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8/18/2019 Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions
1/26
Content, Cause, and Stoic Impressions
Author(s): Glenn LessesReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 1-25Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182573 .
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8/18/2019 Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions
2/26
Content,Cause,
and Stoic Impressions
GLENN LESSES
According o
the
Stoics, only physical stuff exists.'
To describe
t in
their
terms, the
world
consists
of
different ypes
of
an
airy substance,pneuma.
Some
of these
pneumatic
stuffs instantiate
psychological
properties
or
states. Thus, psychological attributes,
which
they
deny are completely
different n kind from bodily properties,can be studied as part of the
natural world.2 Within the context of
their
naturalism,
he Stoics also
carefullyattend
o
the character
f
psychologicalproperties.
Despitetheir
differences,
uch
states
as
sense-perceptions, motions,
and beliefs convey
information o an agent.
The complex physical organization f the under-
lying pneumatic states determineswhy such psychological
states have
content.
Thus,
the
Stoics aim to provide
a
unified
theoryof varied mental
phenomena.3
Accepted March
1997
' There are ontological complications since they also hold that
there
are
things
that
do not exist, such
as
sayables (lekta). See, e.g., Sextus M 10. 218.
2
Though the Stoics reject ordinaryversions of substance
dualism,
their
own
views
are
complicated
in
ways
I
shall
not
explore.
In
particular, hey
do not appear
to
accept
either
a
version
of
reductive
type-physicalism
in
which
psychological states
are
sim-
ply identified
with
physical ones, or eliminativist theories.
The
Stoics
are
committed
to
nothing
more than that
psychological properties
have a
physical basis sufficient for
their
real
existence
and their
explanation.
Accordingly,
all
that
can be
said
here
is
that
the
Stoics
endorse some
weak
version
of
non-reductive physicalism. One apparent
dissent from this view is Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans
and
Mental
Content,
Apeiron
26
(1993), p. 98,
which is
a
review-discussion
of
Julia
Annas,
Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University
of
California Press,
1992).
Modrak
suggests
without argument that Stoic monism about the world provides a motive for a reduc-
tive physicalism. David Sedley, Chrysippus
on
psychophysical causality, Passions
and
Perceptions: Studies
in
Hellenistic
Philosophy of
Mind
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993),
edd.
Jacques Brunschwig
and
Martha
C.
Nussbaum, pp. 313-
331, argues that it is
a
mistake
to
understandChrysippus o
distinguish distinctly phys-
ical
from
mental
descriptions
of
psychological
attributes.
The
basic
Stoic texts and
their fundamental arguments
on
behalf
of
their view are
clearly presented in Julia
Annas,
Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind, pp. 3-6, 20-33, 37-70.
3
These
general remarks help to reveal the attractionof
Stoic philosophy of mind
for
many contemporary
scholars. The
Stoics are
thoroughgoing naturalists
who
con-
duct
a serious
inquiry
into the
ascription
of
propositional
attitudes. Their
analysis
of fundamental issues in
philosophy
of
mind
is
often subtle
and
serves
to
remind
?
Koninklijke
Brill
nv, Leiden, 1998 Phronesis
XLIIIII
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2 GLENN LESSES
It quickly becomes evident that the Stoic view about the nature and
extent
of the
propositional ontentof mentalstates
is puzzling.They deny
that humanyoung
or animals can entertainbeliefs
or have thoughts.The
existenceof
propositional ttitudesordinarily s held to involve the attri-
butionof some
thoughtor belief. So, it would follow that the Stoics deny
small childrenor animalshave mental states with
propositional ontents.
Yet,
there s
also
evidence to the contrary.Forinstance, n his well-known
example, Chrysippus
attributes
what
appears o be
reasoningby disjunc-
tive
syllogism
to a
dog. One might argue that
this
kind
of example
com-
mits the Stoics to the ascriptionof propositional ontentseven in the case
of animals.
Furthermore,
f the
mental states of non-rational nimals are
so
impoverished
as
to
lack
any propositional
content,
the
Stoics must
explain how
it is
possible for
such
animals
to
function
adequately
at
all.
Doesn't, say, a
mouse
see
that
a
cat is nearby?Recently, commentators
have debatedthe extent of
propositional
ontents n the
Stoic account
of
psychological states. The discussion
has
focused,
in
particular,
n
per-
ceptional
states
because
for
the
Stoics
perception
and
impulse
are what
distinguishanimal
life
from
other
living things
and
perception
has a
spe-
cial prominencen theirinquiry nto mental states.Two basic, competing
interpretations ave
emerged.
On
what
has
become
the
orthodoxreading,
the Stoics
sharplyseparate
he
psychological
states
of
non-rational
ni-
mals from those of
rationalanimals.According o advocates
of
the ortho-
dox
position,the mental
states of, say,
small
children
are too
simple
to
have
the
cognitive
structurenecessary
or
the attribution
f
propositional
attitudes
o
them.4Non-rational nimals can
perceive
only qualities
such
scholars of contemporarydiscussions. Hereare just two examples. While Julia Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind,
does not discover the ancestor of any particular on-
temporary position
in Stoic thought, she does suggest, e.g., pp. 1-2, that the Stoics
construct the first philosophy
of mind that is recognizably contemporary. Richard
Sorabji, PerceptualContent
in the
Stoics, Phronesis 35 (1990), pp. 307-314, goes
much further. He argues
that the Stoics would endorse the basic views of Daniel
Dennett on propositional
attitudesratherthan those of Donald Davidson.
4
Michael Frede,
Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,
The
SkepticalTradition Berkeley:University
of
California
Press, 1983),
ed.
Myles Burnyeat,
pp. 65-93,
is
among
the clearest and most forceful
proponents
of this view. Others
include Brad Inwood,
Ethics and Human Action
in
Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), pp. 73-75, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 239-241,
ChristopherGill,
Is there a concept of person
in
Greekphilosophy?, Companions
to
ancient
thought
2:
Psychology
(Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 1991),
ed.
Stephen Everson, pp.
166-193, and Jean-Louis
Labarriere, De la 'naturephantastique'
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CONTENT, CAUSE,
AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS 3
as sweetness or
whiteness.
According
he
second interpretation,
he Stoics
deny thatthe sensoryperceptions f animals
are
completely
devoid
of
pro-
positional contents.
On this alternativereading,
the
Stoics much more
liberally ascribe
propositional
content even in the case of non-rational
animals.5
In this essay, I argue that
the
Stoics
draw some distinctions
as
they
often
are
prone
to do
-
that,
as a
result,
enable
us to locate a solution
to
the
puzzle.
The
Stoics deny
that
there
are
any
raw
psychological
states
completelydevoid
of cognitive content
because theydiscriminate etween
a
conception
of more robustand more
narrowcontent.It follows that the
Stoics occupyan intermediate
osition,
ess severe thanwhat theorthodox
interpretation ttributes
o
them and less
generous than what the alterna-
tive account finds.Thus, the Stoics hold
that there is considerable
conti-
nuity
as
well
as
significant
differencesbetween the psychologicalstates of
rational
and
non-rational nimals.
I
Several basic
featuresof Stoic psychological
heory are relevant
o issues
about content.
The early Stoics speak of psuche in two senses
(Sextus
M
7.
