MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME130Docket: Cum-18-447Argued: May16,2019Decided: August8,2019Revised: September20,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

LESLIES.FISSMERetal.v.

DAVIDD.SMITHetal.GORMAN,J.

[¶1]DavidD.Smith,CunnerLane,LLC,(collectively,Smith)andCunner

LaneII,LLC,(CunnerLaneII)appealfromajudgmententeredbytheSuperior

Court(CumberlandCounty,L.Walker,J.)afterajury-waivedtrialonavariety

of claims and counterclaims concerning the use and ownership of certain

property in Cape Elizabeth. Leslie S. Fissmer,1 KarenA.B. Burke,WilliamA.

Burke,PatriciaM.Gramse,RichardR. Gramse (collectively, theCunner Lane

Owners), and Robert E. Siegel cross-appeal from the same judgment with

regard to the court’s determination declaring Cunner Lane II the owner of

1IndividuallyandastrusteeoftheLeslieS.FissmerRevocableTrust.AlthoughtheTrustowns

thepropertyatissueinthisappeal,andalthoughbothFissmerandtheTrustarepartiestotheappeal,wewillrefertothesepartiescollectivelyas“Fissmer.”

2

certainpropertyasshownona1929subdivisionplan.Weaffirmthejudgment

inpartandvacateinpart.Inaddition,becauseajudgmentdeclaringownership

by adverse possession must clearly describe the boundary lines of the

adverselypossessedpropertysoastosufficientlyestablishthoselinesonthe

faceoftheearth,weremandforfurtherproceedings.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]ThepartiestothisappealareneighborsinCapeElizabethwithland

abutting Cunner Lane,2 a paved private road that provides access to the

neighborhood. AnearlierdisputebetweenSmithandFissmerarosein2015

whenSmithattemptedtobuildahouseonhisproperty.SeegenerallyFissmer

v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2017 ME 195, 170 A.3d 797. That dispute was

resolved in 2017 but, in August of 2016,while itwas still pending, Fissmer

initiated an action against Smith in the Superior Court, seeking, inter alia, a

declaratoryjudgmentthatFissmerholdstitlebyadversepossessiontoportions

ofSmith’sproperty.3InNovemberof2016,Fissmer’sneighbors—theGramses,

2 Siegel’spropertydoesnotdirectlyabutCunnerLane,but itcanbeaccessedonlybywayof

CunnerLane.Siegel,intheend,gainsnothingfromthislitigation,seeinfra¶33,andthus,althoughheisapartytotheappeal,wedonotconsiderhimtobeoneoftheCunnerLaneOwners.

3 Thedisputedpropertyconcernspartsoftwoparcels:oneownedbySmithandtheotherbyCunnerLane,LLC. Smith is themanagingmemberofCunnerLane,LLC,aMaine limited liabilitycompany.

3

the Burkes, and Siegel—joined her complaint as plaintiffs. Smith

counterclaimed,seeking,interalia,adeclaratoryjudgmentastothelocationof

CunnerLane.

[¶3] In September of 2017, Cunner Lane II, a Maine limited liability

companywhollyownedbySmith,filedaseparatecomplaintagainsttheCunner

LaneOwnersandSiegel,seekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthatitownedprivate

roadsintheneighborhood—CunnerLane,BrookRoad,andSunriseDrive—as

well as certain five-foot-wide strips of land that run alongside segments of

thoseroads.TheCunnerLaneOwnersandSiegelthenfiledacomplaintagainst

CunnerLaneII,seekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthattheyholdtitlebyadverse

possession to certain property allegedly owned by Cunner Lane II. In

Novemberof2017,thecourtconsolidatedthethreeactions.

[¶4] Aftera jury-waivedtrial, thecourtconsideredtheparties’claims,

includingtheirassertionsoftitleacquiredthroughthePaperStreetsAct(PSA),

23M.R.S. §§3027, 3031-3035 (2018); 33M.R.S. §§ 460, 469-A (2018), and

adversepossession. In its judgment datedOctober11,2018, the trial court

madethefactualfindingsreferredtointhisopinion,allofwhicharesupported

bycompetentrecordevidence.SeeDupuisv.Ellingwood,2017ME132,¶3,166

A.3d112.Asweexplaininthediscussionsectionbelow,thecourt,however,

4

madesomeerrors in itsapplicationofthePSAtothesefacts,andbecauseof

this,additionallitigationmayberequired.Seeinfra¶¶22-38.Inaddition,the

judgmentcontainsnolegaldescriptionsoftheboundariesitestablished.

A. FactsRelevanttothePaperStreetsAct

[¶5]CunnerLane,asitnowexists,islocatedbetweenSmith’slotandthe

CunnerLaneOwners’lots.A1929subdivisionplan(the1929Plan),createdfor

andshowingthepropertyoftheHarryE.BakerCompany(HEB),designateda

twenty-foot-wide corridor as “Cunner Lane.” Provided here for illustrative

purposesonly,Figure1belowdepictstherelevantfeaturesofthe1929Plan.

5

Figure1.BrookRoadandSunriseDriveappearbutareunnamedontheoriginal1929Plan.Thenamesareaddedhereforeaseofreference.BrookRoadandSunriseDriverungenerallyeasttowest.

6

TheCunnerLaneOwners’originallotsarealllocatedwithintheboundariesof

thesubdivisioncontemplatedby the1929Plan.4 Smith’sproperty, although

shownonthe1929Plan,isnotapartofthecontemplatedsubdivision.

