International LawText, Cases, and MaterialsSecond edition

Ademola Abass

LLM (Cantab), PhD (Nottingham)

Fellow of the Cambridge Commonwealth Society

Adjunct Professor of International Law

University of Leuven, Belgium

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Learning objectivesThis chapter will help you to:

• learninbriefthehistoricaldevelopmentofinternationallaw;

• understandthemeaningandconceptof‘internationallaw’;

• appreciatethenature,basis,andfunctionofinternationallaw;and

• understandthemoderncontextofinternationallaw.

International law in the modern context

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IntroductionNot long ago, international law was regarded as unserious, unenforceable, and some-

thing of a ‘non-law’ discipline. It meant little or nothing then to refer to oneself or

be referred to as an ‘international lawyer’. International law was regarded as politics

dressed in the language of the law—a sentiment also reflected in academia. In most

countries, university curricula did not include ‘international law’ until around the late

1970s. Academic writers rarely wrote about international law, and the few who did

so wrote mainly for the benefit of officials of foreign ministries and diplomats, who

were mostly concerned with issues relating to consular relations and the protection

of aliens in their countries. The rather cynical attitude of most countries towards

international law was aptly captured by a famous English adage ‘English Law is law,

foreign law is fact, and international law is fiction’ (restated in A Contributor (1995)

54 CLJ 230.

In the last fifty years, however, international law has witnessed a radical transforma-

tion. Not only is it the fastest growing of any legal discipline today, it is perhaps the

most fashionable of all legal disciplines for law students to pursue. From its relative

obscurity as a discipline developed mainly for the convenience of States and of which

‘the great majority of the lawyers of all states [knew] little or nothing’, as Oppenheim

once put it (see ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 AJIL

313, 323), international law has grown into the most effective weapon for preserv-

ing global peace and security. Today, international law regulates not only how States

behave towards one another, but also how States deal with their own subjects, espe-

cially concerning the protection of human rights, even within a State’s own territory.

This chapter provides a concise discussion of what international law is all about. It

analyses the basis, nature, and ramifications of international law, and considers how

international law has become such a powerful tool for regulating interstate relations,

and how its rules and principles are now applied across civilizations, religions, and

cultures all over the world.

1.1 A brief history of international law: a distinction between the ‘origin’ and ‘documentation’ of international lawThereisanextensiveliteratureonthehistoryanddevelopmentofinternationallaw.However,

‘history’dependsonwhoistellingit,forwhatpurpose,andforthebenefitofwhichaudi-

ence.Forexample,itiscustomaryformosttextbookwriterstobeginchroniclingtheorigin

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ofinternationallawbyreferringtodevelopmentsinWesternsociety.Somewriterssaythat

internationallaw,properlysocalled,beganwiththeconclusionofthePeaceofWestphaliain

1648,whichendedtheThirtyYearsWarinEurope.Somelocatethebirthofinternationallaw

inthepost-RenaissanceperiodortheclassicalerainEurope.Otheraccountshaveprovided

moreorlessrecentnarrativesthanthesedates.

Onecommontrendinmosthistoricalaccountsoftheoriginofinternationallawistheten-

dencyforwriterstoconfusetheperiodwhentheformal documentationofinternationallaw

beganwithwheninternationallaw,asadistinctlegalfield,emerged.Thesearetworemark-

ablydifferentissuesthatmustnotbeconfused.Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweensaying

thatinternationallaw,asused in modern times,begantogrowfromthesecondhalfofthe

MiddleAges,andsayingthatinternationallawactuallybeganintheMiddleAges.

InRobertJenningsandArthurWatts(eds),Oppenheim’s International Law,Vol. 1: Peace(9th

edn,London/New York: Longman,1996),p. 4,itisstatedthat:

As a systematised body of rules [international law] owes much to the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius,

whose work, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, appeared in 1625, and became a foundation of later

development. [Emphasis added]

Thisisawidelyacceptedviewofwheninternationallawstartedtobeproperlydocumented

and systematized in contrast to when it actually emerged.Itisimportanttomaintainthistype

ofdistinction,inordertoensuretheaccuracyofhistoricalanalysis.

Formanyreasons it isdifficult tospeculatewhen international lawwasactuallyborn.For

instance,theChineseareamongthevariouspeoplescreditedwithinventingtheartofwrit-

ing,evenifitwasperfectedelsewhere.Nonetheless,thevariousChineselanguageswerenot

accessibletoagreatpartoftheworlduntilfairlyrecently.Inthissituation,howcanonebe

surewhattheearlyChinesescholarswroteaboutinternationallaworStaterelations,orifthey

wroteonthesubjectatall.

Anotherdifficultyisthequestionofwhodocumentedinternationallawandwhatpara-

meterswereused indeterminingwhatconstituted international law.Until the twentieth

century, the standard for measuring acceptability of civilization was mainlyWestern. In

theInstitutes of the Law of Nations(1884),JamesLorimerclassifiedChinaas‘barbarous’.

In thefirsteditionofhis International Law: A Treatise,Vol.1 (London: Longman: 1905),

pp. 32–34,OppenheimrankedEuropeanStatesasnumber1,AmericanStates,Liberia,and

Haitiasnumber2,Turkeynumber3,Japannumber4,andPersia,Siam,China,Korea,and

Abyssiniaasnumber5. Hespecificallypronouncedthatcountriesinthelowercategoryhave

notraisedtheircivilizationtotheleveloftheWesternStates.In1955,H. Lauterpacht(ed.),

Oppenheim’s International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1: Peace(8thedn,London: Longman,1955),

p. 49,theauthoraddedIndiaandPakistantothefourthcategoryandremovedKoreaand

Persiafromthefifth.

Perhapsthisclassificationreflectsthepersonalopinionsofindividualauthors.However,such

opinionssignificantlyaffecthowthecontributionsmadebyothersareregarded.(Forgeneral

discussion,seeXueHanqin,Chinese Contemporary Perspectives of International Law. History,

Culture, and International Law,355Recueildescours(HagueAcademyofInternationalLaw,

2012);SundhyaPahuja,Decolonising International Law (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity

Press,2011).

AuthoritativeinternationallegalscholarshavealsoshownthatthegeneralbeliefthatHugo

Grotius’sworkwasthefirstproperdocumentationofinternationallawwasinaccurate.

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AccordingtoJenningsandWatts(1996,seesection1.1):

Although he is rightly called the father of the law of nature as well as the law of nations, he has

created neither the one nor the other. Long before Grotius, the opinion was generally prevalent that

above the positive law which had grown up by custom or by legislation there was in existence

another law which had its roots in human reason and was therefore called the ‘law of nature’.

[Emphasis added]

Onemajorproblemwithattemptingtoputaspecificdateontheoriginofinternationallaw

is thatmostofwhatbecame international lawprinciplesalreadyexistedamongprimitive

nationslongbeforedocumentationstarted.Anexampleistheprincipleofgoodfaith.

InhisbookHistories(trans.A. deSélincourt,Harmondsworth: Penguin,1954),Herodotus,

theancientGreekhistorian, recorded theearly transactions that tookplacebetweencer-

tainNorthAfricantribes.Theseearlytransactions,forthemostpart,constitutedapractice

wherebycommoditiesweresoldbetweentwotribeswithoutasmuchasanexchangeof

words.TheCarthaginians,whoinhabitedseveralcitiesfromtheGulfofTunistopresent-day

Tunisiaaround1BC,wouldarriveinships,offloadtheirgoodsontothebeach,sendasmoke

signal,andthenretire.Theothertribeswouldcome,inspectthegoods,anddepositasumin

goldthattheydeemedafairpriceforthegoods.TheCarthaginianswouldreturn,inspectthe

gold,and,ifsatisfied,wouldtakethepaymentanddepart;ifnot,theywouldleaveboththe

goldandgoodsuntoucheduntiltheothertribedepositedafairprice.ThisiswhatHerodotus

describedinhisworkas‘silenttrading’—butseealsoStephenNeff,‘Ashorthistoryofinter-

nationallaw’inMalcolmEvans(ed.),International Law(3rdedn,Oxford: OxfordUniversity

Press,2010),atp. 4.

Itmaybetoooptimistictoregardthisepisodeasinternationallawproper.Nonetheless,the

narrativeindicatedtheevolutionofthedoctrineofgood faithamongst‘nations’,evenif

thisprimitiveformdidnotexactlycorrespondtothepacta sunt servanda.Aswewillseein

Chapter 3dealingwiththelawoftreaties,thiswell-establishedprincipleofinternational

lawenjoinsStatestoimplementfaithfullythoseobligationsthattheyassumeunderinter-

nationallaw.