234).6 The
term
often
is
used
to
include many of
the
ways
in which
des animaux chez
les Stoiciens, Passions and Perceptions: Studies in
Hellenistic
Philosophy of
Mind
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993),
edd.
Jacques
Brunschwig and Martha
C.
Nussbaum, 225-249.
s
Richard
Sorabji
is
the
principal
advocate of
this
interpretation.
See his
Percep-
tual Content
in
the
Stoics, pp. 307-314,
Intentionality
and
Physiological
Processes:
Aristotle's Theoryof Sense-Perception, Essays on Aristotle'sDe Anima Oxford:Oxford
University Press,
1992), edd. Martha
C.
Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg
Rorty, espe-
cially, pp.
195-206, Animal Minds, Spindel Conference
1992:
Ancient
Minds,
ed.
John Ellis,
The
SouthernJournal of Philosophy 31
(1993), supplement,especially, pp.
1-12,
Animal Minds
and Human Morals: The Origins of the WesternDebate
(Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.
20-28, 40-44. Although Julia
Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 75-87,
officially adopts
a
version
of
the orthodox
interpretation,
he
also
occasionally attributes
a kind
of content
to animal
perceptions,
pp. 57-64,
71-72.
At one
point, p. 64,
Annas
says:
Hence
there
is
a
division
of
kind
between animal and
human inner life. And hence
the
Stoics denied
to
animalsnot only
reasoning but
emotions and even desires; since animals cannot articulateand
interpret
in language the content of their experience.... Does she hold that non-rationalsen-
sory perceptions have
propositional contents
that animals
are unable to
verbalize? If
so,
her
position ascribes content
to the
impressions
of
non-rationalanimals and
appears
very close to what Sorabji formulates more
fully.
6
The
positions formulated by Zeno,
Cleanthes, and, especially, Chrysippus consti-
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8/18/2019 Lesses 1998. Content, Cause, And Stoic Impressions
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4
GLENN
LESSES
both rationaland non-rational nimals
unction.'
The
pneumatic ubstance
constituting he soul, understood his way, is intimately
blendedwith the
somewhat differentpneuma of a body to form a living
animal. Yet, in
another
sense,
the Stoics often refer to just one part of the soul, namely,
its ruling part (to hegemonikon).This part is restricted o those activities
we typically regard as mental
-
thinking,believing, perceiving,and so
forth
-
rather
han
the
entire
range
of
living functions.Bothrationaland
non-rational
nimals
have
a ruling part of
the
soul, though
non-rational
animals
cannot entertain houghts
or
desires. When another
part
of
the
soul
is
affected,
such as in the case of sense-perception,t
also produces
alterations
n
the rulingpart.8Since the ruling partof the soul
is
the
loca-
tion of
desire
and
reason
n
rationalanimals and activities such
as
sense-
perceptionalso affect it,9
it
is particularly asy for
the
Stoics to speak
loosely
-
as they often do
-
and identifythe
soul
with the
ruling part.
I
shall restrictmy use of soul o the notionof the soul's rulingaspect and
usually apply mind
or
mental to describe it.
Central o whether
the
Stoics
hold
that mental events
have content
is
their
view of
perception aisthesis). Ordinaryperceptual
vents have
two
conceptually
distinct
stages: phantasia
and
assent
(sunkatathesis).
Al-
thoughphantasia
is
often
translated
s
appearance,
he
term refers
to
a
basic, representational
ental
state,
which
includes
much more
thanvisual
appearances.'0
he
Stoic notion
of
phantasiaapplies
to other
mentalfunc-
tions
besides sense-perception.
or
instance,
the
hegemonikon
an
gener-
ate
non-perceptual hantasiai through
ts own
internal
operations
D.L.
7.
51). Something
more neutral
such
as
impression aptures
he
term's
wider
range.
tute orthodox
Stoicism. As
is well-known, later Stoics
such as Panaetius appear to
modify or reject several central
tenets of early Stoicism
about the soul.
I
Julia
Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy
of Mind, p. 54, points
out
that in
Stoic theory
some capacities of living
things such as
basic metabolism are not part
of the soul's
functions.
8 See
Calcidius
in
Tim. 220,
Aetius
4.
21. 1-3,
Plotinus
4.
7. 7.
See
Stobaeus
1. 368.
12-15,
Aetius
4. 23. 1.
10
It
is
helpful
to
survey the considerable
scholarship
about Aristotle's concep-
tion of phantasia. Two useful
sources are: Martha Nussbaum,
Aristotle's
De Motu
Animalium
(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1978),
pp. 221-269, for a general
discussion of Aristotleon phantasia, and Brad Inwood, Ethics and HumanAction in
Early Stoicism, for a
succinct account
of the general Aristotelian background
or the
Stoics, pp.
9-17.
Although
phantasia is,
of
course, legitimately
translated
as
appearance
ecause
it derives from the verb
to appear and
is
just
the
way
things appear
to one, this ren-
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CONTENT, AUSE,AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 5
The Stoics often describea phantasiaas a kind of imprint
tup6sis).'2
Although this imprint s something physical, the Stoics debated exactly
how one should construe t:
(1) We shall know this if we first learn what impression is, according to them, and
what its specific d1fferentiaeare. So, according to them, an impression is an
imprint
tuposis)
in
the
soul. And
they
differed
mmediately
aboutthis.
For
Cleanthes
took
imprint
in
terms of depression and
elevation
-
just
like the
imprint
on
wax
made by seal-rings. But Chrysippus thought that such
a view
was absurd. For
first, he says, this will require that when
our
intellect has impressions at one time
of
a
triangle
and
a
tetragon,
the
same
body
will
have to
have in itself
at
the same
time
different
shapes
-
triangular
and
tetragonal together,
or even
round;
which
is
absurd. Next,
since
many imprints
exist in us
at
the same
time the
soul will
also
have
many configurations.
This
is
worse than
the first
problem.
[Chrysippus]
himself speculated, therefore, that imprintwas used by Zeno to mean alteration;
so that the definition becomes like this: impression s
an
alterationof
the
soul ;
for it is no
longer
absurd that
the
same
body
at one
and
the same time
(when
many impressions
exist
in
us)
should
receive
many
alterations.
For
just
as
air,
when
many people speak at once, receiving at
one time
an indefinite number
of
different
blows,
also
has
many alterations,
so too
the
ruling part
of the
soul
will
experience something
similar
when
it receives varied
impressions.'3
[Sextus,
M
7. 227-231]
Both
Cleanthes
and
Chrysippus
hare
the view
thatan
impression
s
some-
thing physical, namely,
a modification
of
some
pneuma. They disagree
about
how
to
explain
this
physical change,
but
both
rule out
treating
dering might misleadingly suggest that it
primarily
involves
visual
images
and
the
sense-modality
of
sight. Michael
Frede, Stoics and Skeptics on
Clear
and
Distinct
Impressions, and
A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The
Hellenistic
Philosophers,
vol.
1,
employ impression. Various other attemptsto renderthe term include:Julia Annas,
Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind, and Richard Sorabji,
Perceptual Content in the
Stoics, use
appearance, Brad Inwood and L.P.
Gerson, Hellenistic
Philosophy:
Introductory
Readings (Indianapolis:Hackett
Publishing Co., 1988), presentation,
(which also has the virtue of
neutrality with respect to sense-modalities,
but doesn't
reflect the
definition of phantasia in
terms of tup6sis quite as well) and A.A.
