LEGWR 2 Cases

8/8/2019 LEGWR 2 Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159357 April28, 2004Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z.VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J. :


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A decision that does notconform to the form andsubstance required by theConstitution and the law isvoid and deemed legally

inexistent. To be valid,decisions should comply withthe form, the procedure andthe substantive requirements

laid out in the Constitution, theRules of Court and relevantcirculars/orders of theSupreme Court. For the

guidance of the bench and thebar, the Court hereby


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discusses these forms,procedures and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, assailing theJune 12, 2003 Decision 2 andJuly 29, 2003 Order 3 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49). 4

The challenged Decision wasthe offshoot of a Petition for

Declaratory Relief 5

filed beforethe RTC-Manila by hereinRespondent Social Justice


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Society (SJS) against hereinPetitioner Mariano "Mike" Z.Velarde, together with HisEminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,Executive Minister Erao

Manalo, Brother EddieVillanueva and Brother EliseoF. Soriano as co-respondents.The Petition prayed for the

resolution of the question"whether or not the act of areligious leader like any of herein respondents, in

endorsing the candidacy of acandidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the


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members of his flock to votefor a specified candidate, isviolative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions xx x." 6

Alleging that the questionedDecision did not contain astatement of facts and adispositive portion, herein

petitioner filed a ClarificatoryMotion and Motion for Reconsideration before thetrial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed aseparate Motion for Reconsideration. In response,


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the trial court issued theassailed Order, which held asfollows:

"x x x [T]his Court cannotreconsider, because what it

was asked to do, was onlyto clarify a Constitutionalprovision and to declarewhether acts are violative

thereof. The Decision didnot make a dispositiveportion because adispositive portion isrequired only in coercivereliefs, where a redress fromwrong suffered and the


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benefit that the prevailingparty wronged should get.The step that these movantshave to take, is directappeal under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, for aconclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provisionto the Supreme Court." 7

The AntecedentProceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJSfiled a Petition for DeclaratoryRelief ("SJS Petition") beforethe RTC-Manila against


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Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registeredpolitical party, sought theinterpretation of severalconstitutional provisions, 8

specifically on the separationof church and state; and adeclaratory judgment on theconstitutionality of the acts of

religious leaders endorsing acandidate for an electiveoffice, or urging or requiringthe members of their flock to

vote for a specified candidate.The subsequent proceedingswere recounted in the


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challenged Decision in thesewords:

"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanuevasubmitted, within the originalperiod [to file an Answer], a

Motion to Dismiss.Subsequently, ExecutiveMinister Erao Manalo andBro. Mike Velarde, filed their

Motions to Dismiss. WhileHis Eminence JaimeCardinal L. Sin, filed aComment and Bro. EliSoriano, filed an Answer within the extended periodand similarly prayed for the


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dismissal of the Petition. Allsought the dismissal of thePetition on the commongrounds that it does notstate a cause of action and

that there is no justiciablecontroversy. They wereordered to submit a pleadingby way of advisement,

which was closely followedby another Order denying allthe Motions to Dismiss. Bro.Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie

Villanueva and ExecutiveMinister Erao Manalomoved to reconsider the


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the motions to dismiss x xx."9

After narrating the aboveincidents, the trial court saidthat it had jurisdiction over the

Petition, because "in prayingfor a determination as towhether the actions imputed tothe respondents are violative

of Article II, Section 6 of theFundamental Law, [thePetition] has raised only aquestion of law." 10 It thenproceeded to a lengthydiscussion of the issue raisedin the Petition the separation


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of church and state eventracing, to some extent, thehistorical background of theprinciple. Through itsdiscourse, the court a quo

opined at some point that the"[e]ndorsement of specificcandidates in an election toany public office is a clear

violation of the separationclause." 11

After its essay on the legalissue, however, the trial courtfailed to include a dispositiveportion in its assailed Decision.Thus, Velarde and Soriano


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filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, asmentioned earlier, were deniedby the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for

Review.12

This Court, in a Resolution 13

dated September 2, 2003,required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) tosubmit their respectivecomments. In the sameResolution, the Court gave theother parties -- impleaded asrespondents in the original


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case below --the opportunity tocomment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Courten banc conducted an OralArgument. 14

The IssuesIn his Petition, Brother MikeVelarde submits the following

issues for this Courtsresolution:

"1. Whether or not theDecision dated 12 June2003 rendered by the courta quo was proper and valid;


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"2. Whether or not thereexists justiceablecontroversy in hereinrespondents Petition for declaratory relief;

"3. Whether or not hereinrespondent has legalinterest in filing the Petitionfor declaratory relief;

"4. Whether or not theconstitutional questionsought to be resolved byherein respondent is ripe for

judicial determination;


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"5. Whether or not there isadequate remedy other thanthe declaratory relief; and,

"6. Whether or not the courta quo has jurisdiction over

the Petition for declaratoryrelief of hereinrespondent." 15

During the Oral Argument, theissues were narrowed downand classified as follows:

"A. Procedural Issues

"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a

justiciable controversy? Did


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it state a cause of action?Did respondent have anylegal standing to file thePetition for DeclaratoryRelief?

"B. Substantive Issues"1. Did the RTC Decisionconform to the form andsubstance required by theConstitution, the law andthe Rules of Court?

"2. May religious leaders

like herein petitioner, Bro.Mike Velarde, beprohibited from endorsing


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candidates for publicoffice? Corollarily, maythey be banned fromcampaigning against saidcandidates?"