[¶6]Additionally,the1929Plandepicted,butdidnotname,portionsof

twoproposedroads—alsotwentyfeetwide—turningoffofCunnerLane.The

proposedroadbetweenLot1andLilyPondLotonthe1929Planencompasses

whatisnowaprivateroadknownasBrookRoad.Theproposedroadabutting

Lot14tothesouthisnowbrushandagrassfootpath,butthepartiesreferto

itasSunriseDrive,asdowe.

1. TheFissmerLot

[¶7]Fissmer’slotisthesouthernmostoftheCunnerLaneOwners’lots

andisdesignatedasLot14onthe1929Plan.Fissmer’ssourcedeedgranted

titletothelotfromHEBtoCarrollChaplinonJuly18,1929.Althoughthedeed

alsogranted“therightofwayasnowtravelledalongtheeasterlysideof[the]

lot...andover[the]proposedroadsontheeasterlyandsoutherlyside[Cunner

LaneandSunriseDrive, respectively]of [the] lot,” this conveyanceoccurred

4 These “original lots” areonly those lotsdepictedon the1929Plan anddonot include any

additionallotstothesouthwestthattheCunnerLaneOwnersmaynowown.

The1929PlanwasrecordedintheCumberlandCountyRegistryofDeedsonAugust31,1929,atBook19,Page5.

7

beforetherecordingofthe1929Plan.5In1942,ChaplinconveyedbacktoHEB

a“stripoflandfivefeetinwidth”attheedgeofthepropertyabuttingCunner

LaneandSunriseDriveasdelineatedonthe1929Plan,“[t]hepurposeofthis

conveyancebeingthatsaidstripoflandmaybeincludedinandmadeapartof

saidCunnerLaneandofsaidproposedroad[SunriseDrive],therebyincreasing

the width thereof to twenty-five feet.” Despite this deed reference, the

five-foot-widestripwasnotincludedontherecorded1929Planaspartofthe

proposedways,andnoamendedplanwaseverrecorded.Chaplindidreserve

aright-of-wayoverthefive-foot-widestrip.

[¶8]A1985deedconveyedthislotandtherights-of-waytoRobertand

LeslieFissmer.In2008,LeslieFissmerdeededthelotandtherights-of-wayas

conveyed in the original source deed to herself as trustee of the Leslie S.

FissmerRevocableTrust.

2. TheBurkeLot

[¶9]TheBurkes’lotislocatedbetweentheFissmerlotandBrookRoad

andisdesignatedasLot1onthe1929Plan.Theirsourcedeedconveyedtheir

5GiventhedateofFissmer’ssourcedeed,thereisanargumenttobemadethat,evenwithoutthe

five-foot-wide-strip“issue,”seeinfra¶¶23-24,29-31,Fissmer’slotwouldnotbenefitfromthePSA.See33M.R.S.§469-A(1)(2018).Forpurposesofthisopinion,however,wewilltreatFissmer’slotinpreciselythesamewaythatwetreattheBurkes’lot.

8

lotfromHEBtoThomasSmileyin1931.Thisdeedalsograntedrights-of-way

“over said road as now travelled along the easterly side of said lot [Cunner

Lane]...andoversaidproposedroadonthenortherlysideofsaidlot[Brook

Road].”In1932,SmileydeededbacktoHEBa“stripoflandfivefeetinwidth”

attheedgeofthepropertyabutting“CunnerLaneasdelineated”onthe1929

Plan, “the purpose of this conveyance being that said strip of land may be

includedinandmadeapartofsaidCunnerLane.”Thisfive-foot-widestripwas

not included as part of Cunner Lane on the recorded 1929 Plan, and no

amendedplandepictingCunnerLaneasatwenty-five-foot-widewaywasever

recorded. Smileydidreservearight-of-wayoverthefive-foot-widestrip. In

2005,thelotandallrights-of-wayweredeededtoWilliamBurke.OnApril11,

2009,WilliamBurkeconveyedthelotandtherights-of-waytoKarenBurke.

3. TheGramseLot

[¶10]TheGramsesliveonwhatwasdesignatedasthe“LilyPondLot”on

the1929Plan,tothenorthofBrookRoadandtheBurkes.Theirsourcedeed

conveyedthelotfromHEBtoMarciaQuimbyin1933;thedeedexceptedand

reservedtitletoafive-foot-widestripabuttingCunnerLaneasdepictedonthe

1929 Plan but did include rights-of-way over Cunner Lane and the

five-foot-wide strip. A 1988 deed conveyed the lot, again excepting the

9

five-foot-wide strip, to the Gramses, along with rights-of-way to the

twenty-foot-widecorridorandthefive-foot-widestrip.

4. TheSiegelLot

[¶11]ThetrialcourtmadelimitedfactualfindingsastoSiegel’slot;Siegel

purchasedthepropertyin1972,has livedtherefull-timeeversince,andhas

walkedalongCunnerLanealmostdailywhilelivingthere.6

5. Smith’sProperty

[¶12]WithCunnerLanetothewestandtheAtlanticOceantotheeast,

Smith’soriginallot—asdeededtohimin1998—isnowtwolots.InFebruary

of2010,SmithconveyedaportionofhisoriginallottoCunnerLane,LLC;Smith

retained the remaining portion of his parcel. The original lot’s source deed

conveyed the property from Albert F. Hannaford to “The Venerable Cunner

AssociationandPropellerClub”in1920andgrantedaright-of-way“overthe

private roadasnow located . . . adjoining said landhereby conveyedon the

westerly andnorthwesterly lines thereof.” Although theoriginal lot isnota

partofthe1929subdivision,thelotismarkedas“TheVenerableCunnerAsso.

andPropellerClub”onthe1929Plan.

