Leasing, Law and Land Tenure Measuring the Impact of the Long Term Leasing Act of 1955 on Indian Land Holdings

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Leasing, Law and Land Tenure: Measuring the Impact of theLong-Term Leasing Act of 1955 on Indian Land Holdings

Dustin Frye

University of Colorado, Boulder

December 11, 2012

Keywords: property rights, land tenure, native americans, leasing, heirship,

public law 280

JEL Classification: D02, K11, N42, N52, P48

The author would like to thank Terry Anderson, Dominic Parker, Murat Iyigun, and severalseminar contributors at PERC for their valuable suggestions and guidance.


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Abstract

An increasing focus of contemporary Native American economic development literature con-centrates on the role of institutions. Land tenure arrangements are an important part of theinstitutional structure on reservations because several reservations rely on agriculture and re-source extraction. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a series of policy interventionstargeting Native Americans. One such policy, the Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955,reduced bureaucratic oversight and altered the composition of Native American trust land. Thepolicy extended the possible term of leases on trust lands, increasing economic opportunities,lowering transaction costs, and increasing the discounted present value of retaining land in truststatus. Using a new panel dataset on land tenure, this paper finds that the LTLA significantlydiminished the flow of land to fee-simple (private ownership) and tribally owned land held intrust, leading to a higher rate of retention in individually owned land held in government trust.I extend the empirical framework to determine whether reservations under state jurisdictionexperienced additional changes in land tenure due to the ability to more credibly commit toleasing contracts or whether legal uncertainty over land-use and expanded credit access led toincreased transfer to fee-simple. The results suggest that reservations under state jurisdiction

continued transferring land to fee-simple, which supports the legal land-use uncertainty andsuggests the expanded credit access impacted purchasing more than leasing. To examine thedegree that heirship is influencing the results, I estimate the model by allotment date groups,where allotment dates proxy for heirship. Results indicate that reservations allotted earlier,which have more fractionated ownership, responded more to the Long-Term Leasing Act. Shiftsin land holdings induced by the LTLA reinforce the importance of reducing transaction costsassociated with trust land for Native American economic development.


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1 Introduction

Native Americans consistently rank as one of the poorest socio-economic groups in United States.

In 2011, median household earnings of American Indians were 30 percent lower than non-Native

households.1 Measures of income, health and education all point to a lack of economic development

on reservations. An increasing focus of contemporary Native American economic development

literature has shifted to the role of institutions (Anderson and Parker 2009; Cornell and Kalt

2000; Dippel 2012). Most reservations are located in rural areas, making agriculture and resource

extraction important components of the local economy. Successful management of these resources

relies on the property rights structures on Native American reservations.

Property rights influence economic development by defining the criterion for using resources and

capturing rents, exchanging goods, and establishing investment and production incentives (Libecap

1986). A great deal of attention has focused on the benefits of secure and well-defined property

rights in development and economic growth.2 In agricultural areas, secure property rights have led

to greater investment (Besley 1995; Goldstein and Udry 2008) and land improvement (Abdulai,

Owusu, and Goetz 2011). Established land rights should promote investment by strengthening

claims to returns on investments, increasing capital access, allowing for gains from trade, and

providing freedom to innovate (Fenske, 2011). Property rights have also led to increased credit

access (Field and Torero 2006), increased household investment (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010),

and increased labor supply (Field 2007).

Returning to the case of property rights on Native American reservations, reservation land

is organized under several different land tenure types: fee-simple, individual trust, tribal trust,

and federal trust.3 Different regulations associated with each land tenure type have important

1According to the 2011 American Community Survey median household earnings for American Indians and Alaska

Natives was $35,192 compared to national median household earnings of $50,502.2See: (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1996; Besley and Ghatak 2010; De Soto 2010;Engerman and Sokoloff 2008; Libecap 2007; North 1981).

3Fee-simple is the typical private ownership structure found in common law countries. Individual trust land iswhere the owner is the beneficiary of the land but the land is managed in trust by the federal government. Similarly,tribal trust land is managed by the federal government but the tribe is the beneficiary of the land. The federal

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consequences for contract costs and agricultural productivity (Anderson and Lueck 1992). On

Canadian aboriginal lands, similar land tenure structure combined with federal involvement leads

to increased transaction costs, which ultimately attenuates economic development (Alcantara 2007).Native American land tenure is also associated with scale differences between Indian and non-Indian

ranchers in Eastern Montana (Trosper 1978).

Despite the recognized value of agriculture and resources on reservations, little is known about

the evolution of these land tenure systems through time. Using a new panel dataset spanning from

1939 to 1974, this paper elucidates the trends and distributional shifts in tenure that occurred in

Native American land during the 20th century. Congress enacted several policies over the mid-part

of the twentieth century as part of the ‘Termination Era’ with the intent of incorporating NativeAmericans into the same economic, educational, and legal structures as mainstream Americans.

One policy targeted at land tenure was the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (hereafter LTLA) of

1955. This act increased lease lengths, reduced administrative oversight and lowered the transaction

costs associated with leasing Native American trust land particularly on fractionated individual

trust land. As a result, the flow of land tenure changed as trustees were more willing to retain

their land in individual trust. This change in land holding behavior suggests that benefactors of

individual trust land faced improved economic outcomes due to lower transaction costs and less

uncertainty regarding the expected stream of rents available from leasing.

This paper makes several contributions to the Native American economic development literature

as well as the general literature on property rights and transaction costs. It offers the first empirical

analysis of the LTLA at the national level, as well as examines the consequences of Public Law 280

(hereafter PL280) on land tenure holdings, using PL280 status as a natural experiment to identify

whether state jurisdiction translated to differential land holding behavior. The paper also highlights

the institutional problem of fractionated land ownership structures by examining differential land

holding behavior by reservation allotment date. This is the first paper to apply panel data to

government is both the beneficiary and manages the trust on federal trust land.

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the issue of Native American land tenure and to provide the first measure of land tenure patterns

through time. The paper also provides insight into leasing and selling decisions of durable assets

under regulated, collective ownership structures and intergenerational transfers.The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief history of Native American land and

property rights institutions prior to 1934. Section 3 discusses Native American land tenure and

the heirship problem on Native American reservations. Section 4 introduces key legal changes from

the 1950s and relates them to land tenure. Section 5 discusses the data, summary statistics and

provides a description of land tenure patterns through time. Section 6 empirically tests the effect of

the LTLA and PL 280 on changes in land tenure. Section 7 discusses the role of heirship in changing

land tenure. Section 8 compares the results from a variety of different empirical specifications andSection 9 concludes.

2 History of Native American Lands and Property Rights

Following the establishment of reservation systems, bureaucrats and activists sought to save Native

Americans from extinction by helping them assimilate into American society (Bobroff 2001). Both

Indian reformers and Congress considered land allotment as a requisite element of the assimilation

process (Otis & Prucha 1973). After a decade of failed allotment bills, Congress passed the General

Allotment Act, commonly known as the Dawes Act, in 1887. The act allowed Indian reservations

to be divided into individual parcels and assigned property rights to Native Americans.

The allotment structure of the Dawes Act provided each head of household one 160 acre parcel,

single individuals older than 18 received 80 acres and each child under 18 received an allotment of

40 acres.4 The government placed allotted lands in a trust for 25 years in an attempt to preserve

ownership. The trust did not allow the land to be sold, leased or willed. Under certain conditions,

land would be alienated and allottees would receive the title for a fee at the end of the 25-year

4These values were proportionally adjusted based on the size of the reservation.

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period.5 The Dawes Act was amended several times after it’s introduction. The amendments

provided more leasing opportunities, changed how parcels were willed and relaxed the restrictions

on keeping land in trust status. The government made the unallotted land available as surplusland to buyers outside of the reservation. Proceeds from surplus land sales were deposited in trust

accounts managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Public sentiment shifted against the Dawes Act following a negative report from the Institute of

Government Research.6 The report, known as the Meriam Report, drew attention to the reduction

in Indian owned land during the Allotment Era and the lack of instruction and capital equipment

provided to Native American farmers. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act

(IRA) effectively ending the allotment era. The government allowed unalienated land to be trans-ferred into individual or tribal trust land to be held by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Acreage

estimates following the allotment era suggest over 64 million acres were ceded either by treaty or

for surplus purposes by 1934 (BIA 1935). Nearly 41 million acres of land were allotted and over

23 million acres of that were alienated and declared fee-simple land, much of which was owned by

non-Indians. Over 17 million acres were for individual trust, approximately 34 million were set

aside as tribal trust and a small fraction was held in federal trust (BIA 1935).

