LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING IN THE FLEET

PETER M. EDMONDO & CDR. PETER L. McCAMMON, USN

LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING

IN THE FLEET THE AUTHORS

Mr. Peter M. Edmondo is presently Senior Human Factors Analyst f i r Sperry Systems Management. He was an Engineering Psychologist in the Shipboard Manning and Automation Program at the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center during the period addressed in the paper. His major responsibility was that of Operations Trials Director f i r the Integrated Bridge System. Previous employment has been with the Department of Psy- chology. Naval Medical Research Institute (1963-1965) and as Senior Project Scientist in the Human Engineering and Systems EfSectiveness Branch. DTNSRDC (1962-1972). Mr. Edmondo. who has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass., is a member of the Human Factors Society and a member of ASNE since 1969.

Cdr. Peter L. McCammon, USN, received his BS degreefrom the U.S. Naval Academy in 1962; his BSEE degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, Calrx; and his MS degree from The Johns Hopkins University. He also graduated from the Naval War College with high distinction upon completion of the Naval Command Course, and is currently serving as the Executive Oflcer, USS Dale (CG-19). Prior to his present assignment. he served as Engineer Oflcer, USS Wallace L. Lind (00-703) and USS Biddle (CG-34). and as Commanding Oflcer. USS Graham County UGP-1176). with additional duties as Commander, Patrol Division 21 consist- ing of the Graham County and jbur patrol combatants (missiles). His signijicant shore assignments have included duty as an Instructor, U.S. Naval Academy; as Staff member, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam; and as Project Oflcer. Shipboard Manning and Automation Program, DTNSRDC. Cdr. McCammon's military decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Joint Service Commendation Medal. and the Navy Commendation Medal.

ABSTRACT

Developmental tests have been conducted in the Fleet to demonstrate concepts for reducing man-hours required to perform certain shlpboard functions whlle maintaining or improving effectivenew. Experiences during the Preparation, Conduct, and Reportlng of the tests am described including the CNO PUot Program for Reduced Bridge Manning; Inte- grated Bridge System (IBS); Fpcllitiea Maintenance (house- keeping); Wlrelew Commdcations During Damage Control EvoluHon8; and the Ship Contdman. Areas discussed include system dealgn and interface requirements; elements that go into tea@ designed for shipboard evaluation; approval requirements to conduct such tests; how to get Fleet Support in terms of personnel and assets; logistics and training requirements; and fhaUy, what Fleet testing buys that other meam do not.

INTRODUCTION

DUE TO THE INCREASINGLY LARGE PORTION OF THE NAVY BUDGET required for personnel related costs, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in May 1972 stated a need for significant reduction in shipboard manning requirements. In addition to requesting a coordinated R&D Program to reduce manning, the CNO also directed that the results of the R&D Program be tested and evaluated aboard ships to vetify factually their value and to speed up Fleet implementation.

The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) established the Shipboard Manning and Automation Program in re- sponse to this need. This program was structured into two categories of projects: LABORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS and SHIP DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS. Lab- oratory Development Projects were generally of a longer duration and broader scope than concepts developed as Ship Demonstration Projects. Ship Demonstration Projects were more directly related to personnel and procedural problems and involved less equipment development. However, both categories of projects were structured initially so that testing in the Fleet was part of their exploratory development process. The value of the projects could, therefore, be measured against the needs of the Fleet.

Since the CNO had requested a coordinated R&D effort, various Laboratory, Navy shore activity, industry, and shipboard personnel were teamed to identify initial concepts to reduce manning requirements. The Naval Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) provided expertise in personnel related matters; the Naval Air Development Center (NADC) provided expertise in automated electronic equipment; the Chief of Naval Material's Combat System Advisory Group (CSAG) provided expertise in their field of specialty; industry provided state-of-the-art procedures and equipment; the Destroyer Development Group, and later, Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) assisted in eval- uating developed concepts; various Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Project Managers provided tech- nical guidance in their specialty areas; Chief of Naval Material (CNM) provided the necessary funds; and the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Develop- ment Center (DTNSRDC) was designated the lead Laboratory of the effort. Among the most important team members were shipboard personnel. Officers and enlisted personnel on staffs and aboard ships provided

112 Naval Engineers Journal, April 1978

EDMONDO/McCAMMON FLEET DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING

the necessary information about their needs. They critiqued the results of the R&D Program. They sug- gested changes to make the projects work aboard ship. They tested the concepts. They made the difference between products designed in an isolated laboratory environment and products that could be usable aboard ship. Theirs was a most signijicant contribution.