6Siegel’spropertyabutsBrookRoadandislocatedtothewestoftheBurkes’lot;Siegel’slotis

notdepictedonthe1929Planand,asmentionedabove,doesnotabutCunnerLane.Thisinformationisdiscernablefromtherecordandprovidedforcontext.

10

[¶13]InMayof2017,HEBconveyedtoCunnerLaneIItitletoCunner

Lane,SunriseDrive,andBrookRoad,allasdepictedonthe1929Plan,aswell

astitletothefive-foot-widestripsabuttingcertainsegmentsoftheseroads.

B. FactsRelevanttoAdversePossession

[¶14] In 1998, Smith commissioned a survey of his property. That

survey indicated that largesectionsof the twenty-foot-widecorridor labeled

Cunner Lane on the 1929 Plan were actually located several feet west and

northwestofthepresent-dayCunnerLane—placingpartoftheexistingroad

onSmith’spropertyandpartofthetwenty-foot-widecorridorontheFissmer,

Burke, and Gramse lots. Sometime after that surveywas completed, Smith

pavedCunnerLanewhereitthenexistedontheearth.7

[¶15] The disputed property, for purposes of the adverse possession

claims, does not include the paved way, but does include portions of the

twenty-foot-widecorridordesignatedasCunnerLaneonthe1929Plan,aswell

as the five-foot-wide strips of land located between that twenty-foot-wide

7Beforetrial,thepartiesstipulatedthattheCunnerLaneOwnersandSiegelhaveaprescriptive

easement appurtenant to the portions of Cunner Lane, as it now exists,where it encroaches onSmith’sproperty.

11

corridorandtheFissmer,Burke,andGramselotsasdeeded.8Providedherefor

illustrativepurposesonly,Figure2belowdepictsthedisputedproperty.

8Fissmer’sadversepossessionclaimalsoincludesanappletreeandasmallareaofornearher

drivewaythatappeartoencroachonportionsofSmith’slot.

12

Figure2.Thebackgroundforthisillustrationcomesfroma2016landsurveycommissionedbySmith.

13

Referringtothecriteriasetoutinourcases—twentyyearsofpossessionand

use of another’s property that was actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile,

underaclaimofright,continuous,andexclusive—thetrialcourtmadescores

offactualfindingsconcerningtheCunnerLaneOwners’useoftheirrespective

propertiesaslawnsandgardens.Weeksv.Krysa,2008ME120,¶12,955A.2d

234.Eachfindingissupportedintherecord.SeeDupuis,2017ME132,¶3,166

A.3d112.

C. TheTrialCourt’sConclusions

[¶16]Afterathoroughreviewoftheevidencepresented,thetrialcourt

ruledoneachoftheclaims.ThecourtultimatelyconcludedthatCunnerLane

II holds title, in fee simple, to the twenty-foot-wide corridor designated as

CunnerLaneonthe1929Plan,aswellastothefive-foot-widestripsof land

directly to the north andwest of that corridor, but also concluded that the

Cunner Lane Owners own the disputed property up to the paved edge of

present-dayCunnerLanebyadversepossession.Asdiscussedbelow,weaffirm

thisportionofthecourt’sdecision.

[¶17]Inotherpartsofitsdecision,however,thecourtdeterminedthat

CunnerLane IIhasno interest inBrookRoadorSunriseDrive. Instead, the

courtconcludedthatSiegel,theBurkes,andtheGramsesown,infeesimple,to

14

thecenterlineofBrookRoadwhereitabutstheirpropertiesandthatFissmer

ownsthe“entirefeeunderSunriseDrive.”Theseportionsofthedecisionmust

bevacated,atleastinpart.

[¶18] No party moved for additional findings of fact after the court

entered the judgment. Smith and Cunner Lane II filed a timely appeal; the

CunnerLaneOwnersandSiegelfiledatimelycross-appeal. 14M.R.S.§1851

(2018); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1), 2C(a)(2). We discuss the competing claims

below,startingwiththosebroughtunderthePaperStreetsAct.

II.DISCUSSION

A. PaperStreetsAct

[¶19] The PSAwas enacted in 1987 “to clarify title to old, proposed,

unacceptedstreetsshownonsubdivisionplans,andtoeliminatethepossibility

ofancientclaims.” Tisdalev.Buch,2013ME95,¶9,81A.3d377(quotation

marksomitted);seealso33M.R.S.§469-A(8).“Inparticular,33M.R.S.§469-A

wascreatedtoresolveownershipdisputesregardingroadsandstreetslaidout

onsubdivisionplanswheretheoriginalownerdidnotreservetitleintheroads

andwheretheroadshaveneverbeenacceptedbyatown.”Tisdale,2013ME

95,¶9,81A.3d377(quotationmarksomitted).

15

[¶20]Pursuanttosection469-A(1),

[a]nyconveyancemadebeforeSeptember29,1987thatconveyedland abutting upon a proposed, unaccepted way laid out on asubdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds is deemed tohaveconveyedallofthegrantor’sinterestintheportionofthewaythatabutsthelandconveyed,unlessthegrantorexpresslyreservedthe grantor’s title to the way by a specific reference to thisreservationintheconveyanceoftheland.

33M.R.S.§469-A(1).Generally,“[i]fthegrantororhissuccessorsfailtoreserve

titleassetforthinthestatute,”andtheproposed,unacceptedwayisbounded

onbothsidesbylandincludedinthesubdivision,thenanabuttinglandowner

“isdeemedtoowntothecenterlineoftheportionofthewayabuttinghisor

her property.” Tisdale, 2013 ME 95, ¶ 9, 81 A.3d 377; see also 33 M.R.S.