Thevariousinstancesrecalledearliershowtheneedtobecautiouswhendealingwithhis-

toricalaccountsoftheoriginofinternationallaw.However,bydistinguishingthe‘origin’

ofinternationallawfromits‘documentation’,asOppenheimdidinthepreviousquota-

tion,weavoidmakinghastyandoften ill-foundedconclusionsaboutthe‘inception’of

internationallaw.

Thereislittleacademicbenefittoderivefromseekingthe‘origin’ofinternationallaw.Assuch,

thisbookseekstounderstandthe‘meaning’,‘basis’,‘nature’,andthe‘moderncontext’of

internationallaw.Understandingthesetopicswillbeofgreaterbenefittothosewhoarenew

tothesubjectthanwouldbeanattempttoestablishtheoriginofinternationallaw—atleast

untilsuchtimeas,asOppenheimhopedin‘TheScienceofInternationalLaw:ItsTaskand

Method’(1908)2AJIL313,317:

The master-historian, to whose appearance we look forward, will in especial have to bring to

light the part certain states have played in the victorious development of certain rules and what

were the economic, political, humanitarian, religious, and other interests which have helped to

establish the present rules of international law.

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thinking points

• Whyisitdifficulttorenderaccuratelyahistoricalaccountoftheoriginofinternationallaw?

• Whatshouldbethefocusofanyaccountofhowandwhyinternationallawbegan?

• WhatistheimportanceofHugoGrotius’searlyworkonthedevelopmentofinternationallaw?

1.2 The meaning and concept of international law1.2.1 What is ‘international law’?‘International law’ was believed to have been coined by the British philosopher Jeremy

Benthamin1789,whodescribeditas‘thatbranchofjurisprudence...[exclusivelyconcerned

with]mutualtransactionsbetweensovereignassuch’.(SeeJeremyBentham,An Introduction

to the Principles of Morals and Legislation([1789]edBurnsandHart,London: AthlonePress,

1970),p. 297.)Thisdefinitionembodiesthenotionofinternationallawintheclassicalera

whenthesubjectwasregardedasapplyingonlytoStates.

Duringthistime,however,somewritersbelievedthat international lawappliedtoentities

otherthanStates.WilliamBlackstone,aneminentEnglishjurist,wasoftheviewthatapart

fromapplyingtointerstaterelationsinternationallawalsoappliedtoindividualssothatthe

subjectappliesto‘intercoursewhichmustfrequentlyoccurbetweentwoormoreindepend-

entstates,andtheindividualsbelongingtoeach’(W.Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws

of England(1stedn,Oxford: ClarendonPress,1765–69),BookIV,p. 66).

Mostmodernwriterstendtodefineinternationallawasabodyofrulesandprinciplesappli-

cableonlytoStates.Letusconsidersomeexamples.

AccordingtoCliveParry,‘Thefunctionoflawintheinternationalcommunity’inM. Sørensen

(ed.),Manual of Public International Law(London: Macmillan,1968),p. 1:

‘International law’ is a strict term of art, connoting that system of law whose primary function it

is to regulate the relations of states with one another.

Section101oftheRestatementoftheLaw(Third),ForeignRelationsLawoftheUnitedStates,

providesthat:

International Law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general

applicationdealingwiththeconductofstatesandofinternationalorganizationsandwiththeir

relationsinterse,aswellaswithsomeoftheirrelationswithpersons,whethernaturalorjuridical.

AndtheOxford Dictionarydefines‘internationallaw’as:

the law of nations, under which nations are regarded as individual members of a common polity,

bound by a common rule of agreement or custom; opposed to municipal law, the rules binding in

local jurisdictions. [Emphasis added]

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Itisnowadaysbothproblematicandoutdatedtodefineinternationallawasonlyapplyingto

States.Internationallawwassodefinedwhenitappliedonlytotherelationsamongnations.

Ifwegoback—perhapstothelatenineteenthcentury,whentheproperdocumentationof

internationallawbegan—itisobviousthatStatescreatedinternationallaw,throughcustoms

thatwerecommonintheirrelationwithoneanother.Fromthiscustomarypractice,States

begantorecordtherulesandprinciplesthattheywantedtoapplyintheirrelationswithone

another.Thefirstmoderntypeofsuchrecordswasthe1856DeclarationofParis,concluded

inanefforttoendtheCrimeanWar.Stateswerethustheonlysubjectsofinternationallawat

theseearlystages,becausetheyalonewerecapableofapplyingitsrulesandprinciples,and

itwasonlytothemthatinternationallawcouldbeapplied.Forthisreason,aswewillseein

Chapter 4,Statesremainthemostimportantsubjectsofinternationallaw,makingitsome-

whataccuratetocontinuetodescribeinternationallawasthe‘lawofnations’.

By the twentieth century, international law application opened wider. Following the

InternationalCourt of Justice’sAdvisoryOpinion in theReparation for Injuries case—that

internationalorganizationshavetheirownlegalpersonality—theybecamefullyrecognized

asinternationallawsubjects.Eventhen,HerschLauterpacht,whowasagreatcampaigner

fortherecognitionofindividualsassubjectsofinternationallaw,stillwrotein1947that‘Asa

rule,thesubjectsoftherightsanddutiesarisingfromtheLawofNationsareStatessolelyand

exclusively’(H.Lauterpacht(ed.),International Law: A Treatise(6thedn,London: Longman,

1947),p. 19).

AswewillseeinChapter 4,inadditiontointernationalorganizations,internationallawnow

appliestohumanbeingsincertaincircumstances.Internationalorganizationscanapplythe

rulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw,whichcanalsobeappliedtothem.Itispossibleto

arguethatsinceinternationalorganizationsconsistofStates,adefinitionofinternationallaw

asapplyingto‘States’invariablyincludesinternationalorganizations.However,aswewillsee

inChapter 5,internationalorganizationsarelegalpersonsandsubjectsofinternationallaw

and,assuch,theycanbedistinguishedfromtheindividualStatesthatcomposethem.

AsimilaropinionwasexpressedinAkehurst’sModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(7th

rev’dedn,edPeterMalanczuk,London: Routledge,1997),inwhichAkehurstnotedthat,dur-

ingtheyearsbetweenthetwoWorldWars,writershadnodifficultydefining‘international

law’asthelawgoverningtherelationsbetweenStates.However,hesaid(atp. 1)thatthis

definition:

did not reflect the reality even at that time. The Holy See, although not a State, was recognized

to have international legal personality, and so, for certain purposes, were insurgents and some

forerunners of modern international organizations. Since the inter-war period, the matter has

become more complicated due to both the expansion of the scope of international law into new

areas and the emergence of actors other than states on the international plane, such as inter-

governmental organizations established by states, non-governmental organizations created by

private individuals, transnational companies, individuals and groups, including minorities and

indigenous peoples.

TheextensionofinternationallawdefinitiontocoverentitiesotherthanStatesmustbehan-

dledwithcaution.Whileinternationallawcanbeappliedtooragainstnaturalpersons—for

example,under theRomeStatuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt (seeChapter 16)—

humanbeingscannotapplyinternationallawinthesamewaythatStatesandinternational

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organizationscan.Thus,despitethefactthatcertaincategoriesofhumanbeing(including

diplomats,staffofinternationalorganizations,amongothers)enjoysomeinternationalrights

andprivilegesthatordinarypeopledonot,theycannotappearbeforetheInternationalCourt

ofJustice(ICJ),orconcludetreatiesontheirownbehalf,althoughtheycandosoasState

officials.Furthermore,individualscannotopendiplomaticmissions(embassies,highcommis-

sions,etc.)inforeigncountries,nomatterhowimportanttheymaybe.Thereforeweneedto

becautiouswhenwedescribeindividualsas‘subjects’ofinternationallawforthepurposeof

defininginternationallaw.Intruth,theyareinternationallawsubjectsonlybecauseinterna-

tionallawcanbeappliedtothemundergivencircumstances;theycannotapplytherulesof

internationallawintheirownrelations,and,assuch,arenotonthesameplatformasStates

andinternationalorganizationsassubjectsofinternationallaw.