The allotment era and passage of the IRA introduced property rights institutions for Native

American reservations that persist today: fee-simple, individual trust, tribal trust and federally

owned. Individual and tribal trust lands are subject to federal restrictions and oversight from

the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regarding alienation, leasing, inheritance, and encumbrance.

Changing or updating prior land-use arrangements as well as enacting new agreements requires

BIA approval at several different administrative levels. As a result, altering or instituting an

agreement often takes several months to complete and can be very costly.

5

Indian Agents determined these conditions at their discretion. Most featured residence and assimilation effortrequirements.6The Institute of Government Research is known today as the Brookings Institute.

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3 Native American Land Tenure

3.1 Land Transactions and Government Organization

Land can be legally transferred between any of the tenure types as long as it obtains approval at

the local and national level. Local interests involve a tribe or tribal agency. 7 Following the Indian

Reorganization Act, tribal charters and constitutions were responsible for defining each tribe’s role

in managing their land (Sutton 1975). Several tribes established formal corporate arrangements,

called Tribal Land Enterprises (TLEs), in the 1940s to help manage and administrate leasing and

sales of trust land at the local level. Tribes without TLEs typically rely on committees within a

tribal council to perform many of the same functions.

Federal oversight is provided at the agency level by a designated Superintendent who reports

directly to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of Interior. Every transaction that alters

the trust status of reservation land requires final approval from the Secretary of Interior. Glenn L.

Emmons, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1958, defined the Bureau’s position on transfers

particularly concentrating on movement from individual trust.

While the Bureau recognizes the competent Indian’s undeniable right to ask for and

receive a fee patent, it also keeps in mind its continuing trust responsibilities to the tribal

group and to other Indian landowners whose holdings may be affected. Consequently, if

there is any real possibility that the disposal of a particular allotment might adversely

affect other Indian lands in trust the Bureau will take the initiative in consulting with

the Indians concerned and will give them every possible assistance in working out a

satisfactory solution to the problem. In some cases this will involve purchase of the

patented allotment by the tribal group, in other cases it will involve other various types

of arrangements. (BIA, 61,1958)

7Agencies were organized geographically to allow for the sharing of administrative resources, often amongst smallerreservations. In some instances, like in California, there are as many as 30 tribes organized into a single agency,whereas in Montana most tribes serve as their own agency.

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The Commissioner’s statement suggests the Bureau’s official position is to seldomly reject ap-

plications requesting land in trust be redesignated as fee-simple.8 However, in the same memo,

while discussing the Bureau’s position on potentially adverse fee patents, Emmons declares that“the issuance of fee patents may be delayed in some cases.” According to a 1958 survey, several

tribes refered to their members outstanding applications (BIA 1958). Both statements lend support

for tribal acquisition of individual trust land as opposed to alienation. However, many reservations

cited a lack of resources and financing available for purchasing land and occasionally used property

exchanges, where land along the reservation fringe is exchanged for a parcel in the reservation inte-

rior. Some reservations cited issues with favoritism, R.E. Miles the acting Superintendent over the

Blackfeet Agency in 1958 noted the “influences that a political body, such as the Blackfeet TribalCouncil is subject to. In very few instances have sales or conveyances been consummated without

some show of favoritism.” He goes on to say that “the Blackfeet Tribal Council must associate with

all members and derives its support from constituents, which does not lend to developing a fair

and unbiased land-acquisition program” (BIA, 315, 1958).

Several legal options are available for transferring trust land to fee-simple. Indian Land Trans-

actions (74-75, 1958) describes each method available to individuals or the tribe. Based on trans-

actions between 1947 and 1957 the most common methods of transferring land from trust status

were, Sales in Fee, Patents in Fee, and Certificates of Competency. Sales in Fee transactions occur

when trust land is sold conditional on the issuance of the fee patent accompanying the sale. Patents

in Fee and Certificates of Competency similarly remove the restriction placed on trust land and

transfer it to fee-simple and face similar application processes. From Indian Land Transactions it

appears Patents in Fee are most useful in multiple ownership situations, particularly when minors

with guardians are involved. Certificates of Competency were issued by the Secretary of Interior

after an applicant established himself “capable of managing his own affairs and transacting his own

business.”9

8I am still looking for a source with information regarding applications and rejections.9I am still looking for a more precise description of the specific characteristics or actions an applicant needed to

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The Bureau employed appraisers to determine the land value. These values were used for every

land transaction. In cases where too much time had expired from the appraisal until the application,

approval a new appraisal was required to update the value to reflect the current market value (BIA,315, 1958). The process from submitting a completed applications to receiving a fee patent could

take several months (BIA 1958).

Instituting a leasing agreement requires approval from the same local and national authorities

that determine fee patents. The major difference between approving a leasing agreement and

issuing a fee patent is the Secretaries authority when partial owners cannot or will not sign the

applications. In the case of leasing, the Secretary has the authority to authorize a lease in cases

where a minor or incompetent individual without a guardian is a partial owner or nearly all majorshareholders agree to the terms of the lease. Fee patent applications require signatures from every

owner regardless of the ownership share. According to a survey in Indian Land Transactions , the

Secretary rarely exercises this ability. Most tribes cited consensus amongst owners as a major issue

hindering both leases and sales.

3.2 Heirship

Heirship made owner consensus increasingly difficult. When the original individual trust owners

died their ownership interests were divided between their heirs. With each subsequent generation

the fraction of ownership for any single individual fell exponentially. Reservations with shares of

individual trust land claimed between 50 and 60 percent of individual trust land was fractionated.

On the Blackfeet reservation, ownership shares were so diluted that the annual return on a one

year lease was only a few cents (BIA, 303, 1958).

In 1958, most reservations reported difficulty reaching agreements regarding leasing or sales of

multiple owner trust land. The Superintendent of the Shawnee expand on several techniques used

by owners to undermine the negotiation process (BIA, 289, 1958). Partial owners would simply

demonstrate to qualify for a Certificate of Competency.

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refuse to sign proposed agreements for a variety of reasons. Payment extraction from the other

owners was typical. Partial owners occasionally moved onto the land, which due to regulations

made it unleasable. Owners, especially those with insignificant shares, would fail to sign due tosentimental reasons. Superintendent reports indicate owners would often pursue their own deals

and disagree about potential buyers or lessees. One major legal problem was that owners had

no legal recourse against another owner (BIA, 290, 1958). In many cases, potentially beneficial

land consolidation is administratively infeasible due to the ownership structure and the tract size

(Williams, 712, 1970)

Several agency Superintendents mentioned Indian emigration and ownership among minors as

serious issues affecting heirship. Following World War II, a large number of Native Americansmigrated from reservations. One consequence reported by several agency Superintendents was dif-

ficulty obtaining signatures from these migrants (BIA, 193, 1958). Reports often claimed that

request were returned due to incorrect addresses or not returned at all (BIA, 352, 1958). In some

instances, minors received ownership shares in individual trust land. Court appointed guardians

were required to sign any applications or agreements regarding the trust holdings of minors. Nu-

merous reservations cited the expense of appointing guardians as a major hindrance. In instances

when the ownership share of the minor is small, income from leasing or sales is often not enough

to offset the cost of obtaining a guardian (BIA, 224, 1958).

The Superintendent of the Fort Belknap Agency reported that finalizing an application or

leasing agreement took over a year simply due to difficulty collecting ownership approval (BIA,

352, 1958). These complications diminished the market value of leases or sales (BIA, 303, 1958)

and made some potential lessees hesitant to lease fractionated land (BIA, 320, 1958).

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4 Legal Changes in the 1950s

4.1 Public Law 280

Congress passed two significant laws in the 1950s in the midst of the ‘Termination Era’ that affected

land holdings; Public Law 280 and the Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955 (Wilkinson & Biggs, 1977).

Public Law 280 (PL 280) moved the jurisdiction of criminal offenses and civil disputes from federal

and tribal courts to the state courts. Altering the jurisdiction of civil disputes was of secondary

importance, but matters for the resolution of disputes in leasing agreements. Public Law 280 was

passed in 1953 and applied to nearly all reservations in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,

Oregon and Wisconsin.10 Some states and reservations were added later, including Washington,

Kansas and the Flathead reservation in Montana.