The Courts RulingThe Petition of Brother MikeVelarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:Requisites of Petitions for

Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of theRules of Court, which deals


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with petitions for declaratoryrelief, provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any personinterested under a deed,

will, contract or other writteninstrument, whose rights areaffected by a statute,executive order or

regulation, ordinance, or anyother governmentalregulation may, beforebreach or violation thereof,bring an action in theappropriate Regional TrialCourt to determine any


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question of construction or validity arising, and for adeclaration of his rights or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an

action for declaratory relief should be filed by a personinterested under a deed, a will,a contract or other written

instrument, and whose rightsare affected by a statute, anexecutive order, a regulationor an ordinance. The purposeof the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of thewritten instrument and to seek


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Brother Mike Velarde contendsthat the SJS Petition failed toallege, much less establishbefore the trial court, that thereexisted a justiciable

controversy or an adverselegal interest between them;and that SJS had a legal rightthat was being violated or

threatened to be violated bypetitioner. On the contrary,Velarde alleges that SJSpremised its action on mere

speculations, contingentevents, and hypotheticalissues that had not yet ripened


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into an actual controversy.Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.

A justiciable controversy refersto an existing case or

controversy that is appropriateor ripe for judicialdetermination, not one that isconjectural or merely

anticipatory. 18 The SJS Petitionfor Declaratory Relief fell shortof this test. It miserably failedto allege an existingcontroversy or disputebetween the petitioner and thenamed respondents therein.


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Further, the Petition did notsufficiently state what specificlegal right of the petitioner wasviolated by the respondentstherein; and what particular act

or acts of the latter were inbreach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother

Eliseo F. Soriano in hisComment, 19 what exactly hashe done that merited theattention of SJS? Heconfesses that he does notknow the answer, because theSJS Petition (as well as the


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assailed Decision of the RTC)"yields nothing in this respect."His Eminence, Jaime CardinalSin, adds that, at the time SJSfiled its Petition on January 28,

2003, the election season hadnot even started yet; and that,in any event, he has not beenactively involved in partisan

politics.An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial courtshould contain "a plain,concise and direct statementof the ultimate facts on whichthe party pleading relies for his


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claim x x x." 20 Yet, the SJSPetition stated no ultimatefacts.

Indeed, SJS merelyspeculated or anticipated

without factual moorings that,as religious leaders, thepetitioner and his co-respondents below had

endorsed or threatened toendorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices;and that such actual or threatened endorsement "willenable [them] to elect men topublic office who [would] in


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turn be forever beholden totheir leaders, enabling them tocontrol the government"[;] 21

and "pos[ing] a clear andpresent danger of serious

erosion of the peoples faith inthe electoral process[;] andreinforc[ing] their belief thatreligious leaders determine the

ultimate result of elections,"22

which would then be violativeof the separation clause.

Such premise is highlyspeculative and merelytheoretical, to say the least.Clearly, it does not suffice to


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constitute a justiciablecontroversy. The Petition doesnot even allege any indicationor manifest intent on the partof any of the respondents

below to champion anelectoral candidate, or to urgetheir so-called flock to vote for,or not to vote for, a particular

candidate. It is a time-honoredrule that sheer speculationdoes not give rise to anactionable right.

Obviously, there is no factualallegation that SJS rights arebeing subjected to any


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threatened, imminent andinevitable violation that shouldbe prevented by thedeclaratory relief sought. The

judicial power and duty of the

courts to settle actualcontroversies involving rightsthat are legally demandableand enforceable 23 cannot be

exercised when there is noactual or threatened violationof a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJSPetition prayed for was "thatthe question raised inparagraph 9 hereof be


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resolved." 24 In other words, itmerely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether thespeculated acts of religiousleaders endorsing elective

candidates for political officesviolated the constitutionalprinciple on the separation of church and state. SJS did not

ask for a declaration of itsrights and duties; neither did itpray for the stoppage of anythreatened violation of its

declared rights. Courts,however, are proscribed from


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rendering an advisoryopinion. 25

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts thatin order to maintain a petitionfor declaratory relief, a causeof action need not be allegedor proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, thereneed not be any violation of aright, breach of duty or actualwrong committed by one partyagainst the other.

Petitioner, on the other hand,argues that the subject matter


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of an action for declaratoryrelief should be a deed, a will,a contract (or other writteninstrument), a statute, anexecutive order, a regulation

or an ordinance. But thesubject matter of the SJSPetition is "the constitutionalityof an act of a religious leader

to endorse the candidacy of acandidate for elective office or to urge or require themembers of the flock to vote

for a specified candidate."26

According to petitioner, thissubject matter is "beyond the


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on the part of the nameddefendant to respect or not toviolate such right; and (3) suchdefendants act or omissionthat is violative of the right of

the plaintiff or constituting abreach of the obligation of theformer to the latter. 29

The failure of a complaint to

state a cause of action is aground for its outrightdismissal. 30 However, inspecial civil actions for declaratory relief, the conceptof a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not


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strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an actionfor declaratory relief presupposes that there hasbeen no actual breach of the

instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. 31

Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending,

imminent or at leastthreatened.

