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1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration Everyone receiving my emails? Lecture slides worked okay? Both ppt and pdf versions Everyone knows how to access the course web page? HW/Lab 1 heads up To be posted coming Monday Labs become active starting next week NO LAB THIS WEEK 2

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Page 1: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

•1

Lecture 3: Cryptography II

CS 336/536: Computer Network Security

Fall 2015

Nitesh Saxena

Course Administration

• Everyone receiving my emails?

• Lecture slides worked okay?

– Both ppt and pdf versions

• Everyone knows how to access the course web page?

• HW/Lab 1 heads up

– To be posted coming Monday

– Labs become active starting next week

– NO LAB THIS WEEK 2

Page 2: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

•2

Outline of Today’s Lecture

• Block Cipher Modes of Encryption

• Public Key Crypto Overview and Math Background

• Public Key Encryption (RSA)

• Public Key Signatures

3

Block Cipher Encryption Modes

9/8/2015 Lecture 1 - Introduction 4

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Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

Block Cipher Encryption modes

• Electronic Code Book (ECB)

• Cipher Block Chain (CBC)

– Most popular one

• Others (we will not cover)

– Cipher Feed Back (CFB)

– Output Feed Back (OFB)

9/8/2015 5

Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

Analysis

We will analyze each mode in terms of:

• Security

• Computational Efficiency (parallelizing encryption/decryption)

• Transmission Errors

• Integrity Protection

9/8/2015 6

Page 4: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode

• Although DES encrypts 64 bits (a block) at a time, it can encrypt a long message (file) in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode.

• Deterministic -- If same key is used then identical plaintext

blocks map to identical ciphertext 9/8/2015 7

Example – why ECB is bad?

9/8/2015 Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I 8

Tux Tux encrypted with AES in ECB mode

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Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

Cipher Block Chain (CBC) Mode

9/8/2015 9

encryption

decryption

Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

CBC Traits

• Randomized encryption

• IV – Initialization vector serves as the randomness for first block computation; the ciphertext of the previous block serves as the randomness for the current block computation

• IV is a random value

• IV is no secret; it is sent along with the ciphertext blocks (it is part of the ciphertext)

9/8/2015 10

Page 6: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Example – why CBC is good?

9/8/2015 Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I 11

Tux Tux encrypted with AES in CBC mode

Lecture 2 - Cryptography - I

CBC – More Properties • What happens if k-th cipher block CK gets

corrupted in transmission. – With ECB – Only decrypted PK is affected. – With CBC?

• Only blocks PK and PK+1 are affected!!

• What if one plaintext block PK is changed? – With ECB only CK affected. – With CBC all subsequent ciphertext blocks will be

affected. • “Avalanche effect”

– This leads to an effective integrity protection mechanism (or message authentication code (MAC))

9/8/2015 12

Page 7: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Security of Block Cipher Modes

• ECB is not even secure against eavesdroppers (ciphertext only and known plaintext attacks)

• CBC is secure against CPA attacks (assuming 3-DES or AES is used in each block computation); automatically secure against eavesdropping attacks

• However, not secure against CCA. Why?

• Intuitively, this is because the ciphertext can be “massaged” in a meaningful way

13

CBC Mode CCA Attack

• Assume adversary has eavesdropped upon a ciphertext – (C0, C1, C2) -- corresponding to a plaintext (M1, M2). C0 is IV.

• Adversary is not allowed to query for (C0, C1, C2) itself

• With CBC, adversary queries for (C0’, C1, C2) and obtains (M1’, M2) [X’ denotes bit-wise complement of X]

14

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How to achieve CCA security?

• Prevent any massaging of the ciphertext

• Intuitively, this can be achieved by using integrity protection mechanisms (such as MACs), which we will study later

• The ciphertext is generated using CBC and a MAC is generated on this ciphertext

• Both ciphertext and the MAC is sent off

• The other party decrypts only if MAC is valid

9/8/2015 Lecture 2.3 - Private Key Cryptography

III 15

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

• National Institute of Science and Technology – DES is an aging standard that no longer addresses today’s needs for

strong encryption – Triple-DES: Endorsed by NIST as today’s defacto standard

• AES: The Advanced Encryption Standard – Finalized in 2001

– Goal – To define Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) by selecting a new powerful encryption algorithm suitable for encrypting government documents

– AES candidate algorithms were required to be:

• Symmetric-key, supporting 128, 192, and 256 bit keys

• Royalty-Free

• Unclassified (i.e. public domain)

• Available for worldwide export

Lecture 2.3 - Private Key Cryptography III

9/8/2015 16

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AES

• AES Round-3 Finalist Algorithms: – MARS

• Candidate offering from IBM

– RC6 • Developed by Ron Rivest of RSA Labs, creator of the widely used

RC4 algorithm

– Twofish • From Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.

