Lawyers' Duty to Society

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LEGAL ETHICS CASES LAWYERS DUTY TO SOCIETY (free for sharing - glai) Page 1

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.

GUTIERREZ,respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL,J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was

convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and togetherwith his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the

judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was

changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted aconditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison

term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of thePhilippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed

a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of

lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the

decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be r emoved suspended from his office asattorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude.Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which

is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275.As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private

and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to theaccepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P.

2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to

respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance isplaced by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy

and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decidedin his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of

a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe

out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after thepardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Courtproceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This

is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. InRe Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,

380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony

conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon,

and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any

felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was takenaway. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicialconstruction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,

344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is

as follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of theoffender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the

existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he hadnever committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the

penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after

conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civilrights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted

the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Exparte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in

connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent

Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to thepardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its

having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent beingmunicipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado

Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purgedfrom the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid

standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules ofCourt not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of

good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered afteradmission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or


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removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes andprofessions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;

and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets

a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for

which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and hisname stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.


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G.R. No. 1203In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.W. A. Kincaid for defendant.

PER CURIAM:Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance,

in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as amember of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had

been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then inforce in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its

organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evadingthe law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to

these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimonygiven by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell, 1wherein he

was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing hiscounsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against

Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as alawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a

certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the

same was based.We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such

as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of theaccused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a

nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating orevading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an

officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for whichhe may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in

a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are

acts which justify disbarment.In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was

acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as theacts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to becondemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be

served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the PhilippineIslands for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of lawfor a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
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G.R. No. L-31865 November 26, 1973

PEDRO CABILDO, as Provincial Treasurer, Ilocos Norte, ADOLFO CALAPINI, as Municipal

Treasurer, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, and THE ILOCOS NORTE COCONUT PRODUCERSASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners,vs.

HON. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.,

JOHN F. NORTHCOTT, JR., and ROBERT PATRICK NORTHCOTT, respondents.

Hermenegildo A. Prieto and Antonio Foronda for petitioners.

Manuel V. San Jose and Arturo B. Cristi for respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO,J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the amended decision of the Court of First Instance

of Ilocos Norte, in its civil case 4235, declaring valid and effective the redemption made by the

private respondents, John F. Northcott, Jr. and Robert Patrick Northcott, of a parcel of landpurchased by the petitioner Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association, Inc. at a public auction

sale.

The essential facts are not controverted.

The Northcotts were the owners of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 931 of theland records of Ilocos Norte. For tax delinquency, the land, which had an assessed value of

P40,300, was sold at public auction by provincial treasurer Pedro Cabildo on December27,1963 to the petitioner Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association, Inc. for the sum of

P6,326. The certificate of sale, together with the final bill of sale, was registered on December

29, 1965. Thru their administrator, Jose Francisco, the Northcotts sought redemption of theland, and accordingly tendered to Cabildo the sums of P5,647.60 on January 21, 1966, P676.30

on February 7, 1966 and P2,553.98 on February 15, 1966, or the total amount of P8,877.88including interests. Because the vendee association resisted the redemption, the Northcottsinstituted civil case 4235; after joinder of the only issue the timeliness of the redemption

the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.

The respondents Northcotts (plaintiffs below) received a copy of the adverse decision onAugust 30, 1968. They filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on

September 21, 1968. Upon an opposition to the approval of the record on appeal, the courtordered its amendment on October 28, 1968. On January 9, 1969, which was the date set for

hearing for the approval of the record on appeal, the court suspended the said hearing until theresolution of a motion for reconsideration filed by the Northcotts on January 2, 1969. The

association opposed the motion. On January 18, 1969 the respondent court rendered anamended decision declaring valid and effective the redemption made by the Northcotts of the

land in question. The petitioners appealed the amended decision to this Court; pursuant to ourresolution dated February 6, 1960, they filed the present petition for review.

We gave due course to the petition on March 13, 1970, and the case was submitted for decision

on February 23, 1971.

