Lesson-31

Monopolistic Competition

In discussing industries that are neither monopolies nor p-competitive, economists have tended to begin from the four characteristics of a p-competitive industry. Those characteristics are as follows:

• Many buyers and sellers • A homogenous product • Sufficient knowledge • Free entry

Competition can be "imperfect" in an industry if the industry deviates from any one of the four. Thus, if there are just a few firms (but more than one), by deviating from the first characteristic, the industry is said to be an "oligopoly." Since the 1920s, economists have also discussed the situation when an "industry" deviates only in the second characteristic. This is called "monopolistic competition." We have "monopolistic competition" when a group of firms sell closely related but not homogenous products. Instead, the products are said to be "differentiated products." Thus, the characteristics of "monopolistic competition" are as follows:

• Many buyers and sellers • Differentiated products • Sufficient knowledge • Free entry

To say that products are differentiated is to say that the products may be (more or less) good substitutes, but they are not perfect substitutes. The hairdressing industry is an example of a monopolistically competitive "industry." There are many hairdressers in the country, and most hairdressing firms are quite small. There is free entry, and it is, at least, possible that people know enough about their hairdressing options so that the "sufficient knowledge" condition is fulfilled. But the products of different hairdressers are not perfect substitutes. At the very least, their services are differentiated by location. A

hairdresser in Center City Philadelphia is not a perfect substitute for a hairdresser in the suburbs, although they may be good substitutes from the point of view of a customer who lives in the suburbs but works in Center City. Hairdressers' services may be differentiated in other ways as well. Their styles may be different; the decor of the salon may be different, and that may make a difference for some customers. Even the quality of the conversation may make a difference. A good friend of mine changed her hairdresser because her old hairdresser was an outspoken Republican. My friend said that she just couldn't take it any more without answering back, and it is not a good idea to get into a controversy with one's hairdresser.

Product Differentiation

The word "industry" was put in quotes earlier in this lesson when it referred to a group of firms with product differentiation. This is because the boundaries of the industry become much more vague when we talk about product differentiation. A hairdresser in Center City Philadelphia and another in a Philadelphia suburb may be close substitutes, but the Philadelphia hairdresser's service will be a very poor substitute for the services of a hairdresser in Seattle. Are they in the same industry? Or should we think of hairdressing industries as localized so that Philadelphia hairdressing is a different industry than Seattle hairdressing? And also, barbers may cut women's hair, and hairdressers may cut men's hair. Are hairdressers and barbers part of the same industry, or different industries? There is no concrete answer to this question. Some economists have avoided any reference to industries in dealing with monopolistic competition. Instead, they talk about "product groups." A product group is a group of firms selling products that are "good," but not necessarily "perfect" substitutes. And, of course, a product group is not unique, since it depends on how "good" we require the substitutes to be. So, there will be broader and narrower product groups. Coke and Pepsi are both members of the product group "cola drinks," while Coke, Dr. Pepper, Sprite and Squirt are members of the broader product group "carbonated soft drinks."

This illustrates another point. Product differentiation is characteristic of monopolistic competition, but not limited to monopolistic competition only. Oligopolies too may have product differentiation. Cola drinks would probably be thought of as a differentiated oligopoly, an oligopoly product group, rather than a monopolistically competitive group.

And what about "free entry?" For monopolistic competition, that means free entry into the "product group." Again, let us think of hairdressers as the example. If a hairdresser is especially successful with a Seattle-punk style at a certain location in Center City

Philadelphia, there is nothing to prevent other hairdressers from setting up at a nearby location, and cutting in a similar style. In that sense, there is "free entry" into the product group. In general, when one monopolistically competitive firm is quite profitable, we may expect that other firms will set up in business producing similar products. Also, established firms may change the characteristics of the products they produce, to make those products more similar to the successful one. In that sense, there is free entry into the monopolistically competitive product group.

The Short Run

In the short run, then, the monopolistically competitive firm faces limited competition. There are other firms that sell products which are good but not perfect substitutes for the firm's own product. In the words of British economist Joan Robinson, every firm has a monopoly of its own product. When the product is differentiated, that means the firm has some monopoly power, maybe not much, if the competing products are close substitutes. This means we should use the monopoly analysis, as in Figure 31.1 below.

Figure 31.1: Monopolistic Competition

We can see that as usual in monopoly analysis, the marginal revenue is less than the price. The firm will set its output so as to make marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, and charge the corresponding price on the demand curve, so that in this example, the monopoly sells 1000 units of output (per week, perhaps) for a price of $85 per unit.

But this is just a short run situation. The price is greater than the average cost (which is $74 per unit, in this case) giving a profit of $11,000 per week. This is economic profit-- net of all implicit as well as explicit costs. So, this profitable performance will attract new competition in the long run. What this means is that new firms will set up and existing firms will change their products, so that there will be more, and closer, substitutes in the long run. This will shift the demand for the firm's profits downward, and perhaps cause the cost curves to shift upward as well, squeezing the profit margins.