Parker (2012) highlights two features that make PL 280 a suitable natural experiment for

identifying the effect of a legal institution on credit and contract enforcement. First, the law was

imposed on reservations; they were not allowed to select in or opt out. The selection into PL

280 treatment was determined at the federal level and reservations were chosen based on crime,

not for economic reasons. Second, PL 280 was instituted immediately and changed the legal

systems governing disputes in a clear manner (Parker 2012). However, ambiguity remains on the

interpretation of PL 280 for land-use activities. Chambers and Price (1973) highlight the lack

of absolute direction put forth by Congress, leading to varied interpretations of statutes in state

courts.

Several papers examine different outcomes relating to land and credit access that followed from

Public Law 280. Anderson and Parker (2008) use PL 280 as a natural experiment to examine the

effect of stable contracting on per capita income. They argue that transferring jurisdiction from

tribal to state courts limited the ability of tribes to alter contracts ex-post and selectively enforcecontracts. Therefore, the law allowed tribes and tribal members to convey ‘credible commitment’

10Exceptions include Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, Warm Springs reservation in Oregon and Menomineereservation in Wisconsin. Only Red Lake reservation is in my final sample.

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to potential investors. Their results suggest that PL 280 reservations experienced 30 percent more

per capita income growth between 1969 and 1999 than non-PL 280 reservations, with much of

the gain occurring before 1980. Parker (2012) finds that PL 280 reservations experienced a sharpincrease in per capita credit access following the implementation of PL 280. He suggests differences

in credit access between PL 280 and non-PL 280 reservations are due to a combination of weaker

creditor rights and more uncertainty regarding creditor rights under tribal jurisdiction.

4.2 Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955

The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955 (25 U.S.C. 415 [August 9, 1955]) was another

significant federal change that impacted Native American reservations. Prior to the LTLA, leasing

arrangements on individual and tribal trust land were subject to a maximum lease length of 5

years. The LTLA increased the maximum lease length from 5 years to 25 years and allowed for

one additional renewal of 25 years subject to BIA approval.11 The legislative history of the LTLA

indicates that Congress sought to promote economic development by expanding market participa-

tion on indian lands and encouraging long-term development through long-term commercial leases

(Chambers & Price, 1074, 1973).

Additionally, instituting a new lease or renewal required BIA approval at several different ad-

ministrative levels, which greatly increased the transaction costs associated with leasing. The

combination of short lease lengths and high transaction costs for lease renewals also reduced the

incentive of outside investors to develop long-term projects. The LTLA lowered transaction costs

by increasing the term length of leases and reducing federal oversight. Theoretically, lower trans-

action costs should result in increased economic development on trust land (Alcantara 2007; North

1984).

Given the perceived benefits of the LTLA, the economic impacts of the Long-Term Leasing11Some reservations update their leasing policies to allow for longer leases up to 99 years. My final sample includes

seven reservations that allow for these longer leases. The empirical results are robust to dropping these sevenreservations.

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Act are less established in the literature. Akee (2009) looks at the effect of the LTLA on the

housing market on the Agua Caliente Reservation in Palm Springs, CA. He finds that Agua Caliente

landowners were constrained because trust land could not be used as a sole source of collateralto secure bank financing. Akee shows that the LTLA in conjunction with the Agua Caliente

Equalization Act of 1959 (25 U.S.C. 951 [September 21, 1959]), which relaxed trust land restrictions,

led to a significant investment in housing on trust land. He also shows that home construction levels

and property values on trust land converge to those found on fee-simple land.

4.3 Heirship and the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955

Every leasing agreement or application for a fee patent had heirship related costs. Superintendent

records in Indian Land Transactions indicate that the time and financial cost of collecting owner

signatures was substantial. Drawn out procedures required additional appraisals and likely required

the renegotiation of terms. Guardian costs and fees to Tribal Land Enterprises added to the expense

of transacting a land deal. These costs were borne for each leasing agreement or sale of land. For

owners making a decision to continue leasing or try to sell, increasing future costs, due to increased

fractionation, may make selling more attractive in the current period. Therefore, for a first empirical

prediction, I expect land to move from individual trust to fee-simple through time.

The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955 does not change the upfront cost of any

single land transaction, however it potentially changes the discounted present value of these costs

by distributing them over a longer time horizon. The LTLA extended the possible duration of a

lease and required the owners to bear the upfront transaction costs less frequently. Allowing for

longer term leases also alters the discounted present value of rents for minors, making the hiring of

a guardian more likely. By distributing the costs over a longer time horizon, the LTLA increases

the discounted present value returned to owners leasing individual trust land. The LTLA does

not alter the cost structure for filing an application for a fee patent and transferring land to fee

simple. All else equal, the discounted present value for transferring land to fee simple and selling it

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should not be any different under the LTLA. Therefore, increasing the discounted present value of

individual trust land, while holding the discounted present value of transferring land to fee simple

constant, should motivate individuals that would have moved land from individual trust to feesimple to keep their land holdings in individual trust. As a second empirical prediction, following

the LTLA I expect land flows from individual trust to fee simple to slow following the LTLA.

5 Data on Land Tenure Through Time

5.1 Land Tenure Panel Dataset and Summary Statistics

The U.S. Department of Interior, in conjunction with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), main-tains records regarding Native American land tenure. I found and recorded reservation level land

tenure acreages for ten years dating back to 1939. The Office of Indian Affairs published Statistical

Supplements to their Annual Report for 1939, 1941, 1942 and 1944, which contain land tenure

information for most reservations nationwide. A published senate report from 1958 contains in-

formation for over 80 reservations regarding land tenure in 1947 and 1957. The Bureau of Indian

Affairs published another statistical supplement, which contains population data, limited demo-

graphic information and land tenure information for all reservations in 1963. In 1971 and 1974,the BIA contributed reservation level land tenure information for U.S. Department of Commerce

publications on economic development on Indian reservations. My final source for reservation level

land tenure information comes from a 1978 report published by the U.S. Department of Interior.

The final panel dataset of land tenure information contains 60 reservations, measured at ten points

in time, spanning from 1939 to 1978.12 This information is supplemented with initial allotment

information from a report on land tenure published by the Office of Indian Affairs in 1935.

Table 1 indicates the 60 Indian reservations remaining in the sample with land tenure andallotment information. For each agency, the table reports the state where the majority of reservation

12See the Data Appendix for more details regarding the construction of the panel dataset and selection of the finalsample.

12



land is located, the administrative area office of each agency, whether the reservation adopted Public

Law 280, the primary allotment date within the agency, and the total acreage that was allotted as

of 1935. The 60 reservations in my sample are geographically varied, coming from 19 states, mostlyin the west and midwest. Figure 1 maps the location of each agency and color codes the area office

regions.13 Twenty-two reservations in the sample eventually adopted PL 280.

5.2 National and Regional Trends in Land Tenure

Panel A of Table 2 presents unweighted descriptive statistics for the full sample of 60 Native

American reservations. To understand land tenure changes through time, the outcomes of interest

are the shares of each land tenure type and the percentage change in the share from the previous

period. These measures effectively look at the levels and changes of each land tenure. Comparing

the tenure shares, there is considerable variation in how reservations are organized. The minimum

and maximums of each tenure category show some reservations can be predominately composed of

one type or another. On average, the reservations in the sample have a higher share of fee-simple

land than individual trust and tribal trust.

Figure 2 visually depicts the national pattern in land tenure shares from 1939 to 1978. Between

forty and fifty percent of reservation land is designated as fee-simple land, with this share peaking

in the early 1970s. The share of tribal trust land starts increasing in the mid-1940s at the expense

of individual trust land. Federal trust represents a relatively small share of overall land tenure and

is ignored in further analysis. Figure 3 graphs the share in each area office by land tenure type.

The national level pattern is consistent across most area offices. Shares of both fee-simple land and

tribal trust land increase throughout the period for nearly every area office and individual trust

declines in most area offices.13The Bureau of Indian Affairs has nine area offices to facilitate regional administration.

13



5.3 Changes in the Shares of Land Tenure

Average year to year percent changes in the share of land tenure provide information about the

short-term responsiveness, which can be particularly useful for analyzing response to policy changes.