– Serpent • Designed by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham and Lars Knudsen

– Rijndael: the winner! • Designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen

Lecture 2.3 - Private Key Cryptography III

9/8/2015 17

Other Symmetric Ciphers and their applications

• IDEA (used in PGP)

• Blowfish (password hashing in OpenBSD)

• RC4 (used in WEP), RC5

• SAFER (used in Bluetooth)

Lecture 2.3 - Private Key Cryptography III

9/8/2015 18

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Some Questions

• Double encryption in DES increases the key space size from 2^56 to 2^112 – true or false?

• Is known-plaintext an active or a passive attack? • Is chosen-ciphertext attack an active or a passive

attack? • Reverse Engineering is applied to what design of

systems – open or closed? • Alice needs to send a 64-bit long top-secret letter to

Bob. Which of the ciphers that we studied today should she use?

9/8/2015 Lecture 2.2 - Private Key Cryptography

II 19

Some Questions

• C=DES(K,P); where (P, C are 64-bit long blocks). What would be DES(K,”PPPP”) in ECB mode? What it would be in CBC mode?

• ECB is secure for sending just one block of data: true or false?

• Is it okay to re-use IV in CBC? Why/why not? • Is ECB secure against CPA? • Is CBC secure against CPA?

Lecture 2.3 - Private Key Cryptography III

9/8/2015 20

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Public Key Crypto Overview

and Math Background

9/8/2015 Lecture 1 - Introduction 21

Recall: Private Key/Public Key Cryptography

• Private Key: Sender and receiver share a common (private) key – Encryption and Decryption is done using the

private key – Also called conventional/shared-key/single-key/

symmetric-key cryptography

• Public Key: Every user has a private key and a public key – Encryption is done using the public key and

Decryption using private key – Also called two-key/asymmetric-key cryptography

22

Page 12: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Private key cryptography revisited.

• Good: Quite efficient

• Bad: Key distribution and management is a serious problem

23

Public key cryptography model

• Good: Key management problem potentially simpler

• Bad: Much slower than private key crypto (we’ll see later!)

24

Page 13: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Public Key Encryption

• Two keys:

– public encryption key e

– private decryption key d

• Encryption easy when e is known

• Decryption easy when d is known

• Decryption hard when d is not known

• We’ll study such public key encryption schemes; first we need some mathematical background.

25

Public Key Encryption: Security Notions

• Very similar to what we studied for private key encryption

– What’s the difference?

26

Page 14: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Group: Definition

(G,.) (where G is a set and . : GxGG) is said to be a

group if following properties are satisfied:

1. Closure : for any a, b G, a.b G

2. Associativity : for any a, b, c G, a.(b.c)=(a.b).c

3. Identity : there is an identity element such that a.e = e.a = a, for any a G

4. Inverse : there exists an element a-1 for every a in G, such that a.a-1 = a-1.a = e

9/8/2015 Lecture 1 - Introduction 27

Groups: Examples

• Set of all integers with respect to addition --(Z,+)

• Set of all integers with respect to multiplication (Z,*) – not a group

• Set of all real numbers with respect to multiplication (R,*)

• Set of all integers modulo m with respect to modulo addition (Zm, “modular addition”)

28

Page 15: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Multiplicative inverses in Zm

• 1 is the multiplicative identity in Zm

• Multiplicative inverse (x*x-1=1 mod m)

– SOME, but not ALL elements have unique multiplicative inverse.

– In Z9 : 3*0=0, 3*1=3, 3*2=6, 3*3=0, 3*4=3, 3*5=6, …, so 3 does not have a multiplicative inverse (mod 9)

– On the other hand, 4*2=8, 4*3=3, 4*4=7, 4*5=2, 4*6=6, 4*7=1, so 4-1=7, (mod 9)

29

)(mod1)(mod1 mxmxx

9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Which numbers have inverses?

• In Zm, x has a multiplicative inverse if and only if x and m are relatively prime or gcd(x,m)=1

– E.g., 4 in Z9

30 9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

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Modular Exponentiation: Square and Multiply method

• Usual approach to computing xc mod n is inefficient when c is large.

