarietiesandmaterials.Thisdocumentationincludesashortdescriptionofthevarie-tiesfortheuseoffarmers,adetaileddescriptionforbreeders(accordingtoCPVOorUPOV),andthenameof theoriginalbreeder.Furthermore, itprovides informationabouttheavailabilityofagivenvariety.

The collection and storage of licensed plant genetic material in the form of seedsamplesina"varietyindex".Thismaterialisnecessaryincaseofperceivedinfringe-mentsandotherincidentswheretestingwillbenecessary.

PublicrelationsandadvertisingfortheOSSlicence.

Adviceforpotentialusers,includinglegalfoundationsandconsiderationsoftheOSSlicenceitself,aswellashowitworksforlicensorsandlicensees.

Ensurethefinancingoftheseservices,whicharefreeofcosttousers.

ThisbundlingofalltasksrelatedtothemanagementoftheOSSlicence–orseedcommons-givestheopensourceseedideamomentum.Itincreasesthepoliticalimpactofthelicence,facilitatesmonitoringlicencecompliance,andaboveall,leavesbreederstogetonwiththeirwork.

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Summary

Intimeswhenthelegalbasisforsecuringprivatepropertyappearsoverwhelmingandwhilecommonshardlyenjoyanylegalprotection,anopensourceinspiredlicencewasdevelopedwhich,restingontheNagoyaProtocol,legallyprotectsseeds(andotherplantmaterial)asacommongood.

Theconceptualbasishasbeenworkedout:licensingofnewvarietiesandbreedinggenerallycreate common goods and, because the licence is viral, the commons created by thesegoodsexpandthroughuseanddevelopment.

Nevertheless,thereisaninternalcontradictionthatmayinhibitrapidacceptanceandwideimplementationoftheconcept:thefreedomofseedsisachievedbyprohibition-aprohibi-tionofprivatisation.Thatbegsthequestion:Canapositivemessagebedisseminatedbywayofaprohibition?

Additionally, the licence requires extra effort, is bureaucratic and requires the change ofvaluesandhabits.

Hence,wesuggest,itwillbenecessarytoinvolveagroupofpioneerbreederstodetermine– on the basis of their expertise and experiences – whether the conceptualised licensingregimeisresilientandthroughtheirengagementreachacriticalmassofusersanddevelop-ers.Simultaneously,thedevelopmentofabroadacceptancealongthevaluechainofbreed-ers,producersandconsumersrequirethecooperationofresearchers,NGOsandend-userstoformalivelyandsuccessfulseedcommons.

We currently see no alternative to intellectual property rights, except legal protection ofcommon goods. In the long term, however, we hope that socio-cultural development to-wardsachangeofvalues, which will rendersuperfluousthecurrent–andexclusive-intellec-tualpropertyrightsregimeandalsotheneedforopensourcelicensing.

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Annex: Open Source Seed (OSS) licence15 – licence agreement Preamble

Byacquiringandusingtheseedspurchasedunderthetermsandconditionsofthis licenceagreementyou,as theLicensee,accept theprovisionsof this licenceagreement.Thepur-poseoftheseprovisionsisthefreeuseofseeds.TheLicensoristhenaturalorlegalpersonwhohandsover theseseeds toyou.TheBeneficiaryof the licenceagreement isAGRECOLe.V.,aregisteredassociation.

Inorder toachievetheobjectiveof freeuse,enhancement,cultivation,disseminationandpropagationof seeds,without therebeing amonopoly taken advantageof by individuals,anyuseoftheseedsisonlypermissibleinaccordancewiththeselicensingprovisions.AsaLicensee, you undertake to limit the use of these seeds or the propagation of them andenhancementsvis-à-visthirdpartiesexclusivelytothemannerstipulatedinthislicence.Youwill inparticularrefrainfrommakinganyclaimtoplantvarietyrights,patentrightsoranyotherstatutorilypossibleexclusivity rightsof theseedsor theirpropagationandenhance-ments.

