Department of International Relations FHSS, Bond University, Queensland, AustraliaLatin America R. James Ferguson © 2006

Week 1:

An Introduction to Latin America in the Global System: Places, Themes, Legacies and Uneven Development

Topics: -1. Terminology and Geography2. Themes and Places3. Moving Past the Colonial Legacy?4. Independence and Nationalism5. The Early International System6. Crises of Social Order and Development7. Bibliography, Further Reading and Resources

1. Terminology and Geography

'Latin America' specifically comprises Mexico, and the countries of South and Central America that have a Spanish or Portuguese cultural influence. More loosely, however, it can also include some 32 countries in South America, Mesoamerica (Central and Middle America) and the Caribbean (Moran 1987, p3). In this subject, we will be looking at the interaction of Latin American nations among each other, regionally in the 'Western hemisphere' (comprising North and South America), in new inter-regional interactions with North America, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific region, and the place of Latin America in the international system during a period of rapid globalisation. Latin America comprises one of the most important regions of the world, interacting intensely with North America and Europe, and comprising a major test case for democratisation, neo-liberal economics, and for new strategies in the developing world (for one view, see Comeau 2003). Although some of these states have emerged as major powers, e.g. Brazil, overall perhaps only 15-20% of the population can afford a 'first world' life style (Petras 1999), with a lower tier too poor to gain benefits from current globalisation trends. Latin America has demonstrated considerable evolution both in regional institutional building, as well as in grass-root strategies designed to empower ordinary individuals. At the same time, the challenges of inequality and poverty, as well as the legacies of violent political confrontation remain very strong in many of countries (see Ferranti 2004 & Schneider 2000). As a result, some of these countries have democracies which function unevenly, marked to some degree by limited rule of law, or by highly divided classes and communities, e.g. as in Venezuela through 2003-2006 (for background see Foweraker & Krzarnic 2002).

In this area, there are dangers in terminology. 'Hispanic', for example, is no longer a favoured term among some Latin Americans, since it sometimes infers that these cultures are little more than a reflection of Spanish culture, and also does not include Brazil and Portuguese influences. Likewise, people in Latin America and within the United States object that it is an umbrella word that is not precise enough to indicate either ethnicity or identity, while others specifically use the term to indicate a Spanish, rather than Amerindian or African origin (see Hamilton 2001). Thus writers

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'such as Gloria Anzaldua, Sandra Cisneros and Denise Chavez are on record as being strongly and proudly "Latina" -not "Hispanic"' (Hamilton 2001). In this subject we will look at major countries which have had a strong 'Hispanic' tradition, e.g. in Mexico and Colombia, but also look at Brazil with its strong Portuguese legacy. It is important to note that these countries now have a unique tradition influenced by indigenous peoples, plus European, African and contemporary American influences. In many cases it is better to look at the specifics of national or local societies, e.g. Chilean cultures, which are different in many ways from either Mexican or Venezuelan culture. Likewise, it is important not to generalise worst case conditions or patterns to the entire region, though some partially shared historical, developmental and regional experiences will be outlined (lectures 1-2, 9-12). In other weeks we will look at particular countries and issues in detail (lectures 3-8).

Latin America, showing borders with United States (courtesy PCL Map Library)

The region is geographically dominated by the Andean mountain chain and by several highland plateaus in Mexico, the Guianan and Brazilian plateaus, as well as by river systems of the Amazon and Parana-Paraguay rivers (Moran 1987, p5). The climate of the region is very diverse: alongside jungles, deserts and snow clad mountains, there are also savannas and temperate tablelands. The resources of the region as a whole are

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vast, including oil, gas, minerals, rainforests, and expanding ranch-lands that have both led to a scramble for resource access as well as leaving considerable environmental management problems for most of these nations. Human, social, intellectual and cultural resources are also very diverse, as well shall see.

2. Themes and Places

There will not be enough time to look at all the countries, institutions and issues that affect Latin America in the international system. Instead, the subject lectures and seminars will sample some of the major countries and central themes, providing a backbone of ideas and approaches. In later lectures we will look at Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, and Brazil in some detail, and at Chile from the point of view of democratisation processes. Major themes will include current economic development, democratic and political systems, regional cooperation, environmental impact, Andean cultures, relations with the United States and Europe, new institutional structures and diplomatic initiatives, current strategic issues, and the future prospects of Latin America. These lecture themes can be seen in the subject outline: -

1) An Introduction to Latin America in the Global System: Places and Themes

2) Latin America: From Colonisation to Nationalism to Globalisation

3) Mexico in Progress and Crisis: From Cortés to NAFTA

4) Cuba: Revolution, Resistance, and Globalisation

5) Colombia and the Paradox of Intervention

6) Brazil: An Emerging, Revisionist ‘Great Power’?

7) The Struggle for Democracy: Chile and Argentina

8) The Shifting Pattern of US-Latin American Relations (Guest Lecturer)

9) Regional Organisations and Political Regionalism: The Hemispheric Dream

10) From Mercosur to Free Trade Areas

11) The Latin American Search for Foreign Policy and Security in the 21st Century

12) The Quest for Stability: From Dependence to Interdependence

3. Moving Past the Colonial Legacy?

Latin America today is still largely shaped by its unique history and economic development. To understand contemporary political, economic, social and strategic trends, some background information is needed. It was during the 19th century that the

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nations of Latin America were formed, but carried forward social legacies from the past. We will not try to cover this in detail, but a timeline and a few key themes will act as an introduction to contemporary Latin America. We will look a little more closely at the history of Mexico, Cuba, Colombia and Brazil later in the subject. The Amerindian and indigenous culture, with its rich history, will also be touched on briefly in later lectures, especially in connection to current political and developmental challenges.

