Liberal Theory

8/9/2019 Liberal Theory

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Moravcsik / Princeton University / 2010

LIBERAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A PRIMER

Andrew Moravcsik 1

This memo outlines the liberal approach to theorizing international relations. Like

realism institutionalism or non!rational approaches it is a name given to a "amily o" relate#

theories o" international relations. $ere it %ill not be use# as many use it in international

relations to #esignate theories that stress the importance o" international institutions. &or to

#esignate theories that stress the importance o" universal altruistic or utopian values o" a liberal

sort such as human rights or #emocracy. &or to #esignate theories "avore# by le"t!%ing

'(liberal)* political parties or policies in the U+. ,nstea# it is a theory that stresses the role o" the

varie# social interests and values o" states an# their relevance "or %orl# politics.

Liberals argue that the universal con#ition o" %orl# politics is globalization. +tates are

an# al%ays have been embe##e# in a #omestic an# transnational society %hich creates

incentives "or economic social an# cultural interaction across bor#ers. +tate policy may "acilitateor block such interactions. +ome #omestic groups may bene"it "rom or be harme# by such

policies an# they pressure government accor#ingly "or policies that "acilitate realization o" their

goals. These social pressures transmitte# through #omestic political institutions #e"ine -state

pre"erences- that is the set o" substantive social purposes that motivate "oreign policy. +tate

pre"erences give governments an un#erlying stake in the international issues they "ace. +ince the

#omestic an# transnational social contet in %hich states are embe##e# varies greatly across

space an# time so #o state pre"erences. ithout such social concerns that transcen# state bor#ers

states %oul# have no rational incentive to engage in %orl# politics at all but %oul# simply #evote

their resources to an autarkic an# isolate# eistence. To motivate con"lict cooperation or any

other costly "oreign policy action states must possess su""iciently intense state pre"erences. The

resulting globalization!in#uce# variation in social #eman#s an# thus state pre"erences is a

"un#amental cause o" state behavior in %orl# politics. This is the central insight o" liberalinternational relations theory. ,t can be epresse# collouially in various %ays (What matters

most is what states want, not how they get it.” –or- “Ends are more important than means.”

Liberal theory is #istinctive in the nature o" the variables it privileges. The liberal "ocus

on variation in socially!#etermine# state pre"erences #istinguishes liberal theory "rom other

theoretical tra#itions realism '"ocusing on variation in coercive po%er resources*

institutionalism '"ocusing on in"ormation* an# most non!rational approaches '"ocusing on

patterns o" belie"s about appropriate means!en#s relationships*. ,n eplaining patterns o" %ar "or

eample liberals #o not look to inter!state imbalances o" po%er bargaining "ailure #ue to private

1 3or more #etail inclu#ing citations an# re"erences see 4n#re% Moravcsik (- The &e% Liberalism- in 5hristian 6eus!+mit an#

7uncan +ni#al e#s. The Oxord !andboo" o #nternational $elations '2008*9 -Taking Pre"erences +eriously 4 Liberal Theory o"

,nternational Politics- #nternational Organization '4utumn 1::;*<9 Liberal ,nternational 6elations Theory 4 +cienti"ic 4ssessment-

in 5olin =lman an# Miriam 3en#ius =lman e#s. %rogress in #nternational $elations Theory& 'ppraising the (ield '5ambri#ge Mass.

M,T Press 200>* 1?:!20@9 (,s 4nybo#y +till a 6ealistA- #nternational )ecurity '3all 1:::* '%ith Be""rey Legro*. 4ll are available at

%%%.princeton.e#u/Camoravcs. The "ocus on variation in state pre"erences is consistent %ith some or all o" other scholarly %riting on,6 theory. +ee "or eample 7avi# Lake an# 6obert Po%ell e#s. )trategic *hoice and #nternational $elations )trategic *hoice and

#nternational $elations 'Princeton 1:::* 5hapter T%o9 6obert Deohane #nternational #nstitutions and )tate %ower& Essays in

#nternational $elations Theory 'Eoul#er 1:::*.

http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/smit-snidal.pdf

http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf


http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism.pdf

http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/anybody.pdf

http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs


http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/smit-snidal.pdf



http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism.pdf

http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/anybody.pdf




in"ormation or uncertainty or particular non!rational belie"s or propensities o" in#ivi#ual lea#ers

societies or organizations. Liberals look instea# to con"licting state pre"erences #erive# "rom

hostile nationalist or political i#eologies #isputes over appropriable economic resources or

eploitation o" unrepresente# political constituencies. 3or liberals a necessary con#ition "or %ar

is that social pressures lea# one or more -aggressor- states to possess -revisionist- pre"erences soetreme or risk!acceptant that other states are un%illing to submit.

Three speci"ic variants o" liberal theory are #e"ine# by particular types o" pre"erences

their variation an# their impact on state behavior. #deational liberal theories link state behavior

to varie# conceptions o" #esirable "orms o" cultural political socioeconomic or#er. *ommercial

liberal theories stress economic inter#epen#ence inclu#ing many variants o" -en#ogenous policy

theory.- $epublican liberal theories stress the role o" #omestic representative institutions elites

an# lea#ership #ynamics an# eecutive!legislative relations. +uch theories %ere "irst conceive#

by prescient liberals such as ,mmanuel Dant 4#am +mith Bohn +tuart Mill Bohn $obson

oo#ro% ilson an# Bohn Maynar# Deynes!%riting %ell be"ore the #eep causes 'in#epen#ent

variables* they stress 'e.g. #emocratization in#ustrialization nationalism an# %el"are provision*

%ere %i#esprea#.

This essay intro#uces the liberal approach in three steps. ,t presents t%o #istinctiveassumptions un#erlying an# #istinguishing liberal theories. Then it "urther eplicates the three

variants o" liberal theory that "ollo% "rom these assumptions. 3inally it revie%s some #istinctive

strengths that liberal theories ten# to share vis!F!vis other types o" international relations theory.

Two Unique Assumptions underlying Liberal Theory

hat basic assumptions un#erlie the liberal approachA T%o assumptions liberal theory

make are the assumptions o" anarchy an# rationality. +peci"ically states +or other political

actors exist in an anarchic environment an# they generally act in a broadly rational way in

ma"ing decisions.2 The anarchy assumption means that political actors eist in the #istinctive

environment o" international politics %ithout a %orl# government or any other authority %ith amonopoly on the legitimate use o" "orce. They must engage in sel"!help. The rationality

assumption means that state lea#ers an# their #omestic supporters engage in "oreign policy "or the

instrumental purpose o" securing bene"its provi#e# by 'or avoi#ing costs impose# by* actors

outsi#e o" their bor#ers an# in making such calculations states seek to #eploy the most cost!

e""ective means to achieve %hatever their en#s 'pre"erences* may be. Liberal theory shares the

"irst 'anarchy* assumption %ith almost all international relations theories an# it shares the secon#'rationality* assumption %ith realism an# institutionalism but not non!rationalist process

theories.

