Legislative Dept. (Sec. 1-13) Cases

8/6/2019 Legislative Dept. (Sec. 1-13) Cases

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Tobias vs Abalos

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan wereone legislative district until the passage ofthe RA 7675 with title AnAct Converting the Municipality of

Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized Cityto be known as the City of Mandaluyong."Same bill is now in question at to itsconstitutionality by the petitioners byinvoking their right as tax payers andresidents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994,people of Mandaluyong voted to for thethe conversion of Mandaluyong to a highlyurbanized city ratifying RA 7675 andmaking it in effect.

Issues: WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) ofthe Constitution regarding 'one subjectone bill rule".2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and(4) as to the number ofmembers of theCongress to 250 and reappropriating thelegislative districts.

Ruling: Applying liberal construction theSupreme Court dismissed the contentionof constitutionality pertaining to Art VI26(1) saying "should be given a practicalrather than a technical construction. Itshould be sufficient compliance with suchrequirement if the title expresses thegeneral subject and all the provisions aregermane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause"unless otherwise provided by law" wasenforced justifying the act of thelegislature to increase the number of themembers of the congress.Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as itwas the Congress itself which drafted thebill reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petitionwas dismissed for lack of merit.

Veterans Federation Party vsCOMELEC

FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first electionfor the party-list scheme was heldsimultaneously with the national elections.One hundred and twenty-three parties,organizations and coalitions participated.On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc

proclaimed thirteen party-listrepresentatives from twelve parties andorganizations, which had obtained at leasttwo percent of the total number of votescast for the party-list system.

Thirty-eight defeated parties andorganizations promptly filed suit in theCOMELEC, pleading for their ownproclamations. Hence, COMELEC orderedthe proclamation of the 38 parties. Suchmove filled up the 52 seats allotted for theparty-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimedparties asked the SC to annul theCOMELEC action and instead to proclaimadditional seats, so that each of themwould have three party-list reps.

HELD:1. Is the 20% allocation for party-listrepresentatives mandatory or is it merelya ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only aceiling and not mandatory.2. Are the 2% threshold requirementand the three-seat limit provided inSection 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?SC: Yes. Congress was vested with thebroad power to define and prescribe themechanics of the party-list system.3. How then should the additionalseats of a qualified party be determined?SC: As to the method of allocatingadditional seats, the first step is to rank allthe participating parties according to thevotes they each obtained. The percentageof their respective votes as against thetotal number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All thosethat garnered at least two percent of thetotal votes cast have an assured orguaranteed seat in the House of

Representatives. Thereafter, thosegarnering more than two percent of thevotes shall be entitled to additional seatsin proportion to their total number ofvotes. The formula for additional seats ofother qualified parties is: no.of votes ofconcerned party divided by no.of votes offirst party multiplied by no. of additionalseats allocated to the first party. As for the


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first party, just take it at face value. ( 5%= 2 seats )

BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC June26, 2001

Facts: Bagong Bayani and and AkbayanCitizens Party filed before the COMELECa Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.3785 issued by the COMELEC. Thisresolution approved the participation of154 organizations and parties, includingthose impleaded, in the 2001 party listelections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents,arguing mainly that the party list systemwas intended to benefit the marginalizedand underrepresented; not themainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues:a. Whether or not political parties mayparticipate in the party-list electionsb. Whether or not the party-listsystem is exclusive to marginalizedand underrepresented sectors andorganizations.

Held:The Petitions are partly meritorious.These cases should be remanded to theCOMELEC which will determine, after summaryevidentiary hearings, whether the 154 partiesand organizations enumerated inthe assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfythe requirements of the Constitution andRA 7941. The resolution of this Courtdirected the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the lastparty-list election, shall remain in forceuntil after theCOMELEC have compiledand reported its compliance a)yes b) no

Rationale:

a.Political parties, even the majorones, may participate in the party-listelections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941,private respondentscannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the groundthat they are political parties.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitutionprovides that members of the House ofRepresentatives may "be elected througha party-list system of registered national,regional, and sectoral partiesor organizations."Furthermore, under

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of theConstitution,political parties may be registered u

nder the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941also provides for "a party-list systemof registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations orcoalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3expressly states that a"party" is"either a political party

or a sectoral party or a coalitionof parties."