Nevertheless,itisnolongercorrecttocontinuetodefineinternationallawasrulesthatapply

toStatesalone,evenifStatesremainthemostimportantsubjectsofinternationallaw.Thus,

inlightoftheshortcomingsinthevariousexistingdefinitionsofinternationallaw,wepropose

todefineinternationallaw,forthepurposeofthisbook,as:

a body of rules and principles, contained in various sources, including treaties and customs,

which the subjects of international law have accepted as binding on them either in their relations

with one another per se, or in those with other juristic or natural persons.

Thisdefinitionisdistinguishablefrommostoftheexistingdefinitionsinmany ways:

• itrecognizesthatinternationallawappliestoentitiesotherthanStates;

• itliststhemainsourcesofinternationallaw—treatiesandcustoms—butisnotlimitedto

these;

• itrevealsthattheauthorityofinternationallawderivesmainlyfromtheacceptanceofits

bindingforcebyitssubjects;and

• itdemonstratesthatinternationallawdoesnotregulateonlytherelationsofoneStatewith

another,butalsogovernstherelationsofStateswithhumansandjuristicpersons(whether

nationalsorforeigners).

thinking points

• Explainthemeaningofinternationallawasthe‘lawsofnations’.

• ListwhichentitiesotherthanStatesmayapplyinternationallawandthosetowhichinter-national law may apply.

• Towhatextentdoestheproposeddefinitionofinternationallawimproveuponordetractfromotherdefinitionsofinternationallawwithwhichyouarefamiliar?

1.2.2 Public and private international law: a distinctionAsaconcept,weusethephrase‘internationallaw’ratherlooselytorefertotwodistinctareas

ofalegaldiscipline.Ontheonehand,whenwesay‘internationallaw’,wemaymean‘public

internationallaw’—thatis,thelawofnations,which,asdiscussedpreviously,concernsrela-

tionsamongsubjectsofinternationallaw.

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LetussupposethattwofictionalStates,CandomaandRutamu,regularlyconductrela-

tionswitheachotherandthattheyeachhaveanembassyontheother’sterritory.Thusthe

exchangeofdiplomaticofficialsbetweenthesecountries,theconclusionoftreatiesregu-

latingthetreatmentofnationalsofonevisitingtheterritoryoftheother,theadoptionof

rulesandprinciplesfordealingwiththecommercialenterprisesofonecountrycarryingon

businessintheother,andsoon,areallmattersforpublicinternationallaw.Thisisbecause

suchmattersinvolvetheapplicationofcertainrulesandprinciplesofinternationallawto

thetwoStates.Therulesandprinciplesare‘public’becauseneitherStatecanclaimowner-

shipofthem;rather,theyarerulesagreeduponbybothCandomaandRutamualone,or

inconjunctionwithotherStates.

Ontheotherhand,whenwesay‘internationallaw’,wemay,infact,mean‘privateinterna-

tionallaw’,otherwisecalled‘conflictoflaws’.Thisisabranchofinternationallawthatdeals

withrelationsbetweenindividualsorlegalpersons,suchascorporations,inwhichthelawsof

morethanoneStatemaybeapplied.Privateinternationallaw,orconflictoflaws,concerns

rulesdevelopedbyStatestodealwithsuchmattersastransactionsinvolvingprivatenationals

ofoneStateandanotherState,whichmaycontainsomeforeignelements.

LetusimaginethatXandYareCandomancitizenswhomarriedinCandoma,butlivein

Rutamu.TheirchildrenwereborninRutamuandtheycarryonbusinessactivitiesinthatcoun-

try.InadivorceproceedingbetweenXandYinstitutedinaRutamuancourt,theresolutionof

issuesconcerningthecustodyoftheirchildren,thedistributionofpropertyownedbythecou-

ple,andthedispositionoftheirresourceswillinvolveaconsiderationofthelawofCandoma,

underwhichthecoupleweremarried,andthatofRutamu,underwhichtheirchildrenwere

bornandunderwhichtheyandtheirchildrenreside,andunderwhichtheypractisetheirbusi-

ness.ItistheinteractionofthelawsofCandomaandRutamu,andtheconsequencesarising

therefrom,thatarereferredtoas‘conflictoflaws’,or‘privateinternationallaw’.

NOTE AlthoughthelawsoftwoStates(CandomaandRutamu)areinvolvedinthedivorce

proceedingsbetweenXandY,thecaseisnotactuallybetweenthesetwoStates.Rather,the

caseisabouthowCandomannationalswho,despitehavingmarriedinCandoma,musthave

theirmarriagedissolvedintheircountryofdomicile,Rutamu,which,nevertheless,mustcon-

siderhowCandomanlawdealswithcertainissuesarisingintheproceedings.

Distinguishingbetween‘public’and‘private’internationallawdoesnotimplythatthesetwo

aspectsofinternationallawarealwaysmutuallyexclusive,orthattheyoperateindependently

ofeachotheratalltimes.Onthecontrary,therearecircumstancesinwhichcertainaspects

ofthesetwo‘internationallaws’interrelate,andinwhichonemayberelevantindetermining

whetherabreachoftheotherhasoccurred.

InJenningsandWatts(1996,seesection1.1),atp. 7,itwassaidthat:

Although the rules of private international law are part of the internal law of the state con-

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in treaties. Where this happens the failure of a state party to the treaty to observe the rule of

private international law prescribed in it will lay it open to proceedings for breach of an interna-

tional obligation owed another party. Even where the rules of private international law cannot

themselves be considered as rules of public international law, their application by a state as part

of its internal law may directly involve the rights and obligations of the state as a matter of public

international law, for example where the matter concerns the property of alien or the extent of

the state’s jurisdiction.

Thisisaveryimportantobservation.Indeed,situationsmayariseinwhichfailuretoapply

therulesofprivateinternationallawmayberegardedasabreachofpublicinternational

law.AswillbeseeninChapter 3,Statesacceptcertainprivateinternationallawrulesas

governingtheirinternationalrelationsandsuchrulesmayinvolveprivateinternationallaw

issues.ThereforeifaStatefailstoapplyaprivateinternationallawruleembodiedinatreaty

towhich it isaparty, that failuremaybeconsideredtobeabreachofan international

obligationagreeduponbythetwoStates,which,ineffect,constitutesabreachofpublic

internationallaw.

thinking points

• Distinguishbetween‘public’and‘private’internationallaw.

• Arepublicandprivateinternationallawsmutuallyexclusive?

• Nameonecircumstanceunderwhichthefailuretoapplyaprivateinternationallawrulecangive rise to a breach of public international law.

1.2.3 General, regional, and particular international lawAsidefromthedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivateinternationallaw,afurthercategoriza-

tion(althoughnotadistinctionassuch)canbemadeintheoperationsofpublicinternational

law.Whilethereisageneralbodyofrulesandprinciplesthatmakesuppublicinternational

law, theoperationof these rules andprinciplesmay sometimes vary.Generally speaking,

internationallawrulesmayoperateglobally,buttheymayalsoberestrictedtospecificregions

oftheworld.Usually,internationallawappliestoavastmajorityofStatesallovertheworld;

nonetheless,therearecertainrulesthatarepeculiartoparticularregionsoftheworld.Thus

weoftenspeakof‘general’internationallawand‘regional’internationallawinrespectofthe

universalorregionalapplicationofinternationallaw.

Thebasisof thedistinctionbetween ‘general’ and ‘regional’ international law liesmainly

inthescopeoftheapplicationofinternationallegalrules,aswellasthenumberofStates

involved.GeneralinternationallawusuallyappliestoagreatermajorityofStatesinall regions

oftheworld.RegionalinternationallawmayalsoapplytoaconsiderablenumberofStates

(althoughtheyareusuallyfewerthanthoseinvolvedin‘generalinternationallaw’),butthe

Statesareusuallylocatedwithinasingleregionoftheworld.

WhereastheruleprohibitingthethreatoruseofforcebyStates(seeChapter 10)isanexam-

pleofgeneral internationallaw,becauseitappliestoallStatesregardlessoftheregionin

which theyare located, the ‘Estrada’doctrine,whichconcerns the ‘recognitionofStates’

(seeChapter 4),originatedfromandinitiallyoperatedonlyinLatinAmerica.However,more

NOTE Itmustalwaysbeborneinmindthatthisbookisconcernedonlywithpublicinternationallawandnotprivateinternationallaw.