A perusal of the Petition filedby SJS before the RTCdiscloses no explicit allegationthat the former had any legalright in its favor that it sought


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to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in itsfavor, from its bare allegationthat it "has thousands of members who are citizens-

taxpayers-registered votersand who are keenly interestedin a judicial clarification of theconstitutionality of the partisan

participation of religiousleaders in Philippine politicsand in the process to insureadherence to the Constitution

by everyone x x x."32

Such general averment doesnot, however, suffice to


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in a declaratory judgmentaction does not seek toenforce a claim against [the]defendant, but seeks a judicialdeclaration of [the] rights of the

parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct,and the essential distinctionbetween a declaratory

judgment action and the usualaction is that no actual wrongneed have been committed or loss have occurred in order to

sustain the declaratory judgment action, althoughthere must be no uncertainty


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that the loss will occur or thatthe asserted rights will beinvaded." 35

SJS has, however, ignored thecrucial point of its own

reference that there must beno uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded .

Precisely, as discussed earlier,it merely conjectures thatherein petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in partisanpolitics, use "the awesomevoting strength of its faithful


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Indeed, the Court finds in thePetition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of factupon which SJS could base aright of relief from the named

respondents. In any event,even granting that it sufficientlyasserted a legal right it soughtto protect, there was

nevertheless no certainty thatsuch right would be invaded bythe said respondents. Noteven the alleged proximity of

the elections to the time thePetition was filed below(January 28, 2003) would have


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instrument, as distinguishedfrom a mere incidental interestin the question involved. 38

Petitioner alleges that "[i]nseeking declaratory relief as to

the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse,or require the members of thereligious flock to vote for a

specific candidate, hereinRespondent SJS has no legalinterest in the controversy"; 39 ithas failed to establish how theresolution of the profferedquestion would benefit or injure it.


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Parties bringing suitschallenging theconstitutionality of a law, anact or a statute must show "notonly that the law [or act] is

invalid, but also that [theyhave] sustained or [are] inimmediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury

as a result of its enforcement,and not merely that [they]suffer thereby in someindefinite way." 40 They must

demonstrate that they havebeen, or are about to be,denied some right or privilege


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to which they are lawfullyentitled, or that they are aboutto be subjected to someburdens or penalties by reasonof the statute or act

complained of.41

First, parties suing astaxpayers must specificallyprove that they have sufficient

interest in preventing theillegal expenditure of moneyraised by taxation. 42 Ataxpayers action may beproperly brought only whenthere is an exercise byCongress of its taxing or


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spending power. 43 In thepresent case, there is noallegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers moneyis being illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showingin the Petition for DeclaratoryRelief that SJS as a politicalparty or its members as

registered voters would beadversely affected by thealleged acts of therespondents below, if thequestion at issue was notresolved. There was noallegation that SJS had


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only is the presumed interestimpersonal in character; it islikewise too vague, highlyspeculative and uncertain tosatisfy the requirement of

standing.45

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges theCourt to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legalstanding, considering that "theissues raised are of paramountpublic interest."

In not a few cases, the Courthas liberalized the locus standi


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requirement when a petitionraises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to thepeople. 46 Recently, after

holding that the IBP had nolocus standi to bring the suit,the Court in IBP v. Zamora 47

nevertheless entertained the

Petition therein. It noted that"the IBP has advancedconstitutional issues whichdeserve the attention of this

Court in view of their seriousness, novelty andweight as precedents." 48


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Similarly in the instant case,the Court deemed theconstitutional issue raised inthe SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the

Filipino people. The issue didnot simply concern adelineation of the separationbetween church and state, but

ran smack into the governanceof our country. The issue wasboth transcendental inimportance and novel in

nature, since it had never beendecided before.


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The Court, thus, called for OralArgument to determine withcertainty whether it couldresolve the constitutional issuedespite the barren allegations

in the SJS Petition as well asthe abbreviated proceedings inthe court below. Much to itschagrin, however, counsels for

the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made nosatisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply

the deficiencies hereinabovediscussed. Hence, even if theCourt would exempt this case


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from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effortwould be futile because thetranscendental issue cannotbe resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Beforethe Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of thiswaste of precious judicial timeand effort, and for theguidance of the bench and thebar, the Court reiterates theelementary procedure 49 thatmust be followed by trial courtsin the conduct of civil cases. 50


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Prefatorily, the trial court may-- motu proprio or upon motionof the defendant -- dismiss acomplaint 51 (or petition, in aspecial civil action) that does

not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causesof action. 52 A complaint or petition should contain "a

plain, concise and directstatement of the ultimate factson which the party pleadingrelies for his claim or

defense."53

It should likewiseclearly specify the relief sought. 54


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Upon the filing of thecomplaint/petition and thepayment of the requisite legalfees, the clerk of court shallforthwith issue the

corresponding summons to thedefendants or therespondents, with a directivethat the defendant answer 55

within 15 days, unless adifferent period is fixed by thecourt. 56 The summons shallalso contain a notice that if

such answer is not filed, theplaintiffs/petitioners shall takea judgment by default and may


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be granted the relief appliedfor. 57 The court, however, may-- upon such terms as may be

just -- allow an answer to befiled after the time fixed by the

Rules.58

If the answer sets forth acounterclaim or cross-claim, itmust be answered within ten

(10) days from service. 59 Areply may be filed within ten(10) days from service of thepleading responded to. 60

When an answer fails totender an issue or admits the


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material allegations of theadverse partys pleading, thecourt may, on motion of thatparty, direct judgment on suchpleading (except in actions for

declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation). 61 Meanwhile,a party seeking to recover

upon a claim, a counterclaimor crossclaim -- or to obtain adeclaratory relief -- may, atany time after the answer

thereto has been served,move for a summary judgmentin its favor. 62 Similarly, a party