The Long Run

In monopolistic competition, when one firm or product variety is profitable, it will attract more competition-- more substitutes and closer substitutes for the profitable product type. Thus, demand will shift downward and (perhaps) costs will increase. This will go on as long as the firm and its product type remain profitable. A new "long run equilibrium" is reached when (economic) profits have been eliminated. This is shown in Figure 31.2.

Figure 31.2

In this example, the firm can break even by selling 935 units of output at a price of $76 per unit. The profit-- zero-- is the greatest profit the firm can make. So, profit is being maximized (as usual) with the output that makes MC = MR.

Zero (economic) profit is also the condition for long run equilibrium in a p-competitive industry. But this equilibrium is not the ideal one like the long run equilibrium in a p-competitive industry. Many economists feel that the long run equilibrium in a monopolistic industry has some problems. These are as follows:

1. Inefficiency You may notice that either in the long run or in the short, the price is greater than marginal cost. But the condition for efficient production is that price is equal to marginal cost. Thus, an individual firm's output is less than what would be efficient, according to the traditional standard. 2. Excess Capacity We can see that in the long run, the firm is not producing at the bottom of its long run average cost curve. Instead, it is operating on a scale which is smaller and less efficient-- the firm has a capacity to produce more at a lower average cost. To put it differently, each firm is serving a market which is too small, and there are too many firms, so that the product group as a whole has the capacity to serve more customers than there are. This is called excess capacity. 3. Advertising and Non-Price Competition A firm in a p-competitive industry will not advertise at all. Why should they? The p-competitive firm can sell all it wants to sell, without cutting its price. So, why spend money to get more customers? But the monopolistically competitive firm cannot sell all it wants without cutting its price, and advertising to get more customers may be more profitable than cutting price. Thus, economists expect to see monopolistic competition associated with advertising. Moreover, advertising seems to go along with differentiated products. As a profitable firm attracts more competition, with more substitutes and closer substitutes for their product, the firm may feel that it needs to spend more on advertising. (That is why the cost curve could be higher in a long run equilibrium.) In this context, advertising is seen as wasteful.

Of course, all of this is controversial. Some economists have been quite critical of the idea of monopolistic competition from the start. Here are some responses the critics might make to these points.

Inefficiency While the hypothetical monopolistically competitive firm does operate inefficiently, it does not miss efficiency by much. The deviation of marginal cost from marginal price,

and of the firm's production and price from the efficient, p-competitive quantities, could be only a few percent-- less than what we can detect in practice. Thus, despite the differentiation of products, the p-competitive theory may be a "good enough" approximation, especially in the long run. Excess Capacity Again, for concreteness, let us think of hairdressing as a typical instance of "monopolistic competition." What this is telling us is that if some of the existing hairdressing enterprises were combined, so that there would be fewer hairdressers each serving a larger market, they could serve that market at a lower cost and price, perhaps. But, some consumers would lose out, since they would have to go further from their homes or offices to find the nearest hairdresser. Generally, getting rid of "excess capacity" means sacrificing variety, and that is a loss. The question is-- whose favorite is to be eliminated? Advertising and Non-Price Competition Advertising is common in most industries, however competitive, as a disequilibrium event. When price is a little above equilibrium, it makes sense for a competitive firm to include advertising in its competitive mix. But, when price competition brings the price down to its equilibrium level, sellers no longer have any reason to compete for buyers, either by price cuts or advertising or any other way. In the real world, a competitive industry is always reacting to changing events, and always moving toward the equilibrium, but it may never stay there for very long. And this advertising is useful in keeping consumers up-to-date about their opportunities. So, it is not clear whether monopolistically competitive advertising is something to be concerned about.

As we have seen before, economic theory favors price competition. While, on the other hand, non-price competition-- by advertising and other means-- is often seen as a mixed bag of good and bad. But some economists claim that monopolistic competition promotes a particularly unfortunate kind of non-price competition. The idea behind that is discussed next.

Increasing Product Differentiation

A monopolistically competitive firm faces competition from other products that are good substitutes for its own product type. One way it might be able to improve its profit margins is by changing its product type so that the other products are less substitutable for it. This is "increasing the differentiation of the product" or "(further) differentiating

the product." It may be accomplished by creating, marketing or engineering redesign, or by other means.

How does "increasing the differentiation of the product" work in the model of monopolistic competition? With reference to the section on elasticity, we can recall that the more and the closer substitutes there are for a product, the more elastic the demand for that product is.

So, if the effort to differentiate the product is successful, the elasticity of demand for the product will be decreased. In turn, we can also recall that a less elastic demand is correlated with a steeper demand curve.

So, we can visualize a more differentiated product as having a steeper demand curve. That is the idea behind Figure 31.3:

Figure 31.3

In the figure, the firm has succeeded in further differentiating its product, (starting from the long run equilibrium we saw before) without losing any of its customers. This substitutes the lighter green new demand curve for the old demand curve D. As a result, referring to the new marginal revenue curve (which is not shown, to avoid complications), the firm will maximize profits by selling 642.5 units at $110 each for

profits somewhat over $70,000 at an average cost of $90 per unit. That compares with zero profits in the long run equilibrium on demand curve D.

