Liberal Justice, Political and Metaphysical (Bellamy)

8/9/2019 Liberal Justice, Political and Metaphysical (Bellamy)

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/liberal-justice-political-and-metaphysical-bellamy 1/20

Scots Philosophical Association

University of St Andrews

Liberal Justice: Political and MetaphysicalAuthor(s): Richard Bellamy and Martin HollisSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-19Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and theUniversity of St. Andrews

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219845 .

Accessed: 07/02/2015 19:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association, University of St. Andrews are collaborating with

JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 186.69.157.209 on Sat, 7 Feb 2015 19:33:32 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=spa

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ustandrew

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219845?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219845?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ustandrew

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=spa

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup



The

Philosophical uarterly

ol.

5

No.

178

January

995

ISSN

o03 -8094

The

Philosophical

Quarterly

LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL

BY

RICHARD

BELLAMY AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

The

God of the Old Testament

s

proclaimed

as a

just

God but

is

assur-

edly

no

liberal.

A

society

whose idea of

ustice

accords with

patriarchal

principles

of

political authority

s

an

unjust

society

by

the test

of

liberal

ideas about

freedom,

utonomy

nd the

equality

of

persons.

Such a dis-

pute betweenconceptionsof ustice sounds squarelymetaphysical,urn-

ing

on the

true character of a

just society,

f human nature

and,

per-

haps,

of

ajust

God. Nor

is it

meta-ethically

eutral:

f

patriarchy

ere

to

prevail,

just

society

would

oblige

citizens to lead a

particular

formof

good

and

upright

ife,

contrary

o the familiar iberal tenet that

ques-

tions of what is

right

can be

settled

without

prejudice

to

questions

of

what

is

good.

Yet

this

liberal tenet

is

not

disputed only by patriarchs

and

other

opponents

of

iberalism.

There are

competingconceptions

of

justice

within he liberal

camp,

and some of them nclude a

specific,

f

carefully ncomplete, ccount of a citizen s moral commitments.

Liberals

who

agree

with

J.S.

Mill

that the

only

freedom

worthy

f

the

name is thatof

pursuing

our own

good

in

our own

waymay

eem

bound

to

leave each

of us to

define

our own

good

for ourselves.

This familiar

conclusion does

not follow

imply,

however.

A liberal could stress

our

own

way ,

rather than our own

good ,

when

designing

a constitution

whose

primary

dea of

religious

toleration

was

to

allow a

variety

f

ways

to a

Christian

good (e.g.,

Locke).

A more

agnostic

iberal could tolerate

widerexperimentsn living, rovidedthatthey mbodya prescribed, f

secular,

notion of human

flourishing e.g.,

Mill).

A

liberal

with com-

munitarian

endencies

could let us choose ourown

good

without

etting

each of us choose his

or her

own

good (e.g.,

Rousseau).

This

may

be

to

approach

the limits

f

liberalism,

ut there are liberal

disciples

of

Rous-

?The

Editors

f

The

Philosophical uarterly,

995.

Published

y

Blackwell

ublishers,

08

Cowley

Road,

Oxford

X4

IJF,

UK

and

238

Main

Street,

ambridge,

A

02142,

USA.








2

RICHARD

BELLAMY AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

seau

and,

in

general,

the line between the

right

nd the

good

has never

been

perspicuous.

Contemporary

liberals

usually

contend that modern

democratic

societies are so deeply plural that iberalismmust do without nycom-

prehensive

moral framework

f

a

distinctively

iberal

kind. Pluralism

forces

the issue. But

it

does so neitherbecause

it

is a

contingent

histori-

cal factwhicha democratic iberal should

recognize,

nor because liberal-

ism

implies

moral relativism

r

some such meta-ethical

ommitment.

The

point

is, rather,

hat a

liberal

society

which

permits

ree discussion

and

action

has

to

leave

radically onflicting

thical

viewpoints

n

play.

To restrict his

diversity y

the

use of state

power

would be

oppressive

(Rawls

1993

p.

37).

Hence,

it is

argued,

liberalism

annot

defend itself

by

appealing

to the inherent

superiority

f the liberal ideal without

becoming

illiberal.

The

only way

to

avoid

this

paradox

is to

provide

principles

of

ustice

which are neutral

in

the

political

sense that

all

involved

ccept

them

as

offering

air

terms f social

co-operation

when

viewed

fromwithin heir

respective omprehensive

doctrines.

Pluralism

involves a

compromise

between liberal

and illiberal

views,

which,

although

reached

in the

name of

ustice,

allows

illiberal

practices.

We

shall test

the

coherence of this

ine

later.)

Can one construct conception of ustice that eschewsmetaphysical

claims to

universal

truth,

or nstance about the nature

of

persons,

and

instead seeks

simply

o

provide

a fair nd stable

basis for

peaceful polit-

ical

co-existence?

The

attempt

has been made most

explicitly

n

the

recent

writings

fJohn

Rawls

notably

n

PPA

1985

[JF],

evised

n

Polit-

ical Liberalism

PL]

as

Lecture

1).

His idea of a

just

society

as a fair

system

f

co-operation

between

free and

equal

persons

is

finely

oised

(JFp.

238;

PL

pp.

9,

26).

Fairness

s a

procedural

notion,

falling

hair s-

breadth short of

implying

thick

conception

of

the

good.

Co-operation

involvesa notion of

proper

conduct Kantian

enough

to

prevent

free-

riding,yet

without

equiring

shared moral

purpose.

The

freedom

nvis-

aged

leaves room for

dispute

between

disciples

of

Locke

(the

moderns )

and

disciples

of Rousseau

(the ancients ).

Equality

con-

strains the

distribution

f

power

and resources

without

conceding

to

egalitarians.

Persons re

essentially

articipants

n

social

life,

equipped

with

capacity

or

sense of

ustice

and of the

good; yet

this

onception

does

not

call

for

a

metaphysical

octrine

of the nature

of the self. The

whole idea is framedto apply not universally r eternallybut to the

basic structure f a modern

political

democracy.

t starts romwithin

particular

political

tradition ,

oughly

he one which

emerged

in

West-

ern

Europe

from

the

wars

of

religion

and has

given

us

an

overlapping

consensus about

the

virtues

required

of citizens to base

the

construct

?The

Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

TUSTICE:

POLITICAL AND

METAPHYSICAL

on

(JFp.

225;

PL

pp.

14-15).

The

revised

theory

of

justice

is thus

as

promised by

the title of

JF,

political,

not

metaphysical

JFp. 230;

PL

p.

10).

In thispaper,we addresstworelateddoubtsabout tryingoturnmeta-

physical

water

nto

political

wine.

First,

here are rival

non-metaphysical

theories

of

ustice

on

offer,

nd

in

weakening

his

conception

of the

self,

freedom

and

equality,

Rawls

may

have let

himself

be

fatally

queezed

between ibertarianwritersike

F.A.