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against whom a claim, acounterclaim or crossclaim isasserted -- or a declaratoryrelief sought -- may, at anytime, move for a summary

judgment in its favor.63

After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall berendered forthwith if there is a

showing that, except as to theamount of damages, there isno genuine issue as to anymaterial fact; and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 64


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Within the time for -- butbefore -- filing the answer tothe complaint or petition, thedefendant may file a motion todismiss based on any of the

grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.During the hearing of themotion, the parties shall

submit their arguments on thequestions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact. 65 After the hearing, the

court may dismiss the actionor claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the


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pleadings. It shall not defer theresolution of the motion for thereason that the ground reliedupon is not indubitable. Inevery case, the resolution shall

state clearly and distinctly thereasons therefor. 66

If the motion is denied, themovant may file an answer

within the balance of theperiod originally prescribed tofile an answer, but not lessthan five (5) days in any event,computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If thepleading is ordered to be


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amended, the defendant shallfile an answer within fifteen(15) days, counted from theservice of the amendedpleading, unless the court

provides a longer period.67

After the last pleading hasbeen served and filed, thecase shall be set for pretrial, 68

which is a mandatoryproceeding. 69 A plaintiffs/petitioners (or its dulyauthorized representatives)non-appearance at the pretrial,if without valid cause, shallresult in the dismissal of the


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action with prejudice, unlessthe court orders otherwise. Asimilar failure on the part of thedefendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner

to present evidence ex parte ,and the court to render judgment on the basisthereof. 70

The parties are required to filetheir pretrial briefs; failure todo so shall have the sameeffect as failure to appear atthe pretrial. 71 Upon thetermination thereof, the courtshall issue an order reciting in


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detail the matters taken up atthe conference; the actiontaken on them, theamendments allowed to thepleadings; and the agreements

or admissions, if any, made bythe parties regarding any of the matters considered. 72 Theparties may further avail

themselves of any of themodes of discovery, 73 if theyso wish.

Thereafter, the case shall beset for trial, 74 in which theparties shall adduce their respective evidence in support


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of their claims and/or defenses. By their writtenconsent or upon theapplication of either party, or on its own motion, the court

may also order any or all of theissues to be referred to acommissioner, who is to beappointed by it or to be agreed

upon by the parties.75

The trialor hearing before thecommissioner shall proceed inall respects as it would if held

before the court.76

Upon the completion of suchproceedings, the


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commissioner shall file withthe court a written report onthe matters referred by theparties. 77 The report shall beset for hearing, after which the

court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part;or recommitting it with

instructions; or requiring theparties to present further evidence before thecommissioner or the court. 78

Finally, a judgment or finalorder determining the merits of the case shall be rendered.


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The decision shall be inwriting, personally and directlyprepared by the judge, statingclearly and distinctly the factsand the law on which it is

based, signed by the issuingmagistrate, and filed with theclerk of court. 79

Based on these elementary

guidelines, let us examine theproceedings before the trialcourt in the instant case.

First, with respect to theinitiatory pleading of the SJS.Even a cursory perusal of the


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Petition immediately reveals itsgross inadequacy. It containedno statement of ultimate factsupon which the petitioner relied for its claim.

Furthermore, it did not specifythe relief it sought from thecourt, but merely asked it toanswer a hypothetical

question.Relief, as contemplated in alegal action, refers to a specificcoercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of therights of a plaintiff or apetitioner. 80 As already


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discussed earlier, the Petitionbefore the trial court had noallegations of fact 81 or of anyspecific violation of thepetitioners rights, which the

respondents had a duty torespect. Such deficiencyamounted to a failure to statea cause of action; hence, no

coercive relief could be soughtand adjudicated. The Petitionevidently lacked substantiverequirements and, we repeat,

should have been dismissed atthe outset.


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Second, with respect to thetrial court proceedings. Withinthe period set to file their respective answers to the SJSPetition, Velarde, Villanueva

and Manalo filed Motions toDismiss; Cardinal Sin, aComment; and Soriano, withina priorly granted extended

period, an Answer in which helikewise prayed for thedismissal of the Petition. 82 SJSfiled a Rejoinder to the Motion

of Velarde, who subsequentlyfiled a Sur-Rejoinder.Supposedly, there were


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"several scheduled settings, inwhich the "[c]ourt wasapprised of the respectivepositions of the parties." 83 Thenature of such settings --

whether pretrial or trialhearings -- was not disclosedin the records. Before ruling onthe Motions to Dismiss, the

trial court issued an Order 84

dated May 8, 2003, directingthe parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly

thereafter was another Order 85

dated May 14, 2003, denyingall the Motions to Dismiss.


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Dismiss did not state anyreason at all for their denial, incontravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There wasnot even any statement of the

grounds relied upon by theMotions; much less, of thelegal findings and conclusionsof the trial court.

Thus, Velarde, Villanueva andManalo moved for reconsideration. Pending theresolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanuevafiled a Motion to suspend thefiling of the parties


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memoranda. But instead of separately resolving thepending Motions fairly andsquarely, the trial court againtransgressed the Rules of

Court when it immediatelyproceeded to issue itsDecision, even before tacklingthe issues raised in those

Motions.Furthermore, the RTC issuedits "Decision" without allowingthe parties to file their answers. For this reason,there was no joinder of theissues. If only it had allowed


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the filing of those answers, thetrial court would have known,as the Oral Argumentrevealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below

had not committed or threatened to commit the actattributed to them (endorsingcandidates) -- the act that was

supposedly the factual basis of the suit.