Long,
Representation
and
the self
in
Stoicism, Companions
to
Ancient Thought2:
Psy-
chology
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991),
ed.
Stephen
Everson, pp.
102-120, uses representation.
A.A. Long, p. 107,
n.
6, changes
his
usage
from
his
earlier impression
o representation
ecause
he
worries
that
the Humean associa-
tions
of impression
might mislead.
12
See D.L. 7. 50, Sextus M 7. 227-231, 7. 372-373, Plut. Ad Col. 1122C, Comm.
not. 1084F.
1'
See
also
D.L.
7. 45-46,
50.
Unless
otherwise
indicated, translationsare based on
Brad Inwood and
L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy:
IntroductoryReadings, with
occasional
modifications.
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6
GLENN LESSES
impressionsolely as a kind of image.'4Furthermore, oth Cleanthesand
Chrysippus ttempt o explainphantasia in terms
of
the complexityof
its
physicalstructure.Chrysippus ejectswhat he takes to be Cleanthes'view
that
an
adequate explanation of
an
agent's impressions must attribute
the
same qualitative features
to the
impression
as to
that
which
they
represent.
'1
The second stage involved in perception proper is assent (sunkata-
thesis). For perception o
occur,
an agent must not only be presentedwith
an impression,he
or
she
also
mustassentto it.'6
In
rationalanimals,assent
to an impression s a voluntaryact.'7The Stoics often speakof sunkata-
14
For discussions of this passage in Sextus, see Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy
of Mind, pp. 72-75, Deborah Modrak, Stoics, Epicureans,
and
Mental Content,
p. 99, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The
Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 239, and
David Sedley, Chrysippuson psychophysical causality, pp. 329-330. According
to
Modrak, the passage suggests that Chrysippus does not accept that an impression is
an imprint. But the text indicates that the dispute between Chrysippusand Cleanthes
over
what
Zeno meant is instead
a
matterof interpreting he natureof a tuposis. Both
appear to accept that an impression is an imprint of some kind.
's Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 74-75, points out Sextus might
not do justice to the dispute. It is possible that Chrysippussimply attempted o develop
furtherwhat he held to be the same fundamentalview as Cleanthes' position.
However, Chrysippus appears to criticize Cleanthes for accepting a naive view of
mental representation hat implies that perceptual mpressions are copies of the quali-
ties
that
the objects representedhave. For instance, on Cleanthes' account of impres-
sion,
when
we
perceive
a
triangularobject
the
impression
that we
ordinarily
have
is
triangular.Some commentators have taken the remarks of Chrysippus to entail that
impressions are propositional n form or articulable n linguistic form. E.g., Annas, pp.
74-75, concludes
that
Chrysippus analyzed perception
in
terms
of the
reception
of
content and its articulation n linguistic form. This conclusion is too strong. All that
seems to follow is that
the impression conveys information.Whetherwhat is conveyed
requires propositional content
is
less
clear. Why
is
it necessary that our perceptual
impressions of, say, squareness or redness, involve the proposition that something is
red
or square? As it stands, all Chrysippus
has to
accept
is
that the
qualities
that
impressions have are not necessarily similar to the characteristicsof their causes.
16
See
D.L. 7.
49, Cicero
Acad.
1. 40,
2.
145,
Plut. Ad
Col. 1122B-C,
Stobaeus
1. 349. 23-27.
'7
The
nature
of assent
for
non-rationalanimals
is
a vexed and
complicated ques-
tion.
Brad
Inwood,
Ethics and Human Action
in
Early Stoicism, p. 72,
denies
that non-
rational animals can assent. Jean-Louis Labarriere, De la 'nature
phantastique'
des
animaux chez les Stoiciens, especially, pp. 243-249, argues that the Stoic position
is
that
animals
can
exhibit
a
type
of assent to
impressions.
See
also Julia
Annas,
Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 72-75, 89-102, Christopher Gill,
Is
there
a
concept
of
person
in
Greek philosophy?, pp. 185-186,
A.A.
Long
and
D.N.
Sedley,
The
Hellenistic
Philosophers,
vol.
1, p. 322,
A.A.
Long, Representation
nd
the
self
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8
GLENN
LESSES
What
is Frede's
mainevidence?
Text (2) leads
Frede
to hold that
any
impression
of
a
rational
being is
rational.
(2)
Of
impressions,
some
are
rational (logikai)
and some
are
non-rational
(alogoi).
The
rational are
those
of rational
animals,
the
non-rational
of non-rational.
The
rational,
then,
are thoughts
andthe
non-rational
have been
given no
special
name.
[D.L.
7.
51]
Because
the passage
identifiesrational
mpressions
with
thoughts,
he also
concludes hatonlyrationalmpressions ave propositionalontent.22 ther
texts also
sharply
distinguish
between
rationalimpressions
and impres-
sions
that are merely
perceptual:
(3)
Through
the senses
alone one is
not able
to
grasp
the
truth,
as
we
indicated
before23
and now
shall explain
briefly,
for
they [the
senses]
are
by
nature non-
rational,
and of
more than
being
impressed
by impressors
[i.e.,
the things
that
impress]
they are
not capable,
as
they are
completely
unsuitable
for discovering
the truth.
For
not only must
one
be
moved
to have
a sensation
of white
or sweet
for
one
to grasp
the truth
in the
underlying
things,
but one must
be brought
to
have an impressionof that thing that this is white and this is sweet. And so
the other like
things [i.e.,
the
other
senses].
But to grasp a thing
of
this kind
is
no
longer
the
work
of
perception.
For
color only
and taste and sound
is its
nature
to
grasp,
while
that this
is
white
or
this
is sweet, which
are neither
color
nor
taste,
is unsuspected
by
sense.24
Sextus M
7. 344-345]
Frede
identifies
the
results
of sense-perception
n this passage
with
what
are,
according
o (2),
non-rational
mpressions.
t follows
that
by
the
exer-
cise
of
sense-perception
lone
one
would
not be able
to
entertain mpres-
sions
with
propositional
ontent.
A statement
hat something
s
the case
this
point
is
generally
less
important
or
our
purposes,
it is worth
noting
that for
Frede
rational
impressions
can give rise
to distinct
thoughts
because otherwise
identical
im-
pressions
can be held
in different
manners.
Sameness
of content
does
not completely
determine
identity
of thoughts.
See also,
his The Stoic
doctrine of the
affections
of
the soul,
The Norms
of Nature:
Studies
in
Hellenistic
Ethics
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press,
1986), edd.
Malcolm
Schofield
and Gisela Striker, especially
pp.
103-107.
22 Michael
Frede, Stoics
and Skeptics
on Clear and Distinct Impressions,
p.
67:
Rational impressions
have
a propositional
content, they
are
impressions
to the
effect
that
something
is
the
case
very
much in the sense in which we might say ordinarily,
'the impression,
which one gets,
if one looks
at the evidence,
is
that..
Frede
also
appeals
to Galen Def.
med.
126 for
additional support.
23 See
Sextus
M
7.
293.
24
The translation
s mine.
