Upload
sergio-guillen
View
221
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
1/50
The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:
Document Title: An Assessment of the Preparedness of LargeRetail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist
Attack
Author(s): Robert C. Davis ; Christopher Ortiz ; RobertRowe ; Joseph Broz ; George Rigakos ; Pam
Collins
Document No.: 216641
Date Received: December 2006
Award Number: 2003-IJ-CX-1017
This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition totraditional paper copies.
Opinions or points of view expressed are thoseof the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the offic ial posit ion or polic ies of the U.S.Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
2/50
AnAssessmentofthePreparednessofLargeRetailMallstoPreventandRespondtoTerroristAttack
RobertC.DavisPoliceFoundationChristopherOrtizVeraInstituteofJusticeRobertRoweAmericanSocietyforIndustrialSecurityJosephBrozMidwestInstituteforResearchGeorgeRigakosCarltonUniversityPamCollinsUniversityofEasternKentuckyJanuary20,2006
final%20report%2dedited[1] ii
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
http://www.neevia.com/8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
3/50
TableofContentsFigures................................................................................................................................ ivTables................................................................................................................................. iv1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 1
Background........................................................................................................... 2PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World..................................................................3NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility.......................................................... 4PurposesofThisReport.......................................................................................5
2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisors............................................................7PerceptionsofPreparedness.................................................................................8LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders..........11PrivateSecurityRegulation................................................................................12
3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectors............................................................................14HiringStandards................................................................................................. 14Training.............................................................................................................. 15ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingon
SecuritySince9/11...................................................................................... 16PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................17EmergencyPreparedness.................................................................................... 20CoordinationWiththePublicSector.................................................................. 20OpinionsAboutTerroristThreat........................................................................22
4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMalls...................................................................................25SpendingonSecurity.......................................................................................... 25RiskAssessment................................................................................................. 26PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................26TrainingPrograms..............................................................................................27EmergencyResponsePlans................................................................................28RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement.......................................................29Assessment......................................................................................................... 29TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMalls.......................................................................30
5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivateSecurity............................................33SummaryResults................................................................................................ 34ChangesSince9/11............................................................................................35
6. ConclusionsandRecommendations.........................................................................37StepstoTake...................................................................................................... 38
final%20report%2dedited[1] iii
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
4/50
AppendicesAppendixADetailsofMallSecurityDirectorSurveyResultsAppendixBCatalogofRegulationsbyState
FiguresFigure1. Mapofstatesurveyrespondents......................................................................7Figure2. Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetween mallsecurityandfirst
respondersasgoodorverygood...................................................................11Figure3. Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)..........................12Figure4. SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats....................................................22Figure5. Mostlikelyformofattack.............................................................................23
TablesTable1. Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratings onpreparedness..........................8Table2. Qualitiesofbest-preparedmalls......................................................................9Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketobecomebetterprepared.........................10Table4. Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?.....................................10Table5. Suggestionsforadditionalstateregulation.................................................... 13Table6. Hiringstandardsformallsecuritystaff.........................................................14Table7. Backgroundchecksformallsecuritystaff....................................................15Table8. Antiterrorismtraining....................................................................................16Table9. Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurity
spendingsince9/11........................................................................................ 17Table10. Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff............................18Table11. Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons...........................................18Table12. Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11...............................19Table13. Technologicalsecuritymeasures...................................................................19Table14. Partnersinpreparednessexercises.................................................................20Table15. StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanning.................................................21Table16. Lawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanning.....................................21Table17. AssistancesoughtfromDHS......................................................................... 22Table18. Additionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcritical..........................................23Table19. Statestatutesregulatingprivatesecurity.......................................................34Table20. Post-9/11changesinstateprivatesecuritystatutes.......................................35
final%20report%2dedited[1] iv
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
5/50
1. IntroductionSincetheeventsofSeptember11,2001,securityconcernshavefigured
prominentlyinthenationalagenda.Governmentofficialsandthepublicnowrecognizeawiderarrayofpotentialterroristtargetsextendingbeyondmilitaryinstallations. Thesesofttargets,orareaswithpublicaccess,includetransithubs,schools,andmassprivatespaceslikeamusementparksandsportsarenas.
Onetypeofsofttargetthathasreceivedtoolittleattentionistheretailmall.Withalltheothersofttargetsthatexist(e.g.,transitsystems,schools,hospitals,etc.),whyshouldcitizensbeconcernedaboutattacksagainstshoppingmalls? Onereasonisthatthenatureofmallsmakesthemveryvulnerable:therearemultipleentrancesandexits,andtheyareopentothepublic.Largenumbersofpeoplecomeandgo,makingiteasyforpotentialterroriststoblendinunnoticed.Manyofthevisitorscarrylargeparcelsthatcouldhideabomborotherweapon.Therearemultiplewaystoattackamall,rangingfromautomaticweaponstocarbombstobombsplacedinsidethemall,eventoanattackusingabiologicalorchemicalagent.
Moreover,theconsequencesofanattackcouldbequiteserious.Inthecaseofanattackusingabiologicalorchemicalagent,orabombblastresultinginstructuralcollapse,thecasualtiescouldbeveryhigh.Anattackcouldalsoproduceinsuranceandjoblosses.Acoordinatedseriesofattacksagainstmallswouldalmostcertainlyresultinlong-termlostbusinessandseriousregionalornationaleconomicconsequences,aswesawintheairlineindustryfollowing9/11.
Infact,mallsandtheretailsectoringeneralhavebeenattackedinvariouspartsoftheworldforthepastseveraldecades.IsraelhasexperiencedorthwartedattacksagainstmallsontenoccasionssincethestartoftheIntifadaintheWestBankinthemid-1990s.CountriesasdisparateasTurkeyandFinlandhavehadattacksagainstmallsinrecentyears.EnglandsufferedattacksagainstretailstoresbytheIrishRepublicanArmyasfarbackasthe1970s.1
IntheUnitedStates,mallshavebeentargetedaswell.Justafewweekspriortothedraftingofthisreport,amanwalkedintoamallinTacoma,Washington,andopenedfirewithapairofassaultrifles.Aftershootingsixpeople,oneofthemcritically,thegunmanduckedintoamusicstoreandtookfourhostages.Afterhissurrendertoauthorities,thepolicesearchedhiscarandapartmentandfoundarecipeformakingthedeadlypoisonricinaswellasbomb-makingplansandmaterials.Thegunmantoldauthoritiesthathehadbeenhumiliatedduringatroubledchildhoodandthatrecentproblemsmadehimwanttobeheard.2
1DanBilefskyandAnnZimmerman,etal,CanShoppersBeKeptSafe?BombThreatAgainstIkeaInEuropeSpursStores,MallsToReassessSecurityMeasures,TheWallStreetJournal,5December2002.2SuspectinTacomamallshootingsentangrytextmessagesbeforerampage. MinneapolisStarTribune,November21,2005.final%20report%2dedited[1] 1
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
6/50
Lastyear,theFBIarrestedamanonchargesthatheintendedtoblowupaColumbus,Ohio,shoppingcenter.Theman,aSomaliimmigrantwhoallegedlytraveledtoEthiopiatoobtainterroristtraining,wasafriendofamanconvictedofconspiringtoblowuptheBrooklynBridge.TheColumbussuspectisawaitingtrialinfederalcourt.
Thisreport
takes
aclose
look
at
the
state
of
security
in
large
U.S.
shopping
malls.
Howhavethingschangedsince9/11,andisthestateofsecuritytodaymeetingthestandardsthattheindustry,government,andcourtshavedefined?Background
Expertsagreethatprivatizationofpolicingisagrowingtrendworldwide.Thistrendwasfirstwidelynotedasaresultofa1971RandCorporationstudycommissionedbytheNationalInstituteofJusticeintheUnitedStates.3 Severalyearslater,StenningandShearing4notedthataquietrevolutiontowardsprivatesecurityhadoccurredinCanada.South5documentedasimilarphenomenoninbothwesternandeasternEuropeancountries.AnupdateoftheRandassessmentin1985concludedthatprivatesecurityout-spentpubliclawenforcementby73%andemployedtwoandone-halftimesasmany6persons. ExpertsseemtoagreethatprivatesecurityismoreextensiveintheUnitedStatesamongstwesternnationsthanvirtuallyanywhereelse,7butitseemsclearthatprivatizationofpoliceservicesisaglobalphenomenonthatneedstoberecognizedandconsidered.
Asthestatestraditionalmonopolyonpolicingdissipates,manyfunctionsthatwereoncetheexclusivedomainofpublicpoliceforcesarenowbeingperformedbyprivateagencies.Inaddition,wholenewareasofactivitiesservicesthatdidnotexistorwerenotwidelyavailablecannowbepurchased.Whilethestateremainsasignificantplayerinthedeliveryandregulationofpolicing,itisnolongertheonlyinstitutionthataimstosafeguard
the
security
of
citizens.
There
are
now
arange
of
private
security
organizations
thatinclude,forexample,privatesecurityfirms,insurancecompanies,forensicaccountants,andin-housecorporatesecurity.
Theseprivatesecurityagencieshavemovedbeyondsimplyprotectingprivateproperty.Theyareactivelyengagedinmaintainingorder,investigatingcrimes,andmakingarrestsinpublicspaces.Inotherwords,theyareperformingmanyactivitiesthatwereonceexclusivelyperformedbypublicpoliceforces.
3JamesS.KakalikandSorrelWildhorn,PrivatesecurityintheUnitedStates(SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,1971).
4PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegalImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.5NigelSouth,PrivatizingPolicingintheEuropeanMarket:SomeIssuesforTheory,Policy,andResearch,EuropeanSociologicalReview10,no.3(1994):219-233.6WilliamC.CunninghamandToddH.Taylor,TheHallcrestReport:PrivateSecurityandPoliceinAmerica(Portland,OR:ChancellorPress1985).7SouthAfricaandRussiahavehigherlevels. SeeJaapdeWard(1999). Theprivatesecurityindustryininternationalperspective EuropeanJournalofCriminologyPolicyandResearch,7:2,168.final%20report%2dedited[1] 2
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
7/50
Thelinebetweenwhatispublicandprivatepropertyandwhoisresponsibleforpolicingpublicandprivatespaceisbecomingblurred.TherehasbeenanincreaseinwhatStenningandShearinghavetermedmassprivatepropertyshoppingmalls,gatedcommunities,andthelike.8 Thesearelargetractsofpublic-access,privately-ownedspacewhichhavetraditionallyfallenoutsideofthedomainofpublicpolice.
Inpolicingmassprivatepropertyandinothersituationsaswell,publicpoliceandprivatesecurityagenciesoftendevelopcooperativerelationshipswithoneanother.Thiscooperationcontributestotheblurringoftherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivatesectors.Themovementofretiringpoliceofficerstotheprivatesecuritysectoroftenfacilitatescooperation.Manyexecutivesthatheadupprivatesecuritycompanies,forensicaccountingteams,orsecurityconsultingfirmswereformerpublicpoliceofficers.
Insomeplaces,publicandprivatesecurityofficersexchangeinformationaboutpeopleandeventsinagivenjurisdiction.Informally,policeofficersandprivatesecurityguardsoftenshareinformationabouteventsinaparticularareaoraboutwantedpersons.For
example,
Rigakos
9reported
that
police
officers
in
Toronto
made
local
mall
or
housingsecurityofficersawareofwantedpersons,therebyturningsecurityofficersintoanextrapairofeyesandears.Similarly,Davis10reportedextensivecooperationbetweenpublicandprivatesecurityinoneofNewYorkCitysbusinessimprovementdistricts.
Inseveralcities,policeandsecurityfirmshaveformedformalcooperativeassociationstomeetanddiscusstopicssuchasbombthreats,executiveprotection,andburglaryinvestigation.AccordingtoPancake,inAmarillo,Texas,thepoliceandaprivatesecuritycompanyworkedoutanagreementunderwhichtheprivatecompany assumedresponsibilityforrespondingtoalarmcalls.11 Withinthesameperiod,Amarillopolicealsohiredprivatesecurityofficerstopatrolthedowntowncoreduringpeakhoursintandemwiththepolice. InNewYork,thepolicebriefkeyprivatesecuritychiefsmonthlyonterrorismissues.PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World
Forthemostpart,mallsandothersofttargetsthatarepartofourhomelandsecurityconcernsareprotected,notbypublicpolice,butbyprivatesecurity.Thus,theeventsof9/11thrustprivatesecurityofficersintoanewandimportantrole.Recognizingthisreality,severalstatesincludingCalifornia,Illinois,andMichigantookstepstomorecloselyregulatetheindustryintheyearfollowing9/11/2001.128PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegalImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.9GeorgeRigakos(2002). Thenewparapolice:Riskmarketsandcommodifiedsocialcontrol. Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.10RobertC.Davis,SarahDadush,JennyIrish,Dr.ArturoAlvaradoandDianeDavis,ThePublicAccountabilityofPrivatesecurity:LessonsfromNewYork,Johannesburg,andMexicoCity(NewYork,NY:VeraInstituteofJustice,2000).11Pancake,D.(1983). Thenewprofessionals:Cooperationbetweenpolicedepartmentsandprovatesecurity. ThePoliceChief,50,34-36.12RobertSalladay,DavisSignsBillstoGiveSecurityaBoost;PrivateGuardsmustCompleteCriminalChecks,TheSanFranciscoChronicle,16September2002,p.A.16.final%20report%2dedited[1] 3
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
8/50
Howhastheindustryitselfrespondedtotheincreasedresponsibility? Mediareportsafter9/11suggestedthatlittlehadchanged. Anearly2003USATodaystorycharacterizedprivatesecurityashomelanddefensesweaklink.13 Althoughafewstateshadintroducedorraisedhiringortrainingstandards,theUSATodaystoryshowedthat
most
states
still
do
not
impose
minimum
training
standards
or
even
require
backgroundchecks.Moreover,eveninstatesthatdidrequiretrainingprograms,therewaslittleefforttomonitorthecontentorqualityoftheprograms.
Severalnewspaperarticlesandlimitedsurveyshavereinforcedthenotionthatsecurityintheretailsectordidnotundergosignificantchangeafter9/11. A2003surveybytheCouncilonCompetitivenessof230corporateexecutivesfromcompanieswithgrossrevenuesof$50millionormorefoundthatonlyhalfoftheexecutiveshadmadechangestosecurityinresponsetoterrorismconcerns.14AsurveyconductedinthreelargestatesfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnionsimilarlyfoundthatfourintenofficersreportednonewsecuritymeasuresattheirworkplaces.Sevenintenoftheofficers
reported
that
bomb
threat
drills
or
natural
disaster
drills
were
never
conducted
at
theirbuildings.15NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility
Recognizingtheimportanceofsecurityintheretailsector,the9/11Commissiondeterminedthatbusinesseshaveadutytocareaboutthesecurityoftheircustomers.TheCommissionendorsedtheNationalFirePreventionAssociationstandard(NFPA1600)fordisasterandemergencymanagementpreparednessintheprivatesector.AccordingtotheCommission,Webelievethatcompliancewiththestandardshoulddefinethestandardofcareowedbyacompanytoitsemployeesandthepublicforlegalpurposes.16
TheNFPA1600standardspecifiesthatemergencymanagementprogramsshouldaddressthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery,whichinclude:(a)mitigation,oreffortstoeliminateorreducetheriskofadisasteroremergency,(b)preparedness,oractivitiesandprogramsintendedtosupportrecoveryfromdisaster,(c)response,oractivitiestoaddressimmediateandshort-termeffectsofadisaster,and(d)recovery,oractivitiesandprogramsdesignedtoreturnconditionstonormal
TheNFPAstandardlistsanumberofelementsthatcompaniesoughttoadoptinordertoeffectivelyimplementthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery.Includedamongthoseelementsare:13MimiHall,PrivateSecurityGuards:HomelandDefense'sWeakLink,USAToday,23January2003,p.A.01.14SherryL.Harowitz,TheNewCenturions,SecurityManagementOnline,January2003.15PeterD.HartResearchAssociates,APost-September11ReportonSurveysofSecurityOfficersinCalifornia,Texas,andFlorida(Washington,D.C.:PreparedfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnion(SEIU),2002).16The9/11commissionreport. www.gpoaccess.gov/911/final%20report%2dedited[1] 4
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
9/50
RiskassessmentIdentificationofpotentialhazardsandthelikelihoodoftheiroccurrence
HazardmitigationBasedontheresultsoftheriskassessment,effortstominimizelikelyhazards
EmergencyresponseplanAssignmentofresponsibilitiestoorganizationsandindividualsforcarryingoutspecificactionsduringanemergencyordisaster
EmergencycommunicationprotocolsDeterminingcommunicationneedsandcapabilitiesofvariousorganizationsandpersonnelandensuringinteroperability
TrainingofstaffinemergencyproceduresEducationofstaffontheelementsoftheemergencymanagementprogramandperiodictestingandexercises
MutualaidAgreementswithotherentitiesfortheirparticipationinemergencyresponseplansCourtdecisionshavereinforcedtheresponsibilityoftheprivatesectortotake
reasonablestepstoguardagainstterroristattack.ANewYorkdistrictcourtrulingin2003deniedamotiontodismissasuitagainsttheairlinesbyfamiliesofthe9/11victims.Thejudgesrulingwasbasedontheconceptthatitwasforeseeablethataplanewhosepassengershavebeennegligentlyscreenedatcheck-incouldbesubjecttoterroristattack.Inanotherrecentruling,aNewYorkStatejuryfoundthattheagencythatownedtheWorldTradeCenterwasnegligentfornotdoingenoughtothwartthedeadly1993terroristbombingbeneaththetwintowers,arulingthatmayopenthedoortomorelitigation.Infact,thejurorsfoundthatthePortAuthoritywasactuallytwiceasliableforthebombingastheactualterrorists! Jurorssaidtheywereswayedbya1985reportwrittenbythePortAuthoritysownsecurityofficials,whowarnedthattheundergroundparkinggaragewasalikelyattacksite.PurposesofThisReport
ThePoliceFoundation,incooperationwiththeVeraInstituteofJustice,theASISInternationalFoundation,andtheMidwestResearchInstitute,incooperationwithresearchersattheUniversityofEasternKentuckyandCarltonUniversityundertookanassessmentofthelevelofsecurityinlargeindoorshoppingmallsaswellastheassociatedissuesoftrainingandlegislationofprivatesecurityforces.Thecoreissueweaddressinthisreportisthedegreetowhichmallshavebecomebetterpreparedtorespondtoterroristattacksintheaftermathof9/11.