On August 8, 1973, thru new counsels, the parties filed, and moved for the approval of, a

compromise agreement which recites as follows:

1. That for himself and in behalf of the Northcott Family, Robert P. Northcottfiled a Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I,

against the Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association in Civil Case No.4235 for Ownership and which was appealed later by the defendant

Association in the Supreme Court and now pending therein under G.R. No. L-

31865, regarding the Dungon-Dungon Estate, situated in the Municipalitiesof Burgos, and Bangui, Ilocos Norte;

2. That both parties in this case now on appeal before the Supreme Courthave donated the entire land in litigation to the Provincial Government ofIlocos Norte, with the exception of 14 hectares thereof retained by and for

them in equal shares of 7 hectares each, copy of said deed of donation is

hereto attached as part of this Compromise Agreement, and the ProvincialGovernment has immediately possession the land donated to it upon the

execution of this instrument;

3. That both parties in this case before the Supreme Court have mutuallyagreed to have the case dismissed in view of the donation already issued by

both parties in favor of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte.

On August 30, 1973 a "Manifestation" was filed by the law firm of San Jose, Cristi, Enriquez &San Jose, alleging,inter alia, that Atty. Manuel V. San Jose is the counsel of record of the

Northcotts who had retained him on a contingent fee of 60% of all lands and properties whichAtty. San Jose might recover for them; that the said lawyer had rendered services and spent

considerable amounts pursuant to their retainer contract; that there is also an attorney's lien

charged on the subject property in favor of one Atty. Manolo Tolentino; that Atty. San Jose hasnot been paid any amount; and that the donation made by Robert P. Northcott is intended to

defraud him of his attorney's fee.

Required to comment on the "Manifestation," Robert P. Northcott stated as follows:


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In connection with the retainer contract dated December 22, 1969, whereinsixty per cent (60%) as retainer's fee will be given to my counsel, since then

and until now, no property whatsoever has yet been recovered, received ordelivered to me from the cases, so that there is nothing from which the 60%

could be taken and given by me to my counsel; in other words, the 60% isonly collectible if any property is recovered or received. This is the same

situation with Atty. Manolo Tolentino, who never recovered anything.

When the Lower Court set aside its original decision, it was already outside

the reglementary period, so that the Appellate's opinion, most probably, will

be against me, and I will not be able to realize anything except by virtue ofthe compromise agreement which was submitted for approval by thisHonorable Tribunal in the interest of justice and equity.

By resolution of August 30, 1973 the Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte took note of theaforequoted compromise agreement and expressed its gratitude to the parties for donating the

land to the province.

The claim for attorney's fees does not render infirm the to agreement and is no obstacle to itsapproval, for a client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of

his lawyer.1However, since it is not disputed that Atty. Manuel V. San Jose had rendered legalservices (although short of recovery by the Northcotts of any property) as stipulated in the

retainer contract, and the non-recovery may in the very least be partially attributable to the

Northcotts' entering into the compromise agreement, it is but fair and just that the said lawyerbe compensated for his services on a quantum meruitbasis and, to assure the payment thereof,

that a lien be constituted in favor of Atty. San Jose on the 7 hectares retained by the Northcotts

under the deed of donation, without prejudice to the immediate effectivity of the compromiseagreement.

ACCORDINGLY, the compromise agreement is approved, and the parties are hereby enjoined to

comply faithfully with its terms. After this resolution shall have become final, let the record beremanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which is hereby ordered to hear and

determine, on the basis of quantum meruit, the amount of the attorney's fee that may be due toAtty. Manuel V. San Jose. Let the corresponding lien be constituted upon the 7-hectare landretained by the respondents Northcotts under the deed of donation. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.


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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

REMEGIO ESTEBIA, defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO,J.:What is before this Court is the automatic review of a lower court decision convicting the

accused and sentencing him to death. Its correctness is to be tested in the light of the principalcontention that the plea of guilty of the accused under the circumstances disclosed did not

suffice for the lower court's judgment of conviction. There is, as will hereinafter be madeevident, justification for such a stand as a reading of the transcript would indicate that there

were positive and categorical statements denying culpability by the accused in the course ofanswering questions asked by the lower court. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed

and the case remanded.

