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Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 1 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

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Page 1: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 1

Information AssuranceIATF

IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Page 2: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 2

Information Systems Security Engineering

ISSEArt and science of discovering users' information

protection needs.Designing systems with economy and elegance,

so that safely resists the forces to which they will be subjected.

Building and testing such systems.

Page 3: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 3

SE versus ISSE

SE Activities ISSE Activities

Discover needs Discover information protection needsDefine system requirements Define system security requirementsDesign system architecture Design system security architectureDevelop detailed design Develop detailed security designImplement system Implement system securityAssess effectiveness Assess system security effectiveness

Page 4: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 4

Technical Security Countermeasures

Determination of the appropriate technical security measures to address attacks at all layers in the information system.

Page 5: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 5

Security Services

Services that safeguard information and information systems. Authentication Confidentiality Integrity Availability Non-repudiation Robustness Interoperability

Page 6: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 6

Potential Adversaries

Nation States Hackers Terrorists Organized crime Other criminal elements International press Industrial competitors Disgruntled employees Careless employees

Page 7: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 7

Motivations

Access to sensitive information Track operations Disrupt operations Steal money, products or services Free use Embarrassment Overcome technical challenge Compromise

Page 8: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 8

Classes of Attacks

Passive attacks Active attacks Close-in attacks Insider attacks Distribution attacks

Page 9: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 9

Passive Attacks

Monitoring open communication Ethernet sniffing

Decrypting weak encryption WEP

Password sniffing Traffic analysis

Page 10: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 10

Active Attacks

Modify data in transit Modify financial transactions

Replay Session hijacking

Privileges of established session Masquerading

Unauthorized access

Page 11: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 11

Active Attacks (cont'd)

Exploiting app's or OS Outlook Express

Exploit trust Transitive trust, e.g. PGP

Page 12: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 12

Active Attacks (cont'd)

Data execution Open an attachment that is a script

Inserting and exploiting code Trojan horse, back door

Denial of service

Page 13: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 13

Close-in Attacks

Access to comm's wires, RF, visual, etc. Information gathering

IP addresses, IDs, passwords System tampering

Bugging, keyboard sniffing SW Physical compromise

Page 14: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 14

Insider Attacks

Malicious Modify/destroy data and security mechanisms Establish unauthorized access Cover channels Physical damage/alteration

Non-malicious Modification of data/configuration Physical damage

Page 15: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 15

Distribution Attacks

Attacks on the distribution chain of products or services

Modification at vendor's facility Modification during distribution

Page 16: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 16

Primary Security Services

Access control Confidentiality Integrity Availability Nonrepudiation

Page 17: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 17

Access Control Limiting access to information, services and

communications Identity and authentication

You are who you say you are. Authorization

Access rights Decision

Rights match demand Enforcement

Grant/deny and log/notify

Page 18: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 18

Confidentiality

Information state Transmission, storage, proccessing

Data type Crypto keys, config files, text

Amounts or parts of data Value and life of data

Page 19: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 19

Elements of Confidentiality

Data protection Data separation Traffic flow protection

Page 20: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 20

Integrity

Prevention of unauthorized data modification

Detection and notification of unauthorized modification

Logging all modifications

Page 21: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 21

Availability

Protection from attack Protection from unauthorized use Resistance to routine failures

Page 22: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 22

Non-repudiation

Repudiation:Denial by one entity in a multi-entity exchange that it

participated. Non-repudiation:

Proof of origin, proof of identity, time of originationProof of delivery, time of deliveryAudit trail

Page 23: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 23

Security Technologies

APIs CryptoAPI Cryptographic Service Providers File Encryptors Hardware tokens Intrusion detectors IPSec IKE

Page 24: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 24

Security Technologies(cont'd)

Packet filter Stateful packet filter PKI SSL S/MIME Trusted Computing Base Virus detectors Tripwire

Page 25: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 25

Robustness Strategy

Determine the Degree of Robustness

Strength of Mechanism Levels of Assurance

Page 26: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 26

Purpose

Security engineering guidance Levels of security mechanisms Security services appropriate to mission Levels of assurance

Page 27: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 27

Robustness Strategy Functions

Assessment of strength mechanisms Definition of product requirements Subsequent risk assessments Recommend security requirements