§469-A(6).Ifthegrantorfailstoreservetitle,andtheproposed,unaccepted

way “is bounded on the opposite side by land that is not included in the

subdivision,”thentheabuttinglandownerownsnotjusttothecenterlinebut

theentirewidthoftheproposed,unacceptedwayabuttinghisorherproperty.

33M.R.S.§469-A(6-A).

[¶21]Althoughtheterm“proposed,unacceptedway”isnotdefinedin

the PSA, we have construed the term to include “roads, constructed or

unconstructed,thataredepictedonasubdivisionplanrecordedintheregistry

ofdeedsand that areproposed to amunicipality for acceptancebutnot yet

16

acceptedbythemunicipality.”9Fournierv.Elliott,2009ME25,¶20,966A.2d

410(quotationmarksomitted);seealsoTisdale,2013ME95,¶¶10-11,81A.3d

377.

1. CunnerLane

[¶22] The Cunner Lane Owners argue that section 469-A of the PSA

conveys ownership of the twenty-foot-wide corridor and the five-foot-wide

stripstothemandthatthecourterredinconcludingotherwise.Wereviewthe

trialcourt’sfactualfindingsforclearerror,Zablotnyv.StateBd.ofNursing,2017

ME29,¶18,156A.3d126,anditsinterpretationofsection469-AofthePSA

anditsapplicationofthatsectiontothefactsdenovo,Brooksv.Carson,2012

ME 97, ¶19, 48 A.3d 224. Through this de novo review, we analyze “the

statute’splainlanguagetoeffecttheLegislature’sintent.”Id.

a. TheFissmerandBurkeLots

[¶23] With respect to theFissmerandBurke lots, theoriginal source

deedsdidconveylandthatabuttedthetwenty-foot-widecorridoridentifiedas

CunnerLaneonthe1929Plan.Seesupran.5.Bothoriginalgrantees,however,

9Asapreliminarymatter,thepartiesagree,andthetrialcourtimplicitlyfound,thatCunnerLane,

BrookRoad,andSunriseDriveeachqualifiesasa“proposed,unacceptedway”forthepurposesof33M.R.S.§469-A(2018).SeeFournierv.Elliott,2009ME25,¶20,966A.2d410(quotationmarksomitted).

17

conveyed back to HEB the five-foot-wide strips of land at the edge of their

respective properties that abutted the twenty-foot-wide corridor. Although

these deeds of reconveyance explicitly stated that the five-foot strips were

meanttowidentheproposedCunnerLanetotwenty-fivefeet,thetrialcourt

foundnoevidencethatCunnerLanewaseverwidened,andmoreimportantly,

it determined that HEB never submitted a new subdivision plan depicting

Cunner Lane as a twenty-five-foot-wide proposed way. See 33 M.R.S.

§469-A(1).

[¶24] Thetrialcourtexplicitlyfoundthatthefive-foot-widestripsare

notpartofa“proposed,unacceptedwaylaidoutonasubdivisionplanrecorded

intheregistryofdeeds.”10See33M.R.S.§469-A(1).BecauseneitherFissmer

nor the Burkes hold title to land abutting the twenty-foot-wide corridor

identifiedasCunnerLaneonthe1929Plan—whichis“aproposed,unaccepted

waylaidoutonasubdivisionplanrecordedintheregistryofdeeds”—thecourt

correctly determined that section 469-A does not apply to them. 33M.R.S.

§469-A(1).

10Thetrialcourt’sfactualfindingthatthefive-foot-widestripsarenotapartofCunnerLaneas

depictedonthe1929Planissupportedbycompetentrecordevidenceandisdispositiveontheissue.Hadthe1929Planbeenamendedandthenrecordedintheregistryofdeeds—depictingCunnerLaneasatwenty-five-foot-wideway—thedeterminationoffeeownershipcouldbedifferentinthiscase.See33M.R.S.§469-A(1).

18

b. TheGramseLot

[¶25] With respect to the Gramse lot, the source deed—conveyed in

1933—expresslyreservedtitleinHEBto,

astripoflandfive(5)feetinwidthextendingfromthesoutherlylineofthelot...alongeachofthecoursesofthe...lotonsaidroadknownasCunnerLane...,saidfive-footstripoflandextendinginitsfullwidtharoundthecurveatthe intersectionofsaidCunnerLaneandsaidproposedstreet[BrookRoad]andbeingmeasuredatrightanglestoeachofthecoursesofsaidlotalongthelineofsaidCunnerLaneasshownonsaidplan.

Because the Gramse lot was always separated from Cunner Lane by the

five-foot-widestripheldinfeesimplebyHEB,itnever“abut[ted]”CunnerLane.

33M.R.S.§469-A(1).Thetrialcourtdetermined—correctly—thattheGramses

couldnot relyon section 469-A to claimownershipof the twenty-foot-wide

corridorbecausetheirlotneverabuttedCunnerLaneasitwasdepictedonthe

1929Plan.11See33M.R.S.§469-A(1).

[¶26] The Cunner Lane Owners argue that the court erred in these

determinations and ask us to make findings as to the original grantor’s—

HEB’s—intent. As a preliminary matter, we do not make factual findings.

Stickneyv.CityofSaco,2001ME69,¶13,770A.2d592.Moreover,totheextent

11 The court also correctly construed section469-Awhen it declined todeclare theGramses

ownersofthefive-foot-widestrip.