Hayek

and left-of-centreiberals ike

Ronald Dworkin.

Second,

his

theory,

n

common with those of other

philosophical

liberals,

s

curiouslyunpolitical.

He

deliberately

xcludes

the

haggling

and

trading

of interests

nd the

contingencies

of

power,

characteristic f political agreements,from the rational deliberations

that

he

believes

ought

to

motivate

he

parties

n

a democratic

ociety

o

arrive

at his

two

principles

of

ustice.

He contrasts n

articulated

and

normative

overlapping

consensus on

principles

of

ustice

with

a

mere

modusvivendi chieved

through contingent

balance of

power;

and he

sees his

two

principles

as

removing

from the

political

agenda

certain

contentious

ssues,

such as who has the

vote

or what sortsof views

can

be

expressed.

This exclusion

of

politics

threatensto render

the

prin-

ciples

of

ustice

too abstract

nd

far

removed

from

people s

real circum-

stances to

yield

any practical

guidance

to free and

equal persons trying

to workout what counts as fair

co-operation

n

particular

political

con-

ditions.

To focus

these doubts we shall

begin

by

asking

whether

a

Rawlsian

type

of construct

an

be defended

against

libertarianswithout

falling

prey

to communitarians. his

enquiry

willbe conducted

in

the

next

two

sections under

the

headings

of Clubs and

Communities .

We shall

then

step

back to consider whetherthe

political

can

be

kept

clear of

metaphysics .We explore thisquestion in the third ection under the

heading

of

Commonwealths ,

understood as

fair

systems

f

co-oper-

ation between

free and

equal

persons,

conceived

in

a

republican

tra-

dition

updated by drawing

on our earlier comments on each

of the

other

headings.

This

discussion

will

bring

us to

the conclusion

that cit-

izenship

does indeed

involve

a

political

idea of

ustice,

where

political

obligations

re

prior

to

pre-political ights,

ut

one which

s,

as

our title

suggests,metaphysical

or all that.

n

the final

section we test

out this

thesisbyapplying t to questionsabout the positionof women and the

distribution f welfare

n

an illiberal culture.

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








4

RICHARD

BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS

I.

CLUBS

By clubs we mean free associations formedto mutual advantage in

pursuing

limited aims. Members observe the

rules

for instrumental

reasons. The rules

embody

a

system

f

co-operation

related

to the

pur-

pose

of

the

club.

But not all

clubs

treattheirmembers

equally

or

even

fairly.

Women,

for

nstance,

may

be banned from

the

library

n

a Lon-

don

club,

expected

to make the tea

in

a cricket lub or admitted t half-

price

to

a

dating

club. Rich and

powerful

members

may

fare

better han

others,

s

in

clubs for

andowners,

yachting

nthusiasts

nd

oil

barons.

Since

nothing

n

the basic idea of a club itself

ules out all manner

of

discrimination, e need a

particular

ortof club to serve as a model for

the liberal state.

So let us

specify

hat the members be

equal

and the

system

f co-

operation

fair.

Also,

since

they

annot

easily

eave,

we need to construe

their

freedom

n

some broader

sense,

which

may

nvolve resources

for

pursuing

their wn

good

and not

merely

n absence of formal bstacles.

Here

liberal

opinion

starts

o

divide,

with ibertarians

hinking

n

terms

of a mail-order

club,

so to

speak,

and social liberals

in

terms

of a

Christmasclub. In the mail-order tate,all are equally free to trade,

human relations are

severely

nstrumental,

veryone s penny

is worth

the same as

everyone

else s

penny

and it is no one s concern that all

have at least a

basic number

of

pennies.

Each

widow s

mite s worth he

same as each of the millionaire smillion. n the Christmas

lub

state,

ll

insure

themselves

gainst

some

future

ersonal

calamity

y contributing

according

to

their

means to some form

of

collective

welfare nd social

securityprovision,

drawing

on the common fund

according

to

need

rather han

contribution.

n this

view,

which

would

appear

to

be

Rawls ,

mutual

advantage

s secured

by

a

relationship

f

reciprocity.

For both versions

crucial

question

s

whether

he self-interested

art-

icipants

will

rationally

ccept

that

they

have

an

obligation

to abide

by

the

spirit

f the

rules.

f

they

do,

then

they

will

play

fair

ven

when

able

to

avoid

it. If

not,

then

free-riding

ill

destroy

he

system

f

co-oper-

ation,

as Hobbes insistedwhen

arguing

for

a

power

to

keep

all

in

awe .

All

participants

o better

f

all

play

fair

than f the

system

ails;

but

each

seems to do better till

by

undetected

cheating,

not

only

f others cheat

but also ifthey layfair.Wherethis hoice is truly ominantforrational,

self-interested

ndividuals,

the

club

is

doomed.

The

problem

is more

obvious for

the

mail-order

ersion,

where human relations re

explicitly

instrumental,

ut

also

besets the Christmas

club,

which

has

difficulty

explaining why

he

better

off hould

oin

in

the first

lace.

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL

AND

METAPHYSICAL

5

The liberal club

would be

safe from

free-riders,

f

those

takingpart

were

Kantians.

The

problem

vanishes

among

rational

agents,

f

obedi-

ence to the

categorical

imperative

s

a

requirement

of

rationality.

et,

althoughthe Good Samaritanmayhave no reason to regret avingthe

life of a

stranger

who then

pinches

his

wallet,

t

is

hard to believe that

one should

rationally

e as

high-minded

bout

failures

of

mutual

trust

by

mail-order or even

in

the course of a mutual insurance

scheme.

Whereas

moral

obligations

may

be

unconditional,

obligations

of

prud-

ence seem to

be rendered void

by

reasonable

suspicion

of non-com-

pliance,

as

Hobbes

suggests.

Yet Hobbes own

remedy

s

not

as

dour

as

appears

from

remarks ike covenants without he sword are

but

words,

and of

no

strength

o secure a man at all

(ch.

xvii).

In his

reply

to

the

fool who

questionneth

whether

njustice

..

may

not sometimes tand

with hat

reason,

which

dictateth

o

everyman

is own

good ,

he

declares

that it s not

against

reason to honour covenants

of

mutual

trust,

nless

one

has reasonable

suspicion

that

the

other

party

will

not

(ch.

xv).

But

this conclusion is not

easy

to extract

with

as little

pparatus

as Hobbes

provides,

nd even his liberal admirers

usuallygive

themselves

more to

workwith.

The

snag,

as

diagnosed by

Rawls

(PL

pp.

16-17, 147-8),

is that a

societybuilt on nothingbut the mutual self-interestf rationalagents

issues

at best

in

a mere modusvivendi.

uch a

society

need

be

neither

fair,

depending

as

it

does

on a

contingent

distribution f

power,

nor

durable,

since it will

collapse

as soon as

it

suits one or more

of

the

parties

to

defect.