Parenthetically, the court aquo further failed to give anotice of the Petition to theOSG, which was entitled to beheard upon questions


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involving the constitutionalityor validity of statutes and other measures. 87

Moreover, as will be discussedin more detail, the questioned

Decision of the trial court wasutterly wanting in therequirements prescribed bythe Constitution and the Rules

of Court.All in all, during the looselyabbreviated proceedings of thecase, the trial court indeedacted with inexplicable haste,with total ignorance of the law


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-- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with graveabuse of discretion.

Contrary to the contentions of

the trial judge and of SJS,proceedings for declaratoryrelief must still follow theprocess described above -- the

petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings mustundergo the procedureoutlined in the Rules of Court;and the decision must adhereto constitutional and legalrequirements.


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Consistent with thisconstitutional mandate,Section 1 of Rule 36 of theRules on Civil Proceduresimilarly provides:

"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders . A judgment or final order determining the merits of the

case shall be in writingpersonally and directlyprepared by the judge,stating clearly and distinctlythe facts and the law onwhich it is based, signed by


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him and filed with the clerkof court."

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Courton Criminal Procedure reads

as follows:"Sec. 2. Form and contentsof judgments. -- The

judgment must be written inthe official language,personally and directlyprepared by the judge andsigned by him and shallcontain clearly and distinctlya statement of the facts


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proved or admitted by theaccused and the law uponwhich the judgment isbased.

"x x x x x x x x

x."Pursuant to the Constitution,this Court also issued onJanuary 28, 1988,Administrative Circular No. 1,prompting all judges "to makecomplete findings of facts intheir decisions, and scrutinizeclosely the legal aspects of thecase in the light of the


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evidence presented. Theyshould avoid the tendency togeneralize and formconclusions without detailingthe facts from which such

conclusions are deduced."In many cases, 89 this Courthas time and time againreminded "magistrates to heed

the demand of Section 14,Article VIII of the Constitution."The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. inYao v. Court of Appeals, 90discussed at length the


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implications of this provisionand strongly exhorted thus:

"Faithful adherence to therequirements of Section 14,Article VIII of the Constitution

is indisputably a paramountcomponent of due process andfair play. It is likewisedemanded by the due process

clause of the Constitution. Theparties to a litigation should beinformed of how it wasdecided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasonsthat led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot


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simply say that judgment isrendered in favor of X andagainst Y and just leave it atthat without any justificationwhatsoever for its action. The

losing party is entitled to knowwhy he lost, so he may appealto the higher court, if permitted, should he believe

that the decision should bereversed. A decision that doesnot clearly and distinctly statethe facts and the law on which

it is based leaves the parties inthe dark as to how it wasreached and is precisely


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prejudicial to the losing party,who is unable to pinpoint thepossible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.More than that, the

requirement is an assurance tothe parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did sothrough the processes of legal

reasoning. It is, thus, asafeguard against theimpetuosity of the judge,preventing him from deciding

ipse dixit . Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by theConstitution but nonetheless


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vested with the sovereignprerogative of passing

judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the

judge must ultimately depend

on the power of reason for sustained public confidence inthe justness of his decision."

In People v. Bugarin, 91 the

Court also explained:"The requirement that thedecisions of courts must bein writing and that they mustset forth clearly anddistinctly the facts and the


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law on which they are basedserves many functions. It isintended, among other things, to inform the partiesof the reason or reasons for

the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can pointout to the appellate court thefinding of facts or the rulings

on points of law with whichhe disagrees. More thanthat, the requirement is anassurance to the parties

that, in reaching judgment,the judge did so through the


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processes of legalreasoning. x x x."

Indeed, elementary dueprocess demands that theparties to a litigation be given

information on how the casewas decided, as well as anexplanation of the factual andlegal reasons that led to the

conclusions of the court. 92In Madrid v. Court of

Appeals, 93 this Court hadinstructed magistrates to exerteffort to ensure that their decisions would present a


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comprehensive analysis or account of the factual andlegal findings that wouldsubstantially address theissues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starklyobvious that the assailedDecision contains nostatement of facts -- much less

an assessment or analysisthereof -- or of the courtsfindings as to the probablefacts. The assailed Decisionbegins with a statement of thenature of the action and thequestion or issue presented.


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clearly and distinctly the factson which it was based. Thus,the trial court clearlytransgressed the constitutionaldirective.

The significance of factualfindings lies in the value of thedecision as a precedent. Howcan it be so if one cannot

apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simplybecause such circumstancesare unknown? Otherwisestated, how will the ruling beapplied in the future, if there is


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is the investitive or controlling factor thatdetermines and settles therights of the parties and thequestions presented therein,

notwithstanding theexistence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be

confusing."The assailed Decision in thepresent case leaves us in thedark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, theoriginal Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what


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relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of theparties did it conclusivelydeclare? Its final statementsays, "SO ORDERED." But

what exactly did the courtorder? It had the temerity tolabel its issuance a "Decision,"when nothing was in fact

decided.Respondent SJS insists thatthe dispositive portion can befound in the body of theassailed Decision. It claimsthat the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally


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"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannotsupply deficiencies in thedispositive portion. It is amere opinion of the court

and the rule is settled thatwhere there is a conflictbetween the dispositive partand the opinion, the former

must prevail over the latter on the theory that thedispositive portion is thefinal order while the opinion

is merely a statementordering nothing." (Italics inthe original)


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circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with theconstitutional injunction is agrave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in carelessdisregard of the constitutional

mandate are a patent nullityand must be struck down asvoid. 97

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential partsof a good decision consist of


