lbp vs CA final

8/3/2019 lbp vs CA final

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[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP,

HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

CORP., respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.

SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,

respondents.

Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.

Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.

The Solicitor General for respondents. aisadc

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW;

LAND ACQUISITION; SECTION 16(e) THEREOF; CONSTRUED. Section 16(e) of RA

6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands . . .

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of

rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible

bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in

accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and

shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom

that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it

appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it

were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit,

that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have

appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In

sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded

construction of the term "deposit."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BASIC

LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an

administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if

there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave

abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a

legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of

promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the

purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of

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administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into

effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and

amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations

must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a

discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the

former that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits ofits power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No.

9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the

landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in

"cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular

Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the

clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in

striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED. The ruling

in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the

expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from

the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other

than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be

full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is

transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of

compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just

compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the

landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as

compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation,

and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession anduse of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible

expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But

petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs

to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the

"Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on

private respondents, which the Court must rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to

distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final

compensation under Section 18 of purposes of exercising the landowner's right to

appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the

landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should

be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule

that: ". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just

compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to

the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time

from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just'

for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately

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deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually

receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."

D E C I S I O N

FRANCISCO, J p:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the

underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the

landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently

stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: cdasia

". . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether

he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of

reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to

whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is

it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich

simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich

alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles

be applied in its resolution.

Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712)

following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465.

However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered

consolidated. 3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20,

1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and

ruled as follows: cdtai

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is

hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void

insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or

bonds;

b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not merely

'earmark', 'reserve' or 'deposit in trust' with an accessible bank designated by

respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in

cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18

(1) of RA 6657: cdt

P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap

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P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the

above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just

compensation by the proper authorities; and

d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary

administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the

petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit

evidence and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are submitted for

decision." 4 aisadc

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5

denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DARand subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by

the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and

payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,

private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with

prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the

validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative

Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the

pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just

compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds

the amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts"

for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. cdta

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court

referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and

disposition.

As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:

"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates

of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of

Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, basedon the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the

sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L.

Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283 respectively, and

issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed

beneficiaries (ANNEXES 'C' & 'D') without notice to petitioner Yap and without

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complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the

compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.' (Rollo, p. 6).

"The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.

"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago

are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of

18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva

Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and

December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the

beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to pay rentals

to the Landbank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net

harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order

directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment

of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the

Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.

(ANNEX 'E'; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to thelandowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing

themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank (Rollo, p. 133).

"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent

Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the

execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that

respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount

as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99). cdasia

"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for

brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land

covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel

covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary

administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by

TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the

landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F') fixing

the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of

209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish

a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust

account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by

adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991

(ANNEX 'G'). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is

alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-

2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that

emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which

were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR

to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the

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name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices

of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)

"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent

Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land

valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100)." 8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was

issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the

opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in

an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it

is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9

Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely

"earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as

landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the

property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10 cdtai

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid

exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover,

the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the

Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the

ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al.

vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA

343). 12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of

Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land

Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor

of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but

respondent court denied the same. 15

Hence, the instant petitions. cdt

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in

G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to

delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the

motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR

Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of

trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private

respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional

release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it

has filed for just compensation.

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Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as

used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no

way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for

the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through

Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of

discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations inimplementing the declared policies of RA 6657. aisadc

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

"SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . .

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of

rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible

bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in

accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and

shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title

(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP

bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made

in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the

valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying

words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust

account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to

warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit." cdta

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an

administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if

there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave

abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a

legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of

promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the

purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of

administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into

effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and

amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative

regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is

a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it isthe former that prevails. 20

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact

rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis

in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as

compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of

RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP

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bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and

54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of

the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down

Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled towithdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution

of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the

negative. cdasia

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of

compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation

as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right

of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to

the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that

adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account

pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latteramount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the

property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite

the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in

the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform." 22

"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property

even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of

a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of

the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding

payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with

an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright

change of ownership is contemplated either. cdtai

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily

transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected."

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discardingpetitioners' assertion as it found that:

". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation envisioned under RA

6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners

in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that

'payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in

money' even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case 'that the traditional

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medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other' the

Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule . . . that title to the

property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full

payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied.) aisadc

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association"case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be

undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode

of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,

however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just

compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18

is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts

already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply

because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they havealready been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an

oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private

respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it

in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents

in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is,

however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which

the Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation

under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of

exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect inboth situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of

his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly,

we reiterate the cardinal rule that: cdta

". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just

compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to

the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time

from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just'

for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately

deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually

receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal

obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases

involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.

Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the

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farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed,

however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the

landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample

on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also

entitled to protection. 26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on official leave.

Footnotes

1. Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice AliciaSempio-Diy.

2. Ibid., p. 616.

3. Rollo, p. 7. cdtai

4. Rollo, pp. 122-123.

5. Rollo, p. 149.

6. which provides formulas for valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.

7. which provide for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of

depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land

expropriated by the DAR.

8. Rollo, pp. 109-111. cdt

9. Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For the purposes of

acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or,in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an

accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds

in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land

and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title

(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter

proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

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10. Rollo, p. 111.

11. Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the

power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry

out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days

after the publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

12. Rollo, pp. 111-112.

13. Rollo, p. 112. cdasia

14. Rollo, p. 107.

15. Rollo, p. 149.

16. Rollo, p. 63.

17. Rollo, p. 67.

18. Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).

19. Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission , 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing Teoxon

v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33

SCRA 585, 589 (1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs.

Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224.

20. Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines , 162 SCRA 628

(1988). cdtai

21. Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shallcompensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the

landowner and the DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in

Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally

determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.

22. 175 SCRA 343.

23. Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14. cdt

24. Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals , 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990) citing

Coscolluela vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393, 400 (1988); Provincial

Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).

25. 175 SCRA 343, 392.

26. Mata vs. Court of Appeals , 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).

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lbp vs CA final