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CONTENT, AUSE,
AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 9
is required or us to determineruthor falsity.But Fredetakes(3) to deny
that sense-perceptiontself
can
supply
the
requisitepropositional
orm. At
most, the senses
can tell
us
about
the
qualities
of
things
-
their
whiteness,
say,
or sweetness
- when we are
causally
affected
by
external
hings.
This
is all that a tuposis, the imprint,
can
convey
in such cases.
In another mportantpassage, Cicero appears
o confirmFrede's read-
ing and also
adds something:
(4) Those characteristicswhich belong to the things we
describe as
being grasped
by
the senses areequally characteristicof thatfurther et of things said to be grasped
not
by
the senses directly
but
by
them
in
a
certain respect, e.g.,
that is
white,
this is
sweet,
that
is
melodious,
this
is
fragrant,
his
is
bitter. Our
grasp
of these
is
secured by the
mind,
not
the
senses.
Next,
that
is
a
horse,
that is
a
dog.
The
rest
of
the series
then
follows, connecting bigger
items which
virtually
include
complete grasp
of
things,
like if it is a human
being,
it is a
mortal,
rational
ani-
mal. From this class
conceptions
of
things
are
imprinted
on
us,
without which
there
can
be
no
understanding
or discussion of
anything.25
Acad.
2.
21]
For Frede, (3) indicatesthat the senses by
themselves are unable to pro-
duce impressionscontaining any propositionalcontent. This task, ac-
cording
to
(4), requires
certainoperations
of
the
mind.
Thus, rationaland
non-rational animals differ
in
the sorts
of
impressions of
which
they
are
capable.
Frede
explains
the
capacity
of
rational
animals to entertain
rational impressions n terms
of
their ability to
form concepts. Lacking
any conceptualapparatus,
non-rational nimalscannot entertain mpres-
sions having propositional
orm.
In
the
Stoic
account of psychological
development,concepts (ennoiai) arise later
than perceptual mpressions
(Aetius
4. 11.
1-5).
The Stoics separate onceptual hinking rom the mere
occurrenceof perceptual tates.
Although Frede's formulationof the Stoic account
has considerable
plausibility,
Richard
Sorabjirejects
the orthodoxreading. He challenges
both the
philosophical
underpinnings
f Frede's
interpretation
s
well as
its
textual support.Let
us
first consider Sorabji's
objectionto a philo-
sophical argumentemployed
by Frede and next describe his own fresh
interpretiveproposal.
Sorabji
s
unimpressedby the theoreticalargument
that
concepts
are
necessary
or
propositionalhought.
It
is a
controversial
matter
or
many
contemporary hilosophers
f
mindwhether n every case
the employmentof concepts is requiredfor propositionalattribution.26
2'
This translation
basically follows A.A. Long and D.N.
Sedley,
The
Hellenistic
Philosophers.
26
See Richard
Sorabji, PerceptualContent
in
the
Stoics,
pp. 308-309,
Animal
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10
GLENN
LESSES
Some
argue that despite
the necessity of
concepts for
belief-attribution
there is no such
requirement or other sorts of
mental states.
Consider
a
typical
example:agents
can perceivea
structureas
ten-sidedwithout
having
a conceptof ten or
any otherrelevant
concepts.Perceptual on-
tent for
Sorabji
only demandsa sort of
predication i.e., one
thingbeing
another.27
lthough
his
conceptionof
propositional
ontentas predication
is
never fully explained, et
us defer our
discussionof it until
later.At this
point,
all we need to see is
Sorabji's
strategy for
underminingFrede's
argumentabout
concepts and propositional ontents.28
Sorabjialso addresses
Frede's textual
arguments.
First,Sorabjiargues
that it
is
consistentwith
text
(2)
that
non-rational
mpressions
have
prop-
ositional form.
Rational mpressions
can be
a subset of
impressions
hat
have
propositional ontent.29 he
passage
does
not
rule out that
other
m-
pressionsalso
have propositional ontent.
Sorabji
then
suggeststhat our
sources
give
us
reason
to
distinguish
between two
types
of
verbalizable
linguistic form
corresponding
o
impressions.Some
phantasiai
-
rational
impressions are
articulableby their
owners,
while
others
-
non-rational
impressions arearticulable
nly by
non-owners.
Although
ational
gents
can, in
principle,articulate he
content of
their rational
impressions,
n
contrast,
an
infant, say,
cannot verbalize the
content
of its
perceptual
impressions.30
Minds, p. 6, Intentionalityand Physiological Processes, pp. 200-210, and Animal
Minds and Human Morals, pp. 30-31.
He
refers
particularly
o
the work
of
Peacocke
and Evans who deny that concepts are required for propositional thought on every
occasion.
See
Gareth
Evans,
The
Varieties
of Reference (Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press, 1982), and Christopher
Peacocke, Analogue Content, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society (1986), supp. vol. 60, pp. 1-17.
27
Richard Sorabji, Perceptual
Content
in
the
Stoics, p. 307, Animal Minds
and
Human Morals, pp. 12, 21.
28
If the doctrine that content requires conceptual apparatus ails to be settled for
contemporaryphilosophy, then
Sorabji points
out
it
is
a mistake
to
regard it
as
incon-
trovertible for ancient authors.
In
any case,
how far can
Frede's objection
take us?
Although any interpretation
will be driven
by
a
principle
of
charity
to
attribute
as
plau-
sible an account as the evidence
allows,
it
is
always
worth
being reminded that
the
Stoics and other historical figures are
not
immune from adopting patently unjustified
positions. Hence, even
if
the
thesis that
concepts are required for propositionalcon-
tent turns out to be warranted, t still doesn't follow without considerable
additional
argument that the Stoics realized that it must be so.
29
Richard Sorabji, PerceptualContent
in
the
Stoics, p. 311,
Animal Minds and
Human Morals, p.
25.
1
For the moment,
let
it suffice
to
point
out
a more natural
reading
of
(2),
which
is
somewhat weaker
than
Frede's yet does
not
require
hat we endorse
Sorabji's strategy.
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CONTENT,
CAUSE,
AND
STOIC IMPRESSIONS
11
Accordingto Sorabji,manyof Frede'sotherimportant ourcesshould
also be read
differently.
Sorabji
tentativelysuggests
that
text
(3), Sextus
M 7.
344-345, does
not reflect
genuineStoic
doctrine.3'But
even suppos-
ing the
passage is orthodox
Stoicism,
Sorabjiargues
that it together
with
(4), Cicero Acad. 2.
21, entail that
perceptual
mpressionshave content.
For,
he
argues,
if
it is true that the senses can
only
perceive
in a
way,
say,
that
something s white, then such
impressions n a
way
have
some
propositional content.
Accordingly, a
perceptual
impression
must be
as of
something's
being white
rather than an
impression
simply of
whiteness.32
On
Sorabji's
account,
the
impressionsof,
say,
a
newbornor a cat do
have
propositional ontent
n
the sense that their
impressions
presentone
thing
to be
predicated
f
another.Our sources also
only speak
of
impres-
sions as
verbalizable,
not
actually
verbalized.33 o be
sure,
non-rational
animalscannotarticulate r
conceptualize
what
they perceive.
But,Sorabji
argues,
it doesn't follow that non-rational
animals cannot have
impres-
sions with content
solely
because their
impressions
are not
verbaliz-
able
by them.
It suffices for the attribution f
propositional ontent that
the verbalizablempressionsof non-rational nimalscan be articulated y
other animals that are
rational
namely,
US.34
He
concludes that animals
cannot articulate he content of
the
impressions
hat arise in
perception
and
in
other mental
functioning,
but their
impressions
have
articulable
content.35
The
passage only
establishes that not all
impressions are
to be identifiedwith
thoughts
or beliefs.
Rational
animals alone can
have
impressions
of the latter
sort,
but
the pas-
sage
simply
leaves
open whether the attributionof content
requires
that
impressions
are
thoughts.
31
Though most
commentatorsaccept
that
Sextus is describing a
Stoic position
here,
it is
difficult to determine
whether in this text
Sextus
refers to Stoic doctrine
because
there is no
explicit
attributionof
the view to a
particular
dogmatic
school.
Richard
Sorabji, Perceptual
Content in the
Stoics, pp.
311-312,
presents
no
argument
that it
cannot be a reference to
Stoicism. But
it is also not obvious that
Frede's inference
about the
passage
follows. The fact that
the senses can
only
grasp
color, flavor, and
sound
doesn't tell us
exactly what is
entailed
by such grasping.
32
Richard Sorabji,
Perceptual
Content
in
the
Stoics, p. 311.
33
See D.L.
7.
49, Aetius 4. 12.
1,
Sextus M 7.
244,
M
8. 70.
3
RichardSorabji,
Perceptual
Content in the
Stoics, p.
311, Animal
Minds and
Human
Morals, pp. 22-23.
3S
In supportof
his
interpretation,
Sorabji also appeals to
additionalsources,
which
our sketch of
his
position
can
only survey in
passing.
For
instance,
he refers to
Chrysippus'
well-known
example
of
the
dog
engaging
in
something analogous
to the
application
of
disjunctive
syllogism
(Sextus,
PH 1.
69).
Chrysippus
explicitly states
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12
GLENN LESSES
Despite the considerableorce andeleganceof Sorabji's nterpretation,
we shouldhave reservations
bout t as well. Firstof all, obviously
much
dependson
an assumptionhat
underlies is
reading
f the Stoics.He accepts
the
principle
hat we oughtto ascribe
intentionality
o the
impressions
of
non-rational nimals
f
rational
animalscan articulate heircontent.In this
respect,
Sorabjiacknowledges hat
he is
following
Dennett.36Of
course,
one could have reasonabledoubts about
the success of Dennett's instru-
mentalism or the attribution
f propositional
ttitudes.37 et, regardless
of whetherwe find Dennett's
position plausible,
t has a certain lack of
fit with Stoic theory. Dennettis an anti-realistabout propositionalatti-
tudes.38On his view, we ought
to
acceptexplanations
of humanbehavior
that employ beliefs and desires
solely
because of their usefulness.
But,
although
his
metaphysical
ssue
will
not be discussed
ully
here, t is clear
that
the
Stoics
really
admit desires and beliefs into their
ontology. They
are robustrealists about propositional ttitudes.
Impulsesand perception
that the mental
activity
of the dog is only
in effect or
passes for (dunamei)
reasoning.
The Stoics deny that
a dog can have beliefs,
so it must grasp through perception that
one
or
more
of
the
paths ahead of
it does not have
any
scent.
Sorabji
also refers to
passages from Hierocles,
Seneca, and Chrysippusin which these authors
discuss the
early stages of an animal's
life. Self-awareness is necessary for self-preservation,
an
impulse which the Stoics
claim all animal life possesses from the very
start. The Stoic
analysis
of self-awareness requires that animals
are aware that they
have
particular
body parts, that their prey have weaknesses, and so forth. In PerceptualContent in
the Stoics, p. 312,
he holds that such instances of self-awareness can
only be under-
stood
by attributing
propositional attitudes.
In
addition,
he cites
passages
in Plutarch
and Sextus
(Plut. On
the E at Delphi 386F-387A,
Sextus M 8. 276) in which rational
and
non-rational
animals
are
distinguished
in terms of whether
they
are capable of
inferential
reasoning.
Sorabji says that only rational animals
can
draw
inferences.
Althoughthe Stoics are silent in these sources about the nature of animal perceptual
impressions,
the texts suggest to Sorabji that
the difference between rational and
non-rationalanimals has little to do with whether
or not their impressionshave propo-
sitional form. Consequently, these other sources
also lead Sorabji
to
deny
that non-
rational animals are only capable of impressions
completely devoid
of propositional
contents.
`6
See Richard Sorabji, Perceptual
Content in the
Stoics, p. 314, Intentionality
and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory
of
Sense-Perception,
p. 206,
and
Animal Minds and Human Morals, p. 28. He cites,
in
particular,D. Dennett,
Condi-
tions of
Personhood,
n A.
Rorty, ed.,
The
Identities
of
Persons
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press),
pp.
175-196.
37
E.g., see Jeriy A. Fodor, Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation:The Intel-
ligent
Auntie's
Vade-Mecum,
A
Theory of
Content
and Other
Essays (Cambridge,
Massachusetts:The
MIT
Press, 1992), pp.
6-8.
38
See
Jerry
Fodor,
Fodor's Guide to Mental
Representation:
The
Intelligent
Auntie's
Vade-Mecum, p.
7.
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CONTENT, CAUSE,
AND STOIC IMPRESSIONS
13
are whatdistinguishanimallife from otherkindsof living things.39When
they
speak
more
precisely,
the Stoics restrictdesire
(orexis),
which
they
define as a kind of
impulse
that
requires
belief,
to
rational
beings, though
some animal
impulses
can be
relatively
similar in
nature to human
desires.' In
any case,
impulses, desires, and beliefs are identifiedwith
movementsof the
soul. Thus, the Stoics take such
psychological
statesto
be instancesof
actuallyexisting physicalstates.
Sorabji tells us
very
little about his
predicationalnotion of
proposi-
tional
contents.His position
appears
o come
to this:there s a
weak sense
of propositional which means only that one thing is connected with
another.4'Animals have
impressions
hat a
is
related to b. On his
view,
we should
attribute
propositionalcontents to the
mental states of non-
rational
animals
because their
impressionscontain the
propositionthat
one
thing
is
predicatedof another.
Sorabji
commits himself to
nothing
more
than the
position that propositions
are what that-clauses
ntroduce.
As we
already
saw,
the orthodox
nterpretation
hares this core analysis
of
propositions.Sorabji also adds a
distinction
between
perceiving-that
and
perceiving-as.42
ccordingly,
one
might
hold
that animals can
per-
ceive, say, somethingas sweet even if one denies thatthey can perceive
that
something s sweet. If
we argue thatthe
impression hat
gives rise to
the
latter sort of perception
corresponds o lekta,
then non-rationalani-
mals cannot
entertain t.
However, it is unclear
what importanceSorabji
places
on this
distinction ince he
concedes that
neitherwe nor the Stoics
neatlydistinguish
n
this
way
between
as and that.43
A
more importantproblem
s that
Sorabji'sattribution f
propositional
contents s far from
restrictive.To
say
that
non-animalsperceive that a is
related o b or that
a is
predicated
f b is
to attribute hugeclass of what
the
Stoics must hold are
impressionsexpressing ekta. If the Stoics
deny
that animals can
entertain he
impressionthat
something
is
white,
it is
hardto see
why they
would
attribute
predicationalmental
contents o ani-
mals or what real
theoretical
advantage
ollows. On what basis is it rea-
39 D.L. 7.
86.