Theinvestigationweconductedwentwellbeyondearliersurveysconductedafter9/11.Itincludedsurveyswithstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstogettheirviewsonmallpreparednessaswellassurveyswiththesecuritydirectorsofthenationslargestindoorretailmalls.Weconductedsitevisitstotenmallstogaingreaterinsightintohowtheyaredealingwithsecuritypreparednessandresponsetodisasters.Weconductedastate-by-stateanalysisoflegislationregulatingthehiringandtrainingofprivatesecurity.
Thedetailedassessmentthatresultedfromourworkindicateswhatmallsaredoingintheareasofriskassessments,preventivemeasures,emergencypreparednessplans,training,andcoordinationwithstateandlocalgovernment.Thecomprehensivepicturethatemergesofthestateofsecurityinlargeretailmallssuggeststhattherearefinal%20report%2dedited[1] 5
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
10/50
gapsinpreparednessandthatstatehomelandsecurityofficialsandlocalpoliceaswellasmallownersandsecuritystaffhavearoletoplayinfillingthosegaps.
Thepresentationofdatafromourworkbeginswithresultsofthesurveythatweconductedwithstatehomelandsecuritydirectors.Wethenpresentresultsofthesurveyofmall
security
directors
and
insights
we
gained
in
site
visits
to
malls
both
in
this
country
andinIsrael.Finally,wediscussstatelegislationintheareaofprivatesecurityandchangesinstateandfederalstatutessince9/11.Weconcludewithadiscussionofwhatwelearnedfromourworkandourthoughtsaboutwhatstepsmightbetakentoincreasethesafetyofmallcustomers.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 6
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
11/50
2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisorsWeundertookasurveyofstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstofindout(a)how
closelytheywereinvolvedwithsecurityinshoppingmalls,(b)howcloselymallsworkedwithlocalfirstresponders,and(c)howpreparedtheythoughtmallsweretorespondtoterroristattack.Thesurveyconsistedofbothforced-choiceandopen-endedquestions.
WewereaidedindistributingthesurveybytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.DHSagreedtodistributethesurveytohomelandadvisorsinall50statesandPuertoRico,andtotaskthemwithcompletingit.Theinitiale-mailfromDHSwasfollowedbytwoadditionale-mails,andthenphonecallsbyprojectstafftostateadvisorswhohadnotresponded.Atotalof33responseswereobtained.Figure1depictsthestatesthatcompletedsurveysandshowsgooddispersionacrossallregionsofthecountry.
Figure1.Mapofstatesurveyrespondents
final%20report%2dedited[1] 7
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
12/50
PerceptionsofPreparednessThefirstsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentstogivetheiropiniononissues
surroundingtheabilityoflargeretailmallstopreparefor,andrespondto,terroristattack.Includedinthissectionwerequestionsabouttheperceivedlevelofpreparednessofretailmalls,theindustrysabilitytoprepare,impedimentstopreparation,andtheavailabilityoffundingandtraining.
Overall,therespondentswerefairlyoptimisticabouttheabilityoflargeretailmallsintheirstatetorespondtoterroristattack.Eighteenpercentofrespondentsreportedthattheabilityoftheretailmallsintheirstatetorespondtothethreatofterrorismwasverygood,27%thoughtitwasgood,andanadditional24%believedthatitwasatleastfair.Table1presentsthereasonsbehindtheirassessments.Mostrespondentswhoreportedapositiveassessment(verygood,good,orfair)believedeitherthatmallscooperatedwellwithlocallawenforcementorthattheyhaddevelopedemergencyplans.OthersfeltpositivebecausesomemallsintheirstateshadreceivedfundingtoupgradesecuritythroughthefederalBufferZoneProtectionProgram,avehiclethatprovidesupto$50,000forimprovingsecurityatcriticalinfrastructuresites.
Table1.Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratingsonpreparedness
Respondentsansweringverygood,good,orfair
Reason (n=24)Cooperationbetweenmallsandfirstresponders 9Developmentofemergencypreparednessplans 9ParticipateinBufferZoneProtectionProgram 4Otherreasonscited 2
Oneinthreestateadvisorsratedpreparednessaspoor.Themostcommonreasonsgivenfortheseassessmentswereinadequatetraining,inadequateequipment,oranopinionthatmallsecuritywouldbeirrelevantintheeventofanattack,sincetheresponsibilityforresponsewouldbeuptolawenforcement.Onestateadvisorcomplained:
Theabilityoflargeretailmallstorespondtoaterroristattackdependsinlargepartonthequalityoftrainingprovidedtheprivatesecurityguardswhowouldbethefirstrespondersintheeventofanattack.Unfortunately,[this]isoneofthefewstatesinthenationthathasnoregulatoryboardprovidingoversightoftheprivatesecurityguards.Respondentswereaskediftheywereawareofanylargemallsintheirstatethat
havedoneagoodjobofpreparingforthethreatofaterroristattack,andwhatmadethemfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 8
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
13/50
successful.Amongthe19stateadvisorswhowereabletoidentifyanexceptionalmall,themostfrequentelementidentifiedwiththemallssuccesswassuperiorsecuritystaff(seeTable2).Otherreasonswhymallswerethoughttobebetterpreparedincludedanemphasisonpreparednessplanningandtraining,agoodworkingrelationshipbetweenlocallawenforcementandmallmanagement/security,participationintheBufferZoneProtection
Program,
and
advanced
closed
circuit
television
systems
(CCTV).
One
state
advisornoted:
WehavethreemallsinthestatethatarecurrentlyparticipatingintheDHSBufferZoneProtectionPlaninitiative.Byactuallysittingdownatthetableandworkingwiththeotherkeystakeholdersfromthelocallawenforcement,fire,EMS,andEMAcommunities,thesemallsaremuchfurtherdowntheroadinidentifying,understanding,andacquiringthephysicalsecurityresourcesandtrainingthatbetterpreparethemtointerdictand/orrespondtoaterroristevent
Table2.Qualitiesofbest-preparedmallsResponses
Reason (n=19)Superiorsecuritystaff 7Emphasison 6planning/trainingGoodworkingrelationshipwithlocallawenforcement 4ParticipationinDHSBufferZoneProtectionProgram 1AdvancedCCTVsystem 1
Whenaskedwhattheybelievedtobethemostimportantmeasuresretailmallscouldtakeinordertobetterprepareagainstterroristattacks,mostrespondentsendorsedimprovedtrainingforsecuritystaffandemergencyresponders(seeTable3).Otherresponsesincludeddevelopmentofemergencypreparednessplans,morevisiblesecurity,bettercoordinationwithlocallawenforcement,enhancedtechnology,andhigherstandardsforsecurityofficers.Somestateadvisorsincorporatedmultipleideasintotheiranswers:
Outsidebudgetandpersonneladditions,formaltraininginareassuchasterrorism
awareness
and
hazard
mitigation
would
be
helpful.
Additionally,
weencourageincreasedcommunicationandpartnershipswiththelocalfirstresponders(police,fire,EMS)toestablishmechanismsforinformationsharingandcollaborationtopreventaterroristattack,andtoprepareafullycoordinatedresponsetooneshouldtheneedarise.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 9
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
14/50
Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketobecomebetterprepared
ResponsesTypeofaction (n=34)
Training 15Additionalplanning 6Increasevisibilityofsecuritystaff 5Partnerwithlocallawenforcement 4Increasetechnology 3Increasesecurityofficerstandards 1
Respondentswerethenaskedwhattheybelievedwasthebiggestimpedimenttofullerpreparedness.Amajorityofrespondentsidentifiedcostorlackoffundingasthemostsignificantissue(seeTable4),andrespondentsindicatedthatstateswereoflittlehelpwiththisproblem.Onlyfiverespondentssaidthatfundingforimprovedsecuritywasavailablethroughtheirstate.17
Thenextmostcommonimpedimenttobetterpreparednessnamedbythestateadvisorswasfearofdisruptingmallbusinessandfrighteningcustomers.Onerespondentstated,Hardeningopenenvironmentsimpliesrestrictionsandlimitationsthatimpedetrafficflowandimposeunaccustomedcontrolsonmallvisitors. Otherstateadvisorsfeltthatmallownerslackedawarenessorconcernaboutthethreatposedbyterrorism,thattrainingprogramswereinadequate,thatmallsecurityandfirstrespondershadfailedtocoordinateeffectively,orthatstateregulationoftheindustrywasdeficient.
Table4.Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?Responses
Obstacle (n=29)Cost/funding 18Disruptmallbusiness 4Lackofthreatawareness 3Trainingsub-par 2Lackofcoordinationwithfirstresponders 1Inadequateregulation 1
Thisquestionwasfollowedbyaquestionaskingwhetherornotrespondentsbelievedthattheretailmallindustrywaspreparedtotakeadditionalsecuritymeasures.Twooutof threestateadvisorsdidnotbelievethattheindustrywaspreparedtotake
Infact,itisverylikelythatthesefiverespondentswerereferringtotheBufferZoneProtectionprogram,whichprovidedfederalfundingforsecurityenhancementsforcriticalinfrastructuresitesrecommendedbythestates.final%20report%2dedited[1] 10
17
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
15/50
thesesteps,primarilybecauseofreluctancetospendmoneyonadditionalsecuritystafforothermeasuresthatcouldimprovepreparationandresponsetoterroristacts.LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders
Respondentswereaskedtheiropinionsaboutthelevelofcooperationbetweenmallsecurityandlocalfirstresponders.Thestatehomelandsecurityadvisorswereverypositiveabouttheserelationships.Twenty-six,orroughlythreeoutoffour,respondentscharacterizedrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandpublicpoliceasgoodorverygood,whiletheremaindercharacterizedrelationsasfair(seeFigure2).Asimilarnumber(23)ofthestateadvisorscharacterizedrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandemergencyservices(fireandEMT)asgoodorverygood.