Simultaneously, the licensing provisions oblige you, in turn, to subject any seeds or en-hancementsoftheseedsobtainedfromthepresentseedstotheselicensingprovisions,andonly topass themonto thirdpartieson theseconditions (“copyleft”).Shouldyou infringetheobligationsarisingfromthislicenceagreement,youwillforfeityourrightsofuseoftheseedsoranyseedsorenhancementsobtainedtherefrom.Inaddition,theBeneficiaryshall,insuchcases,beentitledtorequireyoutoceaseanddesistandmakeapayment,asstipu-latedinthisagreement(agreementtothebenefitofthirdparties).

1. Definitions

Thefollowingdefinitionsapplytothislicence:

1.1 Seeds:Seedswithinthemeaningofthisagreement,shallmean,dormantgenerativereproductiveorgans,suchasseeds,fruits,pseudo-fruits,fruitclustersorpartsthere-of,aswellasanyvegetativeplantorgansfromwhichwholeplantscanbegenerated–bywhatevermethod–,aswellaspollen,andallinformationalcomponentstherein,whichhaveineachcasebeenplacedonthemarketunderthetermsandconditionscontainedinthislicenceorhasbeenobtainedfromsuchseedsthroughpropagationorhasbeenenhanced.

1.2 Propagation:Propagationshallmeanany typeof reproduction, i.e. thenewor fur-thergenerationofseeds.Propagationshallalsoincludetechnicalmethodsofextract-inggeneticinformationforthepurposeofgeneratingseedswithcertaincharacteris-tics,includinganymethodsthatareunknowntoday.

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1.3 Placing on themarket: The offering, keeping in stock for distribution, keeping forsale,andanyhandingoverofseedstoanotherparty.

1.4 Enhancements: Enhancements shallmean cultureorbreedingofnewplants, in re-gardtowhichtheseseedshave,underthislicenceagreement,beeninvolved,atleastonepoint,inthecourseofthedevelopment–regardlessofwhethersuchenhance-mentsconcernvarieties,populationsorotherplantgroupingsorindividualplantsorpartsofplants.

1.5 The copyleft principle: obliges all future plant growers to grant users of their en-hancementsthesamerightsasthosethattheyhaveenjoyedthemselves.

1.6 Licensor:Thepreviousowneroftheseeds,whoisrightfullyhandingthemovertotheLicenseeunderthetermsofthisLicense,conferringtherightsofuseoftheseedsac-cordingtoArticle3.

1.7 Licensee: Anyonewho takes possessionof or utilises the seeds in accordancewiththeselicensingprovisions.

1.8 Beneficiary:AGRECOLe.V.,Hauptstr.15,88379Guggenhausen

2. Conclusion of the agreement

(1) Withthese licensingprovisions, theLicensordeclaresvis-à-viseveryonethatsheorheismakinganoffertoconcludealicenceagreementonthegrantingofrightsoftheuse of the seeds in accordancewith the following provisions. The agreement shallmaterialiseoncetheLicenseeacquirestheseeds,orotherwiseobtainsthemwiththeconsentofthepriorowner,howeveratthelatestonceheorsheopensthepackageofseeds.ThedeclarationofacceptancedoesnotneedtobereceivedbytheLicensor.

(2) Uponconcludingthelicenceagreement,theLicensorherebyassignshisorherrightsarising from the licence agreement, in particular the cease and desist rights andcompensationrightsfordamageinaccordancewithArticle6,totheBeneficiary.

(3) This licenceagreement istobeunderstoodasacontractundercivil law. Itshallbedeemed tohavebeenacceptedasbeing legallymandatorybyallParties, fromthemomentofacquiring theseedsoropeningthepacket,oncetheLicenseebegins tomakeuseoftheseeds,eveniftheLicenseeconteststhetermsandconditionsofthelicenceagreement.

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3. Scope of the licence rights

(1) Uponthematerialisationofthelicenceagreement,theLicenseewillbegrantedtherighttousealltheseeds,asheorshehasreceivedthem,underthetermsandcondi-tionsofthislicence.

(2) Theseedsmaybeusedforanypurpose,andbyanyonewhoacceptsthetermsandconditionsofthislicence,inparticularalsoforenhancement.