In spite of the many participants in this R&D effort and the attempts to insure that the products would be useful aboard ships, the Program Managers encountered many problems. These problems included:

Variations in system design requirements and interfaces depending on individual biases. The differences between analytical or simulation- oriented test designs and shipboard evaluations. Gaining approval to conduct shipboard evaluation of “young” development projects, i.e., exploratory development. Obtaining the support of Fleet personnel. Identifying logistics and training requirements.

These areas will be discussed by relating them to the various projects undertaken in the Shipboard Manning and Automation Program. The lessons learned in the prosecution of these projects may be helpful to research and development activities in efforts to develop concepts and equipment that can be used by shipboard personnel. Products (hardware, software or procedures) designed for use aboard ship should be evaluated in the environment of their intended use during early stages of their development. This reduces the risk of research/ development work not functioning aboard ship after extended periods of time and much money have been spent. It must be remembered that Fleet personnel are the prime, ultimate users of NAVY Research and De- velopment.

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Shipboard Manning and Automation Program personnel developed various concepts to reduce manpower requirements. These concepts formed the basis for projects which seemed feasible for testing aboard ships. A brief description of the following projects will be presented:

0

0

0

0

0

The

The CNO Pilot Program for Reduced Bridge Manning. The Integrated Bridge System (IBS). The Ship Controlman. Facilities Maintenance Demonstration Study (FM)

Wirefree Communication (WIFCOM). [ll.

CNO Pilot Program for Reduced Bridge Manning

During a one year period, (September 1972 through August 1973) Program personnel studied various aspects of Bridge manning reduction. This study included Bridge manning reduction with and without

equipment augmentation. The CNO requested seven- teen ships to institute reduced manning on the Bridge, After Steering, and the Signal Bridge during Readi- ness Conditions 111 and IV. On ships with equipment augmentation, various devices were installed, and their effect on ship effectiveness and their impact on manpower requirements were assessed. TABLE 1, shows the ships and mix of installed equipment.

In order to acquire and to install this equipment inexpensively and rapidly, commercial “off-the-shelf’ items were chosen. These equipments were added to normal ship’s equipment which were kept in an operational condition.

It was demonstrated, in this study, that the use of semi-automatic and remote controls could feasibly reduce Bridge manpower requirements.

The Integrated Bridge System (IBS)

As a result of the initial efforts in the CNO Pilot Program to reduce ship Bridge manning, it was concluded that, if Bridge systems were integrated into a centralized work station, with the addition of some automation, a significant reduction in Bridge personnel could be made.

Information gained in the CNO Pilot Program formed the basis for the IBS design. Interviews with and responses to questionnaires from ships’ Commanding Officers, Navigators, and Watchstanders; other Navies; and the private sector of the marine industry provided additional information and display requirements. The IBS contains the following main equipment:

Two main consoles which house the svstem com-

0

0

The

puter; main and auxiliary display which provide maneuvering, collision avoidance, and digital chart information; integrated internal and external communications; an autopilot; a single lever Engine Order Telegraph and various equipments to process and display information. An overhead “Fiddleboard” which provides con- solidated warnings and alarms, a non-verbal manned and ready reporting status display, and continuous displays of ship’s course and speed, with depth and time. Automatic logging devices including a magnetic recording of computer generated information display on the main and auxiliary display, a voice recording of verbal communications in the Pilot House, and a data logger which records ship’s data such as engine orders, answered and actual RPM, position, ship’s courses (magnetic and gyro), and time.