Figure2.Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandfirstrespondersasgoodorverygood
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10Police Fire
Follow-upquestionsaskedrespondentswhethermallsecuritystaffconductedjointtrainingexerciseswithfirstresponders.Fifteen,orslightlylessthanhalf,ofthestatehomelandsecurityadvisorsaffirmedthattheywereawareofjointexercisesbetweensecuritystaffinsomemallsandlocalpolice.Thirteenaffirmedjointexerciseswithfireand/orEMTstaff.
Cooperationwithpublicofficialsprovedtobeanimportantstimulusforthedevelopmentofemergencypreparednessplans.Respondentswereaskedwhethertheyknewifmallshaddevelopedemergencyresponseplansthatspecifiedwhattodointheeventofterroristattackorothercatastrophicsituation.Sixteen,orslightlyunderhalf,ofthestateadvisorsrespondedintheaffirmative.NearlyalltheadvisorswhowereawareofemergencyresponseplansstatedthatthepublicsectorwasinvolvedintheirdevelopmentthroughtheBufferZoneProtectionProgramorthroughstateorlocalemergencyplanningefforts.Accordingtoonerespondent:final%20report%2dedited[1] 11
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
16/50
Localpoliceandemergencyserviceshavedevelopedresponseplansspecifictoaterroristattackatthemall.Thereiscoordinationtodevelopsimilarmatrixesforelevatedthreatlevelsecurityandpreventionmeasures.Bothmallofficialsandlocalfirstrespondersareactiveindeveloping
these
plans
due
to
the
clear
incentives
of
the
Buffer
Zone
ProtectionPlan.
PrivateSecurityRegulationStateadvisorswereaskedtheiropinionsregardingtheadequacyofstate
regulationconcerningprivatesecurity.Threeinfiverespondentsthatgaveananswertothisquestionbelievedthatthelegislationwaspoor,whilelessthanoneinfourcharacterizedtheirstateslegislationasgoodorverygood(seeFigure3).
Figure3.Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Poor Fair Good VeryGood
Of29advisorsanswering,19ortwooutofthreefeltthatadditionalstateregulationwouldhelptheindustry.Themostfrequentsuggestionswereforcreationofminimumtrainingstandardsandhiringstandards(seeTable5).Accordingtoonestateadvisor:
Somespecificmeasureswouldbetoupdatelawsasnecessaryforthescreeningofsecuritypersonnelandthemandateofappropriatetrainingpertainingtoprecursorincidentrecognitionandbasicresponsestoterrorattacks.Thislegislationshouldbedevelopedwithrecognizedsecurityprofessionalorganizationstoimprovesecuritystandardswithintheindustry.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 12
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
17/50
Table5.SuggestionsforadditionalstateregulationResponses
Suggestedmeasure (n=21)Minimumtrainingstandards 16Hiringstandards 4Othermeasurescited 1
RespondentswerethenaskediftheythoughtthereshouldbeuniformnationalstandardsregulatingtheprivatesecurityindustryintheUnitedStates.Twenty,ornearlytwooutof three,stateadvisorsrespondedaffirmatively.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 13
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
18/50
3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectorsWesentletterswithsurveysattachedto1,372securitydirectorsofenclosedretail
mallsacrossthecountryhavingatleast250,000squarefeet.TheletterswerewrittenonASISletterhead.Theresponserateforthefirstwavewasdisappointing:wereceivedjust32completedsurveys.Severalsecuritydirectorscalledandtoldusthattheyhadbeeninstructedbytheirparentorganizationsnottocooperatewiththesurvey.TheselargemallownersweremembersoftheSecurityCommitteeoftheInternationalCouncilofShoppingCenters.Severalweekslater,afollow-upletterwassentout,thistimeonNationalInstituteofJusticeletterhead.Thesecondlettergotasomewhatbetterresponse,foratotalof120completedsurveys.Thisiscertainlylowerthantheratewehadhopedfor,butbetterthanwemighthaveexpected,giventhecircumstances.Wedidnotobservesignificantdifferencesinresponserateseitherbysizeofmallorregionofthecountry(EastCoast,South,Midwest,West,orWestCoast).
Themediannumberofsecurityemployeesatthemallsrespondingtothesurveywas5full-timeand5part-timestaff.Themedianstartinghourlyrateforofficerswas$8.50,andtheaverageforallsecuritystaffwas$9.50.HiringStandards
Webeganthesurveybyaskingmallsecuritydirectorsaboutqualificationsforhiringnewemployees.Nearlyhalfofrespondentssaidtheyhadeducationstandards,mostoftenahighschooldiplomaorGED;veryfewmallsrequiredadvancededucationofnewhires(seeTable6).Aboutoneinthreerespondentssaidthattheyhadexperiencerequirementsincludingpriorlawenforcement,military,orsecurityexperienceand/orstatecertification.Lessthanoneintenindicatedthattheyhadagerequirements,andaboutthesameproportionsaidtheyhadotherrequirements,includingavaliddriverslicenseorcleandrivingrecord.
Table6.HiringstandardsformallsecuritystaffMinimumqualificationsintermsofeducationand
experienceforsecuritystaff Responses(n=276) PercentEducation/skills 133 48.2
Highschool 86 31.1GED 35 12.7Somecollege 7 2.5Verbal/writtenskills(English) 3 1.1A.A.
or
B.A.
in
criminal
justice
2
0.8
Experience/Training 88 31.8
Securityexperience 24 8.7Statecertification/license/training 16 5.8Generalexperience 10 3.6Noexperience/qualifications 10 3.6Lawenforcementexperience 6 2.2In-housetraining 6 2.2
final%20report%2dedited[1] 14
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
19/50
Minimumqualificationsintermsofeducationandexperienceforsecuritystaff Responses(n=276) Percent
Militaryexperience 5 1.8Off-dutypoliceofficer/deputy/somepoliceofficertraining 3 1.0Peaceofficer 2 0.7Correctionsexperience 2 0.7Other 4 1.6
Agerequirements 22 7.9Atleast18yearsofage 12 4.3Atleast21yearsofage 10 3.6
Otheremploymentrequirements 33 12.0Cleanrecord 13 4.7Validdriverslicense 7 2.5Drugtest 4 1.4Other
9
3.4
Wealsoaskedrespondentswhethertheyrequiredbackgroundchecksonnewemployees.Nearlyallrespondentssaidtheyrequiredcriminalbackgroundchecks,whileslightlymorethanhalfrequireddrugtestsaswell(seeTable7).
Table7.BackgroundchecksformallsecuritystaffTypeofbackgroundcheckconductedon
newemployees Responses(n=118) PercentCriminalbackgroundchecksonly 48 40.7Drugtestsonly 1 0.8Bothbackgroundchecksanddrugtests 65 55.1Neitherbackgroundchecksnordrugtests 4 3.4
TrainingParticipantswereaskedhowmanyhoursoftrainingnewemployeesreceive.
Trainingaveragedaboutaweek(mean=45.1hours;median=40hours).Thevastmajorityofnewemployeetrainingwaseitherdonein-house(50%)orbytheparentsecuritycompanyorganization(31%).Localgovernmententities(police,fire,orstate/countyofficials)togetherconductedtrainingat17%ofthesites(seeTable1inAppendixAforfurtherdetail).
Whenaskedifemployeesreceivespecialtrainingonpreventingandrespondingtoterrorism,justoverhalf(52%)ofthesecuritydirectorsrespondedaffirmatively.Whenaskedtoindicatewhichareasareincorporatedintotheirantiterrorismtraining,thedirectorsmostcommonlycitedworkingwithfirstresponders(46%).Another43%mentionedsecuringthesceneafteranattack,41%identifiedaccesscontrol,40%saidrespondingtochangesinnationalalertlevels,and34%indicatedidentifyingterroristsfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 15
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
20/50
(seeTable8).Otherareasidentifiedbysmallernumbersofsecuritydirectorsincludedtraininginweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs)andevacuationprocedures.
Table8.AntiterrorismtrainingAreasincludedinthemalls
antiterrorismtrainingWorkingwithfirstrespondersSecuringthesceneafteranattackAccesscontrolRespondingtochangesinnationalalertlevelIdentifyingterroristsWMDOther
Responses(n=120)
5552494841414
Percent45.843.340.840.034.23.311.7
Antiterrorismtrainingwasprovidedin-houseaccordingto28%ofsecuritydirectors.Theremaindersaidthatthetrainingwasconductedbyavarietyofsources,mostcommonly lawenforcementorfirepersonnel,trainersfromparentsecurityorganizations,consultants,orhomelandsecurity(forabreakdown,seeTable2inAppendixA).Justoveroneinthreerespondents(38%)believedthattheirmallsantiterrorismtrainingwasadequate.Exactlyhalfbelieveditwasinadequate,andtherestwerenotsure.
Figure4:Is your antiterrorism training program adequate?
AdequateInadequateUnsure
ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingonSecuritySince9/11Weaskedthesecuritydirectorshowmuchhadchangedsince9/11/2001.Itturned
outthatremarkablylittlehadchanged(seeTable9).Only6%ofrespondentssaidthathiringstandardsweremorestringentsince9/11andjustoneintensaidthatadditionalbackgroundverificationwasbeingrequiredsince9/11.Thosewhodidhaveadditionalfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 16
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
21/50
requirementsindicatedthattheynowconductedmorethoroughchecksorrandrugchecks(seeTable3inAppendixA).