b. That political parties may participatein the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political party -- or anyorganization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite characterof these parties or organizations mustbe consistent with the purpose ofthe party-list system, as laid down in theConstitution and RA7941. Section 5,Article VI of the Constitution.The provision on the party-list systemis not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phraseslike "in accordance with law" or "as maybe provided by law"; it was thusup to Congress to sculpt in granite thelofty objective of the Constitution.Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECSeptember 18, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy

for the position of Representative of theFirst District of Leyte. Private respondentCirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for thesame position, filed a petition forcancellation and disqualification with theCOMELEC alleging that petitioner did notmeet the constitutional requirement forresidency. Private respondent contendedthat petitioner lacked the Constitutions


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one-year residency requirement forcandidates for the House ofRepresentatives.Issue: Whether or not petitioner hassatisfied the residency requirement asmandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the

Constitution.Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determinedthat petitioner possesses the necessaryresidence qualifications to run for a seat inthe House of Representatives in the FirstDistrict of Leyte, the COMELECsquestioned Resolutions dated April 24,May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 arehereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELECis hereby directed to order the ProvincialBoard of Canvassers to proclaim petitioneras the duly elected Representative of theFirst District of Leyte. For electionpurposes, residence is used synonymouslywith domicile. The Court upheld thequalification of petitioner, despite her owndeclaration in her certificate of candidacythat she had resided in the district for only7 months, because of the following: (a) aminor follows the domicile of her parents;

Tacloban became petitioners domicile oforigin by operation of law when her fatherbrought the family to Leyte; (b) domicileof origin is lost only when there is actualremoval or change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the formerresidence and establishing a new one, andacts which correspond with the purpose;in the absence of clear and positive proofof the concurrence of all these, thedomicile of origin should be deemed tocontinue; (c) the wife does notautomatically gain the husbands domicilebecause the term residence in Civil Lawdoes not mean the same thing in PoliticalLaw; when petitioner married PresidentMarcos in 1954, she kept her domicile oforigin and merely gained a new home, nota domicilium necessarium; (d) evenassuming that she gained a new domicile

after her marriage and acquired the rightto choose a new one only after herhusband died, her acts following herreturn to the country clearly indicate thatshe chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin,as her domicile of choice.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A.Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacyfor the position of Representative for thenew Second Legislative District of MakatiCity. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquinostated that he was a resident of the

aforementioned district for 10 months.Faced with a petition for disqualification,he amended the entry on his residency inhis certificate of candidacy to 1 year and13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May andallowed Aquino to run in the election of 8May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion forreconsideration of the above dismissal,the Commission on Election later issuedan order suspending the proclamation ofAquino until the Commission resolved theissue. On 2 June, the Commission onElections found Aquino ineligible anddisqualified for the elective office for lackof constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue: Whether residency in thecertificate of candidacy actually connotesdomicile to warrant thedisqualificationof Aquino from the position in the electoraldistrict.

Held:The place where a party actuallyor constructively has his permanenthome, where he, no matter where hemay be found at any given time,eventually intends to return and remain,i.e., his domicile, is that to which theConstitution refers when it speaks ofresidence for the purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers ornewcomers unfamiliar with the conditionsand needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstancesexisting in that community for electoralgain. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in aprevious (1992) election indicates that hewas a resident and a registered voter ofSan Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than

52 years prior to that election. Aquinosconnection to the Second District ofMakati City is an alleged lease agreementof a condominium unit in the area. Theintention not to establish a permanenthome in Makati City is evident in hisleasing a condominium unit instead ofbuying one. The short length of time heclaims to be a resident of Makati (and the


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fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and hisclaims of other residences in MetroManila) indicate that his sole purpose intransferring his physical residence is notto acquire a new, residence or domicilebut only to qualify as a candidate for

Representative of the Second District ofMakati City. Aquino was thus rightfullydisqualified by the Commission onElections.

CO vs. HRET

Facts:The HRET declared thatrespondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural bornFilipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,Northern Samar for voting purposes. Thecongressional election for the seconddistrict of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidates who vied for theposition of representative in the secondlegislativedistrict are the petitioners, SixtoBalinquit and Antonio Co and the privaterespondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOngwas proclaimed the duly electedrepresentative of the second district ofNorthern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests onthe grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not anatural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of thesecond district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is acitizen of the Philippines.