Page 28: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 28

Robustness Strategy Process

1. Assess value2. Assess threat3. Determine strength level appropriate4. Determine implementation necessary

Page 29: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 29

Degree of Robustness

Page 30: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 30

Degree of Robustness Determination

Level of strength and assurance recommended for a potential security mechanism

Depends on:1. Value of information2. Perceived threat environment

Page 31: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 31

Information Value Levels

.VI. Violation of the information protection policy would have negligible adverse effectsor consequences..V2. Violation of the information protection policy would adversely affect and/or causeminimal damage to the security, safety, financial posture, or infrastructure of theorganization..V3. Violation of the information protection policy would cause some damage to thesecurity, safety, financial posture, or infrastructure of the organization..V 4. Violation of the information protection policy would cause serious damage to thesecurity, safety, financial posture, or infrastructure of the organization..V5. Violation of the information protection policy would cause exceptionally gravedamage to the security, safety, financial posture, or infrastructure of the organization.

Page 32: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 32

Threat Levels

.TI. Inadvertent or accidental events ( e.g., tripping over a power cord).

.T2. Passive, casual adversary with minimal resources who is willing to take little risk( e.g., listening)..T3. Adversary with minimal resources who is willing to take significant risk ( e.g.,unsophisticated hackers)..T4. Sophisticated adversary with moderate resources who is willing to take little risk(e.g., organized crime, sophisticated hackers, international corporations)..T5. Sophisticated adversary with moderate resources who is willing to take significantrisk (e.g., international terrorists)..T6. Extremely sophisticated adversary with abundant resources who is willing to takelittle risk (e.g., well-funded national laboratory, nation-state, international corporation).

.T7. Extremely sophisticated adversary with abundant resources who is willing to takeextreme risk (e.g., nation-states in time of crisis).

Page 33: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 33

Strength of Mechanism Levels

.SMLl is defined as basic strength or good commercial practice. It is resistant tounsophisticated threats (roughly comparable to TI to T3 threat levels) and is used toprotect low-value data. Examples of countered threats might be door rattlers, anklebiters, and inadvertent errors..SML2 is defined as medium strength. It is resistant to sophisticated threats (roughlycomparable to T4 to TS threat levels) and is used to protect medium-value data. It wouldtypically counter a threat from an organized effort (e.g., an organized group of hackers)..SML3 is defined as high strength or high grade. It is resistant to the national laboratoryor nation-state threat (roughly comparable to T6 to T7 threat levels) and is used to protecthigh-value data. Examples of the threats countered by this SML are an extremelysophisticated, well-funded technical laboratory and a nation-state adversary.

Page 34: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 34

Assurance Levels

EAL 1 Functionally TestedEAL 2 Structurally TestedEAL 3 Methodically Tested and CheckedEAL 4 Methodically Designed, Tested and ReviewedEAL 5 Semiformally Designed and TestedEAL 6 Semiformally Verified Design and TestedEAL 7 Formally Verified Design and Tested

Page 35: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 35

Security Mechanisms

1. Security Management2. Confidentiality3. Integrity4. Availability5. Identification & Authentication6. Access Control7. Accountability8. Non-repudiation

Page 36: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 36

Security Management Mechanisms

Page 37: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 37

Confidentiality Mechanisms

Page 38: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 38

Integrity Mechanisms

Page 39: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 39

Availability Mechanisms

Page 40: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 40

Identification & Authentication Mechanisms

Page 41: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 41

Access Control Mechanisms

Page 42: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 42

Accountability Mechanisms

Page 43: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 43

Non-Repudiation Mechanisms

Page 44: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 44

Interoperability

Contemporary Systems involve multiple networks as well as multiple heterogeneous computer systems

All systems depend on communication Security must be as transparent as

possible in such a compute environment

Page 45: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 45

Elements of Interoperability

1. Architecture2. Security Protocols3. Standards Compliance4. Interoperable Certificate Management5. Agreement on Security Policies

Page 46: Lecturer: Lynn AcklerDate:10/28/081 Information Assurance IATF IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework Security System Engineering methodology

Lecturer: Lynn Ackler Date:10/28/08 46

Interoperability Strategy

1. Foster Standards2. Security Negotiation3. Support Open Standards