Liberal theories are #istinguishe# "rom other rationalist theories such as realism an#institutionalism by t%o uniue assumptions about %orl# politics '1* +tates represent social

groups %hose vie%s constitute state pre"erences9 an# '2* ,nter#epen#ence among state pre"erences in"luences state policy. Let us consi#er each in turn.

Assumption One: States Represent Societal Preferences

The "irst assumption share# by liberal theories is that states represent some subset o

domestic society, whose views constitute state preerences. 3or liberals the state is a

2 This is not to assume that states are per"ectly rational calculating machines nor to claim that political contestation %ithin states is

unimportant "or international a""airs. &or is it to assume that states have all relevant in"ormation at their #isposal. Liberals #o assume

ho%ever that states are in a broa# sense instrumentally rational in "oreign policy!making.

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representative institution constantly subGect to capture an# recapture construction an#

reconstruction by #omestic social coalitions. These social coalitions #e"ine state (pre"erences) in

%orl# politics at any point in time the (tastes) (en#s) (basic interests) or ("un#amental social

purposes) that un#erlie "oreign policy. Political institutions constitute a critical (transmission

belt) by %hich these interests o" in#ivi#uals an# groups in civil society enter the political realm.4ll in#ivi#uals an# groups #o not %iel# eual in"luence over state policy. To the contrary their

po%er varies %i#ely #epen#ing on the contet. Hariation in the precise nature o" representativeinstitutions an# practices helps #e"ine %hich groups in"luence the (national interest.) +ome states

may represent i#eal!typically the pre"erences o" a single tyrannical in#ivi#ual a Pol Pot or Bose"

+talin9 others a""or# opportunities "or broa# #emocratic participation. Most lie in bet%een. The

precise pre"erences o" social groups %eighte# by their #omestic po%er shape the un#erlying

goals '(state pre"erences)* that states pursue in %orl# politics. +ometimes non!governmental

organizations '&IJs* an# other actors may "orm transnational alliances to assist social "orces.

(+tate!society relations)Kthe relationship bet%een a state an# its #omestic 'an# transnational*

society in %hich it is embe##e#Klies at the center o" liberal theory.>

Liberals believe that state pre"erences cannot be re#uce# to some simple metric or pre"erence

or#ering such as seeking (security) or (%ealth). Most mo#ern states are not +partan They

compromise security or sovereignty in or#er to achieve other en#s or in#ee# Gust to save money. &or#o mo#ern states uni"ormly seek (%ealth.) ,nstea# they strike rather strike comple an# varie# tra#e!

o""s among economic social an# political goals. &or "inally #o they seek (po%er) in the sense o"

(#omination) Many countries %oul# clearly rather spen# money on (butter) rather than (guns.) To

see ho% conseuential the variation in goals can be one nee# look no "urther than the implications "or

international relations o" Iermanys evolution "rom 4#ol" $itlers pre"erence "or militant nationalism

"ascist rule autarky an# ruthless eploitation o" Ierman -ebensraum un#er as ritte $eich to the

social compromise un#erlying the post%ar /undesrepubli" eutschland %hich "avore# capitalist

#emocracy epan#ing Ierman eports an# peace"ul reuni"ication. +imilarly one can look at the

striking change in policy bet%een Maoist an# post!Maoist 5hina +oviet an# post!+oviet 6ussia

,mperial an# post!,mperial Bapan an# so on.

Assumption Two: nterdependence among State Preferences nfluences State !eha"ior

The secon# core assumption share# by liberal theories is that the interdependence among

o state preerences inluences state behavior. 6ather than treating pre"erences as a "ie# constant

as #o realists or institutionalists liberals seek to eplain variation in pre"erences an# its

signi"icance "or %orl# politics. The precise #istribution an# nature o" the (stakes) eplains

#i""erences in state policy an# behavior. +tates liberals argue orient their behavior to the precisenature o" these un#erlying pre"erences compatible or con"lictual intense or %eak an# their

precise scope. +tates reuire a (social purpose) K a perceive# un#erlying stake in the matter at

han# K in or#er to pay any attention to international a""airs let alone to provoke con"lict

inaugurate cooperation or take any other signi"icant "oreign policy action. ," there is no such

inter#epen#ence among state obGectives a rational state %ill con#uct no international relations

satis"ying itsel" %ith an isolate# an# autarkic eistence. 5on"lictual goals increase the incentive

"or o" political #isputes. 5onvergence o" un#erlying pre"erences creates the precon#itions "or

peace"ul coeistence or cooperation.

> &ote that "or liberals the key term (pre"erences) or (un#erlying interests) #esignates as it #oes in economics vie%s about the

ultimate substantive outcomes o" policy rather than imme#iate instrumental obGectives that may vary %ith the tactical or strategic

setting. Ey (pre"erences) liberals mean un#erlying (pre"erences over outcomes) 'e.g. sectoral or national prosperity peace national

unity or a cleaner environment* not (pre"erences over strategies or tactics) 'e.g. #eterring an attack balancing a rival or constructing

an e""icient international institution*. The latter are (policies) (strategies) or (tactics.)

>



The critical theoretical link bet%een state pre"erences on the one han# an# state behavior on

the other is the concept o" policy inter#epen#ence. Policy inter#epen#ence re"ers to the #istribution

an# interaction o" pre"erencesKthat is the etent to %hich the pursuit o" state pre"erences necessarily

imposes costs an# bene"its 'kno%n as policy externalities* upon other states in#epen#ent o" the

-transaction costs- impose# by the speci"ic strategic means chosen to obtain them. 7epen#ing on the

un#erlying pattern o" inter#epen#ence each o" the ualitative categories above the "orm

substance an# #epth o" con"lict an# cooperation vary accor#ing to the precise nature an#intensity o" pre"erences.

The eistence o" some measure o" #ivergent "un#amental belie"s scarcity o" materialgoo#s an# ineualities in #omestic political po%er among states an# social actors ren#ers

inevitable some measure o" pluralism an# competition among an# %ithin states. Unlike realists

such as altz an# Morgenthau liberals #o not assume these #ivergent interests are uni"ormly

zero!sum. 4t the same time liberals reGect the utopian notion 'o"ten attribute# to them by realists*

o" an automatic harmony o" interest among in#ivi#uals an# groups in international society. &or

#o liberals argue as realists like Morgenthau charge believe that each state pursues an i#eal goal

oblivious o" %hat other states #o. Liberals argue instea# that each state seeks to realize #istinct

pre"erences or interests un#er constraints impose# by the #i""erent interests o" other states.@ This

#istribution o" pre"erences varies consi#erably. 3or liberals this variationKnot realism<s#istribution o" capabilities or institutionalism<s #istribution o" in"ormationKis o" #ecisive causal

importance in eplaining state behavior.

