Lecture 25 Washington Beijing Consensus

8/12/2019 Lecture 25 Washington Beijing Consensus

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International Political Economy #23

The Washington vs. Beijing Consensus

William Kindred Winecoff

Indiana University Bloomington

December 10, 2013

W. K. Winecoff | IPE #25: Washington vs. Beijing Consensus 1/18
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Some Politics of Reform

Reforms political and economic have distributional consequences.

In Core countries, capitalism + democracy leads to a welfare state thatstabilizes politics.

In Gap countries, political institutions are less well consolidated.

The result? Often lots of inequality and the potential for political

instability.

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Inequality in Comparative Perspective

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The Next Great Powers?

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China and Order

It depends on how you look at it.

China has advantages economic, military, demographic that are

more significant than previous challengers to US hegemony.

Are these the appropriate criteria?

Monadic, dyadic, and systemic attributes.

What would it mean for China to dominate?



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A Multipolar Order?

Are the BRICSAM countries willing and able to alter the global order?

In some ways, yes (e.g. Doha).

Accommodation of rising powers is one feature of the liberal order.

Is BRICSAM revisionist? If so, are they capable ofcoordinating? If so, will they be able to effectively manage

their transition?

Alternative views:

BRICSAM too worried about domestic issues to take globalleadership.

But US and EU are maybe still in decline: a G-Zero world?

This could lead to instability and conflict.

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The Development Subsystem

The Core has prevailed: IMF and World Bank extend W.C. globally.

By turn of millennium no alternative to W.C. exists. (End of history)

Democratization goes hand-in-hand with marketization, both

ideationally and materialistically.

This is linked to the American hegemonic project.

Institutionalization and strategic restraint.

Rule of law, human rights (not just sovereignty), markets

(not just states).

Order becomes increasingly interdependent, democratic,prosperous, peaceful, and stable.

Only extended to Core until 1980s. Extended to Gap since (?)

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U.S. Hegemony and Development

Has this been a success?

U.S. is hypocritical, over-bearing, unilateral, self-interested, coercive.

And yet:

Less war (and less damaging war) than ever.

More prosperity than ever.More political and economic freedom than ever.

If its successful, it has been because:

U.S. can provide global public goods, and has an incentive to

do so.This enables ROW to focus on growth and prosperity in a

peaceful, rule-based international environment. (I.e., no

anarchy, so productive interaction is possible.)

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The Rise of China

Subramanian: By 2030, relative U.S. decline will have yielded not a

multipolar world but a near unipolar one dominated by China.

Is the U.S. hegemonic project doomed by its own success?

Providing space for development also allows for shifting

distribution of power.

Emergence of an alternative model Beijing Consensus"

that is less democratic, involves a heavy role for the state,

isnt dependent on global financial institutions?The Return of history?

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Catching Up

Whether China catches up to the U.S. is a function of growth

differentials:

Extensive growth: pulling underemployed resources to work.Intensive growth: using fully-employed resources more

efficiently.

China is currently doing the former.

To do the latter China will have to sustain technological innovation at a

rate higher than the U.S.

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Catching Up, con.

This assumes, of course, that China maintains political stability.

Looming demographic nightmare.

Increasing signs of internal discontent and regimecompetition.

Increasing signs of balancing against China in Asia.

Questions about China in Africa and L.A.

Can you sustain a closed political system in an open world?

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Bad Company

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Bad Company

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A Chinese Order?

That isnt a prediction... its a question. Maybe Chinese unipolarity is

inevitable anyway:

Dont need to catch up to U.S. in per capita income to behegemon. Otherwise Luxembourg would be the hegemon.

If so, what would that look like? Is there a distinctive Chinese model?

What is it?

How would we get there from here? Peacefully? Kissinger says

US-China conflict is a choice.

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Lecture 25 Washington Beijing Consensus