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FACULTY OF LAWLund University
Ognyan Savov
Calculating laytime – problematic arrivals in port charter parties
JASN09 Essay
Master´s Programme in Maritime Law
Private Shipping LawCONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. LAYTIME 1
3. ARRIVAL AND NOTICE OF READINESS 2
4. PORT BOUNDARIES 3
4.1 THE OLDENDORFF TEST 3
4.2 THE OLDENDORFF AND THE MARATHA
ENVOY CASES COMPARED 5
5. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
CREATED BY THE OLDENDORFF 7
6. CONCLUSION 10
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 11
1. INTRODUCTION
Subject of research in this paper will be the most problematic area in defining the
moment at which laytime starts running in a port charter party – the time of
arrival within the port. The essay starts with a definition of laytime and notice of
readiness and subsequently narrowing the application of the latter term only to
matters relating to port charter parties. Following a discussion and analysis of
American and English cases relating to the issue at stake, it is shown as to why
the former approach is to be preferred in finding out when a ship is arrived. At
the end of the paper certain proposals are made as to how costly litigation relating
to the discussed issue could be avoided.
2. LAYTIME
Laytime (laydays) is defined as the time necessary for a ship to load/ discharge its
cargo.1 The procedures of calculation laytime are normally stipulated in the
voyage charter party.2 The importance of defining it in specific terms is owing to
the fact that the narrower this period, the more profitable for the shipowner. On
the other hand, the wider the laytime, the better for the charterer. The reasoning
behind these words is that should the laytime period be over before the loading/
disharging finishes, the charterer compensates the ship owner with a sum of
money commonly known as demurrage. Should it be the other way around, that is
should the loading/ discharge operations finish before the end of the laytime, the
ship owner compensates the charterer in the form of dispatch money.
Regulating laytime in such strict terms is for commercial reasons – demurrage
money compensates the ship owner for cargo services brought on expiration of
the agreed period after which he is normally entitled to earn freight. On the other
hand, dispatch money is seen as an incentive to make the charterer perform its
duties more quickly than agreed. With the cargo operations finishing before the
laytime expires, the ship owner could be seen to be at a loss as being obliged to
1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/layday?show=0&t=1290072083.2 Z. Mokia and J. Dinwoodie’ Spatial aspects of tanker lay-times’ 10(1) (2002) Journal of Transport Geography 39 at 39.
pay demurrage. However, on a close scrutiny payment of dispatch would also
mean that the ship owner would start earning freight earlier.
3. ARRIVAL AND NOTICE OF READINESS
Most of the disputes concerning laytime arise as to the event that triggers it, that
is the notice of readiness. In Glencore Grain Ltd v Goldbeam Shipping Inc (The
Mass Glory)3 notice of readiness is defined as
”given to start laytime running [as provided by the charter party]4 not merely to
provide charterers with information which in many cases will be in their
possession. As such it represents an essential step in the contractual mechanism
for allocating the risk of delay in loading or discharging”.
For a notice of readiness to be considered valid the following two main factors
must be present: the vessel must be an arrived ship at the destination and she must
be ready to load/ discharge in all respect.5 To these prerequisites could be added
the obligation on the ship to comply with certain additional requirements of the
charter party, for instance that the ship be in possession of free pratique and
customs clearance certificates.6 While the readiness to load/ discharge cargo may
sometimes cause more problems than the issue of arrival, 7 it will not be discussed
in this paper.
In the Johanna Oldendorff case it was held that a ship is deemed to be an arrived
ship if she is at the disposal of the shippers. 8 However, distinction between berth
and port charter party has to be made at this point. In the case of a berth charter
party the ship is deemed to be arrived when she has berthed.9 Thus the risks of
delays caused by unavailability of berths rest with the ship owner.10
3 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 244.4 ’Laytime commencement clause’ available on http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php?action=page_display&PageID=149 (accessed 17.11.2010)5 D Davies Commencement of laytime 4th ed (2006) 1.6 W Packard Laytime calculating 2nd ed (1983) 16.7 If there are cargoes carried under different consignments and in order to discharge the necessary cargo, first has to be unloaded the cargo from the other consignment. In that case the ship may not be considered as ready to unload – see Governement of Ceylon v. Société Franco-Tunisienne d'Armement -Tunis (The Massalia No 2) [I960] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 352. 8 Johanna Oldendorff & Co GmbH v Tradax Export SA [1974] AC 479at 535.9 North River Freighters Ltd. v President of India [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 668.10 C Lacey ‘Berth or port charter party?’ (2-2002) Freight Demurrage & Defence / Crew, The Swedish Club letter 2-2002 13 at 14, available http://www.oldendorff.com/unloaders/fleet_details.html (accessed 14.12.2010).