The second set of outcomes in Panel A of Table 2 show summary statistics for the percent change

in land tenure shares. On average, the share of land in both fee-simple land and tribal trust

land experience positive percent changes, as indicated by the increases in their shares in Figure 1.

Comparing the unweighted means, it appears that the share of tribal trust land grew faster than

the share of fee-simple land. This is supported by stronger changes in the distribution of tribal

trust compared to fee-simple land as well. Panel A indicates that the average percentage change

in individual trust is negative, implying a decreasing share of individual trust land through time.

This was also supported in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the average annual percentage change of each land tenure

type through time where each data point is a reservation. Each panel of Figure 4 also plots the

estimated bivariate regression separately for before and after the Long-Term Leasing Act. The

fitted regression lines for both fee-simple and individual trust land change sharply following the

LTLA. Consistent with the prior empirical predictions, the average growth rate into fee-simple

was increasing and positive prior to the LTLA and is diminishing after the LTLA. Similarly for

individual trust, land was being redesigned away from individual trust status at an increasing rate

prior to the LTLA, and the pattern similarly reverses following the LTLA. The scatterplot for tribal

trust land reveals growth in tribal trust both before and after the LTLA. The following sections

explore this observed bivariate relationship more explicitly.

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6 Understanding the Impact of the Long-Term Leasing Act of

1955 on Changes in Land Tenure

6.1 Empirical Specification

As outlined in Section 4.3, increasing the discounted present value of individual trust land, while

holding the discounted present value of transferring land to fee simple constant, should motivate

individuals that would have moved land from individual trust to fee simple to keep their land

holdings in individual trust. This theory is empirically testable by examining whether the LTLA

significantly changed the flow of land between the types, specifically looking at whether it increased

the retention rate of trust land and diminished the flow to fee-simple land.

To empirically test for a structural break in the flow of each outcome around 1957, I examine

the following model using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression, allowing for the error terms to be

correlated across the regressions.

TenurePctChangei,t = β 0 + β 1Y eart + β 2LTLAt + β 3(LTLAt x Y eart) + X iγ + ρi + i,t (1)

The outcome, T enurePctChange, is the percentage change from period t − 1 to t for a given

land tenure type. The indicator LTLA is equal to one if the year is after 1957.14 The coefficient

β 1 gives the average year to year percentage change prior to the LTLA. Similarly, the coefficient

β 3 is the average percentage change from one year to the next after the passage of the LTLA.

The null hypothesis of interest tests whether or not the Long-Term Leasing Act is associated with

changing the pattern of land tenure, mathematically denoted β 2+β 3∗Y ear = 0. This model exploits

variation at the reservation level, i, across ten years, t from 1939 to 1978. The specification includes

a reservation fixed-effect, ρ, to account for time invariant factors at the reservation level.15

14In order to include the values in 1957 in both the pre-LTLA period and post-LTLA period I duplicate the 1957data and assign it to 1958.

15In the robustness section, I replace reservation fixed-effects with area office fixed-effects and linear time trends

15



The vector, X , contains allotment era, land demand and political controls. The allotment era

was a formative period for Native American property rights. Several papers and books examine

the political and economic environment that contributed to the Dawes Act and influenced theallotment era. McChesney (1990) looks at political factors associated with introducing and aborting

the allotment era. Carlson (1981) examines how agricultural conditions contributed to earlier

allotments for reservations. Frye (2012) shows that both demographics and land characteristics

surrounding reservations were responsible for earlier allotment dates. Anderson & Parker (2012)

show resources were important for reshaping Native American reservations during the allotment

era. To account for changing land demand conditions, the model controls for the average value of

agricultural land per acre in the state containing the majority of reservation land in year t. Themodel also includes a proxy for mortgage rates by controlling for the discount rate in year t. To

allow for philosophical and policy differences for the Secretary of Interior, I control for the political

party of the executive branch.

The model tests for a structural break around 1957, but I would prefer to use 1955 to coincide

with the LTLA, however due to data constraints this is not possible. Table 3 shows the number of

transactions disposing of individual trust land by area office from 1948 to 1957. The data indicates

there was not a strong decrease in the number of transactions immediately after 1955, so it does

not appear that the LTLA induced immediate changes in the quantity of land transactions. Given

it can take several months and even years for land to be transferred between types, it is not entirely

unexpected that the LTLA would not immediately alter the flow of land between tenure types. 16

6.2 Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on Changes to Land Tenure

Tables 4 presents the results from the Fixed-Effects Seemingly Unrelated Regression (FE SUR)

specification described in equation 1. Each column presents coefficient estimates for a differenthowever the results do not change.

16The large increase in transactions in the Aberdeen area office in 1951 is the result of the dam construction onthe Standing Rock reservation. I am still unsure why there is a rise in the volume of individual trust land disposaltransactions starting in 1953, prior to the LTLA, this increase is something I need to explore further.

16



land tenure type, with t-statistics in parenthesis. The coefficients on Y ear indicate the trend in

the flow of land tenure prior to 1957. The signs of the coefficient estimates on the interaction term,

(LTLA X Y ear), report the slope of the marginal effect and support the predicted effects suggestedin Section 4.3. Both follow the empirical predictions outlined in section 4.

Figures 5 through 7 plot the marginal effects of the Long-Term Leasing Act in each year, for

each land tenure type, along with the 90 percent confidence intervals.17 These figures reveal when

the marginal effects become statistically different from zero. Figure 5 plots the marginal effects

for the impact of the LTLA on the percent change in individual trust land. The figure shows the

positive effect through time and indicates a statistically significant difference approximately four

years after the passage of the LTLA. Figure 6 plots similar marginal effects for fee-simple land. Theresults indicate the LTLA had a negative effect on the growth rate of fee simple land. This effect

is statistically different from zero about six years after the passage of the LTLA. Figure 7 plots

the marginal effects of the LTLA on the percent change in tribal trust land. The results indicate

the LTLA had a positive effect on tribal trust land accumulation, although it is not statistically

different from zero prior to 1978. These results support the hypothesis posited in section 4.3, which

suggested increasing returns to the discounted present value of individual trust land compared to

fee-simple land should induce more land retention in individual trust land.

6.3 Incorporating Public Law 280

The impact of the Long-Term Leasing Act may vary by the quality of the other legal institutions

present. Public Law 280 could influence land holdings through similar mechanisms to those de-

scribed by Anderson and Parker (2008) and Parker (2012). The ability to credibly commit to a

leasing contract and access credit are both important features that could work in conjunction with

the Long-Term Leasing Act. Additional term lengths translate to longer commitments, which may

be more beneficial under state jurisdiction because outside investors want to know any dispute will

17Confidence intervals are calculated based on the joint significance between the intercept and slope term. Morespecifically, the standard error of the marginal effect is

V ar(β 2) + V ar(β 3) ∗ year2 + 2 ∗ Cov(β 2, β 3) ∗ year.

17



be handled in court they are more familiar with. However, Chambers and Price (1973) highlight

the legal uncertainty of PL 280 regarding land use activities. This uncertainty may not translate

to benefits for the leasing market but may make sales of fee-simple land more attractive. Theexpansion of credit access may also translate to more purchasing power leading to more sales as

well.

To disentangle which of these two effects dominates, I fully interact the previous specification

with an indicator for whether a reservation was ever designated as a Public Law 280 reservation,

to empirically test whether there are differences in land flow behavior from being subject to state

jurisdiction.18

TenurePctChangei,t = β 0 + β 1Y eart + β 2LTLAt + β 3(LTLAt x Y eart) + β 4(PL280i x Y eart)

+ β 5(LTLAt x PL280i) + β 6(LTLAt x PL280i x Y eart) + X iγ + ρi + i (2)

The null hypothesis of interest tests whether or not Public Law 280 reservations experienced dif-

ferent changes in the patterns of land tenure following the Long-Term Leasing Act, mathematically

denoted β 5 + β 6 ∗ Y ear = 0.

