Legal Ethics Case Batch 2

8/11/2019 Legal Ethics Case Batch 2

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RULE 137

Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Section 1.Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he isrelated to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within thefourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior courtwhen his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties ininterest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for justor valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Section 2.Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. If it be claimed that an official isdisqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, filewith the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceedwith the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of hisdisqualification. is decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in thecase, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his owncompetency, until after final judgment in the case.

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"epublic of the #hilippinesSUPREME COUR

$anila

%I"& &I'I(I)N

!.R. "os. 173#$7%7& Se'te()er 2#* 2#1#

+!en. ,Ret.- JOSE S. RM/SCL* JR.*#etitioner,vs.

0O". JOSE R. 0ER""DE* as Justice of te Sandian)a4an5 &0 D/6/S/O"*S"D/!"+" and 0E PEOPLE O8 0E P0/L/PP/"ES*"espondents.

D E C / S / O "

6/LLRM* JR.* J.:

%his is a #etition for *ertiorari and #rohibition with prayer for the issuance of a %emporary "estraining)rder +%") see-ing to reverse and set aside the "esolution!dated $ay , /001 of the(andiganbayan in *riminal *ase Nos. /20//3/4 and /5!//35. %he assailed "esolution deniedpetitioner6s motions for inhibition,/which sought to disqualify respondent 7ustice 7ose ". ernande8,

Associate 7ustice of the (andiganbayan, 9ourth &ivision, from ta-ing part in said cases.

%he facts are as follows:

#etitioner, "etired ;#rofessor *arolina


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)n )ctober !!, /00, eight additional informations were filed with the (andiganbayan againstpetitioner. %wo were assigned to the 9ourth &ivision of the court, one for violation of ".A. No. 40!=,doc-eted as *riminal *ase No. /20//, and the other for estafathrough falsification of publicdocuments, doc-eted as *riminal *ase No. /20/4.

)n April 1, /001, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit 7ustice ernande8 from ta-ing part in *riminal*ase Nos. /5!//35 and *riminal *ase Nos. /20//3/4pending before the 9ourth &ivision. #etitionercited that 7ustice ernande86s wife, #rofessor ernande8, was a member of the 9eliciano*ommission and was tas-ed to implement fully the recommendations of the (enate ;lue "ibbon*ommittee, including his criminal prosecution. 9urther, the spousal relationship between 7usticeernande8 and #rofessor ernande8 created in his mind impression of partiality and bias, whichcircumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the second paragraph of(ection !, "ule !4> of the "ules of *ourt.

In its *onsolidated *omment@)pposition,2the )ffice of the (pecial #rosecutor +)(# asserted thatthe grounds raised by petitioner in his motions for inhibition were anchored on mere speculations and

conjectures. It stressed that the recommendation of the 9eliciano *ommission was a product ofconsensus of the members of the *ommission which was a collegial body. And even if #rofessorernande8 signed the "eport of the *ommission to implement the recommendations of the (enate;lue "ibbon *ommittee, the findings of the said *ommission did not remove the presumption ofinnocence in petitioner6s favor. ence, the )(# argued that the mere membership of #rof. ernande8in the 9eliciano *ommission did not automatically disqualify 7ustice ernande8 from hearing thecriminal cases against petitioners.

)n $ay , /001, 7ustice ernande8 issued the assailed "esolution, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

A**)"&IN


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?ssentially, the issue is: &id 7ustice ernande8 commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac-or excess of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the(andiganbayanJ

#etitioner submits that it was erroneous for 7ustice ernande8 to deny the motions to inhibit himself

under the second paragraph of (ection ! of "ule !4> of the "ules of *ourt, when in fact the basis forhis disqualification was the latter6s spousal relationship with #rofessor ernande8, which situationwas governed by the first paragraph of the said section. According to petitioner, while #rofessorernande8 was not directly Kpecuniarily interestedK in the case, she was more than so interested inthem because as an appointee of #resident Arroyo, she was receiving emoluments to monitor theprogress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the 9eliciano *ommission arefulfilled.

Ge deny the petition.

%he rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in (ection !, "ule !4> of the "ules of

*ourt:

(ection !. &isqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, orhis wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he isrelated to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within thefourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when hisruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signedby them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just

or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

%he "ules contemplate two -inds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Dnder the first paragraph ofthe cited "ule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in theinstances mentioned. %he second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to thesound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons,with only their conscience as guide.!0

In denying the motions for his inhibition, 7ustice ernande8 explained that petitioner failed to imputeany act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:

Ghat can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of provingbias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. %he proof required needs topoint to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant$otions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to 7ustice ernande8 from where asuspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is oddly stri-ing that theaccused does not even ma-e a claim or imputation of bias or partiality on the part of 7usticeernande8. Dnderstandably, he simply cannot ma-e such allegation all because there is none to betold. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a judge is considered by the(upreme *ourt as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more insufficient it becomes if there isabsent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with. !!

Ge find the above explanation well3ta-en and thus uphold the assailed "esolution upon the groundsso stated. Ge have ruled in #hilippine *ommercial International ;an- v. &y ong #i,!/that the mereimputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge iswithout basis. ?xtrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, orcorrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.%his *ourt has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudicebefore the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. 1avvphi1
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_173057_2010.html#fnt12


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An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the Kjust orvalid reasonsK contemplated in the second paragraph of (ection !, "ule !4> of the "ules of *ourt forwhich a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. %he bare allegations of the judge6s partiality,as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome thepresumption that the judge will underta-e his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law

and evidence, and without fear or favor. 'erily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasonsfor the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.!4

#etitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of (ection !, "ule !4>, buta closer examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invo-ed thesecond paragraph by underscoring the phrase, Kfor just or valid reasons other than those mentionedabove.K %his was an express indication of the rule that he was invo-ing. $oreover, it was specificallystated in paragraph > of both motions that K in accuseds mind, such circumstances militates againstthe Hon. Justice Hernande and constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the !nd

paragraph, "ection 1 of #ule 1$%, in so far as the cases against accused are concerned.&ence,there is no question that petitioner relied on the second paragraph of the "ulewhich contemplates

voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for inhibition.

And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invo-ed the first paragraph of (ection !, "ule!4> in his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground todisqualify a judge from hearing a case. Dnder the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition, KNo judge or

judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,legatee, creditor or otherwise....K %he relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only whensuch spouse or child of the judge is K'ecuniaril4 interestedK as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.#etitioner, however, miserably failed to show that #rofessor *arolina


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official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence. %his provision shall apply to officers and employees ofoffices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits orother concessions.

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A"%. !>!. 9alsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.%hepenalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon anypublic officer, employee, or notary who, ta-ing advantage of his official position, shall falsify adocument by committing any of the following acts:

x x x x

. $a-ing untruthful statements in a narration of facts

x x x x

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#ollo, p. 5.>Id. at 4434.

2Id. at 532.

=Id. at !>.

!0#agoda #hilippines, Inc. v. Dniversal *anning, Inc.,

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Legal Ethics Case Batch 2