IBS was installed in USS McCandless (FF-1084). the crew was provided with training in operation and maintenance, and the system underwent test and evaluation by DTNSRDC and OPTEVFOR from 21 January 1977 to 23 August 1977. The results of this test were reported previously by MESSRS P u c m r r and SNIFFIN in this Journal [2]. I

Naval Engineers Journal, April 1978 113

FLEET DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING EDMONDO/McCAMMON

Ship I ~

FORRESTAL (CVA 59)

P O K E (LPD 15)

DETROIT ( M E 4)

TATPNALL (DDG 19)

INGRAM (DD 938)

W . S . SIMS (DE 105g

STRIBLING (DD 867)

I3ERIDETH (DD 890)

CONSTELLATI ON (CVA 64)

DUBUQUE (LPD 8)

PoNcHAmuLA ( A 0 148)

BUcHlwAN (DDG 14)

R O A M (DE 1053)

SHIELDS (DE 1066)

ENGLAND (DLG 22)

TABLE 1

EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN PILOT PROGRAM S H I P S

- B e l l

Logge: EOT/ RPM

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

X

X

X

X

-

- iu to- , i l o t

X

X

-

barter Raster I

T a p e lecorde

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

4u t o n a t e h e g

X

-

:cTC

X

X

X - and carried t o n u m e r o u s

Tape Xecordei

for RF

X

X

Fog i i g n a l ! i m e r

X

X

X

X

X

X

- ips d u r i n g evalua

- Laser corn -

X

X

X

X

- on.

S h i f t of A f t

5 teer i n g

X

LOCKWOOD (DE 1064)

EOT - E n g i n e O r d e r T e l e g r a p h . RPM - R e v o l u t i o n s per m i n u t e . CCTV - C l o s e d - C i r c u i t T e l e v i s i o n . CA - C o l l i s i o n - A v o i d a n c e . C a m - C a m n u n i c a t o r .

!assette T a p e

lecorder

X

X

Ship Controlman

Again, based on experience gained in the CNO Pilot Program, Program personnel expanded upon the “Watch Team” approach used by USS Tattnall (DDG-19) to develop the Ship Controlman concept. I t was felt that by combining the functions performed by the Quartermaster, Boatswain’s Mate, ahd Signalman rates, a new rate, the Ship Controlman, could be established. The objective of the project was to demonstrate that a small, dedicated “Watch Team,” properly or- ganized and cross trained, could effectively perform all Bridge watch functions with fewer personnel.

A Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) was developed to provide the basis for training, and the concept was implemented in USS Blakely (DE-1072).

The concept was tested for a period of six months. Final results of this test provided ambiguous findings because of the lack of control by the Project Ofice in the way in which the concept was implemented by the ship.

Facilities Maintenance (FM)

Normal cleaning and care of shipboard spaces requires a large expenditure of man-hours. Even if Watch Station manpower requirements are reduced, shipboard personnel will still have to perform house- keeping tasks.

The FM concept was developed to evaluate innovations in organization, training, materials, and equipment in terms of manpower savings, increased skill of personnel who do this work, and improved ship clean-



liness. In Phase I, innovations evaluated in USS Trippe (FF-1075) in 1975 included:

Task consolidation, a management system, and the establishment of a dedicated FM Team aboard ship. A comprehensive FM training program in a slide/ tape format. Improved FM equipment and materials including labor saving devices.

Phase I efforts showed that the FM system was efficient with a demonstrated man-hours savings on the order of thirty percent while the ship was better maintained. Since this effort showed promise, a second phase was initiated to expand the FM system to include all of the ship (only 30% of the ship’s spaces were involved in Phase I) and to evaluate the concepts of ships of other classes.

Phase I1 work, initiated in July 1977, expanded the FM concepts to total ship coverage, including surface preparation and corrosion conrol, for ships of the FF 1052 Class, LST 1179 Class, and the FFG-7.

Wirefree Communication ( WZFCOM)

Program personnel postulated that the use of wire- less communication aboard ship could reduce the numbers of personnel involved .in damage control communications such as messengers and phone talkers. “On-scene” personnel could communicate directly with Damage Control Central. They also postulated that the speed and accuracy of these communications could be improved.

Program personnel designed and installed a developmental model of the system aboard USS Pharris (DE-1094) for test and evaluation. The system consisted of a leaky coaxial cable and portable transceivers. Transmissions from the transceivers were carried to other locations in the ship via the coaxial cable which was installed in several spaces (mostly engineering) acting as an antenna. Fleet eflaluation of this concept showed promise but that further implementation would require additional engineering development.

