Letter from APEC TEL Chair Enclosing the TEL’s 2010 Report on …mddb.apec.org/Documents/2010/CTI/CTI2/10_cti2_012.pdf · 2012-11-24 · Letter from APEC TEL Chair Enclosing the

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2010/SOM2/CTI/012 Agenda Item: 6.2(b)

Letter from APEC TEL Chair Enclosing the TEL’s 2010 Report on “Progress Towards Adopting and

Implementing the WTO Reference Paper”

Purpose: Information Submitted by: TEL Chair

Second Committee on Trade and Investment Meeting

Sapporo, Japan1-2 June 2010

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION WORKING GROUP 21 May 2010

Ms Mary Elizabeth Chelliah Chair APEC Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) Dear Ms Mary Elizabeth Chelliah, As you are aware, in accordance with “Next ‘Steps” paper adopted by the Meeting of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade in 2003, the APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL) is tasked to examine and assess the progress that pathfinder economies are making to adopt and implement the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper and to report on its assessment annually to CTI. With this in mind, on behalf of APEC TEL, I am pleased to send you as attached the 2010 report on progress towards adopting and implementing the WTO Reference Paper. The updates have been highlighted for ease of reference.

Sincerely yours,

Liu Ziping

Chair, APEC TELWG

Enclosure: Progress towards Adopting and Implementing the WTO Reference Paper May 2010

APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group Progress towards Adopting and implementing the WTO Reference Paper

Introduction In June 2003, APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade met in Khon Kaen, Thailand. Following their meeting, they approved a “Next Steps” paper with action items based on the Leader’s Los Cabos Pathfinder Statement to Implement APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy. As an outcome of this meeting, the APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL) was given the task of providing annual updates on Pathfinder economies’ progress towards adopting and implementing the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper. According to the “Next Steps” paper: WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper. Pathfinder economies committed in the Leaders’ Statement to adopt and implement the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper. For pathfinder economies acceding to the WTO, the Leaders Statement encouraged them to adopt and implement the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper. Action 4 (WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper): Pathfinder economies (both WTO members and acceding economies) that have not adopted and implemented the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper will report on progress to do so. (Pathfinder economies that have not yet adopted and implemented the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper will report progress they have made to do so to in 2003 to CTI III and the Telecommunications Working Group (TEL) and annually thereafter to CTI II and the TEL. The TEL will examine and assess this information and report on its assessment to CTI III in 2003 and annually thereafter to CTI II the progress pathfinder economies are making to adopt and implement the WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper.) See: www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/documents_reports/trade_ministerial_meeting/2003.html

At TEL 28, members of the TEL Liberalization Steering Group agreed to take up the task, noting several considerations:

APEC TEL has undertaken studies and work on a range of related topics, including Principles of Interconnection and a series of capacity-building workshops on the WTO and telecommunications services. Members of APEC TEL agreed to consider outcomes from this work in developing the project.

There is no “one-size fits-all” solution to the implementation of the Reference Paper. Information regarding the adoption of the WTO Reference Paper is available through the WTO website at: www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.

Each member economy that participated in this study undertook an assessment regarding whether and how elements of the Reference Paper have been implemented in their specific circumstances.

Members of an oversight committee include: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United States. Finally, APEC TEL is continuing work on related projects in support of our trade facilitation objectives. For example, information from this effort has been used to support work within APEC TEL to develop a guide of Best Practices for implementing the WTO Reference Paper.

Page 2 of 67 APEC Telecommunications and Information Working Group: Progress towards Adopting and Implementing the WTO Reference Paper, TEL 37

The 2005 edition of the report was approved by the APEC TEL Working Group in April 2005, at APEC TEL 31 in Bangkok, Thailand. The 2005 edition had been provided to the CTI in May 2005, and presented to Ministers at TELMIN 6. Member economies agreed that, if they have new information to share, they would work with Canada to update the document intersessionally. The following contains updates by Australia, Canada, Hong Kong China, Korea, Peru, Philippines, Chinese Taipei, and Thailand for submission and approval by the members of the TEL Liberalization Steering Group at TEL 33. This study is comprised of six sections: A. Definitions B. Competitive Safeguards C. Interconnection D. Universal Service E. Public Availability of Licensing Criteria F. Independent Regulators G. Allocation and Use of Scarce Resources


A. DEFINITIONS:

Definitions How is “Major Supplier” defined in your economy? How are “Essential Facilities” defined in your economy?

Australia Major Supplier is not defined in Australian legislation. However, within a trade context, Australia has adopted the Reference Paper definition of Major Supplier. Within the context of competition policy, a major supplier in Australia is defined as a carrier or carriage service supplier with a substantial degree of power in a relevant market.

Essential Facilities is not defined in Australian legislation. However, within a trade context, Australia has adopted the Reference Paper definition of Essential Facilities.

Brunei Darussalam

It is not defined in Brunei Darussalam’s legislation, but Brunei Darussalam has adopted the definition as per the Reference Paper.

It is not defined in Brunei Darussalam’s legislation, but Brunei Darussalam has adopted the definition as per the Reference Paper.

Canada “Major supplier” is not directly defined in Canadian legislation. ILEC’s are regulated by the telecommunications regulator (CRTC) though many services have been deregulated. The competition authority also has the authority to deal with issues of abuse of market power.

The CRTC concluded that, “to be essential, a facility, function, or service must meet all three of the following criteria: (1) it is monopoly controlled; (2) a CLEC requires it as an input to provide services; and (3) a CLEC cannot duplicate it economically or technically. Facilities that meet this definition shall be subject to mandatory unbundling and mandated pricing.” The definition of “Essential Facilities” is currently being reviewed by the CRTC under Telecom Publics Notice CRTC 2006-14. Details of the procedure are available at: http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Notices/2006/pt2006-14.htm

Chile Major supplier is not defined in Chilean legislation. However, the national antitrust agency it is obliged to fixed the tariffs to those operators “in case the conditions existing on the market are insufficient to guarantee a free rate-setting regime”. According with this, the agency has determined case by case the existence of a major operator but in general it has taken into consideration the market share (Number of lines) traffic, development of technological alternatives that allow competition and maturity of unbundling of the network.

Essential facilities are not defined in Chilean Legislation. However, as the General Law on Telecommunications establishes that interconnections is obligatory and that tariffs of these services are to be fixed by the authority. Essential facilities are defined case by case in the tariff decree of each company (Art. 24 bis y 25 bis LGT) Among the criteria used :

a) in case it is monopoly controlled b) can be reasonably duplicated or substituted; c) the existence of technical alternatives; d) whether the facility is critical to the supply of service by the licensees;

China The definition is indicated in the Regulation on Telecommunications of P. R. China, which refer to telecommunications business providers that control the necessary basic telecommunications facilities and account for a large proportion of the market, and are thus able to influence substantially the market of other business providers.

Not defined.



Hong Kong, China

In Hong Kong, China, there is the concept of “dominant position”. A telecommunications licensee is in a dominant position when, in the opinion of the Telecommunications Authority, it is able to act without significant competitive restraint from its competitors and customers. In considering whether a licensee is dominant, the following matters are taken into account: - the market share of the licensee; - the licensee’s power to make pricing and other decisions; - any barriers to entry to competitors into the relevant telecommunications market; - the degree of product differentiation and sales promotion; and - any other relevant matters as may be stipulated by the Telecommunications

Authority in guidelines on the test of dominance A dominant licensee is, under the Telecommunications Ordinance, prohibited from abusing its position.

Under section 36AA of the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Telecommunications Authority may in the public interest direct a licensee to coordinate and cooperate with another licensee to share the use of any facility owned or used by it. For this purpose, “facility” is defined to include: a) a cable, wire, telecommunications line, duct, pit, tunnel and manhole; b) a tower, mast, pole and antenna; c) land, buildings and ancillary equipment at sites on which radiocommunications

facilities have been established; d) reasonable space within a carrier licensee's exchange buildings or other sites

to locate equipment of another licensee required to establish interconnection between the licensee's and that other licensee's network at the exchange or sites;

e) other installations, including but not limited to in-building risers, cable trays and cable entry points into buildings, reasonably necessary for the efficient provision of a telecommunications network; and

f) services incidental to the building, place and premises in which the facility is situated that are reasonably necessary or incidental to the efficient operation by all parties to the sharing of the facility.

In considering issuing a direction to a licensee in the public interests to share a facility, section 36AA of the Telecommunications Ordinance stipulates the Telecommunications Authority shall take into account relevant matters including, but not limited to: a) whether the facility is a bottleneck facility; b) whether the facility can be

reasonably duplicated or substituted; c) the existence of technical alternatives; d) whether the facility is critical to the supply of service by the licensees; e) whether the facility has available capacity having regard to the current and

reasonable future needs of the licensee or person to whom the facility belongs; f) whether joint use of the facility encourages the effective and efficient use of telecommunications infrastructure; g) the costs, time, penalties and inconvenience to the licensees and the public of the alternatives to shared provision and use of the facility.

Indonesia In the current Indonesian regulation KM 33 year 2004, Major supplier is applied to local fixed services, fixed long-distance services (STD), fixed international services (IDD) operators whose business activities control the majority of market share and revenue. In the preparation for the new cost – based interconnection regime, major supplier will be defined not only for fixed network and services but also for other segment of services such as cellular mobile.

In the supporting regulation for interconnection, Essential Facilities will be defined as facilities required for interconnection, which the interconnection seeker doesn’t have option rather then to use the facilities offered by the interconnection supplier.

Japan In the Japanese regulatory framework, telecommunication carriers which install “Category I designated telecommunications facilities” are regarded as dominant telecommunications carriers. NTT East and NTT West belong to this category. “Category I designated telecommunications facilities” shall be regional networks facilities that own fixed subscriber lines on a considerable scale (more than 50% of lines in a specified area).

The word “Essential Facilities” is not defined in the Japanese regulatory framework. The Telecommunications Business Law in Japan (TBL) designates the regional network facilities that own fixed subscriber lines on a considerable scale (more than 50% of lines in a specified area) as the telecommunications facilities which interconnection with the telecommunications facilities of other telecommunications carriers is essential for the enhancement of the users' benefit and the comprehensive and rational development of telecommunications.



Korea Korea does not have specific definition for the term 'Major Supplier'. However, the facilities-based service suppliers that fall under the criteria set forth below are obliged to provide facilities, interconnection and information: - whose previous year revenue from the respective facilities-based services

exceeds the amount determined by the Minister of Information and Communication Korea Communications Commission and,

- whose previous year market share exceeds 50% of the total domestic revenue in the respective service areas.

- The facilities-based service suppliers that fall under the following criteria are obliged to get approval from the Minister of Information and Communication Korea Communications Commission for the terms and conditions and the price of the respective facilities-based services they supply:

- whose market share of the total domestic revenue from the respective services is the highest and,

- whose previous year revenue from the respective services exceeds the amount determined by the Minister of Information

Telecom-related Acts do not specifically define the term 'Essential Facilities'. However, the Telecommunications Business Act provides that the service suppliers with essential facilities shall provide facilities, interconnection, and information.

Malaysia No specific equivalent except a classification for dominance The primary characteristic of a firm in a dominant position in a market is its ability to undertake conduct to a significant extent independently of its competitive rivals and its customers (whether consumers or intermediate industry participants), and the pressures they would exert on the firm in a competitive market. This independence generally manifests itself as the ability to independently fix prices, although it extends to the ability to fix levels of output or the quality of output with similar disregard for the responses of rivals and customers in the market.

The term essential facility is not defined in Malaysia. Instead, the term bottleneck is generally used. Bottleneck is used for facilities that cannot be easily duplicated. If a facility or service has bottleneck characteristics or it is in line with long term interest of the end users, the facility or service is included in the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission’s (MCMC) Access List (Commission Determination on Access List, Determination No. 1 of 2005) (registered on 13 June 2005), which ensures that all network facilities providers, network service providers, applications service providers and content applications service providers can gain access to the listed facilities and services on reasonable terms and conditions. This is to encourage downstream activities to flourish, thus creating a more robust market environment, one that is able to offer consumers more choice and value-for-money services.

Access List 1. Fixed Network Origination Service 2. Equal Access (Fixed Network) Service 3. Fixed Network Termination Service 4. Mobile Network Origination Service 5. Mobile Network Termination Service 6. Interconnect Link Service 7. Private Circuit Completion Service 8. Domestic Network Transmission Service 9. Internet Access Call Origination Service 10. 3G-2G Domestic Inter-Operator Roaming Service 11. Inter-Operator Mobile Number Portability Support Services 12. Infrastructure Sharing 13. Domestic Connectivity to International Services 14. Network Co-Location Service 15. Network Signaling Service 16. Full Access Service 17. Line Sharing Service 18. Bitstream Services 19. Sub-loop Service 20. Digital Subscriber Line Resale Service 21. Internet Interconnection Service 22. Broadcasting Transmission Service 23. Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting Multiplexing Service



Mexico Federal legislation defines a carrier with a “substantial power in the market”. See article 63 of the Federal Law of Telecommunications (FLT) and article 13 of the Federal Economic Competition Law. In accordance with Article 11 of the Interconnection Plan, the Commission, according with the available information, will identify dealers who operate the largest number of fixed access or mobile access in the coverage areas of their concessions. In addition, it can be said that Mexico has adopted the WTO Reference Paper definition of Major Supplier, since Mexico has subscribed such instrument.

Interconnection plan denotes Essential Facilities in its article 2. - Traffic conduction - Transmission links - Access ports - Signaling - Transit - Collocation - Sharing of infrastructure - Ancillary services - Access to services

New Zealand “Major Supplier” is not defined per se. “Essential facilities” is not defined per se.

Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC

Peru Our legal framework mentions that “Major Supplier” will be defined according to the WTO agreements. The Tariff Regulation (Art. 35°) defines major supplier as an operator that has the ability to affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in certain market for basic telecommunications service as a result of: (i) control over essential facilities; or (ii) use of its position in the market.

“Essential facility” is the service or any part of a network that (i) is exclusively or predominantly provided by one or a limited number of operators; and (ii) whose substitution in order to provide a service, is not economically or technically feasible. (Interconnection Regulation, Art. 6° and Tariff Regulation, Art. 35°)

Philippines Major supplier is defined as a carrier with a system of nationwide inter-exchange facilities critically capable of carrying huge traffic volumes throughout the economy.

Essential facilities can be defined in the context of facilities critical to the provision of a service wherein access from one point to a certain distant point outside its network can be carried except through other networks.

Russian Federation

TBC TBC

Singapore “Major Supplier” is defined as Dominant Licensee in Singapore. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 2 – Classification of Facilities-Based Licensees), IDA will classify a Facilities-based Licensee as either (a) Non-dominant Licensee; or (b) Dominant Licensee. A Licensee will be classified as dominant if it controls facilities that provide a direct connection to end users within Singapore, regardless of the technology used, and: a) exercise operational control over telecoms service facilities that are sufficiently

costly or difficult to replicate; or b) has the ability to exercise significant market power in the provision of telecoms

services in Singapore.

“Essential facilities” are defined as Essential Support Facilities (ESF) in Singapore. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Appendix 2 Section 4 – Essential Support Facilities (ESF)), ESF are defined as those passive support structures, for which no practical or viable alternatives exist, that enable the deployment of telecommunication infrastructure. These would include a) Co-Location facilities; b) Lead-in ducts, lead-in manholes and cable chambers; and c) Space within cable risers in commercial and residential buildings

Chinese Taipei

Article 10 of the Administrative Regulations Governing Tariffs of Type I Telecommunications Enterprises stipulates that the dominant market player ( the major supplier) of Type I telecommunications enterprises refers to Type I telecommunications enterprises bulletined by the National Communications Commission (NCC) under the following circumstances: 1. Those who control key telecommunications facilities. 2. Those who have dominant power over the market price. 3. Those whose subscriber amount or sales volume is over 25% of each service

market.

Pursuant to Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Regulations Governing Fixed Network Telecommunications Businesses, bottleneck facilities (essential facilities) are defined as those that, in the telecommunications network, cannot be self-constructed or substituted for by other available technologies within a reasonable period of time.

Thailand “Major Supplier” is defined as Significant Market Power (SMP) in Thailand. According to Clause 8 of the NTC Notification regarding Criteria and Procedures for Determining Significant Market Power in Telecommunication Service which has been published in the Royal Gazette in August 2009, there are three main factors need to be taken into

“Essential Facilities” means facilities, operations, Processes, or services provided by a licensee with their own telecommunications network which are necessary for telecommunications network access or interconnection. It is defined in the Notification of the National Telecommunications Commission regarding


account for determining SMP in Thailand 1) specifying relevant markets 2) Anal sizing competitive level in relevant market 3) determining licensees who have Significant Market Power in relevant market bases on their market share together with the following factors:

1) Overall size of the undertaking 2) Control of infrastructure not easily duplicated 3) Technological advantage or superiority 4) Absence of or low countervailing power 5) Easy or privileged access to capital market/financial resource 6) Product/service diversification (eg. Bundled products or service) 7) Economies of Scale 8) Economies of Scope 9) Vertical Integration 10) A highly developed distribution and sales network 11) Absence of potential competition 12) Barrier to expansion 13) Ease to market entry

Telecommunications Network Access and Interconnection B.E. 2549 (2006).