6.4 Results from Incorporating PL 280

Tables 5 present the regression results for the FE SUR model outlined in equation 2. The coefficient

estimates on the interaction term, (LTLA X Y ear), are similar between Table 4 and Table 5. The

coefficient estimate on the triple interaction term, (LTLA X PL280 X Y ear), is not statistically

different from zero in any of the three specifications. Figures 8 through 10 plot the marginal effects

of PL280 on the different land tenure types following the LTLA. Figure 8 shows a positive difference

in the growth rate of individual trust land for Public Law 280 reservations compared to non-PublicLaw 280 reservations, however it is not ever significantly different from zero. Figure 9 plots the same

marginal effect for fee-simple land and indicates a positive difference in growth rates between PL280

18Figure 1 distinguishes the PL 280 reservations and non-PL 280 reservations on the map.

18



and non-PL280 reservations, which becomes significantly different after approximately seven years.

This suggests that PL280 reservations continued transferring land to fee-simple, which supports

the legal land-use uncertainty promoted by Chambers and Price and suggests the expanded accessto credit impacted purchasing more than leasing.

7 Heirship

Reservations with earlier allotment dates were granted property rights earlier and have had more

time to accumulate heirs. Therefore, allotment date serves as a useful proxy for heirship conditions.

Comparing the marginal effects of the Long-Term Leasing Act within allotment date groups indi-

cates whether or not there were differential responses to the LTLA by heirship conditions. Recall

from section 4.3, that more heirs, increases the transaction costs for signing or renewing a lease.

Longer term leases distributed these costs over a longer time horizon and increased the discounted

present value of leasing compared to transferring land to fee-simple. So reservations with more

heirs would be more likely to benefit from the Long-Term Leasing Act.

Table 6 presents results from a FE SUR model described in equation 1 for different allotment

date groups. Panel A examines the effect for unallotted reservations. There is no clear expectation

for the sign of the marginal effects for unallotted reservations because there is uncertainty regarding

the number of heirs. The coefficient estimates in Panel A, support the uncertain sign by indicating

the LTLA had no significant effect on the unallotted reservations in the sample. Panels B and C

present the coefficient estimates for reservations allotted before 1900 and after 1900 respectively.

The sign and magnitude of these estimates are similar to the original estimates in Table 4. However,

for individual trust land, the magnitude on the interaction term, (LTLA X Y ear), is larger for

reservations allotted earlier. This supports the prior that reservations allotted earlier respond more

to the Long-Term Leasing Act. Figures 11 through 13 plot the marginal effects for each heirship

group. Comparing the early and late allotment groups, we see a more abrupt changes to the flow

of individual trust land and fee-simple land for reservations allotted before 1910.

19



8 Robustness

To check the sensitivity of the estimates to different specifications I estimate six different models

varying the controls, fixed-effects and weighting. The base model does not include any controls

for land value, interest rates or political party indicators or any fixed-effects. The controls are

introduced in the second specification. The third model includes area office fixed-effects to account

for time invariant factors at the area office level. The fourth specification expands these fixed-effects

to include an area office linear time trend, which accounts for unobserved factors that change linearly

through time. The fifth specification replaces the area office linear time trend with reservation level

fixed-effects. The final specification is a weighted OLS with reservation fixed-effects, weighted by

reservation size. Aside from the base specification the coefficients estimates are very robust across

the specifications. The weighting does increase the coefficient on the interaction term for both

individual trust land and tribal trust land.

9 Conclusion

In order to measure the economic impacts of land tenure on Native American reservations it is

important to understand the evolution of land tenure through time. The origins of land tenure on

Native American reservations trace back to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The 1950s and

1960s were characterized by a series of policy interventions targeting Native Americans. One such

policy, the Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955, had a large impact on Native American trust land. The

policy extended the possible term of leases on individual and tribal trust lands, increasing economic

opportunities, lowering transaction costs and increasing the present value of retaining land in trust.

As a result, the pattern of land movement shifts away from transfers to fee-simple and tribal trust

and results in more land retention in individual trust.

I extend my empirical framework to determine whether reservations under state jurisdiction

experience additional changes in land tenure shifts due to the ability to more credibly commit to

20



leasing contracts or whether legal uncertainty over land-use and expanded credit access lead to

increased transfer to fee-simple. The results suggest Public Law 280 reservations continued trans-

ferring land to fee-simple, which supports the legal land-use uncertainty and suggests the expandedcredit access impacted purchasing more than leasing. To examine the degree that heirship is in-

fluencing the results I estimate the results by allotment date groups, where allotment dates proxy

for heirship. The results indicate that reservations allotted earlier, which have a more pronounced

heirship problem, responded more to the Long-Term Leasing Act. The strong shifts in land induced

by the Long-Term Leasing Act suggests that similar policies aimed at decreasing transaction costs

associated with Native American land tenure offer an alternative means of promoting economic

development on Native American reservations without sacrificing tribal sovereignty.

21



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Anderson, T. L., and D. P. Parker 2009. Economic development lessons from and for North Amer-ican Indian economies *. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 53 (1),105–127.

Anderson, T. L., and D. P. Parker 2012. Natural Resources on American Indian Reservations:Blessing or Curse? Perc working paper, Property and Environment Research Center.

Besley, T. 1995. Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and evidence from Ghana. journal of Political Economy , 903–937.

Besley, T., and M. Ghatak 2010. Chapter 68 - Property Rights and Economic Development*.In D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (Eds.), Handbooks in Economics , Volume 5 of Handbook of Development Economics , pp. 4525 – 4595. Elsevier.

Bobroff, K. H. 2001. Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of CommonOwnership. Vanderbilt Law Review 54 (4), 1559.

Carlson, L. 1981. Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land: the Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming . Contributions in economics and economic history. Greenwood Press.

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Chambers, R., and M. Price 1973. Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasingof Indian Lands. Stan. L. Rev. 26, 1061.

Cornell, S., and J. P. Kalt 2000. Wheres the glue? Institutional and cultural foundations of

American Indian economic development. Journal of Socio-Economics 29 (5), 443 – 470.

De Soto, H. 2010. The Mystery Of Capital . Transworld.

Dippel, C. 2012. Forced Coexistance and Economic Development: Evidence from Native AmericanReservations. Working paper, UCLA Anderson School of Management.

Engerman, S., and K. Sokoloff 2008. Institutional and non-institutional explanations of economicdifferences. Handbook of new institutional economics , 639–665.

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North, D. C. 1984. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History. Zeitschrift fr die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140 (1), pp. 7–17.

of Indian Affairs. Office of Trust Responsibilities, U. S. B. 1978. Annual Report of Indian Lands .Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Trust Responsibilities.

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Otis, D., and F. Prucha 1973. The Dawes Act and the allotment of Indian lands . Civilization of the American Indian Series. UMI books on demand.

Parker, D. P. 2012. The Effects of Legal Institutions on Access to Credit: Evidence from American

Indian Reservations. Working paper, Montana State University.

Sutton, I. 1975. Indian land tenure: bibliographical essays and a guide to the literature . Library of American Indian affairs. Clearwater Pub. Co.

Trosper, R. L. 1978. American Indian Relative Ranching Efficiency. American Economic Re-view 68 (4), 503–16.

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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1958. Indian land transactions: memorandum of the chairman to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,United State Senate. An analysis of the problems and effects of our diminishing Indian land base, 1948-57 . Number v. 1 in Indian Land Transactions: Memorandum of the Chairman to theCommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate ; an Analysis of the Problemsand Effects of Our Diminishing Indian Land Base, 1948-57. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

United States. Dept. of Commerce 1974. Federal and State Indian reservations and Indian Trust Areas . Native American legal materials collection. For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt.Print. Off.

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United States. Office of Indian Affairs 1941. Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941.

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United States. Office of Indian Affairs 1944. Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1944.

United States. Office of Indian Affairs and United States. National Resources Board. Land PlanningCommittee 1935. Indian Land Tenure, Economic Status, and Population Trends . Report on landplanning. U.S. Government Printing Office.

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24



A Data Appendix

A.1 Data Source Guide

Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the FiscalYear Ended June 30, 1939 (1939)

Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for theFiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941 (1941)



Indian land transactions: memorandum of the chairman to the Committee on Interior andInsular Affairs, United State Senate. An analysis of the problems and effects of our diminishingIndian land base, 1948-57 (1958)

U.S. Indian Population (1962) and Land (1963) (1963)Federal and State Indian Reservations: An Economic Development Administration Handbook

(1971)Federal and State Indian reservations and Indian Trust Areas (1974)Annual Report of Indian Lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs & the Office of Trust Respon-

sibilities (1978)

A.2 Data Composition and Restriction Guide

Fee-simple land amounts are calculated by subtracting the sum of tribal trust, individual trustand federal trust land from the given reservation size following Anderson and Lueck (1992). Thepercentage change in the share of a given land tenure was calculated as the difference in the share

between year t and t − 1 divided by year t − 1. I dropped the top and bottom five percent of land tenure changes from my sample to remove outliers. Indian Land Transactions (1958) does notcontain information for federal trust land for 1947 and 1957. I chose to replace the missing federaltrust acreages in 1947 with the 1944 levels and the 1957 acreages with 1963 acreages. In most casesthese values were consistent between 1944 and 1963.

