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Latino congressional staffers and policyresponsiveness: an analysis of Latinointerest agenda-settingWalter Clark Wilson aa Political Science and Geography , University of Texas at SanAntonio , San Antonio , 78249 , USAPublished online: 16 May 2013.
To cite this article: Walter Clark Wilson (2013) Latino congressional staffers and policyresponsiveness: an analysis of Latino interest agenda-setting, Politics, Groups, and Identities, 1:2,164-180, DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2013.785959
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Latino congressional staffers and policy responsiveness:an analysis of Latino interest agenda-setting
Walter Clark Wilson*
Political Science and Geography, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, 78249 USA
(Received 4 August 2012; final version received 12 March 2013)
Surprisingly little research explores whether congressional staffers systematically influencelegislative agendas, or whether the descriptive representation of groups like Latinos oncongressional staffs shapes policy responsiveness to group interests. I address thesequestions through an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of factors associatedwith the prevalence of Latino interests on legislative agendas during the 110th Congress(2007–2008). Results show the proportions of representatives’ legislative agendas thatrepresented Latino interests, especially through symbolic initiatives, were positivelyassociated with the representation of Latinos on their legislative staffs. These findingssuggest Latino representation on legislative staffs enhances congressional policyresponsiveness to Latinos.
Keywords: Latino/a politics; legislative; representation; congressional staff
Introduction
Do Latino congressional staffers influence policy responsiveness to Latino interests? A number ofstudies suggest that congressional staffers influence policy-making (Romzek 2000; Romzek andUtter 1996; 1997; Rundquist, Schneider, and Pauls 1992). Similarly, research suggests passive, ordescriptive representation of societal groups on congressional staffs may influence the active,or substantive representation of group interests in Congress by enhancing responsiveness to orsupport for group interests (Rosenthal and Bell 2002; 2003). But empirical evidence verifyingthese relationships is quite limited. This article1 extends previous research by examiningwhether Latino legislative staffers influence the legislative agendas of US representatives. Specifi-cally, it explores whether legislative agendas associated with Latino interests are significantlyrelated to the presence of Latino staffers in the personal offices and on the legislative staffs ofmembers of Congress.
This study has important practical and normative implications for research on institutionaldiversity and representation. First, it is relevant to debates over the importance of institutionaldiversity to policy responsiveness. If Latino staffers influence the content of legislativeagendas, then they may be seen as important to enhancing policy responsiveness to Latinos.By the same token, the extent to which Latino staffers influence Latino interest legislativeagendas provides a critical substantive measure of the importance of staff diversity, and would
© 2013 Western Political Science Association
*Email: [email protected]
Politics, Groups, and Identities, 2013Vol. 1, No. 2, 164–180, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2013.785959
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support normative arguments that congressional staffs should mirror the diversity of the consti-tuencies they serve.
This study also raises provocative questions about the larger role of staffers in congressionalpolicy-making and representation. If Latino staffers shape Latino interest agenda-setting, is itpossible that staff composition also affects other responsive behaviors? Is such influence consist-ent with democratic norms? And if the relationship observed here between the representation ofLatinos on congressional staffs and the presence of Latino interests on legislative agendas can begeneralized, what are the implications for the legislative representation of other marginalizedgroups, like African Americans and women? The influence of Latino staff revealed in this analy-sis highlights the importance of continued research to address these questions.
This article is organized as follows. First, literatures on congressional staff influence and therelationship between staff characteristics and substantive representation are explored, and hypoth-eses regarding the influence of Latino staff on patterns of policy responsiveness are derived. Next,data from 10,356 bills introduced during the 110th Congress by 434 members of the US House ofRepresentatives, and coding techniques used in the analysis, are described.2 Ordinary leastsquares (OLS) regression models are then used to estimate the proportion of bills in each billsponsor’s legislative portfolio classified as Latino Interest and Anti Latino Interest. The analysisalso estimates sponsorship of two sub-classifications of Latino Interest bills: Substantive LatinoInterest and Symbolic Latino Interest. Finally, conclusions about the influence of Latino legisla-tive staffers on policy responsiveness to Latinos are drawn, and implications for larger questionsabout responsiveness to marginalized groups are discussed.
Congressional staffers and policy responsiveness?
Congressional observers often relate, sometimes jokingly, that the real legislative work, andperhaps substantial policy-making power, rests in the hands of unelected, 20-something staffers.While observers disagree about whether staff influence is positive for the legislative process, per-ceptions that such influence exists are common. For example, a 1992 CRS report on the influenceof congressional staff stated:
The impact of staff is seen as pervasive. Virtually nothing is done in Congress so exclusively byMembers of Congress themselves that staff have no impact on the outcome. Supporters of staff influ-ence claim that staff result in innovation and a broader range of informed perspectives being broughtto bear upon the policy decisions of Congress. Opponents claim that at least some staff have too muchinfluence and power. (Rundquist, Schneider, and Pauls 1992)
Mark Bisnow (1988), a former aide to Senator Robert Dole, similarly observed:
There’s quite an incentive [for members of Congress] to turn over matters to staff and say ‘summarizethis issue for me; I don’t want to read all this material. Or don’t even summarize it for me. Tell mewhat the groups we’re interested in think, or tell me what you think’ … there’s this tendency todefer a little too much to staff.
Both comments reflect the broader conclusions of public administration scholar Barbara Romzek(2000, 413) that “congressional staff have substantial autonomy and opportunity to influencepublic policy, albeit in ways that are not very visible to the general public.”
The substantial legislative research conducted by staff, and the large numbers of colleaguesand constituents with whom staffers communicate, indicate staffers do, in fact, take on thelion’s share of congressional work. The larger question, with implications for responsiveness,accountability, and policy-making, is whether staffers actually influence the policy process in
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Congress or the responsive behaviors of the representatives they serve. The possibility that staf-fers influence patterns of legislative behavior is particularly interesting because congressionalstaffers have no direct mandate to act for the constituents represented by members of Congress(Malbin 1980; Romzek 2000). Whether and how congressional staffers use opportunities and dis-cretion to influence the policy process is, therefore, of both practical consequence and normativeconcern (Romzek 2000).
Previous research outlines a number of expectations regarding staff influence. First, questionsabout substantive representation by congressional staffers require consideration of the types ofresponsiveness toward which different staff positions are oriented. The staffers of greatest interestto the present study are those in positions oriented toward policy responsiveness. Policy respon-siveness refers to actions by representatives that support or advance policy goals consistent withconstituent interests (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1977). Policy responsivenesstends to be of foremost concern to scholars interested in issues of substantive representation,and is assessed using many indicators associated with legislating, including roll call voting,bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship, and committee participation. Generally, staff positionswith roles oriented toward policy responsiveness are located in legislative offices in Washington,DC. In the US House of Representatives, these typically include legislative staffs composed of alegislative director and two or three legislative assistants.
Second, the discretion and opportunity of congressional staffers to influence congressionalresponsiveness appears contingent upon the possession of certain resources that enable such influ-ence (Malbin 1980; DeGregorio 1997; Romzek and Utter 1997; Rosenthal and Bell 2003). Thesecritical resources include “a high degree of ability, seniority, expertise, autonomy, and access tothe member [of Congress]” (Rosenthal and Bell 2003, 69). “Inner circle” staffers with substantialresources, including chiefs of staff, legislative directors, and some legislative assistants (Romzekand Utter 1996, 420), often make important judgments on representatives’ behalves, exerciseinfluence in policy-making decisions (Fox and Hammond 1977) and even act as surrogates formembers of Congress (Romzek and Utter 1996, 420; Rosenthal and Bell 2003). Given that leg-islative director and legislative assistant positions are oriented toward policy responsiveness, andoften possess resources for active representation, staffers in these positions appear more relevantto studies that consider measures of policy responsiveness compared with staffers in other types ofpositions.
Although numerous studies suggest that congressional staffers have the potential to influencepolicy processes or policy-making, evidence demonstrating that this is actually the case reliesalmost exclusively on descriptive accounts and qualitative data (Fox and Hammond 1977;Romzek 2000; Romzek and Utter 1997; DeGregorio 1994; DeGregorio and Snider 1995;Rundquist, Schneider, and Pauls 1992; Peterson 2008). For example, research suggests that con-gressional staffers are often involved in “working out the details” of important legislation (Foxand Hammond 1977, 123), congressional staffers have autonomy and opportunity to influencethe policy process from behind the scenes, although they derive much of their authority fromand remain largely accountable to the representatives they serve (Romzek 2000), and congres-sional staffers may “achieve recognition as leaders in their own right” depending on the positionsthey hold, and the talent or expertise they offer to policy processes (DeGregorio and Snider 1995,494). The overall impression of staff influence implied by these qualitative studies is that staffersassist and facilitate representatives’ pursuits of their political and legislative objectives.
The critical next step in this research agenda, one that can help to verify and generalizeinsights drawn from qualitative analyses, is to examine the influence of congressional staffusing quantitative indicators. This task comes with some difficulty. Quantitative measures ofpolicy responsiveness may pose a challenge to assessing the influence of staff because the stat-istical effect of staff could be endogenous to the preferences or behaviors of the representatives
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they serve. Representatives are, after all, likely to hire staffers who will work faithfully to pursuetheir goals and who share their ideologies and attitudes. This fact complicates the job of assessingwhether staffers actually influence responsiveness, or whether such relationships are merely spur-ious. It also suggests some indicators are more likely to reveal staff influence than others.
Among the observable implications of policy responsiveness, legislative agenda-setting beha-viors, such as bill sponsorship, stand out as preferable for assessing the influence of staff. To beclear, the influence of staffers on policy responsiveness should not be cast as influence over theideological decisions of representatives. The policy effect of staff is more clearly cast as influenceover legislative initiative. For example, as a former congressional staffer, I observed legislativestaffers actively seeking, identifying, and weighing what might be called legislative opportunitieswith the purpose of efficiently and effectively advancing the representative’s political and policyobjectives. Clearly, such staff-inspired efforts do not determine legislative agendas. But they maycatalyze legislative efforts that otherwise would not occur.
Finally, certain contextual factors may shape influence. Analyses should control for variousdimensions that relate to patterns of responsiveness by representatives, including salientmember and constituency characteristics, because such factors may condition the types of policiesthat staffers can influence. Careful attention to the aforementioned factors, as well as to the oppor-tunities afforded by and responsive orientations of staff positions, should allow empirical analysisto provide insight into the influence of congressional staffers on legislative agenda-setting and, byextension, policy responsiveness.
Latino staffers as representatives of Latino interests?
Both practitioners and researchers suggest that the representation of marginalized groups on con-gressional staffs affects responsiveness to groups or group interests (Canon 1999; CHSA 2010;Rosenthal and Bell 2002; 2003; Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007; Grose 2011). The Congres-sional Hispanic Staff Association (CHSA), for example, sees underrepresentation of Latinos oncongressional staffs as a problem for responsiveness to Latino concerns. According to CHSA,the underrepresentation of Latinos in senior staff positions means that “on issues like education,the economy, health care, and decisions of war and peace, Members of Congress are largelywithout the perspective of a community that encompasses about one in six Americans” (CHSA2010).
In research on black representation, David Canon similarly suggests that staff diversity, andthe representation of marginalized groups on congressional staffs, matters in part because itenhances the diversity of perspectives available as resources to representatives. “To the extentthat people have different life experiences based on their racial background,” suggests Canon(1999, 206), “a racially diverse staff is more likely to push the member in different directionsthan is a racially homogeneous staff.” Given the power sometimes wielded by congressional staf-fers, he argues (206), “to truly understand the nature of racial representation in Congress, it maybe nearly as important to examine the race of the staffers as it is the race of the member.”
The theory that personal experiences related to racial, ethnic, or gender backgrounds shapepolitical perspectives and patterns of representation supports numerous studies exploring the sub-stantive effects of racial, ethnic, and sex representation. According to Mellissa Williams (1998, 6),social groups:
define the contours of important patterns of social, political, and economic inequality, and thus help todetermine the life prospects and to constrain the life choices of most of their members … whatmembers of such groups share is the experience of marginalization and the distinctive perspectiveon matters of public policy that comes out of that experience.
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Social perspectives arising from salient shared experiences constitute an important dimensionof political affinity between group members, and uniquely position females and minorities to rep-resent the interests and concerns of these societal groups (Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000). Forexample, representative bureaucracy theorists posit that bureaucracies are more responsive tomarginalized interests when females and minorities are represented passively, or descriptively,among bureaucratic ranks (Selden 1997). The theorized linkage between “passive” and“active” representation is based on the behavioral influences of a number of factors, including per-sonal attitudes of bureaucrats that stem from politically salient characteristics, such as gender,race, or ethnicity (Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998). These scholars echo arguments thatexperiential commonalities among women and within minority groups yield political perspectivesamong female and minority legislators that make them more likely to represent the interests andconcerns of female and minority constituencies (Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999).
Scholars also draw on the concept of group consciousness, and associated feelings of linkedfate, to explain patterns of racial and ethnic representation. Marginalized groups, such as AfricanAmericans and Latinos, such theories suggest, are set apart by feelings that policies affect groupmembers in systematic ways, and that individual experiences are tied to and shaped by groupexperiences (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Hero 1992; Tate2003; Sanchez 2006; Garcia Bedolla 2009). A number of scholars theorize that descriptive repre-sentatives act for minorities based on a commitment to group interests that they derive from theirown group consciousness and feelings linked fate with group members (Swain 1993; Fenno 2003;Minta 2011). For example, Minta (2011, 22) argues that in spite of their substantial diversity,“there is a strong reason to expect that ethnic group consciousness may play a role in predictingLatino policy preferences.” He suggests (24) that Latino group consciousness related to commonexperiences with discrimination, segregation, and colonization unites many Latinos, and likelyexplains consistencies observed in Latino attitudes across numerous policy issues as well as com-mitments by Latino legislators to advance the collective interests of Latinos.
While substantial empirical research on representative bureaucracy (Dolan 2001; 2002; Fraga,Meier, and England 1986; Meier 1975; 1984; 1993; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Meier andEngland 1984; Meier, O’Toole, and Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Rocha and Hawes 2009; Selden1997; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998; Wilkins 2006; 2007), and descriptive representationby legislators (Bratton 2006; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Casellas2007; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Huerta and Santos 2006; Gamble 2007; Kerr and Miller 1997;Knoll 2009; Minta 2011; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997; Wilson 2010), examines the effects of race,ethnicity, sex, and other descriptive characteristics on policy responsiveness, research examiningthe substantive influence of congressional staff diversity is more limited. Two studies examine therelationship between descriptive representation by African American district staffers and consti-tuency linkages (Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007; Grose 2011). Each presents qualitative evi-dence that staffers observed stronger connections between African American district staffers andAfrican American constituencies compared with their white counterparts. This relationshipappears to result from the greater likelihood of overlap in the social, political, and professionalcommunities between African American staffers and constituencies (Grose, Mangum, andMartin 2007, 457).
Rosenthal and Bell (2002; 2003) theorize that passive representation by women committeestaffers in Congress translates into active representation of women only under certain conditions:when interest groups lobby for passive representation on an issue, when staffers possess necessaryresources of “interest, expertise, and status,” and when “the opportunity structure of member–staffrelations, staff autonomy, and political salience coincide” (Rosenthal and Bell 2002, 355). Theyuse case studies of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and the Consumer BankruptcyReform Act (CBRA), along with data from elite interviews, to illustrate active representation
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by women staffers when issues called for gender representation (VAWA) more than technicalexpertise (CBRA), when women staffers possessed adequate resources, and when substantial del-egation of responsibility to trusted staffers presented opportunities for active representation,especially on issues of relatively low priority to representatives (357–364).
Research has yet to address the influence of Latino staffers, but has explored the relationshipbetween representative ethnicity and policy responsiveness fairly extensively. While this body ofresearch produces some mixed results, especially regarding support for Latino interests in votingbehaviors (Casellas 2007; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Huerta and Santos 2006; Knoll 2009), studiesdemonstrate that Latino representatives sponsor more Latino interest bills at both state (Bratton2006) and congressional levels (Wilson 2010).
Although literature on the substantive influence of staff composition in Congress is limited,larger research agendas on descriptive and passive representation strongly suggest the possibilityof a relationship between Latino staff and policy responsiveness to Latinos. Research on staffersalso offers key theoretical insights that suggest certain types of legislative initiatives, policyenvironments, and staff resources are likely to condition whether Latino staff influence policyresponsiveness. If Latino ethnicity of staffers influences policy responsiveness, the relationshipis likely to occur with regard to issues where demand for Latino representation is greatest,namely issues that affect Latinos disproportionately. Second, staffer influence should be greaterwhen representatives permit staffers autonomy to seek out legislative opportunities. This mightoccur with regard to popular initiatives that exact relatively low “costs.” One such marker thatcaptures a relative dichotomy with regard to the costliness of legislative initiatives, and thatcan be broadly applied to congressional legislation, is the distinction between substantive andsymbolic bills. As congressional scholars have long noted, initiatives that are symbolic tend tobe long on goals, short on means to achieve them, and relatively non-controversial comparedwith substantive initiatives. They, therefore, offer both substantial opportunity for beneficialcredit claiming and relatively ample room for compromise and legislative success (Mayhew1974). Representatives would be wise to allow or even encourage staffers to seek out such leg-islative opportunities. If staffers exercise disproportionate freedom to pursue symbolic initiatives,then their influence over policy content should be disproportionately visible in such initiatives.Third, because previous research shows that Latino representatives are more supportive ofLatino interests in their bill sponsorship behaviors (Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010), it is importantto ask whether the influence of Latino legislative staff on policy responsiveness to Latinos is con-ditioned by the ethnicity of the representatives they serve. Staffers may feel freer to pursue leg-islative initiatives that represent Latinos when they work for Latino representatives. Finally,because legislative staffs are most closely associated with work related to policy responsiveness,and often possess resources for active representation, representation of Latinos on legislativestaffs, more than in other types of positions, should influence policy responsiveness to Latinos.
Data
The data used to examine Latino interest agenda-setting are derived from 10,356 public billssponsored during the 110th Congress (2007–2008). For purposes of analysis, each bill wascoded to distinguish symbolic bills (bills that proposed no substantive policy) from substantivepolicy proposals. Next, each bill was coded to distinguish between Latino Interest Bills, Anti-Latino Interest Bills, and bills that were not of disproportionate interest to Latinos. Coding ofLatino Interest and Anti-Latino Interest Bills was based on two criteria. First, all bills proposingpolicies that would impact Latinos disproportionately were identified. While my own experiencesand observations working in Congress provide some credibility for making these judgments,I corroborated them by referencing both demographic and opinion surveys conducted by the
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Pew Hispanic Center, and the policy agendas of Latino advocacy organizations.3 The issueagendas of Latino advocacy organizations reflect broad consistency regarding Latino prioritiesacross a range of topics including immigration, education, health, social welfare, and civilrights, and generally paralleled survey evidence about Latino concerns. Demographic andopinion data confirm that education, healthcare, economic opportunity, poverty, immigration,and discrimination are issues of objective interest and substantial salience to Latinos (PewHispanic Center 2002, 2004; 2007, 31–33; 2011; Lopez and Minushkin 2008; Suro 2005). Theseven main issue categories in which I identified policy proposals with disproportionate impacton Latinos – civil rights, equal economic opportunity (often affirmative action), education,health, housing, immigration, and symbolic tributes – largely reflect the priorities expressed byLatino opinion surveys and advocacy organizations.
The second criterion used to distinguish Latino Interest Bills and Anti-Latino Interest Billsfrom other legislative initiatives, and from one another, relates to the congruence of policy pro-posals with Latino interests. Following other studies, Latino Interest Bills contained policy pro-posals that “might decrease discrimination against Latinos or alleviate the effects of thatdiscrimination, or were designed to improve the socioeconomic status or health of Latinos”(Bratton 2006, 1142), or represented Latino interests in achieving greater cultural recognitionand social inclusion through symbolic resolutions (Wilson 2010). Policy proposals on issuesthat would impact Latinos disproportionately and that were incongruent with Latino interestswere coded as Anti-Latino Interest Bills. These bills would have the effect of discriminatingagainst or marginalizing Latinos, or of reducing services heavily relied upon by Latinos. Admit-tedly, this distinction largely reflects a liberal–conservative dichotomy.4
Typically, congruence between policy proposals and Latino interests was easy to determine.Nevertheless, the policy agendas of Latino advocacy organizations, and evidence from surveys ofLatino opinion were again consulted, this time for purposes of corroborating judgments aboutpolicy orientations. Although surveys and organizations did not advertise positions on everybill sponsored during the 110th Congress that would disproportionately impact Latinos, theyexhibited policy agendas and orientations that were broad and detailed enough to corroboratejudgments about Latino interests in relation to specific proposals.
Evidence of the representation of Latino interests in bills was often quite explicit. Bills thatsought to expand funding for Hispanic Serving Institutions, like H.R. 451, the Next GenerationHispanic-Serving Institutions Act, sponsored by Representative Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX), forexample, clearly represented the interests of Latinos on an issue that impacts Latinos dispropor-tionately. Some symbolic bills, like H.Res. 347, Recognizing the historical significance of theMexican holiday of Cinco de Mayo, sponsored by Representative Joe Baca (D-CA), or H.R.706, sponsored by Representative Susan Davis (D-CA) which would have renamed a postal facil-ity after Cesar E. Chavez, a famous Latino labor leader, paid tribute to events or figures with par-ticular importance to Latinos. More often, Latino representation in legislation was implicit. Billsseeking comprehensive immigration reform, like H.R. 1645, the Security Through RegularizedImmigration and a Vibrant Economy (STRIVE) Act, sponsored by Representative Luis Gutierrez(D-IL), for example, implicitly addressed many issues that impact Latinos in proportionatelygreater numbers than most non-Latinos, and proposed policies that represented Latino immigra-tion concerns. H.R. 4849, the Equal Rights for Health Care Act, sponsored by RepresentativeLaura Richardson (D-CA), sought to prohibit discriminatory healthcare practices, and wouldhave disproportionately benefited vulnerable populations like Latinos. H.R. 1031, the MinorityDiabetes Initiative Act, sponsored by Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA), sought grants forpublic and nonprofit healthcare providers to treat diabetes in minority communities. This proposalwould also impact Latinos in proportionately greater numbers compared with more privilegedgroups, and offered services that would positively impact Latinos. Although benefits of policy
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proposals in these and similar bills would not apply exclusively to Latinos, each clearly met thecriteria of being a Latino Interest Bill.
A pair of examples helps to illustrate the contrasting category, Anti-Latino Interest Bills. H.R.769, the National Language Act of 2007, sponsored by Representative Peter King (R-NY), soughtto establish English as the official language of the United States and, among other provisions thatwould have had negative consequences for language minorities, repeal provisions of the VotingRights Act ensuring ballot access in languages other than English. Latinos would clearlybe impacted negatively and disproportionately by such legislation relative to most Americans.H.R. 133, the Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, sponsored by Representative Elton Gallegly(R-CA), would have eliminated birthright citizenship for children born in the United States ifat least one parent did not have permanent resident or citizenship status. Again Latinos wouldhave been negatively and disproportionately impacted by such legislation.
In all, 215 Latino Interest Bills, and 78 Anti-Latino Interest Bills were identified within thepopulation of bills sponsored. A diagnostic analysis of the coding of Latino Interest Bills andAnti-Latino Interest Bills produced an alpha reliability score of 0.95 between the dataset and arandom sample of 529 bills (5% of the sample) coded by a graduate research assistant, confirmingthe accuracy of the coding scheme.
Table 1 displays patterns of Latino Interest Bill sponsorship and Anti-Latino Interest Billsponsorship by issue topic. The subject matter addressed by Latino interest and Anti-Latino inter-est legislation was characterized by both commonalities and contrasts. In areas of civil rights,equal economic opportunity, and immigration, for example, Latino Interest and Anti-Latino Inter-est Bills offered diametrically opposed positions on issues including voting rights, affirmativeaction, and the language accessibility of government services. Similarly, on immigration,Latino Interest Bills outlined comprehensive plans, and emphasized humanitarian concerns,while Anti-Latino Interest Bills emphasized restrictive, enforcement-oriented proposals, andsought to criminalize undocumented persons.
By contrast, almost no Anti-Latino interest legislation appeared opposite programmaticefforts that would expand programs in areas like education, health, and housing that would dis-proportionately benefit Latinos relative to most other groups. Symbolic tributes on Latino issueswere also one-sidedly Latino interest. Overall, then, while vastly different policy proposalscharacterized the legislative treatment of immigrants, and issues of civil rights, discrimination,and employment opportunity, efforts to enhance programs to meet social welfare needs of the dis-advantaged, or pay tribute to the symbolic interests of Latinos, faced little oppositional equivalentin bills sponsored during the 110th Congress.
Table 1. Latino Interest Bills and Anti-Latino Interest Bills by issue area, 110th Congress.
Issue Latino Interest Bills Anti-Latino Interest Bills
Civil rights 12 6Equal economic opportunity 16 13Education 35 1Health 59 1Housing 8 0Immigration 37 50Symbolic tributes 45 7Other issues 3 0Total Bills 215 78
Source: 110th Congress legislative data as coded by the author
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Modeling the influence of Latino staffers on legislative agenda-setting
The following analysis examines legislative agenda-setting on Latino interests using four depen-dent variables: Latino Interest Bill, Symbolic Latino Interest Bill, Substantive Latino Interest Bill,and Anti-Latino Interest Bill. Symbolic Latino Interest Bill and Substantive Latino Interest Billreflect a simple division of Latino Interest Bills into symbolic and substantive categories.These dependent variables are operationalized as the proportions of bills in bill sponsors’ legis-lative portfolios that fit within each category, and were derived by dividing the number of billsrepresentatives sponsored in each category by the total number of bills sponsored by the represen-tative. Representatives constitute the unit of analysis, and OLS regression is used to estimate billproportions. Although other methodologies were explored in order to verify the robustness of thefindings presented below, OLS is the preferred method for assessing the relationship betweenLatino staffers and Latino interest agenda-setting because the outcome estimated reflects theextent to which Latino interest issues were a focus of each representative’s activity as a billsponsor.5
To identify Latino staffers, all 6930 personal office staffers listed in the Spring 2007 US Houseof Representatives Telephone Directory were coded by Spanish surname and staff position (Miller2007). The use of Spanish surname lists to identify persons of Latino descent has been employedto collect data for numerous purposes, including the US Census (Word and Perkins 1996). Whilenot a foolproof method for identifying Latinos, Word and Perkins (1996) suggest that classifi-cations of ethnicity using Spanish surname lists are relatively accurate. For example, morethan 92% of householders with 12 common Spanish surnames6 self-identified as Hispanic indata drawn from the 1990 Census. Conversely, less than 1% of householders with 12 commonnon-Spanish surnames7 self-identified as Hispanic in the same set of data (Word and Perkins1996). Error appears more likely with regard to women staffers, who may be falsely identifiedif they are non-Latinas married to Latinos, or Latinas married to non-Latinos. Staffers withLatina mothers and non-Latino fathers may also be falsely identified as non-Latino. Given thepossible misidentification of both Latinos and non-Latinos in the data, it is unlikely that thedata are substantially biased in any direction, although they may lack some efficiency due to error.
In all, 632 Latino staffers were identified. Of these, 99 were legislative staffers. Table 2 illus-trates the average numbers of Latino staffers by the party and ethnicity of representatives. Slightlymore than a third of all Latino staffers and Latino legislative staffers worked for Latino membersof Congress, and close to three-quarters of Latino staffers and Latino legislative staffers workedfor Democrats. Every Latino representative employed at least one Latino staffer, and 20 of 26employed at least one Latino legislative staffer.8 On average, Latino representatives employedmore than eight times the number of Latino staffers employed by non-Latino representatives.Democrats employed twice as many Latino staffers as Republicans. While 222 non-Latino repre-sentatives employed at least one Latino staffer, and 98 non-Latino representatives employed mul-tiple Latino staffers, 186 non-Latino representatives (107 Republicans and 79 Democrats)
Table 2. Average number of Latino staffers by rep. ethnicity and party, 110th Congress.
Latino Dem.(n = 22)
Latino GOP(n = 4)
Non-Latino Dem.(n = 212)
Non-Latino GOP(n = 196)
Latinos, all staff positions 8.09 10.75 1.31 0.68(2.74) (6.70) (1.54) (0.95)
Latino legislative staffers 1.36 1.50 0.21 0.10(1.00) (1.00) (0.45) (0.31)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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employed no Latino staffers at all. Still, sizeable numbers of Latino staffers in a number of non-Latino and Republican offices suggest robust comparison of their influence across offices shouldbe possible.
The three key independent variables in the following analysis are Latino Legislative Staff,Latino Representative, and the interaction term Latino Leg. Staff*Latino Rep. The variableLatino Legislative Staff reflects the proportion of legislative staffers in an office who wereLatino. Values for Latino Legislative Staff ranged from zero to 1, with a mean of 0.06 and standarddeviation of 0.15. Latino Representative is a dummy variable indicating whether the legislator forwhom staffers worked was Latino.9 Latino Leg. Staff*Latino Rep. is an interaction of the previousroot variables. While the expected relationship between Latino interest agendas and both LatinoLegislative Staff and Latino Representative is positive, coefficients for these variables must beinterpreted in the context of the interaction term. The Latino Representative variable reflectsthe effect of representative ethnicity when the value of Latino Legislative Staff was zero, andthe Latino Legislative Staff variable reflects the effect of these staffers in the offices of non-Latino representatives. Finally, if the influence of Latino Legislative Staff was positively con-ditioned by whether staffers worked in offices of Latinos, as expected, the coefficients for theinteractive variable will be positive and significant.
Each model also includes the independent variable Latino non-Legislative Staff. Latino non-Legislative Staff reflects the proportion of non-legislative staffers in an office who were Latino.Values for Latino non-Legislative Staff ranged from zero to 0.92, with a mean of 0.09 and standarddeviation of 0.15. Non-legislative staffers occupy a range of positions, including chief of staff,press secretary, district director, staff assistant, constituency correspondent, and caseworker pos-itions. While these positions vary with regard to their prestige and resources, they are generallynot oriented toward policy responsiveness. Therefore, no relationship is expected between thisvariable and Latino interest agenda-setting. This variable is particularly important because ithelps to control for the possibility that associations between Latino interest agenda-setting andLatino staff are endogenous to representative preferences. If the relationship between Latinostaff and Latino Interest Bill sponsorship was spurious, and endogenous to representative prefer-ences, Latino legislative and non-legislative staff would be expected to predict Latino Interest Billsponsorship in comparable ways.10
Whether the representative was a Democrat11 was modeled based on previous research thatshows party sometimes affects support for Latino interests (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Knoll2009). Female Representative was modeled based on findings that female representatives maybe more supportive than male representatives of some policies, like social welfare programs,that often overlap with Latino interests (Swers 2002). Similarly, whether the bill sponsor was aBlack Representative is also controlled for because black interests sometimes overlap withthose of Latinos (Lublin 1997). These variables12 are expected to share positive relationshipswith Latino interest agendas and negative associations with anti-Latino interest agendas.
Finally, three characteristics of congressional districts13 appear in the following analysis:Latino Population, Black Population14 and Constituency Conservatism,15 gauged by electoralsupport for President Bush in 2004. Latino interest agendas should vary positively with thesize of Latino populations given past evidence that Latino Interest Bill sponsorship behavior isgenerally responsive to Latino constituency demands, while anti-Latino interest agendasshould vary negatively with Latino population (Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010). Given that Latinointerests overlap with many African American interests, similar relationships are expected forthis variable. But given that many Latino interest positions run contrary to conservative policypreferences, Constituency Conservatism should be negatively associated with Latino interestagenda-setting, and positively associated with anti-Latino interest agenda setting.
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Findings
Results of OLS regression analyses suggest that Latino staffers influenced Latino interestagenda-setting in the 110th Congress. Results also suggest that their significant influence wasobserved primarily on legislation that represented Latino interests symbolically. And resultsshow that while Latino legislative staffers affected Latino interest agenda-setting on symbolicpolicy initiatives in offices of both Latinos and non-Latinos, the influence of Latino legislativestaffers was greater in offices of Latino representatives. Given that the typical office housed 3.33legislative staffers, increasing the number of Latino legislative staffers by one would have beenassociated, on average, with an increase of 0.031 in the proportion of a Latino representative’slegislative agenda that represented Latino interests symbolically, and an increase of 0.005 in theproportion of a non-Latino representative’s legislative agenda that represented Latino interestssymbolically.
Findings also suggest that Latino legislative staffers play something akin to a supplementaryrole with regard to Latino interest agenda-setting in offices of Latino representatives. While sub-stantive Latino interest items occupied a larger share of Latino representatives’ legislativeagendas than non-Latino representatives’ legislative agendas, even if they employed no Latinolegislative staffers, this was not the case with regard to symbolic Latino interest agendas. Thisfinding is somewhat surprising given the political importance and expedience of symbolic respon-siveness to key constituencies. Assuming that symbolic Latino Interest Bills provide relatively
Table 3. Latino staffers and Latino interest agenda-setting, 110th Congress.
Latino Interest Bills
OLS regression All Symbolic Substantive Anti-Latino Interest
Latino legislative staff 0.025 0.016 + 0.010 –0.008(0.021) (0.007) (0.018) (0.014)
Latino non-legislative staff –0.017 –0.008 –0.009 –0.008(0.028) (0.009) (0.023) (0.018)
Latino representative 0.053 + 0.000 0.053* 0.002(0.022) (0.007) (0.018) (0.014)
Latino leg. staff*Latino rep. 0.131* 0.104* 0.027 0.002(0.043) (0.014) (0.036) (0.028)
Democrat –0.005 –0.003 –0.002 –0.014*(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Female representative 0.000 –0.002 0.002 0.003(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Black representative 0.000 0.006 –0.006 –0.005(0.014) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Latino population 0.090* 0.020 + 0.068* 0.001(0.027) (0.009) (0.022) (0.017)
Black population 0.028 –0.006 0.034 0.014(0.027) (0.009) (0.023) (0.017)
Constituency conservatism –0.001 + 0.000 –0.000* 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.031 0.007 0.024 0.011(0.018) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012)
Number of observations 434 434 434 434F-Statistic 26.6 36.2 16.7 2.60Adjusted R2 0.37 0.45 0.27 0.04
Note: +p < 0.05; *p < 0.01; two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses.
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costless ways to reach out to and represent Latinos, the positive influence of Latino legislativestaffers on symbolic Latino interest agenda-setting appears especially beneficial to the needs ofLatino representatives in demonstrating responsiveness to Latinos (Table 3).
The fact that Latino non-legislative staffers had no impact on legislative agendas strengthens theargument that the significant effects of Latino legislative stafferswere real, rather than spurious. If therelationship between Latino staffers and Latino Interest Bill sponsorship was merely endogenous torepresentative preferences, similar effects for both Latino legislative and non-legislative staff shouldhave been observed. Overall, then, these results indicate that Latino legislative staffers influencedlegislative agendas, and suggest that Latino staffers may enhance policy responsiveness to Latinos.
Latino interest agenda-setting was also positively associated with Latino population pro-portion. On average, a 10-percentage point increase in the proportion of the population thatwas Latino was associated with an increase of nearly 0.01 in the proportion of legislativeagendas that addressed Latino interests, an increase of 0.002 in the proportion of legislativeinitiatives that addressed Latino interests symbolically, and an increase of 0.007 in the proportionof Latino interests that addressed Latino interests substantively. Constituency conservatism hadsignificant but very small negative effects on Latino interest agenda-setting generally, and withregard to substantive Latino interest policy proposals specifically.
In contrast to Latino interest agenda-setting, Anti-Latino interest agenda-setting was bestexplained by political party. Being a Democrat was associated with a reduction of 0.014 in theproportion of legislative agendas advancing anti-Latino interest proposals, consistent with thefact that these bills generally reflected “conservative” proposals on Latino issues. Latino legisla-tive staff presence was negatively, but insignificantly associated with this type of legislativeagenda-setting. No other independent variables reached significance. Importantly, Latino repre-sentatives sponsored no Anti-Latino Interest Bills during the 110th Congress, although this wasalso the case with the vast majority of their colleagues.
Conclusion
The relationships observed here between Latino interest agenda-setting and the representation ofLatinos on congressional staffs have interesting implications for literatures on Latino represen-tation, congressional staff, and congressional agenda-setting. The fact that the composition of leg-islative staffs was associated with the content of legislative agendas suggests legislative staffers arenot simply “clerks” who serve relatively interchangeably as assistants to members of Congress.Instead, legislative staffers appear to influence the legislative agendas of the representativesthey serve and, by virtue of this influence, an important aspect of policy responsiveness. Thisfinding is important because previous research has produced little systematic empirical evidencethat staffers shape policy-making in Congress, or that policy responsiveness to minority constitu-encies is associated with representation of minority groups among the ranks of congressional staff.
The facts that the relationship between Latino staffers and Latino interest agenda-setting wasrelated to the positions occupied by Latino staffers and conditioned by the offices in which Latinostaffers served, along with the finding that the relationship between Latino legislative staffers andLatino interest agenda-setting differed for substantive and symbolic legislative agendas, confirmseveral expectations about the opportunity structures theorized to shape the relationship(Rosenthal and Bell 2002; 2003). The representation of Latinos among legislative staff appearsmore critical to patterns of agenda-setting than the representation of Latinos among non-legislative staff. The relationship between Latino staffers and Latino interest agenda-settingappears greater in offices of Latinos than non-Latinos. And Latino legislative staffers were associ-ated with significantly increased Latino interest legislative efforts that were symbolic in the officesof both Latino and non-Latino representatives. These findings are interesting because they suggest
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that Latino legislative staffers exercise significant influence over legislative agendas in diverseoffice settings.
Some may interpret findings that Latino staffers influence symbolic legislative efforts mostsignificantly as evidence that their effect on policy responsiveness is relatively unimportant.But previous research refutes such interpretations. Tate (2003, 98–99) argues that symbolic legis-lation can provide political cover, initiate and augment larger legislative agendas, persuade col-leagues in Congress to embrace core principles on policy, cultivate executive policy support,and address group concerns that might otherwise be ignored. Aside from resolutions thatprovide political cover, Tate describes symbolic policy as a “way to distribute nonmaterialpublic goods to constituents” (100). The group pride and social inclusion associated with sym-bolic tributes is not unimportant from the perspective of groups whose interests have been histori-cally ignored, neglected, and excluded in policy processes. Symbolic Latino interest legislationsends the empowering message that Latinos matter to the fabric of American society, and alsobrings broader social recognition to Latino concerns, accomplishments, and goals. The roleLatino legislative staffers play in placing such initiatives on legislative agendas may have impor-tant effects on policy responsiveness to Latinos when viewed from this perspective.
While the research here shows evidence consistent with a relationship between legislativestaffers and policy responsiveness, it is important to note that individual-level responsivenessdoes not automatically translate into institutional-level responsiveness in the form of policyoutputs. Agenda-setting opens critical opportunities for policy-making, but cannot guaranteepolicy change. Important directions for future research on Latino staffers, and the influence ofcongressional staff more generally, must expand the examination of staff influence to other impli-cations in the policy process in order to gain fuller appreciation of the relationship between staffcomposition and policy responsiveness. Still, like many studies of descriptive representation thatexamine bill sponsorship, roll call voting, and other isolated indicators of responsiveness, thefindings here strongly suggest that staff composition matters in substantive ways.
Finally, the results of this analysis have interesting normative implications for questions aboutresponsiveness and accountability. Some may argue that the influence of non-elected officials onlegislative agendas in Congress raises major issues for congressional accountability. After all,congressional staffers have no direct mandate to act on behalf of the public. If staffers influencelegislative agendas, what mechanisms exist to ensure that legislation reflects the public will?Scenarios in which staffers influence the substance of legislation to serve special interestsrather than the public interest are easy to imagine, and tempting to entertain.