United States

In the U.S., the parallel to the concept is the dominant carrier, or ILECs (incumbent local exchange carriers).

While “essential facilities” is not a term used in the U.S., the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 established competitive checklists (see section 251 (a-c)) among other things to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements.

Vietnam TBC TBC


B. COMPETITIVE SAFEGUARDS

Competitive Safeguards

Does your economy have an agency responsible for oversight and enforcement of competition? If so, please name the agency.

Does your economy have measures in place to prevent major suppliers from engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.

Does your economy have measures in place to prevent major suppliers from using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.

Does your economy have measures in place to prevent major suppliers from not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to provide services? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.

Australia The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) administers general competition regulation as well as the telecommunications -specific anti-competitive conduct provisions in Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act. The ACCC also administers the telecommunications specific access regime in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act and the retail price controls that apply to Telstra.

Yes. No specific proscription. This matter is dealt with through general and telecommunication-specific regulation of anti-competitive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974. Record keeping powers exist to assist with identifying any instances of such conduct.

Yes. No specific proscription. This matter is dealt with through general and telecommunications-specific regulation of anti-competitive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974. In addition section 152AYA of that Act specifically provides that access providers must quarantine information provided by access seekers in relation to the supply of services declared under the access regime. Record keeping powers exist to assist with identifying any instances. . Also, the operational separation requirements that apply to Telstra under Part 8 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 require Telstra to maintain separation between its wholesale, retail and network services business units. Among other things, the operational separation requirements impose restrictions on Telstra which are designed to prevent Telstra’s wholesale business units from disclosing commercially sensitive information about Telstra’s wholesale customers to the retail business units.

Yes. Under Schedule 1, Part 4 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 carriers must provide other carriers with access to certain information relating to the operation of telecommunications networks. In addition, section 472 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 specifies the requirements for an Integrated Public Number Database (IPND). All carriage service providers have obligations in relation to providing customer information to the IPND.

Brunei Darussalam Currently, there is no competition law in Brunei Darussalam but safeguards against anti-competitive behaviour are included in existing operator’s licences. Generally, the Telecommunications Authority has the power to review tariffs and prices to be charged to consumers. Guidelines have also been developed under the Telecommunication Order 2001 which will be enforced sometime in the future.

Information will be provided upon request.

Canada Yes. Canada’s competition authority, the Competition Bureau, is responsible for oversight and enforcement of competition generally in the economy.

The CRTC also sets and administers competitive safeguards in the telecommunications services sector.

Yes. In 1995, the CRTC implemented accounting separations for the services of dominant telephone companies into “Utility” and “Competitive” segments, creating a “split rate base” regulatory regime.

Also, the incumbent’s tariffed services are subject to price caps; limiting the ability of incumbent carriers to generate funds in markets they have market power to offset price decreases in competitive markets.

Incumbent carriers are required to demonstrate that price reductions

Yes. The CRTC has directed incumbent telephone companies to establish separate and distinct Carrier Service Groups in order to restrict the flow of information between the incumbents’ monopoly/essential and competitive service personnel to ensure that information provided by competitors to the incumbents is kept confidential.

Yes. The CRTC has mandated interconnection arrangements for LECs and directed that associated technical modifications be made to the ILEC’s networks. Additional measures have been undertaken to assist with the implementation of interconnection arrangements, including the establishment of industry consultation/working groups, such as the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committees (“CISC”) to address technical, operational and administrative issues associated with competition.

The CRTC generally requires that incumbent carriers notify interconnecting carriers of network changes at least six months in advance of the changes being implemented.

The CRTC has developed Quality of Service standards, and associated enforcement mechanisms, for interconnection services provided to competitors by the incumbents.







to tariffed services do not result in below cost pricing (predatory pricing test).







Chile Yes. Tribunal of Defence of Competition (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia) that is responsible for oversight and enforcement of the Competition Law in all sectors of the economy.

Is this Tribunal the one that determines the operator subject to tariff fixation.

In order to prevent cross subsidies, General Telecommunication Law (here and after LGT) established that vertical integration it is allowed between local and long distance operators but only as filliates or subsidiaries entities.

Besides, Tribunal of Defence of Competition has required SUBTEL to fix the tariffs in a manner to eliminate cross subisidies

The general legislation on antitrust may cover this situation. However, there is no specific provision on for this matter.

The general legislation on antitrust may cover this situation. However, there is no specific provision on for this matter.

China The Ministry of Information Industry (MII).

As indicated in the Reference Paper accepted by China upon WTO accession.







Hong Kong, China Yes. The Telecommunications Authority is responsible for enforcement of competition in the telecommunications sector.

Yes. Anti-competition provisions are incorporated in the Telecommunications Ordinance. The licensees are forbidden to engage in conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications market. The licensee in a dominant position in a telecommunications market shall not abuse its position. A licensee who is in a dominant position is deemed to have abused its position if, in the opinion of the Telecommunications Authority, the licensee has engaged in conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications market which includes inter alia predatory pricing.

Yes. Anti-competition provisions are incorporated in the Telecommunications Ordinance. The licensees are forbidden to engage in conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications market.

Yes. Under section 7I of the Telecommunications Ordinance, a telecommunications operator shall supply the Telecommunications Authority in the manner and at the times the Telecommunications Authority may reasonably require to perform her functions or exercise her powers, in order to ensure the operator’s compliance with the Telecommunications Ordinance, licence conditions, determinations and directions applicable to the operator. The Telecommunications Authority may disclose information supplied to her if she considers that it is in the public interest to disclose that information. Before making a decision to disclosure the information, the Telecommunications Authority shall give the operator supplying the information a reasonable opportunity to make representations on the proposed disclosure.

Indonesia Yes, Indonesia has established such agencies within its legal framework,i.e. a. Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU – Komisi Pengawasan Persaingan Usaha) for business corporations in general; Indonesian b. Telecommunication Regulatory Body (BRTI – Badan Regulasi Telekomunikasi Indonesia) for supervising competition and enforce competition regulations in telecommunication sector.

Yes, Indonesia has measures to prevent major supplier from engaging anti-competitive cross subsidization through its legal framework i.e. the Law No. 5 year 1999 on Anti Monopoly and Unfair Treatment Practices and Law No. 36 Year 1999 on Telecommunications.

Yes, as stated in the Law No. 5 Year 1999 on Anti Monopoly and Unfair Practices.

Yes. Stipulated in Government Decree No. 52/2001 Article 21 and 25. Every operator is mandatory to provide interconnection to other operator upon request. In the supporting regulation for interconnection the major supplier has to provide the Reference Interconnection offer, which describe the detail term and conditions for other operator to get interconnections. . Indonesia also has established competitive safeguards in telecommunication sector through a Ministerial decree no 33 year 2004. which prevent the major supplier to abuse their dominancy. .







Japan Yes. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).

Yes. It is ensured by proper calculation of charges through putting accounts in order stipulated in Article 24 and Article 30 paragraph 5 of the Telecommunications Business Law (TBL).

Yes. It is ensured by Article 29 (Order to Improve Business Activities). Article 30 paragraph 3 and 4 (Prohibited Acts) of the Telecommunications Business Law (TBL).

Korea Korea Communications Commission (KCC)

Yes. Facilities-based service suppliers shall separate the accounting according to the respective services and submit a business report to the KCC. (Telecom Business Act Art. 36-2) Facilities-based service suppliers are prohibited from unfairly itemizing the expenses or revenues for calculating prices of service, facility provision, interconnection, and information provision, etc. (Telecom Business Act. Art. 36-3 para.1 sub-para. 3 )

For violation of the Telecom Business Act. 36-3, the KCC may order change of internal accounting standard, or imposition of a penalty surcharge. (Telecom Business Act. Art.37, Art.37-2)

Yes. Telecom service suppliers are prohibited from disclosing any information concerning an individual user that has been obtained in the process of providing their own services, facilities, or interconnection. The usage of the information obtained should be restricted to the purposes of the obtained information and the information should not be improperly used or not be provided to the third parties. (Telecom Business Act Art. 34-5. para.1, Art 34-5. para. 2) A person who discloses uses or provides the information in violation of Art. 34-5 is subject to imprisonment for not more than two years or to a fine not exceeding 100 million won. (Telecom Business Act Art.71) Telecom service suppliers are prohibited from improperly diverting information obtained in the course of information exchange from other service suppliers. (Telecom Business Act Art.36-3) In case the prohibited acts listed under Telecom Business Act Art. 36-3 are violated, the KCC may order suspension of such acts or impose a penalty surcharge. (Art 37, Art. 37.2)

Yes. In case telecom service suppliers request the information listed below, the market dominant operators described in Question No.1 shall provide such information by concluding an agreement. Technological information or the user's personal information which are required for a provision of telecommunications facilities, interconnection, or imposition and collection of services tariffs, etc. (Telecom Business Act Art.34-4. para. 3) In addition, the above-mentioned facilities-based services suppliers shall determine and make a public notice of the technical standards for interconnection, of the terms and conditions for services supply, and of other standards for fair competitive environments (Telecom Business Act Art. 34-4. para. 4). The facilities-based services suppliers who violate the above-mentioned Art. 34-4 para.4 are subject to a fine for negligence not exceeding ten million won (Telecom Business Act Act.78-1 para. 5). Telecom services suppliers are prohibited from unfairly discriminating in relation to providing information, etc., or unfairly refusing conclusion of an agreement, or not implementing the concluded agreement without any justifiable reasons. (Telecom Business Act Art. 36-3) In case Art. 36-3 is violated, the KCC may order suspension of such acts, or impose a penalty surcharge. (Art. 37,Art. 37-2)







Malaysia The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) is responsible for specifically the oversight and enforcement of competition for the communications and multimedia industry

Yes. The MCMC has developed the following documents to prevent anti-competitive conduct in the communications and multimedia industry: 1. Guideline on Substantial

Lessening of Competition in a Communications Market

2. Guideline on Dominant Position in a Communications Market

Yes they are provided for in the following documents: 1. Guideline on Substantial

Lessening of Competition in a Communications Market

Guideline on Dominant Position in a Communications Market

Yes they are provided for in the following documents: Commission Determination on the Mandatory Standard on Access, Determination No.2 of 2005 (registered on 13 June 2005).

Mexico There are two relevant responsible agencies. The first one is the “Federal Competition Commission” (Cofeco), which is responsible to protect the process of loyal and free competition by the prevention and elimination of monopolistic practices and other restrictions for the efficient functioning of markets and to contribute to the welfare of the society. The Cofeco, created in 1993, is an agency of the Ministry of Economy with technical and operational autonomy, which is responsible for the implementation of the Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE) in Mexico. Article 8 of the LFCE prohibits monopolies and practices which diminish, damage or impede competition in the production, processing, distribution and commercialization of goods or services. This agency has an ex-post function because it is responsible for condemning and penalizing the anticompetitive practices and/or dominant practices. On the other hand, Cofetel is responsible for the enforcement of competition in the telecommunications sector, and has an ex-ante function, because it is a regulatory agency that has a preventive function in order to implement a level playing field.

The Federal Law of Telecommunications states in its articles 44 item IV and 62, the obligation of Accounting Separation for all the operators and cross-subsidization are forbidden. The LFCE states in its article 10, item VII, that cross-subsidization is considered as a monopolistic practice. In this sense, it is forbidden. Interconnection Plan states in its article 32, the obligation of Accounting Separation for telecom operators.

Yes, the LFCE forbids in its article 9, item I, fixing, increasing or manipulating the sale or purchase price of goods or services to which they are offered or demanded in the market, or to exchange information with the same purpose.

Yes, article 44, item IX, of the Federal Law of Telecommunications (LFT) establishes the obligation for the major supplier to avoid establishing technical or any other type of barriers, to the connection located in the residence of a user with other licensees of public networks and, according to item X, to act under non-discriminatory basis on providing information of commercial character, with regard to subscribers, affiliates, subsidiaries or third-parties. Interconnection Plan states in its chapter III the Technical Aspects of Interconnection that prevents anticompetitive practices. It can be mentioned: adopt open networks designs, provide unbundled access to interconnection facilities, provide interconnection services in any point where feasible technically.







New Zealand Yes. The Commerce Commission

Yes. Part 2 of the Commerce Act prohibits restrictive trade practices. Under the Commerce Act both the Commerce Commission and third parties have rights of action.

Yes. Part 2 of the Commerce Act prohibits restrictive trade practices. Under the Commerce Act both the Commerce Commission and third parties have rights of action.

Yes. The Telecommunications Act provides for the regulation of certain services. An access seeker can apply to the Commerce Commission to have terms on which the regulated service is supplied (including making available necessary information) specified in a determination.

Papua New Guinea TBC TBC TBC TBC

Peru OSIPTEL, the National Telecommunication Regulatory Agency, that is in charge of the Competition Policy in the Telecommunication sector, have had an important task in the enforcement and implementation of the Competition Legal Framework. In 2002, OSIPTEL issued guidelines regarding the evaluation of anticompetitive practices in those markets, which have improved the legal system and the predictability of the authority procedures. The competition agency for other sectors is INDECOPI

Yes. The legislation states that tariffs of the major supplier services that use essential facilities provided by itself, must be subject to periodic imputation tests. The last specific imputation test was published on December 2005. Also, the legislation in telecommunication states that operators with earnings greater than US$ 15 millions are obligated to keep separate accounting in order to avoid cross – subsidization from services more profitable to others less. Nowadays, only Telefónica del Perú S.A.A. (incumbent) has separate accounting. The cases of crossed subsidies could constitute a case of abuse of dominance in the market. In this scenario OSIPTEL, through the administrative instances (special task force and a specific tribunal for Controversies among operators).

Yes. These cases can be analysed under the Unfair Competition Law. Besides that, the Free Competition Law (approved by Legislative Decree 701) bans and punishes abuse of joint dominant position that is when two or more agents with dominant position use the foreseeable information of their competitors (because of market structure) to fix their own prices or other commercial conditions. This has the effect of restricting competition, without collusion between those agents.

Yes. All the interconnection agreements and OSIPTEL mandates include technical information about essential facilities provided by operators. This information is publicly available at OSIPTEL web page and certified copies can be expended upon request. Additionally, in December 2003, OSIPTEL established a rule for local fixed operators to provide relevant information (for example: long distance traffic per user) to long distance operators.

In year 2004 Law 28295, Law of Shared Use of Infrastructure, establishes obligation for companies, which have infrastructure in localities where local governments establishes restrictions for new infrastructure, to share its infrastructure. In this law the Principle of Access to the Information settles down. It is guaranteed that who require the infrastructure will have the necessary information with the object of evaluating and negotiating its access and use and to make its decision from enter the respective market.







Philippines Yes. The National Telecommunications Commission

Yes. One example is the power of the NTC to mediate or intervene in interconnection disputes between or among the telcos upon the advice of one of the parties. This is a last resort because telcos are given the leeway to negotiate an agreement.

Yes. The safeguard is for the NTC to immediately act on the complaint of the aggrieved telco against the erring for any violation upon verification of the filed complaint.

Yes. This is part and parcel of the guidelines provided by the NTC to telcos in their negotiations with each other, which include for example POIs, circuits, traffic data, etc.

Russian Federation TBC TBC TBC TBC

Singapore Yes. Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) A telecommunication licensee that engages in anti-competitive behaviour is deemed to have contravened the conditions of its license.

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 7 – Unfair Methods of Competition), Section 7.2.1.3 2 Cross-subsidization, a Dominant Licensee must

not use revenues from the provision of a tariffed telecommunication service to cross-subsidize the price of other telecommunication services and equipment.

To prevent such abuse, Dominant Licensees must comply with separate regulations and guidelines issued by IDA requiring accounting separation, the correct allocation of costs between competitive and non-competitive operations, and the use of arm’s length transactions between competitive and non-competitive operations.

Similarly, a Licensee that is affiliated with an entity that has market power may not accept any cross-subsidization from that affiliate.

Currently, companies which have been granted an integrated (multiple) services license or more than one license are required by IDA to implement accounting separation.

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 4 – Required Cooperation Amongst Licensees to Promote Competition), Section 4.2.6 Duty to Preserve Confidential Information Provided by Other Licensees, Licensees must protect from

disclosure any confidential or proprietary information provided by another Licensee in the course of negotiating or implementing an Interconnection Agreement. Licensees may use such information only for the provision of the specific interconnection related services requested.

Licensees shall adopt appropriate procedures to ensure that the information is not used for the development or marketing of other telecommunication services or equipment by the Licensee, its affiliates or third parties.

Although this regulation is specific to interconnection, most if all instances where major suppliers have access to competitors’ information are from interconnection activities.

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 4 – Required Cooperation Amongst Licensees to Promote Competition), Section 4.6.1 Duty to Disclose Interfaces), A Licensee must make publicly available, in a clear

format and in sufficient detail, any physical and logical interfaces of its network necessary to allow the development and deployment of telecommunication services, value-added services and telecommunication equipment that can interconnect to, and interoperate with, that Licensee’s network. A Licensee must also make publicly available, not less than 6 months prior to deployment, any changes in logical or physical interfaces that could materially affect existing interconnection arrangements.

A Licensee may not disclose this information to any affiliated entity, whether licensed or not, prior to the time that the Licensee makes this information available to the public.