The information under which the accused was arraigned reads as follows: "That on or about the7th day of June, 1966, in the afternoon, in Bo. Gobarogwan, Municipality of Mondragon, Samar

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,actuated by lust and with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, and with the

use of deadly weapon locally known as "depang" did then and there, willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously have carnal knowledge with Felisa Buenaobra, 26 years old, an unmarried woman

of good reputation, against the will and consent of the latter. That in the commission of the

crime, the following aggravating circumstances were present: (1) in an uninhabited place; and(2) recidivism, the accused having been convicted by final judgment before the Honorable

Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Catarman, Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-445 for ForcibleAbduction, on May 18, 1959, convicting the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging

from Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to Twelve (12) years and one(1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of

P500.00 and to pay the costs." This information filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on August

26, 1966 arose from a complaint for rape against the accused by the offended party, FelisaBuenaobra, dated June 21, 1966.The arraignment was held on August 26, 1966 in the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch

IV, then presided by Judge Manuel R. Pamaran. The accused was represented by an attorney deoficio, Gabriel de Guia. After the counsel de oficiostated that the accused would want to enter a

plea of guilty, the lower court twice asked him whether such was the case, after informing himthat the penalty imposed could be death. Twice the accused answered in the affirmative. 1 He

was then informed by the presiding judge that in order to give him enough time to deliberate

maturely on such a grave matter, he was given up to 2:00 o'clock that afternoon. Accordingly,when the session was resumed, he was asked "what is his stand now?" This was the reply of his

lawyer: "Upon arrival, this representation inquired from the accused, after having been dulyinformed by the Court of the effect of the plea of guilty, and he still makes his decision to

proceed with his plea of guilty as stated this morning to this Court." 2 When the accused was

asked directly whether such manifestation of the lawyer was true, the accused categoricallyaffirmed "Yes, sir." 3 Then, through the court interpreter, this question was put to him: "Are youguilty or not?" The answer: "Guilty." 4

Thus far, it would seem that the accused did really intend to enter such a plea, but whattranspired in the subsequent questioning would, at the very least, raise doubts on the matter.

The court wanted to find out why he entered the plea of guilty. This was his response: "To becandid, sir, I would have not entered the plea of guilty." 5 When the question was repeated, he

answered: "Because I already asked the woman to marry her. What was lacking was ourmarriage." 6 Again, when queried as to his plea of guilt, he spoke of the real reason, which was

not an admission of culpability: "Because, I cannot do anything, sir, because I cannot fight thiscase as I am very poor." 7 He was given the opportunity to elaborate by the court stating that he

would be furnished counsel de oficio. What came from him in effect was a denial that the crimeof rape was committed: "To tell the truth also, sir, in this case when it happened it is not true

that I raped her. We were at that time going to town to buy our necessities. It so happened thatmy supposed brother-in-law, a younger brother of the woman, desires that another person

marry her. As a matter of fact, I was even wounded. The first slash blow I received was this one.(Witness showing a scar extending one finger at the lower left scapula and about 1 centimeter

wide)." 8 When pressed further why he had to plead guilty, if what he said was true, he had anexplanation: "Because I had already a previous case, and I believe that the government will still

prosecute me." 9 The lower court, desirous of further clarification, informed the accused that he

could reconsider his plea and that he would be given a lawyer so that he would have a fair trial.All that was said in reply was: " I submit myself to the discretion of the Court." 10 When pressed

to be specific on the matter, he categorically stated: "I would desire not to plead guilty in thiscase if I have the funds or money to pay for this." 11 There would still, however, appear to be

some slight confusion in the mind of the accused, for when reminded that he did not have to

pay a single centavo, he surprisingly came out with the statement that "he would plead guilty tothe charge." 12 At that stage, he was reminded again that the penalty imposed would be death.

13

Then and there, in open court, the decision now on review was rendered, with the accused

sentenced to death, the crime being one of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, attended bythe two aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and recidivism, which was offset by themitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty. This Court, as announced, is of a different mind. The

plea, considering the totality of the replies made by the accused to the questions propounded

by the lower court, could not in law be said to be one of guilt. The conviction cannot stand.

1. The principal error assigned, as set forth in the very able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty.

Gonzalo W. Gonzalez, is that the lower court did not fully inform the accused of theconsequences of a plea of guilt. In a recent opinion promulgated a year ago, 14 this Court

speaking through Justice Dizon, there is this timely reminder to trial judges as to the course ofconduct to be followed whenever an accused in a capital offense enters such a plea. Thus: "We

have gone over the record and We find that the motion for new trial mentioned heretofore is

justified. The present being one for murder for which the defendant was sentenced to suffer themaximum penalty of death, We find it proper to invite the attention of the court a quoand of all

trial courts in general to what We said in People v. Apduhan, G.R. L-19491,August 30, 1968 andPeople v. Solacito,G.R. L-29209,August 25, 1969 on the matter of what the trial court should do

upon arraignment of a defendant charged with a capital offense, before he is allowed to enter a

plea of guilty." 15In People v. Apduhan, 16 Justice Castro, for the Court, did properly stress the need for such careand circumspection in these words: "Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors,

we must hasten to commend the trial judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patientefforts to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan,
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notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and hencepresumed to have been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully

understood the seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it.When the accused proposed to confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the

death penalty might be imposed despite his plea of guilty. As aforementioned, when it appearedthat Apduhan's plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge Alo re-opened the case to determine with

definitiveness the nature of his plea. The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whetherApduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the significance and consequences of his act,

recommends itself to all trial judges who must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused'splea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be

extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully themeaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." 17 In People v. Solacito, 18

there is this realistic appraisal of the matter by the Chief Justice: "No comparable assurance isimparted by defendant's affirmative answer to the questions propounded by the lower court

"whether he understands the meaning of a plea of guilty and whether he is admitting all the

material averments in the information." The questions were, apparently, formulated in such atechnical language that a layman is likely to miss the far-reaching implications thereof. There is

every reason to believe that the accused, who claims to be an "ice-plant delivery boy" is notcapable of understanding the precise connotation of the term "material averments" of the

information, used by His honor the trial Judge, without any explanation thereof, which,

seemingly, was not given." 19There is, in addition, this equally relevant excerpt from People v. Arpa, 20 where Justice

Teehankee, as ponente, after referring to the early cases of United States v. Talbanos 21 and

United States v. Rota, 22 quoted with approval this excerpt from People v. Bulalake: 23 "It is of

course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of death aresubject to review by the Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant

appeals or not, which automatic review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade,

it would seem that the proper and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a p lea of"guilty" to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education,

is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid the Supreme Court indetermining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning,

full significance and consequences of his plea." 24 Tested by such authoritativepronouncements, it would appear that the lower court, while not lacking in awareness of the

proper procedure to be followed in the event that the plea of the accused is one of guilt, ought,in the light of the answers made, to have called to the stand witnesses to ascertain exactly whatdid really transpire.

2. In that sense, the principal error assigned is not without basis. Moreover, precisely becauseof the line of questioning pursued, the answers elicited from the accused did cast enough doubt

as to his intention to accept culpability. There were explicit statements made that cannot be

interpreted as other than a denial that he was liable for the crime of rape imputed to him. It hasbeen the constant, uninterrupted holding of this Court from United States v. Dineros 25 that theessence of such plea "is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily,

and with a full knowledge of the consequences and the meaning of his act." 26 As furtherelaborated by Justice Carson, who likewise penned the opinion in the subsequent case of United

States vs. Jamad: 27 "The effect of that ruling is to make it clear that the doctrine just referredto is not applicable unless the plea of "guilty" is in truth and in fact made under the conditions

indicated, that is to say on arraignment, freely and voluntarily, as an express admission of theguilt of the accused of the offense with which he is charged, and with full knowledge of the

consequences and the meaning of his act. A mere formal plea of "guilty" made undercompulsion, or under any condition other than those just indicated will not suffice." 28

There is need, then, for such a categorical declaration by the accused that he is guilty of the

crime charged, one made with full knowledge of the consequences that such an admissionwould entail. The plea entered in this case was not impressed with such an attribute. To so

construe the statements of the accused, characterized by inconsistencies and expressdisclaimers of guilt, as amounting to an acknowledgment of criminal liability, would be to

disregard what has so long and so constantly been adhered to. 29 There is force in the

observation that the Constitution cannot be satisfied with anything less. 30 It presumes theinnocence of the accused; it is imperative then that the fact of guilt be demonstrated bycompetent and credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused could, of course,

dispense with the need of proof by the express admission at his arraignment that he is guilty ofthe offense charged. There must be a clear and categorical showing, though, that such indeed

was his intention. The plea of guilt must be unequivocal. It must not give rise to contraryinterpretations. Unfortunately, that is what happened in this case. The lower court should not

have been satisfied that the accused did in fact plead guilty. Thus, his judgment of conviction

cannot stand.

3. With the conclusion thus reached there is no need to pass upon the other three errorsassigned by the accused to the effect that the lower court should not have appreciated theaggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, should not have imposed the death penalty, and

should not have considered plea of guilt as an admission of the allegations in the amended

information.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 26, 1966, convicting the accused of thecrime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and sentencing him to death, is set aside, and thecase remanded to it for further proceedings in conformity with law. Without pronouncement as

to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar,

JJ., concur.

Dizon and Castro, JJ., are on official leave.


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AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs.ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYAP. SALAYON, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in

connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers

in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City

Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficiovice-chairman as provided by

law.[1]Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),[2]respondents tamperedwith the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs)

and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial

candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan,Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of

votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted

therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainantmaintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the

entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of theirlawyers oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of

the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assistin the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed

to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held

responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of theirregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their

control and supervision.

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had beenreferred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the

dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.[3]Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration onMarch 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors datedApril 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).

It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents beforethe COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution

dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency ofevidence. However, on a petition for certiorarifiled by complainant,[4]this Court set aside the

resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges againstrespondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.

Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.

First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that

it was filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under

Rule 139-B, 12(c)[5]and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governorsdid not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assumingsuch motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the

April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be

ascertained whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).

The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a

prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.

Villanueva,[6]in which this Court held:

Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothingin its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed

within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged

before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, toafford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have

committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[7]

On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15 -day periodprovided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999,

respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Bo ard ofGovernors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petitionwas filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar

Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are

sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by himlater than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15

days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as themoving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15 -day period for filing

it.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18,

1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the BarConfidant, the delay would only be two days.[8]The delay may be overlooked, considering the

merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole

question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges assuch or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the

attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the

outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[9]For thisreason, laws dealing with double jeopardy[10]or prescription[11]or with procedure like

verification of pleadings[12]and prejudicial questions[13]have no application to disbarmentproceedings.
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Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interestof justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due

course to appeals even though filed six,[14]four,[15]and three[16]days late. In this case, thepetition is clearly meritorious.

Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the

following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns,

because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already beenaccomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in thepresence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public

so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the actsdealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed

to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents.[17]

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of

the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.[18]As long as theevidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court[19]is more

convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto,[20]theimposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended thecanvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such

irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue onthe part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections .[21]In rejectingthis allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this

Court said:

There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight

due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only inthe total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC

and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the totalnumber of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of

voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the

defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22]

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation ofvotes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the

erroneous figures in one or two SoVs[23]but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain

senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in theelection returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least

24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters

who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts weretabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited

to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differfrom those indicated in the SoVs.[24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the

double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as

reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that thevariation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as

true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.

Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and dueexecution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true andcorrect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of

___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerousindividuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that

only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them anddetect the discrepancies therein.

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member ofthe bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[25]However, if the

misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or thelawyers oath or is of such character as to a ffect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moraldelinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such

misconduct.[26]

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed abreach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6 , this is made

applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oathof office as lawyers to do no falsehood.

Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their

public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27]in which this Court said:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times ina manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that

lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should notbecome a common reality. . ..[28]

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater

obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.

Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legalprofession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in theperformance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will

as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for thefact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long

public service.[29]Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for

each of the respondents should be sufficient.
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WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. SalayonGUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a

WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-9609. March 9, 1956.]

OTILLO R. GOROSPE and VITALIANO GOROSPE, Petitioners, vs. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, as

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, CEFERINA SAMU, FRANCISCO DE LAFUENTE, ET AL., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside an order of Respondentjudge rendered

on August 2, 1955 in criminal case No. 29736 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ceferina

Samu, et al., pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting the motionofDefendantsto disqualify the counsel for the private prosecution to intervene in behalf of the

offended party.

On October 6, 1954, Petitioners filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinanagainst RespondentsCeferina Samu, Ester Campus alias Rosa Lopez, Carmelita de la Cruz alias

Josefina Dizon, and the General Indemnity Co., Inc., to annul certain contracts entered into bythe latter and to recover the damages they suffered as a consequence thereof. Upon the

initiative of Petitioners, an action for estafa through falsification of a private document was filedin the Court of First Instance of Manila against the same Respondents, with the exception of the

insurance company, who, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Ester Campus filed a petition in the criminal case praying that the counsel for the offendedparties be prevented from intervening on the ground that the latter have already filed a civilaction for the annulment of the same documents involved in the criminal case and for the

recovery of damages resulting therefrom, and as such they have no right nor authority to assistthe fiscal in the prosecution of the case. The trial court found the petition meritorious and

disauthorized the private prosecutor to intervene in behalf of the offended parties. A motion to

reconsider the order was filed which was denied in an order entered on August 2, 1955. To setaside this order, the present petition for certiorari has been interposed.

It appears that, upon the instance of Petitioners, an action for estafa through falsification of aprivate document was filed by the city fiscal of Manila against RespondentsCeferina Samu, Ester

Campus, Carmelita de la Cruz and Francisco de la Fuente who, upon arraignment, pleaded notguilty to the charge. It likewise appears that before the institution of the criminal

case Petitionersfiled an action against the same Respondentsfor annulment of the same

documents involved in the criminal case for damages resulting from their execution. Theattorneys for the offended parties entered their appearance in the criminal case but, uponpetition of RespondentEster Campus, they were prevented from doing so on the ground that,

the offended parties having already instituted a civil action, they have no right nor authority tobe represented in the criminal case. Has Respondentjudge abused his discretion in issuing the

order of disqualification?

Section 15, Rule 106 provides that Unless the offended party has waived the civil action orexpressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case cralaw hemay intervene, personally or by attorney, i n the prosecution of the offense. The wording of the

law is clear. It states that an offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the

prosecution of the offense if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right toinstitute it. The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the

prosecution of the offense if he has waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action isthat by such action his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes

the sole function of the public prosecutor. This is our ruling in the decisions hitherto renderedin this jurisdiction interpreting the above provision of our rules of court.

In People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil, 676, this court said that the offended party may, as of right,intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but then only when, from the nature of the

offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action thereof has not by him been waived orexpressly reserved. (Italics supplied.) The same ruling was reiterated in People vs. Velez, 77

Phil., 1026 and People vs . Capistrano, 90 Phil., 823. In the former case, we said, The reason of

the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case ifhe has waived his right to institute a civil action arising from the criminal act, or has reserved

or, a fortiori, already instituted the said civil action, is that he has no special interest in theprosecution of the criminal action. (Italics supplied.) And in another case we likewise said that

since the offended party has already filed a civil action arising from the criminal act, he has noright to intervene in the prosecution of the case (People vs. Olavides, 80 Phil., 280; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary45 Off. Gaz., 3834).

It therefore appears from the foregoing that an offended party losses his right to intervene in

the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expresslyreserved his right to institute it, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action even if

he has not made the waiver or reservation above adverted to. This ruling is furtherstrengthened by Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides that In cases of defamation,

fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action, may be brought by the injured party, and that such action may proceedindependently of the criminal and for its determination preponderance of evidence would

suffice. The present case comes within the purview of this provision.

Petition is denied, with costs against Petitioners.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and

Endencia,JJ., concur.


12/20


G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUANSAMSON anddefendant-appellant.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

Norberto J. Quisumbing f or appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO,J.:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in

1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with JuanSamson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with

Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial

vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend

"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed

to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor'srepresentative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a

certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that theexpenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not

signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public worksprojects.

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. Itis signed by the provincial engineer.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations andfunds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February28, 1969, reads:

I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in theamount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100

(P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover thepayment.

This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in

the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below

and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincialtreasurer signs two part of the voucher.

Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As

accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by JuanSamson, a point which is disputed by him):

Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province ofPangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100(16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby

certify to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON

According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below

the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. ByJuan Samson."

Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) . This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences thepayment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and

hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the

Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The vouchermakes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:

(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).


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(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply CoThe alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the companyto the provincial government

(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issuevoucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and

hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civilengineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting

provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office.

These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are theirgenuine signatures.

(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved:

For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not

the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18,

1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), isfake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company'sinvoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied

that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged.Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is

due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of

lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). NarcisoP. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his

signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).

The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.

Other five forged voucher. Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments ofcertain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials

supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the

following:

(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of

P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repairof Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).

(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment ofP5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of

the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)

(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment ofP6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of

the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).

(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment ofP9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of

the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).

(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of

P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair ofthe Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that

their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the

papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, thosesupporting papers could not be presented in evidence.

Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testifiedthat the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered

by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the saidvouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected

repairs of the bridges were fictitious.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber

and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fakeofficial receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7)

bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer totransactions with the provincial government.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of

the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the

provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. Herepresented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor,

provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincialofficials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).


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The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the

provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).

Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, alaborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls,

recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on

the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.

Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the

provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him,

Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's officefor processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).

From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He

asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled thevoucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's

office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash(instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). Hereceived the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown

on the face of the vouchers.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedlyauthentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's

defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the

provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited andapproved by the auditor.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that

he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumberand hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s

treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures aregenuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged withmalversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated

February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869,11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective

amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers,Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.

3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated

April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.

After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnsonguilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the

following penalties:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years,

ten months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, twomonths and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine

of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of

Pangasinan in the same amount;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand a fine

of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government ofPangasinan in the same amount; and

(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years,ten months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months

and twenty-one days of reclusion temporalas maximum , and a fine ofP14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of

Pangasinan in the same amount.

Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.

Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing

Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:

The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or

before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court

became final and executory extinguished hiscriminal liabilitymeaning hisobligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability

to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civilliabilitysurvived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final


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judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, whichconvicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification

and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23(should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the

criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a

separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action forthe civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People

and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies beforefinal judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be

prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules ofCourt (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment hadbeen rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives

him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds

improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina,

24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the

deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court

Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civilliability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the

alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had beeninstituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civilliability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an

order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error

affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, hiscounsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names

and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under

administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs oradministrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action

for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named

Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo

and Manolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by addingthereto the following.Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P.

Sendaydiego.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liabilitywhich is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate

would be liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate . In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is notnecessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition

of reclusion perpetuaas a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no

complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.

In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing privateprosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the

accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-

interest.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the

prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up tothe termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditorinquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private

prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millorareplied that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that hehad authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).

Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as privateprosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of

Criminal Case No. 23350).

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal

of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all

dated November 4, 1969.

At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial

fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscalmoved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject

to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).


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At the hearing on A pril 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorizedto examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted

the motion (155 tsn).

The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscalwere present together with the private prosecutor.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the

rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal"and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules

of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have

been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attendedthe proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its

impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative

value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor onwhich the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to thepropriety of the imposition ofreclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion

perpetuacannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.

The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court'sconclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversationthrough falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,

evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the

assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed hisinitial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that

unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson

told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since thetreasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).

Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial courterred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in

them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial(75 tsn July 3, 1969).

The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the

amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the

symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". Thebookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he

(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be madein cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors

other than Juan Samson.

The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where

the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE).As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's

office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.

The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from theCarried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the

vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments werereceived, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments orto require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.

Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would

have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if thepayments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would

have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make anypayments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with

Samson.

Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy

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