4 Stobaeus 2.
86.
17
-
87. 6. For a
discussion of
Stoic distinctions
among
kinds
of
impulses, see
Brad
Inwood, Ethics
and Human
Action in Early
Stoicism, pp. 224-
242. See also
Julia
Annas,
Hellenistic
Philosophy of
Mind,
pp. 89-102.
41 Richard
Sorabji,
Perceptual
Content
in
the Stoics, p.
307,
Animal
Minds
and
HumanMorals, pp. 12, 17, 21.
42
See Richard
Sorabji,
Perceptual
Content
in the Stoics,
p. 309,
Animal
Minds
and
HumanMorals,
pp. 21-22.
41
Richard
Sorabji,
Animal Minds
and
Human
Morals, p.
22.
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14
GLENN
LESSES
sonable to acceptthat animalscan have, for example,impressions hata
white
thingis to the
left of a blue
thing,
yet not
attribute
o themthe im-
pression
that something
s white?
Frede and other
proponents
of ortho-
doxy are
right to deny
that the Stoics would accept
so generous
a view
since
impressions
with predicational
ontents
also correspondo lekta
and
as such are accessible
only
to rationalanimals.
Finally, there
are also textual
reasonsto
be wary of Sorabji's
reading.
The sources to
which he
appealsoften
might reasonably
be read more
weakly. In particular,
cannot
findany passage
thatsupports
his
position
thatthe contentof the impressionsof non-rational nimalscan, in princi-
ple,
be articulated y
rationalanimals.
For instance,
D.L.
7. 49, one pas-
sage
on which
he
places
much importance,
distinguishes
between
two
mental operations:
i) the
occasion of having
an impression
and (ii) for-
mulating
n wordshow one
is affected hrough
having
it. The text is silent
aboutrational
animalshaving
the
capacity
to verbalize he
impressions
f
non-rational
nes. It is possible
to read
t simply as
asserting hatthe
agent
in
whom the
impression ccurs
has the
abilityto express
ts content.
More-
over,
some
passages
weigh against
Sorabji'spoint.
Consider
part
of Aetius
4. 12. 1, which statesof an impression: [giventhrough ight]we are able
to
say (eipein
ekhomen)
hat
thereexists something
white which moves
us
(hemas);
similarly
or touch or
smell. 44
In this
passage,
an
impression
s
linked to what the
agents
themselves
presented
with an
impression
are
capable
of
verbalizing.
ts contentscan
be
expressedby
the
same
subjects
in whom it occurs. Although
such
passagesindeed
show that the Stoics
distinguish
between what can
potentially
be
expressed
and what actually
is
verbalized,
no mention
s made of one
person's
mpression
being
artic-
ulableby anotheror
of an animal's
perceptual
mpression
being
verbaliz-
able by us. A morenaturaland straightforwardeading hanSorabji's s
availableto us. The Stoicsdo distinguish
betweenwhat
is articulable nd
what actually is articulated.
However,
this point applies
only
to rational
agents
presented
with
an impression.
Although
rational
agents
normally
can
express
the contentof some
of their
impressions,
hey
do not
always
actually
articulate
what these
impressions
convey.
In other
words,
the
Stoics
are sensitive to the difference
between
occurrent
verbalization
nd
I
Aetius
4.
12.
1
is part
of text (5) below.
See RichardSorabji, Perceptual
Content
in the Stoics,
p. 309,
for
his additional
citations.
Sextus M 7.
244 says
of certain
impressions
that it
is
possible
to make
a true
or false assertion
as a result
(the
true,
persuasive
ones, a true assertion,
the
false
persuasive ones,
a false
one).
Sextus
M
8. 70 similarly
says of rational
impressions
that
their content
can be expressed
in
words. See
also
Sextus M
8. 10, D.L. 7.
65, Sextus
M 9.
211.
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CONTENT, CAUSE, AND STOIC
IMPRESSIONS 15
an agent's ability to verbalize.Thus,it is consistentwiththe evidencethat
the Stoics are making
a much
more
obvious
point
in
these passages
than
Sorabjisuggests.
III
The Stoics investigate the initial stages of animaldevelopment n terms
of their
doctrine
of oikeiosis.
In
the
process
that they describe, animals
come to have inclinations o act and
become
aware
of
themselves.45
ni-
mal life is distinguished rom other kinds of living and non-living things
in virtue
of
having impulses(hormai)
and
perception
aisthesis).4
For the
Stoics, perception
s
prior o impulsebecause
animals
must
perceive
hem-
selves
in order
for impulses to occur.47 Such impulses arise as a result
of
impressionswith which animals are presented.48 nimals
perceive them-
selves (aisthanesthai heautou, Hierocles 1, 34-9, 51-7) continuously from
birth (Hierocles
1.
37-50, 3. 52-4. 53, 4. 53-4. 58). Chrysippus states that
an
animal's initial inclination s based on the first
thing for every animal
belonging
to
it
-
its own
constitution sustasis) andthe self-consciousness
(suneidesis) of this (D.L. 7. 85).49 If self-perception
s a species of per-
ception,
then
self-perception
lso
requires he occurrenceof phantasiai.S0
D.L. 7. 85, Cicero Fin. 3.
16.
See Hierocles
1. 30-37, especially, and D.L. 7. 86. Hierocles'
arguments
are
dis-
cussed in Brad
Inwood,
Hierocles:
Theory
and
Argument
in the Second
Century
A.D.,
OxfordStudies in Ancient
Philosophy
2
(1984),
pp. 151-183, and
in A.A.
Long,
Hierocles on
oikeiosis and
self-perception,
Hellenistic
Philosophy,
vol.
1,
ed.
K.J.
Boudouris (International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, Athens, 1994),
pp. 93-104.
Long's essay is a
summary of more extended discussion
in
the
edition
of
Hierocles that he together with
Guido Bastianini have completed for the
series
Corpus
dei
Papiri
Filosofici
Greci
e
Latini (CPF) I, vol. 1**
(Florence, 1992).
47
See
Cicero
fin.
3.
16, Seneca Ep. 121. Cicero
actually
refers
to the
desires of
infants
ratherthan
their
impulses. When the Stoics speak
precisely, they typically dis-
tinguish desire
(orexis)
from
impulse
(horme)
and
deny that non-rational animals
including
human young can have
desire, which is a species of
impulse. Stobaeus
2. 86. 20
-
87.
6 indicates
that
orexis is
a kind of rational impulse.
See Brad
Inwood,
Ethics and
Human
Action
in
Early
Stoicism, pp. 225-230, 235-237,
A.A. Long
and
D.N. Sedley, The
Hellenistic
Philosophers, vol. I1, p. 318, note on
Stobaeus 2. 86.
17
-
87. 6, and Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 91-97.
48
See
Stobaeus
2.
86.
20
-
87.
6,
Origen, Prin.
3. 1. 2-3.
4
He
refers to self-consciousness
in
this
passage,
not
self-perception.
We
have no
sources
of
which
I am
aware where
Chrysippus speaks
explicitly
of
self-perception.