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Stateselsewherehavenowadoptedthedoctrine.Anotherexampleofregionalinternational

lawcanbeseenintherequirementssetfornewentitiesaspiringtobecomeStatesinEurope,

underEuropeanUnionlaw,inadditiontofulfillingthecriteriaofstatehoodunderthe1933

MontevideoConvention.ThesenewrulesapplyonlyinEurope(seeChapter 4).

Itisalsopossibletodescribesomerulesofpublicinternationallawas‘particularinternational

law’.ThisrefersmainlytorulesthatareacceptedbyonlyafewStates,butwhicharenotcon-

finedtoaparticularregionoftheworld.Sucharuleisnot‘regionalinternationallaw’,since

thefewStatesthatsubscribetoitarenotnecessarilyconfinedtothesameregion(inwhich

case,itwouldbe‘regionalinternationallaw’notwithstandingthesmallnumberofStates).

Thusreferringtosucharuleinsteadas‘particularinternationallaw’accuratelyrepresentsthe

factthatitappliesonlytoafewStates,unrelatedtotheirgeographicallocation.

Thebulkofinternationallegalrulesareappliedonauniversalbasis.Examplesofsuchrules

canbefoundineminentinternationaltreatiessuchastheCharteroftheUnitedNations(UN

Charter)andvarioushumanrightstreaties—especially the InternationalCovenantonCivil

andPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCultural

Rights(ICESCR).Inaddition,generalinternationallawrulescanbefoundinsuchspecificlegal

regimesasthe1948ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide

(theGenocideConvention).

Although‘regional’or‘particular’internationallawsaresubservienttogeneralinternational

law,thereareoccasionswhenregionalorparticularinternationallawobligationsclashwith

generalinternationallawobligations.Inordertoavoidsuchsituations,generalinternational

lawoftenregulatestherelationsbetweenitselfanditssubcategories(seeChapter 2).

Article103oftheUNCharterprovides: ‘Intheeventofaconflictbetweentheobligationsof

theMembersoftheUnitedNationsunderthepresentCharterandtheirobligationsunder

anyotherinternationalagreement,theirobligationsunderthepresentChartershallprevail.’

ThisprovisionrelatesspecificallytotheobligationsofUNmemberStatesunderany other

internationalagreements,butsuchotherinternationalagreementsincludethosethatapply

eitheramongafewStatesorinaparticularregion.TheotherobligationsoftheUNmem-

berStatesoverwhichtheirCharterobligationstakeprecedencemightbeobligationsunder

general international law(outsidethoseoftheUNCharter), regional international law,or

particularinternationallaw.Thismeansthatevenwithintheclassofgeneralinternationallaw,

theobligationsassumedbyStatesundertheUNCharter(whichembodiesgeneralinterna-

tionallaw)aresuperiortotheirobligationsunderotheragreements,whichmayalsoembody

generalinternationallaw.

Further,Article53ofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT)statesthat:

Atreatyisvoidif,atthetimeofitsconclusion,itconflictswithaperemptorynormofgeneral

internationallaw.ForthepurposesofthepresentConvention,aperemptorynormofgeneral

internationallawisanormacceptedandrecognizedbytheinternationalcommunityofStatesas

awholeasanormfromwhichnoderogationispermittedandwhichcanbemodifiedonlybya

subsequentnormofgeneralinternationallawhavingthesamecharacter.

Aswill bediscussed fully inChapter 2, aperemptorynorm—otherwise called ius (or jus)

cogens—iswidelyregardedasthemostfundamentalnormoftheinternationalcommunity,

breachofwhichshakestheveryfoundationofhumancivilization.Examplesofsuchnorms

includetheprohibitionoftheslavetrade,genocide,andtheuseofforcebyStates.Peremptory

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normsarethereforerulesofgeneralinternationallawandmaynotbecontradictedbyany

otherrule,whetherregionalorparticularinternationallaw.However,aperemptorynormmay

bereplacedbyanothernormofinternationallawhavingasimilarcharacter,pursuanttothe

provisionsofArticle64VCLT.

‘Regional’and‘particular’internationallawsarenotaspopulartodayastheywereinthepast.

ThisispartlybecausealmostallStatesarenowmembersoftheUnitedNations,andpartly

becausetheexistenceofregionalcustomsarebeingsuccessfullychallengedbeforetheICJ

(seeChapter 2).InafastglobalizingworldwhereStatesareconstantlyexpandingtheirareas

ofcooperation,itisbecomingincreasinglydifficultforafewStatestoclaimthattheyaccept

customsorrulesnotopentothevastmajorityofStates.

KEY POINTS

• ‘Generalinternationallaw’meansabodyofrulesandprinciplesofinternationallawthatappliesamongavastmajorityofStates.

• ‘Regionalinternationallaw’referstotherulesandprinciplesofinternationallawthatapplytoStateswithinaparticularregionoftheworld(forexample,theEstradadoctrine).

• ‘Particular international law’referstotherulesorprinciplesof international lawapplicabletoafewStatesregardlessofwheretheyarelocated.

• Theuseofboth‘regional’and‘particular’internationallawhasdecreasedconsider-ablyinmoderntimes.

• ItisoftenverydifficultforStatestoprovetheexistenceofaregionalorparticularcustom,especiallyinmattersinvolvingStatesthatarenotlocatedwithinthesameregion.

1.3 The nature of international law: theoriesAcrossgenerations,legalscholars,philosophers,thinkers,andpoliticalscientistshavepro-

poundedvarioustheoriesaboutthenatureofinternationallawinordertobetterunderstand

itsfunctions,characteristics,andlimitations.Themostimportantandinfluentialoftheseare

thenaturalist,thepositivist,andtheGrotianschools.Thisdoesnotconstituteanexhaustive

list,butareonlythreeofthemanyschoolsofthoughtthatputforwarddifferenttheories

aboutthenatureoflawandthroughwhichthenatureofinternationallawmaybebetter

understood.

1.3.1 NaturalismAccordingtonaturalism, there isa lawofnature thatapplies toStates justassuch law

appliestoindividuals.Inproposingthata law of natureappliestoStatesandindividuals,the

naturalistsopposetheideathatStatesvoluntarily,intheirconductwithoneanother,should

thinking pointDistinguish between‘general’,‘regional’,and‘particular’international law.

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be boundby laws that they eithermake themselves orwhich theyobserveby custom.

Consequently,naturalistsbelievethatallothertypesoflaw—includingthosethatareman-

made—mustconformtoahigher(natural)law.Someeminentmembersofthenaturalist

schoolsincludedPufendorf,Hobbes(whowouldlaterbecomeapositivist),Rutherford,and

Barbeyrac.

InThe Concept of Law(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2nded1994),p. 186,H. L.A. Hart,

whowasactuallyapositivist,agreedthat:

there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which

manmade law must conform if it is to be valid.

Inanutshell,naturallawtheoryproposesthatitisthesamelawofnaturethatregulates

humanconductthatalsoregulatesStatesintheirconductwithoneanother.Itpositsthat

whileStates,likehumans,maymakeotherlawsbythemselves,suchlawsmustconformto

thelawofnatureinordertobevalid.Nonetheless,becausethenaturalistsdonotaccept

thatStatesmakethelawsthatbindthemintheirconductwithoneanother,theyattracted

thetitle‘deniersoftheLawsofNations’—thatis,theywereseentorejectinternational

law.

1.3.2 PositivismOpposedtothenaturallawtheoryistheconceptofpositivism,atermbelievedtohavebeen

coinedinthe1830sbyFrenchsocialphilosopherAugustComte.Comteusedthetermpositiv-

ismtomeansomething‘scientific’and‘objective’,asopposedtosomethingdeducedthrough

somereligiousorspeculativemeans.

However,beforediscussingpositivismasatheoryonthenatureofinternationallaw,weneed

toremindourselvesthat,asaconcept,positivismiscapableofawiderangeofthings.Inthis

regard,wecanspeakbroadlyofthreebranchesofpositivism.AccordingtoA. P. d’Entrèves,

Natural Law(2ndrev’dedn,London: Hutchins&Co.,1970),p. 175,these are:

• imperativism;

• normativism;and

• legalrealism.

Althoughthelasttwobrancheshavesomebroadrelationstothetheoryoflaw,itis‘imperativ-

ism’withwhichwearemainlyconcernedhere.Imperativismcapturesthewholeessenceof

positivism,inthatitconveysthenotionthatthelawisacommandofa‘sovereign’endorsed

bythehabitualobedienceofhisorhersubjects—atheorygenerallycreditedtoEnglishlegal

philosopherJohnAustin.