4 "e% eamples illustrate ho% liberal theories #i""er "rom realist institutionalist or non!

rational ones. e have alrea#y encountere# the eample o" %ar in the intro#uction in %hichliberals stress states %ith aggressive pre"erences rather than imbalances o" po%er incomplete

in"ormation or non!rational belie"s an# processes. 4nother illustration is tra#e policy. =conomists

%i#ely agree that "ree tra#e is superior %el"are!improving policy choice "or states yet tra#e

protection is o"ten practice#. To eplain protectionism liberals look to #omestic social

pre"erences. 4n important "actor in almost all countries is the competitive position o" a""ecte#

economic sectors in global markets %hich generates #omestic an# transnational #istributional

e""ects Protectionism is generally backe# by pro#ucers %ho are globally uncompetitive9 "reetra#e by pro#ucers %ho are globally competitive. Moreover even i" the state is a net bene"iciary

"rom "ree tra#e #omestic a#Gustment costs may be too high to tolerate politically or may

en#anger other countervailing #omestic social obGectives such as #omestic social euality or

environmental uality. 5ertain #omestic political institutions such as non!parliamentary

legislative systems %hich governe# U+ tra#e policy be"ore 1:>@ grant #isproportionate po%er to

protectionist interests.

This #i""ers "rom realist eplanations o" tra#e protectionism %hich ten# to stress the role

o" (hegemonic po%er) in structuring tra#e liberalization or the nee# to #e"en# sel"!su""icient

national security %ithin the prevailing zero!sum geopolitical competition perhaps by maintaining

sel"!su""iciency or by ai#ing allies at the epense o" purely economic obGectives. ,nstitutionalists

might cite the absence o" appropriate international institutions or other means to manage thecomple in"ormational tasks an# collective action problemsKnegotiation #ispute resolution

en"orcementKreuire# to manage "ree tra#e. Those %ho "ocus on non!rational theories

'psychological cultural organizational epistemic perceptual or bureaucratic* might stress an

i#eological #isposition to accept (mercantilist) theory share# historical analogies an# the

psychological pre#isposition to avoi# losses.

@ Liberalism is not a (#omestic politics) theory that ignores the (international system.) ,t is a (systemic) theory as Denneth altz

#escribes one in Theory o #nternational %olitics. Eut it simply treats the #istribution o" interests as an important systemic element

Gust as realism stresses the #istribution o" coercive po%er an# regime theory stresses the #istribution o" in"ormation.

@



To "urther illustrate the importance o" patterns o" policy inter#epen#ence consi#er the

"ollo%ing three circumstances zero!sum harmonious an# mie# pre"erences. ,n the case o" zero0

sum pre"erences attempts by #ominant social groups in one state to realize their pre"erences

through international action may necessarily impose costs on #ominant social groups in othercountries. This is a case o" (zero!sum) pre"erences similar to the (realist) %orl#. Iovernments

"ace a bargaining game %ith "e% mutual gains an# a high potential "or interstate tension an#con"lict. Many ancient cities an# states inclu#ing those o" 4ncient 4thens o"ten impose#

imperial tribute on #e"eate# neighbors or in etremis kille# the male population cast %omen an#

chil#ren into slavery an# repopulate# the to%n %ith their o%n citizensKa situation

approimating zero!sum con"lict. To#ay it might still be argue# that there are certain casesK

tra#e in agricultural goo#s by in#ustrial #emocracies "or eampleK%here entrenche# national

interests are so strong that no government seriously consi#ers embracing "ree tra#e. ,n the case o"

harmonious pre"erences %here the eternalities o" unilateral policies are optimal 'or

insigni"icant* "or others there are strong incentives "or uiet coeistence %ith lo% con"lict an# 'at

most* simple "orms o" interstate coor#ination. 3or eample a#vance# in#ustrial #emocracies

to#ay no longer contemplate %aging %ar on one another an# in some areas governments have

agree# to mutual recognition o" certain legal stan#ar#s %ithout controversy. Jne case o" mixed

pre"erences is bargaining %here states can achieve common gains 'or avoi# common losses as%ith a %ar* i" they agree to coor#inate their behavior but may #isagree strongly on the

#istribution o" bene"its or a#Gustment costs. Un#er such circumstances one o" the most important

#eterminants o" bargaining po%er is the intensity o" the pre"erences o" each party9 the more

intense their pre"erence "or a bene"icial settlement the more likely they are to make concessions'or employ coercive means* in or#er to achieve it. 4nother situation o" mie# motives is a

situation %here interstate coor#ination can avoi# signi"icant risks an# costs as in agreement to

avoi# naval inci#ents at sea or to share in"ormation on in"ectious #iseases. ,n such situations

institutional pre!commitments an# the provision o" greater in"ormation can o"ten improve the

%el"are o" all parties.

Liberals #erive several #istinctive conceptions o" po%er very #i""erent "rom that o"

realism. Jne "orm o" international in"luence "or liberals stems "rom the inter#epen#ence among pre"erences that Deohane an# &ye ' %ower and #nterdependence call (asymmetrical

inter#epen#ence.) 4ll other things eual the more inter#epen#ent a state is the more intense its

pre"erence "or a given outcome the more po%er others potentially have over it9 %hile the less a

state %ants something the less a state cares about outcomes the less intense its pre"erences the

less po%er others have over it. +ituations o" asymmetrical inter#epen#ence %here one state has

more intense pre"erence "or an agreement than another create bargaining po%er. ,n tra#enegotiations "or eample smaller an# poorer countries are o"ten more #epen#ent on tra#e an#

thus bene"it more "rom "ree tra#e an# thus ten# to have a %eaker position an# make more

concessions in the course o" negotiations. =nlargement o" the =uropean Union is a recent

instance. 6elative pre"erence intensity can also in"luence the outcome o" %ar but in a #i""erent%ay. &ations are in "act rarely prepare# to mortgage their entire economy or military in con"lict so

their po%er #epen#s not on their coercive po%er resources but on their resolve or %ill. This is %hysmaller states o"ten prevail over larger ones. Hietnam "or eample #i# not prevail over the U+ in

the Hietnam ar because it possesse# more coercive po%er resources but because it ha# a more

intense pre"erence at stake.

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#rom Assumptions to Theories

Taken by themselves these liberal assumptionsKthe international system is anarchic

states are rational social pressures #e"ine state pre"erences inter#epen#ence among pre"erences

#ictates state behaviorKare thin. They eclu#e most eisting realist institutionalist an# non!rational theories but they #o not taken by themselves #e"ine very precisely the positive content

o" liberal theory. +ome might rightly complain that simply pointing to state pre"erences opens upan unmanageably %i#e range o" hypothetical social in"luences on policy. et in practice research

has sho%n that in practice the range o" viable liberal theories that test out empirically are

relatively "e% "ocuse# an# po%er"ul. Three broa# variants or categories o" liberal theory eist

ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism. 4t the core o" each lies a #istinct conception

o" the social pressures an# representative institutions that #e"ine state pre"erences an# the

conseuences "or state behavior. +ome o" these have proven empirically to be among the most

po%er"ul theories in international relations. Let us consi#er each in turn.

deational Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on $omestic Social %alues and dentities

,#eational liberalism vie%s domestic social identities and values as basic #eterminants o"state pre"erences. 7ra%ing on a liberal tra#ition o" political philosophy #ating back to Bohn +tuart

Mill Iiuseppe Mazzini oo#ro% ilson an# Bohn Maynar# Deyes liberals #e"ines social

values as the set o" pre"erences hel# by various in#ivi#uals an# groups in society concerning the

proper scope an# nature o" legitimate state obGectives. ,n particular nations an# groups %ithinnations #i""er in their conceptions o" %hat a legitimate #omestic or#er isKthat is their conception

o" %hich social actors belong to the polity an# %hat is o%e# them. Thus "or liberals en#s that

may appear universalKsuch as the #e"ense o" political sovereignty an# national securityKare not

necessarily en#s in themselves but are Gusti"ie# only inso"ar as they are means to realize the

speci"ic un#erlying pre"erences o" social actors concerning (legitimate social or#er.) +ome states

such as aggressive states like $itler<s Iermany %illing place security an# sovereignty at risk in

or#er to achieve conuest. Jther states may place security at risk to maintain peace or prosperity.