Table9.Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurityspendingsince9/11
Change Responses(n=120) PercentHiringstandardsYes 7 5.8No 113 94.2BackgroundchecksYes 13 10.8No 107 89.2TrainingYes 38 32.2No 71 60.2Dontknow 9 7.6SecurityspendingYes 19 15.8No 101 84.2
Similarly,just16%ofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheirbudgetshadincreasedbeyondtherateofinflationsince2001.Thosewhoindicatedanincreaseinexpendituressaidthattheincreasedfundshadbeenspentonnewtechnology(bettercommunicationorCCTVsystems),increasedmanpower,developingemergencyresponseplans,orperformingriskassessments(seeTables4through4dinAppendixA).
PreventionStrategiesThenextsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentsaboutprotectivemeasuresthey
mayhavetakentoreducethelikelihoodofaterroristattack.Theseincludedthedevelopmentofsecuritygoalsandobjectives,humansurveillancestrategies,accesscontrol,andtechnology.Slightlyoveroneinthree(37%)ofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheyhaddevelopedasetofgoalsandobjectiveswithrespecttoprotectionfromterroristattack.Oneinfoursaidthattheyhadspecificperformancemeasurestodefinewhethertheyweremeetingthosegoals.
Patrol strategies. Fewmalls(34%)everusedundercoverstaffaspartoftheirsurveillancestrategy,andmostofthesedidsoonlyoccasionally.Butabouthalf(49%)oftherespondentssaidthattheirstaffwereinstructedtobeonthelookoutforunusualbehaviorordressofmallclients.Thekindsofthingssecuritystaffwereinstructedtolookforincludedgenerallysuspiciousbehavior,takingphotosornotesofthefacilities,
final%20report%2dedited[1] 17
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
22/50
suspiciousclothing(extrabulky),andlargeorotherwiseunusualpackages(seeTable10).
Table10.Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff
Characteristic Responses(n=94) PercentageSuspiciousbehavior(ingeneral) 18 19.5Takingphotographs/videos/notes 16 17.0Unusual/suspiciousclothing 16 17.0Carryinglarge/suspiciouspackages 11 11.7Loitering 7 7.5Unusualinterest/curiosity 5 5.3Suspiciousappearance(ingeneral) 4 4.2Suspiciousvehicles 3 3.2Foreignersactingsuspicious 3 3.2Largegroups/gangs 2 2.1Youngeradults 2 2.1Abandonedpackages 2 2.1Other 5 5.5
Almostallrespondentssaidthattheirmallshadwell-definedpoliciesonwhattodowhensecurityguardsencounteredasuspiciousperson.Inmostcases,theencouragedresponsewastocontinuesurveillanceand/orreporttoasupervisororlawenforcement,ifrequired(seeTable11).Aboutoneintenrespondentssaidthattheirpolicywastohavestaffapproachandtalktothesuspiciousindividualtogainbetterinformationonwhattheyweredoing.
Table11.Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons
Whattheofficershoulddo Responses(n=89) PercentageReportbehavior(tosupervisor/dispatch/otherofficers) 30 33.7Continuesurveillance 27 30.3Informpolice(ifrequired) 16 18.0Approach(non-threatening) 10 11.2Other 6 6.6
Nearlytwointhree(63%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirpatrolandsurveillancestrategieshadchangedsince9/11.Themostfrequentchangesweretoincreasethevisibilityofsecurityofficers,instructofficerstobealertforsuspiciousindividuals,andpaymoreattentiontocarsanddeliverytruckscomingintothemall(seeTable12).
final%20report%2dedited[1] 18
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
23/50
Table12.Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11
Patrolandsurveillancestrategies Responses(n=32) PercentageMorepatrols/strategies/visibility 12 37.5Heightenedawareness/alertness 8 25.0Moreattentiontovehicles/parking/firelanes 4 12.5Moreattentiontodeliveries/truckdrivers 2 6.3Other 6 18.6
Access control. Weaskedrespondentswhethertheyhadplanstorestrictaccesstosensitiveareasofthemallincaseofachangeinthenationalthreatadvisorysystemoraspecificthreat.Sixintenansweredaffirmatively.Nearlythesameproportion(56%)saidthattheyhaddevelopedorreviewedplanstokeeppotentialwrong-doersfrombreachingsensitiveareassince9/11.
Technology.Weaskedthesecuritydirectorsaboutwhethertheyemployedtechnologytomaketheirmallsmoresecure.HalfofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheirmallhadaCCTVsystem(seeTable13).Thevastmajorityofthesesystems(81%)wereusedtomonitoreventsinrealtime.Threeintenmallshadinstalledbollards,orpassivebarriers,topreventvehiclesfrombreachingtheentrance.Fifteenpercentofmallsreportedemployingexplosivedetectiontechnologyorbomb-sniffingdogs,whileoneintenhadinstalledtechnologytocleantheairinsidethemallofsmokeorothercontaminants.Verysmallpercentagesofmallshadinstalledwindowfilmorexplosive-resistanttrashcans(4%)orequipmenttodetectbiologicalorchemicalagents(1%).
Table13.Technologicalsecuritymeasures
Securitymeasure Responses(n=120) PercentageSurveillancecamerasYes 60 50.0No 60 50.0PassivebarriersYes 36 30.0No 84 70.0Explosivedetectiondevices/caninesYes 18 15.0No 102 85.0AirdecontaminationtechnologyYes 12 10.0No 108 90.0Windowfilm/explosive-resistanttrashcansYes 5 4.2No 115 95.8DetectionofbiologicalorchemicalagentsYes 1 0.8No 119 99.2
final%20report%2dedited[1] 19
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
24/50
EmergencyPreparednessThreeoutoffour(73%)securitydirectorsreportedthattheyhaddeveloped
writtenprotocolsforsecuritystafftofollowintheeventofadisaster.Thesameproportionreportedthattheseplansincludedcoordinationandcommunicationwithlocallawenforcement,fire,andmedicalfirstresponders.Amuchsmallernumber(3in10)hadheldexercisestorehearseemergencyprotocolswithfirstresponders.Mostcommonly,theexerciseswereheldwithlocalpoliceorfiredepartments.OthermallsconductedexerciseswithEMTs,RedCross,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),orFBIstaff(seeTable14).CoordinationWiththePublicSector
Mallsecuritydirectorsindicatedalowlevelofsupportfromtheirstatehomelandsecurityadvisors.Just3%saidthattheirstateadvisorswereveryinvolvedwithsecurityplanning,whilefully78%saidthattheiradvisorswerenotatallinvolved(seeTable15).ThemajorimpetusforinvolvementofthestateadvisorsinmallsecurityhasbeentheBufferZoneProtectionProgram(BZPP).Ninepercentofsurveyrespondentssaidthattheirmallhadbeendesignatedasacriticalassetunderthatprogram,andanother7%believedthattheywouldreceivesuchdesignation.SecuritydirectorsindicatedthatfundsreceivedthroughtheBZPPwouldbeusedtoinstallorupgradeCCTVsystems,installbollards,orimprovetrainingofsecurityofficers(foracompletebreakdown,seeTable5inAppendixA).
Table14.PartnersinpreparednessexercisesAgenciesparticipatinginmallsrehearsalofemergencyprotocols Responses(n=90) Percentage
Policedepartment 28 31.1Firedepartment 27 30.0EMS 10 11.1County/cityagencies 5 5.6RedCross 2 2.2FBI 2 2.2FEMA 2 2.2Other 14 15.4
final%20report%2dedited[1] 20
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
25/50
Table15.StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanningInvolvementofstatehomelandsecurity
advisorinplanning,reviewing,orapprovingmallsecuritymeasures Responses(n=117) Percentage
Veryinvolved 3 2.6Somewhatinvolved 23 19.7Notatallinvolved 91 77.8
Surveyrespondentsreportedthattheirlocalpoliceweremoreinvolvedwithsecurityintheirmallsthanwerethestatehomelandsecurityadvisors.AsTable16shows,twointhreemallsecuritydirectorscharacterizedtheirlocalpoliceasbeingatleastsomewhatinvolvedintheirsecurityplanning.Nearlyhalf(44%)ofmallsecuritydirectorsstatedthatlawenforcementofficialsregularlysharedkeyintelligencewiththem,andanother34%saidthatinformationwassometimesshared.Aboutoneinthree(36%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirrelationswithlocallawenforcementhadbecomeclosersince9/11.
Table16.LawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanningInvolvementoflocalandstatelaw
enforcementinplanning,reviewing,orapprovingmallsecuritymeasures Responses(n=117) Percentage
Veryinvolved 21 17.6Somewhatinvolved 57 47.9Notatallinvolved 41 34.5
Byalargemajority(63%),mallsecurityofficialswouldwelcomegreaterinvolvementoftheirstateDHSandlawenforcementofficialsinsecurityplanning.(Infact,80%hadinvitedlocalpolicetopatrolorsetupaministationinthemall.) Surveyrespondentsfeltthatpublicofficialscouldassistthemsharingmorekeyintelligence(40%),byconductingriskassessmentsordevelopingemergencymanagementplans(33%),orhelpingtotrainsecurityofficers(27%).