Positivistsrejectthenotionofsome‘higher’or‘natural’lawtowhichallman-madelaws(posi-

tivelaws)mustconformbeforetheycanbevalid.Forthepositivists,Statesareboundonlyby

thoselawsthatareeitherman-made(suchastreaties)orwhichderivethroughcustomsand

areissuedbyasovereign.Inshort,positivismisbasedontheideathatthelawisthecommand

ofanuncommandedcommander.

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Thenatureofinternationallaw: theories

1.3.3 GrotianismThethirdtheoreticalschoolistheGrotianperspective,or‘Grotianism’.Asnotedpreviously,

HugoGrotiusiscreditedasbeingthe‘fatherofinternationallaw’.Itisnotsurprisingthere-

forethatthiseminentinternationallawyerhasawholeschooloflegaltheorydedicatedto

hisname.

TheGrotiansoccupyamiddlepositionbetweenthenaturalistsandthepositivists,regarding

neithernaturallawnorpositivelawashavinganymoreoranylesscharacterthantheother.

HugoGrotiussawapossibilityofharmonizingthevariousschools.

InDe Jure Praedae(The Law of Prize)(1868),Grotiusspeaksoftheneedtosystematize:

That body of law . . . which is concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of

states, whether derived from nature, or established by divine ordinances or having its origin

in custom or tacit agreement . . . [and to the importance of] a knowledge of treaties of alliance,

conventions, and understandings of peoples, kings and sovereign nations . . . in short, of the

whole law of war and peace.

InTheAnarchicalSociety: AStudyoftheOrderoftheWorldPolitics (London: Macmillan,

1977),p. 27,HedleyBullobservesthattheGrotians:

View international law politics as taking place within an international society [in which] states are

bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law.

(See also H.  Bull, ‘The Grotian conception of international society’ in H.  Butterfield and

M. Wight(eds),Diplomatic Investigations(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1968),

pp. 51–73.)

CliveParry(1968,seesection1.2.1),atp. 26,sumsupthemaintenetsoftheGrotiantheory

ofinternationallawtotheeffectthatitattributes‘equalweighttowhatstatesactuallydo,to

habitandcustomandtothecourseofdealingbetweenparties,whichcontributesignificantly

towhateversystemoflaw;andnolesstowhatstatesare—orwhattheymustdobecauseof

theirnature’.

Insummary,internationallaw,likemunicipallaw,isregardedashavingtranscendental,aswell

asmundane,origins.Statesagreetobeboundbyinternationallawwhentheysigntreaties

andenterintodifferenttypesofagreement,andwhentheirpracticeindicatessuchagree-

ment.Inaddition,Statesareregardedasbeingboundbycertainnormsandtenets,suchas

peremptorynorms,notnecessarilybasedonanyagreement,butbasedonthenatureofthe

normsthemselves.Grotianismthereforeprovidesamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofthe

basisofinternationallawanditsbindingnatureaslaw.

thinking points

• Distinguishbetween‘naturalism’and‘positivism’.

• What does ‘Grotianism’ stand for? How can it be differentiated from naturalism andpositivism?

• Inyouropinion,whichofthetheoriesdoyouthinkbestrepresentsinternationallawandwhy?

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1.4 The relationship of theories of law with international lawAswillhavebeennoticed,thevarioustheoriesconsideredpreviouslyrelateto‘law’ingeneral

andnotonlytointernationallawinparticular.Thisraisesthequestion: howdothetheories

relatetopublicinternationallaw?

Therelevanceofthesetheoriestointernationallawmanifestsintheirsubtleinfluenceson

thevariousaspectsofinternationallawratherthanasingle,dominanteffect.Forexample,

therelationshipbetweeninternationallawandmunicipalordomesticlaw,whichisusu-

allyexpressedasacontestbetweenmonismanddualism(seeChapter 9),canbeproperly

understoodonlyagainstasoundappreciationofthetheories.Whetheronebelievesthat

internationallawissuperiortodomesticlaw(monism),orthatthetwoareindeedseparate

and functionas such (dualism), dependspartly on towhat theoretical viewof lawone

subscribes.

Generallyspeaking,theinfluenceoftheabovetheoriesoninternationallawtodayismuch

lessthanitwaswhenthedisciplinebegantobesystematized.Nonetheless,Grotianismhas

provedtobethemostenduringofallofthetheories,especiallyaftertheSecondWorld

War.Thedevelopmentofastronginternationalhumanrightssystemafterthewarmeant

thatlawscouldnotsimplybeviewedasthe‘commandofanuncommandedcommander’,

norcoulditbesharplydivorcedfrommorality,aspositivistswantustobelieve.Today,a

soldier cannothope toescape liability for committingheinouscrimesduringanarmed

conflictbysimplystatingthatheorsheisauthorizedbyhisorhersuperiorcommander.

Internationallawmakeseffortsnowadaystoensurethateverysoldierisawareofthelaws

ofwar,andthatallsoldiersbehaveaccordingtotheselawsandnotsimplyaccordingto

thewhimsoftheircommanders.Inaddition,theideaoftheabsolutesovereigntyofthe

Stateasan‘uncommandedcommander’intheinternationalforumisbeingchallengedby

thedevelopmentofinstancesinwhichinternationallawwill,inasense,piercetheveilof

sovereigntyandpunishoffendersforcrimescommittedintheirterritory,aswillbeseen

inourdiscussionofinternationalcriminallaw.Allofthesedevelopmentsininternational

lawhaveledtoasharpdeclineinpositivism,justastheroleplayedbylawinthemodern

societyhasequallyreducedtheefficacyofthebeliefthatsomehigher(natural)lawisall

thatmatters.

KEY POINTS

• The relevance of ‘theory’ to international law generally declined after theSecondWorldWar, due partly to the development of international humanrights.

• The impact of ‘theory’ on international law can be seen in its influence on specificaspectsofinternationallawratherthanasanoveralleffect.

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Thebasisofinternationallaw: consent

1.5 The basis of international law: consentInanygivensociety,lawsaremadebycertaininstitutions.Indemocraticsocieties,lawsare

madebythelegislature,knownbydifferentnamesindifferentcountries.IntheUK,forexam-

ple,the‘Parliament’ isdividedintothe‘HouseofCommons’andthe‘HouseofLords’; in

theUSA,thefederallegislatureiscalled‘Congress’;inNigeria,itisthe‘NationalAssembly’,

comprisingthe‘Senate’andthe‘HouseofRepresentatives’;andinIsraelandRussia,theyare

called‘Knesset’and‘Duma’,respectively.

Incontrasttodomesticlegalsystems,internationallawdoesnothavelaw-makinginstitutions.

Hence,man-madelaws,inthesenseoflegislativeenactmentsorActsofParliament,donot

formthebasisoftheinternationallegalsystem;rather,internationallawisbasedprincipally

ontheconsentofthoseStatesthatagreetobeboundbyit.ItisonlywhenStatesacceptto

forminternationallawthatinternationallawcanexist.HowStatesconsenttotheformation

ofinternationallawcan,however,vary.Statesmayexplicitlyagreetosetouttherulesofinter-

nationallawthattheywishtoapplyandtobeappliedtothemintheirrelations,andthiscan

bedoneintreatiesorconventions;suchanagreementcanalsoemergefromthecustomary

practicesofStates.Thesetwomodes(treatyandcustom)arediscussedinChapter 2.

Theoriginof ‘consent’as thebasisof international law isbothancientandmodern. It is

believedthatconsensualinternationallawemanatedfromthepracticeoftheRomanEmpire.

ThusCliveParry(1968,seesection1.2.1),atp. 17,notesthat:

The ius gentium of the Romans—that amalgam of the laws of all the peoples of the empire . . . hav-

ing been received over much of the European continent after the Renaissance, constituted an

actually operative common system of law providing a basis ready made for international law.

Obviously,consentasabasisof international lawwas influencedbydevelopmentswithin

domesticlegalsystems,butittookawhilebeforethesedomesticdevelopmentsactuallyreg-

isteredameaningfulimpactoninternationallaw.

