Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007 1 AMS-02 Safety Summary

Leland D. Hill AMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007

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AMS-02 Safety Summary


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AMS-02 Safety

Topics to be Discussed Payload Safety Review Panel Meeting History Summary Safety Analysis/Hazard Report Since Phase I Significant Changes Since Phase I Action Item Status Operational Controls Hazard Report/Pre-Review Discussion Results


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AMS-02 Safety

Meeting HistoryAlpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Phase 0/I Flight Safety Review

January 16, 2001

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Vacuum Jacket Leakage Special Discussion Meeting (SDM)

October 11, 2001

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Gauss Limit Special Discussion Meeting (SDM)

October 16, 2001

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM)

January 17, 2003


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AMS-02 Phase 0/I

11 Unique Hazard Reports Reviewed 1 Standardized Form 1230 Hazard Report

Reviewed All Approved at Phase I

3 Action items assigned


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AMS-02 Phase 0/I

Action Items Assigned: AI Action Date Due 1 Assigned to: SF3/J. Bates

Continue to assess the helium venting analysis with Shuttle Integration and EP4 and develop a history of cryostat operations to determine the necessity of a Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) inside T-9 minutes to launch.

Date: Phase II Mandatory Reviewers: PSRP

2 Assigned to: SF3/J. Bates HR: AMS-02-6

Pre-submit AMS-02 vent test data regarding TCS, warm helium supply, TRD, and the cryosystem to EP4/H. Flynn for approval; submit data to USA in April 2001 for analysis; and add results to HR AMS-02-6 for presentation at Phase II FSR.

Date: Phase II Mandatory Reviewers: PSRP

3 Assigned to: NC55/S. Loyd HR: AMS-02-7

Provide updates regarding changes to the magnetic requirements for the EMU and peripheral equipment, and status the relevant communication between the PO and EVA Project Office/XA. (PSRP may schedule a meeting with XA and AMS following review of the AI, if necessary.)

Date: February 18, 2001 Mandatory Reviewers:


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Vacuum Jacket SDM

Topics Discussed: Overpressurization of the Payload Bay During

Ascent Caused by Loss of Vacuum

Originally Total Loss of Vacuum (Instant) Was Assumed Deemed Unrealistic – Credible Maximum Leak Sized

Established

Action Item 3 from Phase 0/I Closed by S. Loyd


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Gauss Limit SDM

Topics Discussed: Acceptable Hole Size for Vacuum Loss Analysis

Agreement to: Qualification and Acceptance Testing of AMS-02 Structural

Test and Flight Units Independent testing of Flight O-Rings of Vacuum Case Monitoring of Vacuum Case Leading up to T-9 minutes.

Gauss Limits of EMU Changing EMU limits to 300 Gauss


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AMS-02 TIM

Topics Discussed: Burst Disks

Certification as Equivalent of Single Fault Tolerant Reverse Acting Circumferentially-Scored with Cutting Teeth

Burst Disks

Venting due to Burst Disk Operation Causing Overpressurization of Payload Bay

Three Burst Disks Used in Series


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Significant Changes In AMS-02

Major Hardware No Longer Part of AMS-02 Synchrotron Radiation Detector (SRD) AMS-02 Crew Operations Post (ACOP)

ACOP Was Only ISS Interior Element of AMS-02

Natural Design Evolution Presented in SDP/Presentations

Series/Reflown Hardware No Elements or Systems of AMS-02 Are Considered Series

or Reflown As They Were At Phase 0/I All of AMS-02 Considered in the Unique Configuration and

Environments of this Mission in Hazard Reports Facilitates Integrated Safety Control and Verification Efforts


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Significant Changes In AMS-02

Zenith Radiators and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipes added to design.