Accordingly

e now advocates a solution with moral

element,

njected

by basing

a

just

society

n an

overlapping

consensus

among

reasonable

agents

who

recognize

ties of

reciprocity .

Since

reciprocity

nvolves

discharging

ne s

obligations

even

when one

could

defect,

we are

being

offered

a

version of

the

Christmasclub

model

which ooks safe fromfree-riders.

This

manoeuvre

compares interestingly

ith

the role

of the veil of

ignorance

in

A

Theory f

Justice.

ehind the veil the demands

of self-

interest

generated

an

extensive

mutual insurance scheme

by

reasoning

uncannily

close to

Kantian. It

looked

as if

prudence pursued

in

ignor-

ance was

congruent

with

the Kantian

moral

point

of

view.

Even

so,

that

left

t unclear

why

rational

agent,

as

standardly

efined,

would

comply

withthe social

contract, f,

once the veil was

lifted,

efection

urnedout

to be dominant. By making more of a distinctionbetween rational

agents

and reasonable

agents

and

relyingheavily

on an

overlapping

consensus ,

Rawls makes

compliance

less

problematic.

Nevertheless,

reciprocity

s

something

of a

mystery

ngredient.

ts

effect s

to

populate

the

ust

society

with reasonable

agents

of a

neigh-

?The

Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








6

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

bourly

sort. Yet this

would be a

sleight

of

hand

if

it

only

worked

by

doctoring

the

passions

so as to make

human

beings

more

sociable,

sym-

pathetic

to one

another,

or

prone

to the

pangs

of a bad

conscience than

originallynvisaged.So presumablyts role is to make reasonable agents

reflective and hence

able to

over-ride their own

preferences

as

expressed

in

their

current

utility ankings

of

outcomes:

when rational

choice

theory

bids rational

agents

to

defect,

reasonable

agents

some-

times refuse.

But

why?

The

obvious answer

might

seem to be

that we

are

being

offered robust

philosophical

psychology

r a

metaphysical

doctrine of the

self,

which ncludes a

Kantian

power

of

reason

to over-

ride

inclination,

renders

agents

less individualistic

nd more

sociable,

and

thus

grounds

a

distinction

between

reciprocity

nd even

super-

enlightened

self-interest.

Yet Rawls

squarely

refuses to

elaborate

any

such moral

ontology

or

metaphysics,

nsisting

hat no

political

view that

depends

on

these

deep

and

unresolved matters an

serve as a

public conception

of

ustice

in

a

constitutional emocratic

tate ,

and

remarking

hat we

must

apply

the

principle

of

toleration to

philosophy

itself

(JFpp.

231,

223;

PL

pp. 13-

14, 9-1o).

In

that

case, however,

he

puzzle

remains how

to

undermine

free-riding,

hen that s a

dominant

choice,

within

procedural

theory

ofrationalitynd ustice that tillkeeps the iberalityn liberalism.Recip-

rocitymay

ndeed hold

the

key,

but not as an ad

hoc

device.

The

generic problem

is

that,

f

prudence

is

construed

along

the

lines

of

standard rationalchoice

theory,

hen t

threatens o be

self-defeating.

The

putative

olution is to set the

hypothetical

n

pursuit

of

the

categ-

orical

by equipping

rational

agents

with a reflectiveness

which

leads

them to

overcome this featureof

prudence

to their

mutual

advantage.

Yet,

while

(expected)

utilities

remain a

given

element

in

the

stock of

common

knowledge

which

rational

agents

have of one

another

and are

an automatic link between

preference

and choice, there is

simply

no

way

for

reflectiveness o make a

difference.Hence we

need a

device for

distancing

rational

agents

from

their

preferences,

while

leaving

them

self-interested

n

the

pursuit

of theirown

good.

Rawls

failsto

solve this

difficulty.

he

imperative

o

co-operate,

n

his

view,

remains

hypothetical,

n

that

co-operationproceeds

on

terms hat

each

participantmay

reasonably ccept,

provided

that

veryone

lse

like-

wise

accepts

them

(JFp.

232;

PL

p.

16).

However,

there s

bound to

be

a problemofcompliance among rationalmaximizers, nce theyhave a

shrewd

dea of their

power

to

avoid

doing

their bit. This

is

explicit

n

David Gauthier s

versionof the

club,

for

example,

where rational

agents

know

their historical

and social

positions

and

yet

choose to

be con-

strained maximizers

who

play

fair

with other

constrained

maximizers

?The

Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL AND

METAPHYSICAL

7

even

when able to avoid it. That

may

sound

promising.

f it

pays

the

weak and the

strong

alike to

adopt

a

disposition

to

play

fair,

then

the

Hobbesian

problem

s

solved without he trouble nd

expense

of a fraud

squad. But the burden of this solution fallsveryheavilyon the idea

thatone can

choose

a

disposition

to

be

a

Kantian

among

Kantians

and,

presumably,

rat

among

rats.Since the choice is

prompted

by

self-inter-

est,

and the

disposition,being

conditional,

can

be

suspended

when it

suits,

we

fail

to see

why

a rational villain will not smile

and

smile and

stillbe

a

villain.

n

Rawls and

Gauthier

alike,

the social

contractneeds

to

bring

bout whatRousseau called

(I

8)

a

remarkable

hange

in

man ,

putting

justice

in

the

place

of instinct nd

leading

him to

consult

his

reason rather

han

study

his inclinations .Gauthier s

disposition

owards

enlightened

self-interests not to be trusted

ny

more than Rawlsian

reciprocity,

nless the self

s

transmuted

n

acquiring

t.

That

will

disappoint

those who

hope

that Kant can furnish

the

element

of

trustwhich

even a

mail-ordermarketneeds. But the Kantian

Rechtsstaat

s

not a

club,

even

though

it

seems

to

keep

the

liberality

n

liberalism

without

blending

the

right

and the

good. Despite

its

con-

tractarian

ir,

the

Rechtsstaat

irmly

resupposes

a

theory

of

morality

which is not

contractarian nd rational

agents

who are

categorically

moral in all theirpractical dealingswith one another. In undertaking

to

respect

one another s

autonomy,

hese

agents

are not

entering

con-

tractbut

simplyrecognizing

what their own

autonomy mplies.

It

may

look as

if

autonomy

s too schematic a notion to have

moral

content.

But there is no

mistaking

Kant s

view that someone

who

consults

only

self-interest,

owever

reflectively,

s

not a fit citizen of the Rechtsstaat.

Autonomous

agents keep promises

because

they

have

made

them,

and

regardless

of their

expected

utilities

when the time

comes. Pace

Rawls,

the

Rechtsstaat

mbodies a universal

onception ofjustice,

metaphysical

doctrineof the self and a refusal o

apply

the

principle

of tolerationto

philosophy

tself.