AsReismanobserves in‘Sovereigntyandhumanrights incontemporary international law’

(1990)84AJIL866,867:

It took the formal international system time to register these profound changes. Another cen-

tury beset by imperialism, colonialism and fascism was to pass, but by the end of the Second

World War, popular sovereignty was rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of political

legitimacy. Article 1 of the UN Charter established as one of the purposes of the United Nations,

to develop friendly relations between States, not on any terms, but ‘based on respect for the

principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.

Itdoesnotfollow,however,thateveryStatemustgiveitsconsentbeforeinternationallawcan

beestablished.AccordingtoOppenheim(1908,seesection1.1),atn. 14:

The ‘common consent’ cannot mean, of course, that all states must at all times expressly con-

sent to every part of the body of rules constituting international law, for such common consent

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could never in practice be established. The membership of the international community is con-

stantly changing; and the attitude of individual members who may come and go must be seen

in the context of that of the international community as a whole, while dissent from a particular

rule is not to be taken as withdrawal of consent to the system as a whole.

JohnDuggardnotes,inInternationalLaw: A SouthAfricanPerspective(3rdedn,CapeTown:

Juta&Co.Ltd,2008),atp. 14:

While the notions of justice and the values of legal idealism associated with natural laws form

the foundation of much of contemporary international law, particularly the promotion of human

rights and the right of self-determination, it cannot be denied that for many states consent

remains the basis of their participation in the international community.

AswillbeseeninChapter 2,inthecaseofcustomswhatisrequiredisthatagreatmajority

ofStatesgivestheirconsent;inthatwaythecustomcomestoberegardedasinternational

law.Withtreaties,theruleisdifferent: onlyStatesthatconsenttoatreatycanbeboundby

therulescontainedinthattreaty,subjecttonotableexceptions.(SeealsoFernandoR. Teson,

‘Interdependence,consent,andthebasisofinternationalobligation’(1989)Proceedings of

theAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw,5–8April,pp. 558–566,

andWilfredC. Jenks,‘Thechallengeofuniversality’(1959)Proceedings of the Annual Meeting

oftheAmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw,30April–2May,pp. 85–98;AnthonyCarty,

‘Criticalinternationallaw: recenttrendsinthetheoryofinternationallaw’(1991)2EJIL66.)

KEY POINTS

• Stateconsentisthebasisofinternationallaw.

• ConsentasthebasisofinternationallawwasinspiredbydevelopmentsindomesticlawinEuropeandtheUSA.

• StateconsentdoesnotimplythatallStatesmustgivetheirconsentatalltimesforthepurposeofestablishinginternationallaw;theconsentofthemajorityofStatesissufficient.

1.5.1 The limits to State consent as the basis for international law

ThereareinstancesinwhichStateconsentisprecluded.Theseincludesituationsconcerninga

specialclassofnormsandwithregardtosomeexistingcustoms.Wewillnowconsidersome

examplesoftheseinstances.

Consent versus peremptory norm

WhileStateconsentiscrucialtotheformationofinternationallaw,therearecertainaspects

ofinternationallawinrelationtowhichStateconsentispracticallyirrelevant.Onceanormis

categorizedasaperemptorynorm(thatis,themostfundamentalinthehierarchyofnorms),

Statescannotconsensuallyderogatefromsuchanorm(seeArticle53VCLT).A Statecannot,

forexample,consenttothecommissionofthecrimeofgenocideonitsterritorysimplybecause

ithasnotratifiedthe1948GenocideConvention;neithercanaState,inpresenttimes,permit

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slavetradeonitsterritoryforanyreason.Theproscriptionofgenocideandslaveryarenow

widely regardedasperemptorynormsbyStates,because theyare so fundamental to the

existenceofhumankindthatadisturbanceofthemthreatensthatveryfoundation.A State

cannotalsoclaimthatitsinternationallywrongfulactwhichviolatesaperemptorynormis

precludedbyconsent.(SeeArticle26oftheInternationalLawArticlesonStateResponsibility

forInternationallyWrongfulActs,2001.)

Nevertheless,thefactthatonlyafewcrimesbelongtothecategoryofperemptorynorms

demonstratesthatit isonlyforextraordinaryreasonsthatStateconsentcanbeprecluded

fromoperatingoninternational law.Outsidethesenorms,therearenootherinstancesin

whichStateconsent isprecludedasbeing thebasisof international law.Stateconsent is

sopowerfulthat,aswewillseeinChapter 13,whenStatescreateinternationallaw,their

consentisevenneededbeforetheycanbeheldresponsibleforitsbreach.IfaStatedoesnot

acceptthattheICJ,forexample,shouldadjudicateacaseinvolvingtheState’sbreachofan

internationalobligationthatitowestoanotherState,thenthereislittlethatcanbedone

intermsofholdingitlegallyliable.Thisisoneofthemainreasonswhyinternationallawis

frequentlyseenas‘nolaw’,sinceeverythingseemstodependonthewishesofStates.Itis,

inotherwords,consideredtohavenoindependentorobjectiveregimeofsanctionsagainst

recalcitrantStates.But,asweshallseelater,thisisnotatruepictureofthenatureofinterna-

tionallaw.(SeegenerallyAnthonyD’Amato,‘It’sabird,it’saplane,it’sjuscogens’(1990–91)

6ConnJIL1.)

Consent and pre-existing customs

ItisoftenthecasethataStateacceptstheexistenceofaparticularcustomininternational

law.Naturally,thismeansthattheStatepractisesthecustomandisboundbyit.Thequestion

is: whathappenstothatconsentiftheStatebreaksupintoseveralotherStates?Thisquestion

isimportantbecause,generallyspeaking,‘new’Statesarenotaffordedtheopportunityto

exercisechoiceoverwhetherornottheyacceptthatcustom.Thishasledsomewriterstodeny

thatconsentisthebasisofinternationallaw,since,althoughsuchnewStateshavenotbeen

givenanopportunitytoexpresstheirconsentinrespectofsuchcustoms,theyarenonetheless

automaticallyboundbyit.

Inanidealworld,itwouldbedesirableforeveryStatetoconsenttoeveryruleofinternational

law,butthisisunrealisticinthemoderncontextinwhicheventsoccuratanexponentialpace.

ThefactthatnewStatesdonothavetheopportunitytoconsenttooldcustomsdoesnotipso

factomeanthattheirconsentisirrelevant.Itdoessuggest,however,thatwhileconsentisthe

basisofinternationallaw,itisnotitselfsufficientforthepurposeofformulationanddevelop-

mentoftherulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw.AsJohnDuggard(2008,seesection1.5)

notes,atp. 14:

Consent, on its own, however fails to provide an explanation for the rules and principles that

comprise international law. Third World States, for instance, have at no time expressly con-

sented to the rules that shaped international law before they attained independence. Indeed, as

consent becomes more difficult to obtain for the creation of new rules of law, consensus in the

form of majority decision-making is increasingly adopted.

AswillbeseeninChapter 2,ifanumberof(new)Statesbegintodepartfromtheexisting

custom,thisraisessignificantdoubtastothevalidityandsustainabilityofthatcustominthe

longrun.Also,anewStatecanbepresumedtohaveacceptedapre-existingcustomaryruleif

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suchrulerelates,forexample,toaperemptorynorm.ThespecificconsentofthatnewState

willbeirrelevant,sincethecustomaryruleregardingtheperemptorystatusofanormderives

notbyvirtueofStateconsent,butfromthefactoftheprescientstatusthattheinternational

communityhasaccordedtothatnorm.Lastly,toarguethatStateconsentisnotthebasisof

internationallawonlybecauseconsentappearsassailableonaparticularoccasionistostretch

therelevanceofexceptionstobreakingpoint.

thinking points

• WhatarethepossibleexceptionstoStateconsentasthebasisofinternationallaw?

• DoyouagreethatthefactthatnewStatesarenotgiventheopportunitytoconfirmorrejectoldcustomsunderminesStateconsentasthebasisofinternationallaw?

• Whatare‘peremptorynorms’andwhyaretheyexcludedfromthereachofStateconsent?

1.6 The functions of international lawSofarwehaveconsideredabriefhistory,thenature,andthebasisofinternationallaw,but

thesedonottelluswhatinternationallawactuallydoes.Afterall,ifweweretoaskwhat

functionsdomesticlawperforms,wecouldcomeupwithscoresofanswers.Wemightsay,

forexample,thatdomestic lawregulatestherelationsbetweenpeopleandtheState;we

mightevensaythatitisacodeofconductthatspellsoutthedutiesandresponsibilitiesof

everyonewholiveswithinaState,includingthoseentrustedwiththeresponsibilityforrun-

ningtheStateorconductingitsaffairs.Clearly,thesekindsoffunctionmakeitpossiblefor

peopletoempowerspecificindividuals—legislators—tomakelawsontheirbehalf.However,

since,asstatedpreviously,theinternationallegalsystemdoesnothavetraditionallaw-making

institutionsassuch,doesitthenmeanthatwecannotexpectinternationallawtofunctionin

amannersimilartomunicipallaw?