In a port charter party, laytime is triggered when the ship enters the port area and
serves a notice of readiness. Any of the losses caused by unavailable berths are
born by the charterer. However, this scenario is more complicated than the berth
charter party because the boundaries of a port are not as distinguishable as the
location of a designated berth.
In order to make things more certain, the parties may state in their contracts that
the laytime starts running on service of a notice of readiness upon passing a
certain geographical point. Another solution would be that the laytime runs from
the moment the pilot boards the ship even though the boarding occurs outside the
port boundaries.
4. PORT BOUNDARIES
4.1 THE JOHANNA OLDENDORFF TEST
The word port is a nebulous concept and causes much concern when it comes to
defining its boundaries. In The Oldendorff 11the House of the Lords had to
determine when the laytime started running in a voyage charter party contract.
Under it The Johanna Oldendorff had to carry a load of grain from the USA to a
port in the UK. Upon her arrival there were no available berths so the port
authorities ordered the Master to anchor at the ordinary place for grain ships
waiting to discharge their cargo. The anchorage was located within the port
boundaries but some 17 miles from the docks.
The Johanna Oldendorff was ready in all respects to load, however, almost three
weeks passed while she waited for an available berth. The ship owner claimed
demurrage. The court agreed that the contract was a port charter party. However,
it was concerned with the moment at which the ship had arrived for the purpose
of determining the start of the laytime.
In The Aello12 which had similar facts to the latter case, the House of Lords
considered a ship not to be an arrived ship even though waiting for a berth within
11 Ibid.12 Agrimpex Hungarian Trading Company for Agricultural Products (The Aello) [1961] AC 135 HL
the boundaries of the port. The reason behind the court’s decision was that the
ship was anchored outside the commercial boundaries of the port in question. The
commercial area had been understood to be as the part of the port where a ship
can perform cargo operations when a berth is available and in determining it the
distance between the anchorage and berth had been of great importance.13
In The Oldendorff their Lordships held that The Aello case was outdated because
the geographical position of a ship should be treated as of secondary importance
in determining her arrival time.14 She should be considered to be arrived
whenever two conditions are met. The first is that she should be within the
administrative boundaries of the port, that is where the port authorities could
exercise their authority.15 The second is that she should be at the ’immediate and
effective disposition of the charterer’.16
While the interpretation of the first requirement causes little concern, the second
is subject to different views. How can a ship be at the immediate disposition of
the charterer if she has not made her way to the berth? In The Oldendorff the
court held that as long as she is at anchor within the port boundaries, she is at the
charterer’s immediate and effective disposition. But this statement seems to be
wrong. Because if there are no available berths, it is difficult to see how she will
be able to conduct cargo operations whenever the charterer pleases. Therefore,
she cannot be said to be at the charterer’s ‘immediate’ disposition due to being
obstructed in performing her duties.
While at anchor she would be only at the charterer’s effective disposition.
Consequently, it would be better to narrow down the phrase in The Oldendorff
test to read ‘the ship has to be at the effective disposition of the charterer’.
Furthermore, the ship might be at its effective disposition but not be within the
control of the port authorities – for instance where the anchorage is far away from
the port where the authorities do not exercise jurisdiction and the ship cannot
make it to the port due to it being congested. Therefore, it is correct to state that
The Oldendorff test puts a very hard burden on the ship owner to prove that the
ship is an arrived ship.
13 Leonis SS v Rank [1908] 1 K.B. 57.14 At 535.15 Davies D (n 5) at 13.16 TheOldendorff case (n 8) at 535.
Although The Oldendorff was welcome by the shipping business, some of the
drawbacks in this decision were recognized by the legal writers soon after it was
brought to light. William Wilson in a 1974 article comments that it would be
quite difficult to comply with the requirements of the test if the port is very wide
and the normal waiting area within the boundaries of the port is 50 or 100 miles
from the docks.17 It is submitted that the author is quite right and the House of
Lords’ decision is wrong or at least is worded in very narrow terms to exclude
situations to be discussed later.
4.2 THE OLDENDORFF AND THE MARATHA ENVOY CASES COMPARED
A similar to The Oldendorff case scenario, The Maratha Envoy, 18 came before the
same court several years later. In it Lord Diplock, bringing the judgment on
behalf of the court, applied The Oldendorff test and came, it is submitted, to a
wrong decision. In this case the chartered vessel had to discharge her cargo in a
port on the river of Weser. Although the Maratha Envoy was in all respects ready
for cargo operations, due to her size and unavailability of berths to accommodate
her, she was ordered to anchor at the Weser lightvessel located outside the port
area. In order to make her fall within The Oldendorff test and be considered an
arrived ship in terms of the port charter party, she made two voyages upriver and
after that returned to the lightvessel.
The issue before the court was to decide whether by making the short trips she
was an arrived ship for the purpose of determining the validity of the notice of
readiness. In bringing its decision, the House of the Lords unanimously upheld
the claim of the voyage charterer that the vessel could not be considered an
arrived ship.
Of more interest to the present discussion is the decision of the court of appeal. It,
although going against the conclusion of the House of the Lords,19 is to be
preferred as putting a right balance on the rights and duties of the contractual
17 W Wilson ‘British Assspects of Chartering problems: some recent developments’, 49 (1974-75) Tul. Law Review 1065 at 1067.18 Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA[1978] AC1.19 Ibid (n 8).
parties. The charterer is the one who decides the most suitable place for the
delivery of the ship and is supposed to have the necessary expertise in relation to
the ports to which it wants its cargo delivered/ loaded. Therefore the charterer
should bear all the expenses incurred by the shipowner due to unavailability of
berths. In addition, should one consider that in terms of a charter party it is the
ship owner who is bound to deliver the vessel at a certain period of time and to
make his ship ready for cargo operations otherwise he will incur penalties, the
burden imposed on him by the contract and common law20 is too high. The
charterer gets everything even if at fault while the ship owner incurs expenses
even if innocent.
When the appeal court heard The Maratha Envoy, Lord Denning and Shaw L.J.
took the pragmatic approach by stating that the meaning of the port boundaries is
the one as understood by the people in the shipping business and few miles
outside the boundaries of the port should not affect the court’s decision.21 What
the two judges considered of importance was that The Oldendorff test was based
solely on the vessel being "as effectively at the disposal of the charterer for [cargo
operations] while at that waiting place as she would have been if waiting in the
immediate vicinity of the berth.”22
A further argument worth noticing is that had the court of appeal taken a different
approach in upholding the shipowner’s claim, its reasoning would have led to
absurdity. The ship, by making these trips back and forth, met the strict
requirements of The Oldendorff test. However, if the court reviewed the issue
from that perspective, Lord Denning stated that it would cause exposing the law
to ridicule.23
The court of appeal cited with approval decisions of US arbitrators24 who even
notifying the existence of The Oldendorff case, did not dare to follow it due to the
unjust outcome it would bring.25 In the view of the arbitrators whenever the vessel
has reached the nearest possible point to her berth and it can be proved that it is
20 Eg. The Oldendorff and The Maratha envoy cases.21 Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA[1977] QB 324 at 339D-E and 347B-D.22 Ibid(n 8) at 561.See also The Maratha Envoy(n 18) at 13F.23 Ibid (n 21) at 336 F.24 The Polyfreedom (1974) New York Arbitration.25 Ibid (n 21) at 346F.
impossible or impractical to get nearer, then the physical and geographical
location of the waiting point is of no relevance.
The US arbitrators’ decision seems commercially viable and makes the
negotiations of charter party contracts much easier. Otherwise, should the
shipowners want to deviate from an unwanted Oldendorff outcome, they should
elaborate on the contractual clauses. Such are the clauses allowing a notice of
readiness to be given as soon as the vessel reaches the normal waiting place
before berthing.26
The decision of the appellate court in The Maratha envoy struck a right balance in
confirming that it is not the physical boundaries of the port that have to determine
the validity of a notice of readiness. What matters is the fact that the ship is
obstructed in some way from proceeding to the berth due to no fault of the crew
and/ or the ship owner and is in all respects ready to perform the cargo
operations. However, the good was undone when the House of the Lords took the
matter into its own hands. Their decision seems unsound and lacking reasonable
explanation. The House of the Lords is the highest court and the validity of the
doctrine of stare decisis in England makes the lower courts there bound by their
decisions and thus bring injustice, rather than justice to the litigants’ rights and
duties.
5. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
OLDENDORFF
The facts of The Oldendorff and The Maratha Envoy are similar so it would not
have been easy for the highest court to accept that its judges had been very
restrictive in delivering their speech in The Oldendorff. Furthermore, the majority
of the adjudicators in the two cases were the same meaning that their state of
minds must have been the same when they brought the two decisions. The second
case was a test in which they could elaborate on the issue and rectify their
approach. But how could they do so without overruling their previous decision?
26 D.Davies (n 5) at 30.
One of the options was to agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal by
stating that when relying on The Oldendorff test the consideration whether the
ship is at the effective disposition of the charterer is of utmost importance while
the location of the ship being within or outside the boundaries of the port is
secondary and should not be taken into account in situations such as The Maratha
Envoy.
A second alternative, as was done in the arbitration cases Antico Elias27and
London Arbitration 5/90,28 is to extend artificially the boundaries of the port area.
In the former award a vessel anchored outside the port area of the port of
Alexandria, Egypt as determined by ‘The Mediterranean Pilot’. In addition, there
was no legislation defining the boundaries of the port. However, the port
authorities did in fact exercise jurisdiction over the ships anchoring there. In
addition, there were domestic regulations controlling the movement of ships in an
area within which was the disputed anchorage. It all meant that The Antico Elias
was in a place where the port exercised its jurisdiction.
Even though the arbitrator applied The Oldendorff test successfully and the result
was just, it is clear that the basis for such a decision was the actual control of the
port authorities and the existence of laws. However, it is uncertain how the
arbitrator would have adjudicated had the port authorities not exercised control
over vessels anchored there or had there been no domestic legislation. It could be
argued (and such an argument would be commercially sound) that for
determining whether she was an arrived the issue of her safety and not whether
she was 10 or 15 miles off the port area was to be the guiding light for the
adjudicators. Because when an area is congested in an attempt to make her an
arrived ship, the integrity of the ship and crew would be endangered. And one
cannot contend that their safety is of less importance than the issue of her arrival.
Furthermore, the ship must be considered an arrived ship since she has reached
the nearest possible point to the berth and any further proceeding would be
impossible and unsafe.29
In the London Arbitration 5/90 award, the ship was voyage chartered to carry a
load of cargo to Haldia, India. The issue was whether she could be considered an 27 1977.28 LMLN 274.29 As held by the US arbitrator cited by the appellate court in The Maratha Envoy.
arrived ship at Haldia on condition she anchored in an area, Sandhead, outside the
port limits – a factor which was undisputed by the litigants. Although the nautical
chart showed an anchorage waiting area outside Haldia, ships usually waited at
Sandheads and tendered their notices of readiness from there. However, the
charterers argued that the fact that the custom created by the use of Sandheads as
a waiting area and by tendering notices of readiness from that position, did not
bring that location within the boundaries of the port. Still the arbitrators did not
agree with them. The reason for their decision might have been based on the fact
that the vessels normally waited there and upon their tender of notice of readiness
they came under the control of the port authorities which immediately provided a
pilot or gave orders as to anchoring.30 That is even though outside the port, the
authorities had full control over them.
What is obvious from the arbitration cases decided after The Oldendorff and The
Maratha Envoy is that when applying the test, the adjudicators try to interpret it
in the most just way. The arrival test could be summarized as having one of the
following features: the ship must be at the effective disposition of the charterer
or; the custom of the port area is to be taken in consideration. Furthermore, the
control exercised by the port authorities should also be considered but it is of
secondary importance. In addition to the above-mentioned elements, it is the
safety of the ship that is to be the main regulator in determining whether a ship
can be said to be arrived in the port.