(3) TheLicenseemaypassontheseedstoothers,propagatethem,enhancethemanddisseminatepropagatedorenhancedseeds,howeveronlyontheconditionthatheorsheprovidesacopyofthislicenceagreementtoallotherpartiestowhomheorshedisseminatessuchseeds,whichwillalso legallybindanythirdpartiestothis li-cenceagreement,andprovidestheBeneficiary,withevidenceofhavingdonesoup-onrequest.Thislegalbindingofsaidpartiesmaybecarriedoutinwritingorverbally,orbywayofan implicitdeclarationofconsenton thepartof such thirdparty.En-hancements are, after being disseminated, to be regarded as “seeds” within themeaningofthislicence.

(4) ThecopyleftprincipleobligestheLicenseetoimposethesamerightsandobligationson the future owners of the seeds, any seeds propagated from the latter or en-hancementsoftheseedsasheorshepersonallyacquiredandassumed.Anylimita-tionoftherights intheseedsvis-à-visthirdpartiesgoingbeyondthat, inparticularany limitation based on statutorily granted special protective rights (plant varietyrights,patentrights,trademarkrights,copyrights,etc.)isprohibitedandillegitimate.

4. Plant material index

(1) TheBeneficiarymayprovide itsownplantmaterial index, inwhichallgroupingsofseeds(identifiedaccordingtocharacterizationcriteria)andtheirenhancementsareincluded.AnyenhancementsundertakenbytheLicenseehavetobeprovidedtotheBeneficiary in the formofaviableandpropagatableseedsample for incorporationintotheplantmaterialindex.

(2) Theplantmaterial indexwillbepublishedby theBeneficiaryon itswebsiteonce ithasbeenprepared.

(3) Theuseofanyvarietiesandenhancements thatare included in thisplantmaterialindexmaynotbelimitedinanywayotherthanthroughtheprovisionsofthislicenceagreement.

(4) TheoriginandpropertiesofthematerialwillbepublishedbytheBeneficiaryintheplantmaterialindex,andcanbereviewedthereatanytime.

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5. Rights of third parties and governmental prohibitions

ShouldtheLicenseebeobligedtodeviatefromtheselicensingprovisions,basedonrightsofthirdpartiesorgovernmentalprohibitions,inwholeorinpart,whenutilisingtheseeds,heorshemayonlyusetheseedsandpropagationsthereofforpersonal,non-commercialpur-poses.

6. Lapse of the rights upon infringing the licensing provisions

(1) ShouldtheLicenseeinfringetheselicensingprovisions,hisorherrightsofuseoftheseeds or their enhancements will lapse immediately. A claim may in particular bemadeagainsttheLicenseebytheBeneficiary,toceasinganddesistingfromdissemi-nating theseeds,propagating theseedsorenhancing theseedsaswellas tocom-pensatedamages.

(2) Theexpiryoftherightsofuseinaccordancewithparagraph1shallnothaveanyin-fluenceupontherightsofotherusers,aslongasthelatterdonotinfringethelicens-ingprovisionsthemselves.

7. Applicable law, place of jurisdiction, any other provisions

(1) TheselicensingprovisionsshallbesubjecttoGermanLaw.

(2) Shouldoneoftheaboveclausestranspiretobeinvalid,itshallnotaffectthevalidityoftheremainderoftheselicensingprovisions.

(3) ShouldtheLicenseebeatrader, legalpersonunderpublic laworspecialpublic lawfunds,theplaceofjurisdictionshallbeBerlin.

(4) The Beneficiary shall be entitled to assign its rights arising from this agreement inwritingtothirdpartiesatanytime.

(5) Shouldoneoftheprovisionsofthislicenceagreementbeorbecomeinvalid,ineffec-tiveorunenforceable,thisshallnotaffectthevalidityoftheremaininglicensingpro-visions. Rather, the provision concerned shall be replaced by a valid and effectiveprovisionwhichcomesclosesttotheeconomic intentionofthecontractingparties,inparticulartheobjectivesofthelicenceagreementlaiddownintherecitals.

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Appendix to the Open Source Seed (OSS) licence

Inordertobeabletoprovideanyonewiththerightstofreelyusetheseedsinaccordancewiththeselicensingprovisions,everytimetheseedsarepassedonthefollowingorasub-stantiallyequivalentreferencetotheapplicabilityofthislicenceanditssourceistobedis-playedclearlyandattached.