In

denying

that the

Rechtsstaat

s a

contract,

we

do not

deny

that

it

may

be a construct.Such

a

constructwould need

to be the work of

already

autonomous

agents,

however,

not their incentive

to become

autonomous. That

is to

build

a

specific principle

of

limited toleration

into

the

construct

nd hence a refusalto

compromise

between

liberal

and illiberal

views.

The

grounds

of this refusal

can

only

be moral

and

connectedwith metaphysical octrineof the self, ven ifthemorality

involved

s

carefully

chematic

rather

than

detailed.

The

Kantian

self

s

not

prior

to

all

the ends

which

constitute

t. That much

is

clear.

But a

new

difficulty

rises,

when

we ask

exactly

which

ends are

integral

to a

citizen of

the

Rechtsstaat.

hat is

the

cue for communitarians.

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








8

RICHARD BELLAMY AND

MARTIN HOLLIS

II. COMMUNITIES

Communitiesdiffer rom lubs in that, ather han ndividuals onstitut-

ing society

ordistinct

urposes

of

their

wn,

social

membership uppos-

edly

constitutes ndividual

identity.

Communitarians

regard

the club

model of

society

s an

impossible

attempt

o

pull

society

up

by

its own

bootstraps,

ince

it assumes what t seeks

to create: unless

there

s

already

a social

setting

which

provides

ndividualswith

roles and

standards,

he

notion of

individual

choice has no

meaning.

The

self-interested

gents

of much

liberal

theorizing

re ridiculed as

compulsive shoppers

in the

supermarket

of ends.

Lacking

either a

sense of

purpose

or a

shared

moralframework,uchdisencumbered ndividuals s the

participants

n

Rawls

original position

or Gauthier s

contractors ould not

establish

a

settledorder of

preferences

r

reach

stable

agreements

withothers.

Communitarians

contend,

therefore,

that

the

Kantian

Rechtsstaat

makes

sense

only

within

he context of

the

Hegelian

ethical state.

The

right

cannot be

separated

from the

good,

since

rules of

ustice

reflect

common

understandings

f

ends,

rather han

means,

which

explain why

certain

goods

are

important

nd

how

they

fit nto a

particular

pattern

of social relationships fwhichtheindividual s a part.Despite an estab-

lished

tradition of

neo-Hegelian

liberal

communitarianism, owever,

many

iberals have

been

uneasy

with this

way

of

thinking, egarding

t

as either

conservative,

ith small

c ,

or

downright

uthoritarian.

Contemporary ttempts

at communitarian

iberalism cannot

easily

escape

these criticisms.

Communitarian

liberals

can

be

divided

into

relativistsnd

rationalists,

ithMichael

Walzer s

Spheres fJusticerovid-

ing

an

example

of

the

first nd

Joseph

Raz s

Morality

f

Freedom n

instance

of

the second.

Walzer s

argument

s

communitarian

n

so far

as he

argues

(p.

7)

that distributions re

patterned

n accordance with

shared

conceptions

of

what the

goods

are and what

they

re for .

His

theory

s

liberal,

however,

n

contending

that we

ought

to show

equal

concern

and

respect

both

for the

different

nderstandings

of

ustice

found in

different

ocieties and for the

distributional riteria

ppropri-

ate to

different

oods

within

ocieties.

The

problem

withWalzer s thesis

is that the

relativism eed not

generate

the liberalism.

His contention

(p.

313)

that a

given

society

s

ust

if

ts substantive ife s

lived

... in a

wayfaithful o the shared understandingsof the members can legi-

timize

extremely

oercive

regimes.

Public

opinion may

be

misguided

or

unreliable.

People

are

often

misinformed,

rejudiced

or

self-deluded,

their

views

as

much the

product

of

socialization and

various

formsof

indoctrination s of

reasoned

argument.

Oppression

is

often

accepted

?The Editors f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL

AND

METAPHYSICAL

9

by

the

oppressed

as

a

result of their

acquiescence

in

the

ideology

inflicted

on them.

Thus a shared

understanding

that

we

are

all,

for

instance,

miserable

sinners

can

underpin

a

substantive

ife

quite

con-

traryo a liberal idea ofjustice.

Moreover,

the relativist

rgument

provides

no basis

for

tolerating

plurality

f

views

either

within r

between

societies

-

something

Walzer

desires.

Complete agnosticism

bout

any

foundations

for truth r mor-

ality

eads

not to tolerance

but to

struggles

etween

opposed ideologies

in which

might

s

right.

f X

seeks to

impose

a

lifestyle

n

Y,

on the

grounds

that Ys

life will otherwise

ack

fulfilment,

hen

Y

can restrain

Xonly

by

appealing

to some

principle

transcending

heir

respective

ub-

jective

ideals.

The

equality

of

respect

desired

by

Walzer

mightemerge

naturally

where there is an

equitable

balance of

power.

Outside this

purely

contingent

situation,

however,

he needs

a

warrant

for it in an

objective

claim about

what

makes all human lives

worthy

f our

concern.

Rationalist

ommunitarians

eek

to

provide

such

a

justification y argu-

ing

that the

central

human

good

that

a

liberal

society

hould

uphold

is

the

capacity

for

utonomy.

A

communitarian

iberalism

must, herefore,

be

committed

to

maintaining

an

autonomy-supporting

nvironment

that secures those

conditions

necessary

to make

meaningful

choices

possible. This entailsnot merelyprotecting ach individual snegative

liberty

romdeliberate

coercion

by

others,

but also

providing

range

of

worthwhile

ptions.

The

danger

with this

thesis

from liberal

point

of

view

arises

from the classic

objection

to

all

positive

theories

of

liberty:

namely,

hat

they

ead to

the

paternalistic

mposition

f

a

particular ype

of behaviour

on

individuals,

n the

grounds

that freedom

requires

the

pursuit

of

certain

goals

necessary

o realize

their true

selves.

The

dif-

ficulty

rises

from

rying

o reconcile

the

requirements

f

the conditions

for

autonomy,

which

only

flourishes

n a certain

kind of social

set-up,

withthe

capacity

for

autonomy,

een as our

ability

o create our own

moral world.

Once

our

capacity

for

autonomy

becomes

itself

a

con-

ditioned

product,

then one can

no

longer appeal

to

it as

an inde-

pendent

standard

to

preventpaternalistic

nterferences

with

ndividual

liberty

see

Mendus).

As

Raz himself bserves

(p.

391),

for those

who

live

in

an

autonomy-supporting

nvironment

here s

no choice

but to

be autonomous .

This criticism

may

seem unfair.

Raz

does

after

ll contend

that

auto-

nomy presupposes what he calls competitivepluralism ,and we our-

selves

believe that

iberalism

annot divorce

tself

rom ll

metaphysical

and

moral

considerations.

n

our

view,

however,

Raz

goes

too far.

He

attempts

o make

the

metaphysics

o all

the work

n

producing

a well-

ordered

society.