Nearlythreeinfourmallsecuritydirectors(72%)alsofeltthattherewerespecificthingsthatthefederalDHScoulddotomakemallssafer.Whatmostrespondentswantedwashelpwithtrainingandbettersharingofthreatintelligence.Otherssoughtmorefunding
for
equipment
or
help
with
developing
emergency
plans
(see
Table
17).
final%20report%2dedited[1] 21
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
26/50
l%20report%2dedited[1] 22
Figure 1: Rating of Security Threats
Table17.AssistancesoughtfromDHSHowDHScouldhelpmake
largeretailmallssaferProvideorassistwithtraining/education/seminars/drillsMorecommunication/information/contact/updatesMorefundingfortraining/equipmentHelpwithdevelopingprocedures/policies/plans/strategiesSetminimumsecuritystandards/training
Responses(n=78)242413125
Percentage30.830.816.715.46.4
OpinionsAboutTerroristThreatThefinalsectionofthequestionnaireaskedsecuritydirectorsabouttheirthoughts
onthedangerposedbyterrorismandanyadditionalstepstheybelievednecessarytoadequatelyprotecttheirmalls.Theywereaskedtorateterrorismandfiveothersecurityconcerns(shoplifting,vandalism,burglary,kidsloitering,androbbery)intermsofimportanceindailysecuritywork.Theresults,presentedinFigure5,indicatethatterrorismwasrankedfirstby27%ofrespondents,slightlylessthanthe30%whorankedkidsloiteringasfirst.Interestingly,terrorismwasalsothesecurityconcernmostoftenratedasleastimportant.Oneinthreerespondentsratedterrorismlastfarmorethanratedanyotherconcernlast.Thissuggestsabipolarreactiontotheterroristthreat:itwaseitheraseriousconcernorwasviewedasaproblemconfinedtocertaincitiesandnotonehighontheprioritylistofmallsintheheartland.
Figure5.SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats
fina
VandalismBurglary
RobberyShoplifting
TerrorismKids loitering
0 10 20 30 40 50
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
27/50
Figure 2: Most Likely Form of Attack
Securitydirectorsbelievedthat,ifaterroristattackcame,itwouldmostlikelytaketheformofabombblastintheinteriorofamall(seeFigure6).Smallnumbersofrespondentsalsofearedacarbomb,attackwithsmallarms,orabiologicalorchemicalattack.
Figure6.
Most
likely
form
of
attack
0
Bio/chemattack
Carbomb
Firearms
Bombinterior
20 40 60 80 100
Slightlymorethanoneinthreesecuritydirectors(38%)believedthatimplementingadditionalsecuritymeasureswascritical.Themostcommonmeasuressoughtinvolvednewequipmenttobettermonitorthemallortoprotectitfromcarbombs(seeTable18).Somerespondentsalsothoughtmorefundsfortrainingwereimportant.Just16%ofsecuritydirectorswhoarticulatedcriticalmeasuressaidthatthoseneedswerebeingaddressed,andthree-quartersoftheserespondentssaidthiswasduetolackoffunds.
Table18.AdditionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcriticalCriticalmeasures Responses(n=43) Percentage
Securityequipment/surveillance/barriers/detection 23 53.5Moreandimprovedtraining 11 25.6Funding 3 7.0
final%20report%2dedited[1] 23
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
28/50
Communication 2 4.7Morepersonnel 2 4.7Domesticterrorism 1 2.3Increasedpayandbenefits 1 2.3
final%20report%2dedited[1] 24
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
29/50
4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMallsInthissection,wediscusstheresultsofourvisitstoeightU.S.mallsandtwomallsinIsrael.TheeightU.S.mallsweredoublethenumbercalledforinourproject
workplan. Wefeltitwasimportanttoexpandthenumberofsitevisits,inpartbecausewehadalowsurveyresponseratebutmoreimportantlybecausethesitevisitsprovidedanopportunitytogatherfarmorecomprehensiveinformationthanwecouldhopetogainthroughasurvey.Forexample,inthesurveywecouldonlyaskwhethermallshadanemergencyresponseplan.Inthesitevisits,wecouldtrytoascertainhowspecifictheplanwasandwhetheritwasrehearsedbystaff.Wecannotclaimthattheeightmallswevisitedwererepresentativeoftheindustrysincethenumberissmalland,aswiththesurvey,weranintooppositionfromsomeofthelargemallowners.However,themallswevisitedweregeographicallydiverse,spreadacrossCalifornia,Texas,Wisconsin,andUtah.Theywerediverseaswellintermsofownershipandhowsecuritywasprovided(locallyorthroughnationalcompanies).
Ateachsite,wespoketothemallsecuritydirector,localpolice,andlocalfireofficials.Wedonotdivulgetheidentitiesofthemallsherebothtoavertthepossibilityofdisclosingconfidentialsecurityinformationandalsotoprotecttheidentitiesofthesecuritydirectors,someofwhomspoketousinspiteofcontraindicationsfromtheirparentcompanies.SpendingonSecurity
Oneofthemostconsistentandstrikingfindingsduringthesitevisitswasthatmallswevisitedhavenotmadeanysignificantinvestmentinincreasedsecurityfollowing9/11.WiththeexceptionofsitesthatreceivedfederaldollarsthroughtheBufferZoneProtectionProgram,wedidnotobserveanyincreasesinspendingbeyondinflationoverthepastfouryears.(Infact,onemallhaddramaticallycutitssecuritybudget.) Theprivatesectorgenerallyhasnotinvestedinimprovingsecurityeithertoprotectagainstemergencysituationssuchasaterroristattackortoprotectagainstpettycrimescommittedinmalls.
TheBufferZoneProtectionProgramwastheonlysignificantsourceoffundingforupgradingsecuritythatweobservedduringsitevisits.Accesstoprogramfundsappearedlargelytobeafunctionoftheprioritiesofeachstateshomelandsecurityadvisor.Weobservedthat,insitesthathadreceivedBZPPfunds,locallawenforcement,workingwiththestatehomelandsecurityoffices,tooktheinitiativeandcontactedareamallstoconductariskassessment.OtherstatesappearednottoplacemallshighontheirpriorityliststoreceiveBZPPfunds.18OnemallownereagertoparticipateintheBZPPhadbeenunabletoinitiateariskassessmentforhismallsintwostates,thefirststepingettingBZPPfunds.BZPPgrantdecisionsweremadebyDHS,butinformedbyrecommendationsofstatehomelandsecurity
advisors.final%20report%2dedited[1] 2518
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
30/50
BZPPfundswereusedtoenhancevideosurveillancesystemsintwoofthefourmallsthathadreceivedgrants.Intwoofthesites,BZPPmoneywasusedtohelpimproveregionalresponsetodisasters.Forexample,onejurisdictionusedBZPPmallfundstohelpfundamobilecommandvehicleforthelocalpolicethatwouldassistinrespondingto
terrorism
or
other
disaster
at
the
facility.
The
vehicle
has
the
ability
to
access
the
mall
videosurveillancesystemfromaremotelocationintheeventofadisaster.RiskAssessment
Riskassessments,whenconducted,havelargelybeendrivenbytheBZPPapplicationprocess.Thisprocedure,codifiedbytheDHSandgenerallyimplementedbystateorlocalhomelandsecurityofficials,isquasi-quantitativeandemploysstandardriskassessmenttechniquesdevelopedbythemilitary.Itdeterminesprobabilitiesandpotentiallossesfordifferenttypesofhazardsoccurringatvariouslocationswithinfacilities.Infiveoftheeightmalls,ariskassessmenthadbeenconductedattheinstigationofthestatehomelandsecurityadvisor.(Followingtheassessment,fourofthefivemallshadbeendesignatedasBZPPsites;onehadnot.) Forexample,theriskassessmentatonemalldeterminedthatthemajorriskpotentiallyimpactinglivesandpropertywouldbeabombblastinthemallsfoodcourt.Suchablast,itwasdetermined,wouldproducethemostcasualtiesandpotentiallyharmthestructuralintegrityofthatpartofthemall.Thisknowledgewasincorporatedintoexercisesforsecuritystaff.
ThethreemallsnotconsideredforBZPPstatushadnotundertakenriskassessmentsontheirown,evenonaninformalbasis. Insomecases,mallssimplywerenotatthetopofthelistoflocalcriticalsites.Butinonemallwevisited,thesecuritydirectortoldusthatlocallawenforcementhadofferedtoconductariskassessment,butthatmallownershaddeclined,worriedaboutpotentialliabilityiftheyfailedtoimplement
precautionary
measures
following
arisk
assessment.
Without
undergoing
someformofriskassessmentprocess,itisdifficultformallmanagerstoarriveatanunderstandingaboutwhatelementsshouldbeprotectedandwhichstrategiesshouldbeemployedforpreventionofspecificassets.PreventionTactics
Weobservedbothhumanandtechnologicaldeterrentstrategies.Onemallwevisitedhadinstalledbollards,orbarriers,toprotectagainstthepossibilityofacarbombbeingdetonatedinsidethemall.Severalothersecuritydirectorssaidthatbollardswouldbeagoodidea,butthattheircompanydidnothaveplanstoimplementthem.Mostmallshadpoliciesdesignedtomonitorandrestrictdeliveriestostores.Deliverytruckswerecheckedcomingin,andnonroutinedeliverieswerecheckedoutbeforeallowingthedriverstoproceed.Afewmallsrestricteddeliveriestooff-hourswhenstoreswereclosedorthemallwaslesspopulated.Othersecuritydirectorssaidthattheywouldmovetosuchaplanifthenationalalertlevelwentuporifaspecificthreatagainstthemallwasuncovered.