25



F i g u r e 1 : N a t i o n a l M a p I n d i c a t i n g S a m p l e R e s e r v a t i o n s , A r e a

O ffi c e s a n d P L 2 8 0 S t a t u s

26



F i g u r e 2 :

0 . 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5

1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

S h a r e

o f I n d i v

. T r u s

t

S

h a r e o

f T r i b a

l T r u s

t

S h a r e

o f F e

d e r a

l T r u s

t

S

h a r e o

f F e e - S

i m p

l e

V e r t i c

l e l i n e r e p r e s e n

t s t h e p a s s a g e o

f t h e

L o n g - T e r m

L e a s

i n g

A c

t i n 1 9 5 5

.

S o u r c e s :

S e e

D a

t a A p p e n

d i x

S h a r e s o f

N a

t i v e

A m e r i c a n

L a

n d T e n u r e s

1 9 3 9 t o 1 9 7 8

27



F i g u r e 3 :

0 . 2 . 4 . 6 . 8 1

S h a r e o f I n d i v . T r u s t

1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

0 . 2 . 4 . 6 . 8 1 S h a r e o f F e e - S i m p l e

1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

0 . 2 . 4 . 6 . 8 1 S h a r e o f T r i b a l T r u s t

1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

V e r t i c l e l i n e r e p r e s e n t s t h e p a s s a g e o

f t h e L o n g - T e r m L

e a s i n g A c t i n 1 9 5

5 .

S o u r c e s : S e e D a t a A p p e n d i x

S h a r e s o f L

a n d T e n u r e s B y A r e

a O f fi c e s

A b e r d e e n

A n d a r k o &

M u s k o g e e

B i l l i n g s

M i n n e a p o l i s

S a c r a m e n t o

G a l l u p

P o r t l a n d

P h o e n i x

28



F i g u r e 4 :

- 1 0 - 5 0 5 1 0

1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

F e e - S i m p l e

- 8 - 6 - 4 - 2 0 2 1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

I n d i v i d u a l T r u s t

0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 1 9 4 0

1 9 5 0

1 9 6 0

1 9 7 0

1 9 8 0

Y e a r

T r i b a l T r u s t

V e r t i c l e l i n e r e p r e s e n t s t h e p a s s a g e o

f t h e L o n g - T e r m L

e a s i n g A c t i n 1 9 5

5 .

B i v a r i a t e r e g r e s s i o n i s

u n w e i g h t e d .

S o u r c e s : S e e D a t a A p p e

n d i x

C h a n g e s i n t h e

S h a r e s o f L a n d T e n u r e b y T y p e

P r e

- L T L A

P o s t - L T L A

F i t t e d P r e - L T L A

F i t t e d P o s t - L T L A

29



Figure 5:

- 4

- 2

0

2

4

M a r g i n a l E f f e c t s

-20 -10 0 10 20Years After LTLA

Marginal Effect Upper Bound

Lower Bound

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Individual Trust Pct Change

Figure 6:

- 4

- 2

0

2

4




Lower Bound

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Fee Simple Pct Change

30



Figure 7:

- 6

- 4

- 2

0

2




Lower Bound

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Tribal Trust Pct Change

31





Figure 10:

- 4

- 2

0

2

4

6




Lower Bound

Marginal Effects of PL280 on Tribal Trust Pct Change

Following the LTLA

Figure 11:

- 2

0

2

4


-20 -10 0 10 20

Years After LTLA

Unallotted Allotted Before 1910

Allotted After 1910

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Changein Individual Trust by Allotment Date

33



Figure 12:

- 4

- 2

0

2

4




Allotted After 1910

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Change

in Fee-Simple by Allotment Date

Figure 13:

- 4

- 3

- 2

- 1


-20 -10 0 10 20

Years After LTLA


Allotted After 1910

Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Changein Tribal Trust by Allotment Date

34



Table 1: Reservation Summary

Primary FinalAgency Name State Area Office PL280 Allotment Allotment

Date AcreageBlackfeet Montana Billings No 1913 1441992Camp Verde Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0Chemehuevi California Phoenix Yes Unallotted 0Cheyenne River South Dakota Aberdeen No 1906 1261926Cocopah Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0Coeur D’ Alene Idaho Portland No 1909 102569Colorado River California Phoenix Yes 1915 8410Colville Washington Portland Yes 1886 414974Consolidated Chippewa Minnesota Minneapolis Yes 1889 873101Crow Montana Billings No 1907 2054055Crow Creek South Dakota Aberdeen No 1890 284732Flathead Montana Billings Yes 1908 836261Fort Apache Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0Fort Belknap Montana Billings No 1921 539448Fort Berthold North Dakota Aberdeen No 1910 605875Fort Hall Idaho Portland No 1914 347271Fort McDowell Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0

Fort Peck Montana Billings No 1921 1422172Fort Totten North Dakota Aberdeen No 1892 129504Fort Yuma Arizona Phoenix No 1912 8150Gila River Arizona Phoenix No 1887 97595Great Lakes Wisconsin Minneapolis Yes Unallotted 307287Havasupai Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0Hoh Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 0Hoopa Valley California Sacramento Yes Unallotted 0Kickapoo Kansas Andarko & Muskogee No 1895 19132Kiowa Oklahoma Andarko & Muskogee No 1901 544457Lower Brule South Dakota Aberdeen No 1900 233373Lummi Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 12309Makah Washington Portland Yes 1910 3723Mescalero New Mexico Gallup No Unallotted 0Navajo Arizona Gallup No Unallotted 708746Nez Perce Idaho Portland No 1893 175445Nisqually Washington Portland Yes 1884 4717Northern Cheyenne Montana Billings No 1932 233120

Omaha Iowa Minneapolis No 1882 135495Osage Oklahoma Andarko & Muskogee No 1906 1465350Ozette Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 0Pine Ridge South Dakota Aberdeen No 1904 2380195Port Madison Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 7248Potawatomi Kansas Andarko & Muskogee No 1906 77268Puyallup Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 0Quillayute Washington Portland Yes 1929 15Quinaielt Washington Portland Yes 1907 193291Red Lake Minnesota Minneapolis No Unallotted 0Rocky Boy’s Montana Billings No Unallotted 0Salt River Arizona Phoenix No 1913 25223San Carlos Arizona Phoenix No Unallotted 0Santee Nebraska Aberdeen Yes 1882 99704Shoalwater Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 0Skokomish Washington Portland Yes 1885 4973Spokane Washington Portland Yes 1910 65063Squaxin Island Washington Portland Yes 1889 1494Standing Rock South Dakota Aberdeen No 1905 1366731

Swinomish Washington Portland Yes Unallotted 7170Uintah & Ouray Utah Phoenix No 1905 113027Umatillah Oregon Portland Yes 1899 156252Warm Springs Oregon Portland Yes 1887 162948Wichita Oklahoma Andarko & Muskogee No 1901 152715Winnebago Iowa Minneapolis No 1887 110204Source: See Data Appendix

35



T a b l e 2 : S u m

m a r y S t a t i s t i c s b y P u b l i c L a w 2 8 0 S t a t u s

V a r i a b l e

N

M e a n

S D

M e d i a n

M i n

M a x

P a n e

l A :