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS WHEN PREPARING FOR AND CONDUCTING DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING

IN THE FLEET

System Design Requirements and Znterjfaces

Exploratory development projects can be constrained in both funding and time. In order to save costs and time, equipments do not have to be “militarized” in order to test their feasibility. They do have to be con- structed well enough to avoid degrading ship performance. Ship drawings may be incomplete or in- accurate and interfaces must be verified on the actual test ship. If testing takes place in a real environment, during normal ship’s operations, there is always the chance the ship will have to deploy, encounter heavy weather, or even go into combat with the equipment

aboard. Installing new equipment in a ship might necessitate modifications to existing equipment for interfacing. The time that a ship is inoperable while an installation takes place must be short or the installation should be made during scheduled “down time.” The ship should be removed from service for as short a period as possible. With the fewer numbers of ships in the Fleet today, all operating units are assigned essen- tial missions.

The physical environment aboard must be considered. Developmental equipment placed aboard ships must be able to withstand the temperatures, vibration, and shock expected in the shipboard environment if failure of the equipment will impact on the ability of the ship to perform its mission.

Personnel are a key part of the ship “system”. Care must be taken to provide adequate training in the operation and maintenance of equipment placed aboard ship for testing. Because of the nature of ship busi- ness, the crew cannot normally be expected to be “dedicated” for training. Training has to be scheduled with all the other activities in a ship’s normal, busy workload. If possible, training should be removed from the ship.

In the IBS Program it was desirable to design and install the system quickly to respond to CNO direction to speed up implementation. Because of funding con- straints and the need to proceed in a timely manner, some commercial, “off-the-shelf’ items were included in the system. However, care was taken to insure that commercial items of unproven shipboard reliability would be used only where they were not critical to the effectiveness of the ship’s Bridge operations. For example, a commercial data logger was chosen instead of a more rugged one that would meet military speci- fications. Since personnel would not actually be removed from the ship during the test and evaluation, if the commercial data logger failed, the person usually keeping a manual log, the Quartermaster, could augment the Bridge watch.

In the Ship Controlman project, hind sight indicates that greater care should have been taken to train and to brief personnel involved in the test. Due primarily to inadequate initial indoctrination and training of both the Officers and Enlisted personnel and to lack of Project Offlce follow-up onboard ship, the project was incompletely implemented aboard the ship. Leaving training in the form of a PQS on the ship did not insure it would be used. The concept was not “interfaced” with the existing ship’s organization. As a result, training efforts (self-taught) ceased soon after the demonstration started. Due to a lack of understanding of the project aboard ship, the original team was disbanded and members added with no training. The ship deployed soon after the concept was introduced and there was no opportunity to interact with the ship to jointly work out implementation problems and procedures. As implemented, the Ship Controlman concept was not perceived by the ship to be feasible. However, lack of detailed guidance and ship-induced modifications resulted in conceptual changes of such a mag-



nitude that the concept was no longer the same as the one initially concerned. Lessons learned in this project were applied in both the FM and IBS projects later.

The Differences Between Analytical or Simulation Oriented Laboratory Test Designs and Shipboard Evaluations

In an analytical or simulation oriented laboratory test, there is a strictly controlled environment. Data is taken by persons usually familiar with testing and data gathering, the data usually can be expected to be pure, there is control over the testing, and scheduling depends on the availability of the researcher.

In an evaluation in an operational ship, the environment is usually uncontrolled. Data sometimes must be taken by personnel assigned to the ship who are neither familiar with nor trained in data taking; the data sometimes is incomplete or biased; there is little control over actual testing; and scheduling depends on the ship’s schedule.

These major differences are described below:

1) ENVIRONMENT - Testing aboard ship subjects both equipment to be tested and data takers to a humid, wet, sometimes very hot, sometimes very cold, environment. Equipment is subject to shock and vibration when guns or missiles are shot or the ship en- counters rough weather. Even though equipment is in the exploratory development phase of testing, it must be rugged enough to function in this shipboard environment.