`0
One
way to understand he
continuous
self-perception
to
which
the Stoics
refer
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16
GLENN
LESSES
What s thenatureof the initial mpressions f self-perception? nswer-
ing this
questionwill help determine he extent of the Stoic
attribution f
propositional
ontents.Since theseimpressionsoccur from the
momentof
birth, the
initial
impressionscannot be the
result
of
repeatedexperience.
Stoic
examplesof self-perception ftenrefer to specific animal
body parts
and functions.For
instance,
snails
perceive heir
flesh
and shells
and birds
perceive
their
wings
are
for
flying.5'Self-perception ometimes
s
said
to
involve
perceiving hat something
s
the case but since such
descriptions
are
far
from
typical
we
should exercise caution about
drawing
oo
much
from this evidence.52 he Stoics often seem to be searching or a way of
speakingthat
is less cognitively loadedand appear o
be
reluctant
o
at-
tribute oo muchcognitionto animals and human nfants.53n
any event,
these kinds of
examples
such
as
the bull
perceiving
hat
its
hornsare
for
self-defense
-
appeal
to
later
stages
of
oikeiosis.
But
self-perception
also occurs
during
the
initial
stages
of oikei6sis.
What about
the
original mpressions
hat
arise
in
self-perception
n
the
is that
animals have a steady disposition
to perceive
themselves. It is also
possible
that they
intend to make the stronger
claim that
animals are continuously
perceiving
themselves
occurrently.A.A. Long,
Hierocles
on
oikeiosis
and self-perception,
pp.
93-104, proposes an account
along
these lines of continuous
self-perception n terms
of proprioception,
.e., the notion of
self-monitoring.
51
See Hierocles 1.
51-2. 3, Seneca Ep. 121.
18-20.
52
See
Hierocles 3.
2-6
and Seneca Ep.
121.
21.
S3
For instance, Seneca, in a remark
reminiscent
of Chrysippus, ays that
every ani-
mal is aware
of its constitution or
physical makeup from birth
(Ep. 121. 5-6). Their
awareness
is
the developmental basis
for the other things that
they perceive
(Ep. 121.
12). But he also thinksthat it is a mistaketo take animals or humanyoung to be capa-
ble of explaining their makeup
or defining theirconstitution Ep.
121. 11-13).
Although
non-rational animals are
aware of their ruling part,
they cannot elucidate
or express
what it is (Ep. 121. 13).
Seneca makes
an
analogy
(Ep. 121.
12) between the aware-
ness that adult humans
have
of
their
souls and the awareness of non-rational
animals
of
their
constitution.
Though
we
perceive
our souls, this awarenessdoes not entail
that
we know the soul's nature
or even
its location. Similarly,
when non-rationalanimals
perceive themselves,
the impressions
that occur do
not
include enough information
to define what they perceive
or to
say anything clearly about
it. See also Seneca
Ira
1. 3.
7.
RichardSorabji, Perceptual
Content
in
the
Stoics, p. 312, is,
of
course,
cor-
rect
that
these texts
and similar ones where
the Stoics speak of the vagueness
or
lack
of clarity of the perception of non-rationalanimals underdeterminewhethertheir im-
pressions
are propositional.My point
here
is
simply
that Seneca
marks non-rational
animal perceptual mpressions
as somewhat weaker
than
the
perceptual mpressions
of
rational animals. Though Seneca
does not
say
exactly
what
is
ruled
out,
he
places
restrictions
on what
the initial
impressions
of
self-perception
can
contain.
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CONTENT, AUSE,
AND STOIC MPRESSIONS 17
initial stages of oikei6sis? In the following passage, the Stoics refer to
basic sense impressions:
(5) Chrysippus says
that
these four
things
differ from each other.
Impression, then,
is an experience
(pathos)
which occurs in the soul and
which,
in
[the
pathos]
itself, also indicates that which caused it.
For
example,
when
we observe
some-
thing
white
by means
of
vision,
there is a
pathos
which has occurred n the
soul
by
means
of
vision;
and
this
pathos
we are able to
say
there
exists
something
white which
stimulates
us.
And
similarly
for touch and smell.
Impres-
sion
(phantasia) gets
its
name
from
light (ph6s);
for
just
as
light
reveals itself
and the other thingswhich are encompassedin it, so too impressionreveals itself
and that
which
caused
it. The
impressed thing
is
that which causes the
impres-
sion. For example, the impressed thing is
the white and the cold
and everything
which
is able
to
stimulate the soul. [Aetius
4.
12. 1-3]
In
conjunction
with
(5), consider also another
similar
text,
which
further
helps us to understand nd explain differences
n
mental content:54
(6)
And this
pathos
must
be indicative both of
itself
and of
the
phenomenon
which
produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that
an impressionis a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the
other
thing [i.e.,
its
cause]. For example, Antiochus says,
when we look
at some-
thing
we are
put
into a certain
condition
with
respect
to
sight and
we do
not have
our
sight
in
the
same
condition
as
before
we
looked.
In
this
sort of
alteration,
we
take hold
of
(antilambanometha) wo things, one, the alteration tself, which
is the
impression, and,
the
second,
that which
produced
the
alteration, which
is
the visible thing. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So, just as light
(phos)
reveals
both
itself and
everything
in
it, in
this
way the impression too,
which is the beginning of the animal's cognitive functions, like light, must make
apparentboth
itself
and the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it.
[Sextus,
M
7.
161-163]
Neither
of
these passagesprimarily oncerns he kinds of examplesof self-
perceptionprovidedby Hierocles such as the bull's awarenessof its own
horns
for
self-defense.The accountshere are general descriptionsof any
impressionof sense. In addition, ext (6) speaks of the impressionsas the
source of
any cognition,
which
strongly suggests that these descriptions
pertain
o
the
earliest
stages
of
oikeiosis.
First,
a
preliminaryquestion must be addressed. Do these passages
apply
to
both non-rational
nd rationalanimals?55 here is no reason to
I
The
language of (6) is so similar to
(5) that we should suppose that
Antiochus is
speaking
in
his
Stoicizing mode and that
the passage genuinely reflects Stoic
doctrine.
S5 This question is raised
by
Jean-Louis
Labarrire, De la 'nature
phantastique'
des
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18 GLENN LESSES
think that these texts are restricted o a discussionof the beginningsof
cognition n rationalanimals. 5) speaksgenerallyof the
notionof impres-
sion and gives an account of its etymology. If these
sources mean to
include the impressionsof human newborns, hen they
are likely also to
refer to the impressionsof any non-rational nimal.
Furthermore,ext (6)
refers
very
broadly o the impressionsof an animal (to
z6on). Even more
significant s that in (6) we discoverthat impressionsare related to the
beginnings
of
an animal's cognitive functions. Thus, we should con-
clude that our sourceshere describe heoretical eatures
haredby impres-
sions generally.
An examinationof these generalfeaturesproduces
a relativelycircum-
scribed
notion of propositionalcontents.
First
of all,
we are told that
impressions
of
this sort
reveal
their causes.
The
Stoics
do not say that an
impressionhas featureswhich copy the characteristics
f its cause.As an
example, sight
is
said
to
perceive
the
white,
which
is
identified
as
the
cause of the
impression.