Thequestionwhatfunctioninternationallawperformshasexercisedthemindsoflegalschol-

arsformanyyears.Thisisatrickyquestionbecause,asobservedearlier,internationallawused

tobeconsideredasirrelevant.In1968,RichardFalkgaveashismainreasonforinvestigating

therelevanceofinternationallawthatitwaspartofalargereffortof‘liberatingthediscipline

ofinternationallawfromasenseofitsownfutility’(seeRichardA. Falk,‘Therelevanceof

politicalcontexttothenatureandfunctioningofinternationallaw: anintermediateview’in

KarlW. DeutschandStanleyHoffmann(eds),The Relevance of International Law(Cambridge,

MA: Schenkman,1968),atp. 142).

International lawperformsmanyfunctions,andtheseincludeencouragingfriendlyrelations

amongStates,outlawingwarsamongnations,andpromotingthepeacefulresolutionofdis-

putesamongnations.Themostfundamentaloftheseisthemaintenanceofinternationalpeace

andsecurityamongStates.ThisrathersacredfunctionisalsounderscoredbytheUnitedNations.

Oneoftheobjectivesoftheorganization,containedinArticle1oftheUNCharter,is:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:  to take effective collective

measuresforthepreventionandremovalofthreatstothepeace,andforthesuppressionof

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Thefunctionsofinternationallawinconformitywiththeprinciplesofjusticeandinternationallaw,adjustmentorsettlementof

internationaldisputesorsituationswhichmightleadtoabreachofthepeace;

AccordingtoC. Tomuschat,in‘Internationallaw: ensuringthesurvivalofmankindontheeve

ofanewcentury’(1999)23RecueildesCours1,23,internationallaw:

has a general function to fulfil, namely to safeguard international peace, security, and justice in

relations between States.

However,expressingthecorefunctionofinternationallawasthemaintenanceofinterna-

tionalpeaceandsecurityneitheranswersthepracticalquestionofhowthiscanbeachieved—

especiallywheretheneedtomaintainpeaceandsecurityconflictswiththeattainmentof

justice—norexplainswhatthetermsusedmeaninreality.Inhischapter‘Whatisinternational

lawfor?’inEvans(2010,seesection1.1),p. 32,MarttiKoskenniemirightlyqueries:

What do ‘peace’, ‘security’, or ‘justice’ really mean? As soon as such words are defined more

closely, disagreement emerges. To say that international law aims at peace between States is

perhaps already to have narrowed down its scope unacceptably. Surely, as Tomuschat [1999,

above] asks at p. 33, it must also seek to advance ‘human rights as well as the rule of law

domestically inside States for the benefit of human beings’? But what if advancing human

rights would call for the destruction of an unjust peace?

Thereisawholegenerationofwritingsontheso-called‘peaceversusjustice’tensiontowhich

Koskenniemi(inEvans,2010,above)alludes,butthisisnotourconcern.Itsufficestonote

that,originally, internationallawwasnotasconcernedwiththejusticeofasituationasit

waswiththemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity.However,thisapproachhaschanged,partly

becauseoftheincreasingpressurethatinternationallawimposesonStatestoensurethat

theydojusticewhilepursuingpeaceandsecurity.Forexample,itisnowcommonforaState

thathasexperiencedcivilwaroranauthoritarianregimetoseektodojusticebyconfronting

itspast.Thismechanism—nowadaysreferredtoas‘transitionaljustice’—isaprocessbywhich

post-conflictsocietiesattempttounderstandtheillsandshortcomingsofthepastthatledto

thecollapseoftheruleoflaw,soastodevisestrategiesforhowbesttoaddresstheseissuesas

theybuildnewsocieties.Transitionaljusticehasfeaturedinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,and

post-conflictLiberiaandSierraLeone,aswellaspost-authoritarianCambodia.

AnotherimportantfunctionofinternationallawisthesettlementofdisputesamongStates.

Withregardtothisfunction,internationallawdoesnotoperatewiththesamestrengthor

predictionasdomesticlaw.Thisisentirelyduetotheconsensualbasisofinternationallaw,as

explainedpreviously,andthetopicisdiscussedfullyinChapter 13.

H.L. A.Hart(2ndedn,1994,seesection1.3.1),atp. 214,underscoresthisweaknessininter-

nationallawbyobservingthat:

International law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide

for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and

providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.

Whileitistruethatinternationallawlacksinstitutionssuchaslegislaturesandcourts,theview

thatinternationallawlacksunifyingrulesofrecognitionspecifyingsourcesisopentochal-

lenge.In‘Wickedheresiesorlegitimateperspectives?Theoryandinternationallaw’,inEvans

(2010,seesection1.1),atp. 64,IainScobbiedidchallengeHartonthispoint:

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This view was wrong when Hart first expressed it in 1961. Despite criticism, whether on the

grounds of inadequacy or inept drafting, it is generally accepted that Article 38 of the Statute of

the International Court of Justice provides at least a starting place for the enumeration of the

sources of international law and thus functions as a ‘rule of recognition’ for the international

legal system, should one wish to adopt a Hartian analysis.

Thecategoryofthefunctionsperformedbyinternationallawisnotclosed.Itisimportant

that,whenengagedinaninquiryintothefunctionofinternationallaw,legalscholarsshould

endeavourtobeascreativeandflexibleaspossible,andnotbeoverpreoccupiedbyideas

expressedbyothers.

In‘Internationallaw: contentandfunction—areview’(1967)11JConflRes504,Anthony

D’Amato,remarkedaboutawriter’soverrelianceonotherpeople’sviews:

From the writer’s point of view, therefore, the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy exists. This

possibility in turn encourages the writer to incorporate, to a greater or lesser extent, her own

ideas of what the law should be into her account of existing international rules. Nor should we be

surprised that legal writers invariably do this. For they are, primarily, jurists and not political sci-

entists; they have no particular commitment to scientific detachment, but rather were attracted

to their subject for motives such as patriotism, humanitarianism, morality, or merely a passion

for ‘tidying up’ the disparate assortment of available international legal rules.

Ifoneaccepts thisproposition, it ispossible tofindagreatnumberofother functions

thatinternationallawcouldbesaidtoperform,dependingonone’sunderstandingofthe

subjectmatterandthecontextinwhichinternationallawoperates.Anne-MarieSlaughter

Burleynoted that in1992 the taskof liberating international law from its own futility

‘appears to have been accomplished. International legal rules, procedures and organi-

zationsaremorevisibleandarguablymoreeffective thanatany timesince1945’ (see

Anne-MarieSlaughterBurley,‘Internationallawandinternationalrelationstheory: adual

agenda’(1983)87AJIL205.

thinking points

• Summarizethemainfunctionsofinternationallaw.

• Towhatextentisjusticeimportantwheninternationallawseekstomaintainpeaceandsecurity?

• DoyouagreewithHart’sviewofthefunctionofinternationallawwithregardstotheiden-tificationofitsrules?

1.7 What next in international law?Despiteitsphenomenalpopularityinthelastfiftyyearsorso,somestilldoubtthatinterna-

tionallawis‘law’properlysocalled.Thisviewderivesfromabeliefthatinternationallawis

eitherentirelyunenforceable—forexample,whereaStaterefusestogiveitsconsenttoadju-

dicationbeforetheICJoranyotherinternationaltribunal—orthatitisnotenforceableagainst

powerfulcountries.Itistrue,aswehavediscussedpreviously,thatStatesneedtogivetheir

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Conclusion

consentbeforetheICJcanadjudicateamatterinvolvingthem;thusthereisnocompulsory

jurisdiction,assuch,underinternationallaw.