Held:Yes. In the year 1895, the privaterespondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrivedin the Philippines fromChina andestablished his residence in themunicipality of Laoang, Samar. The fatherof the private respondent,Jose Ong Chuanwas born in China in 1905 but was broughtby Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, hefiled withthe court an application fornaturalization and was declared a Filipino

citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married aFilipina named Desiree Lim.For theelections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as avoter of Laoang, Samar, and voted thereduring those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born ofFilipino fathers and those born of Filipino

mothers with analien father were placedon equal footing. They were bothconsidered as natural born citizens.Besides, privaterespondent did more thanmerely exercise his right of suffrage. Hehas established his life here in

the Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is notrequired that a person should have ahouse in order to establish hisresidenceand domicile. It is enough that he shouldlive in the municipality or in a rentedhouse or in that of afriend or relative. Torequire him to own property in order to beeligible to run for Congress would betantamountto a property qualification. TheConstitution only requires that thecandidate meet the age, citizenship,votingand residence requirements.

Dimaporo v. Mitra

FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as arepresentative for the second legislativedistrict of Lanao del Sur during the1987congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacyfor the position of governor of ARMM.Secretary and Speaker ofthe Houseexcluded the name of Dimaporo from theRoll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec67 of theOmnibus Election Code.Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letterintending to resume performing his dutiesandfunctions as an elected member of theCongress. Unfortunately, he was not ableto regain his seat in the Congress.Dimaporo contended that he did not losehis seat as a Congressman because Art. IXSec. 67 of BP 881 isnot operative in the present constitution,and therefore not applicable to themembers of Congress.

Grounds may be termed to be shortened:1.Holding any officer or employment in the

government or ant subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof.2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for adisorderly behavior3.Disqualification as determined by aresolution of the electoral tribunal in anelection contest4.Voluntary renunciation of office


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ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still beconsidered as a member of Congress evenafter he has filed for anothergovernmentposition

HELD: N o.In the constitution there is a

new chapter on the accountability ofpublic officers. In the 1935Constitution, itwas provided that public office is a publictrust. Public officers should serve with thehighest degree of responsibility andintegrity.If you allow a Batasan or a governor or amayor who has mandated to serve for 6years to file for anoffice other than theone he was elected to, then that clearlyshows that he did not intend to serve themandate of the people which was placedupon him and therefore he should beconsidered ipso facto resigned.

The filling of a certificate shall beconsidered as an overt act or abandoningor relinquishing his mandate to the peopleand he should therefore resign if he wantto seek another position which he feels hecould be of better service.

Jimenez vs Cabangbang

Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was amember of the House of Representativesand Chairman of its Committee onNational Defense. He wrote an open letterto the President and caused its publicationin several newspapers of generalcirculation exposing the allegedlyoperational plans by some ambitious AFPofficers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense,

Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become acandidate for President in 1961.

Issue: Whether or not the publication inquestion is a privileged communication

Held: The determination of the issuedepends on whether or not the publicationfalls within the purview of the phrasespeech or debate in Congress as used inArt. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Saidexpression refers to utterances made byCongressmen in the performance of theirofficial functions, such as speechesdelivered, statements made, or votes castin the halls of Congress, while the same is

in session, as well as bills introduced inCongress, whether the same is in sessionor not, and other acts performed byCongressmen, either in Congress oroutside the premises housing its offices, inthe official discharge of their duties as

members of Congress and ofCongressional Committees duly authorizedto perform its functions as such, at thetime of the performance of the acts inquestion.

The publication involved in this case doesnot belong to this category. It was an openletter to the President, when Congresspresumably was not in session, anddefendant caused said letter to bepublished in several newspapers ofgeneral circulation. In causing thecommunication to be so published, he wasnot performing his official duty, either as amember of the Congress or as officer ofany committee thereof. Hence, saidcommunication is not absolutelyprivileged.

People vs Jalosjos

Facts:The accused-appellant, RomeoJalosjos, is a full-fledged member ofCongress who is confined at the nationalpenitentiary while his conviction for

statutory rape and acts of lasciviousnessis pending appeal. The accused-appellantfiled a motion asking that he be allowed tofully discharge the duties of aCongressman, includingattendance atlegislative sessions and committeemeetings despite his having beenconvicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popularsovereignty and the need for hisconstituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellantshould be allowed to discharge mandateas member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of thesovereign power of the people. However,inspite of its importance, the privilegesand rights arising from having beenelected may be enlarged or restricted by


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law.