F u

l l S a m p

l e

O u

t c o m e s

S h a r e o f F e e - S i m p l e

6 3 8

0 . 4 5 5 6

0 . 3 2 7 5

0 . 4 2 7

0

0 . 9 9 8 2


6 3 8

0 . 2 2 3 3

0 . 2 3 7 6

0 . 1 3 9 4

0

0 . 8 2 4 9

S h a r e o f T r i b a l T r u s t

6 3 8

0 . 3 1 5 5

0 . 3 5 7 2

0 . 1 0 0 7

0

1

P e r c e n t C h a n g e i n S h a r e o f F e e - S

i m p l e

5 7 1

0 . 2 2 9

1 . 7 5

0

- 1 0 . 7 5

8 . 3 9 9

P e r c e n t C h a n g e i n S h a r e o f I n d i v

. T r u s t

5 7 1

- 0 . 9 1 3 7

1 . 5 9 5

- 0 . 0 4 1 5 2

- 8 . 4 9 2

1 . 5 9 8

P e r c e n t C h a n g e i n S h a r e o f T r i b a

l T r u s t

5 7 1

1 . 6 5 2

4 . 3 5 9

0

- 1 . 6 9 9

3 5 . 3 6

C o n

t r o

l s

R e s e r v a t i o n S i z e ( a c r e s )

6 3 8

2 4 1 0 6 4 3

1 3 7 0 0 0 0 0

2 8 2 5 2 2

4 4 3

1 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0

A v e r a g e L a n d V a l u e s ( $ / a c r e )

6 3 8

1 1 4 . 2

1 5 3 . 5

6 0

5

1 3 3 1

A v e r a g e D i s c o u n t R a t e

6 3 8

3 . 0 8 7

2 . 4 9 9

2 . 1 5 7

1

7 . 8 7 5

P r i m a r y A l l o t m e n t D a t e

4 3 5

1 9 0 2

1 2 . 4 4

1 9 0 5

1 8 8 2

1 9 3 2

A c r e a g e A l l o t t e d b y 1 9 3 4

6 3 8

3 3 6 5 7 3

5 4 6 4 7 5

9 9 7 0 4

0

2 3 8 0 1 9 5

I n i t i a l S h a r e o f A l l o t t e d A c r e a g e

6 3 8

0 . 4 2 6 4

0 . 3 8 6 2

0 . 2 9 4 3

0

0 . 9 9 2 2

R e s e r v a t i o n N e v e r A l l o t t e d

6 3 8

0 . 3 0 5 6

0 . 4 6 1

0

0

1

P a n e l

B :

N o n - P

u b l i c L a w

2 8 0 R e s e r v a t

i o n s

O u

t c o m e s


3 9 7

0 . 4 8 5 1

0 . 3 3 8 6

0 . 4 6 8 7

0

0 . 9 9 7 2


3 9 7

0 . 2 2 2 7

0 . 2 3 1 3

0 . 1 5 1 3

0

0 . 8 2 4 9


3 9 7

0 . 2 8 4 4

0 . 3 4 1 5

0 . 1 0 0 7

0

1


i m p l e

3 5 5

0 . 1 3 1 4

1 . 7 7 6

0

- 1 0 . 7 5

8 . 0 4 6


. T r u s t

3 5 5

- 0 . 8 2 9 9

1 . 3 4 4

- 0 . 0 5 2 1 4

- 7 . 8 0 6

1 . 4 5


l T r u s t

3 5 5

2 . 1 4 5

5 . 0 6 5

0

- 1 . 2 7

3 5 . 3 6

C o n

t r o

l s


3 9 7

3 6 8 3 3 4 3

1 7 3 0 0 0 0 0

5 4 8 0 7 9

8 2 5 . 8

1 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0


3 9 7

8 4 . 5

1 3 4 . 8

4 2

5

1 3 3 1


3 9 7

3 . 1 1 5

2 . 5 3

2 . 1 5 7

1

7 . 8 7 5


2 8 8

1 9 0 3

1 1 . 2 9

1 9 0 5

1 8 8 2

1 9 3 2


3 9 7

4 5 9 7 0 9

6 3 4 8 9 3

1 5 2 7 1 5

0

2 3 8 0 1 9 5


3 9 7

0 . 4 1 1 8

0 . 3 8 7 1

0 . 2 6 2 2

0

0 . 9 9 2 2


3 9 7

0 . 2 7 4 6

0 . 4 4 6 9

0

0

1

P a n

e l C :

P u

b l i c L a w

2 8 0 R e s e r v a

t i o n

s

O u

t c o m e s


2 4 1

0 . 4 0 7

0 . 3 0 2 8

0 . 3 6 5

0

0 . 9 9 8 2


2 4 1

0 . 2 2 4 3

0 . 2 4 8

0 . 1 2 8 8

0

0 . 8 0 9 9


2 4 1

0 . 3 6 6 7

0 . 3 7 6 7

0 . 0 9 7 5 1

0

1


i m p l e

2 1 6

0 . 3 8 9 3

1 . 6 9 9

0

- 1 0 . 1 6

8 . 3 9 9


. T r u s t

2 1 6

- 1 . 0 5 2

1 . 9 3 4

- 0 . 0 0 6 7 1 7

- 8 . 4 9 2

1 . 5 9 8


l T r u s t

2 1 6

0 . 8 4 1 6

2 . 6 5 9

0

- 1 . 6 9 9

1 9 . 6 6

C o n

t r o

l s


2 4 1

3 1 4 1 2 2

5 3 9 6 5 0

2 9 5 1 5

4 4 3

1 9 3 4 6 5 4


2 4 1

1 6 3 . 1

1 6 9 . 5

1 1 6

7

9 1 4


2 4 1

3 . 0 4 2

2 . 4 5 2

2 . 1 5 7

1

7 . 8 7 5


1 4 7

1 8 9 8

1 3 . 7 7

1 8 8 9

1 8 8 2

1 9 2 9


2 4 1

1 3 3 7 3 1

2 4 7 2 4 9

7 1 7 0

0

8 7 3 1 0 1


2 4 1

0 . 4 5 0 4

0 . 3 8 4 4

0 . 4 0 7 6

0

0 . 9 7 5 7


2 4 1

0 . 3 5 6 8

0 . 4 8 0 1

0

0

1

S o u r c e : S e e D a t a A p p e n d i x

36



T a b l e 3 : B u r e a u o f I n d i a n A ff a i r s , A r e a T o t a l s , I n d i v i d u a l I n d i a n L a n d D i s p o s a l T r a n s a c t i o n s

A r e a

1 9 4 8

1 9 4 9

1 9 5 0

1 9 5 1

1 9 5 2

1 9 5 3

1 9 5 4

1 9 5 5

1 9 5 6

1 9 5 7

T o t a l

A v e r a g e

A b e

r d e e n

1 6 7

4 2 8

1 5 8

1 4 5 9

1 4 1

1 7 6

5 6 9

2 4 0

3 4 8

3 4 7

4 0 3 3

4 0 3 . 3

A n a

d a r k o

1 9 5

1 4 9

1 2 1

1 2 2

1 1 1

1 4 3

2 0 7

1 7 9

3 3 1

4 6 8

2 0 2 6

2 0 2 . 6

B i l l i n g s

8 6

1 7 6

1 4 0

1 7 9

2 4 8

6 4 0

9 5 6

7 2 1

2 6 9

4 9 0

3 9 0 5

3 9 0 . 5

G a l l u p

0

0

1 2

7

1 4

4

1

0

1

1

4 0

4

M i n

n e a p o l i s

0

0

0

3 7

3

1 7 3

2 4 9

4 2 2

4 8 6

4 2 1

1 7 9 1

1 7 9 . 1

M u s

k o g e e

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

P h o

e n i x

4

5

1

1

0

4

3

2

1

4

2 5

2 . 5

P o r t l a n d

3 4

4 1

4 0

8 2

9 5

9 0

8 4

1 6 2

1 7 1

2 8 8

1 0 8 7

1 0 8 . 7

S a c r a m e n t o

4 4

7 4

1 4 8

3 3 8

1 0 9

1 3 2

6 7

8 9

1 1 8

5 2

1 1 7 1

1 1 7 . 1

T o t a l

5 3 0

8 7 3

6 2 0

2 2 2 5

7 2 1

1 3 6 2

2 1 3 6

1 8 1 5

1 7 2 5

2 0 7 1

1 4 0 8 8

1 4 0 7 . 8

S o u r c e : T a b l e w a s d u p l i c a t e d f r o m T a b l e 1 i n I n d i a n L a n d T r a n s a c t

i o n s ( 7 8 , 1 9 5 8 ) .