Timeline (Post European contact, 1415-1889, adapted from Slatta 2000)

Exploration and Conquest, 1492-1550: 1415-60 Prince Henry the Navigator opens the great Portuguese "Age of Exploration" 1492 Columbus makes landfall in the Bahamas on October 12 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas divides the New World between Spain & Portugal 1500 Pedro Alvares Cabral claims the Brazilian "hump" for Portugal 1507 A German cartographer publishes a map of the New World, using the name America in honour of Amerigo Vespucci (1454-1512) 1519-22 Cortez enters, lays siege to, and conquers Aztec capital Tenochtitlan 1532 Pizarro captures Atahualpa, ending the Inca Empire 1535 Maya defeat and force out all Spaniards from the Yucatan 1540 Pedro de Valdivia begins the conquest of Chile

Colonial Era, 1550-1800: 1524 Council of the Indies established to help administer the new colonies 1536 Pedro de Mendoza founds Buenos Aires 1540 Francisco Vasquez de Coronado explores north from Mexico to the Great Plains 1609 Spanish establish Santa Fe, New Mexico 1680-92 Massive Pueblo revolt drives Spaniards out of northern frontier 1697 Last of the Maya defeated by Spaniards 1767 Society of Jesus (Jesuits) expelled from Spanish America 1780-81 Indian revolt led by Tupac Amaru in Upper Peru 1781 Comuero Revolt in Colombia 1791-1804 Slave revolt on French island of Saint-Dominigue (Haiti) leads to independence 1793-1815 Napoleonic Wars disrupt political rule in Europe

Beginning of Independence:1807 King John and his court flees to Brazil to escape Napoleon's invading armies in Portugal 1808 Napoleon Bonaparte installs his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne 1810 Creoles establish ruling juntas in Carcas, Venezuela, Santiago, Chile, Buenos Aires, Argentina; Hidalgo's "Grito de Dolores" in Mexico 1811 Venezuela and Paraguay declare independence from Spain; Hidalgo killed and replaced by Morelos; José Gervasio Artigas leads battle for Uruguayan independence 1815 Bolívar forced to retreat to the island of Jamaica 1816 Argentina declares independence 1818 Chile declares independence 1821 Iturbide declares Mexico independent with his Plan of Iguala 1822 San Martín and Bolívar meet a Guayaquil, Ecuador; the former departs for France and self-imposed exile; King Pedro declares Brazil independent from Portugal 1823 US issues the Monroe Doctrine warning against recolonization of the newly independent Spanish American republics 1824 Last patriot victories against the Spaniards: Bolívar at Junín in August and Sucre at Ayacucho in December; Pedro writes a new Brazilian constitution 1825 Bolivia declares independence

Aftermath of Independence, 1826-1860s: 1828 British force a settlement of the war between Argentina and Brazil over the "Banda Oriental." This long-contested land becomes newly independent Uruguay.

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1829 Venezuela leaves "Gran Colombia" 1830 Ecuador leaves "Gran Colombia"; Bolívar dies preparing to go into exile 1830s Rise of caudillos, self-interested military dictators backed by private armies 1831-1844 Pedro I forced to abdicate. Brazil ruled by committee--the Regency--a time of political fragmentation 1844-89 King Pedro II rules Brazil

Several unusual impulses need to be considered in the European view of the 'New World'. As we all know, Christopher Columbus (= Cristoforo Colombo = Cristóbal Colón) had headed westwards in the hope of finding a new route to India, the East Indies, China and Japan. Instead, from 1492 he helped open up a new continent to European expansion. Although at first viewed as less lucrative than the goal of India and the East Indies trade, Portuguese and Spanish conquests in the Americas were driven by several factors: -

* Access to removable wealth including gold, silver and slaves. In time, the wealth of agricultural land also became central, with the creation of vast plantations and ranches. Thus 'the mines of Mexico and Peru produced only one quarter of the wealth produced by agriculture and cattle ranching', even at their height (Fuentes 1992, p156). Yet this value could only be realised with the use of cheap labour, and at first this was done through encomienda and then the repartimientos grants, whereby Indian inhabitants were tied to land as labourers (Williamson 1992, pp14-15; Fuentes 1992, p131). Eventually these grants became private property, leading to the hacienda system, with workers often being tied to these large estates through debt peonage (Fuentes 1992, p135; discussed further in lecture 3).

* The geopolitical contest of powers, including rivalry among Spanish, Portuguese, British, French and Dutch interests. European powers competed to enrich themselves and therefore gain more dominance back in Europe, as well as for strategic ports and colonies. From the 19th century onwards emerging American powers, including the United States, Brazil and Mexico, would seek to limit and moderate European political influence achieving their at times tenuous independence (see below).

* The interests of the Catholic Church in the conversion and 'education' of native Americans. Christianity, for good and bad, was one of the main shapers of colonial experience in Latin America. A major debate soon emerged among different Christian orders: some argued that the Indians were innocent humans with rational souls ready for conversion (as thought by Father Bartolomé de Las Casas), others denied that they had true souls and following a line of thought that goes back to Aristotle suggesting that they were fit only for conquest and enslavement (Hanke 1959; Fuentes 1992, p125, p130). Catholicism also became one of the contested patterns of

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identity in many Latin American communities, to be challenged in diverse settings by revolutionary rationalism, modernism, nationalism and Protestantism (for resurgent indigenous voices I the 21st century, see Cleary 2005).