As

a

result,

he

pluralism

which he allows

turns

out to

?The

Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








10 RICHARD

BELLAMY AND

MARTIN

HOLLIS

be

narrower han at

first

ppears, consistingonly

in

putatively

worth-

while

options .

Crucial

to

his

thesis s

a

distinction

he

makes

between

self-interest nd

personal

well-being

analogous

to Mill s

famous

divisionbetween the lower and the higherpleasures.The first elates

primarily

o

our

biological requirements

nd

arouses

pleasure

which,

on Raz s

definition,

s

both insatiable and

non-diminishing.

he second

is

orientated towards

goals

or

pursuits

of

independent

value and

prod-

uces

happiness ,

which Raz

regards

as

a

satiable and

diminishing

mo-

tion.

He

argues

that,

whilst he

pursuit

of

self-interest

roduces

conflict,

striving

fter

personal well-being

oes not.

Consequently,

f

the

opport-

unities

available within

ociety

nly

enshrine sound moral

conceptions

then

people

will

naturally

choose

for

themselves

oals

which

ead to a

rough

coincidence in theirown lives of moral and

personal

concerns .

Social

harmony

will

follow,

n

which

by

being

teachers,

production

workers,

rivers,

ublic

servants,

oyal

friends

nd

family

eople,

loyal

to their

ommunities,

ature-loving

nd

so

on,

[people]

willbe

pursuing

theirown

goals, enhancing

their

own

well-being,

nd

also

serving

heir

communities,

nd

generally

iving

n

a

morallyworthyway

(p.

215).

This

ethical liberal

utopia,

in

which

(only slightly

o

amend a famous

phrase)

the

autonomy

of each is

the condition for the

autonomy

for

ll,

is wildlyoptimistic.Not only does it underestimatethe potential for

moral

conflict etween different

eatures

f

people s

lives even within

single

ethical

code,

it

greatly

verestimates he

degree

of

moral

agree-

ment that a

liberal

society

which

encourages diversity

nd

experimen-

tation

s

likely

o be able to

sustain. As we shall

argue

in

the

following

sections,

t

is

the

ob

of

politics,

lbeit

informed

by

liberal

morality,

o

conciliate and resolve

such

disputes.

To

avoid the sort of

difficulties e have raised

concerning

Raz s the-

ory,

Rawls

proposes

a

non-metaphysical olitical

liberalism

that

avoids

comprehensivemeta-ethical laims.Yet,we submit,Raz is correctto the

extent that such a

conception

cannot

in

itself be

entirely

neutral

between

conceptions

of

the

good.

At

the

very

east,

t

requires

an

attach-

ment to a

specific

set

of

political

virtues

which force us to

exchange

viewsratherthan

bullets and

agree

on

equitable

solutions and

compro-

mises.

How

deep

such

citizenly

thics need bite into our

personal

mor-

ality

orms

he

subject

of the next

section.

III. COMMONWEALTHS

The

members of

clubs and communes

lack the

qualities

required

of a

citizen

of

a

liberal

polity.

The former

re too detached and the

latter

too

involved.

The club

model cannot show

why

it is

instrumentally

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL

AND

METAPHYSICAL 11

rational for

atomistic

ndividuals

o

adopt

the

impartial tandpointpre-

scribedwithin he liberal frameworknd thus

regulate

their ocial

inter-

action

in

ajust

manner.

n

any

case,

such an

abstract nd

general

frame-

work is only part of what is needed. By itself, t cannot motivate a

common concern

for

the

quality

of life or

guide

it towards set

of

poli-

cies.

Yet,

as

we shall

argue

below,

it

is

the

ability

o formulate nd mot-

ivatecommon concern and to translate t

into

policy

that

represents

he

true

task

of

politics

nd hence of

citizenship.

Clubs are

inherently polit-

ical.

Communities,

by

contrast,

re

unmistakably

olitical.

Communitar-

ians are

generally

neo-Aristotelians,

nd to accuse them of

lacking

a

conception

of

citizenship may

seem

perverse.

However,

their

civic

humanistversionof

citizenship

excludes

politics,

n the modern sense

of

negotiation

and

bargaining

in

(until

recently)

smoke-filled ooms.

For

communitarians,

olitics simply

nvolves

participation

n

the

public

life of the

community.

t

presupposes

a

pre-existing

ommunal

good,

a

tradition which

participants

re to

accept

as a

going

concern.

It

does

not start rom

debating

a

variety

f different

iewpoints

bout what that

good

might

be

so

as to

secure the

emergence

of

a

workable

ompromise.

Indeed,

the

communitarian

position

denies both the

pluralism

of

ends,

at least within a community, nd the public/privatedivide necessary

to make

sense

of such a

conception.

Yet

both,

we would

contend,

are

inescapable

features

f

modern life withwhich a

viable

formof liberal-

ism must come to terms.

A

liberalism

posited

upon

a

homogeneous

moral

communitymay

have been

possible

in

the

eighteenth

century,

but not

in

the

twenty-first.

The form of

citizenship

we associate with commonwealths stems

from

the civic

republican

tradition.

Deriving

from

Machiavelli rather

than

Aristotle,

t treats

political participationmerely

as

the condition

for

retaining

ur

liberty,

atherthan as essential to our self-realization.

According

to

this ine of

thinking,

ince

the

rights

nd

liberties vailable

to

us

depend upon

the

laws,

norms and

priorities

of

our

particular

society,

we shall

be free

only

to the extent thatwe share

in

determining

their haracter.

As

Rawls notes

(PL

pp.

205-6),

since this

conception

of

citizenship

nvolvesno

advance commitment o

any

specific

onception

of the

good,

civic

republicanism

s

compatible

with

a

pluralist

demo-

cratic iberalism.Yet

the schema

implies

an

unspecific

onception

of

the

good, since it is underpinnedbyobligations.For,ifthesearrangements

are

to

respect

fairly

he values and

demands

of all

members

of

society,

rather than

ust

those of

elites,

hen

we have

an

obligation

not

only

to

participate personally

n

collective

decision-making

ut

also

to

ensure

that others

do

too.

?The Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








12

RICHARD BELLAMY

AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

Our

conception

of

citizenship

ests n the

acceptance

of duties whose

discharge

s

a

precondition

for

the

political

life of the

commonwealth.

They enjoin equal

basic

respect

and concern for all others

n

this com-

monwealthof free and equal persons. The idea of respect looks to

Kant s notion

of

autonomy, ogether

with his thesis that to claim

auto-

nomy

for

oneself s to

recognize

that others have the same claim

to

be

treated s ends in

themselves.

ree

citizens

of the

kingdom

of ends

are

separate

and

equal persons,

n

a sense which

respects

both their ccess

to

public

life and their

right

to a

private

one.

The idea of concern

implies

an

equal

minimum

of

resources,

enough

to make

autonomy

real.

A

degree

of

material

ndependence

is needed for

public

and

priv-

ate life

alike,

to

give

citizens the time and means

to

play

their

public

part

and

literally

o close the door on othersforthe sake of

privacy.

