Learning From Sadat

7/28/2019 Learning From Sadat

1/9september/OctOber 2012 7

In Nvebe 1977, Egyptian Pesident Anwa el-Sadat tk the pdi-u in the Isaeli Knesset. Decying fanaticis, Sadat challenged Isaelist velk the past, with all its cplexities and weighing eies,

and t ake a adical tun twad peace. Yet nly seven yeas ealie, as heascended t pwe, Sadat had eched Gaal Nasses adical views egad-ing Isael and Westen ipeialis: The tie f evlutinay actin hasce. . . . The battle is the fist thing. The battle is the secnd thing, andthe battle is the final thing.

Sadats wds, in bth 1970 and 1977, wee each in thei wn way aespnse t the assive disdeing f Aab plitics that esulted fthe failue f Aab aies t desty Isael in the Six Day Wa f 1967. In1977, Sadat abandned the adicalis that spang f defeat and chse

a e espnsible path. His cuage tangibly advanced Egyptian inte-eststhe ecvey f Egyptian teity and thity-five yeas f peaceandsiilaly advanced the lng-te inteests f thesIsael, f cuse, butals Jdan, Syia, and the United States.

Tday Aab plitics is undeging anthe peid f geat disde,siila in agnitude t its pedecess decades ag, althugh the esult

Hillel Fadkin is a seni fellw at the Hudsn Institute. Lewis Libby is a seni vicepesident at the Hudsn Institute.

Hillel Fradkin and

Lewis Libby

LEArNING From SADAT

The Dividends of American Resolve


2/98 WORLD AFFAIRS

learning from sadat

f diffeent causes. As befe, thee ae yeanings f dignity and pliticalejuvenatin. As befe, thee ae lage hpes that Aab states ight final-ly establish a plitics that wuld be espnsible, effective, and fee; a pl-itics that ight advance the healthy inteests f bth the egin and theUnited States. As befe, the cuse that the Aab wld takes will lagelydepend n whethe espnsible leadeship eeges.

But tday that is fa f cetain. If events fllw thei cuent dift,it is nt beynd iagining that we culd see a middle East that is eIslaist, e entenched, e vlatile, e lethal, and e hstilet u inteests than anything since the Babay ea, when the eginweighed s uch less heavily in the wld balance.

As the US pivts away f the egin and lks anxiusly back veits shulde in hpes that espnsible leadeship will nce again sehwtake fi hld, it culd lean uch f Anwa Sadats eientatin tthe West e than thity yeas ag.

When Sadat tk pwe, bth Egypt and the US seeed t hldunpising gestategic psitins. Egyptian intellectual Saad Ibahi

ecalls that Sadat had ce t pwe when Egypt was wunded anddefeated, suffeing the nightae f an Isaeli ccupatin, he abitius[ecnic] develpent plans had gund t a halt. Bth US and Bitishfficials had cncluded that Sadats tenue wuld be easued in weeks.Sadat, in tun, saw an Aeica, in his wd, scaed by Vietna, apidlybleeding ney, tps, and pestige as it despeately sught a way ut. Theecny was unstable. Aeicas piay intenatinal gals, nt unelat-ed t Vietna, wee dtente with the Sviets and an pening t China.

Even in bette cicustances, Sadat wuld hadly have seeed the an

t stike bldly f peace. He had been jailed by the Bitish duing WldWa II f cllabating with the Nazis. An ealy clleague f Nasses, hejined the yung ffices veent that faved Aab adicalis. Hewas chsen t succeed Nasse nt f his stng leadeship, but f hissuppsed alleability. As pesident, he pptly eched Nasses adicalcalls. T win as t theaten Isael, he assiduusly cuted the Sviets. Heseduced the hadheaded pesident f Syia, Hafez al-Assad, int an alliancet attack Isael; and then he pulled ff a eakable supise attack in 1973that, at least tepaily, egained bth sides f the Suez Canal.



Hil l e l Fradkin and Lewis Libby

Hweve, in tie it wuld be evealed that Sadat had been undeginga slw-tin cnvesin. It was his cnfidence in Aeican pwedespite the lng deal f Vietnathat cnvinced hi that a daaticplitical change was bth pssible and shewd. As he nted in a aj

addess, Sviet suppt fEgypt fell fa sht f USsuppt f Isael. rus-sians can give yu as,but nly the United Statescan give yu a slutin,Sadat bseved. If the

middle East wee a gae,he wuld say, the UnitedStates hlds ninety-ninepecent f the cads.

Heny Kissinge wuldlate wite, Unlike Nass-e, Sadat saw n futue in

being the leade f adical Aabs wh cnfused hetic with achieve-ent. In Fuad Ajais phase, Sadat fesaw Aeican piacy and

placed his bet n Aeican pwe. Pat f that pwe, Sadat saw, wasAeicas ecd f eliability. Even at a tie when Aeica seeed weak,Sadat believed that Aeican stength wuld eliably be applied f peace.

And s Sadat began a cautius appach t winning Aeican sup-pt, testing all the while Aeicas intentins. In 1971, he fist cautiuslysignaled the pssibility f a peace deal with Isael. In July 1972, Sadatthew the Sviets ut f Egypt and sught a secet channel with the WhiteHuse. Even then, nne saw thugh t his full plans. The next yea,Sadat launched a wa that he knew in advance he culd nt winindeed,

that he culd gain n stategic bjectives fin de, as Kissinge hasnted, t lay the basis f deatin in its afteath.In that 1973 wa, a peccupied and weakened Aeica nnetheless

shwed the stength f its citents. Even while seeking dtentet get Sviet assistance in pessuing Hani f a peace settleent,Aeica eaed Isael and aised its nuclea alet level t festallSviet inteventin.

Neithe a cippled Egypt n an intenatinally weak and desticallydivided US festalled Sadats tun westwad.With cnfidence in Aei-

As the US pivots away from the

region and looks anxiously back

over its shoulder in hopes that

responsible leadership will once

again somehow take firm hold,

it could learn much from Anwar

Sadats reorientation to the West

more than thirty years ago.


4/910 WORLD AFFAIRS

learning from sadat

cas stength and eslve, Sadat ved bldly f peace. Secetay f StateCyus Vance late aditted that Sadats decisin t g t Jeusale su-pised and stunned the Cate adinistatin.

The wld has changed since Sadats day, in pat because f the anhiself. T blste his wn destic legitiacy, he caved t deateIsla. Ang thse cleics wee se wh stked exteis. Egyptianintellectuals f Sadats day cied ut against the danges these cleicspsed t decacy, but thei wanings abut the lng te wee ve-ce by the sht-te csts f evesal. The adicals wh killed Sadat in1981 eagely deliveed the bill he left due. Cuched beside Sadats bdyin that uined eviewing stand was Hsni mubaak, Sadats chsen suc-

cess, whse uninspied path led by the ealy 1990s t widening adicalvilence in Egypt. The ilitay and bueaucatic egie that blsteedmubaak eniched itself, and the pptunities Sadat had sught fWesten suppt wee squandeed. Slwly, the decatic space cdedaway. By 2011, when mubaak theatened t tun an autcatic pesidencyint a dynastic ne, aneuveing f his sn t be his success, even theilitay bulwaks f his egie left hi. mubaak was sn thugh, hisde lst. Wasted pspects f decatic feed ay descend int anillusy, Islaic de.

As a esult, a enewed tun t the West ay be hade tday thanbefe Sadat, bth because f a ppulatin that has been diveted intadical paths, and because Sadats cuse ay be seen by the t havebeen tied and fund wanting. The leades we will need t sway in nthst ce ay nt necessaily be aligned with u pinciples. If a stng,citted Aeican leadeship was needed t swing Sadats eienta-tin in his day, can a less cnfident wldview be expected t cnvince hissuccesss t tun westwad tday?

In the week afte the attacks f Septebe 11th, u leading schlaf the Islaic wld, Benad Lewis, asked the st iptant questin.What wuld ake middle Easten leades, thewise nt citted tWesten ideals, tun against vilent adicalis and wk with the West?Plicies f middle Easten leades twad us, he nted, will be dete-ined by thei assessent f Aeicas psitin. What is needed is cla-ity in ecgnizing issues and alignents, finess and deteinatin in




defining and applying plicy. Lewis cncluded, Even with these, thee isn cetainty f success. Withut the, thee is a cetainty f failue.

Lking aund tday, wuld waveing middle Easten leades cn-clude that Aeican plicy eliably had thei backs if they undetk a p-lnged capaign t cnfnt the st destuctive eleents f Islais?Sadly, in the eyes f the egin, ecent Aeican plicy has ften pvedweak and incnsistent, leaving fiends expsed and eneies exultant.

In the afteath f his fathes assassinatin by Syian pxies, theLebanese deate Saad Haii wn pwe thugh the ballt bx andAeica allied t hi. But Aeica did nt lift a hand t save hi whenIans pxy Hezbllah tk t Lebanese steets. Bahain has hsted US

fces, but the Sunni Aab wld sees us ding little t back Bahainsuling faily when it faces Ianian-suppted Shia ppsitin. Suely, theegin thught, Aeica has n inteest in seeing Ianian influence inIaq unchecked, but Aeica ffeed the Iaqis nly a tken stay-behinddeplyent f Aeican fces. Sall wnde, t the disay f eginalleades, that Iaqi Pie ministe Nui Kaal al-maliki saw in such anffe n advantage wth bucking Ianian inteests.

In a egin that pizes lyalty, we have dne sething wse thanpve uselves ineffective: we have ften tuned n fiends. The egin

ay nt have adied mubaak, but it saw in hi Aeicas best Aabfiend. Yet Aeican suppt f mubaak vanished quickly in the face fsteet ptests that began with yung decats, but wee sn fueled byanti-Aeican Islaic veents. Libyan Pesident muaa el-Qadd-afi was n del f gd gvenent, but the egin saw that he hadcut his deal with the West, abandning weapns f ass destuctin andpaying ff his Lckebie debts. Even s, the West hastened t attack hiwhen a cnvenient ent ase.

Thee is an ld Aab saying, ften hned in that egin: if yu can-

nt chp ff the hand f the king, kiss it. The cuent Aeican adin-istatin, fustated with the Iaqi peie that they had nce chsen,suppted his ival, Ayad Allawis, successful bid t win a pluality f seatsin Iaqi electins. But then Aeica seeed t abandn Allawi in thepwe-shaing negtiatins that fllwed, leaving Pie ministe malikit weaken the ppsitin he epesented, stipping it f pwe, and had-ening his ule. Aeica ceated Afghani Pesident Haid Kazai, buildinghi up t take a leadeship le, aneuveing hi int pwe, seatinghi by the Aeican pesident f paise, but then tied t undeine


6/912 WORLD AFFAIRS

learning from sadat

his eelectin. Kazai peseveed, kept pwe, and subsequently shwedhis ie twad a US adinistatin that, having nce called Afghanistanthe necessay wa, sheepishly piitized withdawal.

Aeica has pven even e uneliable in cnfnting eneiesthan in suppting fiends in the egin. Ian suppted attacks n Ae-ican fces in Lebann, Saudi Aabia, and Iaq. But the US has dne littlet exact a pice f these utages. Indeed, the obaa adinistatinsught t engage Ian, even hning it, in hpes f talking the ullahsut f thei cheished nuclea bjectives. All the while, eginal leadesshk thei heads at what they saw as the navet f such gestues. meystifying yet, when decatic fces tk t the steets t challenge the

ule f the bldy Ianian cleics wh call Aeica Satan, Washingtnlng held its tngue.

In defiance f Aeica, Syia aditted teists int Iaq t killAeicans; assassinated rafik Haii, the Westen-iented pwe bkef Lebann; suppted Hezbllahs aed takeve f Lebann, whichtheatened Aeicas allies; and secetly undetk a patneship with theutlaw egie in Nth Kea t build a nuclea eact. F this behav-i, Aeica extacted n pice. Indeed, even with Syian Pesident Assadn the pes, Aeica des little t aid his intenal eneies.

Gd easns ay have suppted Aeican plicies in these c-plicated eginal pbles. But the net esults have left eginal leadeswith dubts abut Aeicas eslve. Such leades will have little sensethat dealing with Aeica will, in the lng un, esult in eliable Westensuppt. They ae clea abut this, even if we ae nt. It will nt be easyf such leades t d the difficult things needed t tun westwad in theface f stng, even vilent, ppsitin, as Anwa Sadat did.

Aeica shuld neithe veestiate its influence, n undeestiatethe iptant le that tust in its suppt can play. In tdays middle

East, thee ay be pactical and skilled leades f cuage and pinciplewh see the advantages f a tun t the West. Wh else ight be assuedt shae thei hpes f espnsible, decent decatic plitics in pusuitf thei peples pgess? Cetainly nt China; still less russia and Ian.Yet thee is easn t wnde whethe such leades will judge Aeicanseliable patnes f the difficult path they wuld face.

recently, New York Times clunist Thas Fiedan laentedthe absence f leades in this pstAab awakening wld, asking whye had nt appeaed. I a always quick t pint ut that y wn




cunty . . . has a siila pble, he added. But in the Aab wld tdayit is paticulaly pbleatic, because this is a citical junctue. In fact, thelessn f Sadat ay be that the absence f u leadeship helps explainthe absence f theis. Benad Lewis had it ight: With finess alng theppe lines, we ay ay nt succeed in wenching f this egintleable behavi. That is, behavi that des nt attack Westen inteestsand spill Westen bld. But withut such finess, failue beckns.


8/914 WORLD AFFAIRS

learning from sadat

Four years ago, the bottom fell out of the economy. The middle class has

been decimated; the poor have fared even worse. In our Fall Issue, we ask

some of our best policy thinkers to imagine an economic agenda aimed at

securing and expanding opportunity for low- and middle-income Americans.

...and much more

Ron Brownstein on Robert Caros LBJ Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein on

how to x Washington David M. Kennedyon Michael Sandel and the morality of

markets William Galston on long-term care for the elderly Michelle Goldberg

on the end of men Joshua Kurlantzick on Aung San Suu Kyi Sharon Lerner

on the Mommy Wars Kent Greenfeld on the best way to ght Citizens United

One way to guess what Obama might do.

The Philadelphia Inquirer

Visit us at democracyjournal.org.

To read us in print, call 888-238-0048 for a subscriptionjust $24

or ask for us at your local bookstore.

Rebuilding Wealth:

Assets in an Age of Austerity

A J o u r n A l o f I d e A s

FALL 2012

For your print subscription, go to www.democrAcyjournAL.org


9/9

Copyright of World Affairs is the property of World Affairs Institute and its content may not be copied or

emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.

However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Documents

Learning From Sadat