19

that the Cunner Lane Owners ask us to examine their source deeds or

reconveyancesinordertodetermineHEB’soverallintentwithrespecttoeach

lot,wedeclinetodoso.SeeN.SebagoShores,LLCv.Mazzaglia,2007ME81,

¶15,926A.2d728(statingthegeneralrulethatwewillnotlookbeyondthe

four corners of a deed to discern intent unless the intent of the grantor is

ambiguous). Through reconveyance or reservation, HEB explicitly and

unambiguously held title to the five-foot-wide strips that sit between the

twenty-foot-widecorridorandtheFissmer,Burke,andGramselots.

c. CunnerLaneIIistheRecordOwneroftheTwenty-Foot-WideCorridorIdentifiedasCunnerLaneonthe1929Plan

[¶27]AlthoughtheCunnerLaneOwners’generalassertionthatthePSA

was intended to eliminate “ancient claims” concerning land underlying

“proposed,unacceptedways”iscorrect,33M.R.S.§469-A(8);Tisdale,2013ME

95,¶9,81A.3d377,theirrequestthatthePSAbe“liberallyconstrued”isbetter

understoodasarequestforustoapplyaseriesofexceptionstosection469-A

that would effectively rewrite the current statute; granting such a request

wouldbeinappropriate.SeeCapeElizabethSch.Bd.v.CapeElizabethTeachers

Assoc.,459A.2d166,171(Me.1983)(“[I]tisnotourroletorewritethestatute

whereitsmeaningisplain.”).

20

[¶28]Byreservingafive-foot-widestripinadeedorreacquiringtitleto

astripthroughaconveyance,HEBheldtitleinfeesimpletotheentirelengthof

thefive-foot-widestripsindisputeinthiscase.Byvirtueofitsownershipof

the five-foot-wide strips,which abutted theproposed,unacceptedway—the

twenty-foot-widecorridordesignatedasCunnerLaneonthe1929Plan—HEB

becametheownerofthetwenty-foot-widecorridorpursuanttothePSA.See

33M.R.S.§469-A(6-A).In2017,HEBconveyedtitletothetwenty-foot-wide

corridor and the five-foot-wide strips to Cunner Lane II, and the trial court

correctly determined that, through this conveyance, Cunner Lane II holds

record title—in fee simple—to this property. Portions of this property,

however,areownedbytheCunnerLaneOwnersthroughadversepossession.

Seeinfra¶¶39-49.

2. SunriseDrive

[¶29] SmithandCunnerLane II argue that the trial court erred in its

determination that “Fissmer owns the entire fee under Sunrise Drive.” We

agree.Fissmer’spredecessorconveyedtoHEBafive-foot-widestrip,notonly

alongCunnerLane,butalsoextending“aroundthecircleatthesouthwesterly

corner of said Cunner Lane and said proposed street [Sunrise Drive] . . . ,

maintainingawidthoffivefeetmeasuredatrightanglestothenortherlyline

21

ofsaidproposedroad[SunriseDrive],adjoiningsaidroadandextendingtothe

westerlylineofsaidland.”Inotherwords,thefive-foot-widestripextendsthe

entire length of Sunrise Drive as it abuts Lot 14 on the 1929 Plan. The

predecessor’s reconveyance of the five-foot-wide strip along Sunrise Drive

meansthatFissmerdoesnotownland“abutting”aproposed,unacceptedway,

andthereforethecourterredindeclaringthat,pursuanttothePSA,Fissmer

ownsanyportionofSunriseDrive.12See33M.R.S.§§469-A(1),(6-A);Brooks,

2012ME97,¶19,48A.3d224.Tothecontrary,duetoitsacquisitionofland

fromHEBinMayof2017,CunnerLaneIIistherecordownerofSunriseDrive

asdepictedonthe1929Plan,andofthefive-foot-widestripthatabutsit.See

33M.R.S.§469-A(6-A).Therefore,wemustvacatethatportionofthecourt’s

judgmentdeclaringFissmertheowneroftheentirefeeunderSunriseDrive.

[¶30]ThisopiniondoesnotaddressownershipofanyportionofSunrise

Drivenotshownonthe1929Plan.See33M.R.S.§469-A(1).

[¶31]Furthermore,portionsofthefive-foot-widestripabuttingSunrise

Drive,aswellasSunriseDriveitself,mayoverlapwithpropertythatFissmer

claimsandusesaspartofheryard,especiallywithrespecttothesouthernmost

12Atoralargument,counselfortheCunnerLaneOwnersconcededthattherewasnodifference

betweenCunnerLaneandSunriseDrivewithrespecttothefive-foot-widestrips.

22

edge of her property. We do not addresswhether Fissmer has acquired by

adverse possession any portion of Sunrise Drive or the five-foot-wide strip

runningalongthatproposedroad;nofactualfindingsweremadeconcerning

Fissmer’suseofthisarea.Finally,althoughCunnerLaneIIisthetitleownerof

theportionofSunriseDrivethatisdepictedonthe1929Planandofthefive-

foot-wide strip abutting that road, Fissmer still maintains a right-of-way in

commonoverSunriseDriveandthefive-foot-widestripthroughcertaindeeds

andconveyances.

3. BrookRoad

[¶32]SmithandCunnerLaneIIalsoarguethatthetrialcourterredby

declaring that Siegel, the Gramses, and the Burkes own to the centerline of

BrookRoadwhereitabutstheirproperties.Specifically,Smithassertsthat(1)

section 469-A of the PSA does not apply to Siegel’s lot nor does it apply to

portionsofBrookRoadnotdepictedonthe1929Plan,and(2)asmallportion

ofBrookRoadwhereitintersectswithCunnerLaneisownedbyCunnerLane

II—nottheGramsesandBurkes—pursuanttothedeeditacquiredfromHEBin

2017.Again,weagree.