These duties

provide

a substantive ccount

of the

preconditions

for

open-minded

discussion

among

free and

equal

persons, ncluding

con-

sideration

of

the social resources

necessary

for freedom

of

thought,

expression

and action. As

preconditions,

hey

need

to be

metaphysically

grounded

and defended

as

reflecting priori

otions

of

what s

due

to

individuals,

o that no citizen is treated

as less than a

person.

Then,

within this framework

f

enablements

and

constraints,

here will be

room forpoliticsof a practicalkind to deliberate and settle matters f

collective

oncern.

By putting

uties before

rights

nd

making

them

preconditions

f the

life of a

commonwealth,

we

hope

to

overcome

two familiar

problems

for

iberal

attempts

o accommodate

pluralism.

The first rises from he

charge

that iberals concede too much

if

they

thin down their

concep-

tion of

ustice

so as to

appeal

to all

points

of

view. There is a

danger

that

a

theory

f

ustice

thin

enough

to

appeal

to a

plurality

f

groups

will entail

tolerating

he intolerable.

Moreover,

t could be

decidedly

inegalitarian,prone

to

entrenching

nd

legitimating

atherthan chal-

lenging

the

prevailingdisparities

f

power

and wealth. Pluralism

com-

bined with

thin

theory

f

ustice may

mean

capitulation

to the

existing

distribution

f

power

in

society

and an

implicit

endorsement of

the

belief that

might

is

right.

The second

problem

arises because meta-

physicsprovides

no substitute

or

politics.

Our moral

obligationsprove

too narrow to determine to whom

our

duty

s owed or how it

is

to

be

discharged.Rights-based olitical

moralities xacerbate

this

difficulty

y

upholding negative perfect obligations of non-interference o firmly

that

they

cannot set about

explaining

why

we

should

as

opposed

to

merely

ould)

participate

within orms

f

collective

decision-making

nd

co-operation.

We

shall returnto this

point

in

the discussion of welfare

in

the next

section.

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL

AND METAPHYSICAL

13

The first

roblem

has

surfaced

forcefully

n

recent criticisms

f liber-

alism

by

feminists

ho

have

remarked

how the

discourse

of

ustice

needs

to

be

supplemented

by

an awareness

of

the sources

of

oppression

(e.g.,

Young). It has also been central to criticisms f the Rawlsianproject

since

its

inception.

On the one

hand,

Rawls first

rinciple

of

ustice,

which

prescribes

maximal

equal

liberties

for

all,

has been

criticizedfor

being

too formal.

t fails

to

appreciate

that

udgements

about maximal

equal

liberty, eing

necessarily

ualitative

rather

than

quantitative

n

nature,

cannot

yield

definite resolutions

of conflictsbetween

liberties

(O Neill

1979/80).

On the other

hand,

his second

principle,

which

allows

inequalities,

provided

that

they

benefit

the worst

off,

has

been

attacked

for

failing

o

capture

the

importance

of

people s

relative

tand-

ing

fortheirevaluationof theirsense ofworth.Moreover,the division

between

state

and

civil

ociety, rivate

nd

public,

implied by

giving

he

first

rinciple

lexical

priority,

nderestimates

he

extent to which

the

equal

liberties

equire

a

substantial

ocial

and economic

empowerment.

These criticisms

an

be related to Rawls

attempt

o

draw

a distinction

between

the

right

nd the

good

so as to confine

the Rechtsstaat

o mat-

tersof

procedural

ustice,

while

eaving

ts

members

utonomy

o

pursue

their own

good

in

their own

way.

This classic

distinction

s

a

liberal

hallmark;but it has nevercome out cleanly.The snag is thatthereis

no

purely

rocedural

objection

to

treating

different

eople

or

groups

differently.

ny

objection

has to take the

form of

complaining

that a

particular

difference

s irrelevant

nd such

questions

of

relevance

are

moral

uestions,

even

if

they

do

not

thereby

ease

to

be

questions

of

justice.

For

example,

fairness etween

free

and

equal persons

rules

out

forms

f

the

subjection

of

women

for

which

some

religions

laim

moral

authority,

ven

though

the

religion

deals

fairly

etween

women

(and

fairly

etween

men).

The liberal

retort s that

no moral

authority

an

infringe

nyone s

autonomy

- a moral laim thatwomen are free and

equal

persons.

The liberal division

between

public

and

private

s

not one

between

ustice

and

morality

ut one

distinguishing

moral

commitments

which

the

commonwealth

makes

fromthose

where t stands

aside.

Rawls

retreat rom

metaphysical

o

a

political

theory

f

ustice

is a

partialrecognition

f

the

point.

Political is meant

to

avoid

metaphysics,

thus

etting

rgument

bout

the

merits f

public

policyproceed

without

having

to settle

questions

of

objectivity

n ethics. But

it is not

meant

to abolish all moral engagement. n a societymarkedbya reasonable

pluralism ,

there

are

overlapping

conceptions

of

the

good

with

nough

of a

liberal consensus

in the

overlap

to

allow

the

emergence

of

reason-

able

policies

like

those

mplied

by

the

Difference

rinciple.

The consen-

sus

is

morally

ommittal,

ven

if

the

warrant

s

only

consensus

itself.

?The

Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








14

RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

Can

a

political theory

f

ustice rely

on

its own

bootstraps?

Rawls s

ambivalent. Sometimes he

presents

the liberal

overlap

in

commun-

itarian

guise

as the historical

product

of the

Western democratic tra-

dition. We findthisprofoundlyunsatisfactory,rantedthattraditions

are not

rigid.

To

continue

the

example,

are

there

ways

of

treating

women

in

contemporary

ritainwhich are established

practices,

nd

so

acceptable

to an

evolving

tradition,but,

by

the test of a reasonable

pluralism,

unreasonable? For

instance,

sexual harassment and the

exclusion of women from all-male clubs are well-established

ractices,

and Britain has

lately

ncorporated

new traditions

which,

it has been

argued

in

a

local

government

ouncil

chamber,

nclude

an

established

practice

of female circumcision.

By

what test does a liberal deem these

practices

unreasonable ? Someone

mightperhaps reply

hatthecrux s

not

what is

in

fact

accepted

but whether a liberal view can be

got

to

prevail

n

a

power-game

where winners re

always

easonable and losers

always

nreasonable. But thatwould be a

desperate

move.

t would offer

a

way

of

making ustice political

which

recalls

Thrasymachos

ardonic

viewthat

ustice

is what uitsthe

strong.

The test f a reasonable

plural-

ism, therefore,

tillneeds a

metaphysical acking.

Accordingly,

awls now

argues

that an

attempt

o arrive t a

political

conception bystriking merelypragmaticbalance between thevarious

moral viewsfound within

ociety

would be

political

in

the

wrong

way

(PL

p.

40).