But, of course, it is still a short run gain. In the long run, the new product type will attract new competition, and profits will again be eroded. That is life in a competitive business. Profits in the short run beat no profits at all.

Increasing Product Differentiation-- Long Run

If the increasing product differentiation is successful in increasing profits in the long run, it will attract new competition until the economic profits are wiped out in the new long run equilibrium. Since all of the firms are trying to increase the differentiation of their products, the competing products are not closer substitutes. But just because of increasing numbers of firms, demand decreases and profits disappear. The way the firm's new long run equilibrium would look like is shown in the following figure.

Figure 31.4

Now, we see zero profits on the new demand curve, with sales of 610 units at a price of $99 per unit. Comparing the two long run equilibriums, we see that in this case, non-price competition has increased the price and cost from $76 per unit to $99 per unit, while production has been cut back from 935 units to 610 units. This does not look good for monopolistic competition.

The Controversy on Monopolistic Competition

It sometimes happens in the reasonable dialog of economics that issues are raised which cannot be fully resolved to everybody's satisfaction. This has been the case with the theory of monopolistic competition. Some of the great economists of the 1920s and 1930s began the study of monopolistic competition. American economist Edward Chamberlin and British economists Joan Robinson and Abba Lerner made important contributions to the theory, while British economist Roy Harrod and American economist George Stigler criticized it. As we have just seen, increasing differentiation of products could lead to non-price competition with increasing prices and costs. Critics argued that a firm which was unwise enough to adopt this price raising strategy would soon be undercut by a low cost producer before very long. In other words, a high price situation could not be a long run equilibrium. The critics also held that the monopolistic competition theory was too imprecise. While it may not be very easy to see, the p-competitive theory could be restated in very precise ways. The theory of monopolistic competition was harder to restate in precise terms.

By about 1970, it seemed as if the critics had won. But during the 1980s and 1990s, monopolistic competition theory had made something of a comeback. Product differentiation and variety seemed to be important enough to be left out of economic theory, and economists found ways to make this idea quite precise. It also seemed especially important in international trade. When both the United States and Germany import automobiles to one another, it must mean that automobiles are a differentiated product, and that the American cars are different from the German cars. The problem is that we still really do not know what this implies for efficiency. The theorists of the 1990s tend to put a great deal of stress on the tendency of non-price competition to encourage innovation and the introduction of new products, rather than any tendency to raise prices. The discussion is still going on.

What we are sure of is that product variety is important. But we have a lot to learn about how the market system creates product variety, and whether it creates too much, too little, or just about enough.

Decreased Price Competition

In a p-competitive industry, in the long run, economic profits will be zero and prices determined by supply and demand. In a monopoly, prices are higher and the industry profit is at a maximum. How high will the profits and prices of an imperfectly competitive industry be? This issue has been discussed by economists for over a hundred years and is still not entirely resolved.

The answer may depend somewhat on the structure of the industry we are looking at. You might remember that there is a wide range of imperfectly competitive structures. Here, we do need to distinguish between monopolistic competition and oligopoly.

For monopolistic competition, there is free entry. So, as in p-competition, economic profits will be zero in the long run. As long as there are positive economic profits, new competition will be attracted into the industry group. Therefore, positive economic profits will not be stable in a monopolistically competitive industry. However, some economists believe that a monopolistically competitive industry may have high prices because non-price competition pushes up costs.

Oligopoly Prices

Economists have been discussing oligopoly prices and profits since the 1840s. In principle, the oligopoly's profits could never be higher than those of a monopoly, since the monopoly chooses the price that maximizes industry profits. A price higher than the monopoly price would just reduce profits (by driving away too many customers), so we would not expect to see a price above the monopoly price. At the other extreme, in the long run, no industry—and, in particular, no oligopoly-- could be stable with prices and profits lower than those of a p-competitive industry in long run equilibrium-- zero economic profits and the supply-and-demand equilibrium price. But where in this range will the oligopoly's prices settle?

There are four major hypotheses about oligopoly pricing. These are as follows:

1. The oligopoly firms will conspire and collaborate to charge the monopoly price and get monopoly profits.

2. The oligopoly firms will compete on price so that the price and profits will be the same as those of a p-competitive industry.

3. The oligopoly price and profits will be somewhere between the monopoly and competitive ends of the scale.

4. Oligopoly prices and profits are "indeterminate." That is, they may be anything within the range, and are unpredictable.

Unfortunately, theoretical reasoning has not been able to determine which of these hypotheses is most likely to occur. Economists have developed models that lead to each of these four results. Instead of relying on theory, we will have to try to discover the answer by observation.

Hypothesis 3: This hypothesis seems to be the right choice. Since the 1950s, there have been many studies in the fields of "industrial organization" and "econometrics" (economic statistics) to try to resolve this question. While there is a room for some controversy, the weight of the evidence seems to favor hypothesis 3.

