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PEREZ VS ATTY. DELA TORRE Perez as Brgy. Captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, that in Dec 2001,several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal bldg. of Calabanga where the accused were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; Theextrajudicial confessions included herein the complainant as the mastermind in the criminal activities forwhich they were being charged.Respondent claimed thatwhen Ilo soughthis assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, He conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under compulsion didhe assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.

ISSUE:WON the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR

HELD:Atty. De la Torre was guilty of violation of Rule 15.03 of CPR. He is suspended forthree years from the practice of law. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that atty. De la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the victim s family.

Under Rule 15.03 of the CPR, a lawyer shall notrepresent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after afull disclosure of the facts.

Respondent is therefore dutybound torefrain from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. Theprohibition against representing conflicting interest isfounded on principles of public policy and good taste. In course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strongpoints of the case. It behooveslawyers not only tokeep inviolate the clients confidence, butalso toavoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then canlitigants be encouragedto entrust their secrets to theirlawyers which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. His representation ofopposing clients in themurder case invites suspicion of double-dealing andinfidelity tohis clients. What is unsetting is that respondent assisted in the execution bythe twoaccused of theirconfessions whereby they admitted their participation invarious serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his betterjudgment before conceding toaccuseds choice ofcounsel.

Dr. Gamilla et. al. v. Atty. Mario JrFacts:Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. Theres a long history of collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million pesos for back wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits (42M) for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the balance of 42M ceded to them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the benefits allotted to faculty members.

Issue:Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty. Marino

Held: No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the same duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence, Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.

Atty. Catalan v. Atty. SilvosaFACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of the Esperon Case. Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP- Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent. 3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment. HELD: 1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts." Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension. 2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a respondent. There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complaint of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring member of the bench and bar can not escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension. 3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a priveledge, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his privilege.

Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

Seares, Jr. v. Atty. Gonzales-Alzate

Quiambao v. Atty. BambaFacts: Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation Bureau (AIB) and its president and managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Quaimbao in an ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the ejectment case was still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against Quiambao.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.

Held: Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year. At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of record of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. This is founded on the principles of public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client 2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment

Artezuela v. Atty. Maderazo

Facts:Echavia crashed the car he is driving which is owned by Kiyami, but was registered in the name of Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. The destruction of the carinderia caused the cessation its operation, resulting to her financial dislocation. Artezuela incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. Artezuela hired Maderazo in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and Kiyami. For his services, Artezuela paid Maderazo 10,000 as attorneys fees and 2,000 as filing fee. However, the case was dismissed, allegedly upon the instance of the Artezuela and her husband. Because of the dismissal of the case, Artezuela filed a civil case for damages against the Maderazo. The case was dismissed.

Artezuela filed for disbarment against the Maderazo. Artezuela argues that Maderazo engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, Maderazo prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in Maderazos office. Artezuela further averred that it was Maderazo who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent. Maderazo denied Artezuelas allegations. However, he admitted that Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia.

Case was referred to IBP. IBP investigated the case. IBP found Maderazo guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics.

Issues:

(1) Whether Maderazo violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 (conflict of interest) of the Code of Professional Responsibility

(2) Whether Maderazo had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.

Held:YES to both

Maderazo was actually giving advice to Echavias but he was not the counsel of record. Maderazo does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting interests of record. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. Good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative. The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics.

Pormento, Sr. v. Atty. PontevedraSamson v. Atty. EraPCCG v. Sandiganbayan and TanFACTSGeneral Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza.PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

ISSUEW/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

HELDNO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.

Atty. Teodosio v. NavaRespondent Mercedes Nava used to be the manager of Melanie Batislaongs lending business and, in that capacity, dealt with several borrowers, including Letecia Espinosa and Maria Gilda Palma. Due to acts of mismanagement committed by Nava, Batislaong, sued Nava for accounting and damages and in turn, Nava charged Batislaong, Espinosa and Palma with estafa.

While the complaints against them were pending preliminary investigation, Espinosa and Palmahired petitioner Atty. Hector Teodosios services in seeking the annulment of certain trust receipt agreements allegedly falsified by Nava, which wasthe basis of the criminal complaints against them. As a result, Teodosio filed on their behalf civil cases against Nava and Batislaong for annulmentof contract and damages. Teodosio impleaded Batislaong as Navas co-defendant because Espinosa and Palma wanted to settle thebalance of the amount they had borrowed from Batislaong through Nava but they were unsure to whom the payment should be made. Both were, therefore, impleaded so that they could interpleadwho between them should receive the payment. After Teosdosio had filed these cases Batislaong offered to hire him as her counsel not only in the civil case she had filed against Nava but also in thetwo estafa cases, filed against her by Nava. He claims that he agreed to represent Batislaong in these cases only after he had explained to her thenature of the complaints filed by Espinosa andPalma against her and Nava in the Civil Cases.