Instead,

he

presents

his

theory

f

ustice

as a

free-standing

view

derived

from the

fundamental dea

of

society

s

a fair

system

f

co-operation ,

n

the

hope

that this

dea,

with

ts ndex of

primary oods

arrived at from

within,

an be the focus of a

reasonable

overlapping

consensus . Yet without ome transcendental eason

why

liberal con-

vergence

should

occur,

this

must

surely

remain a

pious hope

-

parti-

cularly

s he

rejects

as

oppressive

any

state action

through

education

or

legislation

to

uphold

a

political morality.

In

arguing

for some

metaphysical

oundations

for

liberalism

we do

not

wish

to

run foul of

the

second familiar

problem

associated with

liberal

theory,

amely

that t is

anti-political.

Here we

agree

withRawls

that

metaphysics

must not swallow

up

the whole

of

morality.

he

polit-

ical realm

needs a

metaphysical

basis to define fairnessfor decision-

making procedures,

while

setting

only partial

conditions

on what

may

emerge

from

them.

Thus

who

gets

what,

when and

how,

remains an

issue wherespecificpoliciesare to be settledbythepushingand shoving

of different nterests nd

points

of view within

the basic constraints.

Whatever

olicy merges

from

due

process

of decision is to be deemed

reasonable.

Yet,

to make it

a

due

process ,

we

require

not

only

due

formality

bout

the

procedure

but

also

substantive

onditions for

polit-

?The Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:


15

ical debate between

free and

equal persons.

These conditions

could

be

said to enable

the

emergence

of a General

Will,

while also

constraining

its

scope.

From this

perspective,

the General

Will

is a

matter

not of

discovering he objective,antecedent truth bout the best policies but

of

constructing

olicies

which

are

reasonable

by

the test

of whether

they merged bypolitical horse-trading

ithout reach of the conditions

of

communicative

ction.

Here lies the basis

for

a

conception

of

liberal

ustice

and

citizenship

that

s

both

political

and

metaphysical.

t is

metaphysical

n

its connec-

tion with a

formof

Kantian

universalism.

However,

unlike

rights-based

theories,

which

attach to certain

putative

natural or

basic

properties

of the

individual,

our

duty-based rgument

does not idealize

any parti-cular formof

agency,

but is concerned

solely

withhow one should act

towards

others

(see

O Neill

1989

for

this

reading

of

Kant).

Moreover,

unlike Raz s ethical

liberalism,

t is directed

to

the

preconditions

of

political

communication rather

than to the detailed conduct

of social

life at

large.

It is

political

in

leaving

the

choice

of

specific

policies

for

what

is

owed to

whom to be determined

by

the

deliberative

process

itself.

IV. THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE DISTANCE

To illustrate the

merits of this

approach,

we offer two concrete

examples.

That such an exercise

s

possible

in

itself

ignals

an

advantage

over rival

conceptions

of

political ustice,

which

so often fail to

engage

critically

ith

the real world.

The

first

xample,

by way

of comment

on Rawls

Liberty

principle,

continues our remarks

bout what a reasonable

pluralism

is to make

of the

position

of women

in

a

society

marked

by

illiberal

practices.

n

so far as the question is whether to tolerate the intolerant,we echo

Milton s

Areopagitica:

I

cannot

raise

fugitive

nd cloistered

irtue,

nexercised

nd

unbreathed,

that

ever allies ut nd

seesher

dversary,

ut

links utofthe

race,

where

that

mmortal

arland

s to be

run

for,

otwithout

ust

nd

heat.

In

insisting

n

a

metaphysical

grounding

for

a

principle

of

equal

lib-

erties for

all,

we

bypass

the subversive

thought

that

unsexed,

risk-

inclined individuals

behind

a

veil

of

ignorance

might assign

some

women to drudgery nd gamble on not turning ut to be among them.

We

also

deny

that

the

Liberty rinciple

can be classed

as

a matter

where

a liberal can

agree

to

disagree

with the

intolerant,

by deploring

the

subjection

of women while

recognizing

the

right

of

the

oppressors

to

get

on with

t.

?The Editors

f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








16 RICHARD BELLAMY

AND

MARTIN HOLLIS

But this does not

dispose

of

two

more awkward

spects

of the

prin-

ciple.

What

if

there are women who are content with ubservient oles

and

regard

a

liberal rescue

as

illegitimate aternalism?

ince this can

indeed be the case in a plural society,male authorscannotmerely ulk,

like

knights

expostulating

that the infuriateddamsel cannot

possibly

prefer

he

dragon

they

have slain to them. The

point

at

issue concerns

the status

of

preferences

n

a

liberal

theory.

n market

versions

of the

club,

where

the

customer

s

alwaysright,

here s no

scope

for

arguing

that

preferencesmay

be

contrary

o

real

interestsbecause

shaped

by

the

existing

distribution

f

power.

We see no need for a

metaphysical

liberalismto

let itself

be

cloistered

by

this

ine.

Nor,

we

might

add,

do

liberal women feminists.

Once the

preconditions

of

reasonable dis-

course include considerations f social

empowerment,

owever,

prefer-

ences cease to

be

simply given .

Those formed

after

he

dust and heat

have subsided are to

be

respected

and

they

can still

be for

a woman s

role of a sort

to

disappoint

a

feminist.

he

liberal

metaphysic

nsists n

equal

liberties or

all,

without

upposing

that

no one

could

then reflec-

tively

hoose

to

forgo

some of them. But

such

a

choice threatens

he

liberal trust

n

the

spread

of

enlightenment

nd

it

may

be

that t has

to

be

an

option

which

only

a

few are allowed.

In

the last resort iberals

cannot let theRechtsstaatade out unexercised and unbreathed.

Relatedly,

here

s

an awkward

uestion

about the

line

between

public

and

private

for a

theory

which

denies that

ustice

can

be

purely

a

pro-

cedural notion. In

homes,

as

in

markets,

cquiescence

is

not

always

o

be read

as consent.

Here we

endorse

the

proposition

that

the

personal

is the

political.

But that

does

not

give

the

plural, yet

iberal,

common-

wealth the

right

r

duty

o

regulatepervasively.

We

envisage

a

three-fold

grouping

of

issues,

into

those

where the

Liberty principle

must be

upheld,

those where it

definitely

orbids

intervention

nd

those

in

between,wherethe outcome is a matterfor

political

debate.

Examples

are domestic

violence,

adult

homosexuality

nd

varieties

f

pornography

respectively.

ut the

topic

is

too

complex

for

the

present

paper

and we

leave

it with

the

remark

that a distinctionbetween

public

and

private

remains as crucial for a liberalismwhose notion of

ustice

has a

moral

foundation

as it

is

difficult o

determine.

The

second

example

is

by

way

of comment on Rawls

Difference

rin-

ciple.