&one o" these choices are necessarily (irrational)9 they simply involve varying sets o" social pre"erences.

3oreign policy in the i#eational liberal vie% is an e""ort to realize these vie%s

#omestically. +ocial actors provi#e support to the government in echange "or institutions that

accor# %ith their i#entity!base# pre"erences an# are there"ore #eeme# (legitimate). +imilarly

actors %ill sometimes a#vocate "oreign policies that subvert the eisting #omestic social or#er.Jn the liberal vie% the e""ect o" conceptions o" social legitimacy on state behavior #epen#s on

patterns o" inter#epen#ence among these i#ealsKin other %or#s on the transnational eternalities

create# "or others by attempts to realize those pre"erences in one place. Liberal theories pre#ict

that %here national conceptions o" legitimate bor#ers political institutions an# socioeconomiceuality are compatible generating positive or negligible eternalities peace"ul coeistence is

likely. here social i#entities are incompatible an# create signi"icant negative eternalitiesKas%hen one state vie%s the promotion o" its legitimate bor#ers political institutions an#

socioeconomic stan#ar#s as reuiring aggression or #eman#s vis010vis another stateKtension an#

zero!sum con"lict is more likely. here national claims can be ma#e more compatible through

reciprocal policy a#Gustment e""orts to cooperate eplicitly through international institutions are

more likely.

N



+ome social pre"erences about a legitimate social or#er are particularly important such as

those pertaining to the proper location o" national bor#ers the nature o" political institutions an#

the scope o" socioeconomic regulation.

2ational #dentity& Jne basic type o" social i#entity concerns the scope o" the (nation)speci"ically the legitimate location o" national bor#ers an# the allocation o" citizenship rights.

here bor#ers coinci#e %ith un#erlying patterns o" i#entity coeistence an# even mutualrecognition are more likely but %here there are inconsistencies bet%een bor#ers an# un#erling

patterns o" i#entityKas there have been in the Ealkans "or over 100 years in central =urope in

the mi#!1:th century an# in many places in the %orl# to#ayKgreater potential "or interstate

con"lict eists. Jver the last century an# a hal" "rom mi#!nineteenth century nationalist uprisings

to late t%entieth!century national liberation struggles the #esire "or national autonomy constitutes

the most common issue over %hich %ars have been "ought an# great po%er intervention has taken

place. The Ealkan con"licts prece#ing orl# ar , an# in the "ormer ugoslavia a"ter the en# o"

the 5ol# ar are notorious eamples. &ot by chance is scenario planning "or 5hina/Unite# +tates

con"lict "ocuse# almost eclusively on Tai%anKthe one Guris#iction %here bor#ers an# national

i#entity 'as %ell as political i#eology* are subGect to competing claims .

%olitical #deology& The secon# basic type o" social i#entity stems "rom in#ivi#uals an#group commitments to particular "orms o" political institutions. here the realization o"

legitimate #omestic political institutions in one Guris#iction threatens its realization in others

'negative eternalities* con"lict is more likely. 3rom 4ncient Ireece %here oligarchic an#

#emocratic "actions in city!states use# "oreign policy to #e"en# an# a#vance their pre"erre# "orm

o" government to the 3rench 6evolution an# nineteenth!century 5oncert o" =urope %here

monarchies use# international cooperation to uash #emocratic an# nationalist revolution to the

+econ# orl# ar %here #emocracies an# communists "ought "ascists to the 5ol# ar %hen the

Unite# +tates an# the +oviet Union %ere motivate# by #ivergent political i#eologies #isputes

over political i#eology have "uele# international con"lict.

)ocioeconomic $egulation& The thir# basic type o" social i#entity relevant "or %orl#

politics stems "rom belie"s about legitimate socioeconomic regulation an# re#istribution. Mo#ernliberal theories 'in contrast to the laissez aire libertarianism sometimes labele# as

uintessentially (liberal)* have long recognize# that societal pre"erences concerning the

appropriate nature an# level o" regulation impose legitimate limits on transnational markets.

7omestic an# international markets are embe##e# in local social compromises concerning the

provision o" regulatory public goo#s. The etent to %hich countries can cooperate to liberalize

markets "or eample #epen#s on the level o" con"lict or convergence o" vie%s about

immigration social %el"are taation religious "ree#om "amilies health an# sa"ety

environmental an# consumer protection cultural promotion an# many other #omestic public

goo#s. These issues have increasingly been the subGects o" international economic negotiations.

e o"ten see o## #omestic coalitions ma#e up o" i#ealists an# materialistsKso!calle# (Eaptist!

bootlegger) coalitions %here those %ho "avor regulation "or public spirite# reasons '(Eaptists)*

ally %ith those %ho bene"it in a material sense '(bootleggers)*Karoun# international economicissues. 3or eample %e sometimes observe unions uncompetitive business an#

environmentalists all supporting tra#e protectionK"or uite #i""erent reasons.

&ommercial Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on 'conomic nterests

5ommercial liberal theories seek to eplain the international behavior o" states base# on

the #omestic an# global market position o" #omestic "irms %orkers an# o%ners o" assets.

;



5ommercial liberal theory posits that changes in the structure o" the #omestic an# global

economy alter the costs an# bene"its o" transnational economic echange thus creating pressure

on #omestic governments to "acilitate or block such echanges through appropriate "oreign

economic an# security policies.

