SOPHIA ALAWI,complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,respondent.D E C I S I O
NNARVASA,C.J.:Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari
M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and
used to be friends.It appears that through Alawi's agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).Not long
afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising
of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:" **
I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of
my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between
me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract voidab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and
quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad
faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission
of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract **.I hope I do not have
to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated
contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by
your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had
been typed.On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote
to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection
Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at
Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void
his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from
salary deductions at the rate ofP4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the
contract itself is deemed to be voidab initioin view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from
me."And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC,
dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of
which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account thereof.aHe also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management &
Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan
in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent."bThe upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to
the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP
loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa
& Co. "for the buy-back of** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the
refund of ** (his) payments."cOn learning of Alauya's letter to
Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1]In
that complaint, she accused Alauya of:1."Imputation of malicious
and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"2."Causing undue injury to, and
blemishing her honor and established reputation;"3."Unauthorized
enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and4.Usurpation of
the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.She deplored Alauya's references to
her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without
"even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent.
She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the
service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "The Court
resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of
resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]Alauya first submitted a
"Preliminary Comment"[3]in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of
Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a
"strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a
scion of a Royal Family **."[4]In a subsequent letter to Atty.
Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5]Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6]He stated that
his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
ofP4,333.10 from his salary.And in his comment thereafter submitted
under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total ofP26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.[7]He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in
defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gaveP20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters;
that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the
affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex
J);[8]and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters
with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those
letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this
had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake.[9]Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by
the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he
did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10]He
claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.[11]He was induced to sign a blank contract on
Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him
later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite
"numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's
principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12]He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw.[13]Averring in fine that his acts in question
were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having
come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.It may be
mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant
Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996),
and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all
of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of
June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
"DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."The Court referred the case to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]The first accusation against Alauya is that in
his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:1)Alawi obtained his consent to
the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"2)Alawi acted in bad
faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"3)Alawi was an
"unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and4)Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."Alauya's
defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total ofP26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713)interaliaenunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service.[16]Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and **
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17]More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge
to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with
good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed --
however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is
evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."[19]Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.[20]As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and
that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused,
by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this
Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21]While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.Alauya says he does
not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the
term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.Finally, respecting Alauya's
alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer,
and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Melo,
Francisco,andPanganiban, JJ.,concur.A.C. No. 6317 August 31,
2006LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO,Complainant,vs.ATTY. ROGELIO P.
TERRADO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:On February
13, 2004, an administrative complaint1was filed by complainant
Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado
for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys
fees.According to the complainant, she engaged the services of
respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia,
Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her
foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in
the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No.
B-2610.Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before
the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No.
B-2610.2Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred
that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for
legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters
Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.The complaint was
referred3to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005,
the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide:Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide
a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except:a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latters death, money shall be paid over a
reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified
in the agreement; orb) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; orc) Where a lawyer
or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan,
even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing
arrangement.In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules
1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that:In disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must
be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as
free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the Supreme
Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. x x x.In the instant scenario, despite the strong
protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is
purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings
account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to
wit:1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a
Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;2.) Respondent actively
acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise
agreement.By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other
individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law.
Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise
agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant
can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property
respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.4The Investigating
Commissioner thus recommended:WHEREFORE, finding respondent
responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and
the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts
in the future will be severely dealt with.5The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.6We agree with the findings of the IBP.The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.7Lawyers are prohibited from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct8and
are mandated to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.9They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them,
and this negligence in connection therewith shall render them
liable.10Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to
the recovery of complainants savings deposit from Planters
Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as
complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement
between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610.
Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement
to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover,
the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00
for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.11Respondents disregard for his clients interests
is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise
agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the
foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already
expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she
releases her claims against it.12As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because
respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the
property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a
lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his
retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition
of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the
legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.13Respondents admission14that he divided the legal fees
with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from
liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee
for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases.15Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the
following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers
oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.InSantos v. Lazaro16andDalisay v. Mauricio,
Jr.,17we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer
takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not
just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to
his clients case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this
duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should
accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to
sufficiently protect his clients interests. It is not enough that a
lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he
must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost
fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for
his clients cause.18In view of the foregoing, we find that
suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In
addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he
received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing
jurisprudence.19WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY
of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law forsix (6) monthseffective from notice, andSTERNLYWARNED that
any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is
further ordered toRETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the
sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to
submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days
therefrom.Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ,petitioners, vs.ARSENIO
SALAZAR,et al.,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NConsidering
respondents Motion to expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon
A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to
Dismiss the Petition and said Atty. Manangans admission at the
hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer
entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the
same Filemon A. Manangan who was found by this Court G.R. No. 82760
(Filemon Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya,
Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres
Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite
these facts he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an
attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this
case, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag,
is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this
Court.Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months
imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders
from this Court.SO ORDEREDHalili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)Facts:The
cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. The
disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties
reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the
employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The
parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the
Union.The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for
authority to sell and dispose of the property. Atty. Espinas, (the
original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When
Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an
associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name
B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the
principal lawyer in these cases.Atty. Pineda, without authority
from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given
him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying
that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally
consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement.Issue:Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela
should be held in contempt.Held:YES.Contempt of court is a defiance
of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or
their witnesses during litigation.The power to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the
confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client
relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing
such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.In the case, the
expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty.
Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property makes the
entire transaction dubious and irregular.Significantly Atty.
Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was
by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait
for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from
the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so
authorize.Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of
court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment and directed to
show cause why he should not be disbarred.
