Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot Facts: Respondent is
charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in
Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for
the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service12 Escolta, ManilaRoom 105, Tel.
2-41-60
Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.
Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of
merchantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character
and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO.
L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964FACTS:
Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by
legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said
spouses through a series ofdonations, principally the deed of
donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to
the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to
"such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow
continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and
DionisioJakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and
defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons ofMariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial
document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath
of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either
the "convenio" or ofhis brother's assumption of the position.-Dr.
Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned
over to him; and the demand not having been complied with the
plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson
of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed ofdonation.
-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus
is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation.
However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among thel egitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point
in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus
Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of
Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on
the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by
this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospiciode Barili.
-Courta quo- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a
full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and
considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and
therefore means a law degree or diploma ofBachelor of Laws. This
ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
defendant, to the office ofadministrator. (YES)
RATIO:
Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification,
and has reference to that class ofpersons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend,
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to
the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority ofthe
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate
being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itselfhas little to do with admission to the
Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved by the Secretary ofEducation." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of
the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there
are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and
to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession
of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not
possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic
degree of Bachelor ofLaws from some law school or university.The
founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed
of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or
failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified.
A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers
or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions
subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons
may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules
and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with
the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a
working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset. Under this particular
criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against
the defendant, to the office of administrator. As far as moral
character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting
than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed ofdonation as a
requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is
also a lawyer, grandson ofVicente Cui, one of the nephews of the
founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation.
He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio
Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said
nephews. Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio
Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The interven or contends that
the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by
line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in
the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the
last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the
Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of
Vicente Cui, to whom the interven or belongs. This interpretation,
however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of
donation.Facts of the Case: Sophia Alawi is a sales representative
of EB Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City, while
Ashari Alauya is an incumbent executive clerk of court of
4thJudicial Sharia District in Marawi City.
Alawi and Alauya were classmates and friends. Through Alawis
agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the abovementioned
firm. Thereafter, a housing loan was granted to Alauya by the
NationalHOME MORTGAGEFinance Corporation (NHMFC). On December 15,
1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa and
Co. advising the termination of contract with the company, on the
ground that Alauyas consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by sales agent which makes the contract void ab initio.
Alauya also wrote to Vice President of Credit and Collection Group
of NationalHOME MORTGAGEFinance Corp. (NHMFC) repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co. and
asking for a cancellation of his housing loan.
Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez, Head of Fiscal
Management and Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division of
Supreme Court to stop deductions from his salary.
Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996,
to which she appended a copy of the letter and accused Alauya
of:
Imputation of libellous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith.
Causing undue injury.
Unauthorized enjoyment of free postage.
Usurpation of the title attorney which only regular members of
the Philippine Bar may use.Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was
only envious of him for being an Executive Clerk of Court but also
a scion of a Royal Family. He also claimed that Alawi falsified his
signature.
As with the use of the title attorney, he justified it by
assertion that it is synonymous with Counsellors-at-Law. He
preferred to use attorney because counsellor is often mistaken for
councillor.
Issue: Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libellous charges
without solid grounds through bad faith.
Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use the appellation
attorney.Court Ruling:The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Public officials and
employees must at all times respect the rights of others and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.The
conduct of behaviour of every official and employee of an agency
involved in administration of justice from presiding judge to the
most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with heavy burden of
responsibility.
He must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
As to Alauyas usurpation of the title attorney, the Court has
declared that persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledge
members of the Philippine bar. His disinclination to use the title
counsellor does not warrant his use of the title attorney.
InIn re Meling, the Court said that the title attorney is
reserved only to those, who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing, and it is they who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.IN RE CUNANAN
(CASEDIGEST)
Standard IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the
Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix
the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower
than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained
a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.ISSUE:Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is
constitutional.RULING:Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due
to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act.
As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of
1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws
and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force
and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to
the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of
the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative
to determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to
class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could
not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of
an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power
to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to
the practice of law.CASE DIGEST PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVAG.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.
FACTS:On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take
the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has
passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that
the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The
respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases
does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers
and other individuals who passed the examination can practice
before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the
long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his
right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and
the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes
such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice
before the patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and
conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal
to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent
Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken
not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.CASE
DIGEST RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSODG.R. No. 100113.
September 3, 1991.
FACTS:Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of
the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice.
Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice
of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
HELD:1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the
determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)The records of the 1986
constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term
practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the
Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that
they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of
the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized
fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the
demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or
functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation
lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore,
Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank
Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986,
became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of
the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been
engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager,
lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of
the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the
constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition
that the appointee should possess the qualification required by
law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.DIGEST: Legal Profession Case
23
LEGAL PROFESSION CASE 23ROYONG VS. OBLENAAC No. 376 April 30,
1963En Banc, Barrera
FACTS: Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston
Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor
General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that
there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and
respondent seems to be consensual sex. In view of his own findings
as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other
misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging
the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old
Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying
that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of
the respondent as lawyer and judge.
ISSUE:Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with
Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with
Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:The continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for
one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground
for disbarment.Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office
and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless
rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer.Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense
of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.As
former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to
have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member
of the bar.
DOCKET NO./CASE NO.: A.C. No. 244
DATE: March 29, 1963SUBJECT: In the Matter of the Petition for
Disbarment of Telesforo A. DiaoPETITIONER: Severino G. Martinez
FACTS:
Telesforo A. Diao passed the Bar Examinations in 1953. Two years
after, Severino Martinez charged him (Diao) of misrepresentation in
the application of the examinations becasue Diao failed to meet the
academic pre-requisites. Diao did not complete secondary education
(high school) and did not attend Quisumbing College nor obtained an
Associate in Arts degree from the said institution.
Diao admitted the charge but claimed that he left high school in
his third year because he served in the U.S. Army. He passed the
General Classification Test, which was said to be an equivalent to
a high school diploma.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diao should continue to practice law?
HELD:
NO.Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to
take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he
was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in
the regular manner is equally essential.. IN RE: VICTORIO D.
LANUEVOA.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
Facts:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio
Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme
Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam
notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been
re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams
and was admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks
of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for
re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having
re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar
Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and
that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass
the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results
bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil,
Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight
Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the
Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in
one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject
which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties,
including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in
his declaration of assets and liabilities.
Issue:
WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that
Galang passed the Bar? YES
Held:
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated
moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in
his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be
honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on
the borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who
fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to
know better than the examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground
for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The
practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every
one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld
in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and
the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA26 18 Jul FACTS:Al Caparros
Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking
the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his
conviction of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide from a
hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by
the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he
be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of
Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now
possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications
among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together
with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of their hazing victim.ISSUE:Whether or not Mr.
Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls
of Attorneys, and practice law.HELD:YES. Petition
granted.RATIO:Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited
competent proof that he possessed the required good moral character
as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not
inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt,
Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not
merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that
the community assistance he had started is expected to continue in
serving the more unfortunate members of the society.
Aguirre Vs. Rana
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of the successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Mae Aguirre filed against
respondent a petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law,
grave misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation.
The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the respondent indeed
appeared before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
Supreme Court agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC
that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
does not deserve admission admission to the Philippine Bar. True,
respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer's oath. However it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys
that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
Wherefore, respondent Edwin L.Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
EMBED
_47881376.unknown
_47986752.unknown