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the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignmentof errors; (4) court ruling, inwhich each issue is, as a rule,

separately considered andresolved; and, finally, (5)dispositive portion. The

ponente may also opt to

include an introduction or aprologue as well as anepilogue, especially in cases inwhich controversial or novel

issues are involved.98

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive


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statement of the principalfactual or legal issue/s of thecase. In some cases --particularly those concerningpublic interest; or involving

complicated commercial,scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters-- a longer introduction or

prologue may serve toacquaint readers with thespecific nature of thecontroversy and the issues

involved. An epilogue may bea summation of the importantprinciples applied to the


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resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also laydown an enduring philosophyof law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for theguidance of the bench and thebar, discuss the essential partsof a good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Caseconsists of a legal definition of

the nature of the action. At thefirst instance, this part stateswhether the action is a civil


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In a criminal case, theverbatim reproduction of thecriminal information serves asa guide in determining thenature and the gravity of the

offense for which the accusedmay be found culpable. As arule, the accused cannot beconvicted of a crime different

from or graver than thatcharged.

Also, quoting verbatim the textof the information is especiallyimportant when there is aquestion on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether


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qualifying and modifyingcircumstances have beenadequately alleged therein.

To ensure that due process isaccorded, it is important to

give a short description of theproceedings regarding theplea of the accused. Absenceof an arraignment, or a serious

irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellatecourt would be futile. In someinstances, especially inappealed cases, it would alsobe useful to mention the fact of


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the appellants detention, inorder to dispose of thepreliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or

jumping bail.Mentioning the court of originand the case number originallyassigned helps in facilitating

the consolidation of therecords of the case in both thetrial and the appellate courts,after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of thedecretal portion of the assailed


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the defendant or defense issummarized according to the

judges best light. Third, in thesubjective method, the versionof the facts accepted by the

judge is simply narratedwithout explaining what theparties versions are. Finally,through a combination of

objective and subjectivemeans, the testimony of eachwitness is reported and the

judge then formulates his or

her own version of the facts.In criminal cases, it is better topresent both the version of the


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prosecution and that of thedefense, in the interest of fairness and due process. Adetailed evaluation of thecontentions of the parties must

follow. The resolution of mostcriminal cases, unlike civil andother cases, depends to alarge extent on the factual

issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibilityor the implausibility of eachversion can sometimes be

initially drawn from a readingof the facts. Thereafter, thebases of the court in arriving at


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its findings and conclusionsshould be explained.

On appeal, the fact that theassailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and

correctly resolved all factualand legal issues involved maypartly explain why thereviewing court finds no

reason to reverse the findingsand conclusions of the former.Conversely, the lower courtspatent misappreciation of thefacts or misapplication of thelaw would aid in a better


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understanding of why its rulingis reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, theopposing sets of facts nolonger need to be presented.

Issues for resolution usuallyinvolve questions of law, graveabuse of discretion, or want of

jurisdiction; hence, the facts of

the case are often undisputedby the parties. With fewexceptions, factual issues arenot entertained in non-criminalcases. Consequently, thenarration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear,


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may be reproduced; otherwise,the material factualantecedents should berestated in the words of thereviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whosedecision is under reviewshould be laid out, in order that

the parties may clearlyunderstand why the lower court ruled in a certain way,and why the reviewing courteither finds no reason toreverse it or concludesotherwise.


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3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issuesshould be stated. On appeal,the assignment of errors, as

mentioned in the appellantsbrief, may be reproduced intoto and tackled seriatim, soas to avoid motions for

reconsideration of the finaldecision on the ground that thecourt failed to consider allassigned errors that couldaffect the outcome of the case.But when the appellantpresents repetitive issues or


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when the assigned errors donot strike at the main issue,these may be restated inclearer and more coherentterms.

Though not specificallyquestioned by the parties,additional issues may also beincluded, if deemed important

for substantial justice to berendered. Note that appealedcriminal cases are given denovo review, in contrast tononcriminal cases in which thereviewing court is generallylimited to issues specifically


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raised in the appeal. The fewexceptions are errors of

jurisdiction; questions notraised but necessary inarriving at a just decision on

the case; or unassigned errorsthat are closely related tothose properly assigned, or upon which depends the

determination of the questionproperly raised.

4. The Courts Ruling

This part contains a fulldiscussion of the specificerrors or issues raised in the


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complaint, petition or appeal,as the case may be; as well asof other issues the courtdeems essential to a justdisposition of the case. Where

there are several issues, eachone of them should beseparately addressed, asmuch as practicable. The

respective contentions of theparties should also bementioned here. Whenprocedural questions are

raised in addition tosubstantive ones, it is better to


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resolve the former preliminarily.

5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, thedisposition should include afinding of innocence or guilt,the specific crime committed,the penalty imposed, theparticipation of the accused,the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability andcosts. In case an acquittal isdecreed, the court must order the immediate release of the


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the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied.First, the parties should knowtheir rights and obligations.Second, they should know

how to execute the decisionunder alternativecontingencies. Third, thereshould be no need for further

proceedings to dispose of theissues. Fourth, the caseshould be terminated byaccording the proper relief.