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a. TheSiegelLot

[¶33] Although the trial courtmadeno findings about the locationof

Siegel’spropertynordiditfindthatSiegel’spropertywasdepictedonthe1929

Plan,itdeclaredSiegelownertothecenterlineofBrookRoadwhereitabutshis

property.AscounselfortheCunnerLaneOwnersconcededatoralargument,

however,thereisnocompetentevidenceintherecordtosupportthecourt’s

determinationthat,pursuanttosection469-A,Siegelholdstitletoaportionof

BrookRoad.SeeStickney,2001ME69,¶13,770A.2d592(explainingthatwe

will vacate a trial court’s conclusions if no competent evidenceexists in the

recordtosupportthem).Wethereforevacatethisportionofthejudgment.

b. BurkeandGramseLots

[¶34]Asapreliminarymatter,SmithandCunnerLaneIIdonotdispute

that “section 469-A vests [the] Burke[s] and Gramse[s] with title to those

portions of Brook Road delineated on the 1929 Plan that do not abut the

five-footstrips.” Theyassert,however, thatover theyears, theBurkeshave

acquiredadditionallandabuttingBrookRoadthatwasnotincludedinthe1929

Plan,andthat,becauseofthis,thecourterredindeclaringtheBurkesowners

ofportionsofBrookRoadnotdepictedonthe1929Plan.Additionally,Smith

andCunnerLaneIIcontendthatthecourterredindeclaringtheBurkesand

24

GramsesownersofasmallsectionofBrookRoadwhereitmeetsCunnerLane

becausethefive-foot-widestrips“curveintoBrookRoad.”Weagree.

[¶35]Again,section469-Aappliesonlytolanddepictedonasubdivision

plan. See 33M.R.S. §469-A(1). BrookRoad, as it nowexists, is longer and

proportioneddifferentlythantheproposedroadonthe1929Plan. Thetrial

court’sdetermination that theBurkes andGramsesown to the centerlineof

BrookRoad“whereitabutstheirproperties”isthusoverbroad;byvirtueofthe

PSA,theBurkesandGramsesowntothecenterlineofBrookRoad—asdepicted

on the 1929 Plan—only where the road abuts their properties as they are

depictedonthe1929Planas“Lot1”and“LilyPondLot,”respectively.See33

M.R.S.§469-A(6).

[¶36]Furthermore,thetrialcourt’sjudgmentdidnotaddresshowthe

five-foot-widestripsaffecttheownershipofBrookRoadwheretheroadmeets

CunnerLane.Asdiscussedabove,theGramsesourcedeedreservedafive-foot-

widestripforHEB,andtheBurkes’predecessorre-conveyedafive-foot-wide

striptoHEB. Thus,totheextentthatthesefive-foot-widestripscurveoffof

CunnerLane and rundown either side ofBrookRoad,13 theBurkes and the

13Thetrialcourtmadenofactualfindingsastohowfarthesefive-foot-widestripscurvedown

BrookRoadwithregardtoeitherlot.

25

Gramsesdonotownproperty“abutting”thatportionofBrookRoad;counsel

fortheCunnerLaneOwnersconcededasmuchatoralargument.See33M.R.S.

§469-A(1).

[¶37]BecauseHEBconveyedownershipofthefive-foot-widestripsto

CunnerLaneIIin2017,itnecessarilyfollowsthatCunnerLaneIIholdstitleto

anysegmentofBrookRoad,nomatterhowsmall,thatislinedoneithersideby

thefive-foot-widestrips,pursuanttothePSA.See33M.R.S.§469-A(6).Tothe

extent, however, that the Burkes and Gramses have used portions of these

five-foot-widestrips,orportionsofBrookRoadabuttingthesestrips,astheir

lawns,thenthefive-foot-widestripsandthoserespectivesegmentsofBrook

Road may be owned by the Burkes and Gramses through their adverse

possessionofthisland.Seeinfra¶¶39-49.

[¶38]Onremand,iftheBurkesandGramseswishtorelyonthePSAto

bedeclaredownersofanyportionofBrookRoadasdepictedonthe1929Plan,

theywillhavetoestablish(1)theextentofBrookRoadasdepictedonthe1929

Planand(2)wherethefive-foot-widestripsendonBrookRoadasdepictedon

the1929Plan.ThelocationoftheirlawnsinrelationtoBrookRoadandthe

five-foot-wide strips will be relevant to any claims of ownership based on

adversepossession.

26

B. AdversePossession

[¶39] As mentioned above, the trial court concluded that although

Cunner Lane II has title ownership of the twenty-foot corridor and the

five-foot-wide strips, the Cunner Lane Owners “obtained fee simple title by

adverse possession to the property abutting thewestern and northwestern

edgeofthepavedroadknownasCunnerLane.”SmithandCunnerLaneIIargue

that the Cunner Lane Owners did not satisfy their burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, adverse possession to the disputed land.

Specifically, Smith and Cunner Lane II assert that the court erred in its

determination because several of the Cunner Lane Owners’ uses were

permittedandnotcontinuousforthetwenty-yearlimitationsperiod.

[¶40] Adverse possession presents amixed question of fact and law.

See,e.g.,Striefelv.Charles-Keyt-LeamanP’ship,1999ME111,¶7,733A.2d984.

“Whetherthenecessaryfactsexistisforthetrieroffact,butwhetherthosefacts

constituteadversepossessionisanissueoflaw.”Grondinv.Hanscom,2014ME

148,¶13,106A.3d1150(alterationsomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).We

reviewa trial court’s factual findings regardingadverse possession for clear

error andwill affirm those facts if they are supported by competent record

27

evidence.Id.Wereviewquestionsoflawdenovo.See,e.g.,D’Angelov.McNutt,

2005ME31,¶6,868A.2d239.