Chinese Taipei Yes. For industry-specific regulation of competition in telecommunications and broadcasting the National Communications Commission (NCC) is in charge.

Yes. The competitive safeguards are prescribed in the Telecommunications Act. Article 19 stipulates that a Type I operator shall establish a separate accounting system and shall not employ cross-subsidies that may hinder fair competition. The same applies to Type I telecommunications enterprises that also operates a Type II telecommunication enterprise or any other non-telecommunication business. And Article 26, paragraph 4, provides that the determination of tariffs of Type I telecommunications enterprise shall not involve cross subsidy to hinder fair competition. The same is applicable to a Type I telecommunications enterprises that also operates a Type II telecommunications enterprises or other non-telecommunications business.

Yes. Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises, stipulates that the information obtained by Type I telecommunications enterprises during negotiation on network interconnection or during implementation of the network interconnection agreement can only be used for services related to network interconnection, and proper security measures shall be taken to ensure that the information is kept from use by other affiliates or third parties.

Yes. Article 26-1, paragraph 1, of the Telecommunications Act stipulates that a Dominant Market Player (DMP) of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall not obstruct, directly or indirectly, the request of the interconnection of networks proposed by other Type I telecommunications enterprises with its proprietary techniques, nor refuse to release to other Type I telecommunications enterprises the calculation methods of its interconnection fees and other relevant materials, nor discriminate against other telecommunications enterprises or users without due cause, etc. In addition, pursuant to the Article 16, paragraph 3 to 5, of the Telecommunication Act, among Type I telecommunications enterprises, an agreement shall be reached within three months from the date one party requested for network interconnection. If the agreement can not be reached within three months, or if the agreement cannot be reached within three months from the date of one party's request for amendment or renewal of a network interconnection agreement or in the event Type I telecommunication enterprises do not carry out network interconnection as agreed which failure is within the scope of those mandatory terms required by law to be included in interconnection agreements, the NCC shall arbitrate the matter upon receipt of request thereof.

Thailand 1. The Trade Competition Commission, Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, an industry-wide competition authority. 2. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), a sector-specific telecommunications regulator.

Yes. In Section 21 of the Telecommunications Business Act, the NTC has power to prescribe measures to prevent the licensee from committing acts: cross-subsidization, cross-holding in the same category of service, abuse of dominant power, anti-competitive behavior, protection of small-sized operators, that lead to monopoly, reduction or restriction of the competition in supplying the telecommunications service.

Yes. Clause 9, Chapter 2 of the Notification of the National Telecommunications Commission regarding Measure for Prevention of Monopoly or Unfair Competition in Telecommunications Business B.E. 2549 (2006) has prescribed the prohibition of unjustly using information obtained from other licensees for his or her own competitive network.

Yes. It is prescribed in Section 21, 25 and 28 of Telecommunications Business Act B.E. 2544.







United States Department of Justice and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Any person or carrier may file a complaint with the FCC against a common carrier. Formal complaint procedures are similar to court proceedings. Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the Act may either make a complaint to the FCC, or may bring suit for the recovery of damages in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction.

Yes. The Department of Justice has authority under the Clayton Act to determine if certain telecommunications transactions substantially lessen competition. The FCC also maintains safeguards to prevent anti-competitive cross-subsidization under the Communications Act.

Yes. Under section 222(b) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, "[a] telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains proprietary information from another carrier for purposes of providing any telecommunications service shall use such information only for such purpose, and shall not use such information for its own marketing efforts."

Incumbent local exchange carriers are required, under Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act, as amended, to provide timely information about their network to competing service providers. Section 51 of the FCC's rules sets out more specific requirements about the notice that the incumbent carriers must give. For example, the FCC’s network disclosure rules require that incumbent local carriers must provide reasonable public notice of network changes that will affect a competing provider's performance or ability to provide service, the incumbent's interoperability with other service providers, or the manner in which customer premises equipment is attached to the incumbent's network.

Vietnam TBC TBC TBC TBC


C. INTERCONNECTION Interconnection Is interconnection provided:

(a) Under non-discriminatory terms, conditions and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.

Is interconnection provided: (b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.

Is interconnection provided:

(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary additional facilities? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.

Are procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier made publicly available?

Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.

Is it ensured that major suppliers will make publicly available either its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.

Dispute Settlement: do service suppliers requesting interconnection with a major supplier have recourse either (a) at any time or (b) after a reasonable period of time which has been publicly known, to an independent domestic body to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been established previously?


Australia Yes. Any carrier or carriage service provider (called an ‘access provider’) supplying that service is under an access obligation to supply the declared service to other carriers or carriage service providers (called ‘access seekers’) on request, at the same technical and operational quality as the access provider provides to itself, and is also under an obligation to supply the following ancillary services with the declared service: Provide interconnection

that is necessary to enable the access seeker to make use of the declared service;

Provide billing information; and

Provide services necessary to enable the access seeker to supply its own services for the means of that conditional access customer equipment.

Yes. The ACCC has a wide discretion to require the unbundling of services where this will promote the objectives of the access regime. The ACCC does this by ‘declaring’ a service under the telecommunications-specific access regime in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974.

Yes. Under Part XIC the access provider of a declared service is required to permit interconnection. While the points at which interconnection must be provided are not specified under the Act, the ACCC can arbitrate disputes about access to a declared service. If, for example, an access provider refuses to interconnect at a point other than the point offered to a majority of users, the ACCC can arbitrate the dispute (s 152CP). The ACCC can also require an access provider to extend or enhance the capability of a facility, although the access provider cannot be required to bear an unreasonable amount of the cost of doing so (s 152CQ). Also, the ACCC has included an express requirement in the declarations of the PSTN originating access and PSTN terminating access services that access providers must

Yes. The three ways in which access providers and access seekers can agree on the terms and conditions of interconnection are set out in the Trade Practices Act Division 5 states access providers must comply with the standard access obligations on terms and conditions which may be determined in three ways: as commercially

agreed by the access provider and access seeker;

as detailed in an access undertaking; or

as determined by the ACCC through arbitration.

No. Australia does not maintain a requirement for interconnection agreements to be made publicly available. We believe that allowing for the confidentiality of agreements can benefit consumers in that it is more likely to result in competitive pricing. However, in practice major suppliers currently either publish their interconnection offers or make them available on request to carriers and carriage service providers.

Yes. There is no timetable set for negotiations although the ACCC is directed to endeavour to resolve access disputes in a timely manner. Any party, at any time, may notify the ACCC of a dispute and seek arbitration. The ACCC has limited powers to refuse to arbitrate a dispute.


Interconnection Is interconnection provided:










provide interconnection at additional points if requested by an access seeker.

Brunei Darussalam

Interconnection Framework is currently under development and will be published in the future, once it has been adopted and approved by the authority.

Not at the moment, pending the enforcement of the Telecommunications Order 2001. Currently, service providers can file their complaints to the Telecommunication Authority.


Interconnection Is interconnection

provided:










Canada Yes. Section 27 of the Telecommunications Act stipulates that in providing a telecommunications service, no Canadian carrier can unjustly discriminate or give an undue preference toward any person, including itself, or subject any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage. The terms, conditions and rates for interconnection with the incumbents are specified in published tariffs or interconnection agreements approved by the CRTC.

Yes. The CRTC has adopted an approach for establishing rates for network interconnection services and unbundled services that is based on long run incremental costs. The rating approach adopted by the CRTC is intended to establish rate levels for essential facilities and interconnection services that are cost-based and give the proper economic signals to entrants, helping to ensure efficient entry and utilization of telecommunications infrastructure.

Yes. Under the Telecommunications Act, the CRTC has the power to order a Canadian carrier to connect any of its facilities to any other telecommunications facility. An order may require the connection to be made at or within such time, and subject to such conditions, if any, as to compensation or otherwise, as the CRTC determines to be just and expedient. Under the Act, parties are free to negotiate interconnection agreements which are subsequently subject to CRTC approval. However, in cases where negotiations fail or disputes arise, parties can request the intervention of the CRTC.

Yes. The terms, conditions and rates for interconnection are stipulated in publicly available tariffs and/or in specific interconnection agreements, subject to CRTC approval. The Telecommunications Act requires that all tariffed services be made available on a non-discriminatory basis.

Procedural and administrative interconnection issues are established by the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC), an open body comprised of incumbent and competitor service providers and other interested parties.

Yes. Pursuant to the CRTC Tariff Regulations the CRTC requires that incumbent carriers make tariffs available for public inspection, most of which meet this obligation via their websites.

Applications for approval of interconnection agreements are available publicly, including on the CRTC website.

Yes. Under the Telecommunications Act, the CRTC has the power to order a Canadian carrier to connect any of its facilities to any other telecommunications facility, subject to any condition the CRTC determines to be just and expedient. An order may require the connection to be made at or within such time, and subject to such conditions, if any, as to compensation or otherwise, as the CRTC determines to be just and expedient. Under the Telecommunications Act, parties are free to negotiate interconnection agreements which are subsequently subject to CRTC approval. However, in cases where negotiations fail or disputes arise, parties can request the intervention of the CRTC to ensure access by competitive long distance service providers, competitive local exchange carriers and wireless service providers. Any person or corporation that fails to do anything required or prohibited under a provision of the Telecommunications Act (e.g., interconnection orders), is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine of up to $5,000 for a person and $50,000 for a corporation. In both cases a prosecution must have the consent of the CRTC and must be commenced within two years of the offence. The CRTC has the power to issue mandatory orders which have the force of law and can be made an order of the court.












Chile Yes, According with the Art 24 bis LGT

Yes, SUBTEL fixes all the access charges (Interconnection) of all the operators (not only the major supplier) in a cost oriented manner (LRIC), with public participation, and sufficiently unbundled.

Currently, SUBTEL is about to establish a new specífic regulation on unbundling

Interconnection must be done at any “Point of Network Terminarion” (PTR)

These PTRs are established by SUBTEL according to the offer of each operator. Once a PTRs has been declared as such by SUBTEL, the operator is obliged to provide interconnection to anyone

Yes, there is a specific regulation that establishes a general procedure of interconnection (Resolución exenta N°1007, 26/09/1995)

The tariff Decree that establishes the access charges it is published in the official newspaper.

The interconnection agreements between the operators are registered at the Undresecretariat of Telecommunication (SUBTEL)

Art.28 bis LGT Claims made by, between or against operators which refer to any matter derived form the General Telecommunications Law (including interconnection) shall be resolved by the Undresecretariat of Telecommunication (SUBTEL) upon hearing the parties.

China Yes, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Administration of Interconnection between Public Telecommunications Networks, and the Provisions on the Supervision and Administration of Telecommunication Quality between Public Telecommunications Networks

Yes, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Administration of Interconnection between Public Telecommunications Networks, and the Provision on the Interconnection Settlement and Relay Cost-sharing between Public Telecommunications Networks.

Yes, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Administration of Interconnection between Public Telecommunications Networks, and the Provisions on the Interconnection Settlement and Relay Cost-sharing between Public Telecommunications Networks.

Yes, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Administration of Interconnection between Public Telecommunications Networks.

The tariff Decree that establishes the access charges it is published in the official newspaper.

The interconnection agreements between the operators are registered at the Undresecretariat of Telecommunication (SUBTEL)

Yes, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Interconnection Dispute between Telecommunications Networks.





Is interconnection provided: (c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary additional facilities? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.

Are procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier made publicly available? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.


Dispute Settlement: do service suppliers requesting interconnection with a major supplier have recourse either (a) at any time or (b) after a reasonable period of time which has been publicly known, to an independent domestic body to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been established previously? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain.

Hong Kong, China

Yes. Where applicable (e.g. for fixed telecommunications network service), licence conditions are imposed on licensees requiring them to interconnect and to provide interconnection promptly and efficiently and for an interconnection charge based on the reasonable relevant cost. Under the mobile carrier licences for third generation mobile services, the licensee is required to open 30% of its network capacity to nonaffiliated service providers on a non-discriminatory basis. Further, under section 7N of the Telecommunications Ordinance, a licensee who is in a dominant position in a telecommunications market is prohibited from discriminating between persons who acquire the services in the market on charges or the conditions of supply.

Yes. Where applicable (e.g. for fixed telecommunications network service), licence conditions are imposed on licensees requiring them to interconnect and to use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that interconnection is done promptly, efficiently and at charges which are based on reasonable relevant costs incurred. Under section 36A of the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Telecommunications Authority may on the request of a party to interconnection or in the absence of a request determine terms and conditions of interconnection if she considers it is in the public interest to do so. Notwithstanding the power to make determinations, the Telecommunications Authority has adopted a light-handed regulatory approach and prefers the terms and conditions for interconnection be resolved by commercial negotiation and agreement as far as possible. The Telecommunications Authority has issued a number of statements setting the charging principles so as to provide guidance to telecommunications providers on methodologies for calculation of interconnection charges.

Yes. Under section 36A of the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Telecommunications Authority may make determination on terms and conditions for interconnection. For the purpose of determination under section 36A, “interconnection” means any connection between systems or services or elements of systems or services for the delivery of any communication. Response in (b) is also repeated.

Yes. Guidelines which set out principles governing the criteria and process for determination under section 36A as well as the statements issued by the Telecommunications Authority on interconnection issues are published on OFTA’s website and are publicly available.

Yes. In accordance with section 36A (5A), parties to an interconnection shall ensure a copy of the agreement is filed with the Telecommunications Authority within 14 days of it being made. The Telecommunications Authority is empowered under section 36A(5C) to publish all or any part of an interconnection agreement if she considers it is in the public interest to do so, after considering the representations made by the parties on such publication

Yes. Normally, the terms and conditions of interconnection should be resolved by commercial negotiation and agreement wherever possible. When an agreement cannot be reached, either party may request the Telecommunications Authority to make a determination under section 36A of the Telecommunications Ordinance. In the absence of a request, the Telecommunications Authority may also make a determination under section 36A if she considers it is in the public interest to do so.



provided:










Indonesia Yes, Indonesia has such stipulation in Law No. 36 year 1999 on Telecommunication, Article 25, which orders that interconnection is mandatory among operators. The Law requires them to interconnect to make optimum use of national telecommunications resource and ensure healthy competition. The current regulations that regulate the interconnection include Government Regulation No. 52 year 2000, Article 24; and Ministerial Decree No. 20 Year 2001, Article 13 which states that interconnection shall be carried out in transparent, non-discrimination manner in terms of quality and rates given in a short-time, cost based, and upon request.

Yes, as stipulated in the Government Decree No.52/2000 Article 21 and 25 as well as Ministerial Decree No. 20/2001 Article 12 and 13. The international consultant appointed by the Regulator has completed the calculation for tariff interconnection based on cost. The new interconnection tariff for originating, transit and termination to PSTN and cellular mobile were given to all operators to be applied to their business application, and give them 10 days to react. In the mean time the Government is preparing the supporting interconnection regulation which consists of general rule, tariff calculation, standard accountancy, Reference Interconnection Offer and Essential facilities

Yes. Stated in Ministerial Decree No. 4/2000, Fundamental Technical Plan 2000, which states that interconnection seeker can negotiate additional point of interconnection offered to majority users , based on ordinary business deal.

Regulator is preparing to have guidance for the major supplier to issue RIO (Reference Interconnection Offer) which should be made public.

Yes. Interconnection charges set by the regulator are published through Ministerial Decrees. In the few cases where commercial arrangements are negotiated, the arrangements are confidential.

Services suppliers requesting interconnection with major supplier at any times, if all the requirements are fulfilled. The interconnection agreement should be implemented in an equal treatment regarding terms, conditions and rates. Any dispute will be settled by Regulatory Body or Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition or to Court.

Japan Yes. Under Article 32, 33, and 35 of the Telecommunications Business Law (TBL), interconnection with major supplier under proper condition, charges, etc, are ensured. The parties concerned about the interconnections fail to come to an agreement may apply for an award to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, also may apply for Mediation and Arbitration to the Telecommunications Business Dispute Settlement Commission.



provided: (a) Under non-discriminatory terms, conditions and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates? Please answer “yes” or “no”, and explain how this is ensured.






Korea Yes. Facilities-based service suppliers should provide equal, transparent, timely, and reasonable interconnection. (Equal interconnection refers to non-discriminatory interconnecting on the equal or like communication network among the interconnecting providers. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Article 3, Paragraph 1)

The Korea Communications Commission sets forth and publicly notifies the scope of interconnections, the conditions, procedures and methods, and the standards for calculation of fees.(Telecommunications Business Act, Article 34)

Yes. Costs are calculated by respective network facilities. Only the prices for the facilities used for interconnection are charged. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Article 7)

Yes. A carrier requesting interconnection shall be connected based on licensed services and business areas, and the interconnecting carrier selects the switch for interconnection. Networks between the interconnection points are constructed and operated by the relevant service providers, and the service providers are to cooperate whenever necessary. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Article 6)

The carrier requesting interconnection pays for access to the circuit, and a carrier wishing to rebuild the existing telecommunication facilities in relation to interconnection bears the cost required to do so. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Articles 19 and 20)

Yes. Notifications related to such procedures are available on the KCC web site. (www.kcc.go.kr) A facilities-based telecommunications operator shall conclude an agreement and report it to the KCC within ninety days unless there are any special reasons when it is requested to provide interconnection by other telecommunications operators. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 34-6)

A carrier requesting the interconnection shall submit an application in writing 3 months prior to the intended date of connection. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Article 10)

Yes. The interconnection agreement of which a market dominant operator is a party concerned should be reported to, and approved by the KCC, although it is not publicly notified. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 34-6, Paragraph 2) The KCC authorizes the agreement after deliberating whether it realizes equal, transparent, timely, and reasonable interconnection.

(Korea Communications Commission Notification No.2008-129, Article 4)

Yes. Disputes among service suppliers related to interconnection can be settled at the KCC. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 35).



provided:










Malaysia Yes. This is provided for in the following MCMC’s documents: 1. Section 149

Communications and Multimedia Act 1998.

2. Access List Determination

3. Mandatory Standard on Access

4. Commission Determination on the Mandatory Standard on Access Pricing, Determination No. 1 of 2006 (registered on 13 February 2006).

Yes.

This is provided for under the MCMC’s Mandatory Standard on Access and Mandatory Standard on Access Pricing.

Yes.

This is provided for under the MCMC’s Mandatory Standard on Access and Mandatory Standard on Access Pricing.

Yes. This is provided for under the MCMC’s Mandatory Standard on Access.

Yes

This is provided for in the MCMC’s Mandatory Standard on Access. All access providers are obligated to prepare and maintain an Access Reference Document and make the Access Reference Document available.

Yes. This is provided for under Section 151 and Section 82-89 Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and MCMC’s Guideline for Dispute Resolution.












Mexico Yes, according to the operation and interconnection of public telecommunications networks, article 41, item II of the LFT provides the obligation of giving a non-discriminatory treatment to licensees. This obligation is supervised by the Cofetel. Also, article 43, item II and IV, and article 44, item VI and X provide non-discriminatory treatment in the following cases: 1. referring to tariffs in the access in a desegregated basis to its services; 2. acting on a reciprocity basis in the interconnection between licensees that provide similar services, capacities or functions between them, in tariffs and conditions; 3. providing, according to their respective License, services to the public on a non-discriminatory basis; 4. on providing information of commercial character with regards to their subscribers, to other affiliates, subsidiaries or third-parties. Concerning quality of service, article 43, item VII obliges to establish mechanisms to guarantee that there will be sufficient capacity and quality to exchange traffic requested between both networks involved in the interconnection. As well, article 44, item II and III oblige licensees to abstain to interrupt the telecommunications traffic signals between the interconnected licensees, without the previous authorization, as making modifications to its networks that could affect the functioning of the users equipments or of the networks to which it is interconnected, without obtaining the permission of the parties and without previous authorization. Article

5, of the Interconnection Plan provides the principles to be met by licensees to provide interconnection.

Yes, the interconnection must be made on terms that provide a safe competition between the licensees. Cofetel intervenes when the operators do not reach an agreement on each one of the mentioned items. Interconnection Plan states in its article 3 item VI regulates access to unbundled elements, services, capabilities, functions and network infrastructure for the interconnection services on the basis of tariffs, non-discriminatory terms and conditions, prevents the dealers have to consume and / or pay for resources not required for the interconnection and interoperability of its network with other dealers.

Article 43, item I establishes that the interconnection agreements should establish and identify the points of the terminal connections of its networks. Also, paragraph V establishes that the interconnection should be made at any switching point or others at which it may be technically feasible

Article 15 of the Interconnection Plan states that interconnection services be provided at any point where technically feasible. Article 16 of the Interconnection Plan states that all licensees will be required to identify and make available to other contractors, a point of interconnection that will be accessible to all users of one or more ASL in providing services.

A choice of the applicant and, if the requested address more of an local service area (ASL) through the same interconnection point, that point will be used for all areas, without additional charge.

Yes, the third transitional Interconnection Plan states that the Commission will initiate a consultation process aimed to define cost models to be used to resolve, in terms of section 42 of the LFT, interconnection charges.

Yes, article 10 item VI establishes that the dealers who operate the largest number of users access to fixed or mobile access to users in the coverage areas of their concessions, have an obligation to no later than June of each year, publish an offer that meets interconnection Plan.

Yes, terms and conditions are established in article 42 of the Federal Law of Telecommunications.









New Zealand Yes. The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for the following standard access principles in respect of interconnection with Telecom’s fixed PSTN: a) principle 1: the access

provider must provide the service to the access seeker in a timely manner;

b) principle 2: the service must be supplied to a standard that is consistent with international best practice;

c) principle 3: the access provider must provide the service on terms and conditions (excluding price) that are consistent with those terms and conditions on which the access provider provides the service to itself.

Note: the Telecommunications Act 2001 allows for the price of interconnection to be set by the Commerce Commission.

Yes See answer to question 2(a). The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for the regulation of basic interconnection services. The final pricing principles applied for regulated interconnection services are based on forward looking costs. The Commerce Commission is the government agency that has the regulatory authority and responsibility for enforcing regulated services. There are timeframes set in the Telecommunications Act 2001 for the Commission making determinations on the terms for the supply of regulated interconnection services. Charging rates determined by the Commerce Commission for interconnection services are published. See www.comcom.govt.nz

Yes. Points of interconnect where public telecommunications networks interface are commercially negotiated between the respective network operators. Points of interconnect for regulated interconnection services may be a term of supply determined by the Commerce Commission.

Yes. Telecom New Zealand (the largest fixed line telecommunications network operator) publishes guides to interconnection services see www.telecom.co.nz

Yes. Telecom New Zealand publishes an “Interconnection Agreement Reference Offer” See www.telecom.co.nz

Yes. The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for the regulation of interconnection to Telecom’s fixed PSTN where the party seeking interconnection has made reasonable attempts to negotiate the terms of supply of interconnection and has not been able to reach an agreement.



provided:










Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC

Peru Yes. The principles of access equality, no discrimination and neutrality are defined in the Telecommunication Rules and in the Interconnection Rules.

Yes. OSIPTEL has established maximum charges for essential facilities such as origination and termination in the local fixed network, local transit, long distance carriage service, termination charge in mobile networks scenarios and interconnection links. All the interconnection arrangements must be approved by OSIPTEL. If the operators do not reach an agreement, they can ask OSIPTEL for a mandate.

No. The regulation only establishes that the incumbent operator has to provide at least one interconnection point in each local area (there are 24 local areas in Peru).

Yes. The interconnection regulation is publicly available. Additionally, all the approved interconnection agreements and interconnection mandates are published on the OSIPTEL web page. Interconnection mandates are also published in the Official Newspaper.

Yes. All the interconnection agreements approved by OSIPTEL and mandates elaborated are published on the OSIPTEL web page. Also, all the interconnection mandates are published in the Official Newspaper. All operators can ask for certified copies of the agreements and mandates.

Yes. Once an agreement or a mandate has been approved or established by OSIPTEL, in case of a dispute, there is an administrative procedure that can be initiated at first instance at OSIPTEL. The second instance is an administrative tribunal.

Philippines Yes. Presidential Executive Order 59 and subsequent related regulations provide for mandatory interconnection for all telcos to be established and maintained at points of connection, preferably at the local exchange level and the junction side of trunk exchanges, as required within a reasonable time frame and having sufficient capacity to meet all reasonable traffic demands and complies with grade for service standard.

Yes. Under interconnection guidelines prescribed by the NTC, interconnecting parties are enjoined to observe good faith and transparency in establishing the terms of payment, and details covered by such payment for the access.

Yes. This is possible subject to consent of the party to which the request is addressed. In case of disagreements over points in addition to network termination points, the NTC may step in to resolve the dispute.

Yes. The regulatory process governing interconnection are readily available as public documents that are available at the NTC.

No. All interconnection agreements concluded by the parties are subject to approval by the NTC. However, although subject to NTC approval, they are not publicly available because Interconnection agreements are essentially private commercial contracts.

Yes. Normally, interconnecting parties are allowed a period of 90 days to conclude an agreement. In case of disagreements over negotiations over the terms of a renewal of the interconnection agreement, the prior agreement shall remain in force until a new agreement can be concluded; should a deadlock persists after the lapse of the 90 day period, neither party can request the NTC to intervene for the purpose of mediating or a resolving the dispute.



provided:










Russian Federation

TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC

Singapore Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 4 –Required Cooperation Amongst Licensees To Promote Competition), Subsection 4.2 Minimum Interconnection Duties, licensees must fulfill numerous Minimum Interconnection Duties, including the following: 4.2.3 Duty to Provide Non-discriminatory Interconnection Quality, unless the parties agree otherwise, a Facilities-based Licensee that provides direct interconnection to other Licensees shall provide sufficient points of interconnection and take other measures to ensure that, on a service-by service basis, the services that it provides to other Licensees under any Interconnection Agreement (‘‘Interconnection Related Services’’) are at least equivalent in quality to the quality that the Licensee provides to itself, its affiliates or to any other Licensee. (continued on next page)

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 5 – Interconnection with Dominant Licensees). Under the Telecoms Act, Section 6 "Designation of public telecommunications licensees", any person granted a licence as a public telecommunications licensee is obligated to perform all or any functions relating to the operation and provision of telecommunication systems and services in Singapore. A Licensee that seeks to interconnect with a Dominant Licensee has three options for entering into an interconnection agreement: a) an approved Reference

Interconnection Offer (‘‘RIO’’) extended by the Dominant Licensee (see subsection 5.3);

b) any existing Interconnection Agreement between the Dominant Licensee and any similarly situated Licensee (see subsection 5.4); or

c) an individualized agreement between the Dominant and Requesting Licensees (see subsection 5.5).

(continued on next page)

Yes. In Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code, Appendix Two describes in detail, the prices, terms and conditions at which a Dominant Licensee must offer to provide interconnection related services. Under subsection 2.3 Physical Interconnection, A Dominant Licensee must offer physical interconnection to Facilities-based Licensees. Physical Interconnection may take place at a number of points in the network. The Dominant Licensee need only offer Services-based Licensees virtual (distant) interconnection. In a virtual interconnection arrangement, the network nodes are not located at the same site. (continued on next page)

Yes. The detailed procedures can be found in Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code, (Section 5 – Interconnection with Dominant Licensees), which is available if the IDA website. www.ida.gov.sg

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 5 –Interconnection with Dominant Licensee). 5.6 Publication of Interconnection Agreements, All Interconnection Agreements involving a Dominant Licensee will be published by IDA. However, IDA on its own motion or at the request of either of the Licensees, may withhold from publication any portion of an Interconnection Agreement if IDA determines that it contains proprietary or commercially sensitive information.

Yes. Under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 5 –Interconnection with Dominant Licensee). 5.5.6 Agreements Arrived at Via the IDA Dispute Resolution Procedure - IDA recognizes that, in many cases, the Dominant and Requesting Licensees will not voluntarily reach agreement regarding the Interconnection Agreement, and provided numerous provisions to address this situation. In particular, the following Subsections in the code addressed the above concerns: 5.5.6.1 Petition for IDA Dispute Resolution - If the Licensees fail to reach a voluntary Interconnection Agreement within 90 days either Licensee may file a petition for dispute resolution with IDA. (continued on next page)












In addition, under Singapore’s Telecom Competition Code (Section 5 –Interconnection with Dominant Licensee), Section 5.3.5.1 Absolute Prohibition on Discrimination in Favour of Affiliates, a Dominant Licensee must offer to provide all Interconnection Related-Services to a Requesting Licensee on prices, terms and conditions that are no less favourable than the prices, terms and conditions on which it provides comparable services to itself or its affiliates.

The Dominant Licensee must provide Interconnection Related Services ("IRS") and wholesale services to Facilities-based Licensees and Services-based Licensees under its RIO. The RIO must contain a comprehensive and complete written statement of the IDA-approved prices, terms and conditions on which the Dominant Licensee is prepared to provide IRS to any Requesting Licensee. The RIO is modular and allows a Requesting Licensee to purchase only IRS that it wants to obtain. In particular, the following subsections in the code addressed the above principle: 5.3.5.3 Provision of Unbundled Network Elements and Unbundled Network Services 5.3.5.6 Pricing: the prices that a Dominant Licensee offers for all Interconnection Related Services must be cost-based.

In addition, Appendix Two of the Telecom Competition Code describes in detail, the prices, terms and conditions at which a Dominant Licensee must offer to provide IRS.

In this arrangement, the interconnection link between the two nodes is provided by the Dominant Licensee, with the costs of this link borne by the Services-based Licensee.

5.5.6.6.2 Timing of the Dispute Resolution Procedure - IDA will seek to complete the Dispute Resolution Procedure, and issue a direction resolving each of the issues presented in the Petition and specifying any further actions that the Licensees must take, within 60 days from the day on which it receives the Petition. This period will be shortened to 30 days where one of the parties is a Services-based Licensee.


Interconnection










Chinese Taipei

Yes. Article 16, paragraph 2, of the Telecommunications Act stipulates that the arrangement of network interconnection shall follow the principles of transparency, reasonableness, non-discrimination, network unbundling and cost-based pricing. In addition, Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises specifies that Type I telecommunications enterprises provide themselves, their affiliates or other telecommunications enterprises with network interconnection service, and that the price, quality and other interconnection conditions shall meet the principle of being

Yes. According to Article 16 of the Telecommunications Act, the arrangement of network interconnection shall follow the principles of transparency, reasonableness, non-discrimination, network unbundling and cost-based pricing. In addition, according to Article 14 of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises provides that Except as otherwise provided hereunder, the access charge of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be determined through negotiation between both parties of the network interconnection. Calculation of the above-mentioned charge shall meet the principle of cost orientation, fair and reasonable, and non-discrimination. The access charge of a dominant market player of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be figured out pursuant to the following principles in accordance with the cost of the applied relay, transmission and switching equipment, which shall be reviewed regularly each year: 1. The access charge shall be determined by the costs of the unbundled network elements in service; and 2. The cost mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be figured out on the basis of TELRIC. The access charge figured out by a dominant market player of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be verified by the NCC in advance, and it also applies to its modification. In order to maintain the competition environment, consumer benefits and other public interests, the NCC shall modify the access charge submitted by the dominant market player of Type I telecommunications enterprises during verification. The access charge of a dominant market player (DMP) of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be figured on the basis of TELRIC, and that of a non-DMP of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be determined on the

Yes. A dominant market player of Type I telecommunications enterprises may set up interconnection points beyond the technically feasible points including local switches, local tandem switches, etc. as required by other Type I telecommunications enterprises, and may collect charges for such points, based on actual cost in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 5, of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises.

Yes. The procedures applicable for interconnection are defined under the Telecommunications Act and the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises and are easily obtained publicly.

Yes. Both Article 16, paragraph 10, of the Telecommunications Act and Article 26, paragraph 5, of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises specify that the DGT (now NCC) may disclose a part or the whole of the interconnection agreement between dominant market players of Type I telecommunications enterprises and other Type I telecommunications enterprises. The interconnection agreement between dominant market players of Type I telecommunications enterprises has been listed on our website since 2000.

Yes. According to Article 16 of the Telecommunications Act and Article 28 of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises, an agreement shall be reached within three months from the date one party requested for network interconnection. If the agreement can not be reached within three months, the DGT (now NCC) shall arbitrate the matter upon receipt of request thereof or by its official authority. or in the event Type I telecommunication enterprises do not carry out network interconnection as agreed which failure is within the scope of those mandatory terms required by law to be included in interconnection agreements, the NCC shall arbitrate the matter upon receipt of request thereof


just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

basis of cost. The access charge determined by a dominant market player of Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be verified by the DGT (now NCC) in advance, which also applies to its modification. At the same time, the unbundled network elements are defined under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises



provided:










Thailand Yes. Those conditions are prescribed in chapter 2, the access and interconnection of the telecommunications network, of the Telecommunications Business Act,

Yes. According to Section 20 of the Telecommunication Business Act B.E. 2544 (2001), the interconnection charge shall be calculated by LRIC method based on unbundling network elements.

Yes. According to Section 35 of the Telecommunication Business Act B.E. 2544 (2001), the Licensee shall pay for any necessary cost occurred from the construction of such additional points.

Yes. According to the Act, it is stated that each operator has to make procedures applicable for interconnection available to interconnection parties. ;

No. According to Section 33 and 41 of the Telecommunication Business Act B.E. 2544 (2001), both interconnection/access contract and reference interconnection/access offer shall be made publicly available.

The dispute resolution process will be established by the NTC.



provided:










United States Yes. Incumbent carriers have the obligation to provide interconnection. This access is to be at rates, terms and conditions that are “just, reasonable and non-discriminatory” and in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to offer service.

Yes. The incumbent carrier must provide interconnection at a cost-based price. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the incumbent local telephone companies and new entrants may voluntarily agree to terms and conditions. In the Local Competition Order, a forward-looking long-run incremental cost-based pricing methodology, referred to as LRIC, is used to determine rates designed to facilitate competition.

Yes. There are a number of methods of obtaining interconnection and access to unbundled network elements. Incumbents are required to provide any reasonable method of interconnection, including physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection unless the incumbent can demonstrate that physical collocation is not practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations. In that event, the incumbent should still be obligated to provide virtual collocation of interconnection equipment. However, a number of network elements have been eliminated, or had conditions put on them. Based on the presence of competitive suppliers, some network elements were eliminated and others were made available only under limited circumstances, or for a set period of time.

Yes. Procedures are publicly available in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, Part 51.

Yes. According to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, all agreements, including those reached voluntarily, must be publicly filed with the states.

Yes. Once an interconnection agreement has been approved by a state utility commission, any aggrieved party may file a complaint at the courts. Parties can (I) seek mediation at any point in the negotiations and (2) arbitration after 135 days from the original request for negotiation. The states have initial responsibility to mediate and arbitrate these disputes but may choose to pass these responsibilities on to the FCC.

Vietnam TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC


D. UNIVERSAL SERVICE Universal Service Please provide a definition of the universal service obligation your

economy maintains. Please outline how your economy’s universal service obligation is administered to ensure transparency, non-discrimination and competitive neutrality, and that it is not more burdensome than necessary.

Australia The universal service obligation (USO) is the obligation to ensure that standard telephone services, payphones and prescribed carriage services are reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on business.

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) monitors the universal service obligation (USO). Provision of the USO is effected through Federal legislation Telstra is the Primary Universal Service Provider for all of Australia, which was determined by legislative instrument. Telstra is required to make public how it fulfils its USO through its Policy Statement and USO Standard Marketing Plan. USO subsidies are paid to the universal service provider, Telstra, each year in arrears to compensate it for loss making services provided under its USO obligations. The amount of the subsidy is determined for each claim period (financial year) by the Minister based on advice from the ACMA. The USO subsidies are funded by way of a levy on the telecommunications industry (all licensed telecommunications carriers including Telstra). Each contributes proportionally based on a calculation of the carrier’s ‘eligible revenue’. Eligible revenue is defined as gross sales revenue of the carrier and its related companies less a series of revenue and expense deductions. The ACMA requires an annual financial return from each carrier to assist it to determine each carrier’s USO liability.

Brunei Darussalam

Universal Service is defined as providing basic communication services and facilities throughout the economy, including rural areas. Brunei Darussalam has reached 100% household penetration, which enables people from rural areas to access the internet.

Under the Telecommunications Order 2001, which has yet to be enforced, funds will be allocated for USO.

Canada The basic service objective for Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), defined by the CRTC is: Local individual line service, with touch-tone dialling, provided by a

digital switch with capability to connect via low-speed data transmission to the Internet at local rates;

Enhanced calling features, including access to emergency services; Access to operator services and directory assistance; Access to the long distance network; and A copy of the local telephone directory.

The Telecommunications Act explicitly gives the CRTC powers to require telecommunications service providers to contribute to a fund to support access by Canadians to basic telecommunications services. The CRTC has implemented universal service measures to help maintain basic telephone service rates affordable in high cost service areas. Funding obligations, applicable to telecommunications service providers, are based on a percentage of eligible revenues. Exemptions apply to small service providers with less than $10 million in revenues. Revenues from retail Internet, paging and terminal equipment are excluded. The total annual funding requirements are based on the incremental costs of providing basic telephone service in high-cost serving areas and are set in the context of public proceedings. Both incumbent and competitive LECs are eligible to receive these subsidies for residential basic telephone service lines they provide in high-cost serving areas.

Chile There is no Universal Service Obligation to public telecommunication service providers, there are no specífic taxes or other kind of burden for this purpose. Instead, Chile has developed a Policy of Universal Access through the Telecommunications Development Fund, which is 100% part of the national budget.

The Telecommunications Development Fund , is regulated in detailed on the LGT and a complementarý regulation. Therefore, it is completely transparent the way this fund is granted.

China Not defined yet. You can find something relevant in Article 44 of the Regulation on Telecommunications of People’s Republic of China. The telecommunications service providers shall fulfil their statutory obligation in regard to universal telecommunications service. The MII may, through appointment or tender, determine the substantive obligations of telecommunications service providers in regard to universal telecommunications service. The subsidy policies for universal telecommunications service shall be formulated by MII together with the Ministry of Finance and the competent price authority of the State Council.


Universal Service Please provide a definition of the universal service obligation your


Hong Kong, China The Telecommunications Ordinance defines “universal service obligation” as the provision of a good, efficient and continuous “basic service” by a carrier licensee subject to a universal service obligation to all persons within the areas of Hong Kong covered by that obligation and “basic service” as: a) a public switched telephone service including the service connection,

continued provision of connectivity, provision of a dedicated telephone number, an appropriate directory listing (except where the customer otherwise directs), a standard telephone handset without switching capacity (except where the customer elects to provide the handset), standard billing and collection services and relevant ancillary services and facilities necessarily utilized by the licensee;

b) a reasonable number of public payphones including payphones located within publicly or privately owned facilities to which the public have access (including intermittent access);

c) a reasonable number of public payphones, designed for ease of effective use by the hearing impaired;

d) a reasonable number of public payphones, designed for access by the physically disabled, including but not limited to those persons using wheelchairs;

e) operator provided directory enquiries, fault reporting, service difficulty and connection services; f) a tropical cyclone warning service; g) a thunderstorm and heavy rain warning service; h) a flood warning service; i) access to a number or numbers for emergency services; and j) such other service, as the Authority may include, under regulations made under section 37 of the Ordinance.

The universal service obligation framework is provided under section 35B of the Telecommunications Ordinance. The Telecommunications Authority is empowered under section 35B to require that one or more fixed carrier licensees have a universal service obligation and to establish a system for licensees to meet a reasonable contribution to the cost of providing the universal service obligation. The Telecommunications Authority has published a number of statements setting out the detailed framework including the calculation method and the collection mechanism for the universal service contribution. The relevant statements of the Telecommunications Authority are publicly available on OFTA’s website.

Indonesia The Universal Service obligation is obligation for all operators to contribute in the provision of telecommunication services in un-served areas. The initial program covers the provision of one telephone access to one village which there is no telephone line yet. The priority will be given to districts which provide facilities such as land, access road and building.

Regulator made an agreement with all telecommunication networks and service operators the amount of percentage Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) should be reserved for the USO. The fund is handled by the Regulator, and will select USO operators through competitive bidding among the operators. The Operators will also sit on the Supervisory Board for the implementation of the USO. The operators have agreed to contribute 0,75% out of their AGR (Gross Revenue minus interconnection charge and bad debt.)

Japan In Article 7 of the Telecommunications Business Law, universal telecommunications services are defined as telecommunications services, which are stipulated in the applicable ministerial ordinance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) in order to ensure the provision of such telecommunications services nationwide which are indispensable for people’s daily lives.

The universal telecommunications services support mechanism, which provides eligible telecommunications carriers with supports to recover the part of costs for providing universal telecommunications services, is created to ensure transparency, non-discrimination and competitive neutrality and that it is not more burdensome than necessary, pursuant to Article 106-116 of the Telecommunications Business Law, the applicable cabinet order and the applicable ministerial ordinance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).




Korea The term "universal service" refers to the basic telecommunications service that is delivered to every user at reasonable price anytime, anywhere. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 2) The universal service includes: d) fixed-line telephone services(local call service, payphone service and

telecommunications service on the islands) ; e) emergency call services (special number service and maritime

radiotelephone service); and f) telephone services whose tariffs are reduced or exempted for the

disabled and the low income class.

(Enforcement Decree of the Telecommunications Business Act, Article 2-2, Paragraph 1)

All telecom operators have the obligation to provide universal service or to replenish the losses incurred by the provision of such services. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 3-2, Paragraph 1) For the purpose of the efficient and reliable provision of universal services, the Korea Communications Commission may designate an operator to provide universal service in consideration of the scale, quality and tariff level of the universal service and the technical capacity of the operator (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 3-2, Paragraph 4) The Korea Communications Commission may have the facilities-based service suppliers share the burden of replenishing the losses incurred by the provision of universal service in the proportion to their revenues (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 3-2, Paragraph 5).

Malaysia “Universal Service Obligation” means the obligation to ensure that collective access, as the case may be, in respect to universal service target is fulfilled. “Universal Service Target” means an underserved area and/or an underserved group within the community. An underserved area is defined as an area where the penetration rate for basic telephony service is 20% below the national penetration rate. An underserved group within the community is defined as a group of people linked by similar characteristics from socio-cultural or economic perspective, within a served area, who do not have a collective and/and or individual access based on the following priorities: 1. collective access to basic telephony an public payphone services; 2. individual access to basic telephony services 3. collective access to internet access services; and

individual access to internet access services

This is done pursuant to Section 202 - 204 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998

The Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission has issued the Commission Determination on Universal Service Provision, Determination No.2 of 2001 and Commission Determination on Universal Service Provision, Determination No.6 of 2002 which focus, among others, on provision of services to universal service targets and requirement for contribution to USP fund. On 30 October 2003, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission issued the Variation to Commission Determination of Universal Service Provision (Determination No.6 of 2002), Variation No.1 of 2003 to reflect the amendments in the Commission Determination on Universal Service Provision, Determination No.6 of 2002.

Mexico Universal Service is not defined in Mexican legislation. However, universal service is guarantee through obligations established in operator’s Licensees and through the adoption of multiples initiatives to provide universal service, as the Programme of Rural Telephony; the National System of e-Mexico, and; the Fund of Social Coverage of Telecommunication.

In the case of the Fund of Social Coverage of Telecommunications, two national public auctions have already been realized. The Fund is administrated by an independent Technical Committee, integrated by different governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Communication, of Education and of Social Development, the Regulator (Cofetel) and by representatives of telecommunication’s industry and associations, that deliberate in a collegiate form.


Universal Service Please provide a definition of the universal service obligation your economy

maintains. Please outline how your economy’s universal service obligation is administered to ensure transparency, non-discrimination and competitive neutrality, and that it is not more burdensome than necessary.

New Zealand The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSO) instruments for the supply of telecommunications services to meet social objectives. The Minister of Communications consults with the telecommunications industry and other interested parties before a TSO instrument is declared.

An agreement between the Crown and Telecom New Zealand controls the supply of local residential telephone service. An update of the agreement in Telecom’s company constitution was agreed as a deed in December 2001. The updated agreement is deemed to be a TSO instrument by the Telecommunications Act 2001.

The TSO requires that price capped local telephone service (including an option for unlimited non-chargeable local calls) be available to residential users. The TSO commits Telecom to:

Not increasing in real terms the standard residential line rental provided that the overall profitability of Telecom’s fixed business is not unreasonably impaired;

the standard residential line rental for customers in rural areas being no higher than the standard line rental for customers in urban areas;

local residential telephone service being as widely available as it was in December 2001;

99% of residential telephone lines being capable of supporting a connect speed of at least 9.6 kbps;

a range of specific quality standards for local residential telephone service; and

reporting of service performance to the Crown and the Telecommunications Commissioner.

The Commerce Commission is responsible for calculating the net cost of any TSO instrument where this is not specified. The Commission also apportions the net cost amongst liable telecommunications service providers.

Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC




Peru Peru fulfils the universal access concept. Universal access is the policy that allows to overcome market failures that limit the development of telecommunication services to rural population and special social low income areas. Universal access consists in the provision of telecommunication and electronic communication that are located at a reasonable distance from the residence location of the target population. Through the communitarian use of the basic infrastructure that allows to distribute asset amortization, operation costs and a reasonable profit between the users through the payment of a tariff for the use of the services, instead of the individual acquisition of them. The Universal Access Program is financed by the contribution of 1% of total income of telecommunication firms, with the exception of cable TV.

The Regulation approve the law Nº 28900, law that grants to the Investment fund in Telecommunications FITEL. By means of the law Nº 28900, it is granted to the investment fund in telecommunications – FITEL (formerly part of OSIPTEL´s structure) ; the quality of legal person of public right, assigned to the Sector Transport and Communications. The law establishes that FITEL will be administered by a directory head by the Ministry of Transport and Communications and having as members the Ministry of Economy and Finances and the President of OSIPTEL. Ministry of Transports and Communications is the Technical Secretariat. FITEL´s reglament enacted by DS 010-2007 -MTC establishes in its art. No 7 the following principles for the fund administration: 1. Transparency, 2. Efficient resources management, 3. Equal opportunities, 4. Technological innovation, and 5. Technological neutrality

Philippines In accordance with Executive Order No. 109, and later inscribed in RA 7925, all enfranchised and licensed international gateway operators and cellular mobile telephone providers are required to provide 300,000 and 400,000 local exchange lines, respectively, in their assigned areas of operations subject to a ratio of 1 line in a rural area for every 10 lines installed in an urban area.

Under the implementing guidelines of Executive Order No. 109, all IGF and CMTS operators are given a period of 3 years, from their acceptance of the terms of their license, to comply with the roll-out program these operators propose to undertake in their assigned areas. On a periodic basis, these operators shall provide a report to the NTC detailing the installations in their assigned areas, which shall be verified by the NTC for compliance in terms of number of lines required and if these are in accordance with the coverage ratio of 1:10. At the end of the 3 year, the NTC shall determine the level of compliance by these operators, and shall impose the incentives and sanctions accordingly.

Russian Federation

TBC TBC

Singapore IDA imposes a Basic Service Obligation on operators that are designated as public telecom licensees under Section 6 of the Telecoms Act. These operators are then required to provide a basic telephone service to any person in Singapore who requests the provision of such service. Basic telephone service means "a fundamentally plain telephony service provided through a telephone set connected to the public switched telephone system and which service excludes that which is provided through any enhanced of supplementary configuration of Systems."

The Basic Service Obligations are set out in the licences of public telecom licensees and the licences are published on IDA's website at: www.ida.gov.sg.

Chinese Taipei Universal service is defined as “Indispensable telecommunications services with a reasonable level of quality provided fairly and at reasonable rates for all citizens”.

For voice service, the incumbent operator shall, prior to the fiscal year in which universal service is implemented, submits the Universal Service Annual Implementation Plan to NCC to apply for the provision of universal service for uneconomic public payphone and uneconomic area telephone services. Meanwhile, other local network operators may also apply for the provision of universal service for uneconomic area telephone service. Implementation plans are published by the NCC and local network operators may raise further comments on plans or again submit improved implementation plans. The NCC shall then compare the net universal service costs, the predicted improvements in service penetration and quality benchmarks in its assessments of implementation plans, and consider the actual operating abilities of the applicants, and then finally determine the best implementation plans for submission to the universal services Fund Management Committee for approval. For data communications, middle and elementary schools and public libraries desiring Internet access shall select legal operators for the provision of universal service for data communications. At present, there are four legitimate operators that schools and public libraries can choose from for provision of universal service for data communications. To reduce the digital divide in urban and rural areas, and achieve the goal of “Every rural community has broadband internet service “, NCC integrated broadband Internet data communications into the universal service.




Thailand According to the NTC Notification regarding Criteria and Procedures for Providing Basic Telecommunication Services and Social Services, Volume II, Universal Service is defined as providing Basic Telecommunication Services to all people. Basic Telecommunication Service means payphone, fixed line and the Internet without technology limitation and its application. It may include terminal equipments, software and other components that are essential for communication.

The basic principles of USO implementation as prescribed in the Telecommunications Business Act are: - The criteria, procedures and conditions prescribed for the supply of telecommunications service of

the licensee under USO regime shall be issued in advance so that a person who intends to apply for a license will be informed of the scope of such services prior to the submission of the application.

- The obligation to provide such services shall not pose undue burden on the investment of the licensee, and shall not cause discrimination among the licensees of the same nature and type of telecommunications service.

- NTC is now publishing the Notification regarding Criteria and Procedures for Providing Basic Telecommunication Services and Social Services, Volume II.

United States The goals of Universal Service, as mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, are to promote the availability of quality services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates; increase access to advanced telecommunications services throughout the Nation; advance the availability of such services to all consumers, including those in low income, rural, insular, and high cost areas at rates that are reasonably comparable to those charged in urban areas. In addition, the 1996 Act states that all providers of telecommunications services should contribute to Federal universal service in some equitable and nondiscriminatory manner; there should be specific, predictable, and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service; and all schools, classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should, generally, have access to advanced telecommunications services. All providers of interstate telecommunications services should contribute to the fund.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 articulated five principles that drive the FCC’s implementation of universal service. These principles have become increasingly important as competition matures. Universal service support should be: explicit vs. implicit; specific, predictable, and sufficient; competitively neutral; portable among carriers; and contributions to universal service should be equitable and non-discriminatory.

Vietnam TBC TBC


E. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF LICENSING CRITERIA

Public Availability of Licensing Criteria

Does your economy make licensing criteria publicly available?: (a) licensing criteria and period of time normally required to reach a decision concerning

an application for a licence (b) terms and conditions of individual licences.

Please answer “yes” or “no” and explain.

Are the reasons for the denial of a licence made known to the applicant upon request?


Australia Yes. ACMA has a publicly available booklet, Know Your Obligations:, which is a guide to key legislative obligations placed on carriers and carriage service providers. The booklet covers consumer, community, competition and technical obligations. ACMA’s publicly available application for carrier licences states that ACMA has 28 days to grant a licence, with an additional 14 days if further information is required.

Yes. If ACMA refuses to grant a licence it will write to the applicant to advise that they can ask for the reasons for the denial and the procedures for requesting reconsideration of the decision.

Brunei Darussalam

Licensing regime currently under review.

Canada Yes. Canada has generally relied on open entry rather than licensing, with the exceptions of international basic telecommunications services, international submarine cable licences and wireless services: 1. International telecommunications services: The instructions for making applications for international telecommunications service licenses, including the information that should be provided by applicants, are publicly accessible on the CRTC website. Applications are placed on the public record for 21 days and subsequently approved provided they are satisfactory on their face and no adverse comments are received.

2. International Submarine Cable Licences

Procedures and information requirements for making applications for International Submarine Cable Licences are publically available through Industry Canada. The period of time normally required is generally available, but may vary with considerations such exceptional environmental conditions for the proposed cable location.

3. Wireless services: Entry by wireless telecommunication operators into the market requires prior approval in the form of a license. Industry Canada uses a competitive licensing process to award spectrum licenses for a wide range of wireless services. In the past few years, Canada has used an auction process since 1999 to grant area licenses for PCS at 2 GHz, broadband spectrum at 24/38 GHz, 2.3/3.5 GHz wireless access spectrum, AWS at 2 GHz and the PCS expansion band. Auctions are planned for 700 MHz and 2500 MHz however timing has not been finalized. The licenses are given full spectrum usage rights with secondary trading and full transferability. For further information, please see: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/spectrumauctions.

1. International telecommunications services: Applications that meet the published criteria are approved.

2. International Submarine Cable Licences: Reasons for denial would be made known upon request.

3. Wireless licenses are awarded based on an auction process.

Chile Yes, the Title 2 of the General Law on Telecommunications established the criteria licensing, the requirements to apply to a license and the process to obtain one. At the same time, each license once granted is published in the official newspaper of the nation.

Yes, Art 16 LGT establishes that SUBTEL must explain the reasons to deny a license.

China Yes. As indicated in the Reference Paper accepted by China upon WTO accession.

Hong Kong, China

Yes. Guidelines related to application and criteria for licence as well as terms and conditions of licence are published and can be found on OFTA’s website : www.ofta.gov.hk/en/Howto/howto-lic.html

Yes. Section 7(11) of the Telecommunications Ordinance requires the Telecommunications Authority to provide the person her reasons in writing where she refuses to issue a licence to a person.

Indonesia a) Yes, through Government Regulation No. 52 year 2000 concerning Telecommunication Implementation, Articles 64 point (1) and (2).

b) Yes, through Government Regulation No. 52 year 2000 concerning Telecommunication Implementation, Articles 65, 66 and 67. Full and further elaboration of these Government Regulations can be seen at

www.postel.go.id

Yes, Government Regulation No. 52 year 2000 concerning Telecommunication Implementation states that within 60 days, the Minister is obliged to reply to any application by applicant requiring the right to hold principle license. If within that period of time the Minister does not give any answer, then the applicant automatically gets the principle license.




an application for a licence (b) terms and conditions of individual licences.


Are the reasons for the denial of a licence made known to the applicant upon request?


Yes, a legal framework in the form of a Ministerial Decree states that license is given to applicant without expiry time. However, the license holder will be evaluated every 5 years and if such evaluation discloses any unsuitable practices that are against regulation, then the license could be revoked.

Japan Yes. It is ensured by the Administrative Procedures Law and related review standards. Yes. It is ensured by the Administrative Procedures Law.




an application for a licence (b) terms and conditions of individual licences. Please answer “yes” or “no” and explain.

Are the reasons for the denial of a licence made known to the applicant upon request? Please answer “yes” or “no” and explain.

Korea Yes, Licensing criteria are listed on the relevant laws: A license is granted after the comprehensive examination into feasibility of the plans for

providing the facilities-based services, appropriateness of the size of telecommunications facilities, and financial and technical capability, etc. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 5)

The KCC examines and deliberates the application documents and notifies the result of the application within 1 month unless there are any special reasons. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No. 2008-54, Article 9)

When licenses are granted, certain conditions necessary for the promotion of the telecommunications industry can be attached. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 5, Paragraph 5)

An applicant is notified of the result of review on her or his application. It is also possible for the applicant to exert a right to request for disclosure of information.

Malaysia Yes. 1. The Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) Regulations 2000 and the subsequent

amendments provides for standard licence conditions for all licences, and special licence conditions for each category of Individual licence and the Communications and Mlultimedia Act 1998 Section 30 provides for timelines for decision-making.

2. Information Paper on Licence Application Procedure and Licensing Criteria 11 August 2003. The information paper provides licensees and other interested parties with a guide to the type of information that is required in a licence application and the criteria applied by MCMC in evaluating an individual licence application.

3. The register of licenses provides the terms and conditions of individual licenses.

Yes The reasons will be made known to applicants as provided for under Section 30 (6) Communications and Multimedia Act 1998: “(6) If the Minister refuses to grant an individual licence to an applicant, the Minister shall give the applicant a written notice informing him - (a) that the application has been refused; and (b) the reasons for the refusal.”

Mexico Yes. Since June 12, 2003, entities of the Public Federal Administration must fulfill the obligations established on the Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Governmental Public Information (“Law of Transparency”). The Law of Transparency mandates access for all individuals to information in the hands of the State branches, autonomous constitutional bodies, federal administrative tribunals, and other federal agencies. The Law of Transparency provides a list of “transparency obligations” that each governmental office and entity must observe. In this sense, article 7 of the Law of Transparency mandates entities to publish on a regular basis the information related with the proceedings, requirements and formats for the licenses, permits and authorization, as well as all useful and relevant information. The information has to be published in a way to facilitate its use and understanding by individuals and in a way to ensure its quality, veracity, opportunity and confidentiality. Moreover, all proceedings that need to be filed before Cofetel are subscribed in the Register of the Federal Bureau of Regulatory Improvement (Cofemer, for its initials in Spanish, Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria) or at Cofetel´s web site. Licensing procedures are established in the Cofemer’s Register, ruled by the Federal Law of Administrative Procedures (article 69, item M, to article 69, item Q).

This information should be established in COFEMER’s Register.



Does your economy make licensing criteria publicly available?: (c) licensing criteria and period of time normally required to reach a decision concerning an

application for a licence (d) terms and conditions of individual licences. Please answer “yes” or “no” and explain.


New Zealand Not applicable. There are no licensing requirements to provide telecommunications services in New Zealand.

Not applicable. There are no licensing requirements to provide telecommunications services in New Zealand.

Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC

Peru Yes. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is in charge of licensing. The Telecommunication Rules established some broad licensing criteria and the maximum period of time for evaluation. Information regarding specific requirements and procedures for licensing, is available at the web site of the Ministry. Also, terms and conditions of licenses are contained in the concession agreement template, available at this web site.

Yes. The legal framework establishes when a license can be denied.

Philippines Yes. The licensing criteria are made publicly available by the NTC. Applicants, who have acquired the appropriate franchise from Congress are then evaluated by the NTC on the basis of their technical and financial capabilities to provide the service they are applying for. Applicants may be subjected to an economic needs test to establish if the area they wish to operate in may necessitate the entry of a new operator. Public hearings shall be conducted to hear these applications.

Yes. The NTC sitting as a quasi-judicial body shall render a ruling on applications. The basis of the ruling is usually derived from evidence and testimonies provided and heard during the public hearings, and on existing laws and regulations pertinent to applications for the acquisition of a license to operate the service.

Russian Federation

TBC TBC

Singapore Yes. All the information mentioned above can be found in the various licensing guidelines made publicly available in the IDA website: www.ida.gov.sg

Yes. IDA will undertake to explain to the applicant concerned, on the applicant’s request, why the applicant is unsuccessful in its application for a licence.



Does your economy make licensing criteria publicly available?: (a) licensing criteria and period of time normally required to reach a decision concerning an

application for a licence (b) terms and conditions of individual licences. Please answer “yes” or “no” and explain.


Chinese Taipei Yes. In Chinese Taipei, the public is comprehensively involved in discussion to understand the related licensing requirement and stipulation through on-line and the government’s communiqué during the deregulation of the telecommunication business and the enactment of the related regulation, so that it ensures the liberalization progress to be open and transparent. In addition, the authority negotiates with both the prospective applicants and related and interested organizations face to face by convening consultation meetings for the public.

Yes. A formal letter giving the reason for the denial would be sent to the applicant whose licensing was overruled by the NCC.

Thailand Yes. Those criteria are detailed In the National Telecommunications Commission Announcement: criteria and procedures for Type I, Type II and Type III telecommunications business licensing.

Yes. It is detailed in Section 37 of the Administrative Procedure Act B.E. 2539 (1996).

United States Yes. All proceedings are conducted according to the Administrative Procedures Act and stringent FCC rules for transparency and notice and comment. The amount of time required for each decision can vary somewhat; thus, timeline is put forth in at the start of each proceeding.

Yes.

Vietnam TBC TBC


F. INDEPENDENT REGULATORS

Independent Regulators

What is the name of the telecom regulator in your economy?

Please specify the major acts and laws concerning independent regulators. Briefly describe the function, role, and responsibility and enforcement powers of the regulatory agency in your economy.

Is the regulator separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services? Please answer “yes” or “no”. If “no”, please explain.

What procedures are used by regulators in your economy to ensure that the decisions of, and procedures used by, regulators are impartial?







Australia Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)

ACMA is established under the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005, which provides for ACMA’s constitution, governance and general powers. Other legislation (as described below) confers specific regulatory functions and powers on ACMA. ACMA’s main functions are regulating telecommunications in accordance with the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Telecommunications Act) and the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Consumer Protection Act) in addition to managing the radiofrequency spectrum in accordance with the Radiocommunications Act 1992. ACMA also has the function of advising and assisting the telecommunications industry and the radiocommunications community, and of publicizing information and conducting public educational programs, about matters relating to them. ACMA may apply to the Federal Court for an injunction to restrain a person from engaging in any conduct in contravention of the Telecommunications Act or Consumer Protection Act. ACMA may also institute proceedings in the Federal Court for the recovery of financial penalties for breaches of certain provisions of the above laws. The ACCC is established under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Trade Practices Act), which provides for the ACCC’s constitution, governance and general powers. Specific regulatory powers are conferred on the ACCC by the Trade Practices Act, the Telecommunications Act, the Telecommunications and Consumer Protection Acts and the Radiocommunications Act. The ACCC is responsible for the competition and consumer protection provisions of the Trade Practices Act, which applies to all sectors of the Australian economy. The ACCC assumed responsibility in 1997 for administering the industry-specific telecommunications access regime in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act and the industry-specific anti-competitive conduct prohibitions in Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act. Under the Consumer Protection Act, the ACCC is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the controls on the prices set by Telstra, the major supplier, and has the role of arbitrating terms and conditions of access to certain services, facilities or information under the Telecommunications Act. The ACCC can commence proceedings in the Federal Court at any time for an injunction to stop anti-competitive conduct. It can also apply to the court for a financial penalty in relation to anti-competitive conduct. Penalties of up to Aus$10m apply for anti-competitive conduct plus $1m for each day that the anti-competitive conduct continues; these penalties increase to $30 million plus $3 million for each day that the anti-competitive conduct continues, if that conduct has continued for more than 20 days. The Federal Court may also order a telecommunications provider that has engaged in anti-competitive conduct to pay compensation to any other telecommunications provider that has

Yes. ACMA was established as an independent statutory authority under the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005. Its Chair and Members are appointed for fixed terms by the Governor-General on the advice of the Government. The ACCC was also established as an independent statutory authority, under the Trade Practices Act. Its Chairperson and Members are appointed for fixed terms by the Governor-General on the advice of the Government. The Chair/Chairperson and Members of ACMA and the ACCC are required to disclose any conflict of interest and are required not to participate in making decisions where they have a conflict of interest.

Under Australian administrative law, decisions of agencies including ACMA and the ACCC must be made in accordance with a procedure that is fair and impartial. Certain decisions of the ACCC are appealable to the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT), which reviews the decision on the merits. The ACT is able to affirm or vary the ACCC’s decision or set it aside. A wide range of decisions of ACMA are subject to review by ACMA or by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which reviews the decision on the merits. Complaints may be made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman about alleged governmental maladministration, including decisions of the ACCC and ACMA. Where a complaint is found to be justified, the Ombudsman reports his or her finding to the decision maker and the relevant Minister, together with recommendations for remedial action. The Ombudsman can also make a report to the Australian Parliament if appropriate remedial action is not taken by the decision-maker concerned.





Please specify the major acts and laws concerning independent regulators. Briefly describe the function, role, responsibility and enforcement powers of the regulatory agency in your economy.



Brunei Darussalam

Authority for Infocommunications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam (AiTi)

In 2001, the Government of Brunei Darussalam commenced a restructuring of the ICT industry. To this effect, three new pieces of legislation were enacted:

Telecommunications Successor Company Order, 2001;

Authority for Info-communications Industry of Brunei Darussalam Order, 2001;

Telecommunications Order, 2001

The Telecommunication Successor Company Order, 2001, transfers all property, rights and liabilities belilonging to the Telecoms Department (JTB) to Telekom Brunei Berhad (TelBru) whereby TelBru will assume the role of service provider in place of the JTB. TelBru will not retain the regulatory function. JTB is currently undergoing the process of corporatization. In the meantime, the Regulatory Unit at the Ministry of Communications continues to function. This Order has not been brought into effect as of yet.

The AiTi Order, 2001 establlishes AiTi as an independent statuatory body to regulate the local ICT industry, and provides for its functions and duties. AiTi is accountable only to the Minister of Communications. The AiTi Order must be read in conjunction with the Telecommunications Order which provides AiTi with the powers to perform the functions and duties as set out in the AiTi Order. This Order was brought into effect on January 1, 2003.

The Telecommunications Order, 2001 confers upon AiTi the exclusive privilege to operate and provide telecommunication systems and services in Brunei Darussalam and allows AiTi to grant licences for the same. It must be noted that AiTi only has a residual power to provide telecommunication services in limited circumstances as defined within the Order. In practice, AiTi will only carry out the function of regulator and grant licences to operators for the provision of telecommunication services. This Order is yet to be brought into force.

It is intended that the Telecommunications Order will be brought into effect together with the Telecommunications Successor Company Order in the near future. The Telecommunications Act of 1952 will be repealed once the Telecommunications Order is enforced.

Yes. The operation of AiTi is run by a Chief Executive reporting directly to a Board of Members and a Chairman, consists of representatives from academia, banking and industry, which are not related to domestic “telcos”.

There are procedures to ensure impartiality whereby additional checks exist where AITI can be sued and any appeals against AiTi’s decision may be addressed to the Minister of Communications.







Canada Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)

The CRTC is responsible for the regulation of telecommunications services in Canada. It is also charged with the supervision and regulation of Canadian broadcasting services. The CRTC is an independent federal agency with quasi-judicial status. Its institutional structure and powers are outlined in the CRTC Act (see http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-22/index.html), the Broadcasting Act (see: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/B-9.01/index.html ) and the Telecommunications Act (see: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/T-3.4/index.html ). The 1993 Telecommunications Act gives the CRTC a broad range of powers, which must be exercised with a view to implementing the policy objectives in section 7 of the Act, and any directions issued by the Governor in Council. Consistent with these policy objectives the main activities of the CRTC over the last decade have been the implementation of the regulatory regime fostering competition in the telecommunication sector and developing consumer safeguards appropriate to the competitive policy structure. In discharging its responsibilities the CRTC must ensure that rates are just and reasonable and that Canadian carriers do not discriminate unjustly or accord any undue preference with respect to the telecommunications services they offer. The CRTC has the authority to approve tariffs for services offered by Canadian carriers (s. 25) and agreements entered into between carriers (s. 29). It may, however, forbear from the exercise of these and other powers where it finds that a service or class of services is or will be subject to competition sufficient to protect the interest of users. The CRTC may also settle disputes between Canadian carriers and municipalities or other public authorities regarding the use of rights-of-way (s. 42-45). In addition, the CRTC can settle disputes between parties on any telecommunications issue either as a mediator or through a public process. The Telecommunications Act was amended in May 1998 by An Act to Amend the Telecommunications Act and the Teleglobe Canada Reorganization and Divestiture Act that were related to Teleglobe's special investment and regulatory regime. It also amended the Telecommunications Act to exempt international submarine cables and earth stations from the foreign ownership and control restrictions. The 1998 amendments also provided the CRTC with the authority to introduce a licensing regime for international services (s. 16) and gave it responsibility for numbering administration (s. 46). The amendments also authorized the CRTC to require any telecommunications service provider to contribute to a fund to support continuing access by Canadians to basic telecommunications services and to designate a person to administer that fund (s. 46).

Yes. The CRTC is comprised of up to 13 full-time Commissioners and six part-time Commissioners appointed by the Governor in Council for a fixed term. A person is not eligible to be appointed or to continue as a member of the Commission if the person is not a Canadian citizen ordinarily resident in Canada or if, directly or indirectly, is engaged in a telecommunications undertaking or has an pecuniary or proprietary interest in a telecommunications undertaking or the manufacture or distribution of telecommunications apparatus.

The CRTC is a quasi-judicial regulatory tribunal. Its decisions can be appealed to the courts on matters of law, including procedural fairness.







Chile Undersecretariat of Telecommunications SUBTEL

SUBTEL was created by Decree (DFL) N° 1762 on 1977. SUBTEL is in charge of the application and control of the General Law on Telecommunications and its regulations and setting the public policy of telecommunication sector. Among its role, we can mention licensing, management of Spectrum, administration of numeration, Universal Access policy, etc

Yes. SUBTEL is absolutely separated and not accountable to any supplier.

Transparency is one of the basic principles of our procedures. For this purpose. There is a resolution that establishes that all administrative documents are public (except those that content sensible commercial information of some companies or those that involve national security) Addittionaly, regulation on tariff processes allows participation of third persons interested on the matter and all the documents are publicly available in the web: www.subtel.cl

China The Ministry of Information Industry (MII)

As indicated in the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Telecommunications, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) is responsible for the supervision and administration of the telecommunications industry nationwide in accordance with the stipulations of the Regulations.

Yes To ensure impartiality of regulators, there are laws, regulations and provisions that govern issues on interconnection and dispute resolution, licensing, allocation and use of scare resources, as stipulated in the Provisions on the Administrative Licensing Law, and the Provisions on the Regulations on Telecommunications, and the Provisions on the Licensing of Telecommunications Services, and the Provisions on the Interconnection Dispute Resolution between Telecommunications Networks, and the Provisions on the Administration of Interconnection between Public Telecommunications Networks , etc.







Hong Kong, China

Telecommunications Authority, with Office of the Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) as its executive arm

The Telecommunications Ordinance (Chapter 106 of Hong Kong laws) and its subsidiary legislation provide for the regulation of telecommunications network, services and related matters. The Telecommunications Authority is appointed under the Telecommunications Ordinance. Under the Ordinance, the Telecommunications Authority is empowered to, inter alia: issue, administer, suspend, cancel or withdraw telecommunications licences; enforce the anti-competitive provisions in the

Ordinance; grant right of access to land to

telecommunications operators; prescribe technical standards and specifications; administer the numbering plan; manage radio spectrum (including allocating

frequency); establish a universal service regime; determine terms of interconnection; direct the sharing of use of facilities; issue directions to licensees or other persons for

compliance with licence or the Ordinance, or for securing interconnection;

impose financial penalties on licensees for breach of licence condition, direction or the Ordinance.

Yes. The Telecommunications Authority is required in various provisions of the Telecommunications Ordinance to consult or seek and consider representations from the persons who may be affected before making certain major decisions, for example: issuing guidelines (section 6D); creating and varying a class licence (sections 7B and

7C); dividing the radio spectrum and specifying the general

purpose of frequencies and channels, and designating the frequency bands to be subject to payment of spectrum utilization fee (sections 32G, 32H and 32I);

prescribing standards and specifications. (section 32D);

making a determination on interconnection (section 36A)

issuing a Direction (section 36B); imposing a financial penalty (section 36C) Provision for Appeal Persons aggrieved by an opinion, determination,

direction or decision of the Telecommunications Authority relating to anti-competition provisions of the Telecommunications Ordinance or any licence condition relating to any such section, or by any sanction or remedy imposed or to be imposed under the Ordinance by the Telecommunications Authority in consequence of a breach of any such section or any such licence condition may appeal to the “Telecommunications (Competition Provision) Appeal Board” (sections 32L, 32M, 32N and 32O).

Persons aggrieved may also apply for judicial review.







Indonesia Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory Body (BRTI) which consists of Directorate General of Post & Telecommunications and Telecommunications Regulatory Committee (of Five persons incl. Director General as the Chairman)

The Law No. 36 Year 1999 on Telecommunication gives mandate to the Minister of the sector to establish Independent Regulator which mandate is then implemented through Ministerial Decree No. 31 Year 2003 concerning the independent regulator establishment. BRTI reports to Minister directly. Its role and functions according to the current legal framework is to regulate, supervise and control telecommunications competition. At the moment the regulatory body is given the authority to regulate issues such as licensing based on selection, basic services, voice telephony, and other services that require frequency spectrum and numbering.

Yes. The Law No. 36 Year 1999 on Telecommunications gives the mandate to separate telecommunication regulators from telecommunication network providers. Service suppliers and all operators should be treated equally. The Ministerial Decree KM 31/2003, states that establishment of BRTI is to ensure transparency, independency and fairness in the telecommunication network and services operation.

According to the Ministerial Decree No. 31year 2003 the Regulator’s decision is decided by the Committee Members collegially and where there is no consensus voting take place .Each Member has the same voting right.

Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC)

Under the Law of Establishment of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the MIC is independently established from telecommunications carriers. The law stipulates that the MIC has the authority to regulate installation and use of wire and wireless equipments for electromagnetic distribution of information, frequency allocation and management, and technical standards for wire telecommunications and wireless equipment, etc.

Yes.

Inquiry of the Telecommunications Council, public comments, etc.

Korea Korea Communications Commission (KCC)

Korea Communications Commission Act (Law on the Establishment and Administration of Korea Communications Commission) stipulates establishment, composition and functions of the Korea Communications Commission

Yes. The status of the KCC commissioners are guaranteed by law so as to promote fair competition, protect users' rights, and settle the disputes. Korea Communications Commission Act, Article 8) In cases where prohibited acts are committed, the KCC may conduct an investigation, go through deliberation, give rulings, and issue correction orders as an independent regulator. (Telecommunications Business Act, Articles 36-5 and 37).

The KCC is composed of experts from diverse fields. (Korea Communications Commission Act, Article 5) The deliberation of the KCC is decided by a majority of registered members. To vest fairness to its decision, the Commission retains measures such as Exclusion, Avoidance, and Refrainment of Members. (Korea Communications Commission Act, Articles 13 and 14)







Malaysia Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission

The regulation of the communications and multimedia industry is based on the powers provided for in the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act (1998) and the Communications and Multimedia Act (1998). Pursuant to these Acts the role of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission is to implement and promote the Government's national policy objectives for the communications and multimedia sector. The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission is also charged with overseeing the new regulatory framework for the converging industries of telecommunications, broadcasting and on-line activities. Economic regulation, which includes the promotion of competition and prohibition of anti-competitive conduct, as well as the development and enforcement of access codes and standards. It also includes licensing, enforcement of license conditions for network and application providers and ensuring compliance to rules and performance/service quality. Technical regulation, which includes efficient frequency spectrum assignment, the development and enforcement of technical codes and standards, and the administration of numbering and electronic addressing. Consumer protection, which emphasises the empowerment of consumers while at the same time ensures adequate protection measures in areas such as dispute resolution, affordability of services and service availability. Social regulation, which includes the twin areas of content development as well as content regulation; the latter includes the prohibition of offensive content as well as public education on content-related issues.

Yes. The regulation of the communications and multimedia industry is based on the powers provided for in the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission Act (1998) and the Communications and Multimedia Act (1998). The MCMC also conducts Public Inquiries before making decisions on matters of significant interest to either the public or to current or prospective licensees.







Mexico Federal Communication Commission (Cofetel, for its initials in Spanish, Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones).

Article 9, item A of the Federal Law of Telecommunications establishes that the Federal Communication Commission (Cofetel) is an administrative body of the Ministry of Communication and Transportation, with technical and operative autonomy in expenses and management, in charge of regulating, promoting and supervising the efficient development and the broad social coverage of telecommunications and broadcasting in Mexico, with autonomy to dictate its own resolutions.

Yes, Mexico subscribed the WTO Reference Paper. Since 1990, Telmex is a complete privatized supplier and the Mexican Government has no shares with any supplier of basic telecommunications services.

An institutional and transparent framework ensure that the decisions of, and procedure used by, regulators are impartial in the following way: Institutional framework (art.9-B of the Federal Law of Telecommunications): The governmental body of Cofetel is a Plenary, composed by five commissioners, including its President, elected for fixed and staggered terms. The commissioners deliberate in a collegiate form and take decisions by majority of votes. In order for the Plenary to meet, at least three commissioners must be present. The commissioners are appointed by the President of Mexico. Transparency: As explained above, all proceedings that need to be filed before Cofetel are subscribed and predetermined in the Register of the Federal Bureau of Regulatory Improvement (Cofemer). Cofemer guarantees, for the benefit of the society, transparency in the elaboration and application of regulations. Governmental entities prepare preliminary drafts of laws, legislative decrees and minutes that they present to Cofemer, attached together with a statement of regulatory impact. As a consultative process, prior publication in the Official Gazette, are made available at the Cofemer’s web site (FLAP: 69- K), under the principles of public consultation and transparency, and for the reception and incorporation

of public remarks on the proposed drafts.







New Zealand Commerce Commission

The Telecommunications Act 2001 is the primary legislation regarding the telecommunications sector in New Zealand. The Telecommunications Act 2001 introduced industry-specific regulation for the supply of telecommunications services between telecommunications carriers in New Zealand. It also established the Telecommunications Commissioner within the Commerce Commission. The Commerce Act 1986 is New Zealand’s generic competition legislation. It promotes competition for the long term benefit of consumers and can apply to any person engaged in trade. The Act applies to all individuals and businesses including state owned enterprises, local government, and government departments in so far as they engage in trade. The Commerce Commission’s three principle functions under the Telecommunications Act are to: resolve disputes between carriers; oversee the TSO regime and apportion the annual net

cost between Telecom and liable carriers; and monitor the regulatory regime and recommend to the

Minister of Communications changes to the list of regulated services.

The Commerce Commission’s activities include regulatory control (adjudication and reports to Ministers) and enforcement (investigations, litigation and the provision of information to the public). The Commerce Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial body with responsibility for enforcement and regulatory control under a number of general and specific regulatory regimes set out in the Commerce Act 1986, and the Telecommunications Act 2001 (and others).

Yes. The Commerce Commission is an independent statutory body.

The Commerce Commission is an independent statutory body.

Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC TBC







Peru Organismo Supervisor de Inversión Privada en Telecomunicaciones (OSIPTEL)

Telecommunications Law (D.S. 13-93 TCC) Telecommunication Law Regulation (D.S. 027-2004-MTC) Regulatory Agency for Private Investment in Public Services Law (Ley 27332), modificated by laws Nº 27631 and 28337. Supreme decree Nº 42-2005-PCM Regulation of law 27332 Law frame of the regulating organisms, modificated by: 1) Supreme decree Nº 086-2005- PCM 2) Supreme decree Nº 003-2007 - PCM 3) Supreme decree Nº 001-2007- PCM Law for the development of functions and faculties of OSIPTEL (Ley 27336) OSIPTEL is the telecommunications regulatory agency in Peru in charge of promoting competition in the telecommunications market, guiding users about their rights, achieving efficiency in its institutional functions. The enforcement powers of OSIPTEL are written in the Law for the development of functions and faculties of OSIPTEL.

Yes. The regulator is an independent entity empowered by a five-member board of Directors, all appointed by the government.

The impartiality principle guides the decision-making process of OSIPTEL. All the regulations are published for comments, regulations are published in the official newspaper and in the web page, public hearings are also made. In general, transparency is a policy in OSIPTEL.

Philippines National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)

Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines. The National Telecommunications Commission shall be the principal administrator of this Act.

The NTC is a distinct agency that exercises regulatory functions in the context of the policies formulated by the Department or the agency to which it is attached. The Department shall have administrative supervision over the NTC, but cannot intervene in the quasi-judicial functions of the NTC. The NTC is accountable to the Department for fulfilling the policies prescribed for telecommunications. The NTC is not a supplier of basic telecommunications services.

Prior to all regulatory rulings and/or issuances, the NTC conducts public hearings for the purpose of transparency. Based on the evidence, testimonies and existing jurisprudence, Commissioners of the NTC act as a collegial body who vote upon any new ruling or regulations.

Russian Federation

TBC TBC TBC







Singapore Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA).

Yes. The Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore Act (the "IDA Act") is the statute by which the IDA was constituted following the merger of the National Computer Board ("NCB") and the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore ("TAS") in 1999. The IDA Act sets out the powers, functions and duties of IDA as regulator and promoter of the information and communications technology (ICT) industry in Singapore.

Yes. The Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore Act (the "IDA Act") is the statute by which the IDA was constituted following the merger of the National Computer Board ("NCB") and the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore ("TAS") in 1999. The IDA Act sets out the powers, functions and duties of IDA as regulator and promoter of the information and communications technology (ICT) industry in Singapore. The Telecommunications Act (Cap 323) provides for the licensing and regulatory powers of the IDA in respect of telecommunication systems and services in Singapore.

The IDA Act, Telecommunications Act and the Telecom Competition Code set out numerous procedures to ensure impartiality of the regulator in decisions making and the procedures used. These follow the principles of transparency, non-discriminatory and timeliness. Policies and regulations of general application are developed after conducting a public consultation for all interested parties to give their views. Final decisions on these policies and regulations are made publicly available. This is to ensure there is transparency in IDA's rule-making. The various Acts and Code also set out procedures in Singapore for recourse to IDA for decisions, reconsideration of those decisions and independent appeals against decisions of IDA for parties aggrieved by those decisions.

Chinese Taipei

National Communications Commission (NCC)

The Fundamental Communications Act of 2004 provides a legal foundation for setting up a NCC and sets out common principles for regulating the telecommunications and broadcasting business. The National Communications Commission Organization Act of 2005 specifies the functions of NCC and its operational scheme. The National Communications Commission (NCC) was then established in Feb. 2006 responsible for the formulation of regulatory policies, supervision of operations and issuance of certificates and licenses, and management of communications resources.

Yes. The regulator makes decisions based on publicly available regulations and licensing requirements. To stipulate the regulations or to make a decision, the regulator takes into consideration both international benchmarks and public opinions which come from public consulting processes.







Thailand The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)

The Major Acts concerning independent regulator are (1) Act on the Organisations to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting, and Telecommunication Services, B.E. 2543 (2000) and (2) Telecommunications Business Act B.E. 2544 (2001) and (3) Telecommunications Business Act B.E. 2551 (2008) as Amended. It is publicly available at www.ntc.or.th. The function, role, responsibility of the regulator are as mentioned in: section 51 of the Act on the Organisations to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting, and Telecommunication Services, B.E. 2543 (2000)

The powers and functions of NTC are specified in the Act on the Organisations to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting, and Telecommunication Services, B.E. 2543 (2000).

The NTC operates according to the Telecommunications Business Act 2001 to ensure that the decision-making process is fair and transparent. Prior to the issuance of the Announcements, the NTC conducts public hearings for the purpose of impartiality and transparency.

United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (amending the 1934 Act) Both are available at http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html. The rules that the FCC writes are available in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47 http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/cfr-table-search.html) The FCC is an independent United States government agency, directly responsible to Congress, not to the President. The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions. The FCC is directed by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 5-year terms, except when filling an unexpired term. The President designates one of the Commissioners to serve as Chairperson. Only three Commissioners may be members of the same political party. None of them can have a financial interest in any Commission-related business. As the chief executive officer of the Commission, the Chairman delegates management and administrative responsibility to the Managing Director. The Commissioners supervise all FCC activities, delegating responsibilities to staff units and Bureaus. The FCC coordinates work with various other government agencies. Most notably, the FCC works with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to manage spectrum. The FCC manages commercial and emergency services spectrum, while NTIA is in charge of spectrum used by the federal government.

Yes. The FCC operates according to the Administrative Procedures Act, and its own stringent rules, to ensure that the decision-making process is fair and transparent. For all rulemaking proceedings, Public Notices are issued to keep the public informed, and there is a Notice and Comment period to ensure interested parties can participate in the process. Once a decision is made, it can be appealed to the federal court system.

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G. ALLOCATION AND USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES

Allocation and use of scarce resources

Are procedures for the allocation and use of frequencies carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner? Please answer “yes” or “no”. If “no”, please explain.

Are procedures for the allocation and use of numbers carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner? Please answer “yes” or “no”. If “no”, please explain.

Are procedures for the allocation and use of rights-of-way carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner? Please answer “yes” or “no”. If “no”, please explain.

How is the current state of allocated frequency bands made publicly available?

Australia Yes. ACMA is responsible for managing the radiofrequency spectrum under the Radiocommunications Act 1992. The Act sets out legislative arrangements in relation to frequency planning, and provides for the preparation of plans that will govern the allocations of the spectrum. Under this statutory framework ACMA may make a spectrum plan and it may make frequency band plans.

To further support spectrum planning in Australia, ACMA also develops administrative band plans, detailed channeling arrangements for radiocommunication services, and technical frequency assignment requirements for the frequency coordination of services, as required. Consultation is central to these planning activities.

Certain frequency planning information can also be found within the spectrum licensing regime (e.g. applicable bands, boundary conditions, interference management requirements) and, for specified radiocommunications services and devices, within the apparatus licensing and class licensing regimes (e.g. applicable bands, power limits, channeling details).

Yes. The rules associated with the management of numbers are set out in the Telecommunications Numbering Plan 1997 (the Plan), a statutory instrument created under the Telecommunications Act 1997. These rules, developed in consultation with the telecommunications industry, business and the general public as appropriate, provide for the objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory allocation, transfer and withdrawal of numbers through:

statutory timeframes in which to consider applications;

unit sizes for the allocation, surrender and withdrawal of various types of numbers; and

various criteria against which all applications must be considered.

The rules associated with most numbers are administered by ACMA. ACMA's powers to manage local rate (13) and freephone (180) numbers have been delegated to an industry body known as the Industry Number Management Services (INMS) Ltd.

Yes. Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act 1997 provides licensed telecommunications carriers with the right to inspect public or private land, to determine whether the land is suitable for the carrier's purposes, to install a limited range of low impact facilities and to apply to ACMA for a permit to install any other facilities, and to maintain the facility after it has been installed on the land. (‘Land’ includes structures on land.) Carriers are exempt from State and Territory laws where the activity they are carrying out is authorized under the Telecommunications Act 1997. Carriers are also required by Schedule 3 to comply with the Telecommunications Code of Practice 1997 which sets out conditions that carriers must follow when carrying out their powers.

At least 10 days before accessing land, a carrier must give written notice to the owner of the land and to the occupier, where the land is occupied by a person other than the landowner. The notice must specify the purpose for which the carrier intends to engage in the activity and advise that if a person suffers loss or damage as a result of anything done by the carrier in engaging in the activity, compensation may be payable. Further, the notice must be given 10 business days before the carrier begins to engage in the activity. An owner or occupier of the land has the right to object to the notice on a number of grounds specified in the Telecommunications Code of Practice.

Australia's Radiofrequency Spectrum Plan and information about current licensed services is available at:

http://www.acma.gov.au(Radiofrequency Planning Index)

Brunei Darussalam

Yes Yes TBC AiTi is still in the process of publishing the allocated frequency bands on its website as a way of making the information available to the public.



Are procedures for the allocation and use of frequencies carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner?

Please answer “yes” or “no”. If “no”, please explain.




Canada Yes. Spectrum allocation planning, its regulation and licensing are the responsibility of Industry Canada, the Ministry responsible for telecommunications policy and the Radiocommunications Act. The Spectrum Policy Framework for Canada sets out the core objectives and principles for spectrum management: www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/spf2007e.pdf/$FILE/spf2007e.pdf. The Department has established Guidelines for Licensing Process and Spectrum Release Plan (RP-20) which outlines the processes for licensing spectrum and satellite orbital positions (www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/rp020.pdf/$FILE/rp020.pdf). RP-20 establishes the spectrum demand trigger where more demand for a particular frequency band than supply triggers a competitive process such as auctions. Since 1999, some spectrum has been allocated through competitive licensing processes such as auctions. The Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada (www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf01626.html) document outlines the approach that Industry Canada will take whenever spectrum is assigned by auction in the future. The decision to hold an auction is made on a band-by-band basis after public consultation.

Yes. With amendments to the Telecommunications Act in 1998, the CRTC acquired general powers over numbering in Canada. The Telecommunications Act gives the CRTC the authority to administer numbering services. Included within that power, the CRTC has the authority to issue orders with respect to numbering resources. Sciences Application International Corporation (SAIC), a neutral third party, performs the role of the Canadian Numbering Administrator (CNA) assigning numbering resources in the Canadian portion of the NANP. The CNA works under contract to the Canadian Numbering Administration Consortium (CNAC) and with the oversight of the CRTC.

Yes. Under the Telecommunications Act the CRTC is empowered to arbitrate disputes regarding access to rights-of-way. The Act confers on carriers the right to enter on and break up any highway or public place for the purpose of constructing, maintaining or operating transmission lines with the consent of the municipality or other public authority having jurisdiction. Where a carrier cannot, on terms acceptable to it, obtain the consent of the municipality or other public authority, the carrier may apply to the CRTC for permission and the CRTC may grant the permission subject to any conditions that it determines.

Canada’s Spectrum Management On-line web site provides public access to information on frequency use within Canada via a variety of search tools. (http://sd.ic.gc.ca/engdoc/main.jsp)

Chile Yes, the allocation of frequency follows the same procedure of licensing.

Yes, the allocation of frequency follows the same procedure of licensing.

Yes, according with the General Law on Telecommunications, every operator has right to enter on a public place for the purpose of constructing, maintaining or operating transmission lines without prejudice the principal use of these assets. In case of private properties, there should be an agreement upon the parties and general rules of law must apply. In case parties do not reach agreement, and SUBTEL declares the service as indispensable, a legal easement is legally created.

Yes, the general Plan of Use of the Radioelectric Spectrum it is available at www.subtel.cl Additionally, as mentioned before, each license indicates the frequency assigned and must be published

China Yes Yes Yes The status of the allocation of frequency bands is included in the “Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on Radio Frequency Compartalization”.








Hong Kong, China Yes. Pursuant to sections 32G and 32H of the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Telecommunications Authority shall carry out such consultation with the telecommunications industry and such other persons who may be directly affected as is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case before the Telecommunications Authority exercises his power to divide the radio spectrum and specify the general purpose of the frequencies and channels.

Yes Yes. The powers under which the Telecommunications Authority may grant authorisation to licensees to enter land for the purpose of placing and maintaining telecommunications lines and radiocommunications installations, as well as the relevant factors the Telecommunications Authority must give regard when exercising the powers are expressly provided in section 14 of the Telecommunications Ordinance. Further, guidelines which set out the principles for arbitration proceedings for calculation of access fee are issued by the Telecommunications Authority after due consultation with the persons who may be affected and are published on OFTA’s website.

The information about frequency allocation can be found on OFTA’s website http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/freq-spec/main.html

Indonesia Yes. As stated on Telecomm Law No. 36/1999 Art. 32 – 37, and also Government Decree No. 53/2000 on The Use of Radio Frequency Spectrum and Satellite Orbit.

Yes. Stated on Telecomm Law No. 36/1999 Article 23 and 24. It is also regulated on Indonesian Fundamental Technical Plan (FTP) Ministerial Decree No. 4/2000.

The Regulator (Directorate of Frequency Management) has received the ISO 9001 / 2000 certificate for procedure on spectrum licensing. In addition, work is in progress on setting up Indonesian Frequency Allocation Table, which will be publicly available.

Yes. The Indonesian Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation Table is available for the public. Ministerial Decree No. 5/2001.

Japan Yes. Yes. Yes. MIC prepares and offers for public perusal a list of available frequencies ("Frequency Assignment Plan") and shall issue a public notice of the Frequency Assignment Plan.







Korea Yes. The Korea Communications Commission allocates frequencies taking into account the followings. necessity of the national security, maintenance of order, safety of human lives, domestic conditions for the utilization of

frequencies, trends of international use of frequencies, trends of the development of the radio-wave-

utilization technology, and the demand for the services utilizing radio

waves. The Korea Communications Commission should publish the allocation of frequencies when allocated. (Radio Waves Act, Article 9)

In order to attain fair and efficient use of frequencies through administrative pricing system, the Radio Waves Act retains the system of assigning frequencies, and publication for frequencies assignment. (Radio Waves Act, Articles 11 and 12)

Yes. The Korea Communications Commission formulates and enforces the management plan for telecommunications number in order to: provide services efficiently promote user's convenience promote the environments of fair competition

among operators. In case a management plan for telecommunications number is formulated or altered, it has to go through a deliberation by the KCC. (Telecommunications Business Act, Article 36) The Korea Communications Commission confers identical series of equal digits of identification numbers and equal digits of prefix to operators supplying same services. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No. 2008-63, Article 8, Paragraph 1.1)

Yes. When requested by other facilities-based service suppliers, the market dominant facilities-based service suppliers shall provide the requested facilities such as subscriber copper lines, subscriber optical cable, conduits, poles, and areas of telecom exchange facilities. (Korea Communications Commission Notification No. 2008-68, Articles 5 and 6) A facilities installer shall listen to and reflect the views of the facilities-based service suppliers on the installation of joint-use networks and conduit lines that can accommodate telecommunications facilities and equipment. (Framework Act on Telecommunications, Article 30-2) Facilities-based service suppliers have the legal rights to make use of others' land, buildings, and structures, etc, when necessary for the installation of telecom circuits. In case the above-mentioned land, etc. are unnecessary, restoration of the relevant land, or proper compensation for the damages shall follow. (Telecommunications Business Act, Articles 39 and 44).

Korea's frequency allocation table is announced on Korea Communications Commission Notification No. 2008-136.

Malaysia Yes. Yes Yes. Non-discriminatory access of rights-of-way is provided for in the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 in Section 228. However, the rights-of-way may also involve State authority, local authority, landowners or other authorities.

The information are available on MCMC’s website in the following: 1. Spectrum Plan 2. Standard Radio

System Plan (SRSP) Documents

3. Register of Spectrum Assignments

4. Register of Apparatus Assignments








Mexico Yes. The allocation of frequencies are carried out by competitive auctions.

Yes, through the Fundamental Technical Plan of Numeration (PTFN). In addition, With the Resolution of Portability consumers can preserve their numbers when they change their telecom operator.

Not Available.

The current state of allocated frequency bands is made publicly available through the National Plan of Frecuencies Allocation (CNAF, for its initials in Spanish, Cuadro Nacional de Atribución de Frecuencia) that defines services but not operators. This information can be consulted at Cofetel’s website that presents all services operators divided by specific services.







New Zealand Yes. Spectrum is allocated by the Ministry of Economic Development. Spectrum is generally allocated on a first come first served basis. Where demand exceeds supply, open transparent auctions are used. (Some spectrum is reserved and allocated to meet government policy objectives such as public broadcasting and public safety.)

Yes. Telephone numbers are administered in New Zealand under the control of an industry body called the NAD (Number Administration Deed) Management Committee. see http://www.nz.m-co.com/grids/template_aq.asp?id=19&area=24 M-Co fulfils the role on independent number administrator. Transparent and non-discriminatory rules (negotiated by the telecommunications service providers) are applied for the administration of network numbering resources under the NAD framework. see http://www.nz.m-co.com/upload/sectionimages/9060_Number_Allocation_Rules_-_November_2003.pdf

Yes. The Telecommunications Act 2001 provides for telecommunications service providers who meet certain criteria to be declared a ‘network operator’. Network operators have rights (subject to conditions) to enter roads to construct and maintain lines.

Licenses to use spectrum are recorded in a public register searchable on-line.

Papua New Guinea

TBC TBC TBC TBC

Peru Yes. Peru’s legal framework establishes the cases where radioelectric spectrum must be assigned by means of a first come first served basis (when there is more spectrum available than demand) or by a public auction. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is in charge of the spectrum assignment among operators.

Yes. The Office of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications attends applications. After receiving and evaluating the application, the Ministry issues a report resolving the matter within 15 working days. In 2004 the Bylaw for public Services Numeration, Supervisión and Management was approved. This standard includes principles, procedures and timelines for allocation of numbers.

Yes. In January 2006, the Mandatory Servitude Bylaw was approved for the provision of telecommunications services. This standard foresee the rights derived from servitude to build civil works as the installation of telecommunications networks and includes soil, subsoil topsoil and airs for the performance of underground works.

The National Frequency Allocation Plan is available at the web site of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The National Registry of Frequencies is also publicly available.

Philippines Yes. Yes. Yes. The National Frequency Allocation Table (NFAT) is made available to the public upon request. The NFAT shall be posted, together with the projects currently being undertaken by the NTC, upon the launching of the enhanced NTC website within CY 2006.

Russian Federation

TBC TBC TBC







Singapore Yes. IDA is responsible for the management, allocation and use of the radio frequency spectrum. It ensures the efficient and effective allocation and use of the scarce spectrum resource for radio-communications services. One of the IDA's key roles is to chart the present and future utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. The National Allocation Plan is reviewed and updated regularly. Once the frequency bands have been successfully coordinated with other local and regional demands for that part of the spectrum, they are made readily available to eligible users. Enquires and applications for the use of frequencies would be assessed in a timely manner The detailed procedures are provided in IDA’s Radio Spectrum Master Plan, which serves to inform the industry and interested parties on the availability of spectrum in the coming years, technological trends in the use of spectrum and IDA's policy direction with regard to spectrum allocation and re-allocation for public communication networks. This document is made publicly available in the IDA website www.ida.gov.sg under the Policy and Regulation – Spectrum and Numbering.

Yes. As the telecommunication industry regulator, IDA controls and manages the National Numbering Plan. IDA allocates numbers in blocks of 10,000 numbers to the relevant operators and ensures that the scarce number resource is utilized efficiently. IDA also ensures that the number allocation process is fair and transparent so as to provide a level playing field for competition. The National Number Plan is reviewed from time to time to ensure its continued relevance. The detailed procedures are explained in IDA’s National Numbering Plan. The Plan will be reviewed from time to time to ensure its continued relevance in light of technological advances and the introduction of new services. This document is made publicly available in the IDA website www.ida.gov.sg under the Policy and Regulation – Spectrum and Numbering.

Yes. All Facility Based Operators (FBOs) who need to carry out road opening activities to lay their underground plant and cables along public roads are members of the Road Opening Coordination Committee (ROCC) led by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore (LTA) which to objective to ensure coordinated, fair and transparent processes guide the work. They are required to comply with the LTA's Code of Practice for Road Opening Works (which can be viewed on the LTA website: http://www.lta.gov.sg/dbc/doc/guideline/COP%20For%20Road%20Opening%20Work.pdf) and the Code of Practice for Traffic Control at Work Zone (http://www.lta.gov.sg/dbc/doc/guideline/Part%20I-version%201.pdf). In addition to LTA's codes of practice and guidelines, all utilities/services providers also have to comply with the Singapore Land Authority's policy guidelines on laying of their facilities/infrastructure within State land which includes public roads and drainage reserves.

The current state of allocated frequency bands is illustrated in IDA’s Singapore Spectrum Allocation Chart, which is made publicly available in the IDA website www.ida.gov.sg under Policy and Regulation – Spectrum and Numbering – Spectrum Information – Singapore Spectrum Allocation Chart.

Chinese Taipei Yes. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) is the authority that holds responsibilities for the overall resource planning of spectrum. The National Communications Commission (NCC) is responsible for the supervision of communications enterprises and resource assignment. The Table of Frequency Allocations of Chinese Taipei is available on the NCC websites of- http://www.ncc.gov.tw- and has been revised in accordance to the frequency allocation revision proposed by the World Radio Conference (WRC), convened by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as well as to Chinese Taipei’s own current spectrum management policy, concrete measures, and spectrum planning designed to meet the needs of development of new technology.

Yes. The regulations and guidelines for allocating telephone numbers are prescribed by the Telecommunications Network Numbering Plan, which is under the authority of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and Regulations Governing Telecommunications Numbers. Both the Telecommunications Network Numbering Plan and Regulations Governing Telecommunications Numbers, which can be found on NCC’s website

Yes. According to the Article 31 and 32 of the Telecommunications Act, when a Type I telecommunications enterprise engages in the construction of infrastructure for the lines and pipes of its fixed networks, it may request co-location for its lines and pipes with the facilities at the bottleneck of telecommunications networks with the owners of such facilities for a charge. With respect to the request of using the infrastructure mentioned above, the party being so requested shall not reject such request without due cause. Type I telecommunications enterprises that establish dedicated telecommunications facilities may use public and private land and buildings for establishment of conduit infrastructure and terminal equipment. Governmental authorities shall not reject a request to use public land or buildings without due cause.

The Table of Frequency Allocations has been published on the NCC website for public reference.








Thailand Yes. Yes. The details on allocation and use of numbers is in conformity with the Notification of the National Telecommunications Commission regarding Telecommunication Numbering Plan.

Yes. Clause 1,2 and 3 of Section 39 of the Telecommunication Business Act B.E. 2543 (2001) has prescribed the procedures for allocation and use if right-of-way. Presently, the Draft Notification regarding criteria and procedures of the rights of licensee to erect poles, lay lines or place ducts or install any other associated equipment in supplying telecommunication services is being submitted for approval by the NTC Chairman. In addition, the NTC is on the way of studying infrastructure sharing and sharing cost on facility sharing.

The National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) has posted the allocated frequency on its website and published in National Table of Frequency Allocations, December 1999. However, an updated version is in progress.

United States Yes. The FCC (which is responsible for allocating all non-federal spectrum) is an independent agency. In cases where spectrum is shared between federal and non-federal uses, the FCC and NTIA must collaborate in an open, transparent, public process to determine how that sharing is to be achieved. The FCC's proceedings are also open and transparent, as required by the Administrative Procedures act and the FCC’s own rules. Decisions can also be appealed to the courts.

Yes. “Section 251 (e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), as amended, grants this Commission plenary jurisdiction over the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) and related telephone numbering issues in the United States. In fulfilling this statutory mandate, we have identified two primary goals. One is to ensure that the limited numbering resources of the NANP are used efficiently, to protect customers from the expense and inconvenience that result from the implementation of new area codes, some of which can be avoided if numbering resources are used more efficiently, and to forestall the enormous expense that will be incurred in expanding the NANP. The other goal is to ensure that all carriers have the numbering resources they need to compete in the rapidly growing telecommunications marketplace." From the Numbering Resource Optimization Orders (15 FCC Rcd 7574).

Yes. Although most rights-of-way issues are local issues and addressed at the local level, a federal statute governing rights-of-way (Section 224 of the Communications Act) provides general rules ensuring non-discrimination and transparency, and a basis for the FCC to arbitrate disputes. In addition, if rights-of-way become a barrier to competition, Section 253 of the Act provides a basis for addressing such issues.

The U.S. Table of Frequency Allocations is published every year in the CFR title 47 part 2. The entire CFR, including the Table of Frequency Allocations, is available in hard copy from the U.S. Government Printing Office, and electronically on the FCC's website at http://wireless.fcc.gov/rules.html. Prior to the annual revision of the CFR Spectrum allocation decisions are made available in public documents (report and orders, usually) released by the FCC and available on our website.

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