Open Source Seed licence – text for the package

Seeds with the same rights and obligations for all

Byacquiringoropeningthepacketoftheseplantseedsyouaccept,bywayofanagreement, the provisions of a licence agreement where no costs shall be in-curredtoyou.Youespeciallyundertakenotto limittheuseoftheseseedsandtheirenhancements,forinstancebymakingaclaimtoplantvarietyrightsorpa-tentrightsontheseeds’components.Youshallpassontheseeds,andpropaga-tionsobtained therefrom, to thirdparties onlyon the terms and conditionsofthis licence.Youwillfindtheexactlicensingprovisionsinsidethepacketandatwww.opensourceseeds.de/licence.Ifyoudonotwishtoaccepttheseprovisions,youneedtorefrainfromacquiringandusingtheseseeds.

19thofJuly2016

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Citations and annotations

1Crow,J.F.1998.90YearsAgo:TheBeginningofHybridMaize.GENETICS,March1,1998vol.148no.3923-928.

2PersonalcommunicationwiththeDirectorofBDP(BundesverbandDeutscherPflanzenzüchter)

3Kloppenburg,J.2010.ImpedingDispossession,EnablingRepossession:BiologicalOpenSourceandtheRecoveryofSeedSovereignty.JournalofAgrarianChange.Vol.10,No3.pp.367-388.

4FreewareisnotFreeSoftware.Eventhoughitisfreeofcost,itisnotfreebecausethesourcecodeisunknownandthesoftwarethereforecannotbemodified.

5Helfrich,S.,R.Kuhlen,W.Sachs,C.Siefkes.2009.Gemeingüter–WohlstanddurchTeilen.HeinrichBöllStiftung.

6ibid.

7Theoriginalauthorofaworkholds theexclusive right todecidewhatcanbedonewith theiroriginalwork.Copyrightensuresthisrightofdecisionmaking.Bydefault,copyrightisanexclusiveright,butincludedinthisexclusiverightisofcourse the right todecideon inclusion. You canpreventothers fromcopying yourwork,or you canenableothers toaccessanduseit.ThefreeSoftwarecommonsisbasedoneachuseranddeveloperagreeingtousetheirexclusiverighttoinclude.

8DistrictCourtofMunichI, Judgementof19/05/2004:2106123/04;DistrictCourtofFrankfurtamMain,Judgementof06/09/2006:2-06O224/06.

9Ofcoursetherightinaprotectedvarietycanalsobetraded.Sucharight,however,remainsintheimmaterialrealmandisdistinctfromalivingplantorseed.

10Keukenschrijver,A. 2001. SortenschutzrechtunterBerücksichtigungderVerordnungNr. 2100(94 (EG) desRatesüberdengemeinschaftlichenSortenschutzin:H.LeßmannundG.Würtemberger.2009.DeutschesSortenschutzrecht.NomosVerlag.

11The“breeder’sprivilege”isarticulatedin§10aAbs.1Nr.3SortSchG.

12OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion,20.5.2014/L150/5:Regulation(EU)No511/2014oftheEuropeanParliamentandof theCouncilof16April2014oncompliancemeasures forusers fromtheNagoyaProtocolonAccesstoGeneticResourcesandtheFairandEquitableSharingofBenefitsArisingfromtheirUtilization intheUnionTextwithEEArele-vance.

13TheGerman implementation:Bundesrat (2015):GesetzzurUmsetzungderVerpflichtungennachdemNagoya-Proto-koll,zurDurchführungderVerordnung(EU)Nr.511/2014undzurÄnderungdesPatentgesetzessowiezurÄnderungdesUmweltauditgesetzes.BeschlussdesBundesrates.Drucksache473/15vom6.11.15.

14Alsointhesoftwareindustryinstitutions,suchastheFreeSoftwareFoundationandtheOpenSourceInstitute,handletheoftencomplexlegalaffairs,sothatindividualdevelopersarefreetocodeknowingthattheircommunityiswellman-aged.

15ThelicencehasbeenelaboratedbyMichaelPilzofthelawfirmFreimüller,OberrederandPilz,Vienna.

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Acknowledgements

Thisworkingpaperispartofthe“SeedsasCommons”(SaatgutalsGemeingut)project,funded by Software AG Stiftung Deutschland and Stiftung Mercator Schweiz. We aregratefulfortheirvaluedsupport.