Another approach to be taken towards the rectification of the situation and
avoidance of contentious issues discussed in this paper is to put a clause in the
charter party contract regulating the passing of risk whenever there is a delay in
getting to the place of destination. By place of destination is meant the nearest
and most practical and safe waiting position, determined by custom or law. In
such a case whenever the ship reaches that waiting position, the notice of
readiness or, much better to state – notice of arrival – is always to be considered
valid. 31 As such the parties will know not only their rights and duties and the
moment they start but will also avoid the long and costly litigation.
30 M Lax, ‘Laytime and demurrage – recent developments’ 1992 Marine policy 118 at 119.; see also Davies (n 5) at 29.
31 Francesco Berlingieri ‘The allocation of risk of delay in voyage charter parties’, 8 (1976-77) J. Mar.L.&Com. 497 at 505.
6. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay was to show how the courts of England have
interpreted one of the requirements for serving a valid notice of readiness to the
voyage charterers – the arrived ship prerequisite. What is to be noticed is that the
leading case of The Oldendorff was adjudicated in the 1970’s and is still binding
on the parties who agree their contracts to be regulated by the laws of England.
When Oldendorff was decided the seas were not as congested as today and it
might be argued that at the time this was good law although its restricted
application was visible even then32.
Nowadays when the shipping business is on the rise, the seas are getting more
and more congested. It becomes more difficult for a ship to drop anchor within
the port areas and in order to avoid the great congestions in the harbor areas and
decrease the risk of incidents, sometimes the ships are advised to anchor outside
the port areas or be drifting for some time. However, because the Oldendorff
decision is still binding on the parties, it could cause unnecessary litigation as
regards the moment of start of the laytime. For the purpose of avoiding such from
occurring, in the last part of the paper a decision was proposed as to how The
Oldendorff test should be applied and how with easy and inexpensive measures
the concerned parties could determine the exact moment of the arrival of the ship.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASES:
Agrimpex Hungarian Trading Company for Agricultural Products (The Aello) [1961] AC 135 HL.Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA[1978] AC1.
Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA[1977] QB 324.
32 As shown by the appeal court in the Maratha Envoy (n 18); see also .Wilson (n 17) at 1067.
Glencore Grain Ltd v Goldbeam Shipping Inc (The Mass Glory) [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
244.
Governement of Ceylon v. Société Franco-Tunisienne d'Armement -Tunis (The Massalia
No 2) [I960] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 352.
Johanna Oldendorff & Co GmbH v Tradax Export SA [1974] AC 479.
Leonis SS v Rank [1908] 1 K.B. 57.
North River Freighters Ltd. v President of India [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 668.
The Polyfreedom (1974) New York Arbitration.
Antico Elias(1977) London arbitration.
London Arbitration 5/90 (LMLN 274).
ARTICLES AND BOOKS:
Charlotte Lacey ‘Berth or port charter party?’ (2-2002) Freight Demurrage & Defence /
Crew, The Swedish Club letter 2-2002 13 available
http://www.oldendorff.com/unloaders/fleet_details.html (accessed 14.12.2010).
Donald Davies Commencement of laytime 4th ed (2006) Informa, London.
Francesco Berlingieri ‘The allocation of risk of delay in voyage charter parties’, 8 J.
Mar.L.&Com.(1976-77) 497.
’Laytime commencement clause’ available on http://www.shipinspection.eu/index.php?
action=page_display&PageID=149 (accessed 17.11.2010).
Michael Lax, ‘Laytime and demurrage – recent developments’ 1992 Marine policy 118.
William Packard Laytime calculating 2nd ed (1983) Fairplay Publications,London.
William Wilson ‘British Assspects of Chartering problems: some recent developments’,
49 (1974-75) Tul. Law Review 1065.
Z. Mokia and J. Dinwoodie’ Spatial aspects of tanker lay-times’ 10(1) (2002) Journal of
Transport Geography 39.
INTERNET
http://www.merriam-webster.com accessed 14.12.2010