League of Cities v COMELEC 2009 CD

7/27/2019 League of Cities v COMELEC 2009 CD

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EN BANC December 21, 2009 VELASCO, JR. J .:

LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC

FACTS:

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assail the constitutionality of the 16

laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and

seek to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

In 2008, the Court en banc granted the petitions and nullified the 16 cityhood laws for being

violative of the Constitution, specifically its Sec. 10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent LGUs moved for reconsideration but was denied. A second MR was filed

but was denied being a prohibited pleading. A Motion for Leave to Filed and to Admit Attached 2 nd

MR was also denied.

ISSUE:

1. WON the 6-6 (deadlocked) voted is sufficient to declare a law unconstitutional.

2. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

3. WON the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:

On Issue No. 1

No. It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the “majority of the Members”

contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be

decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part

in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Webster defines “majority” as “a number greater than half of a total.” In plain language, this means

50% plus one. InLambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate

opinion, expressed the view that “a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-

majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.”

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and thecomplementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided . – Where the court en banc is equally

divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be

deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original

action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment

or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the

petition or motion shall be denied.



A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A MR of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or

of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a

Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the

motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.

Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid

application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical

application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a

relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. Time and again, this Court has suspended its

own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of

justice so require.

Hence, the Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ MRs.

On Issue Nos. 2&3 (the main issues in the first decision)

No.

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood

bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject

cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of P100M prescribed by RA 9009;

(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to

exempt respondent LGUs from the P100M million income requirement;

(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsicaids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not

a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be

used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the

passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13 th Congress. Courts may fall back on

the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of

the law results in absurdity or injustice.

(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending

cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from

other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the P20M

income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners

have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their “Motion toAmend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain

Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings,” dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for



Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the

March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of

judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws,

namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,

9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

Documents

League of Cities v COMELEC 2009 CD