We can go a little further by saying that an industry is more concentrated when it is more dominated by a few large firms or, in other words, when its structure comes closer to the monopoly end of the scale. One rough way to measure the concentration of an industry is to compute the portion of the industry's sales revenue that is earned by the biggest four (or three or eight) firms in the industry. This is called the four-firm concentration ratio. The bigger the four-firm concentration ratio, the more concentrated and monopoly-like the industry is. There are other, more complicated ways to measure industry concentration which take into account all of the firms in the industry, rather than just the biggest four. But, we will find industries rank about the same for concentration whichever way we measure it.

Commonsense suggests that the more "concentrated" the oligopoly is-- that is, the fewer and bigger the firms are, so that it more nearly resembles a monopoly-- the nearer monopoly profits and prices of the industry will come. And, once again, the evidence of observation agrees with common sense. Here, again, there is some possible controversy, but the weight of evidence is that more concentrated industries do have somewhat higher profits (counting interest payments as a cost). So, we may think of a spectrum of industries, with competitive industries at one end and monopolies at the other, and with oligopolies falling at the points in between. This is not very precise, but it seems to fit the facts pretty well.

Oligopoly Pricing Strategy

All being the same, those who believe in the "indeterminate" theory have a good case. It seems that traditional microeconomic theory just does not have an answer to the question of oligopoly pricing.

In the 1930s, it began to seem the problem was that oligopoly pricing decisions are strategic decisions. This is not the case with p-competition. P-competitive firms do not decide on a price. They just decide how much to sell at the price determined by supply and demand. Nor are monopoly pricing decisions strategic, at least in the same sense. Since the monopoly has (by definition) no rivals, it does not have to consider how its rivals will respond to its decision. But that is the essence of a strategic decision, and oligopolists' decisions are strategic in that sense-- they have to consider the reactions of their rivals (one another).

The difficulty of resolving the question of strategic price decisions within traditional microeconomic theory led some economists, around 1940, to consider a new theory of strategic decisions that was being developed by the great mathematician John von Neumann. It was called the “Game Theory.” Over the years, game theory has become increasingly important as an approach to microeconomic questions in general, and not just in oligopoly pricing.

Game Theory Basics

Game theory is a distinct and interdisciplinary approach to the study of strategic behavior. The disciplines most involved in game theory are mathematics, economics, and other social and behavioral sciences. Game theory (like computational theory and so many other contributions) was founded by the great mathematician John von Neumann. The first important book was The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, which Neumann wrote in collaboration with the great mathematical economist Oskar Morgenstern. Certainly, Morgenstern brought ideas from neoclassical economics into the partnership, but von Neumann too was well aware of them and had made other contributions to neoclassical economics.

A Scientific Metaphor Since the work of John von Neumann, "games" have been a scientific metaphor for a much wider range of human interactions. In this, the outcomes depend on the interactive

strategies of two or more persons who have opposed or at best mixed motives. Among the issues discussed in the game theory are following ones:

1. What does it mean to choose strategies "rationally" when outcomes depend on the strategies chosen by others and when information is incomplete?

2. In "games" that allow mutual gain (or mutual loss), is it "rational" to cooperate to realize the mutual gain (or avoid the mutual loss), or is it "rational" to act aggressively in seeking individual gain regardless of mutual gain or loss?

3. If the answers to second issue are "sometimes," in what circumstances is aggression rational and in what circumstances is cooperation rational?

4. In particular, do ongoing relationships differ from one-off encounters in this connection?

5. Can moral rules of cooperation emerge spontaneously from the interactions of rational egoists?

6. How does real human behavior correspond to "rational" behavior in these cases? 7. If it differs, in what direction? Are people more cooperative than would be "rational?"

More aggressive? Both?

Thus, among the "games" studied by game theory are the following ones:

• Bankruptcy • Barbarians at the Gate • Battle of the Networks • Caveat Emptor • Conscription • Coordination • Escape and Evasion • Frogs Call for Mates • Hawk versus Dove • Mutually Assured Destruction • Majority Rule • Market Niche • Mutual Defense • Prisoner's Dilemma • Subsidized Small Business • Tragedy of the Commons • Ultimatum • Video System Coordination

(This list is extracted from an index of games discussed in Roy Gardner, Games for Business and Economics.)

Rationality

The key link between neoclassical economics and game theory was and is rationality. Neoclassical economics is based on the assumption that human beings are absolutely rational in their economic choices. Specifically, the assumption is that each person maximizes his or her rewards-- profits, incomes or subjective benefits-- in the circumstances which he or she faces. This hypothesis serves a double purpose in the study of the allocation of resources. First, it narrows the range of possibilities somewhat. Absolutely rational behavior is more predictable than irrational behavior. Second, it provides a criterion for evaluation of the efficiency of an economic system. If the system leads to a reduction in the rewards coming to some people, without producing more than compensating rewards to others (costs greater than benefits, broadly), then something is wrong. Pollution, the overexploitation of fisheries, and inadequate resources committed to research can all be examples of this.