37



Table 4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on the PercentChange in Reservation Land Tenure

Individual Trust Fee-Simple Tribal Trust

Year -0.153*** 0.0888*** 0.182**(-7.91) (3.69) (3.18)

Long Term Leasing Act -0.0250 0.218 -2.135**(-0.10) (0.68) (-2.79)

LTLA X Year 0.143*** -0.133*** 0.0417(5.17) (-3.85) (0.51)

Avg Interest Rate 0.138 -0.0388 -0.514(1.37) (-0.31) (-1.72)

Avg Land Value 0.000476 -0.000277 0.00238(0.76) (-0.35) (1.27)

Sec. Interior is a Democrat -0.716*** -0.0661 1.691***(-4.49) (-0.33) (3.56)

Observations 571 571 571Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects.Sources: See Data Appendix

38



Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act and Public Law280 on the Percent Change in Reservation Land Tenure

Individual Trust Fee-Simple Tribal Trust

Year -0.148*** 0.114*** 0.208**

(-6.93) (4.30) (3.27)Long Term Leasing Act 0.149 0.0507 -2.245*

(0.50) (0.14) (-2.53)LTLA X Year 0.128*** -0.163*** 0.00993

(4.22) (-4.33) (0.11)PL280 X Year -0.0119 -0.0672* -0.0682

(-0.48) (-2.19) (-0.93)LTLA X PL280 -0.460 0.445 0.301

(-1.16) (0.90) (0.25)LTLA X PL280 X Year 0.0400 0.0778 0.0825

(1.25) (1.96) (0.87)Avg Interest Rate 0.139 -0.0371 -0.514

(1.39) (-0.30) (-1.72)Avg Land Value 0.000437 -0.000254 0.00245

(0.65) (-0.30) (1.23)Sec. Interior is a Democrat -0.708*** -0.0656 1.687***(-4.40) (-0.33) (3.52)

Observations 571 571 571Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects.Sources: See Data Appendix

39



Table 6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on the PercentChange in Reservation Land Tenure By Allotment Date Groups

Panel A: Unallotted ReservationsIndividual Trust Fee-Simple Tribal Trust

Year -0.0968** 0.0542 0.140(-3.12) (1.31) (1.60)

Long Term Leasing Act -0.333 0.453 -1.733(-0.81) (0.83) (-1.50)

LTLA X Year 0.117** -0.0879 0.0349(2.68) (-1.51) (0.28)

Observations 174 174 174

Panel B: Allotted Before 1910Individual Trust Fee-Simple Tribal Trust

Year -0.214*** 0.111*** 0.190*(-7.27) (3.35) (1.99)

Long Term Leasing Act 0.158 0.130 -2.574*(0.40) (0.30) (-2.03)

LTLA X Year 0.173*** -0.172*** 0.0695(4.17) (-3.68) (0.52)

Observations 283 283 283

Panel C: Allotted After 1910Individual Trust Fee-Simple Tribal Trust

Year -0.0857* 0.0961 0.228*(-2.40) (1.61) (2.49)

Long Term Leasing Act 0.0342 0.0652 -1.564(0.07) (0.08) (-1.25)

LTLA X Year 0.109* -0.109 -0.0221(2.00) (-1.19) (-0.16)

Observations 114 114 114Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects and controls.Sources: See Data Appendix

40



T a b l e 7 : V a r i o u s S p e c i fi c a t i o n s o f a S e e m i n g l y

U n r e l a t e d R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s o f t h e L o n g - T e r m L e a s i n g A c t o n t h e P e r c e n t

C h a n g e i n R e

s e r v a t i o n L a n d T e n u r e

P a n e l A : I n d i v i d u a l T r u s t A r e a O ffi c e

W e i g h t e d

B a s e

C o

n t r o l s

A r e a O ffi c e F E

T i m e T r e n d

R e s e r v a t i o n F E

R e s e r v a t i o

n F E

Y e a r

- 0 . 0 8 4 2 * * *

- 0 . 1 4 1 * * *

- 0 . 1 4 9 * * *

- 0 . 1 5 9 *

* *

- 0 . 1 5 3 * * *

- 0 . 1 5 7 *

* *

( - 5 . 6 4 )

( -

6 . 3 7 )

( - 6 . 9 2 )

( - 6 . 7 1

)

( - 7 . 9 1 )

( - 1 0 . 4 3 )

L o n g T e

r m L e a s i n g A c t

- 0 . 2 6 0

- 0 . 1 1 4

- 0 . 0 5 6 7

- 0 . 0 3 1

9

- 0 . 0 2 5 0

- 0 . 6 1 7 * *

( - 1 . 0 7 )

( -

0 . 3 8 )

( - 0 . 2 0 )

( - 0 . 1 1

)

( - 0 . 1 0 )

( - 3 . 2 9

)

L T L A X

Y e a r

0 . 1 1 1 * * *

0 . 1

5 0 * * *

0 . 1 4 6 * * *

0 . 1 4 4 *

* *

0 . 1 4 3 * * *

0 . 2 5 8 * * *

( 5 . 7 7 )

( 4 . 6 6 )

( 4 . 6 8 )

( 4 . 6 6

)

( 5 . 1 7 )

( 1 2 . 7 9

)

O b s e r v a

t i o n s

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

P a n e l B : F e e S i m p l e A r e a O ffi c e

W e i g h t e d

B a s e

C o

n t r o l s


T i m e T r e n d


R e s e r v a t i o

n F E

Y e a r

0 . 0 8 7 9 * * *

0 . 0 9 0 3 * * *

0 . 0 8 9 9 * * *

0 . 0 7 8 1

* *

0 . 0 8 8 8 * * *

0 . 0 2 2 8

( 5 . 3 3 )

( 3 . 4 8 )

( 3 . 5 1 )

( 2 . 7 6

)

( 3 . 6 9 )

( 1 . 2 8 )

L o n g T e


0 . 2 9 0

0

. 2 1 7

0 . 2 1 0

0 . 1 9 0

0 . 2 1 8

0 . 4 0 0

( 1 . 0 9 )

( 0 . 6 2 )

( 0 . 6 1 )

( 0 . 5 6

)

( 0 . 6 8 )

( 1 . 8 0 )

L T L A X

Y e a r

- 0 . 1 5 0 * * *

- 0 . 1 3 9 * * *

- 0 . 1 3 4 * * *

- 0 . 1 3 2 *

* *

- 0 . 1 3 3 * * *

- 0 . 0 9 5 9 * * *

( - 7 . 0 6 )

( -

3 . 6 9 )

( - 3 . 6 4 )

( - 3 . 5 9

)

( - 3 . 8 5 )

( - 4 . 0 3

)

O b s e r v a

t i o n s

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

P a n e l C : T r i b a l T r u s t A r e a O ffi c e

W e i g h t e d

B a s e

C o

n t r o l s


T i m e T r e n d


R e s e r v a t i o

n F E

Y e a r

0 . 0 0 9 9 1

0 . 2 0 1 * *

0 . 2 0 1 * *

0 . 2 0 6 * *

0 . 1 8 2 * *

0 . 1 2 8 *

*

( 0 . 2 3 )

( 3 . 0 9 )

( 3 . 2 0 )

( 2 . 9 6

)

( 3 . 1 8 )

( 2 . 9 2 )

L o n g T e


- 1 . 5 4 8 *

- 2 . 2 9 4 * *

- 2 . 2 5 2 * *

- 2 . 2 4 3 * *

- 2 . 1 3 5 * *

- 2 . 2 9 6 *

* *

( - 2 . 2 5 )

( -

2 . 6 2 )

( - 2 . 6 7 )

( - 2 . 6 6

)

( - 2 . 7 9 )

( - 4 . 1 9

)

L T L A X

Y e a r

0 . 1 1 6 *

0 . 0 4 1 9

0 . 0 3 1 2

0 . 0 3 0

8

0 . 0 4 1 7

0 . 2 3 7 * * *

( 2 . 1 2 )

( 0 . 4 4 )

( 0 . 3 4 )

( 0 . 3 4

)

( 0 . 5 1 )

( 4 . 0 3 )

O b s e r v a

t i o n s

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

5 7 1

N o t e s : * * * p < 0 . 0 1 , * * p < 0 . 0 5 , * p < 0 . 1 . Y e a r i s n o r m a l i z e d t o 0 i n 1 9 5 5 . S o u r c e

s : S e e D a t a A p p e n d i x .

Documents

Leasing, Law and Land Tenure Measuring the Impact of the Long Term Leasing Act of 1955 on Indian Land Holdings