5ommercial liberal theory #oes not pre#ict that economic incentives automatically generate

universal "ree tra#e an# peace but "ocuses instea# on the interplay bet%een aggregate incentives an##istributional conseuences. The greater the economic bene"its "or po%er"ul private actors the

greater their incentive all other things eual to press governments to "acilitate such transactions9

the more costly the a#Gustment impose# by the propose# economic echanges the more

opposition is likely to arise. 4s 7ani 6o#rik has argue# contemporary tra#e liberalization generates

#omestic #istributional shi"ts totaling many times aggregate %el"are bene"its. Losers generally ten# to

be better i#enti"ie# an# organize# than bene"iciaries. 4 maGor source o" protection liberals pre#ict lies

in uncompetitive un #iversi"ie# an# monopolistic sectors or "actors o" pro#uction. Their pressure

in#uces a systematic #ivergence "rom laissez!"aire policies!a ten#ency

recognize# by 4#am +mith %ho "amously complaine# o" mercantilism that -the contrivers o" this

%hole mercantile system Oare the pro#ucers %hose interest has been so care"ully atten#e# to.) This

commercial liberal approach to analyzing con"lict over "oreign economic policy is #istinct "rom those

o" realism 'emphasizing security concerns an# relative po%er* institutionalism 'in"ormational an#institutional constraints on optimal interstate collective action* an# constructivism 'belie"s about -"ree

tra#e-*. =tensive research supports the vie% that "ree tra#e is most likely %here strong

competitiveness etensive intra!in#ustry tra#e or tra#e in interme#iate goo#s large "oreign

investments an# lo% asset speci"icity internalize the net bene"its o" "ree tra#e to po%er"ul actors

re#ucing the in"luence o" net losers "rom liberalization. +imilar arguments can be use# to analyze

issues such as sovereign #ebt echange rate policy agricultural tra#e policy =uropean integration

"oreign #irect investment ta policy an# migration policy.

The e""ect o" economic inter#epen#ence on security a""airs varies %ith market incentives. 4 simple

starting point is that the collateral #amage o" %ar #isrupts economic activity the more vulnerable an#

etensive such activity the greater the cost. 4 more sophisticate# cost!bene"it calculation %oul# take

into account the potential economic costs an# bene"its o" %ar. here monopolies sanctions slavery

plun#er o" natural resources an# other "orms o" coercive etraction backe# by state po%er are cost!e""ective means o" elite %ealth accumulation!as %as true "or most o" human history!%e shoul# epect

to see a positive relationship bet%een transnational economic activity an# %ar. here conversely

private tra#e an# investment %ithin comple an# %ell!establishe# transnational markets provi#e a less

costly means o" accumulating %ealth an# one that cannot be cost!e""ectively appropriate#!as is most

strikingly the case %ithin mo#ern multinational investment an# pro#uction net%orks!the epansion o"

economic opportunities %ill have a paci"ic e""ect. 4long %ith the sprea# o" #emocracy an# relative

absence o" nationalist con"lict this #istinguishes the current era "rom the perio# be"ore the

3irst orl# ar %hen high levels o" inter#epen#ence "amously "aile# to #eter %ar. e see in current

estern relations %ith 5hina a very #eliberate strategy to encourage the slo% evolution o" social

pre"erences in a paci"ic #irection by encouraging tra#e. =ric Iartzke has recently argue# that the

-#emocratic peace- phenomenon can largely be eplaine# in terms o" a lack o" economic an# other

motives "or %ar. =ven among #evelope# economies ho%ever circumstances may arise %here

governments employ coercive means to protect international markets. This may take varie# "orms as

occurre# un#er nineteenth!century empires or %ith pressure "rom business "or the Unite# +tates to

enter the 3irst orl# ar to #e"en# tra#e %ith the allies.

Republican Liberalism: State Preferences !ased on Systems of $omestic Representation

8



4 "inal source o" state pre"erences is the structure o" #omestic political representation. hile

i#eational an# commercial theories stress respectively particular patterns o" un#erlying societal

i#entities an# interests relate# to globalization republican liberal theory emphasizes the %ays in %hich

#omestic institutions an# practices aggregate an# transmit such pressures trans"orming them into state

policy. The key variable in republican liberalism %hich #ates back to the theories o" Dant ilson

an# others is the nature o" #omestic political representation %hich helps #etermine whose social

pre"erences #ominate state policyKthereby #e"ining the (national interest).

4 simple conseuence is that policy ten#s to be biase# in "avor o" the governing coalitions or

po%er"ul #omestic groups "avore# by representative institutionsK%hether those groups are

a#ministrators 'rulers armies or bureaucracies* or societal groups that -capture- the state. 5osts an#

risks are passe# on to others. hen particular groups %ith outlier pre"erences are able to "ormulate

policy %ithout provi#ing gains "or society as a %hole the result is likely to be ine""icient an#

suboptimal policy "or the policy as a %hole. To the etent that most in#ivi#uals an# groups in society

ten# generally to be risk averse the broa#er the range o" represente# groups the less likely it is that

they %ill support in#iscriminate use o" policy instruments like %ar or autarky that impose large net

costs or risks on society as a %hole. 7emocracies ten# to be choosy about the %ars they enter

+electing lo%er cost %ar not provoking great!po%er %ar an# "ighting to %in. 6epublican liberal

theory thereby helps to eplain phenomena as #iverse as the -#emocratic peace- mo#ern imperialism

an# international tra#e an# monetary cooperation. Iiven the plausibility o" the assumption that maGor

%ar imposes net costs on society as a %hole it is har#ly surprising that the most prominent republican

liberal argument concerns the -#emocratic peace %hich one scholar has terme# -as close as anything

%e have to an empirical la% in international relations- one that applies to tribal societies as %ell as

mo#ern states. 3rom a liberal perspective the theoretical interest in the -#emocratic peace- lies not in

the greater transparency o" #emocracies 'a claim about in"ormation* the greater military po%er o"

#emocracies 'a realist claim* or norms appropriate behavior 'a constructivist claim* but the

#istinctive pre"erences o" #emocracies.

This is not o" course to imply that broa# #omestic representation necessarily generates

international cooperation. ,n speci"ic cases elite pre"erences in multiple states may be more

convergent than popular ones. Moreover the etent o" bias in representation not #emocracy per se is

the theoretically critical point. There eist con#itions un#er %hich speci"ic governing elites may havean incentive to represent long!term social pre"erences in a %ay that is less biase#!"or eample %hen

they #ampen nationalist sentiment as may be the case in some #emocratizing regimes or eclu#e

po%er"ul outlier special interests as is commonly the case in tra#e policy.

The theoretical obverse o" -#emocratic peace- theory is a republican liberal theory o" %ar

%hich stresses risk !acceptant lea#ers an# rent !seeking coalitions. There is substantial historical

evi#ence that the aggressors %ho have provoke# mo#ern great!po%er %ars ten# either to be etremely

risk!acceptant in#ivi#uals or in#ivi#uals %ell able to insulate themselves "rom the costs o" %ar or

both. Back +ny#er "or eample has re"urbishe# $obsons classic le"t!liberal analysis o" imperialism!in

%hich the military uncompetitive "oreign investors an# tra#ers Gingoistic political elites an# others

%ho bene"it "rom imperialism are particularly %ell place# to in"luence policy!by linking

unrepresentative an# etreme outcomes to log!rolling coalitions. 5onsistent %ith this analysis the

highly unrepresentative conseuences o" partial #emocratization combine# %ith the #isruption o"rapi# in#ustrialization an# incomplete political socialization suggest that #emocratizing states i"

subGect to these in"luences may be particularly %ar!prone. This o""ers one ans%er to the para#o

pose# by Bames 3earon!namely %hy rational states %oul# ever enter into %ar rather than negotiate

their %ay out.