In neoclassical economics, the rational individual faces a specific system of institutions, including property rights, money and highly competitive markets. These are among the "circumstances" that the person takes into account in maximizing rewards. The implications of property rights, a money economy and ideally competitive markets are that the individual need not consider his or her interactions with other individuals. She or he needs consider only his or her own situation and the "conditions of the market." But this leads to two problems. First, it limits the range of the theory. Wherever competition is restricted (but there is no monopoly) or property rights are not fully defined, consensus neoclassical economic theory is inapplicable. Neoclassical economics has never produced a generally accepted extension of the theory to cover these cases. Decisions taken outside the money economy were also problematic for neoclassical economics.

Game theory was intended to confront just this problem-- to provide a theory of economic and strategic behavior when people interact directly, rather than "through the market." In game theory, "games" have always been a metaphor for more serious interactions in human society. Game theory may be about poker and baseball, but it is not about chess, and it is about such serious interactions as market competition, arms races and environmental pollution. But game theory addresses the serious interactions using the

metaphor of a game. In these serious interactions, as in games, the individual's choice is essentially a choice of a strategy, and the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategies chosen by each of the participants. On this interpretation, a study of games may indeed tell us something about serious interactions. But how much?

In neoclassical economic theory, to choose rationally is to maximize one's rewards. From one point of view, this is a problem in mathematics-- choose the activity which maximizes rewards in given circumstances. Thus, we may think of rational economic choices as the "solution" to a problem of mathematics. In game theory, the case is more complex, since the outcome depends not only on our own strategies and the "market conditions," but also directly on the strategies chosen by others. But, we may still think of the rational choice of strategies as a mathematical problem-- maximize the rewards of a group of interacting decision makers. And so we again speak of the rational outcome as the "solution" to the game.

The Prisoners' Dilemma

Recent developments in game theory, especially the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1994 to three game theorists and the death of A. W. Tucker in January 1995, at 89, have renewed the memory of its beginnings. The key period of the emergence of game theory was the decade of the 1940s. The publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was a particularly important step. But in some ways, Tucker's invention of the Prisoners' Dilemma example was even more important. This example, which can be set out in one page, could be the most influential one page in the social sciences in the latter half of the twentieth century.

This remarkable innovation did not come out in a research paper, but in a classroom. As S. J. Hagenmayer wrote in the Philadelphia Inquirer (Albert W. Tucker, 89, Famed Mathematician, Thursday, Feb. 2, 1995, p B7), " In 1950, while addressing an audience of psychologists at Stanford University, where he was a visiting professor, Mr. Tucker created the Prisoners' Dilemma to illustrate the difficulty of analyzing" certain kinds of games. "Mr. Tucker's simple explanation has since given rise to a vast body of literature in subjects as diverse as philosophy, ethics, biology, sociology, political science, economics, and, of course, game theory."

The Game

Tucker began with a little story, like this-- two burglars, Bob and Al, are captured near the scene of a burglary and are given the "third degree" separately by the police. Each has to choose whether or not to confess and implicate the other. If neither man confesses, then both will serve one year on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. If each confesses and implicates the other, both will go to prison for 10 years. However, if one burglar confesses and implicates the other, and the other burglar does not confess, the one who has collaborated with the police will go free, while the other burglar will go to prison for 20 years on the maximum charge.

The strategies in this case are-- confess or do not confess. The payoffs (penalties) are the sentences served. We can express all this compactly in a "payoff table" of a kind that has become standard in game theory. Following is the payoff table for the Prisoners' Dilemma game:

Table 31.1

Al

Confess Don't

Confess 10, 10 0, 20 Bob

Don't 20, 0 1, 1

The table is read like this-- each prisoner chooses one of the two strategies. In effect, Al chooses a column and Bob chooses a row. The two numbers in each cell tell the outcomes for the two prisoners when the corresponding pair of strategies is chosen. The number to the left of the comma tells the payoff to the person who chooses the rows (Bob) while the number to the right of the column tells the payoff to the person who chooses the columns (Al). Thus (reading down the first column), if they both confess, each gets 10 years, but if Al confesses and Bob does not, Bob gets 20 and Al goes free.

So, how to solve this game? What strategies are "rational" if both men want to minimize the time they spend in jail? Al might reason as follows-- "Two things can happen. Bob can confess or Bob can keep quiet. Suppose Bob confesses. Then I get 20 years if I don't confess, 10 years if I do. So, in that case, it's best to confess. On the other hand, if Bob doesn't confess, and I don't either, I get a year. But in that case, if I confess I can go free. Either way, it's best if I confess. Therefore, I'll confess."

But Bob can and presumably will reason in the same way, so that they both confess and go to prison for 10 years each. Yet, if they had acted "irrationally" and kept quiet, they each could have gotten off with one year each.

Dominant Strategies

What has happened here is that the two prisoners have fallen into something called "dominant strategy equilibrium."