[¶41] “Apartyclaiming titlebyadversepossessionhas theburdenof

proving,by apreponderanceof the evidence, thatpossessionanduseof the

property was (1) actual; (2) open; (3) visible; (4) notorious; (5) hostile;

(6)underaclaimofright;(7)continuous;(8)exclusive;and(9)foraduration

exceedingthetwenty-yearlimitationsperiod.”Weeks,2008ME120,¶12,955

A.2d234.Asageneralrule,Mainelaw“disfavorsthetransferoflandbyadverse

possession.”Striefel,1999ME111,¶4,733A.2d984.

[¶42] “Actual possession means physical occupancy or control over

property” and “is established when the evidence shows an actual use and

enjoymentofthepropertythatisinkindanddegreethesameastheuseand

enjoymenttobeexpectedoftheaverageownerofsuchproperty.” Harveyv.

Furrow,2014ME149,¶12,107A.3d604(quotationmarksomitted).“Hostile

simplymeansthatthepossessordoesnothavethetrueowner’spermissionto

beonthelandandhasnothingtodowithdemonstratingaheatedcontroversy

oramanifestationofillwill,orthattheclaimantwasinanysenseanenemyof

theowneroftheservientestate.” Striefel,1999ME111,¶13,733A.2d984

(citationsomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

28

[¶43] “Continuous means occurring without interruption, and, like

actual possession and use, continuous possession and use requires only the

kindanddegreeofoccupancy(i.e.,useandenjoyment)thatanaverageowner

would make of the property.” Harvey, 2014 ME 149, ¶ 16, 107 A.3d 604

(alterationomitted)(emphasisomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).“Finally,a

claimant must prove that its possession and use satisfied each of the

aforementionedelementssimultaneouslyforaperiodofatleasttwentyyears.”

Id.¶17(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶44] As the trial court found, the Cunner Lane Owners and their

predecessorshaveusedthedisputedpropertyasownersoffrontlawnswould

typicallyusesuchproperty: theymowedandwatered their lawns;cared for

plants,trees,andshrubsinthearea;erectedandkeptmailboxesinthearea;

maintained flower beds; installed wooden posts; maintained driveways;

erected and then removed a picket fence; installed an irrigation system;

installedelectricdogfences;placedfourlargerocksalongtheboundaryofthe

paved area of Cunner Lane; recreated on the grasswith their families; and

generallyusedthelandasifitweretheirown.Seeid.¶12.NoneoftheCunner

Lane Owners attempted to hide any of these uses and the community

consideredthedisputedlandasbelongingtotheOwners.Weagreewiththe

29

trial court that the Cunner LaneOwners’ use of the disputed areawas thus

actual,open,visible,andnotorious. SeeStriefel,1999ME111,¶¶9-11,733

A.2d984.

[¶45] SmithandCunnerLaneIIargue,however,thattheCunnerLane

Owners’usesofthedisputedpropertywerenothostilebecausetheOwners’

uses were consistent with their easement rights.14 This argument is not

persuasive.Theterm“right-of-way”generallyrefersto“therightofaperson

topassoverthelandofanotherperson.”33M.R.S.§458(2)(A)(2018);seealso

Easement,Black’sLawDictionary(10thed.2014)(“Aninterestinlandowned

byanotherperson,consistingintherighttouseorcontroltheland,oranarea

aboveorbelowit,foraspecificlimitedpurpose(suchastocrossitforaccessto

a public road).” (emphasis added)). We have held that the scope of a

right-of-wayisnotlimitless,seegenerallyGuildv.Hinman,1997ME120,¶6,

695A.2d 1190 (collecting cases), and that determining this scope “requires

evaluationofthepurposeit[theright-of-way]wastoserve,”Badgerv.Hill,404

A.2d222,225(Me.1979).

14ThetrialcourtfoundthattheCunnerLaneOwners“havealwayshaddeededrights-of-wayover

CunnerLaneandthefive-footstrip.”

30

[¶46] Here, the trial court found that the Cunner Lane Owners’

rights-of-wayoverthetwenty-foot-widecorridorandthefive-foot-widestrips

were “meant for passage.” The Cunner Lane Owners’ use of the disputed

property,however,wasnotlimitedtomerepassage.Maintainingalawn,caring

for flowers, trees, and shrubs, installing irrigation systems and electric dog

fences,andkeepingdrivewaysandmailboxesareallusesthatareconsistent

with completeownership; theseuses are inconsistentwith theCunnerLane

Owners’mererighttopassoverthelandconferredtothembytheirrespective

rights-of-way.Seeid;cf.Whitev.Lambert,332S.E.2d266,267-68(W.Va.1985)

(affirmingatrialcourt’sdeterminationthatwhereapartyplantedshrubsand

trees,buriedawaterline,andbuiltafenceonanunusedportionofaneasement

designatedfor“foringressandegress,”andgenerallyusedthatportionofthe

easement as his “lawn,” the party had successfully extinguished the original

easementovertheunusedportionofthelandbyadversepossession).

[¶47]Smith’sownactionsdemonstratethathebelievedthattheCunner

Lane Owners had, at the very least, a hostile claim of possession over the

disputed area. In 1998, Smith became aware that Cunner Lane, as it then

existedasadirtroad,wasnotinthecorrectlocation.Despitethatknowledge,

hedecided topave theexistingroadwayup to theedgesof theCunnerLane

31

Owners’lawns.Insodoing,hereinforcedtheCunnerLaneOwners’argument

that they have used the disputed properties as their lawns—and not as

rights-of-way.Asthetrialcourtcorrectlyconcluded,theCunnerLaneOwners’

usesofthedisputedarea“exceededtherightsgrantedbytherights-of-wayand

thereforeestablishedhostility.”SeeGuild,1997ME120,¶6,695A.2d1190;

Badger,404A.2dat225.