Also,thereisnodenyingthatthecurrentstructureofinternationallawdoesnotmakeitpos-

sibleforitsenforcementagainstpowerfulStates.Itisidealistictoexpectthatinternationallaw

canbeenforcedaseasilyagainstthelikesoftheUSA,theUK,Russia,France,andChinaasit

canagainstweakandpoorStates.Aswewillseelaterinthebook,theserichandpowerful

StatesarethefivepermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil(knownasthe‘P5’)and

theyenjoyaspecialstatusbasedontheirpossessionofthevetopower—thatis,anegative

vote thateachcancast inadecisionof theSecurityCouncil involving themoranyother

State.TheimplicationofthevoteistonullifyorrenderitimpossibletopassaSecurityCouncil

resolutionintheeventofdissentbyanyoftheP5.Thereforethefactthatthestructureof

thesystemcreatedbytheUNChartercreatesadistinctionbetweenthepermanentSecurity

CouncilmembersandallotherStatesunderminestheeffectivenessofinternationallaw.To

manyobservers,ifallStatesareequalaccordingtooneprovisionoftheUNCharter,certainly

thosethatwieldthevetoaremoreequalthanothers.

TheoverwhelmingsenseoffrustrationabouttheOrwelliannatureof thecurrent interna-

tionallegalorderhascontinuedtohauntseveralgenerationsofinternationallawstudents.

Thedilemmaforstudentsofinternationallawcanbeillustratedbytheexchangebetween

someinternationallawstudentsonapopularwebsitecalled‘Answerbag’,availableathttp://

www.answerbag.com/q_view/1682.Ananonymouswritercalled‘agnostic’posedtheques-

tion: ‘Is“internationallaw”truelaw?’onthewebsite,towhichseveralpeople—apparently

mostlyinternationallawstudents—responded.On12April2009,‘littlebear’responded: ‘I

bloodyhopeso,consideringI justdedicated50+hoursofmylifestudyingit.’And‘firebrand’

responded: ‘Yes,itis—althoughnotallcountriesabidebythelaws.’

Mappingthefutureofinternationallaw,therefore,invitesustocreateafinebalancebetween

thequestionposedby‘agnostic’andtheanswerprovidedby‘firebrand’.Inreconcilingagnos-

tic’sdoubtandfirebrand’sreassurance,itmustbesaidthatinternationallawisoftenjudgedby

itsfailuresratherthanbyitssuccesses.Foreverysingleinstanceinwhichinternationallawis

unabletoenforceitsmeasuresagainstpowerfulStates,eitherforreasonsofthevetooforlack

ofcapacitytodoso,thereareseveralinstancesinwhichinternationallawsucceeds: whenyou

postaletterinEnglandtoFrance,whenyoushipanitemfromAlbaniatoSwaziland,thereis

internationallawpresent,accompanyingthepostandthefreight,guidingallhandsthatcome

intocontactwiththechattelsregardingwhattheycanandcannotdowiththeitems;whenyou

sleepinyourhouseandlistentothedroningsoundofaeroplanesflyingoverhead,international

lawensuresthatnoalienplanesinvadeyourcountry’sterritory.Itisonlyinrecognizingthat

internationallawdoesfarmoregoodthanisrecognizedthatwecanassure‘littlebear’thatthe

fifty-plushoursthatheorshededicatedtostudyingthedisciplinewerewellworthit.

ConclusionInternationallawhasgrownsignificantlyinrecenttimes.Fromthe1990s,internationallaw

madeconsiderableprogress,especiallyintheareasofcollectivesecurity,humanrights,inter-

nationalcriminal law, internationaleconomic law,and internationalenvironmental law,to

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mentionbutafew.TheUNSecurityCouncilwasabletoauthorizeanenforcementaction

against Iraqwhen it invadedKuwait in1990,afeatthatthesameinstitutionwasunable

toachieveinthefirstforty-fiveyearsoftheUnitedNations.Governmentofficials,including

headsofState,arenolongerabletocommitheinouscrimesagainsttheirnationals,orfor-

eigners,andhideunderdiplomaticimmunity(seeChapter 16).MoreandmoreStatesnow

takethehumanrightsoftheirpeoplesmoreseriouslythantheydidduringthefirstforty-five

yearsoftheUNCharter.ManyArabcountries,whichhavelongexperienceddictatorshipand

autocraticregimes,arecurrentlyundergoingmonumentalrevolution;inthecasesofEgypt,

Tunisia,andLibya,thatrevolutionhasalreadyledtothereplacementofgovernments.Inthe

IvoryCoast,theUnitedNationsandsomeofitsmemberStatesassistedIvoriansinrealizing

theirdemocraticaspirationsbyforcingoutLaurentGbagbofromtheofficethatherefusedto

vacateaftersufferingdefeatindemocraticelections.

Nonetheless,thereremainssignificantroomforimprovement.Asinternationallawbecomes

moreassertiveinthemoderncontext,moreareasemergeinwhichimprovementsarerequired.

Thefutureofinternationallawliesnotablyinhowmuchitisabletoharnessthegeneralgood-

willthatitcontinuestoenjoyamongthemajorityofStatestothebenefitofhumankind.

QuestionsSelf-test questions

1 Define‘internationallaw’.

2 Explainthedifferencebetween‘public’and‘private’internationallaw.

3 Whatare‘generalinternationallaw’,‘regionalinternationallaw’,and‘particularinterna-

tionallaw’?

4 Whatfunctionsdoesinternationallawperform?

5 Distinguishnaturalism,positivism,andGrotianism.

6 Whatisthebasisofinternationallawandisthisenoughforthepurposeofinternational

lawdevelopment?

7 Underwhatcircumstancesmayconsent,asabasisofinternationallaw,bevaried?

Discussion questions

1 Towhatextentistheassertionthatinternationallawisnotlawatruereflectionofinterna-

tionallaw?

2 ‘Withoutconsent,therecanbenointernationallaw.Consentisthebeginningandendof

internationallaw.’Discuss.

3 Outlinethevarioustheoriesoflawanddiscusswhatrelevancethesehavetointernational

law.

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Furtherreading4 ‘International law is international law.Theuseof the terms“private”and“public” to

describe international law is amatter of personal preferencewith no practical conse-

quences.’Doyouagree?

5 ‘Understandingpositivism,naturalism,andGrotianismastheoreticalfoundationsoflaw

saysnothingaboutthefoundationofinternationallaw.’Discuss.

6 ‘Thefutureofinternationallawisprecarious.’Evaluatethisassertion.

Assessment question

Candoma*hasrecentlyobtainedindependencefromRutamu*and,eagertodemonstrate

thatitisnowaStateinitsownright,decidestojointheUN.However,thenewlyelected

presidentof thecountry isconcernedthatsinceCandomawasnotaStatewhentheUN

wasestablished,ittooknopartinestablishingtherulesandprinciplescontainedintheUN

Charter,whichitmustacceptuponbecomingamemberoftheorganization.Theopposition

party,whichlosttheelectionthatbroughtinthenewgovernment,ismountingavociferous

campaignagainstCandomajoiningtheUN.Amongseveralargumentsthattheoppositionis

makingare: thatinternationallaw,whichtheUNwilladminister,isnolawatall;thatitprivi-

legesrichandpowerfulnations;thatsinceinternationallawhasnoenforcementmechanisms,

Stateswillfreelyviolateit,renderingCandomaopentoviolationswithoutremedy;andthat

ifCandomadoesnotjointheUN,ithasnoresponsibilitytorespectinternationallaw.Asan

internationallawstudentinaprestigiousCandomanuniversitycurrentlyoninternshipwith

theForeignAffairsMinistry,theministerhasaskedyoutoprepareacounter-argumentthat

mightbepresentedwhenhedebatestheissueswitharepresentativeoftheoppositionparty

liveontelevision.

Outlinetheargumentthatyouwouldsuggest.

* Note that both Candoma and Rutamu are fictional States. They will appear in assess-

ment questions throughout the book.

Key case• TrendtexTradingCorporationv. CentralBankofNigeria[1977]2WLR356

Further readingCoplin, W. D., The Functions of International Law (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965)

Duggard, J., InternationalLaw: A SouthAfricanPerspective (3rd edn, Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2008)

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Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1994)

Higgins, R., ProblemsandProcess: InternationalLawandHowWeUseIt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1: Peace (9th edn, London/New York: Longman, 1996)

Kadduri, M., WarandPeaceintheLawofIslam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955)

Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952)

Neff, S., ‘A short history of international law’ in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 3

Oppenheim, L., ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 AJIL 313

Parry, C., ‘The function of law in the international community’ in M. Sørensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 1

Schwarzenberger, G., The Inductive Approach to International Law (London: Stevens, 1965)

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