There are reasons, however, to believe that representation by congressional staffers has morepotential to improve congressional responsiveness to the public interest than to pervert it. First,the fact that the relationship identified here was associated more with symbolic than substantivelegislation suggests that elected officials maintain significant authority over substantive policyagenda-setting. Certainly, anecdotal examples of powerful staffers influencing major legislationexist, but this analysis provides little evidence that Latino legislative staffers significantlyaffect substantive policy agendas in systematic ways.
More important is the real possibility that representation of groups like Latinos on legislativestaffs brings a diversity of perspectives to Congress that the institution continues to lack when itcomes to elected officials, as previous work suggests (Canon 1999; Rosenthal and Bell 2002;2003). While staffers probably cannot replace the well-established influence of either descriptiverepresentatives or friendly partisans on policy responsiveness to Latinos, Latino legislative staf-fers may broaden the scope of policy initiative and responsiveness by increasing the presence ofLatino interests on policy agendas. This is a good thing for responsiveness to marginalized groupslike Latinos. Representatives, after all, should not only choose staffers who will serve them withloyalty and with the assumption that they serve constituent interests in deference to democratic
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mechanisms of accountability. They should also choose staffers who enable responsiveness tolarger numbers of constituents, and make them better representatives. Findings of this studysuggest that for Latino representatives and non-Latino representatives alike, Latino legislativestaff may help shape responsiveness to rapidly growing Latino constituencies in desirable ways.
Notes1. The motivation for this study springs from questions raised by my observations as a congressional
staffer. As a former APSA congressional fellow in the office of a prominent Latino congressman,and assistant to his Congressional Hispanic Caucus liaison, I spent substantial time working on“Latino issues,” and observing and thinking about the roles of Latino representatives in representingLatinos. My interactions with congressional staffers, many of whom were Latino, raised similar ques-tions about whether staffer ethnicity affects representation or the legislative process.
2. Replication data will be made available on request by the author. Observations of sponsorships byCharles Norwood (R-GA), who died in February 2007, and who did not substantially participate inlegislative activities during the 110th Congress, are not considered in this analysis.
3. Organizations representing Latino policy interests do so with relative consistency regarding policy pri-orities and positions. Organization websites consulted for this research include those of the NationalHispanic Leadership Agenda, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Leagueof United Latin American Citizens, the National Council of La Raza, the Cuban American NationalCouncil, and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund.
4. Clearly, the interests of Latinos are not monolithic, and substantial variation characterizes Latino atti-tudes and interests both within and across subgroups. While my judgments largely conform to ideo-logical positions on Latinos issues, the designations of Latino Interest and Anti-Latino Interestreflect something like a “majority consensus” among Latinos on these issues. Additionally, becausethe definition employed in this analysis is broad and, therefore, likely to conflate policies that affectLatinos to different degrees, and vary regarding the strength and distribution of Latino preferences,one may reasonably question whether all Latino Interest Bills are “equal.” The most likely result isthat this inclusive coding scheme stacks the deck in favor of null findings. Still, I believe it offers avalid, reliable, and replicable measure of legislative efforts to provide policy responsiveness to Latinos.
5. Scholars often use count models, such as negative binomial regression models, to explore bill sponsor-ship behaviors (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair 2003), and logistic regression models ofbill characteristics to explore legislative agenda-setting (Krutz 2005). Because representatives’ legis-lative activities vary wildly (numbers of bill sponsorships in the data examined here range from 2 forBill Young (R-FL) to 92 for Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX)), bill counts are a problematicmeasure for assessing legislative agenda-setting. Because staffers work within offices, it makes bettersense to assess their influence on individual legislative agendas than the institutional agenda as awhole. It should be noted, however, that other methodological approaches using identical modelswere explored, including negative binomial regression to examine counts of Latino Interest Bills spon-sored, and logistic regression to estimate the likelihood that average bills addressed Latino interestissues. These models revealed results for coefficient size and significance that were comparable tothose presented in the manuscript, suggesting that the findings are robust.
6. The common Spanish surnames were: Garcia, Martinez, Rodriguez, Lopez, Hernandez, Gonzalez,Perez, Sanchez, Rivera, Ramirez, Torres, and Gonzales.
7. The common non-Spanish surnames were: Smith, Johnson, Williams, Brown, Jones, Davis, Miller,Wilson, Anderson, Moore, Taylor, and Thomas.
8. The six Latino representatives who did not employ a Latino on their legislative staffs during the periodin question were Jose Serrano (D-NY), Grace Napolitano (D-CA), Jim Costa (D-CA), Devin Nunes(R-CA), Ed Pastor (D-AZ) and Henry Cuellar (D-TX).
9. Twenty-six Latino representatives (22 Democrats and four Republicans) served during the 110th Con-gress. Because the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) recognized two Democrats of Portuguesedescent as full members, these representatives, and one Republican representative of Portuguesedescent, are included in this count.
10. Separate analyses of Latino interest agenda-setting (not shown) demonstrated that the effects of Latinorepresentation in each non-legislative staff category listed here on Latino Interest Bill sponsorship wereinsignificant, as was the effect of an interaction term that multiplied Latino non-LegislativeStaff*Latino Rep.
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11. This variable is a dichotomous variable. Co-linearity between party and ideology (measured byDW-NOMINATE scores) prevented the inclusion of the latter in these models.
12. Race and gender variables were coded dichotomously by the author.13. The percentage of district population that was urban was examined in separate analyses (not shown),
but did not affect results significantly or substantially alter the magnitude or significance of othercoefficients.
14. Latino and Black population data are measured as population proportions, and derived from the USCensus, American Community Survey estimates for 2005. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) diagnosticsdemonstrate that correlation between Latino population and Latino representative does not pose a stab-ility problem in the analyses presented.
15. Data on Constituency Conservatism reflect the percentage of the vote received by President Bush, andwas obtained from the Almanac of American Politics, 2006, by Michael Barone and Richard Cohen(2005).
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