[¶48] Furthermore, theCunnerLaneOwners’ and theirpredecessors’

useofthedisputedlandwasunderaclaimofright,continuous,andexclusive;

since purchasing their homes, the owners considered their respective

properties tobe theirownanddidnot share themwithothers. SeeHarvey,

2014ME149,¶¶15-16,107A.3d604.SmithandCunnerLaneIIaskustolook

ateachusebytheownersinisolation,arguingthatnosingleusesatisfiesthe

twenty-year requirement. This request is antithetical to our adverse

possessionprecedents;weconsideraclaimant’sactivities“intheaggregate,i.e.,

inthecontextofaclaimant’soveralluseoftheproperty.”Id.¶19.

[¶49]WhenconsideringtheCunnerLaneOwners’multipleusesofthe

disputedarea“intheaggregate”andinthecontextoftheir“overalluseofthe

property,” the trial court’s findings that the owners had satisfied the

twenty-yearrequirementaresupportedbycompetentrecordevidence.Id.;see

32

alsoGrondin,2014ME148,¶13,106A.3d1150;D’Angelo,2005ME31,¶6,

868A.2d239.Giventhissupport,wedonotdisturbthetrialcourt’sconclusion

that “for well over twenty years, the use of the disputed property by [the

Cunner Lane Owners] has been comprehensive and complete” and “each

[ownerhas]adequatelysupportedtheelementsnecessarytoestablishtitleby

adverse possession to the disputed property up to the western and

northwestern edge of the pavement.”15 (Quotation marks omitted); see

D’Angelo,2005ME31,¶6,868A.2d239;Striefel,1999ME111,¶7,733A.2d

984.

III.CONCLUSIONS

[¶50]Insummary,

• The court correctly determined that Fissmer, the Burkes, and theGramses failed to establish that they owned the twenty-foot-widecorridordesignated asCunnerLaneon the1929Planpursuant to thePaperStreetsAct.

• ThecourtcorrectlygrantedCunnerLaneIIadeclaratoryjudgmentthatit holds record title to the twenty-foot-wide corridor designated asCunnerLaneonthe1929Planandtothefive-foot-widestripsabuttingCunnerLane.

15Althoughwedonotdisturbthetrialcourt’sadversepossessiondetermination,wemustremand

thecaseonthisissueforthecourttoclarifytheparties’newboundarylines.SeeHennessyv.Fairley,2002ME76,¶¶27-28,796A.2d41.Giventhecomplexitiesofthiscase,includingtheneedforanewassigned justice—because the justice who entered the judgment is no longer a Superior Courtjustice—aRule53refereemaybeinorder.SeeM.R.Civ.P.53.

33

• The court erred in making any determinations concerning Siegel’sownershipofBrookRoad.

• Thecourterredindeterminingthat,pursuanttothePaperStreetsAct,FissmerownsSunriseDriveasdepictedonthe1929Plan.

• ThecourterredindeclaringtheBurkesandtheGramsesownerstothecenterlineofBrookRoadinitsentiretybecausesuchadeterminationisoverbroad.

• ThecourtcorrectlyconcludedthatFissmer,theBurkes,andtheGramseshadacquiredtitle,byadversepossession,tothedisputedpropertythattheyhaveusedastheir lawns,gardens,anddrivewaysuptothepavededgeofpresent-dayCunnerLane.

• AnyadversepossessionclaimbyFissmerconcerningthesouthernmostportionof the twenty-foot-widecorridordesignatedasCunnerLane—theportionofthatcorridortothesouthofherdriveway—willrequireadditionallitigation.

• AnyadversepossessionclaimbyFissmerconcerningSunriseDrivewillrequireadditionallitigation.

• AnyadversepossessionclaimsbytheBurkesortheGramsesregardingportionsofBrookRoadorportionsofthefive-foot-widestripsliningtheroad—totheextentthatsuchstripsdoinfactcurveoffofCunnerLaneanddownBrookRoad—willrequireadditionallitigation.

• Any “additional litigation” undertaken may require the trial court toaddresstheissueofresjudicata.Theentryis:

The portionof the judgmentdeclaring Fissmerowner of the entire fee under Sunrise Drive isvacatedandremandedtotheSuperiorCourtforentry of a judgment declaring Cunner Lane IIownerofSunriseDrive,asdepictedonthe1929

34

Plan, and of the five-foot-wide strip alongsideSunrise Drive. The portion of the judgmentdeclaring the Burkes, Gramses, and Siegelowners of the land to the centerline of BrookRoad is vacated in part and remanded to theSuperiorCourt forproceedingsconsistentwiththis opinion. The judgment is affirmed in allother respects. With regard to the adversepossession issue, however, the judgment isremandedforthepurposeoflegallyestablishingtheparties’newboundarylines.

Kurt E. Olafsen, Esq. (orally), Olafsen & Butterfield LLC, Portland, for appellants David D. Smith, Cunner Lane, LLC, and Cunner Lane II, LLC Kelly W. McDonald, Esq. (orally), and John B. Shumadine, Esq., Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, for cross-appellants Leslie S. Fissmer, KarenA.B.Burke,WilliamA.Burke,PatriciaM.Gramse,RichardR.Gramse,andRobertE.Siegel CumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumbersRE-2016-292,RE-2017-243,andRE-2017-255FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY