290 N. Arun, P.T. Coyle, and N. Hauenstein

Learning Agility: Still Searching forClarity on a Confounded Construct

NIKITA ARUN, PATRICK T. COYLE, AND NEIL HAUENSTEINVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

DeRue, Ashford, and Myers (2012) revisethe conceptualization of learning agilityand propose a conceptual framework ofantecedents and consequences of learn-ing agility. Traditionally, learning agility hasbeen defined as the ability and willingnessto utilize past experiences in novel situ-ations (De Muese, Guangrong, & Hallen-beck, 2010; Lombardo & Eichinger, 2000);however, DeRue et al. argue that past def-initions of learning agility are limited bymultiple problems, most notably the con-founding of (a) the motivation to learn withthe ability to learn and (b) success out-comes with the nature of learning agility.The authors propose a revised definitionof learning agility based on processingspeed (‘‘the ability to come up to speedquickly in one’s understanding of a situa-tion’’) and processing flexibility (the abilityto ‘‘move across ideas flexibly in serviceof learning both within and across expe-riences’’), and argue that their definitioneliminates the motivational and outcome

Correspondence concerning this article should beaddressed to Nikita Arun.E-mail: narun528@vt.edu

Address: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and StateUniversity, 307 Williams Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061

confounds. However, clarity remains a con-cern because the use of processing speedis inconsistent with an understanding ofcognitive aptitude, and cognitive flexibil-ity has not been adequately developed.Furthermore, success and motivation arestill implied in the representation of learn-ing agility, but more importantly, lack ofspecification of learning contexts makes itdifficult to differentiate learning agility fromany constellation of antecedents positivelyrelated to learning outcomes.

Processing Speed and ProcessingFlexibility

The first concern is how learning agility, andthe argument that learning agility is distinctfrom ability to learn, is positioned in relationto general mental ability. In figure 1 of thefocal article, DeRue et al. characterize gen-eral mental ability as a distal antecedentof the processing/perceptual speed facetof learning agility, and pattern recognitionis a processing manifestation of learningagility. Processing speed and spatial abil-ity (i.e., the ability to recognize patternsamong stimuli) have long been recognizedas two of many specific abilities that con-stitute general mental ability (e.g., Lang,

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Kersting, Hulsheger, & Lang, 2010). Spe-cific abilities and general mental ability arerooted in biological processes and viewedas generally immutable. There are validand reliable indicators of processing speed(e.g., variations of Stroop tests) and spatialabilities (e.g., the Block subtest of the Wech-sler Adult Intelligence Test), and the rela-tionships between processing speed/spatialability and job performance and trainingperformance are well established (Salgado,Anderson, Moscoso, Bertua, & de Fruyt,2003). DeRue et al.’s model of learningagility is inconsistent with the typical under-standing of the hierarchical structure ofgeneral mental ability. More importantly,DeRue et al. argue that learning agilityimproves with experience—‘‘the more indi-viduals engage in them [cognitive andbehavioral processes that reflect learningagility], the more learning agile they willbecome.’’ Such an argument implies thatprocessing speed, a biological-based spe-cific aptitude, improves from experience!Framing learning agility in traditional cog-nitive ability nomenclature without embrac-ing the traditional understanding of cogni-tive ability as a disposition does not increaseclarity about learning agility.

The second concern is the use of Deak’sconceptualization of cognitive flexibility asthe basis for the flexibility construct inlearning agility. Deak (2004) defines flex-ible cognition as the dynamic constructionand modification of representations andresponses based on information (i.e., simi-larities, cues, and relations) selected fromthe linguistic and nonlinguistic environ-ment. The focus of Deak was languagedevelopment in children; Deak sought todemonstrate cognitive flexibility in chil-dren using within-subject, task-switchingexperimental protocols. Although the termcognitive flexibility has obvious appeal, itis incumbent on DeRue et al. to provide aclearer conceptualization of cognitive flex-ibility as related to learning contexts, thatis, a definition that achieves the scientificspecificity seen in Deak’s conceptualiza-tion as opposed to dictionary definitionsof flexibility or definitions where flexible

is included in the definition of cognitiveflexibility construct. Furthermore, what-ever cognitive flexibility is, Deak is clearthat empirical validation of his concep-tualization of cognitive flexibility requireswithin-person experimental designs involv-ing switching tasks (neuroimaging is oftenused to demonstrate that flexible individualsactivate different areas of the brain when theexperimental task switches). Given DeRueet al.’s focus on measuring learning agility,it is important to note that it is impossibleto develop a valid self-report measure ofcognitive flexibility aggregated across situa-tions based on Deak’s conceptualization ofcognitive flexibility.

Success and Learning Agility

DeRue et al. argue that learning agilitybased on processing speed and flexibil-ity is free from ‘‘success contamination.’’Deleting success and synonyms of successfrom the definition of learning agility doesnot remove this success contaminant. Forexample, DeRue et al. describe a hypothet-ical, agile manager based on their defini-tion of learning agility: ‘‘imagine the man-ager who can both carry over appropriate[emphasis added] lessons from experienceand not get overly invested (and thus carryover) inappropriate and incorrect [empha-sis added] lessons.’’ The characterizationof lessons as appropriate or inappropriateimplicitly links learning agility to success.

Without clear specification of learningcriteria, it is impossible to eliminate con-tamination between learning and success.In figure 1 of the focal article, DeRue et al.characterize the primary consequences oflearning agility as ‘‘learning in and acrosssituations,’’ which lead to ‘‘positive per-formance change over time.’’ As seen intraining research, transfer of learning isa complex and dynamic process (Bald-win & Ford, 1988), and it is a challengeto empirically identify the antecedents oflearning transfer. For example, in a recentmeta-analysis of training transfer, Blume,Ford, Baldwin, and Huang (2010) surpris-ingly found no empirical support for general

292 N. Arun, P.T. Coyle, and N. Hauenstein

mental ability as an antecedent of utiliz-ing general principles in novel contexts,although this finding was based on only twoeffect sizes because Blume et al. excludedtraining evaluation studies where commonmethod variance was an issue.

Without specification of the learningconstruct space, there are no clear deci-sion criteria for the inclusion or exclusionof variables in the learning agility model.There are numerous person characteristicsand contextual variables that affect learn-ing. For example, ‘‘transfer of learning’’ isconceptualized as an individual differencerelated to ‘‘the application, generalizability,and maintenance of new ideas, knowledge,and skills’’ (Ruona, Leimbach, Holton, &Bates, 2002). Similarly, ‘‘self-monitoring’’ isrelated to the behavioral flexibility impliedin learning agility (Snyder, 1974). Use ofgoal setting is also a situational variablethat affects learning outcomes (Blume et al.,2010). The concern is not that DeRueet al. failed to include transfer of learning,self-monitoring, and goal setting in theirlearning agility model; DeRue et al. do notclaim to provide an exhaustive list of indi-vidual difference antecedents of learningagility, cognitive and behavioral manifesta-tions of learning agility, or environmentalmoderators. Rather, the concern is thatDeRue et al. fail to specify decision cri-teria for including and excluding variablesas antecedents of learning agility, as pro-cessing manifestations of learning agility,or as contextual moderators of individualdifference–learning agility relationships orlearning agility–learning outcome relation-ships. Without such decision criteria, itis reasonable to include in the model oflearning agility any person antecedent, anycognitive and behavioral strategy, or anysituational variable that is positively relatedto any learning outcome.

Motivation and Learning Agility

DeRue et al. argue that conceptualizinglearning agility based on processing speedand processing flexibility removes theconfound between the capability to be

agile and the willingness to be agile. It isdifficult to envision processing speed beingaffected by willingness, that is, an individualchooses to be less agile by slowing his or herprocessing speed. The willingness confoundis an issue with processing flexibility,that is, an individual chooses whether tovary cognitive and behavioral strategiesfrom one learning context to another. Aswith success, removing willingness fromthe definition of learning agility doesnot diminish the fact that willingness isimplied in the learning agility model. Goalorientation is a proposed antecedent oflearning agility; goal orientation is a modelof self-regulation, that is, motivation. Asthe authors state, goal orientation is the‘‘propensity to pursue goals.’’ The authors’perspective on goal orientation as a stableperson characteristic implies that mastery-oriented individuals are by nature morewilling to be flexible than performance-oriented individuals. Of course, it can beargued that a mastery-oriented individualcan go against his or her nature and refrainfrom being cognitively flexible, but thisargument does not change the fact thatthe authors’ learning agility model positsthat certain individuals are more willingto be flexible than other individuals, andvariations in willingness to be flexible arerelated to learning outcomes.

Concluding Remarks

If learning agility is to be raised tothe status of a scientific construct, thenmuch work is still needed. The learningcriterion space must be specified to providedecision criteria to guide the specificationof learning agility. In particular, dimensionsthat differentiate learning situations must tobe specified so as to differentiate cognitiveand behavioral skills relevant to differentlearning contexts. Ultimately, DeRue et al.’sconcept of learning agility hinges onindividual abilities to recognize whichcognitive and behavioral skills are usefulin a given context and how effectively anindividual can engage in relevant cognitiveand behavioral skills. Without specification

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of the learning construct space, learningagility simply becomes a laundry list ofall antecedent variables that are positivelyrelated to any aspect of learning.

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