Dominant Strategy

Let an individual player in a game evaluate separately each of the strategy combinations he/she may face, and for each combination, choose from his/her own strategies the one that gives the best payoff. If the same strategy is chosen for each of the different combinations of strategies the player might face, that strategy is called a "dominant strategy" for that player in that game.

Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

If in a game, each player has a dominant strategy, and each player plays the dominant strategy, then that combination of (dominant) strategies and the corresponding payoffs are said to constitute the dominant strategy equilibrium for that game.

In the Prisoners' Dilemma game, to confess is a dominant strategy, and when both prisoners confess, that is a dominant strategy equilibrium.

Issues with respect to the Prisoners' Dilemma

This remarkable result that individually rational action results in both persons being made worse off in terms of their own self-interested purposes is what has made the wide impact in modern social science. For there are many interactions in the modern world which seem very much like that, from arms races through road congestion and pollution to the depletion of fisheries and the overexploitation of some subsurface water resources. These are all quite different interactions in detail, but are interactions in which (we suppose) individually rational action leads to inferior results for each person, and the Prisoners' Dilemma suggests something of what is going on in each of them. That is the source of its power.

Having said that we should also admit candidly that the Prisoners' Dilemma is very simplified and abstract-- if you will, "unrealistic"-- conception of many of these interactions. A number of critical issues can be raised with the Prisoners' Dilemma, and each of these issues has been the basis of a large scholarly literature, such as the ones below:

1. The Prisoners' Dilemma is a two-person game, but many of the applications of the idea are really many-person interactions.

2. We have assumed that there is no communication between the two prisoners. If they could communicate and commit themselves to coordinated strategies, we would expect a quite different outcome.

3. In the Prisoners' Dilemma, the two prisoners interact only once. Repetition of the interactions might lead to quite different results.

4. Compelling as the reasoning is that leads to the dominant strategy equilibrium, it is not the only way this problem might be reasoned out. Perhaps it is not really the most rational answer after all.

Oligopoly Prices and "Solutions" to Pricing Games

Let us discuss a simplified model of price competition. Like Augustin Cournot (writing in the 1840s), think of two companies that sell mineral water. Each company has a fixed cost of $5000 per period, regardless of whether they sell anything or not. Let us call the companies Perrier and Apollinaris.

The two companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price ($2 per bottle) or a low price ($1 per bottle). Here are the rules of the game:

1. At a price of $2, 5,000 bottles can be sold for a total revenue of $10,000. 2. At a price of $1, 10,000 bottles can be sold for a total revenue of $10,000. 3. If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them. 4. If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the

whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing. 5. Payoffs are profits-- revenue minus the $5,000 fixed cost.

The payoff table for these two companies is shown below:

Table 31.2

Perrier

Price = $1 Price = $2

Price = $1 0, 0 5000, -5000 Apollinaris

Price = $2 -5000, 5000 0, 0

Once again, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma, each company has a strong rationale to choose one strategy. In this case, it is a price cut. For example, Appolinaris might reason, "Either Perrier will cut to $1 or it will not. If it does, then I had better cut too, otherwise I'll lose all my customers and lose $5,000. On the other hand, if Perrier doesn't cut, I'm still better off to cut, since I'll take their customers away and get a profit of $5,000." Thus, the price cut is a dominant strategy.

But this is, of course, a very simplified, even unrealistic, conception of price competition. Let us look at a more complicated, perhaps more realistic pricing example.

Price Competition Example

Following a long tradition in economics, we will think of two companies selling "widgets" at a price of one, two or three dollars per widget. The payoffs are profits, after allowing for costs of all kinds, and are shown in Table 31.3. The idea behind the example is that the company which charges a lower price will get more customers and, thus, within limits, more profits than the high price competitor.

Table 31.3

Acme Widgets

Price = $1 Price = $2 Price = $3

Price = $1 0, 0 50, -10 40, -20

Price = $2 -10, 50 20, 20 90, 10 Widgeon Widgets

Price = $3 -20, 40 10, 90 50, 50

Industry profits in this example depend on the price and, thus, on the strategies chosen by the rivals. Profits may add up to 100, 20, 40 or even zero, depending on the strategies which the two competitors choose. We can also see that there is no dominant strategy equilibrium. Widgeon Company can reason as follows-- if Acme were to choose a price of 3, then Widgeon's best price is 2, but otherwise Widgeon's best price is 1-- neither is dominant.

Nash Equilibrium We will need another broader concept of equilibrium if we are to do anything with this game. The concept we need is called the “Nash Equilibrium,” after Nobel Laureate (in economics) and mathematician John Nash. Nash, a student of Tucker, contributed several key concepts to game theory around 1950. The Nash Equilibrium conception was one of these, and is probably the most widely used "solution concept" in game theory.

Definition

If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by changing his/her strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium.