The "proper relief" usuallydepends upon what the partiesseek in their pleadings. It may


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declare their rights and duties,command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specificacts. The disposition must also

adjudicate costs.The foregoing parts need notalways be discussed insequence. But they should all

be present and plainlyidentifiable in the decision.Depending on the writerscharacter, genre and style, thelanguage should be fresh andfree-flowing, not necessarilystereotyped or in a fixed form;


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much less highfalutin,hackneyed and pretentious. Atall times, however, thedecision must be clear,concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:Religious Leaders Endorsement

of Candidates for Public Office

The basic question posed inthe SJS Petition -- WHETHERENDORSEMENTS OFCANDIDACIES BYRELIGIOUS LEADERS IS


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UNCONSTITUTIONAL --undoubtedly deserves seriousconsideration. As statedearlier, the Court deems thisconstitutional issue to be of

paramount interest to theFilipino citizenry, for itconcerns the governance of our country and its people.

Thus, despite the obviousprocedural transgressions byboth SJS and the trial court,this Court still called for Oral

Argument, so as not to leaveany doubt that there might beroom to entertain and dispose


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of the SJS Petition on themerits.

Counsel for SJS has utterlyfailed, however, to convincethe Court that there are

enough factual and legalbases to resolve theparamount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor

General has sided withpetitioner insofar as there areno facts supporting the SJSPetition and the assailedDecision.


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We reiterate that the saidPetition failed to state directlythe ultimate facts that it reliedupon for its claim. During theOral Argument, counsel for

SJS candidly admitted thatthere were no factualallegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither

were there factual findings inthe assailed Decision. At best,SJS merely asked the trialcourt to answer a hypothetical

question. In effect, it merelysought an advisory opinion,the rendition of which was


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beyond the courtsconstitutional mandate and

jurisdiction. 99

Indeed, the assailed Decisionwas rendered in clear violation

of the Constitution, because itmade no findings of facts andfinal disposition. Hence, it isvoid and deemed legally

inexistent. Consequently, thereis nothing for this Court toreview, affirm, reverse or even

just modify.

Regrettably, it is not legallypossible for the Court to take


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up, on the merits, theparamount question involvinga constitutional principle. It is atime-honored rule that "theconstitutionality of a statute [or

act] will be passed upon onlyif, and to the extent that, it isdirectly and necessarilyinvolved in a justiciable

controversy and is essential tothe protection of the rights of the parties concerned." 100

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother MikeVelarde is GRANTED . Theassailed June 12, 2003


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Decision and July 29, 2003Order of the Regional TrialCourt of Manila (Branch 49)are hereby DECLARED NULL

AND VOID and thus SET

ASIDE . The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief isDISMISSED for failure to statea cause of action.

Let a copy of this Decision befurnished the Office of theCourt Administrator toevaluate and recommendwhether the trial judge may,after observing due process,be held administratively liable


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for rendering a decisionviolative of the Constitution,the Rules of Court andrelevant circulars of this Court.No costs.

SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Puno,Panganiban, Quisumbing,Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,and Tinga, JJ., concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738October 6, 2010

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-

2033-MTJ)CIRILA S. RAYMUNDO,

Complainant,vs.

JUDGE TERESITO A.ANDOY, Municipal Trial


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Court (MTC), Cainta, Rizal,Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolutionthe administrative complaintfor violation of Rule 3.05,Canon 3 1 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct filed bycomplainant Cirila S.Raymundo (complainant)against respondent Judge

Teresito A. Andoy.In her complaint-affidavit, 2 thecomplainant alleged that
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt1


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sometime in 2000, she filed sixcounts 3 of violation of BatasPambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.22) against Hermelinda Chang(accused) before the Municipal

Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta,Rizal. The respondent judgepresided over the court.

The trial of the cases ended on

August 4, 2004 after therespondent judge declared 4

that the accused had waivedher rights to present further evidence for repeated failureto appear in court despite duenotice. On September 2, 2004,


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the complainant received anotice from the MTC, settingthe cases for trial anew onNovember 17, 2004. The datewas later moved to December

20, 2004.On December 20, 2004, theaccused and her counselagain failed to appear in court,

prompting the privateprosecutor to move for thereinstatement of the MTCsAugust 4, 2004 order. Therespondent judge granted themotion and declared the casessubmitted for decision. 5 The
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/oct2010/am_mtj-09-1738_2010.html#fnt5


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accused moved to reconsider this order; the MTC grantedthe motion in its order of February 9, 2005. Accordingly,the cases were again set for

hearing on October 12, 2005.On October 12, 2005, theaccused and her counselagain failed to appear in court

despite due notice. The MTC,thus, ordered the directtestimony of the accused to bestricken off the record, andagain declared the casessubmitted for decision. 6


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On June 23, 2006, thecomplainant filed with the MTCan urgent ex parte motion torender decision. 7 Almost twoyears later, or on March 12,

2008, the complainant filed asecond ex parte motion torender decision. 8 Therespondent judge did not act

on these motions.The Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) requiredthe respondent judge tocomment on the complaint.The respondent judge


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responded with the followingexplanation:

1. He had prepared hisdecision in the subjectcases, dated July 19, 2008,

and had set the same for promulgation on August 18,2008, at 8:30 in themorning;

2. The only first level courtin Cainta, Rizal, this Courthas an average activecaseload of 1,562 cases. Anaverage of 87 new casesare filed each month. It


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The OCA, in its Report 10 datedFebruary 5, 2009, made thefollowing recommendations:(1) the instant case be re-docketed as a regular

administrative matter; and (2)the respondent judge be foundguilty of undue delay inrendering a decision, and a

fine of P20,000.00 beimposed, to be deducted fromhis retirementbenefits. 1avvphi1

The OCA explained that whilethe Court is not unaware of theheavy caseload of judges,


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nothing in the records showsthat the respondent judgeasked for an extension of timeto decide the subject criminalcases. In addition, the

respondent judge failed toconsider that the subject casesrequired a quicker resolutionas they were covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure.THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, weresolve to adopt the findingsand recommendations of theOCA.


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We stress at the outset thatthe subject criminal cases violation of B.P. Blg. 22 areindeed covered by the Rule onSummary Procedure pursuant

to A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC (Re:Amendment to the Rule onSummary Procedure of Criminal Cases).

The Rule on SummaryProcedure was promulgatedby the Supreme Court toachieve an expeditious andinexpensive disposition of cases. Section 17 of this Rulerequires the court to


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promulgate a judgment notlater than thirty (30) days after termination of trial. Trial in thepresent case originally endedon August 4, 2004. For

reasons not stated in therecords, the cases were againset for trial on November 17,2004 and later moved to

December 20, 2004. The MTCordered the cases submittedfor decision when the accusedonce again failed to appear in

court on December 20, 2004.The MTC reconsidered thisorder and again set the case


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for hearing on October 12,2005. The MTC ordered thetestimony of the accused to bestricken off the record anddeclared the cases again

submitted for decision when,again, she failed despite duenotice to appear in court onOctober 12, 2005.

From this sequence of events,we find it clear that therespondent judge failed toobserve the mandated periodof time to decide cases under the Rule on SummaryProcedure. Following Section


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17 of this Rule, he should haverendered a decision within 30days from the termination of trial on August 4, 2004. Evenassuming that the subsequent

resettings of the cases for trialwere valid, he should haverendered a decision within 30days from October 12, 2005,

or the date the cases werefinally considered submittedfor decision. His failure to meetthis deadline is a patent

indication that he did not takeinto account and had


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disregarded the Rule onSummary Procedure.

At any rate, even if we adopt aliberal approach and consider the subject cases to be outside

the coverage of the Rule onSummary Procedure, therespondent judge still cannotescape liability.

The Constitution mandatesthat all cases or matters filedbefore all lower courts shall bedecided or resolved within 90days from the time the case issubmitted for decision. 11


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Judges are enjoined todispose of the courts businesspromptly and expeditiouslyand to decide cases within theperiod fixed by law. Failure to

comply with the mandatedperiod constitutes a seriousviolation of the constitutionalright of the parties to a speedy

disposition of their cases alapse that undermines thepeoples faith and confidencein the judiciary, lowers its

standards and brings it todisrepute. 12 This constitutionalpolicy is reiterated in Rule


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3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct whichrequires a judge to dispose of the courts business promptlyand decide cases within the

required periods.In the present case, thesubject cases had beensubmitted for decision since

October 12, 2005. As correctlypointed out by the OCA, whilethe respondent judgeattributed his failure to render a decision to the heavycaseload in his sala, he did notask for an extension of time to


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decide the cases. This failureto decide within the requiredperiod, given that he couldhave asked for an extension,is inexcusable; it constitutes

neglect of duty as well asgross inefficiency thatcollectively warrantadministrative sanction.

We cannot tolerate unduedelay in the disposition of cases, given our all-out effortand frequent reminders tominimize, if not totallyeradicate, the problem of congestion that has long


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plagued our courts. Therequirement that cases bedecided within thereglementary period isdesigned to prevent delay in

the administration of justice,for obviously, justice delayedis justice denied. 13 As weexplained in Bontuyan v.

Judge Villarin:14

This Court is not unmindful of the heavy dockets of lower courts. Thus, upon their proper application for extension,especially in meritorious caseinvolving difficult questions of


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law or complex issues, itgrants them additional time todecide beyond thereglementary period. In theinstant case, however, no such

application was filed byrespondent. Had he done soand indicated the reasontherefor, he would not have

been subjected to disciplinaryaction. 1avvphi1

"Judges are expected toobserve utmost diligence anddedication in the performanceof their judicial functions andthe discharge of their duties.


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The failure or inability of a judge to decide a case withinthe period fixed by lawsubjects him to administrativesanctions." This is because

undue delay in the dispositionof cases contributes to thepeoples loss of faith andconfidence in the judiciary and

brings it into disrepute.Under Rule 140, Section9(1), 15 as amended byAdministrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC, 16 the respondent

judges undue delay inrendering a decision is


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classified as a less seriousoffense. It carries the penaltyof suspension from officewithout salary and other benefits for not less than one

nor more than three months,or a fine of more thanP10,000.00 but not exceedingP20,000.00. 17

Since the respondent judgehad been previously foundguilty in Blanco v. Andoy, 18 of gross ignorance of procedureand undue delay in theresolution of a motion (for which he was imposed a


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P25,000.00 fine with a sternwarning that a repetition of thesame or similar act shall bedealt with more severely), weimpose on him the maximum

allowable fine of P20,000.00.This amount shall be deductedfrom respondent judgesretirement benefits as the

record shows that he hadalready retired from theservice on October 3, 2008.

WHEREFORE, in light of allthe foregoing, Judge TeresitoA. Andoy is hereby foundGUILTY of (1) undue delay in


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rendering a decision and (2)violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05of the Code of JudicialConduct. He is ordered to paya FINE of twenty thousand

pesos (P20,000.00), to bededucted from his retirementbenefits.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIOMORALES

Associate Justice


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LUCAS P.

BERSAMINAssociate

Justice

MARTIN S.VILLARAMA,

JR.Associate

Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A.SERENO

Associate Justice

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