Equipment tested aboard ship will get hard use. It will be banged, hit, and scratched. It must be rugged enough to withstand use by sailors who won’t dis- tinguish between Laboratory and shipboard equipment.

The environment includes the personnel who use the equipment. To them, equipment placed aboard their ship must be operated and maintained by them and, to them, is operational equipment, not test equipment. They will frequently compare test systems with the systems they might replace or augment as if the test equipment will stay onboard that ship forever.

The IBS, designed to test the feasibility of manning concepts, was designed to operate in the harsh shipboard environment. Although not required to meet all military standards for humidity, temperature, and shock, the ability to withstand these environmental factors had to be designed into the equipment to ensure it would work long enough, and reliably enough, to allow the gathering of the necessary data over an extended test period. After installation, even though care was taken to shield all equipment, internal communications headsets had to be replaced when it was found that electromagnetic interference severely de- graded them.

2) DATA TAKING - Data takers can be supplied either by the ship, from a test and evaluation organization such as OFTEVFOR, from the developing activity, or supplied by a contractor.

Since data is taken, in-situ, and since events which happen to a ship are not repeatable, there is no way to go back and take data that was missed. Extensive planning must be done before a data taking situation is encountered in order to ensure that required data is captured as it becomes available. Sample size is usually very small in testing aboard ship, but the information gained in a real world test will be very meaningful if it can be properly interpreted.

In the IBS tests, the developing activity collected data the entire time the test ship was at sea. Two personnel were aboard the ship at all times and alternated, generally about six hours at a time, on the Bridge. Knowing that as much data had to be taken as possible, the data takers supplemented the automatic data recording devices by commenting on situations and experiences of the Bridge watch personnel. These data takers practiced taking data on other ships before the IBS test and evaluation to find out what data they could record and what forms they would need. The crew was not asked to take data because the size of the Bridge watch was reduced to the minimum and each Watch- stander was required to perform many more duties than they previously had.

3) DATA Accurucr - In a simulation or laboratory setting test, great care is usually taken in making very accurate measurements. Outside influences such as stray electromagnetic fields or vibrations are normally filtered out or can be accounted for. Such things as temperature and humidity can be controlled and power failures are unlikely. Before test runs are made, plans are checked to insure that all necessary sensors or measurement devices are working accurately. Test measurements are made by specialists who are only interested in the accuracy and completeness of their work.

In a shipboard test and evaluation, accurate measurements are difficult to obtain because of a myriad of external forces. Sensor and measuring equipment may fail at the precise time they are needed. Electromag- netic fields and vibrations can cause inaccuracies in measuring devices. The best planning can go for naught when a test is started early or late due to variances in ship’s needs for power or personnel. Measurements are not usually made with as much accuracy even by specialists due to cramped spaces and sometimes violent ship motions. If data is taken by ship’s personnel, it may be taken inaccurately, or taken at wrong times, or from the wrong equipment.

As an example of a case where the purity of data might be suspect, in the Facilities Maintenance demonstration, during the pilot phase, man-hour expenditures were supposed to be recorded by the workers themselves. Having shown the worker the expected number of hours he would take to complete a task, it came as no surprise that he reported taking that long to actually do the work.

On the IBS test and evaluation an effort was made to correlate ship’s navigation fixes between CIC and the

116 Naval Englneers Journal, April 1978


Pilot House. It became difficult to ensure the fixes were taken at the same time and made comparison difficult.

In the Ship Controlman project, questionnaires were used to gather data. Requests for lengthy statements were largely ignored.

4) CONTROL OVER TESTING - In a laboratory, a researcher can usually control the starting and stopping of his tests. He can usually get to his equipment on which he needs to conduct the test, and he can minimize disruptions to the tests. If he is using human subjects, he can screen the test participants and may even pick a known control group.