Let us apply the definition to the widget selling game. First, for example, we can see that the strategy pair p = 3 for each player (bottom right) is not a Nash Equilibrium. From that pair, each competitor can benefit by cutting price if the other player keeps his/her strategy unchanged. Or consider the bottom middle-- Widgeon charges $3 but Acme charges $2. From that pair, Widgeon benefits by cutting to $1. In this way, we can eliminate any strategy pair except the upper left at which both competitors charge $1.

We can see that the Nash Equilibrium in the widget selling game is a low price, zero profit equilibrium. Many economists believe that the result is descriptive of real, highly competitive markets, although there is, of course, a great deal about this example that is still "unrealistic."

Let us go back and take a look at that dominant strategy equilibrium. We will see that it too is a Nash Equilibrium. Also, look again at the dominant strategy equilibrium in the Prisoners' Dilemma. It too is a Nash Equilibrium. In fact, any dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium. The Nash Equilibrium is an extension of the dominant strategy equilibrium.

Cooperative Games

These three examples have the following things in common:

1. In each case, there are two decision-makers. 2. The payoffs to each decision-maker depend on both decisions. 3. Both decision-makers seek their own interests. 4. Each chooses in isolation from the other, taking the other decision as given. 5. As a result, both have relatively bad outcomes-- long prison terms or zero profits.

The Prisoners' Dilemma has been influential throughout the social sciences in the second half of the 1900s because it offers such a vivid illustration of how this can happen.

Rational and self-interested decision-makers, choosing their strategies in isolation from one another, find that the strategies interact so that they both have bad outcomes.

In application to the problem of oligopoly pricing, the examples given so far seem to give strong support to the second hypothesis of oligopoly pricing, the hypothesis that oligopoly prices will be the same as those in a p-competitive market-- zero profits. But that is not really so clear.

The key assumption in these examples is assumption 4 that each chooses in isolation from the other, taking the other decision as given. But is it really rational for them to do so? In the Prisoners' Dilemma game, the isolation is imposed by the rules of the game-- the prisoners have been isolated by the police, and have no choice in the matter. But the oligopolists could, in principle, get together, agree on a common strategy, and share out the gains from it among themselves. They would not be taking one another’s strategies as given. Instead, they would be coordinating their strategies.

Of course, antitrust laws are designed to make such a price-fixing agreement illegal. But we have not always had antitrust laws. They were enacted because many people believed that businessmen were collaborating to fix high prices. And even now, there may be ways to get around the law.

When the decision-makers in a "game" get together, agree on a common strategy, and share out the gains from it among themselves, the agreement they come to is called a "cooperative solution" to the game. The examples we have looked at so far are "non-cooperative solutions."

It appears that we cannot rule out the possibility of a cooperative solution to the oligopoly pricing game. So, we need to look a bit at the cooperative alternative in game theory.

A Basic Cooperative Game

It is not hard to find an example of a cooperative solution to game. In fact, we have been talking about cooperative solutions all through this book. Buying and selling is a cooperative game in which the buyer and the seller are two "players" and the price they agree upon is their common strategy. The following numerical example illustrates this only.

We suppose that Joey has a bicycle. Joey would rather have a game machine than a bicycle. He could buy a game machine for $80, but he does not have any money. We express this by saying that Joey values his bicycle at $80. Mikey has $100 and no bicycle, and would rather have a bicycle than anything else he can buy for $100. We express this by saying that Mikey values a bicycle at $100.

The strategies available to Joey and Mikey are to give or to keep. That is, Joey can give his bicycle to Mikey or keep it, and Mikey can give some of his money to Joey or keep it all. It is suggested that Mikey give Joey $90 and that Joey give Mikey the bicycle. This is what we call "exchange." Here are the payoffs:

Table 31.4

Joey

Give Keep

Give 110, 90 10, 170 Mikey

Keep 190, 10 100, 80

Explanation

At the upper left, Mikey has a bicycle he values at $100, plus $10 extra. While, on the other hand, Joey has a game machine he values at $80, plus an extra $10. At the lower left, Mikey has the bicycle he values at $100, plus $100 extra. At the upper left, Joey has a game machine and a bike, each of which he values at $80, plus $10 extra, and Mikey is left with only $10. At the lower right, they simply have what they began with-- Mikey $100 and Joey a bicycle.

If we think of this as a non-cooperative game, it is much like a Prisoners' Dilemma. To keep is a dominant strategy and keep, keep is a dominant strategy equilibrium. However, give, give makes both better off. Being children, they may distrust one another and fail to make the exchange that will make them better off. But market societies have a range of institutions that allow adults to commit themselves to mutually beneficial transactions. Thus, we would expect a cooperative solution, and we suspect that it would be the one in the upper left.

Thus, we can see that cooperative solutions are not uncommon in a market society. On the contrary, they are the essence of a market system. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that oligopolists will arrive at a cooperative solution, and charge a monopoly price and get monopoly profits.

The Oligopoly Problem

It seems that game theory does not solve the oligopoly problem after all. There are at least two kinds of solutions to the problem of oligopoly pricing-- cooperative and non-cooperative-- and we cannot rule either one of them out.

Actually, it is a bit worse than that. In each of the two categories, there is actually more than one sort of solution, depending on how we approach the problem. So, game theory really is not a "solution" to the problem of oligopoly pricing at all.

This had become clear to economists by the 1960s, and many economists lost interest in game theory. But despite its failure on this specific point, game theory has proved to be a powerful tool of economic thinking. That is why, it has become more influential since the 1960s, culminating in the Nobel Prize for three game theorists (including John Nash who invented the Nash Equilibrium) in 1994.

And it is not just simply a failure in the analysis of oligopoly prices, not really. In a comic strip a few years ago, a schoolboy was discussing his grades with his guardian. The schoolboy said that he had gotten an "A" in an algebra test. The guardian said, "Well, then, you must understand algebra." "No," the schoolboy said, "but I'm confused at a much higher level." Economists can say that about oligopoly pricing.

Sometimes, it is important to be confused at a higher level. We now understand not only that oligopoly pricing is a hard problem, but something of why it is a hard problem. The pricing examples we have seen here give some insight about the reason why price competition-- when it does occur-- is so powerful in bringing prices down to the lowest stable level. And we can apply the same methods to a range of other problems, both related to imperfect competition and in other fields of economics.

Let us apply this to advertising.

Advertising

Some economists and others believe that persuasive advertising may be largely wasteful. Here is an example that illustrates what they have in mind. We consider two whiskey manufacturers, one selling Black George brand, and the other selling Wild Chicken brand whiskey. If they advertise, they can sell more whiskey. The larger market will give both of them more revenues. But the cost of advertising more than offsets the increased revenues, so that profits are slightly less. On the other hand, if only one advertises, he takes most of the customers and gets a large profit. Here is the payoff table:

Table 31.5

Black George

Advertise Don’t

Advertise 40, 40 110, 10 Wild Chicken

Don’t 10, 110 50, 50

Once again, we see an outcome like the Prisoners' Dilemma. If each seller takes the other seller's decision as given, then they both advertise and their profits are lower as a result. Again, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma example, we can contrast a cooperative solution with this non-cooperative solution. A cooperative solution to the advertising game would be one in which the whiskey sellers coordinate their strategy for mutual benefit.

We get these Prisoners' Dilemma-like results because of the way the payoffs are interrelated. Other payoff assumptions might lead to a quite different analysis. We should

stress that this is a hypothesis, not a fact. Some economists believe that advertising is often wasteful, and explain their opinion by this Prisoners' Dilemma-like sort of reasoning. But, so far as evidence is concerned, the jury is still out. We do not know whether advertising is a "Prisoners' Dilemma" or not.

The value of game theory, in a case such as this, is not that it answers the questions but that it enables us to ask them more precisely and clearly. This is helpful and is a step on the way to getting the answer.

Summary

This lesson has undertaken to survey the industries that do not seem to fit into either the “p-competitive" or "monopoly" category-- oligopolies and monopolistically competitive industries, or, taking both together, imperfectly competitive industries. These industries deviate from one or another of the four characteristics of p-competition. But they also involve some competition among two or more firms selling close substitutes, if not the same products.

The two major implications of imperfect competition, by comparison with p-competition, are as follows:

1. Increased Non-Price Competition Unlike price competition, non-price competition may be costly and may or may not make consumers better off all in all. Non-price competition is a mixed bag, but most economists are persuaded that, on the whole, more competition among sellers is better than less. 2. Decreased Price Competition Price competition favors customers and promotes efficiency. So, decreased price competition is clearly a bad aspect of the imperfect competition. But how much will price competition be reduced? Turning to game theory, we learn that there is no one "rational" answer to the choice of price strategies in oligopoly, so the question cannot be given a precise answer. But there is some evidence that the intensity of price competition increases as the number of firms gets larger and their size gets smaller, relative to the industry.

These problems mean that the decisions of imperfectly competitive firms are strategic in a sense that monopoly decisions and the decisions of p-competitive firms are not. Accordingly, we have followed modern economics (and mathematics and other social sciences) in digressing a bit on an important modern theory of strategic choices called "game theory." Here too, we do not find clear answers but a range of possibilities-- the "solutions" to or equilibrium in "games" may be cooperative or non-cooperative. The non-cooperative games sometimes lead to results that nobody wants, such as low prices and zero economic profits in an oligopoly. But we also have to consider the possibility of a cooperative solution with monopoly prices and profits.

Imperfect competition remains a controversial area in economics. Some economists would argue that imperfect competition is the rule rather than the exception. They may conclude that the "Fundamental Principle of Microeconomics"-- however fundamental for theory-- has little application in the real world. Other economists would argue that even if imperfect competition is pretty widespread, the deviations from supply-demand pricing in the real world are small, minor and temporary, so that "supply and demand" remains our best guide to prices and outputs in our market economy, with a very few obvious exceptions. This latter view has become more widespread and influential over the past 30 years, and that change has contributed to the political climate that led to deregulation in the years since 1977.