Lower Radiator Panels Removed (Still Visible in Some Graphics)

Folding ROEU Support Bracket Incorporated in the Design

Addition of Star Trackers and GPS Receiver AMS-02 Tilted 12° for Clearance and Viewing Weight Has Increased


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Safety Analysis

After Phase I AMS-02 Project Revisited the Safety Analysis to Prepare the Phase II SDP Three Year Effort to SDP Submittal

New System and Subsystem Level Safety Analyses Performed and Documented in SDP Energy Analysis Historical Comparative Analysis Maintenance Safety Analysis


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Hazard Reports

Hazard Report Generation Phase I Hazard Reports (HRs) Served as

Foundation for Phase II HRs Reorganization and Additional HRs Required. NEW Designators Assigned to HRs

Use Of Flight “F” Designator And A Two Digit Number To Differentiate Between Phase I And Phase II HRs


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Hazard Reports

Custom Hazard Report Form Compliant with NSTS/ISS 13830 Grouping of Controls and Safety Verification

Methods Together New Control, Cause and Safety Verification

Methods Numbering System aa.bb.cc

aa – Cause Reference bb – Control Reference cc – Safety Verification Method and Status Reference


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Hazard ReportsHR Hazard Report Title AMS-02-F01 Structural Failure of Hardware AMS-02-F02 Toxic Material Offgassing

AMS-02-F03 Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank, Vacuum Case and/or Pressurized System

AMS-02-F04 Overpressurization of Payload Bay Doors

AMS-02-F05 Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized Systems: TRD Gas System (Xe & CO2), Cryomagnet Warm Helium Gas System, Tracker Thermal Control System, Thermal Control System, Cryocooler

AMS-02-F06 Excessive Thrust/Overturning Moments AMS-02-F07 Excessive Radiated Field Strengths, EMI, Magnetic AMS-02-F08 Electric Shock/Discharge AMS-02-F09 Exposure of the Crew to Excessive Ionizing Radiation AMS-02-F10 Flammable Materials in the Payload Bay AMS-02-F11 Mechanism Failure AMS-02-F12 Mate/Demate of Connectors AMS-02-F13 Battery Failure AMS-02-F14 EVA/EVR Operations Hazard AMS-02-F15 Thermal Extremes AMS-02-F16 Shatterable Material Release AMS-02-F17 Electrical Power Distribution Damage AMS-02-F18 Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfiguration AMS-02-F19 Excessive Glare (WITHDRAWN) AMS-02-F20 Crew Exposure to Coherent Light STD-AMS-02-F01 Flight Payload Standard Hazard Report – Exterior Elements STD-AMS-02-F02 Flight Payload Standard Hazard Report – Interior Elements

Reorganized Content New Hazard Report Organization Unchanged Withdrawn Hazard


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Hazard Reports Phase II

Two Standard Hazard Reports Used Exterior Elements of the AMS-02(Shuttle Payload Bay,

ISS Exterior Environment) Interior Elements of AMS-02 (Present in Shuttle Habitable

Environment)

20 Unique Hazard Reports 1 Withdrawn as Non-Hazardous Condition

Due to New Safety Analysis and Rewrite, Phase II SDP is Effectively Entirely New Package Compared to Phase I (Re Agreement 3.2 Phase I Safety Review)


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New Hazard Report Format Provides for Ready Identification of Operational Hazard Controls.

Last Column Indicates Operational Control Present and Vehicle Association

S – Shuttle, I – ISS, G – Ground

Operational Hazard Controls

l. HAZARD CONTROL (CONTROL), m. SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS (SVM), n. STATUS OF VERIFICATIONS (STATUS) OPS

CONTROL

1. CAUSE: Generic Cause

1.1 CONTROL: Generic Operational Control

1.1.1 SVM: Review of Procedures to assure that operational steps are in place.

1.1.1 STATUS: OPEN

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Hazard Report, Control

I/S Summary

AMS-02-F05, 9.2

I In order to assure a limited life of the Warm Helium tank with regards to MMOD, when the usefulness of the system is over with the depletion of Superfluid Helium from the Cryomagnet system, this procedure will allow for the remainder of the Warm Helium Supply helium to be released from the system, eliminating the MMOD concern with the pressurized vessel. This is an AMS-02 operational procedure that must be coordinated with the ISS for scheduling of appropriate release time and rate.