There
is
no
indication hat
the
perception
of
the
white includes the impression hat something
s
white. According o (5),
the white,the cause of
the
impression,
s
the
impressedhing (phantaston)
and is indicated n the impressiontself. Recall thatin text (4) Cicerodis-
tinguishes between what
the
senses perceive
-
whiteness
-
and
what
is
actuallyperceivedby
the
mind,
not the senses
-
the
proposition
hat
some-
thing
is white. There
are
puzzles
about this
passage
to which we
will
return hortly,but
for
the
moment
at least it
is
reasonable
o
suggest
that
the
sense-impression
as
the
impressed hing, viz.,
the
white,
as
part
of its
contents
but does
not
have the
proposition
hat
something
s white as
part.
Passages (5) and (6) also stipulate
hat a
sensory mpression
s
capable
of
conveying
some
additionalcontent
for
we
are told
that
the
sense
impres-
sion reveals itself. Thus, provisionallywe can say thatsense impression
of
white
includes
the
following
contents:
(i)
the
white,
which
indicates
the cause
of
the
impression,
and
(ii)
the
occurrent
mpression i.e.,
of
the
white) itself. At this point,we do
not
have
to
commit ourselves
to
speci-
fying
that
these mental contents
are
propositional
n
form. But it
is
clear
that
the
proposition
hat
something
s
white
goes beyond
the
ascription
f
these
modest
contents.
According o (5), the impression
of
white
is
then
the basis
of
our
say-
ing that there xists something
white.
The
Stoics
are cautious
here
about
animaux
chez les Stoiciens,
pp. 238-243,
though in
the context of whether
animals
have any
self-consciousness.
As
a result, he
never directly
poses the question
about
the cases
of
self-perception
on
which
we
focus.
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CONTENT, CAUSE,
AND
STOIC
IMPRESSIONS
19
the source of thatpropositionalnformation. s the propositionhatsome-
thing white
exists
alreadycontained
n
the impression?
f it
is, then
it
is
tempting o conclude
that
non-rational
minds
are
incapableof discerning
all the contents already contained
in
the impression.
But
an alternative
reading
is also
possible.
It must
be
conceded that
the
evidence underde-
termineseither interpretation, owever, the second reading
is
preferable
for
the
sake
of
consistency
with
our
earlier
analysis
of
(5)
and
(6).
These
sources
are
fairly specific
about
what
narrowcontentsare contained
gen-
erally
in
impressions.
n
addition,
4) tells
us
that rationalanimals bring
other mentaloperations nto play which affect their impressions.On the
preferredreading, a
rational mind
contributes
some
new
information,
which expresses
the
proposition
hat something s white, to the contents
of
the
originalsense-impression.56 propositional
mental
state
of
this
sort
might
well
be broadlydescribedas inferential.
A
rationalanimal
is
capa-
ble
of
inferring hat, e.g.,
if
a
white
thing
causes
my impression,
hen
it
is
the case that something
s
white.For the Stoics, any inferenceabout
the
cause
of
the impressionof whiteness
requiresan ability of which non-
rationalminds are incapable.
Even in the well-knownChrysippeanxam-
ple, the dog employing disjunctive syllogism is only said to simulate
reasoning.57One might plausibly
hold that inferential
reasoning,
how-
ever minimaland
automatic
he
inference,
requires
other
operations
of
the
mind besides perception.
Let
us
return o
text (4),
which
makes
some
distinction
about
content.58
The
senses are said
to
perceive
hings such as whiteness.Yet, Ciceroholds
that
the
senses
perceive only
in
a
way propositional laims
such
as that
something
s
white.
It is
not
altogetherobvious
how
to
unpack
this pas-
sage.59
f
we
read Cicero
rather
iterally here,
he
distinguishes
between
56
Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind,
pp. 82-84, discusses
a
parallel set
of interpretations or
kataleptic vs. non-kataleptic mpressions in rational animals.
S7
Sextus,
PH
1.
69
states
that
the
dog
in
effect
(dunamei)
is
reasoning.
Richard
Sorabji, Perceptual
Content in the
Stoics, p. 313,
takes this instance of
simulated
reasoning
to
be more
or
less a legitimate case of
reasoning.
58
I
am making a weaker point here than Frede, who
argues that
text
(4)
rules
out
the possibility of
non-rational mpressions having
content at
all.
59
We saw that
the passage, according to Sorabji,
PerceptualContent
in
the Stoics,
p. 311, commits
the Stoics to impressions having propositional form. He proposes
that
if
the senses
can
perceive in a way that
something
is
the
case
then
in a
way
such impressions can
have propositional form. He states that to be propositional n
a
way
when
the senses perceive that, say, this is
white
can
be understood as the
senses
present
a
non-verbalized appearanceas of
something's being
white.
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20 GLENN LESSES
what the senses can perceiveonly in a way and what the mind- here,
referring to mental operations
in the hegemonikonother than
sense-
perception
perceives fully. Perception nvolves
assent so that in each
instance the
mind assents to what is presented.
On the orthodox view,
thereis simplyless
to
assent
to in the case of what is presented
only to
the senses.
There also appears o be a reading
consistentwith
Sorabji's
interpretation
f
what the mind contributes s an
articulation f the con-
tent that is already present
in the original impressionof sense.
Let me
suggesta thirdpossibility.If animal
minds areincapableof making
nfer-
ences fromwhat they do in fact perceive,thenCicero'sremarks hat the
mind
alone securesthat, say,
this
is white
appliesonly
to
rational
animals.
The senses of
rationalanimalsalone can grasp
in a way that something
is
white because
they alone can draw inferences
based on their
sensa-
tions.
Frede's orthodox
interpretation
s mistakenin
supposing
that
(4)
supports
he view that animals
perceivesonly qualities.
Sorabji'salterna-
tive is also incorrectbecause
non-rational
mpressions
are not the
issue
here.
The context
of
Acad.
2.
21
shows that
the
impressions
being con-
sidered
are
only those
of rational
animals. So Cicero's
discussion
applies
only to impressionsof rationalanimalsand has little to do with impres-
sions
of
sense
generally.Y0
In
texts (5)
and (6), we saw that the impressions
of
sense are
said to
reveal their causes.
In
the case of an impression
of
whiteness,
the cause
of
the impression
s
the
white,
which
is
the impressed hing (phantaston).
Thepassagesspeak
of
thewhite
to leukon)
or the
visible
(to horaton),
which could
refer,
of course,
either to the quality
of an object
or
to an
object
itself.
But
we do not need
to commitourselves to
either
alterna-
tive and so
will speakjust of qualities n
what follows. Additionally,
he
claim that the impression'scause, the white, is revealedmightbe taken
in two
ways.
First,
one
might hold
that
the
impression
reveals some-
thing, which,
as
it
happens,caused
it. In the case
of the
impression
of
a
white thing,what gets revealed
s just whiteness.
If
all
the
Stoics
mean
is
that
the perceiver
sees
whiteness,
then
nothing
more
is
contained
n
the
impression
han the rudimentary
erceptionof a quality, whiteness.
This
readingof the texts is consistent
with the orthodox interpretation.
ut,
according o
a
second possibleinterpretation,
hat
gets
revealed
when an
impression
eveals
its
cause
is
considerably
more content-laden.
he
white
is revealedas the cause of the impression.So, when these passage