Parallels to the -#emocratic peace- eist in political economy. e have seen that illiberal

commercial policies!tra#e protection monetary instability an# sectoral subsi#ization that may

mani"estly un#ermine the general %el"are o" the population!re"lect pressure "rom po%er"ul #omestic

:



groups. ,n part this po%er results "rom biases %ithin representative institutions such as the po%er o"

money in electoral systems the absence or presence o" insulate# institutions. 5onsi#er the eample o"

international tra#e. 4s %e sa% in the prece#ing section perhaps the most %i#esprea# eplanation

"or the persistence o" illiberal commercial policies such as protection monetary instability an#

sectoral subsi#ization that may mani"estly un#ermine the general %el"are o" the population is

pressure "rom po%er"ul #omestic groups. The po%er o" such groups is o"ten eacerbate# by

biases %ithin representative institutions. here the latter sort o" biases eistKan# it is seen inmost contemporary representative institutionsKspecial interest groups are likely to gain

protection through tari""s subsi#ies "avorable regulation or competitive #evaluation. here

policy makers are insulate# "rom such pressures %hich may involve less #emocraticKsuch as

("ast track) provisions eecutive agreements an# the Unite# +tates Tra#e 6epresentativeKopen

policies are more viable. ,ronically in such cases less (#emocratic) institutions in the sense o"

less (populist) an# (participatory) institutions may in "act be more representative o" society as a

%hole.

The Scope of the Liberal Perspecti"e

e have seen that liberal theory is a coherent "amily o" i#eational commercial an#republican theories that share common assumptions about international relations. +uch theories

eplain not only cooperation among liberal states but pertain to liberal an# non!liberal polities

con"lictual an# cooperative situations security an# political economy issues an# both in#ivi#ual

"oreign policy an# aggregate behavior. +uch theories challenge the conventional presumption that

realism is the simplest most encompassing an# most po%er"ul o" maGor ,6 theories. 4lthough not

all liberal theories are easy to speci"y hypotheses about en#ogenous tari"" setting the #emocratic

peace an# nationalist con"lict suggest that liberalism generates many empirical arguments as

po%er"ul an# parsimonious as those o" realism. 4t "irst glance some may obGect that the claim

that state pre"erences or interests matterKthat is %hat states %ant shapes %hat they #oKis

trivial. et in "act the liberal approach is #istinctively #i""erent than other %i#ely a#vocate#

"amilies o" theories %hich stress instea# the #istribution o" coercive po%er in"ormation cultural

belie"s an# other characteristics o" states. Jthers may "eel that stressing pre"erences may lea# toan impossibly broa# an# vague approach because thousan#s o" "actors might a""ect the social

#eman#s place# on a mo#ern state. ,n practice ho%ever speci"ic liberal theories turn out to benot Gust po%er"ul but precise an# "ocuse# as %ell. 3i"ty years ago Morgenthau launche# the

mo#ern post!%ar "iel# o" international relations by proclaiming that international relations theory

shoul# avoi# (t%o popular "allaciesQthe concern %ith motivesQan# the concern %ith

i#eological pre"erences.) Liberalism seeks to theorize motives i#eologies an# pre"erencesKan#the empirical #ata sho%s that it has #one so success"ully.

Theories base# on the liberal approach can eplain moreover a number o" phenomena

"or %hich realist institutionalist an# non!rational theories o" international relations approaches

lack a persuasive account.

3irst the liberal approach provides a plausible theoretical explanation or variation in

the substantive content o oreign policy. &either realism nor institutionalism eplains the

changing substantive goals an# purposes over %hich states con"lict an# cooperate. Eoth "ocus

instea# on "ormal causes such as relative po%er issue #ensity or the #istribution o" in"ormation

Kan# on "ormal conseuences such as con"lict an# cooperation per se. Ey contrast liberal

theories provi#e a plausible eplanation not Gust "or con"lict an# cooperation but "or the

substantive content o" "oreign policy. Liberal ,6 theory o""ers plausible parsimonious hypotheses

to eplain things like the #i""erence bet%een 4nglo!4merican &azi an# +oviet plans "or the

10



postorl# ar ,, %orl#9 U.+. concern about a "e% &orth Dorean ,rai or 5hinese nuclear

%eapons rather than the greater arsenals hel# by Ireat Eritain ,srael an# 3rance9 the substantial

#i""erences bet%een %ithin the Eretton oo#s compromise o" RRembe##e# liberalism<< an# the

perio# o" ("ree tra#e imperialism) that prece#e# it #ivergences bet%een economic cooperation

un#er the =5 an# &43T4 an# many other cases. +imilarly liberalism makes more sense o" thesu##en reversal o" =astest relations a shi"t ma#e possible by the %i#esprea# vie% among

6ussian o""icials 'so intervie% #ata reveal* that Iermany %as at once ethnically satis"ie# politically #emocratic an# commercially incline#.

+econ# the liberal approach oers a plausible explanation or historical change in the

international system. The static uality o" both realist an# institutionalist theories an# their lack

o" persuasive eplanations "or "un#amental long!term change in the nature o" international

politics are recognize# %eaknesses. Ilobal economic #evelopment over the past "ive hun#re#

years has been closely relate# to greater per capita %ealth #emocratization e#ucation systems

that rein"orce ne% collective i#entities an# greater incentives "or trans!bor#er economic

transactions. 6ealist theory accor#s such shi"ts no theoretical importance but analyzes en#uring

patterns o" state behavior re"lecting cyclical shi"ts in po%er as in the rise an# #ecline o" great

po%ers. Liberal theories by contrast "orge a #irect causal link bet%een economic political an#

social mo#ernization an# state behavior in %orl# politics. $ence "or eample it is signi"icant toliberals that over the mo#ern perio# the principles o" international or#er have been #ecreasingly

linke# to #ynastic legitimacy an# increasingly to "actors #irectly #ra%n "rom the three variants o"

liberalism national sel"!#etermination an# social citizenship the increasing compleity o"

economic integration an# liberal #emocratic governance.

Thir# "ollo%ing on "rom the secon# point the liberal approach oers a plausible

explanation or the distinctiveness o modern international politics. 4mong a#vance# in#ustrial

#emocracies a stable "orm o" interstate politics has emerge# groun#e# in reliable epectations o"

peace"ul change #omestic rule o" la% stable international institutions an# intensive societal

interaction. hereas realists o""er no general eplanation "or the emergence o" this #istinctive

mo#e o" international politics liberal theories argue that the emergence o" a large an# epan#ing

bloc o" paci"ic inter#epen#ent normatively satis"ie# states has been a precon#ition "or such politics. 5onsi#er "or eample the current state o" =urope. Unlike realist theories "or eample

liberal theories eplain the near total absence o" competitive alliance "ormation among the

lea#ing #emocratic po%ers to#ay.

#rom Unicausal to (ulti)&ausal Theory

e have seen that liberal assumptions about %orl# politics o""er a #istinct "oun#ation on

%hich a number o" po%er"ul theories may be groun#e#. et any goo# historian policy!maker or

social scientist is instinctivelyKan# rightlyKsuspicious o" mono!causal eplanations base# ononly a single theory. +urely %orl# politics is more comple. hat i" %e %ant to combine a liberal

theory %ith other theories liberal or non!liberalA T%o "inal points are %orth noting both o" %hichelaborate the various in %hich any given liberal theory can be combine# %ith other theories.