AMS-02-F05, 9.2

I In order to assure a limited life of the TRD Xenon and Carbon Dioxide tanks with regards to MMOD, when the usefulness of the system is over with the first depletion of one of the two gas supplies, the other supply will be released from the system, eliminating the MMOD concern with the pressure vessels. This is an AMS-02 operational procedure that must be coordinated with the ISS for scheduling of appropriate release time and rate.

AMS-02-F06, 4.2

I Discharge stored energy/magnetic field of AMS-02 prior to any removal (robotic) from ISS berthing location.


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I/S Summary

AMS-02-F07, 1.3


AMS-02-F07, 1.6

I Discharge stored energy/magnetic field of the AMS-02 prior to any EVA procedure to be conducted on or with the AMS-02.

AMS-02-F07, 1.6

I Keepout zone (warning) for EVA when Cryomagnet is charged.

AMS-02-F07, 1.7

I SSRMS handling of AMS-02 to assure that primary power feed is used when handling the AMS-02 to assure that power feed capable of charging AMS-02 Cryomagnet is not engaged.

AMS-02-F07, 3.3


AMS-02-F08, 1.1

S Procedural controls to remove power to the AMS-02 before any EVA access while on the Shuttle.


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I/S Summary

AMS-02-F08, 1.1

I Procedural controls to discharge magnetic field and removal of power to the AMS-02 prior to EVA Access of the AMS-02 on the ISS. (Power removal recommended to occur late in EVA process for thermal conditioning.)

AMS-02-F08, 2.6

S Prior to ROEU to ROEU-PDA de-mate, power will be removed from connection and remain off once de-mated.

AMS-02-F08, 3.1

S Review of crew procedures for contingency return of AMS-02 to assure that high voltage supplied to the AMS-02 from the Orbiter is turned off prior to entry.


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I/S Summary

AMS-02-F12, 1.1

I Procedural controls calling for the removal of power to the AMS-02 prior to EVA Access of the AMS-02 on the ISS. (Power removal recommended to occur late in EVA process for thermal conditioning.)

AMS-02-F14, 3.1

I, S Identify the sharp edge keep away zone of the Star Tracker optical baffle.

AMS-02-F14, 5.2

I EVA procedures to establish correct process to release stored energy of the AMS-02 to PAS interface and remove the AMS-02 from the PAS.

AMS-02-F14, 6.2

I EVA procedures to call for the use of the EVA power tool to avoid excessive repetitive cycles for release of the AMS-02 from PAS by EVA technique.


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I/S Summary

AMS-02-F12, 1.5

I SSRMS and UMA power lines (even with the same bus designation) may not be interconnected per SSP 57003, the AMS-02 utilizes common buses that could interconnect the two. Operational Controls will require that UMA not be physically connected while the SSRMS is physically (and the reciprocal) connected and that power from the two different sources not be engaged at the same time.

AMS-02-F17, 2.4

I SSRMS and UMA power lines (even with the same bus designation) may not be interconnected per SSP 57003, the AMS-02 utilizes common buses that could interconnect the two. Operational Controls will require that UMA not be physically connected while the SSRMS is physically (and the reciprocal) connected and that power from the two different sources not be engaged at the same time.

The following controls have been established subsequent to AMS-02 Phase II SDP submittal.


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Launch Commit Criteria

One Safety Related LCC During pre-launch activities, the status of the

superfluid helium tank will be monitored for signs of loss of thermal isolation (vacuum case breach/leak). In the event that there is an increase in pressure indicating the loss of thermal isolation, launch will be scrubbed. Monitoring will continue at a minimum to within L-9 minutes. Credible loss of thermal isolation at L-9 minutes can not manifest to an over-pressurization of the Orbiter payload bay hazard in the time available.


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Flight Rules

Flight Rules in Hazard Reports


I, S Flight Rule Summary

AMS-02-F07, 1.3

I The SSRMS will not grapple the AMS-02 until the AMS-02 has discharge the magnetic field either through command or operation of the “watchdog timer”.

AMS-02-F11, 1.3

S Four of four PRLAs and active keel latch must be secured to return with the AMS-02 installed in the Orbiter payload bay.

AMS-02-F18, 1.5

S Four of four PRLAs and active keel latch must be secured to return with the AMS-02 installed in the Orbiter payload bay.