The

issue of welfare

distribution

as

been

at the

heart of recent

debates about liberal ustice. On the one hand, contractarianshave

sought

to

generate

abstract rules

of

ustice,

ranging

from Rawls two

principles

to

Nozick s historical

theory

of

just

transfer.On

the other

hand,

communitarianshave

attempted

to view welfare s a

social

good

that should

be

distributed

n

accord either

with

the norms of a

specific

?The Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:


17

culturalcontext or

with ome

view

of

human

flourishing.

ontractarian

theories fail for the two reasons

explored

in

?I.

They

cannot

explain

why

the well-favoured

ill be

moved

to

comply

with a

general

welfare

principle,once theyknowthemselves o be among those whowould do

better

by self-help.

Moreover,

they disagree

so

much about

even

the

abstract haracter

of an

impartial heory

f

ustice

thatnot

even

an

over-

lapping

consensus

on

the matter s

in

sight.

n

short,

hey

tand too far

back

from he

problem.

Yet,

f

contractarian heories re

under-determ-

ined,

communitarian

ones stand too close to

prevailingpractices

and

are

over-specific.

f the

debate about how resources

are

to be

distributed

could

be

resolved

by

appealing

to

communal

values,

t

could never have

arisen

in

the first

lace.Our

approach

brings

togethermetaphysical

nd

political,

ndividual-

istic and communitarianconsiderations. Libertarians

rgue

that there

can be

no

human

right

o

welfare,

n

the

grounds

that there can be

no

correlative

universal

duties on

anyone

to

help everyone

n

need.

This

argument

tems

from the

individualism t the

root of

the

club

model,

and can be countered

only

f

duties nclude

imperfect bligations,

which

are wider than correlative ndividual

rights

nd

prior

to them. Rawls

enthusiasm

n

PL

for

reciprocity,

s

distinct

from

mutual

self-interest,

mightdo the trick.But his theory emains too grounded in an individu-

alism of

nterests o

generate

a

general

social

duty.

Communitarians

an

do

this,

but

in

a form

oo

specific

o

particular

ommunities.

Moreover,

we see no

intrinsic

reason

why

the

communitarian

argument

should

relate

one

to other

members of

one s state

rather

than

ust

to

one s

family

r

ethnic

group,

unless states

have

(or

ought

to

have)

a

greater

degree

of

homogeneity

han

they urrently

manifest.

From our

perspective,

n

contrast,

he

denial

of

a

universal

bligation

to

help

othersfalls

foul

of

the

central moral

commitments f a

political

theory

fjustice.

The denial draws ts

plausibility

rom n

implicit ppeal

to a

model

of

idealized

independent agents.

These

paragons

of

self-

sufficiency pparently

suffernone of the

usual

human frailties nd

requirements,

uch

as the

propensity

o fall sick

and the need for

food,

that ead

ordinary

men

and women to call

on the

help

and

support

of

others at

various times

n

their

ives

particularly

n

childhood and old

age.

According

to our

duty-based

iew,

however,

principle

of

universal

indifference

ould never

be

adopted among

ordinarilyneedy

and vul-

nerable human beings.Ifwe are onlyto adopt principles ll can act on,

then we

must

necessarily eject

those that undermine

or

threatenthe

capacity

for

agency

of others.

Nevertheless,

he

duty

o establishedremains

an

imperfect bligation.

This

does not

imply

that we

have

no

duty

to

do

anything.

Rather,

the

?The Editors

f

The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.








18 RICHARD

BELLAMY

AND MARTIN

HOLLIS

argument

reates a

requirement

o create welfare

rrangements

nd to

allocate

recipients

of

welfare

to

agents

and

agencies capable

of

supply-

ing

these needs. Institutional

ights

to welfare can

be

tailored to the

character nd conditionsofparticular ocieties. Such rights apturethe

more

special

obligations

to

help

others which most

of

us

feel

we

have

or

which,

so far as the

greater

ociety

s

concerned,

have

been

created

throughpolitical

commitments

f a

piecemeal

nature.

In

other

words,

a

metaphysics

which

makes sense of our moral

obligations

needs

to be

supplemented

by

more

specificpolitical

obligations.

need to

know,

for

example,

why

my

general

moral

obligation

to

help

others should be

fulfilled

y

giving

o

the

National

Health Service

ratherthan

to Oxfam

for

relief

n

the

Third

World. This seems

to us

to be the

only way

to

understand the

growth

f the welfare tate.

V. CONCLUSION

Metaphysics

s

necessary

o determine those minimum

tandards

of

ust

condutct hich iberals

nsist

re owed to all human

beings.

Politicsboth

enables us

to

appreciate

these basic

obligations

by

bringing

s into com-

municationwith

our

fellow-citizens,

nd makes

possiblepracticalagree-ments that

go

beyond

this bare minimum

by

providing

the extensive

public

services

necessary

to

the

functioning

f

a

well-orderedmodern

state.

Liberal

ustice

needs

to

be

both

metaphysical

nd

political.

Universityf

East

Anglia

REFERENCES

Gauthier,

D.

1986:

Morals

byAgreement

Oxford UP).

Hobbes,

T.

1651:

Leviathan,

d. RichardTuck

(Cambridge

UP,

1991).

Locke,

J.

1689:

A

Letter

oncerning

oleration,

d.

J.

Horton and

S. Mendus

(London:

Rout-

ledge,

1991).

Mendus,

S.

1986/7: Liberty

nd

Autonomy ,

Proceedingsf

the

Aristotelian

ociety

7,

pp.

107-20.

Mill,

J.S. 1859:

On

Liberty,

d. M. Warnock

London:

Fontana,

1962).

Milton,J.

1644:

Areopagitica

London:

Nonesuch,

1952).

O Neill,

0.

1979/80:

The Most

Extensive

iberty , roceedingsf

he

ristotelian

ociety

0,

pp.

45-59.

-

1989:

Constructions

f

Reason:

xplorations

f

Kant sPractical

hilosophyCambridge

UP).

Rawls, . 1971: A TheoryfJusticeOxfordUP).

-

1985:

Justice

s Fairness:

Political not

Metaphysical , hilosophy

nd Public

Affairs

4,

pp.

223-51.

-

1993:

Political iberalism

Columbia

UP).

Raz,J. 1986:

The

Morality

f

Freedom

Oxford UP).

Rousseau,

JJ.1762:

The ocial

Contractnd

Discourses,

d. G.D.H. Cole

(London:

Dent,

1973).

?The Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterlv,

995.








LIBERAL

JUSTICE:

POLITICAL AND

METAPHYSICAL

19

Walzer,

M.

1983:

Spheres

fJustice:

Defence

f

Pluralism

nd

Equality

Oxford:

Martin

Robertson).

Young,

I.

1981:

Polity

and

Group

Difference:

Critique

of the Ideal of Universal Cit-

izenship ,

Ethics

9,

pp.

250-74.

?The

Editors f The

Philosophical

uarterly,

995.

Documents

Liberal Justice, Political and Metaphysical (Bellamy)