3irst various liberal theories wor" well in tandem with one another. &ot only #oes liberal

theory apply across a %i#e #omain o" circumstances but its three variantsKi#eational

commercial an# republican liberalismKare mutually rein"orcing. They are stronger taken

together than separately. &ot only #o they share assumptions an# causal mechanisms but their

empirical implications aggregate in interesting %ays. ,t is %i#ely accepte# "or eample that

economic #evelopment has a strong in"luence on the viability o" #emocratic governance %ith its

11



paci"ic implications9 liberal #emocratic governments ten# in turn to support commerce %hich

promotes economic #evelopment. +uch claims can be analytically rein"orcing even %here they #o

not make parallel pre#ictions. 4nomalies %ithin one variant o" liberal theory may be resolve# by

consi#ering other variants. Positive movement along one liberal #imensionKpatterns o" national

i#entity #emocratic participation or transnational economic transactionsKmay con#one oreacerbate the negative #istortions along another liberal #imension.

&orman 4ngell %hose commercial liberal claims on the eve o" orl# ar , inclu#e# a

pre#iction that %ar among maGor po%ers %as obsolete is o"ten paro#ie# by secon#han# critics.

et he #oes not #eserve this. 4ngell staunchly maintaine# that his %ell!kno%n RRunpro"itability o"

%ar<< thesis in no %ay implies RRthe impossibility o" %ar)Ka #octrine he #ismisse# "or republican

liberal reasons 'i.e. the "act that not all governments are representative* as a RRri#iculous myth.<<

here representative bias permits special interests to control policy aggregate incentives "or

%el"are!improving tra#e are likely to have less e""ect. 6ecent stu#ies reveal that the correlation

bet%een economic inter#epen#ence an# peace hol#s "ar more strongly among liberal states.

5onversely %here #emocratization heightens socioeconomic ineuality nationalist cleavages

uneven patterns o" gains an# losses #ue to inter#epen#ence or etreme heterogeneity o" interests

Kas may have occurre# in the "ormer ugoslavia an# other #emocratizing nationsKit may

eacerbate international economic an# political con"lict. +uch interaction e""ects among liberal"actors o""er a promising area "or more #etaile# analysis. Liberal theories are greater than the sum

o" their parts.

+econ# liberal theories are easily combined with other international relations theories, generating multi0causal explanations. +urely there are cases in %hich a combination o" liberal

an# other theories o""ers a better eplanation o" state behavior than any single sort o" theory

alone liberal or other%ise. ,n such cases a multicausal synthesis is reuire#. Eut an (anything

goes) attitu#e %ill uickly lea# to compleity. $o% can %e #iscipline such a synthesisA hat

mo#el shoul# %e useA

Most theorists believe %e shoul# synthesize theories by employing realism "irst '%ith

pre"erences assume# to be invariant* an# then intro#uce liberal theories to eplain %hatever is le"tover. The Gusti"ication o"ten given is that realist theories #eal %ith the most (important)

phenomena in international a""airs coercive threats to national security an# no state %ill pay

attention to liberal "actors until they resolve such classic $ealpoliti" issues. et such claims

arbitrarily privilege realist eplanations o" any phenomena that might be eplaine# by other

theoriesKan# liberal theories as %e have seen #o #eal %ith essential matters o" peace an# %ar.

Moreover it is clearKas %e have seen aboveKthat con"lict o"ten comes about precisely becausestates have varie# interests an# some aggressor states have privilege# something above security

this violating the key assumptions o" realism.

The truth is in "act the opposite to the etent that both pre"erences an# coercive other"actors matter liberal theories en3oy analytical priority in any synthesis. The assumption o"

rationality or purposive behavior central to realism 'like the RRboun#e# rationality<< claims o"institutionalism* implies action on the basis o" a prior speci"ic an# consistent set o" pre"erences.

Unless %e kno% %hat these pre"erences are 'that is unless %e kno% the etent to %hich states

value the un#erlying stakes* %e cannot assess realist or institutionalist claims linking variation in

the particular means available to states '%hether coercive capabilities or institutions* on interstate

con"lict or cooperation. &or can %e use non!rational #ecision!making theory to assess %hether

the means!en#s calculations use# to realize those interests are rational or not. Pre"erences

#etermine the nature an# intensity o" the game that states are playing an# thus are a primary

#eterminant o" %hich systemic theory is appropriate an# ho% it shoul# be speci"ie#. Hariation in

12



state pre"erences o"ten in"luences the %ay in %hich states make calculations about their strategic

environment %hereas the converseKthat the strategic situation lea#s to variation in state

pre"erencesKis inconsistent %ith the rationality assumption share# by all three theories. #n short,

liberal theories explain when and why the assumptions about state preerences underlying

realism or institutionalism hold. The reverse is not the case at least in the short term. ,n situations%here these assumptions #o not hol# realism an# institutionalism 'as %ell as some variants o"

constructivism* are not Gust o" limite# importance they are theoretically irrelevant.?

The priority o" liberalism in multicausal mo#els o" state behavior implies "urthermore

that collective state behavior shoul# be analyze# as a two0stage process. +tates "irst #e"ine

pre"erencesKa stage uniuely eplaine# by liberal theoriesKan# only then #o they #ebate

bargain or "ight to particular agreementsKa secon# stage eplaine# by realist an#/or

institutionalist 'as %ell as liberal* theories o" strategic interaction. The t%o!stage mo#el o""ers a

general structure "or research #esign an# theoretical eplanation. ,n those cases %here liberal

"actors only in"luence strategic outcomes #irectly through pre"erences an# pre"erence intensities

'a in 3igure 1* liberalism can be teste# as a monocausal hypothesis against alternative realist or

institutionalist "actors 'c in 3igure 1*. Liberal "actors may also in"luence outcomes in#irectly

because the nature o" pre"erences helps #etermine 'b in 3igure 1* the relative po%er an# in"luence

o" states. 'c in 3igure 1*. 6ecall that pre"erences #o not simply shape outcomes they tell us %hichrealist or institutionalist "actors are important an# ho% they relate to state behavior. ,n such cases

eplaining 'or at least controlling "or* variation in state pre"erences is analytically prior to an

analysis o" strategic interaction. ithout a prior analysis o" pre"erences only monocausal

"ormulations o" realist or institutionalist theory can be teste#.