The immunity from arrest or detention ofSenators and members of the House ofRepresentatives arises from a provision ofthe Constitution. The privilege has always

been granted in a restrictive sense. Theprovision granting an exemption as aspecial privilege cannot be extendedbeyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.It may not be extended by intendment,implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given anyreason why he should be exempted fromthe operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of theConstitution. The members of Congresscannot compel absent members to attendsessions if the reason for the absence is alegitimate one. The confinement of aCongressman charged with a crimepunishable by imprisonment of more thansix years is not merely authorized by law,it has constitutional foundations. To allowaccused-appellant to attend congressionalsessions and committee meetings for 5days or more in a week will virtually makehim a free man with all the privilegesappurtenant to his position. Such anaberrant situation not only elevatesaccused-appellants status to that of aspecial class, it also would be a mockeryof the purposes of the correction system.

BENGZON VS. DRILON

FACTS: Petitioners are retired justices ofthe Supreme Court and Court of Appealswho are currently receiving pensionsunder RA 910 as amended by RA 1797.President Marcos issued a decreerepealing section 3-A of RA 1797 whichauthorized the adjustment of the pensionof retired justices and officers and enlistedmembers of the AFP. PD 1638 waseventually issued by Marcos which

provided for the automatic readjustmentof the pension of officers and enlisted menwas restored, while that of the retired

justices was not. RA 1797 was restoredthrough HB 16297 in 1990. When heradvisers gave the wrong information thatthe questioned provisions in 1992 GAAwere an attempt to overcome her earlierveto in 1990, President Aquino issued the

veto now challenged in this petition. Itturns out that PD 644 which repealed RA1797 never became a valid law absent itspublication, thus there was no law. Itfollows that RA 1797 was still in effect andHB 16297 was superfluous because it tried

to restore benefits which were never takenaway validly. The veto of HB 16297 did notalso produce any effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of thePresident of certain provisions in the GAAof FY 1992 relating to the payment of theadjusted pensions of retired Justices isconstitutional or valid.

RULING: The veto of these specificprovisions in the GAA is tantamount todictating to the Judiciary ot its funds

should be utilized, which is clearlyrepugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant toconstitutional mandate, the Judiciary mustenjoy freedom in the disposition of thefunds allocated to it in the appropriationslaw.Any argument which seeks to removespecial privileges given by law to former

Justices on the ground that there shouldbe no grant of distinct privileges orpreferential treatment to retired Justicesignores these provisions of theConstitution and in effect asks that these

Constitutional provisions on specialprotections for the Judiciary be repealed.

The petition is granted and the questionedveto is illegal and the provisions of 1992GAA are declared valid and subsisting.

Puyat vs De Guzman

Facts: After an election for the Directorsof the International Pipe IndustriesCorporation (IPI) was held, one group, therespondent Acero group, instituted at the

SEC quo warranto proceedings,questioning the election. Justice EstanislaoFernandez, then a member of the InterimBatasang Pambansa, entered hisappearance as counsel for respondentAcero to which the petitioner, Puyat group,objected on Constitutional ground that noAssemblyman could appear as counselbefore any administrative body, and SECwas an administrative body. Assemblyman


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Fernandez did not continue hisappearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon requestof respondent Acero. Following the

notarization of Assemblyman Fernandezpurchase, he filed a motion forintervention in the SEC case as the ownerof 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest inthe matter in litigation. The SEC grantedleave to intervene on the basis ofFernandez ownership of the said 10shares.

Issue: Whether or not AssemblymanFernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, mayintervene in the SEC case without violatingSec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) ofthe Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motionfor intervention, Assemblyman Fernandezcannot be said to be appearing as counsel.Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalfof another, although he is joining thecause of the private respondents. Hisappearance could theoretically be for theprotection of his ownership of 10 shares ofIPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstancesmilitate against the intervention ofAssemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case.He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth ofstock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of262,843 outstanding shares. He acquiredthem after the fact that is, after thecontested election of directors, after thequo warranto suit had been filed beforethe SEC and 1 day before the scheduledhearing of the case before the SEC. Andwhat is more, before he moved tointervene, he had signified his intention to

appear as counsel for respondent Acero,but which was objected to by petitioners.Realizing, perhaps, the validity of theobjection, he decided, instead, tointervene on the ground of legal interestin the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, theCourt is constrained to find that there has

been an indirect appearance as counselbefore an administrative body. In theopinion of the Court, that is acircumvention of the Constitutionalprohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII(now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention

was an afterthought to enable him toappear actively in the proceedings insome other capacity.

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Legislative Dept. (Sec. 1-13) Cases