Nava filed a complaint against Teodosio for representing clients with conflicting interests in violation of Rule15.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Teodosio admits that Batislaong, Espinosa, Palma are his clients but denies that their interests are conflicting and contends that his clients in fact have a common interest against respondent Nava.

Teodosio submitted affidavits executed by Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma stating that theyhave no complaints in the way petitioner handledtheir cases and that each of them was aware that the other was represented by petitioner. He further submitted another set of affidavits executed byEspinosa and Palma stating in detail the extent of their knowledge of petitioners involvement in Batislaongs cases as well as the basis of theirconsent for him to act as their common counsel. Nava assails the affidavits of Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma on the ground that they were notarizedby a lawyer from petitioners law firm and that they do not bear the data as to the residence certificates of the affiants. She also claims that Teososio failedto ask the court to declare Batislaong in default despite the latters failure to answer the complaintsfiled by Espinosa and Palma, and contends thatthis is proof of petitioners bias for her (Batislaong).When the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors, however in Resolution XIII-99-23 of February 23, 1999, found petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and ordered him suspended from the practice of law for one year.Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be suspended for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 15.03? NO, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Held: Court held that Teodosios conduct did not amount to a violation of the Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.Under Canon 6 of the previous Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that whichduty to another client requires him to oppose. The rule is designed to remove from attorneys the opportunity to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained during the existence of the client-attorney relation.Teodosio contends that based on the causes of action of the cases involving Batislaong on one hand and Espinosa and Palma on the other, hecould simultaneously represent them without any possible violation of the client-attorney confidentiality. In the cases filed by him forEspinosa and Palma, it is only Nava against whom the former have an adverse interest as it was the latter who allegedly falsified the trust receipt agreements to the prejudice of Palma andEspinosa. Indeed, were it not for the offer of Palma and Espinosa to settle their obligation, there would have been no need to implead Batislaong as adefendant. On the other hand, in the other cases in which Batislaong is a party, either as plaintiff in Civil Case or as an accused in Criminal Cases, neitherPalma nor Espinosa are parties. Indeed, it is Nava who is the respondent in the first case and the private complainant in the last two criminal cases. Under the foregoing circumstances, the danger that petitioner may abuse his clients confidences to the detriment of the other is absent.Even granting that the interests of Espinosa, Palma, and Batislaong are conflicting, Teodosio cannot be held liable for acting as their common counsel in view of the fact that, as stated in their affidavits, petitioner explained to them the consequences of his representation and that they gave their consent to the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it was they themselves who brought Batislaong to petitioners office so that the latter could engage his services. The fact that the first set of affidavits were uniformly notarized by an associate in petitioners law firm and that they did not state certain data relating to the residence certificates of the affiants do not adversely affect their validity absent any proof that the affiants did not execute them of their own volition or that their signature therein are not authentic.

Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame v. Atty. BaguioFACTSPlaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996.However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the dismissal of this case.

ISSUEW/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest that which his duty another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. The protection given to a client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondents rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.

NAKPIL VS VALDEZ

FACTS Valdes is Jose Nakpils accountant, consultant and lawyer. Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds, he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust. Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title issued in his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses estate. And, Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate. Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Joses inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name. The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes family realty corp. Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also, handled the claims of Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.

ISSUEw/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional ethics

HELDYes.The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome.The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for the other side.The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist.Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing requirement for the practice of law.A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.

Hornilla v. Atty. SalunatFACTSComplainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation.Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors.Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest.

ISSUECan a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit?

HELDNo, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal party.The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.

Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Atty. Funk,FACTS: Hocorma Foundation filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. It alleged that respondent used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases.

Complainant alleged that respondent filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma on behalf of Mabalacat institute using information he acquired while with the foundation.

As a defense, Atty. Funk contended that he was hired by Mabalacat Institute by Don Teodoro Santos in 1982 to serve as director and legal counsel. He emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.

Santos left for America to get medical treatment. The former and Atty. Funk agreed that the latter would be paid for his legal services out of the properties that Santos donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. Atty. Funk also claimed that he was authorized to advise Hocorma and follow up with it Santos sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute. Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. It was Santos intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent and expenses.

According to Atty. Funk, Santos suggested to the complainant his inclusion in that board, a suggestion that the foundation followed. After Santos died, respondent was elected President of Mabalacat Institute.

The foundation later refused to pay Atty. Funks fees, thus he severed his ties with Hocorma. Four years later, he filed a suit against Hocorma. The trial court, CA and SC decided in favor of the respondent.

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funks suspension from the practice of law for one year. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

HELD: Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client without the foundations written consent. An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship.

Respondent collected attorneys fees from the foundation. Thus, he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board of the IBP SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the practice of law for one year effective immediately.

Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Maricel Pascual-LopezFACTSPacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent.Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through. After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending her money for the case. Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.------------ I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. -----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ----Candy

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUEWhether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELDYes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

Palm v. Atty. IledanFacts:Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.

Issue: Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?

Held:No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.