During a shipboard test, the starting or stopping of a test usually is determined by the specific employment of the ship. Electric power may be shifted without the researcher’s knowledge. Steam pressures and temperatures may vary due to ship’s maneuvers. The need to go to “General Quarters” may isolate the researcher in a part of the ship far from the area in which he desires to be. Security measures may cause him to be denied access to spaces in which he might want to work. Unless he brings all of the measuring devices he needs, he may find that, once at sea, he needs other devices or instru- ments and that the ship cannot provide them. His measuring devices or equipment might become in- operative and he can’t get a replacement or repairs ac- complished at sea. Human subjects are those that happen to be assigned to the ship, and, as a group, might bear little resemblance to what his postulated needs were.

In the Wirefree Communications project, data about the effectiveness of the equipment during actual damage control exercises were required. Because of the hectic nature of damage control exercises and the fact that the ship is completely secured in Condition Zebra, actual observation of the performance of the “man- equipment” could not be made. The researchers had to rely on after action comments and scant “hard” data.

5) TEST SCHEDULING - Laboratory tests are normally scheduled at the convenience of the researcher after assembling his equipment.

In shipboard testing the researcher has very little control over the scheduling of his tests if he desires to test in an operational environment. Tests on an operational ship, of exploratory development projects are for the most part done on a “not-to-interfere” basis. The researcher must tit his schedule to the ship’s schedule. He must gather data when he can, almost on a “catch- as-catch-can” basis.

In the IBS project, it was directed that data be taken in “all situations a surface ship was expected to operate.” But, in order to get data during actual low visi- bility conditions, the weather had to cooperate. In order to gather data in ASW situations, the ship’s schedule had to place it in an ASW situation. In order to gather data on actual refueling operations, the ship had to require refueling.

Obtaining Approval to Conduct Testing

The normal procedure for gaining approval to conduct a shipboard test and evaluation is to follow OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3960.10, ,the CNOs basic instruction concerning test and evaluation. A Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is submitted and contains the integrated requirements of the developing activity, in the case of developmental testing, and the schedule and resources required for accomplishment of the testing. Approval of the TEMP constitutes CNO direction to conduct testing and commits the required Fleet resources. The CNO then requests a Fleet Commander to provide necessary ships on which to carry out shipboard testing. The Fleet Commander then requests the appropriate Type Commander to make ships available.

When conducting developmental testing in the Fleet, special circumstances are involved. Developmental testing is conducted to determine the feasibility of concepts that sometimes are very new to the Fleet. Because they are new, and sometimes revolutionary, shipboard personnel and their Commanding Officers have reservations concerning safety, reliability and operability of, so far, unproven ideas and equipment. In addition, because of the long lead times required to schedule Fleet assets, persons familiar with the research effort may be transferred after initial approval to conduct the tests and before the actual start of testing. Even if the originally involved decision makers assure themselves that the tests are safe, that the equipment is reasonably reliable, and that it can be operated and maintained by shipboard personnel, the decision makers present when the testing begins might not be so assured. Constant liaison must be maintained with Fleet Staffs during preparation for testing.

In the case of the IBS, approval to conduct shipboard tests was almost denied just before making a major installation aboard ship. Pre-installation had commenced, had to be stopped, and subsequently, extensive cabling removed from the test ship until changes could be made to the system so that it would meet requirements of the new set of decision makers involved at that time.

Early in the design process, a full-scale mock-up of the IBS was approved by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and a Destroyer Type Com- mander. Based on this approval, the IBS was fabricated and made ready for installation two years later. After being built, a diTerent group of decision makers reviewed installation plans and directed a new con- figuration. Because decision makers were not kept ade- quately informed during the two years of fabrication, costly changes had to be made at the last minute. These changes had to be made to gain approval to conduct the shipboard testing.

Obtaining Suppo~t of Personnel and Assets from the Fleet

Shipboard personnel must support the testing in order for the tests to be realistic and meaningful. It is

Naval Engineers Journal, Aprll 1978 117


not enough that higher echelons “order” them to be enthusiastic. They must understand the nature and purpose of the tests. They can, in no way, be made to feel “threatened” by the tests.

In the Ship Controlman project, a-new rating was being tested. Implicit in this concept was the abolish- ment of a separate Signalman rating. Signalman participating in the tests perceived that they could lose their jobs and have to start all over learning another rating if this concept proved feasible. Senior Petty Officers might easily have perceived that they might not be able to advance their careers in their old rate. They were definitely threatened.

In the Wirefree Communications project, shipboard personnel did not fully realize what the tests were for. They felt if the wirefree communications system worked, that all sound-powered phones would be removed from the ship, even though it was never the intent to remove sound-powered phones but only to supplement them. But shipboard personnel felt “threatened” by the possible loss of what, to them, had proved a reliable means of communication.

IdentiBing Logistics and Training Requirements Oftentimes training and spare part support must be

provided to ships in order to conduct shipboard evaluations. Training can be supplied at an industrial plant, at a NAVY shore facility, or aboard ship. Spare parts can be supplied with or without training in maintenance. A factory engineer sometimes is provided to assist in maintenance.

There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting training either on or off a ship. By conducting training off a ship, disruptions can be minimized and more adequate facilities are usually available. However, on many occasions, shipboard personnel cannot be spared to attend the training, and “off-ship” training can be expensive for a developmental project. Training aboard ship is more realistic. All interfaces can be demonstrated, but disruptions of normal ship’s work can distract trainees.

In the IBS project, both “off ship” and “on ship” training was provided in the operation of the IBS. The maintenance training that could have been taught in four weeks in a factory environment, took eight weeks aboard ship. It is felt, however, the skill and knowledge of the personnel who received training aboard ship was greater than that of the personnel who received factory training. This is attributed to the greater involvement with the system during all phases of installation by the shipboard trainees. Operational training aboard ship consisted of approximately 20 hours but took four weeks to accomplish. Because of other ship’s work, trainees were only available a short time each day. It is felt that breaking up the training to this extent diluted the effects of the training. Ship’s officers felt more “hands-on” training should have been provided, but could not, in fact, make themselves available for more training due to the great demands on their time aboard ship. The cooperative spirit they demonstrated by taking training at night during non-duty hours cannot

always be counted upon. Superimposing training of this nature on the ship’s normal workload worked to a dis- advantage to both the shipboard personnel and the development program.

What Does Testing in the Fleet Buy That Other Means Do Not?

“At-sea” testing in the developmental stage of research reduces the risk that equipment or procedures worked on for many years, sometimes at great expense, won’t be suitable for use in ships. It assists planners and managers in deciding whether to continue with even more expensive work or stop before more time and monies are invested. It insures that the ultimate users of the research, shipboard personnel, get their inputs into follow-on designs. Finally, it helps gain acceptance by shipboard personnel of a sometimes revolutionary idea.

Testing aboard ship subjects developmental equipment and procedures to the real environment in which they must operate and function. The people who use the equipment are the people that will be the ultimate users. Equipment that may work very well in a laboratory setting, or that analysis shows should work aboard ship, are tested as they ultimately will be used. Equipment that works in a laboratory may fail aboard ship if it is not really designed to be operated aboard ship by shipboard personnel.

Shipboard personnel are experts in using equipment. They look for things in equipment a researcher may never consider. They want to know if they will have to contend with equipment that is not reliable or that does not function as intended, or whether they will be assisted by good equipment. Their input to follow-on designs must be carefully and thoroughly considered.

There is a major risk in developmental testing in the Fleet. The possibility exists that a goad system or idea can get some unjustified bad publicity because of a lack of understanding. It is incumbent upon the developing activity to reduce this risk by enhancing understanding of the entire evaluation.

SUMMARY

This paper is based upon an almost continual experience in testing in the Fleet over a five year period. We learned and applied lessons in each succeeding test. We will apply the lessons learned in future tests. The paper was written in the spirit that others might benefit from our experiences, both good and bad, to reduce the number of bad experiences in the future. Develop- mental testing in the Fleet should be viewed as a Joint Fleet/Shore Establishment effort for the ultimate benefit of the Fleet.

REFERENCES [l] Schwartz, Melvin A. and James L. Corder, “The Ship-

board Facilities Maintenance Demonstration Study,” Naval Engineers Journal, Vol. 90, No. 2 (April 1978).

[2] Puckett, Lanny J. and Robert A. Sniffin, “Integrated Bridge System ‘At-Sea’ Evaluation,” Naval Engineers Journal, Vol. 90, No. 2 (April 1978).


Documents

LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING IN THE FLEET