Singlingoutandobserving mallvisitorswasanimportantpartofhumanpreventiontactics. But,accordingtopolicies,profilingwasbasednotonethnicitybutonfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 26
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
31/50
dressorpatternsofbehavior(referbacktoTable10).Commonactivitiesprohibitedwerephotographyandlargegroupgatherings.Inonemallthatwevisited,securitystaffhad,infact,observedagroupofmiddleeasternmenphotographingsensitivelocationsinsidethemall:Thegroupwasconfrontedbysecuritystaffandfledbeforepolicearrived.Othertypesofbehavioralprofilingwerelesswell-definedandcoveredcharacteristicssuchasobvious
bulges
under
clothing,
carrying
large
backpacks,
wearing
heavy
coats,
unwillingnesstomakeeyecontact,frequentingthesameareaofthemallrepeatedly,orsittinginoneplacetoolong.Whensecuritystaffencounteredpersonsactingsuspiciously,accordingtothedefinitionsofaparticularmall,thestaffwereinstructedtoobserveorengagethesuspectsin conversation.Ifthesecurityguardscuriositywasnotsatisfied,heorshewastheninstructedtocallthelocalpolice.Wealsoaskedsecuritydirectorsaboutwhethertheyemployedundercoverofficersintheirpreventionstrategies.Asingledirectorrespondedaffirmatively,andeventhen,onlyatcertaintimes,suchasholidays.Thethinkingseemedtobethatofficersweremostvaluablewhenconductingvisiblepatrols.
Deterrencemost
often
relied
on
CCTV
systems.
All
but
one
mall
we
visited
had
someformofCCTVsysteminplace.Thesystemsvariedintheirsophistication:someweremonitoredconstantly,whileothersrecordedeventsforsecuritystafftorefertoaftertheeventhadoccurred.Visiblesecuritypatrolsalsoweredesignedtoactasadeterrent,withpatrolsoftenincreasedatholidaysandotherpeakusagetimes.TrainingPrograms
Allofthemallswevisitedhadimplementedsomeformofantiterrorismtrainingforsecuritystaff.Weencounteredmanyvarietiesoftrainingprograms.Somemallsthathadcontractedwithanationalsecurityfirmhadgenericcompanyprograms,somehadtrainingprogramsdevelopedbystategovernment,andsomeusedtheprogrampromulgated
by
DHS.
In
the
case
of
contracted
mall
security,
training
is
often
viewed
as
akeycompetitiveadvantageofonecontractoroveranother,anditwasmarketedassuch.
Theformatoftheterrorismpreparednesstrainingprogramsvaried.Mostconsistedofaclassroomformatusuallyfourhoursinlength,sometaughtbyoutsideexpertsandothersbymallsecuritydirectorstrainedbyexperts.Onemallhadatext-basedapproach,wheresecuritystaffwererequiredtolearnfromprintedmaterialsandthentakeatesttoindicatemastery.Contentappearedtovarybutmostlyfocusedonidentifyingpotentialterrorists;spottingsuspiciouspackages;andresponsetoanattack,includingsecuringthesceneandworkingwithfirstresponders.Mallsgenerallydidnothavewaystoevaluatewhetherinformationimpartedinterroristtrainingprogramswasretained
for
long
or
affected
the
way
security
staff
approached
their
jobs.
Thehighrateofturnoveramongmallsecuritystafflessenedthelong-termutility
oftraining.Wagesintheindustryaregenerallylow($8to$11/hour)withlittleroomforadvancement.Mostsecuritydirectorssaidthattheyexperienced100%turnoverwithinayear.Whensecuritypersonnelleaveamall,theinvestmentintrainingleaveswiththem;theeffectofthehighturnoveristhat,atanygiventime,thesecuritystaffincludesagood
final%20report%2dedited[1] 27
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
32/50
numberofnewrecruitswhoareinexperiencedandhavenotreceivedanythingbeyondbasictraining.EmergencyResponsePlans
Allmallswevisitedhadwrittenprocedurestofollowintheeventofathreattothemall,orinanactualemergency.Typicalprotocolsfollowingathreattothemallincludedlimitingaccesstocriticalareasofthemall,increasingsecuritystaffpresence,andkeepingaclosereyeonparkinglotsandmallentrances.AnumberofmallshadstandardizedproceduresforsecuritypersonnelintheeventofachangeintheDHSThreatAdvisorySystem.Detailsweresimilartostepstakeninresponsetoaspecificthreatagainstthemall,includingstepped-uppatrolsandrestrictedtruckaccess.
Foremergencies,writtenprocedurescoveredevacuations(intheeventoffire,gasleakorsuspectedbomb),emergencycommunications,small-armsattacks,basicfirst-aidandtriage,aswellasthenormalproceduresforhandlinglostchildren,misplacedproperty,andsoforth.Inemergencies,protocolformostmallscalledforcontactingemergencyservices,contactingdesignatedemergencymanagementstaffinthemall(mallowner,securitydirector),providingfirstaidforanyinjuries,evacuatingpeople,and/orsealingoffanareaofthemall.Someplansweremorespecific,includinghavingsecuritystaffmeetatdesignatedlocations,settingupfirstaidandcommandareas,orevacuatingthroughspecificroutes.
Noneofthemallswevisitedhaddevelopedwaystocoordinatewithfirstrespondersintheeventofanemergency.Theonlymeansofcommunicatingwithfirstresponderswasbyphone.Thegeneralplaninallcaseswasthat,oncefirstrespondersarrivedonthescene,theywouldtakechargeandmallstaffwouldfollowanyinstructionstheywereissuedbypoliceorfireofficials.Innoneofthemallswevisitedwasitclearwho
would
be
responsible
for
briefing
first
responders
or
how
mall
security
evacuation
planswouldbecoordinatedgivenlawenforcementsneedtoretainandintervieweyewitnesses.Onelawenforcementofficialwasbluntinhisassessment:Wedonttakemallsecurityintoaccount.Theyarepoorlytrainedandnotprofessional.
Anemergencyresponseplanmustbewellunderstoodbystaffinordertobeeffective.Wedonotknowfromourvisitstheextenttowhichsecuritystaffhadinternalizedtheseplans.Itwasnotencouragingthat,inonemall,thesecuritydirectorsaidthathewouldrefertohiscompanysmanualintheeventofanemergency.Twoofthemallsweobservedcarriedoutexercisestorehearseresponsetoemergencies.Inone,therehearsalswerelimitedtofindingsimulatedbombsandtakingappropriateaction.Inthe
other,
exercises
also
included
asimulated
response
to
abomb
detonation
and
was
quitesophisticated,includingevacuatingpeople,settinguptriageandpressareas,anddesignatingahelicopterlandingarea.
Themostsignificantgapinemergencypreparednesswasthelackofcoordinationbetweenmallsecurityandthesecuritystaffofthelargemallanchorstores.Inonemall,securitycouldcommunicatewithtenantsbyradio;butinallothermalls,thesolemeansofcommunicationbetweenmallsecurityandtenantswasbyphone.Inonlyonemallfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 28
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
33/50
weretenantsinvolvedinthemallsoverallemergencyresponseplans.Usually,thedecisiontoevacuateanchorstoresandtheresponsibilitytooverseetheevacuationwasuptostoresecurityorstoremanagement.Inseveralmalls,securitydirectorsexplicitlytoldusthatrelationswithsecuritystaffinanchorstoreswereminimalor,inonecase,evenhostile.RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement
Wefoundwidevariationinhowlocallawenforcementandregionalterrorismtaskforceshadbeeninvolvedinmallsecurity.Weobservedmallsthathadacloserelationshipwithlocallawenforcement.Theserelationshipsweresometimesdrivenbystatehomelandsecurityplansthatincludedmallsinriskassessmentsofcriticalinfrastructure. Inothercases,theyweredrivenbymallsecuritydirectorsdrawnfromtheranksofthelocalpolice,whostillhadpersonaltiestomembersofthepoliceforce. Instillothercases,theyweredrivenbythepresenceofpoliceofficersstationedinthemall.Suchmallsparticipatedinriskassessments,andtheirsecuritydirectorsfeltthatthepoliceweregenerousinsharinginformation.
Ontheotherhand,wealsoobservedmallsthathadlittlerelationshipwithlocallawenforcement.Thesemallsweregenerallynotprivytopoliceintelligencedataanddidnotparticipateinriskassessmentsoremergencyplans.Forexample,inadiscussionwithlocalfirstrespondersatonelocation,bothpoliceandfireofficialsacknowledgedthat,althoughtheyprobablyshouldhaveestablishedcontactpeopleinmajorstoresinthelocalmall,mappedoutexitroutes,andcreatedanevacuationplan,theyhadnoplanstodoso.Duringourdiscussion,theyalsodiscoveredthattheydidnotevenhavefloorplansforthemalltorefertoincaseofanemergency.
Wedidnotfindanymallsamongtheeightwevisitedthatconductedjointexercises
with
local
first
responders
and
law
enforcement.