? This conclusion shoul# not be surprising to anyone %ith even un#ergra#uate training in political science. ,t is the unambiguous

lesson o" the classic literature on the metho#ology o" stu#ying po%er an# in"luence %hether in local communities or global politics.6obert 7ahl<s analysis o" po%er teaches us that %e cannot ascertain %hether (4 in#uce# E to #o something) 'that is po%er or

in"luence* unless %e kno% RR%hat E %oul# other%ise #o<< 'that is pre"erences*. The implication is clear &ot only #o %e nee# to kno%

%hat state pre"erences are but unless they are arraye# so that substantial interstate con"lict o" interest eists an# the #eployment o"

capabilities to achieve a marginal gain is acceptable realist theory is po%erless to eplain state behavior. +imilarly institutionalisteplanations o" suboptimal cooperation are appropriate only un#er circumstances in %hich states have an interest in resolving

particular interstate collective action problems. ,6 theorist Denneth Jye #ra%s the implication RRhen you observe con"lict think

7ea#lockKthe absence o" mutual interestKbe"ore puzzling over %hy a mutual interest %as not realize#.<<

1>



The primacy o" liberal theories in such multicausal eplanations may appear to be an abstract

a#monition yet it is o" real practical importance in interpreting historical eperience an# current

policy.

$o% are %e to un#erstan# "or eample oo#ro% ilson<s proposal "or the League o" &ations o"ten cite# as the epitome o" liberal RRlegalism<< an# RRutopianism.<< 4t "irst glance

ilson<s proposal seems to re"lect a naive con"i#ence in international institutions. et in "act it%as a t%o!stage liberal proposalKan# a realistic one at that. 3rom the start ilson %as skeptical

about the autonomous in"luence o" international institutions. $e care# little about their precise

"orm because he vie%e# them as no more than (a symbolic a""irmation o" the Rrightness< o"

#emocracies in their mutual relations.) Thus "or eample his initial #ra"t o" the League

5ovenant inclu#e# no provisions "or international la% or a supranational court9 both %ere

eventually a##e# only at the insistence o" more conservative 'an# more cynical* "oreign an#

#omestic politicians. $e %as skeptical that the League coul# ever actually overri#e national

#ecisions.

,nstea# %hat ilson terme# the RR"irst point<< to remember about the League %as not

institutionalist but liberal ,ts membership %as to be restricte# to those countries enGoying

republican government an# national sel"!#etermination. ,nso"ar as the League %as to rely on public opinion it %as to be solely democratic public opinion. Ease# on a multicausal liberal

analysis ilson eplicitly i#enti"ie# a set o" narro% precon#itions un#er %hich collective

security institutions coul# succee#. The League he argue# %oul# "unction only i" nationally sel"!

#etermining #emocracy %as a nearly universal "orm o" government among great po%ers %hichin turn controlle# an over%helming proportion o" global military po%er. ,n 1:1; ilson believe#

this situation to be imminent (There are not going to be many other kin#s o" nations "or long. . . .

The $apsburgs an# the $ohenzollerns are permanently out o" business.) Iiven ilson<s

un#erlying theory is it surprising that the League ha# become moribun# by 1:>N a"ter t%elve

=uropean countries ha# move# "rom #emocracy to #ictatorshipA Jr that this shi"t isolate#

#emocratic 3rance an# Eritain eacerbating their o"t!note# geopolitical #ilemmas in Manchuria

an# 4byssiniaA hen a similar situation arose in the "ormer ugoslavia a"ter 1:8: in a %orl#

%here almost all the great po%ers in the region %ere liberal #emocraciesKas %e have seen above Kestern governments intervene# to oppose aggression %hile avoi#ing any hint o" arme#

con"lict among themselves. ,n#ee# the absence o" serious con"lict among estern po%ers over

ugoslaviaKthe RRorl# ar , scenario<<Kre"lects in large part a share# perception that the

geopolitical gains "rom con"lict among #emocratic governments are lo%. ,n this sense the

inter%ar "ailure o" the League o"ten cite# as a realist re"utation o" utopian liberal ideology, in "act

con"irms liberal ,6 theory.

Multicausal liberalism helps to eplain not only ambitious schemes "or cooperation like

collective security but RRrealist<< policy outcomes like po%er balancing an# bipolar con"lict. 4

"orm o" multicausal liberalism un#erlay the postorl# ar ,, U.+. policy o" containmentKa policy tra#itionally treate# as the embo#iment o" realism. 5ontainment o" the +oviet Union %as

never simply about po%er balancing. ,t %as a liberal gran# strategy as ma#e eplicit a"ter orl#ar , by ilson an# Bohn 7e%ey then a"ter orl# ar ,, by Ieorge Dennan. Dennan in this

regar# a liberal linke# the =uropean threat to the nature o" the +oviet regime9 it is o"ten "orgotten

that nine!tenths o" the seminal RRS<< article %as given over to an analysis o" +oviet #omestic

belie"s. 4 estern military #eterrent %oul# be reuire# he argue# only until the Eolshevik

revolution ha# run its course %hereupon the +oviet system %oul# collapse o" its o%n accor#. The

#ecisive estern actions in the 5ol# ar accor#ing to Dennan %ere the reconstruction o"

Iermany an# Bapan as capitalist #emocracies through policies like the Marshall Plan. The goal o"

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the policy %as the trans"ormation o" social purposes an# state pre"erences in estern countries

neither o" %hich %oul# assume much importance in a purely realist analysis.

,n the en# the con#uct an# conclusion o" the 5ol# ar procee#e# precisely as Dennan<s

t%o!stage liberal mo#el ha# pre#icte#. 6ealist po%er balancing serve# throughout as a staticinterim instrument to maintain the status uo but shi"ting state pre"erences eplain the outbreak

an# eventual passing o" the con"lict. Ey 1:?: stan#ing in a Mosco% ehibit o" kitchen%are6ichar# &ion an# &ikita Dhrushchev #eclare# that the 5ol# ar %oul# be %on an# lost not

through relative military capabilities but through the relative economic pro%ess an# i#eological

attractiveness o" the t%o superpo%ers. =conomic stagnation an# a measure o" i#eological change

in the =ast pre#ate# "oreign policy change. ," the est as Dhrushchev rashly promise# ha# been

burie# un#er the superior economic per"ormance o" the =ast the outcome might %ell have been

#i""erent. These eamples #emonstrate the ability o" multicausal liberal theories to eplain critical

t%entieth!century "oreign policy #ecisions such as those taken in 1:18 1:@; an# 1:8: even

%hen national security interests are "ully engage#.

,n interpreting such cases the maGor #i""erence bet%een realist an# liberal theories lies

not as is o"ten claime# in the observation that realist states are concerne# about security threats

or even %ith balancing security threats. Eoth theories pre#ict this un#er speci"ic circumstances.here the t%o "amilies o" theory genuinely #i""er is on the sources o" security threats themselves

%ith realists attributing them to particular con"igurations o" po%er 'against %hich states balance*

%hereas liberals attribute them to etreme con"lict among i#eological institutional an# material

pre"erences. '3or their part ,nstitutionalists attribute them to uncertainty an# the "ailure o"commitment strategies an# epistemic theorists to particular belie"s about the e""icacy or

appropriateness o" speci"ic policy responses.* ," liberal theories contribute to eplaining core

realist cases such as bipolar con"lict there is goo# reason to believe that the most po%er"ul

in"luences in %orl# politics to#ay are not the #eployment o" military "orce or the construction o"

international institutions but the uiet trans"ormation o" the #omestic an# transnational social

values interests an# institutions that un#erlie the %i#ely varying pre"erences states bring to

%orl# politics.

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Liberal Theory