* An important early trend was also utopian idealism, hoping that this new continent would offer a paradise of plenty and harmonious social relations (Fuentes 1992, p8). This utopian trend also included images of the 'noble savage', as well as experiments in utopian social villages in Mexico, e.g. the efforts of a Fransiscan bishop to create communal Christian villages among the Tarascan Indians (Fuentes 1992, p134). In Brazil, Jesuits missions protected natives under the idea that Europeanisation need not precede Christian education, and their missions protected these people from enslavement from the 16th century down till the early 17th century, but these towns were raided extensively during the 'just war' of the late 16th century, and was intensified after the Jesuit expulsion from Portuguese (1759) and Spanish (1763) lands (Hudson 1997). This 'invention' of a better place (Fuentes 1992, p125) would form part of the founding myths of the United States, but also influenced images of Brazil and Latin America as a whole. The contrast between North and South American culture would in part be due to different visions of political and social order that would shape their societies and economies in divergent ways (see Véliz 1994).

* The was a pressing need for land and resources for an expanding population, a burgeoning middle and trade class, and land for people within Europe who saw emigration as an escape from poverty. This would in part explain (but not justify) the oppressive treatment of indigenous people, and the appropriation of their land at every opportunity. Political elites also needed wealth to maintain their power and enhance status, while the Spanish and Portuguese crowns sought to enhance their national power through rich colonies. Spain already had the model of conquest and appropriation from their conflict with the Moors (see Fuentes 1992).

* Massive migrations of people into the Americas, the first from Asia (probably over land bridges connecting Siberia and Alaska) probably between 15-12,000 B.C., though some controversial archaeological data has suggested possible earlier dates. The second wave of migration began from 1492, first from Europe, and then forcibly from Africa. Certain aspects of these migrations would have long term effects, shaping the culture of Latin America today: -

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a) The arrival of the Amerindians into the Americas remains only partially charted. It has been suggested that about 14,500 thousand years ago their ancestors crossed over from northeast Asia, then travelled south, gradually exploring and settling as they went. The oldest, date-confirmed finds are about 11,500 years old, but some scientists suggest that the arrival date might have to be pushed back as far as 20,000 years, with migrants using boats rather than crossing on land bridges (see Wright 1999). Numerous different cultures would evolve, some largely based on advanced hunter-gatherer structures, others on more sedentary agricultural systems (as in the Aztec, Maya and Inca). This was not static: change, conquest, and migration occurred within these indigenous cultures, e.g. the arrival of the Mexica (Aztec) into the valley of Mexico and the spread of the Chibchas, Arawaks and Caribs (Hanratty & Meditz 1988) into parts of Colombia.

b) Migration of Europeans was largely shaped by the political control of the territories by the imperial powers. This led to a largely 'Hispanic culture' in much of Latin America, but with Portuguese culture shaping Brazil, while British and French culture influencing North America and parts of the Caribbean. This division between an Anglo-American north and a Hispanic/Luso-Brazilian south is an important cultural divide (Véliz 1994) that remains even today as a factor in foreign affairs and identity politics.

c) From 1518 African slaves were brought into the Americas as labourers, mostly for plantations. Over the next three centuries, they would form the mainstay of many colonial economies (e.g. in Cuba and Brazil), with some 3.5 million coming in during this period (Fuentes 1992, p197). Afro-Americans soon became much more than a source of forced labour. As noted by Carlos Fuentes:

There was hardly an aspect of labour and life in the New World that was not marked by the black culture. In Brazil, which began importing slaves from 1538, blacks helped explore and conquer the interior. Black regiments under black leaders fought the Dutch and defended Rio de Janeiro against the French. They were essential to the conquest, settlement, and development of Brazil. They also rebelled. (Fuentes 1992, p198)

Thus slaves were not merely passive victims. Numerous rebellions were attempted, slave ships were on occasion taken control of by their prisoners, in Brazil they created their own independent town (Palmares) in

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the late 17th century away from Portuguese settlement (eventually crushed), and in Haiti their rebellion led in 1804 to the creation of 'the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere and the first free black republic in the world.' (Haggerty 1989) Soon a growing free Afro-American and mixed population would develop in countries such as Cuba and Brazil, becoming professionals, poets, musicians, nationalists and sometimes revolutionaries. These trends would have numerous implications for the identity, culture and current social forces within Latin America as a whole (discussed further in the Cuba and Brazil lectures).

4. Independence and Nationalism

Various factors aided and hindered the emergence of independent nation-states in Latin America. The independence movement would become strong in the early 19th

century, and after wars with loyalist and Spanish forces eventually create new nations. Independence would be recognised by Spain for Mexico (1836), Ecuador (1840), Chile (1844), Venezuela (1845), Bolivia (1847), Nicaragua (1851), Argentina (1858), Costa Rica (1859), Guatemala (1863), Peru (1863), El Salvador (1865), Paraguay (1880), Colombia (1881), Uruguay (1882), Honduras (1894), with Brazil establishing its independence from Portugal by 1822 (August 1999, p45).

The path towards nationhood, however, was turbulent, and shaped by a number of factors. These include: -

* The role of caudillos or military chiefs (Fuentes 1992, p38), who often resisted centralising impulses and fought to maintain regional power, though at time prominent caudillos would also become national leaders. Likewise, in Brazil, local leaders (given the honorary title of coronel) dominated regional politics (especially in rural areas and the Northeast of Brazil), a trend continuing into the early 20th century. As explained by Rex Hudson: -

Under the more traditional style of politics, coronelismo, the local coronel (colonel), in alliance with other large farmers, controlled the votes of rural workers and their families. The local political chiefs in turn exchanged votes with politicians at the state level in return for political appointments and public works in their municipalities (municípios). (Hudson 1997)

Some would see this as one origin for the prominent role of the military in the 20th century, and the continued rise of 'strong men' who controlled political life in countries such as Chile and Argentina. This remains a serious issue for Cuba and Venezuela through 2005-2006, though for different reasons (see further below). In a general sense, the military was also a source of revolutionary and modernising

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leadership in many cases, leading to a continued role for the military in politics that would become highly problematic in the 20th century.

* Although kingship was the dominant institution in Europe when the New World was first settled, there was a partially democratic institution in Spanish medieval cities whereby limited self-government occured through elected magistrates, alcaldes, and through municipal assemblies, ayuntamientos (Fuentes 1992, pp70-72). This was exported into the new urban centres of Latin America, e.g. in Buenos Aires (Fuentes 1992, pp138-140). The building of cities (either new ones or transformed pre-Colombian cities) is a crucial aspect of European settlement. For example, in Mexico we find a rapid phase of city founding: Veracruz (1519), Oaxaca (1521), Colima (1522), Taxco (1529; Culiacán (1531), Puebla (1535), Guadalajara (1542), Querétaro (1550), and San Cristóbal (1561), with a similar pace of construction of cities in Argentina from 1553 down to 1617 (Fuentes 1992, p140). Today, Latin America hosts megacities such as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, which are sources of great wealth but also have infrastructure and social problems (poverty, drugs, crime) with a rapidly expanding urban population not fully catered for by services (sewage, water, housing, transportation), nor by secure, formal employment.

* The relationship with indigenous native culture was problematic in most of these states. The simple image of the conqueror was later adapted to a Christianising and than humanitarian re-readings of history, while the massive impact, economically and socially, of indigenous culture was only partly recognised. One trend, as we shall see, was indigenismo and Indianismo, (Ruiz 1992, p365), whereby any high elements of indigenous culture were appropriated as part of national culture, or used as part of a wider literary and artistic fusion (see further lecture 3). Vigorous cultural life, as found in the Maya, for example, could not be suppressed, and form part of social, political life of ordinary people in southern Mexico and parts of Central America today. This complex relationship is symbolised by the image of the Indian interpreter who became Cortés' lover: La Malinche (Malintzin) - the term Malinchista symbolises a kind of treachery (Fuentes 1992, p111), and at the least a bowing down before foreign influences. But in Mexico it can be used as kind of insight into the reality of the relationship among the conqueror and conquered (Lanyon 1999, pp6-7). Likewise, indigenous needs and cultural remain important in several Andean countries (especially Peru, Ecuador and Bolovia) and to some extent in Brazil. Racially and socially, the history of Latin America was not just a

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straightforward conquest and colonisation. Fuentes thus suggests a kind of cultural counter-conquest: -

The naked facts of conquest were answered by the more secret and insinuating facts of counterconquest. Both the defeated Indian peoples and the mestizos, eventually joined by the African arrives in the New World, began a process of conquering the conquerors, thus fostering the rise of a properly American, multiracial, polycultural society. (Fuentes 1992, p124)

* Latin America, and more slowly Brazil, began to develop it own version of intellectual, literary and artistic life, at first based on European models, but later on looking back to selective parts of indigenous cultures. Universities were founded in Santo Domingo (1538), Lima and Mexico City (1551), while the first printing press was set up in Mexico City in 1535 (Fuentes 1992, p141). In time, artists, writers and thinkers brought a kind of fusion between European views and 'new world' conditions. This is one of the great cultural resources of Latin America, which retains vigorous high cultures (in literature, film, art, classical music) and strong folk cultures (popular music, dance, religion, story-telling, textiles, art). These cultural resources have economic implications (e.g. tourism and cultural products as export, as in Cuba and Brazil), but also shape the internal and external perceptions of these countries and their national identity.

5. The Early International System

It can be seen that the American colonies (north and south) were soon embroiled in international affairs changing the balance of power in Europe and the geopolitics of imperial expansion. For a time, these colonies helped boost the power of Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent France. However, the benefits were not always sustained. The enormous influx of bullion (gold and silver) through Spain, for example, did increase Spanish military and naval power. However, as Europe's silver resources multiplied seven times this led to higher prices, inflation, and a tendency for Spain to import manufactures from European neighbours, delaying her entry into the industrial revolution (Fuentes 1992, pp156-157). It was estimated that by 1629 that 75% of the bullion from the Americas ended up in Amsterdam, London, Rouen, and Antwerp (Fuentes 1992, p157; see further Braudel 1986).

Several key factors engaged Latin America into the emerging international system from the 16th-20th centuries and changed the global system. These included: -

* The rise of the Ottoman Empire (Ottoman Turks) as a dominant force in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean from the 14th-17th centuries reduced the flow of trade and increased costs, especially rare spice and silk imports into Europe, though Venice and Goa maintained trade. Nonetheless, this encouraged the exploration of Africa

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and the search for alternative naval routes to ‘East Indies’ (Williamson 1992, p2). In this Portugal and then Spain excelled, moving from trade expansion to empire-building (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962). In this light we can see why Christopher Columbus was so keen to find what he thought would be a short westward route around the globe to the Indies. These factors helped turn Spanish and Portuguese attention outwards, away from the confines of the Mediterranean and north European world.

* The race for imperial control of colonies led to numerous clashes among Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French and British colonists and militias. Certain treaties were used to establish boundaries and spheres of influence. One of the earliest of these was the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), arbitrated by Pope Alexander VI to delineate Spanish verses Portuguese spheres of colonisation along a line from pole to pole 370 leagues west of the Azores in the Atlantic, a daring and arrogant peace of diplomacy. Through the Treaty of Madrid in 1750 this boundary would be adjusted westward to allow Portugal to claim the territories it already controlled into the interior of Brazil, and allowing Spain control of the colonies along the Andes, the Caribbean and Pacific coast (Eakin 1998, p23).

* The emergence of the United States as a hemispheric and global power, clearly established by the time of its war with Mexico (1846-1848), in which Mexico lost almost half of its territory and the U.S. acquired its southern tier of states including California, New Mexico, and Arizona. The U.S. quickly moved to try to exclude the influence of other European states, especially Spain, Russia, France and Britain, in the western hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, though in fact they would not be unable to do this effectively until the late 19th century. In the twentieth century, the U.S. would often intervene in following its own interests (as in Cuba during the early 20th century), or as part of a wider ‘ideological agenda’ in support of liberal capitalism. This intensified during the Cold War when Washington was intensely sensitive to any hint of Marxist or communist-alignment as undermining the 'inter-American' system of diplomacy. At times other causes came into play: suppressing drug activity, supporting U.S. business interests, and more recently in terms of security. This led to indirect interventions (e.g. in Nicaragua and ending the government of Socialist president Salvador Allende, 1970-1973, in Chile), failed military intervention (in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in which Cuban rebels, directly supported by the CIA in a covert operation, tried to invade

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Cuba), and 'successful' military interventions in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti (Grant 2001; Edwards 2000; Falcoff 2000; Booth & walker 1993). More generally, during the Cold War period, the U.S. supported right-wing governments that opposed left-wing parties and guerrilla groups, and trained military and police in counter-insurgency, intelligence, and interrogation procedures, e.g. at the School of the Americas, now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (for ongoing controversies, see Marrin 2000). This led to later charges that such officers were often involved in human rights abuses, the use of torture, and the support of death squads, as occurred during the height of the conflict in Guatemala (see Erlick 2001). Although today U.S. training involves courses in human rights and rule of law, there are still concerns about the linkage of such local officers to paramilitary groups in some countries, e.g. in Colombia. Likewise, the renewed emphasis on security concerns since 2001 has also made military cooperation one of the most active areas of U.S. engagement in the wider region.

* In large measure both the U.S. and Latin American states suffer from a simple reality: the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any single state in the region, even large nations such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Even in contrast to the entire region, the U.S. remains a dominant power whose involvement in regional agendas and organisations is crucial. The Caribbean region, for example, has sometimes been viewed as an 'American lake' needed to secure U.S. access to the Panama canal and its shipping routes into the Atlantic. Here either an unyielding dominance or indifference can be disastrous for the development of the region. In one view the U.S. may need to move towards a more consistently cooperative approach, rather than a series of uneven and fitful polices designed to support its national interests under difference administrations, i.e. from Pax Americana to a more Pan American approach (see Dominguez 1998b). Likewise, Latin America is not so much the U.S. 'backyard' as a vital region with serious economic and security projects than support the hemisphere's international stability (e.g. via institutions such as NAFTA and the OAS).

* Any tendencies for unilateral policies, coercive diplomacy and intervention in U.S. foreign policy, however, has been moderated by other trends in U.S. thinking. Thus, at another level, the U.S. hoped for a multilateral regional system which would lead towards greater peace and development (as in the 'Good Neighbour' and 'Alliance for Progress' policies, and under the administration of former President

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Carter), towards democratisation and eventually lead ‘cooperative security’ in the Western hemisphere, as developed under the administration of former President Clinton (Johnson 2001). This was based in part on the theory that democratic states do not go to war with each other (the ‘democratic peace thesis’), but in Latin America the process of democratisation ‘is a dynamic and uneven process that creates uncertainty among political actors and instability across borders’ (Johnson 2001; to be looked at in later lectures).

* The Americas became part of global trade routes from Europe into the Pacific and thence to East Asia. Silver from the Spanish colonies was sent to Manila in the Philippines for trade with China and Japan. This trend continued when later on the U.S. insisted that it was a two ocean power and built up its navy accordingly, gaining influence in the Pacific through Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam. Accordingly, trade routes along the tip of South America became strategically and economically important, as did the Isthmus of Panama. Balboa first crossed the Isthmus to see the Pacific Ocean in 1513, while the city of Panama was founded in 1519 (Williamson 1992, p16). This culminated in the American imperative to build a Canal it could control, leading to its interference in Colombian affairs and the creation in 1903 of the 'independent' state of Panama, which soon became a U.S. client (see Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). Today Panama has charted a more independent path and has a reduced U.S. presence, with Panama assuming direct control of the Panama Canal after the end of 2000. However, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal after 1999 was designed to ensure its continued operation during war and peace, with the U.S. allowed to act military in defence of the Canal (Atkins 1999, p201). For a time there had been some alarm within the U.S. about Chinese (PRC) economic influence and investment on the small state (Morton 1999). A more serious issue is the need to modernise and upgrade the canal to handle bigger ships and more cargo, or alternatively improve the railway networks across the isthmus. Likewise, environmental impact and the relative poverty of indigenous groups are part of a wider Central American focus of developmental needs (see Call 2002 & lecture 12).

* The notion of North and South America as a unique Western hemisphere with its own destiny was used by the U.S. to further its own foreign policy, and by Latin American nationalists (e.g. in Mexico and Cuba) to help shake off control from Spain. Indeed, the original liberators of South America from Spain (such as Simón Bolívar) had hoped for

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some kind of cooperation among the new states. This was emphasised again in the 1960s with the birth of the Latin American Free Trade Association, while during the same period the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress as aimed at regional development (Johnson 2001). This sense of uniqueness would later aid trends towards regionalism, regional cooperation, and the creation of regional organisations (see below).

* The trade of new agricultural products was part of the exchange, e.g. tobacco, maize, potatoes, natural rubber and cocoa came from the Americas. In turn, key products such as sugar and coffee would be brought from the West and grown in huge plantations that would change entire economic structure of several nations, e.g. in Brazil and Cuba. It would affect the millions of people who came to work the plantations, whether as slaves, planters, or small-scale farmers (the latter particularly important in coffee production in Colombia).

* With the above factors in mind, it is not surprising that much of Latin America was developed as an agricultural resource base for the global system. This had serious implications for future development. Since early colonisation by Spain, the America's were at first thought of as a resource to be exploited at will. This mentality was modified but not entirely changed through the 19th and 20th centuries:

The Latin American economy since Columbus has been influenced by the preference for export agriculture over staple food production. This has meant that most of the best soils have been controlled by a few individuals who exploit only small areas of their total estates (about 19 percent in these vast estates or latifundia) and then in monocultures that tend to deplete the soil. The rural population has been forced into tiny plots or minifundia located on less productive, and sometimes on steeper, land wherein forests that previously had been important sources of game and protection for soil resources were cleared. (Moran 1987, p9).

As such the agrarian question remains: 'How might the rural sector be restructured so that national economic goals are achieved and the disenfranchised masses secure greater access to basic resources?' (Moran 1987, p9). Failures in agrarian reform have led to continued demographic shifts towards the city, creating new urban and social problems in megacities such as Mexico City . It has also exacerbated social tensions, and fuelled revolutionary and guerrilla movements. Problems of indigenous land rights, and the returning of land to traditions elders, also remains a contested issue that can at times lead to political violence, e.g. in Brazil where even though court rulings have returned some lands, e.g. to the Guarani-Kaiowá, this has led to

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ongoing political violence through early 2003, with 3 Indians being killed, including the tribal leader Marcos Veron (Lobe 2003). The current government of Brazil supports indigenous rights, but this has been difficult to consistently and evenly implement. President Chavez has suggested large scale land-reform as one way of reducing poverty in Venezuela, though this has been a slow process (see Syvia & Danopoulos 2003). Likewise, large-scale agribusiness, found as major producers in Mexico and Brazil, for example, remains in sharp contrast to traditional patterns of small peasant landholders (see Petras & Veltmeyer 2003; Cabello 2003).

Central America (Courtesy PCL Map Library)

6. Crises of Social Order and Development

It can be seen then, that the major nations of Latin America soon established their freedom from Spain and Brazil, and began to take on the mantle of effective, modernising states with strong elements of nationalism. This trends, however, would soon be complicated by unresolved relations with displaced indigenous peoples, intense political competition among elites and between different political parties (see Shifter 2004), continued population growth, increasing rural poverty, the emergence

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of urban shanty towns, environmental destruction and problems in becoming industrially competitive with the developed 'first' world (for these trends, see Atkins 1999; Williamson 1992, Fuentes 1992; Hopkins 1987). As a result, even with the industrialisation, modernisation, liberalisation, and democratisation of the twentieth century, much of Latin America through the 1980s and early 1990s still had a sense of grappling with a state of crisis: -

Inflation, unemployment, the excessive burden of foreign debt. Increasing poverty and illiteracy ; an abrupt decline of purchasing power and standards of living. A sense of frustration, or dashed hopes and lost illusions. Fragile democracies menaced by social explosion. (Fuentes 1992, p9).

By the start of the 21st century, broad trends seemed to have improved in some areas: -

In important respects, the regional context of the Western Hemisphere has changed dramatically in the past decade. Authoritarian rule has given way to democracy in almost every Latin American country: societies wrenched by years of violent and costly civil wars, driven by Cold War ideological rivalries, have decided to settle their differences with ballots rather than bullets; state controlled, closed economies have been pried open, both by the distress of massive debt and the opportunity of new markets. (Johnson 2001)

However, key elements in the path towards statehood made the emergence of democratic states problematic in much of Latin America. Numerous factors contribute to this, and different theories have been proposed to account for the emergence of weak states, problematic development (see Comeau 2003), limits to international cooperation, a fear of political instability, and uneven democratisation. In part, this crisis was based on poor patterns of economic development, in part on unresolved political crises driven groups who do not feel included in the procedural (election-based) democracies that are now the norm.

This has resulted in various forms of civil protest, and at the most extreme, guerrilla movements bent on control of regions within states and maintaining their own international agenda. In the view of one (left-wing) commentator: -

On the other hand a more consequential extra-parliamentary opposition is growing which questions the "globaloney" of the dominant classes. New sociopolitical movements like the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Mexico, the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the peasant-Indian movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay are openly challenging the neoliberal regimes and their imperialist backers. Although the tactics vary from large scale land occupations to guerrilla armies, and encompass a wide range of other mass action, these movements have called for the socialization of strategic sectors of the economy, far-reaching land redistribution, and the reduction of overseas debt and other transfers. The size and scope of extra-parliamentary struggle is significant. The MST has organized hundreds of occupations covering twenty-four states and has settled five hundred thousand families. Organized as a national-political movement, the MST has successfully unified urban and rural workers in a common struggle against neoliberalism. In Colombia, the FARC controls half of all rural municipalities with an army of fifteen thousand militants and support from close to a million people. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, rank-and-file industrial workers are organizing class-based trade unions to challenge state-run official unions. While full blown alternative programs are still being elaborated, these movements are struggling to form anti-imperialist regimes

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which can begin the reconstruction of the domestic market, regain control over the essential levers of the economy, redistribute wealth and create a participatory form of democracy to replace the elite-driven foreign-based electoral systems that describe themselves as democracies. (Petras 1999)

We will look at these controversial issues in more detail throughout the subject, but a few problems in political and economic development can be highlighted now: -

* As we have seen, South and Central America were soon engaged in the global trade system for over three centuries, but usually as primary producers and markets, i.e. a periphery reliant for the terms of trade first on Europe and then the U.S. This led to a body of theory which suggested that truly modern, independent states would find it hard to emerge because such post-colonial states were vulnerable to outside pressures, and did not have a balanced path of economic or social development. In its most extreme form, this emerged as dependency theory (see Atkins 1999, pp67-72) and a call for greater industrial development and economic independence in these developing states. On this basis, strong external actors, e.g. at first Spain and Britain, now the U.S., can often intervene in the politics, foreign policy and economic management of weaker or dependent Latin American states. At another level, the power of major transnational companies has been a very strong factor throughout the 20th century, e.g. in the 1950s in Venezuela multinational oil companies such as Jersey Standard, Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf Oil, Texaco, and Exxon were the mainstay of the economy (Corrales 2001), while in the past the United Fruit company and Coca-Cola had controversial roles to play in the politics of Guatemala (Erlick 2001). Today, automobile companies such as Ford, Renault and Volkswagon have a very strong influence (in terms of economic development) in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil (see later lectures). As such, these national economies are strongly subject to the (negative and postive) trends of global markets, flows of foreign investment, and high levels of international competition.

* Much of Latin America developed rather hierarchical societies in which class, and to a lesser extent race, acted as limits to the development of egalitarian society. Various groups (Amerindians, the descendants of African slaves, the poor etc.) were effectively excluded from wealth ad political participation. Such excluded groups were not only an ongoing social cost (in terms of poverty, resistance and protest, health and crime problems), but would find other paths seeking their own security. This has led to social, political and military resistance. In this context, the creation of revolutionary groups and paramilitaries to contest the

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political order was common: since no other path was possible, violence and revolutionary ideologies were needed (e.g. in Cuba, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, etc.). Other forms of less violent mobilisaton are also found among poor and indigenous groups in many of these countries, e.g. in Brazil, Mexico (see later lectures), and among Mayan Indians in Guatemala who have begun to influence the media, with one of their own talk-back radio programs, and via indigenous columnists in newspapers (Erlick 2001)

* Independence and nationalism also often led to strong individual leaders who became the symbols of the country and became virtual dictators, even when the forms of democracy and elections were retained. The paths to this were either through direct military support, as in Caudillos or military leaders (see below), or via mass popular mobilisation in which large segments of society support a reforming agenda (i.e. populism and presidentialism), as in the case of Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina and Brazil’s Getulio Vargas (Lecuona & Momayezi 2001). Associated with this is the cult of the leader, and also the political culture of personalismo (Erlick 2001) and patronage by political elites.

* Nation building in many of these states was at least in part reliant on the role of military forces, both in terms of successful revolutions, but also in terms of development and modernisation. This has meant that the army has often had a strong role to play in political affairs, and has been willing to view itself as guarantors of the nation if politicians fail, thereby justifying either a coup or at least pressure on civilian governments. Martial law and the military model, however, has also led to oppression of opposition groups, human rights abuses and torture. Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil in different ways have had a precarious relationship between the military and civilian governments (Palmer 1987). Most Latin American states have moved forward from military rule towards more democratic governments (a strong trend through the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called ‘democratic third wave’). Scars remain from the past abuses of such regimes. Thus the legacy of the 'disappeared' in Argentina and Chile remains strong today. Only a few states have eliminated or seriously reduced their military forces, e.g. Haiti and Panama in the mid-1990s (Johnson 2001), while Costa Rica abolished its military forces in 1948 (Lecuona & Momayezi 2001).

* Political parties formed very early in Latin America, but contests between Liberal and Conservative elites still often excluded the needs of many groups in society. Elsewhere, as in early Cuba, strong political parties did not

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evolve, and were often seen as self-interested or ineffective factions, leading to public disenchantment (see Corrales 2001), or to problematic power-sharing arrangements or ‘national fronts’ (as in Colombia). In these cases, once again, it was quite possible for opportunistic leaders to develop authoritarian regimes based around an individual leader and his supporters (e.g. Cuba under the Batista regime 1952-1958, Venezuela under the regime of Marcos Perez Jimenez, 1948-1958, in Guatemala under the dictator Frain Rios Montt during the 1970s). Other regimes have developed corporatist state models based on both nationalism and the support of the military (as in the past in Argentina and Chile). In all these cases, different paths can occur as these dictatorships are eroded, e.g. in Cuba the Batista dictatorship was eventually overthrown and replaced by the ‘mobilizational authoritarianism’ of Fidel Castro, while in the case of Venezuela a consensual democracy emerged, though some would say that it has been eroded by the strong presidential powers of President Chavez (Corrales 2001), which has generated an ongoing constitutional and economic crisis in the country over the last several years. Here, forms of presidentialism and popularism may undermine and polarise procedural democracies (see Ellner 2003). In general terms, Latin American needs stronger, more inclusive and reliable political parties that can act as conduits for stable democratisation (Corrales 2001), e.g. in Mexico, Brazil and Cuba, Guatemala (Erlick 2001), Haiti and Argentina.

* Even when civil wars have ended, often the underlying social problems and political actors remain, leading to an unsteady peace in which democratic processes and development remain highly problematic. We can see this is in the Central American state of Guatemala, in which one of the longest and bloodiest of civil wars (36 years and 250,000 deaths) was eventually ended through an drawn-out, ten year peace process which was technically completed in December 1996 (Erlick 2001). However, a lack of ‘sense of completion, or of healing’, and the return of leaders responsible for the horrific past limited hope for real conciliation (Erlick 2001), in spite of the activities of a 'truth commission' into military atrocities which has published a 3,500 page report (Roberts 1999). Thus the United Nations mission (MINUGUA) to the country remained past its expected completion date, while ‘only moderate progress has been made on the laundry list of social and economic reforms, including land redistribution, rural development, educational reform, bilingual education, democratization, and modernization of public management’ (Erlick 2001). Political murders and vigilante violence continued in the country, with a strong sense by many that

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the country has the disease of ungovernability, ingobernabilidad (Erlick 2001). There is a danger that: ‘Lethargy, cynicism, dependency and corruption can subvert the hopes for peace’ even when the war stops (Erlick 2001). Some have dubbed this a 'violent peace', and note the local joke: "Beware the peace . . . because now the government is fighting everyone." (Gilbert 2002) Rural, gang, and revenge-based violence continued through 2001 to early 2002, in spite of the peace accords. Through early 2003, UN and OAS (Organization of American States) continued to investigate attacks on ‘judges, prosecutors and rights campaigners’, though the country has since been able to hold democratic elections (completed in December 2003, with Oscar Berger becoming president), and has also begun to solve a border dispute with Belize (BBC 2004a; BBC 2004b). Progress towards a stable state through 2004-2005 has been real but slow in this case, with limited trends in economic development: -

Guatemala has earned the lowest marks for democratic development of any of the 18 nations in the hemisphere included in the study. A report, the Informe de Desarrollo Democratico by the Argentine nongovernmental organization (NGO) Polilat, sponsored by the Fundacion Konrad Adenauer, found that, on a scale of one to 10, Guatemala scored 1.6. This compares with Chile, which got a perfect 10 plus. The scoring to arrive at a democratic-development index is based on evaluation of 31 indicators, among which are spending on education, gender equity, capacity to solve political crises, civil liberties, and the economic situation.

Guatemala took sole possession of last place thanks to a particularly poor showing on these indicators and its high indebtedness, low level of investment, poor participation of political parties in the Congress, and the worst possible accounting procedures. (NotiCen 2005)

It can be seen, then, that there has been considerable progress politically and economically in parts of Latin America. However, this has not solved the enormous social, political and economic problems placing enormous pressures on developing states of the region, and stressing even more developed nations such as Argentina and to some degree even Chile (see Graham and Sukhtankar 2003). We can see some of the long-term and complex linkages among political stability, social justice, and economic growth: -

It is important to understand the channels through which stability affects growth. An unstable political setting provokes greater uncertainty and renders investors reluctant to engage their capital. With instability, the rules of the political and economic game become subject to constant revisions, making it virtually impossible to form rational expectations. The cost of capital rises with various risks (that is, loan defaults, violation of the principle of private property, unreliability of the judiciary, etc.), and entrepreneurs expatriate their funds in search of calmer environments. Worsening the effects of capital flight, instability causes a reduction in the supply of labor. Fragile social climates (that is, insecurity, social violence, authoritarian police forces, etc.)

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mean greater personal risks for workers. The depletion of investments translates to declines in labor demand and in overall employment. The resulting economic hardship, coupled with the fear of further deterioration in the political arena, incites more workers to emigrate. Also, quite damaging is the tendency for emigration to involve skilled workers, for whom the likelihood of smooth integration into better settings is higher than for unskilled workers. In the end, the economy suffers from a deterioration in the quality of the labor force. Assuming positive marginal productivity of factors of production, reduced amounts of capital and labor deplete total output. Deteriorated labor quality slackens the pace of production, further harming growth through diminished marginal productivity, . . . . The final blow to good economic health comes from drastic reduction in research and development activities and subsequent shrinking of technological progress. (Comeau 2003)

On this basis, Latin America needs improved patterns of international cooperation and effective patterns of investment alongside economic and social development to sustain robust human societies. Next week we will look in a little more detail in trends in International and Regional development, at the impact of uneven globalisation, and look briefly at future prospects (we will take this further in Week 12).

7. Bibliography, Further Reading and Resources

Further Reading - You could further your knowledge by looking at one of the following:

ARCENEAUX, Graig Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change, Pitttsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005

ATKINS, G. Pope Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999

COMEAU, Ludovic "The Political Economy of Growth in Latin America and East Asia: Some Empirical Evidence", Contemporary Economic Policy, 21 no. 4, October 2003, pp476-489 [Access via Infotrac Database]

FERRANTI, David M. Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History? Washington, The World Bank, The 2004 [ebook available via Ebrary]

FOWERAKER, Joe & KRZNARIC, Roman "The uneven performance of third wave democracies: electoral politics and the imperfect rule of law in Latin America", Latin American Politics and Society, 44 no. 3, Fall 2002, pp29-62 [Access via Bond University Library Databases]

FRIEDEN, Jeffry A. et al. (eds.) Modern Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy, Boulder, Westview, 2000

FUENTES, Carlos The Buried Mirror: Reflections on Spain and the New World, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1992

GRAHAM, Carol & SUKHTANKAR, Sandip “Economic crisis, markets, and democracy in Latin America: some evidence from the economics of happiness”, Brookings Review, 21 no. 2, Spring 2003, pp36-41

KEEN, Benjamin & HAYNES, Keith A History of Latin America, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 2004

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SKIDMORE, Thomas E. & SMITH, Peter H. Modern Latin America, Oxford, OUP, 2000

TULCHIN, Joseph S. & ESPACH, Ralph H. (eds.) Latin America in the New International System, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001

UNGAR, Mark Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America, London, Lynne Rienner, 2002

WILLIAMSON, Edwin The Penguin History of Latin America, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992

Resources

Primary databases found of the Bond University Library webpages include Ebsco, Infotrac Academic, JSTOR and Ebrary (on-line books), accessible through www.bond.edu.au/library/

The International Relations Portal includes a Latin America daily news update, as well as a range of articles, lectures and links concerning international affairs. An education and research site, selected lectures from this subject for 2006 will be loaded onto this site later in the semester. See http://www.international-relations.com

Useful articles on Latin America will be found in the publicly accessible Findarticles database, located at www.findarticles.com

Useful material on Argentina past and present will be found on the Financial Times webpages at www.ft.com/argentina and www.ft.com/argpast

The BBC has useful news services on the Americas, located at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/default.stm

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