• Instead, represent c as bit string bk-1 … b0 and use the following algorithm:

z = 1

For i = k-1 downto 0 do

z = z2 mod n

if bi = 1 then z = z* x mod n

31 9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Example: 3037 mod 77

32

z = z2 mod n

if bi = 1 then z = z* x mod n

i b z

5 1 30 = 1*1*30 mod 77

4 0 53 = 30*30 mod 77

3 0 37 = 53*53 mod 77

2 1 29 = 37*37*30 mod 77

1 0 71 = 29*29 mod 77

0 1 2 = 71*71*30 mod 77

9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Page 17: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Other Definitions

• The number of elements in a group is called the order of the group

• Order of an element a is the lowest i (>0) such that ai = e (identity)

33 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Lagrange’s Theorem

• Order of an element in a group divides the order of the group

34 9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Page 18: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Euler’s totient function

• Given positive integer n, Euler’s totient function is the number of positive numbers less than n that are relatively prime to n

• Fact: If p is prime then

– {1,2,3,…,p-1} are relatively prime to p.

35

( ) 1p p

)(n

9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Euler’s totient function

• Fact: If p and q are prime and n=pq then

• Each number that is not divisible by p or by q is relatively prime to pq.

– E.g. p = 5, q = 7: {1,2,3,4,-,6,-,8,9,-,11,12,13,-,-,16,17,18,19,-,-,22,23,24,-,26,27,-,29,-,31,32,33,34,-}

– pq – p - (q-1) = (p-1)*(q-1)

36

)1)(1()( qpn

9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Page 19: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Euler’s Theorem and Fermat’s Theorem

• If a is relatively prime to n then

• If a is relatively prime to p then ap-1 = 1 mod p

Proof : follows from Lagrange’s Theorem

37

na n mod1)(

9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Euler’s Theorem and Fermat’s Theorem

EG: Compute 9100 mod 17:

p =17, so p-1 = 16. 100 = 6·16+4. Therefore, 9100=96·16+4=(916)6(9)4 . So mod 17 we have 9100

(916)6(9)4 (mod 17) (1)6(9)4 (mod 17)

(81)2 (mod 17) 16

Public Key Cryptography -- II 9/8/2015 38

Page 20: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Some questions

• 2-1 mod 4 =?

• Find x such that

– x = 4 (mod 5)

– x = 7 (mod 8)

– x = 3 (mod 9)

• Order of a group is 5. What can be the order of an element in this group?

39 9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

Further Reading

• Chapter 4 of Stallings

• Chapter 2.4 of HAC

40 9/8/2015 Public Key Cryptography -- II

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The RSA Cryptosystem (Encryption)

41

“Textbook” RSA: KeyGen

• Alice wants people to be able to send her encrypted messages.

• She chooses two (large) prime numbers, p and q and computes n=pq and . [“large” = 1024 bits +]

• She chooses a number e such that e is relatively prime to and computes d, the inverse of e in , i.e., ed =1 mod

• She publicizes the pair (e,n) as her public key. (e is called RSA

exponent, n is called RSA modulus). She keeps d secret and destroys p, q, and

• Plaintext and ciphertext messages are elements of Zn and e is

the encryption key.

42

)(n)(n

)(nZ

)(n

)(n

Page 22: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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RSA: Encryption

• Bob wants to send a message x (an element of Zn

*) to Alice.

• He looks up her encryption key, (e,n), in a directory.

• The encrypted message is

• Bob sends y to Alice.

43

nxxEy e mod)(

RSA: Decryption

• To decrypt the message

she’s received from Bob, Alice computes

Claim: D(y) = x 44

nyyD d mod)(

nxxEy e mod)(

Page 23: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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RSA: why does it all work

• Need to show

D[E[x]] = x

E[x] and D[y] can be computed efficiently if keys are known

E-1[y] cannot be computed efficiently without knowledge of the (private) decryption key d.

• Also, it should be possible to select keys reasonably efficiently

This does not have to be done too often, so efficiency requirements are less stringent.

45

E and D are Inverses

46

nxnx

nxx

nx

nx

nx

nnx

nyyD

t

tn

nt

ed

de

de

d

modmod1

mod)(

mod

mod

mod)(

mod)mod(

mod)(

)(

1)(

Because

From Euler’s Theorem

)(mod1 ned

Page 24: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Tiny RSA example.

• Let p = 7, q = 11. Then n = 77 and

• Choose e = 13. Then d = 13-1 mod 60 = 37.

• Let message = 2.

• E(2) = 213 mod 77 = 30.

• D(30) = 3037 mod 77=2

47

60)( n

Slightly Larger RSA example.

• Let p = 47, q = 71. Then n = 3337 and

• Choose e = 79. Then d = 79-1 mod 3220 = 1019.

• Let message = 688232… Break it into 3 digit blocks to encrypt.

• E(688) = 68879 mod 3337 = 1570.

E(232) = 23279 mod 3337 = 2756

• D(1570) = 15701019 mod 3337 = 688.

D(2756) = 27561019 mod 3337 = 232. 48

322070*46)( pq

Page 25: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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Security of RSA: RSA assumption

• Suppose Oscar intercepts the encrypted message y that Bob has sent to Alice.

• Oscar can look up (e,n) in the public directory (just as Bob did when he encrypted the message)

• If Oscar can compute d = e-1 mod then he can use to recover the plaintext x.

• If Oscar can compute , he can compute d (the same way Alice did). 49

xnyyD d mod)(

)(n

)(n

Security of RSA: factoring

• Oscar knows that n is the product of two primes

• If he can factor n, he can compute

• But factoring large numbers is very difficult:

– Grade school method takes divisions.

– Prohibitive for large n, such as 160 bits

– Better factorization algorithms exist, but they are still too slow for large n

– Lower bound for factorization is an open problem

50

)(n

)( nO

Page 26: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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How big should n be?

• Today we need n to be at least 1024-bits

– This is equivalent to security provided by 80-bit long keys in private-key crypto

• No other attack on RSA function known

– Except some side channel attacks, based on timing, power analysis, etc. But, these exploit certain physical charactesistics, not a theoretical weakness in the cryptosystem!

51

Key selection

• To select keys we need efficient algorithms to

– Select large primes

• Primes are dense so choose randomly.

• Probabilistic primality testing methods known. Work in logarithmic time.

– Compute multiplicative inverses

• Efficient algorithm (Extended Euclidean algorithm) exists

52

Page 27: Lecture 3: Cryptography II · 2019-12-18 · •1 Lecture 3: Cryptography II CS 336/536: Computer Network Security Fall 2015 Nitesh Saxena Course Administration •Everyone receiving

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RSA in Practice

• Textbook RSA is insecure – Known-plaintext?

– CPA?

– CCA?

• In practice, we use a “randomized” version of RSA, called RSA-OAEP – Use PKCS#1 standard for RSA encryption

http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125

– Interested in details of OAEP: refer to (section 3.1 of) http://isis.poly.edu/courses/cs6903/Lectures/lecture13.pdf

53

Some questions

• c1 = RSA_Enc(m1), c2 = RSA_Enc(m2).

– What is RSA_Enc(m1m2)?

• Homomorphic property

– What is RSA_Enc(2m1)?

• Malleability (not a good property!)

54

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Some Questions

• RSA stands for Robust Security Algorithm, right?

• If e is small (such as 3) – Encryption is faster than decryption or the other way round?

• Private key crypto has key distribution problem and Public key crypto is slow – How about a hybrid approach?

– Do you know how ssl/ssh works?

55

Some Questions

• I encrypt m with Alice’s RSA PK, I get c

– I encryt m again, I get --?

– What does this mean?

• What if I do the above with DES?

56

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Further Reading

• Stallings Chapter 11

• HAC Chapter 9

9/8/2015 Lecture 4: Hash Functions 57

Digital Signatures

9/8/2015 Lecture 1 - Introduction 58

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Public Key Signatures

• Signer has public key, private key pair

• Signer signs using its private key

• Verifier verifies using public key of the signer

Lecture 3.4: Public Key Cryptography IV

Security Notion/Model for Signatures

• Existential Forgery under (adaptively) chosen message attack (CMA)

– Adversary (adaptively) chooses messages mi of its choice

– Obtains the signature si on each mi

– Outputs any message m (≠ mi) and a signature s on m

Lecture 3.4: Public Key Cryptography IV

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RSA Signatures

• Key Generation: same as in encryption

• Sign(m): s = md mod N

• Verify(m,s): (se == m mod N)

• The above text-book version is insecure; why?

• In practice, we use a randomized version of RSA (implemented in PKCS#1)

– Hash the message and then sign the hash

Lecture 3.4: Public Key Cryptography IV