Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - ANSER · • The US (esp. US Army) neglected COIN in the wake of Vietnam • The United States learned effective counterinsurgency principles in

December 9, 2011

John Nagl

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Lessons from Iraq for Afghanistan ---and Beyond

T.E. Lawrence on COIN

“To make war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup

with a knife.”

Key Points • The US (esp. US Army) neglected COIN in the

wake of Vietnam • The United States learned effective

counterinsurgency principles in Iraq and is employing them now in Afghanistan

• Iraq and Afghanistan are harbingers of an era of persistent irregular conflict

• The United States must develop the capability to wage irregular warfare smarter and more efficiently

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The outline I will follow today.

“We put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the matter is: It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency. …After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision….We have responsibility. ”

• GEN Jack Keane, 18 April 2006

After Vietnam

Unprepared.

“In the years following the Vietnam War, the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine, and budget priorities….[This] left the service unprepared to deal with the operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq – the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.” -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

Organizational Learning

“A process by which an organization uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”

- Richard Downie, The U.S. Army as Learning Institution

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Organizational Culture affects the ability of that organization to learn.

Richard Downie, Learning from Conflict

The Organizational Learning Cycle

Individual Action/ Attention

to Events

Change in Situation or

Organizational Behavior

Transmit Interpretation:

Publish Doctrine

Sustained Consensus: Alternative

Solution Accepted

Search for Alternative

Organizational Actions

Organizational Performance

Gap Identified

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Organizational Culture affects the ability of that organization to learn.

Kalev Sepp: Best Practices in COIN

Unsuccessful l Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency. l Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population. l Battalion-size operations as the norm. l Military units concentrated on large bases for protection. l Special Forces focused on raiding. l Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment. l Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army. l Peacetime government processes. l Open borders, airspace, coastlines

Successful l Emphasis on intelligence. l Focus on population, their needs, and security. l Secure areas established, expanded. l Insurgents isolated from population (population control). l Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader). l Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns. l Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents. l Police in lead; military supporting. l Police force expanded, diversified. l Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency. l Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces. l Insurgent sanctuaries denied.

Successful Unsuccessful

Chapter 5: Counterinsurgency Operations

Iraq on a Slow Road to Stability

• Fundamental dynamics of conflict have changed: Cycle of retaliation broken, commitment to working through politics

• Drawdown is on track, necessary • Eventual Iraqi government is likely to request

long term security relationship with US: M1A1 tanks, F16 fighters

• Long term implications of a real democracy in the heart of the Arab world not yet clear

• Eyes on Iran

Afghanistan: A Work in Progress • Counterinsurgency campaign really began in

2009—in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Latter is decisive.

• Good illustration of future of conflict: Not being outfought, being outgoverned

• Kandahar offensive • Effort to raise, train, and equip Afghan Security

Forces finally beginning to be resourced • Long term commitment

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT Increasing Violence

Stable Peace

General War

Insurgency Unstable Peace

Future of Conflict

Globalization

Urbanization

Climate Change

Population Growth

Resource depletion

Nuclear Weapons

US Conventional Superiority

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Discussion: The third and final component of the Continuum of Operations is Full Spectrum Operations. Full spectrum operations are simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to address any form of violence across the spectrum of conflict. Full Spectrum Operations support the type of operation by balancing the proper combination of offense, defense, and stability tasks to accomplish the mission for the unique situation, objectives or conditions to be achieved, desired end state, and level of violence. At brigade level and above, units will simultaneously conduct unique combinations of offense, defense, and stability tasks to accomplish their assigned mission. At battalion level and below, units will typically focus on a single component of full spectrum operations because they lack the resources to conduct simultaneous operations.

“It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly on the ground – at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos….We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.” -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

Asymmetric Warfare Future

Conclusions

• Counterinsurgency and the Military

• Armies as Learning Institutions

• Transformation for the Long War

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The two case studies we have examined show how difficult it is for modern Western armies to adapt to meet the demands of countering insurgent warfare. This mode of warfare - especially the absolute subordination of the military effort to the political - truly is as difficult as “eating soup with a knife’ for Western military forces. The British Army, with its legacy of colonial policing, decentralized leadership, and history of working hand-in-glove with colonial administrators, was able to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency in Malaya. In Vietnam, an American Army accustomed to fighting wars of annihilation with artillery and airpower-but without clear subordination to political rule in theater- fought just that kind of war - and failed to learn from its own mistakes, despite innovative ideas from British veterans of Malaya, US Army advisors, USMC Generals, and even MACV Commander Abrams. I’d like to close with a quotation from Robert Thompson:

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Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - ANSER · • The US (esp. US Army) neglected COIN in the wake of Vietnam • The United States learned effective counterinsurgency principles in