AMS-02-F14, 8.2

I Prior to EVA to AMS-02 Cryomagnet will be Discharged.


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Pre-Review Activity

In response to comments, working group discussions and new data on AMS-02 System, Hazard Reports have been updated

Six (6) were unchanged since submittal March 19th with safety data package.

Fifteen (15) were changes as a result of necessary modifications.


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Unmodified Hazards

AMS-02-F02, “Toxic Material Offgassing “ AMS-02-F10, “Flammable Materials in the Payload

Bay” AMS-02-F15, “Thermal Extremes from Cryogenics” AMS-02-F18, “Rapid Safing/Payload

Reconfiguration” AMS-02-F20, “Crew Exposure to Coherent Light STD-AMS-02-F02, Standard Hazard Report, Orbiter

Interior Elements


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Modified Hazard Reports

AMS-02-F01, “Structural Failure of Hardware” SVM/STATUS Updates Editorial Clarification on Definition of Structural

Fasteners in Control and SVM Updated Attached Tables for Main and Tracker

Radiators


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AMS-02-F03, “Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank, Vacuum Case and/or Cryosystem Pressurized System Element” Added Description of BD18 to Note and Tables. Editorial – Added Acronyms to List Updated Cryosystem Pressure System Tables Updated Cryosystem Schematic for Warm Helium

System Update. Updated References in Pressure Tables


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AMS-02-F04, “Overpressurization of Orbiter Payload Bay ” Deleted Oscillating Heat Pipe from Hazard Report Editorial fixes Added clarification to powered status during

ascent Updated Schematics with Latest Revisions (Warm

Helium Update)


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Modified Hazard Report

AMS-02-F05, “Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized Systems …” Revised Warm Helium System MDP

Removal of High Pressure Burst Disk Removal of Oscillating Heat Pipe Updated TTCS Accumulator Heat Pipe MDP Corrected description in control of heater control for TRD

tank heaters. Editorial Changes Updated Pressure Tables to reflect new and corrected

values. Updated Schematics


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AMS-02-F06, “Excessive Thrust/Overturning Moments” Corrected electrical bus references in control Updated Schematics

AMS-02-F07, “Excessive Field Strengths: EMI, Magnetic (DC Field)” Editorial Corrections, change wording to remove

“radiated” from magnetic descriptions. Clarified SSRMS Power Bus Reference Clarified to have UMA separated for SSRMS Grapple


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AMS-02-F08, “Electric Shock/Discharge” Added Bonding/Grounding Diagrams for PDS and CAB

AMS-02-F09, “Exposure of the Crew to Excessive Ionizing Radiation” Closed SVM 1.1.1 Clarified JSC Form 44 will have to be resubmitted, opened

SVM Status, added note Added Description of composite straw/tube within

calibration tube isolating Fe55 further Clarified graphic error in JSC Form 44 Added/Updated graphics


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AMS-02-F11, “Mechanism Failure” Editorial Change Clarified Open Status of SVM 5.4.3, 5.4.4

AMS-02-F12, “Mate/Demate of Connectors” Change, SSRMS will demate prior to UMA being

connected. Update Control and added SVM.


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AMS-02-F13, “Battery Failure (Leakage/Rupture)” SVM Status with “Closed” Status and TBD

Document Reference was changed to “Open”

AMS-02-F14, “EVA/EVR Hazards” Editorial Clarifications Added ISS Flight Rule to require AMS-02 to have

magnetic field removed prior to EVA to AMS-02.


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AMS-02-F16, “Shatterable Material Release” Added Control to State there are no glass materials

in proximity to EVA translation paths that may be impacted by EVA tools.

AMS-02-F17, “Electrical Power Distribution Damage” Added Control to preclude interconnecting

different RPCM Buses, UMA to SSRMS


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STD-AMS-02-F01, Standard Hazard Report, Exterior Elements Editorial Changes Ignition Source Table Updated Cryosystem Vacuum Pump speed and mass

updated in table

Documents

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May 21-25 2007 1 AMS-02 Safety Summary