There
seemed
to
be
two
reasonsforthis:sometimeslocallawenforcementdidnotconsidermallsahighprioritytargetandhaddecidedtoexpendtheireffortsonothertypesoffacilities.Butmoreoften,itwasthemallsthatresistedbecausetheycouldnotfindaconvenienttimeordidnotwanttoalarmthepublic.Thissituationrepresentsalargedisconnectinresponsetoemergencies.Mostmallsecurityforceshaveconceptualizedtheirroleinemergenciesasaninitialtriageforcethatwillrapidlyhandoffactualsituationstofirstresponders,yettheyhavenotpracticedthishand-offinajointexercise.Assessment
Wedidnotencounteranyactiveprogramstoevaluatewhatguardsderivedfromterrorismtraining,orifterrorismpreventionandresponsewasactuallyincorporatedintodailyworkroutines.Similarly,wedidnotobserveinanymallsstandardsforevaluatingwhethertheirpreparednessplansortheirresponsetoasimulatedemergencywereadequate.(Ofcourse,thispointislargelymootsincefewmallsconductemergencypreparednessexercises.) Withnotabletoporliveexercisesandnoclearstandardsforevaluation,itisimpossibletosayhowwellstaffwouldrespondintheeventofadisaster.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 29
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
34/50
TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMallsIsraelistheworldleaderinexperience-basedexpertisewithantiterrorismefforts
inretailmalls.Intheyearssince9/11,manylawenforcementagenciesintheUnitedStateshaveattendedpresentationsgivenbyIsraelisecuritydirectorsaspartofcomprehensiveantiterrortraininginitiativessponsoredbytheJusticeDepartmentandotherfederalagencies.TheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmenthasoftensentofficerstoIsraeltobetraindinantiterrortactics.
TheterrorismthreatinIsraelisqualitativelydifferentthanthethreatthatU.S.citizensfacetoday.Therefore,antiterrorismeffortsinIsraelimallsdonotrepresentafairstandardforU.S.malls.Still,itisusefultoobserveIsraelimallsasanexemplarofwhatcanbedonewhenmotivationandfundsareathighlevels.InNovemberof2005,researchersconductedsitevisitstotwoofthelargestmallsinIsrael,theAzrieliCenterandtheJerusalemMall.Ateachsite,wemetwiththemallsecurityrepresentatives.Asexpected,wefoundvastdifferencesbetweenU.S.andIsraelimalls.Someofthemostnotabledifferencesarediscussedbelow.
Security strategy. MallsecurityplansinIsraelplacethemallatthecenterofthreeconcentriccircles.Intheoutermostcirclearerovingpatrolsofoneortwosecurityofficersandvehicleinspectionpoints.Bollardsandretractablebarriersareusedtokeepvehiclesfrombeingdriventhroughthecheckpoints.Allvehiclesenteringmallparkingareasaresubjectedtoasearchofthepassengerandtrunkcompartments.Inaddition,driversareassertivelyquestionedbysecurityofficersinanefforttodeterminewhethertheyposeapossiblesecuritythreat.UnlikeU.S.malls,ethnicprofilingisanintegralpartofthescreeningprocess.Onceinsidetheoutermostperimeter,allpedestriansattemptingtoenterthemallhavetheirbagssearchedandmustbescannedbyametaldetector.Screeningsareconductedbyrelativelylow-paid,unarmedsecuritystaff,buttheyaremonitored
by
ahighly
trained
guard
armed
with
asubmachine
gun.
Inside
the
mall
(the
innermostcircle),oneortwoarmedsecurityofficerspatrolandobservevisitors.
Theintentoftheconcentriccircleapproachistointerceptterroristsbeforetheyactuallygetinsidethemall.Thisapproachhasworkedextremelywell.Israelhashadtenattacksagainstmallsinrecentyears,severalofwhichinvolvedsuicidebomberswhoinflictedfatalities.However,noneoftheattackerspenetratedtotheinteriorofthemallwheretheycouldhavedonefarmoreseriousdamage.
Securitychiefsofbothmallsacknowledgedthatevenstringentsecuritymeasuresmightnotbeenoughtostopadeterminedattack.Therefore,theysay,deterrenceanddisplacement
is
abig
part
of
their
strategy.
One
security
director
believed
that
visible
securitymeasureswereresponsibleforthetherehavingbeenrelativelyfewattacksagainstmalls,butmanyagainstbuses.
Spending on security.Israelimallsspendmillionsofdollarseachyearonsecurity.Accordingtooneofthesecuritydirectors,approximately40%oftheoperationalbudgetofIsraelimallsisdevotedtosecurity.(Hecontrastedthiswith3%to5%intheU.S.) Severalfactorsdrivethiscost.Whenstringentgovernmentalregulationandfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 30
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
35/50
licensingrequirementswereadopted,mallswereforcedtoprovidecomprehensivesecurityservices.Initially,governmentaloversightandinspectionsforcedtheimmediateclosingofsomemallsnotincompliance,therebycreatingafinancialincentivetocomply.Moreover,weweretoldthat,inIsrael,securityexpendituresarelookeduponasaninvestment.DuringtheIntifada,forexample,Israelimallsprovidedasanctuaryforpeople
frightened
of
suicide
bombers.
This
was
good
for
the
country,
but
also
good
for
mallbusinesses.
Government involvement in mall security.TheIsraeliGovernmentheavilyregulatesprivatesecuritysystemsinretailmalls.Theregulationprocessconsistsofstringentlicensingprocedurescarriedoutatthelocallevelandoverseenbylocalpolicecommanders.Theregulationstructuremandatesminimumnumbersofsecurityguards,vehiclecheckpoints,andbarricades.Thedistrictpolicealsolicenseandapproveallarmedsecuritycandidatesandlicenseallunarmedsecurityofficers.Compliancewiththeseregulationsisensuredbyfrequenton-siteinspections.Typically,thedistrictpolicewillinspecteachmallonceortwiceamonth.Inaddition,theywillobservemanyofthedrills
being
conducted
by
the
mall
security
staff.
Each
mall
is
required
to
re-apply
for
licensingeveryyear.
Accordingtothesecuritydirectorsthatwespokewith,locallawenforcementandemergencyservicerepresentativesoftenconductjointexerciseswithmallsecurity.Theexercisesincludecomprehensivedrillsattendedbythedistrictfirebrigade,ambulancesystem,andtheentirepolicedistrict.Inaddition,thereisopenintelligencesharingbetweenmallsecurityandlocallawenforcement.Inonemall,policebriefedthemallsecuritychiefweekly.Intheother,thelocalpolicedistrictheldmonthlymeetingsduringwhichantiterrorismintelligencewassharedanddiscussedwithkeyindividualsinthecommunity,includingmallsecuritydirectors.Oneofthemallswevisitedprovidesthelocalpolicedistrictwithanon-sitesubstation.Thisallowsasubsetofofficerstobecomeknowledgeableaboutmalloperationsandphysicallayout.Italsoallowstheseofficerstogettoknowthemallssecuritystaff.Finally,mallsecurityandlocallawenforcementshareinteroperablecommunicationsystems.Intheeventofanemergency,eachunitcouldcommunicatewithoneanotheroverasharedradio-communicationsband.
Risk assessment.Israelimallsarerequiredundergovernmentalregulationstructurestoconductperiodicriskassessments.Accordingtomallrepresentativesthatwespokewith,theriskassessmentsareconductedbybothin-houseandoutsidesecurityexperts.Thein-houseassessmentsareconductedonacontinualbasisaspartofeverydaysecuritypractices.Outsidesecurityassessmentsareconductedperiodicallybyindependentexpertscontractedbythemalls.Oncetheplaniscompletedandreviewedbydistrictpolice,anoperatinglicenseisgranted.
Emergency response plans.BothoftheIsraelimallswevisitedhadcomprehensiveresponseplansforvariousemergencies,requiredbythegovernmentinorderforthemalltoobtainalicensetoconductbusiness. Eachsecurityofficerisgivenadutyundertheplan,andasubsetofofficersisassignedtoanemergencyresponseteam.Plansincludepreventingoutsidersfromgainingaccesstothemallaswellaspossiblefinal%20report%2dedited[1] 31
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
36/50
evacuationadecisionthat,unlikewhatweobservedinU.S.malls,isentirelyuptothesecuritydirector.Animmediatereactionsquadmeetsinaspecialcontrolroomtomonitoranddirectsecurityactionsuntilthepolicearrive.
Emergencyplanstargetthefirst20minutesafteracriticalincident.Theplansinclude
designated
places
to
meet
and
how
to
brief
police
officers
as
they
arrive.
Once
on
thescene,thepolicetakecommandoftheemergency.
Training programs.Mallsprovidemonthlytrainingforallofficersthatisalmostentirelyfocusedonrecognizingandrespondingtoterrorthreats.Trainingishighlyrepetitive,bothtoengraintheproceduresinthemindsoftheofficersandtocounteracttheeffectsofhighsecuritystaffturnover,aproblemasacuteinIsraelasitisintheU.S.OneadvantagethatIsraelhasisthat,whileturnoverishigh,manysecurityofficerscometothejobwithrecentmilitarytrainingasaresultofthecountryspolicyofcompulsorymilitaryservice.
Accordingto
the
security
officers
we
talked
with,
the
malls
usually
conduct
about
50drillspermonth.Theserangefromminorproceduraldrillstocovertdrillsduringwhichfalsebombsareplantedandattemptsaremadetobringthemintothemall.Majorexercisesarecarriedoutincooperationwiththepolice,whoevaluatetheadequacyoftheresponsebymallsecurity.Whensecurityofficersfailtodetectplantedthreats,theyareretrained.Iftheyfailasecondtime,theyarefired.Inaddition,asystemofpositiveincentivesisalsoutilized.Ifasecurityofficerdetectsaproblemduringadrillandactsaccordingly,thatofficerwillreceiveamonetarybonus.Rollcallsoftenfocusontheassessmentofrecentdrills.Successesandfailuresarediscussedandalternativeresponsesareexplored.
final%20report%2dedited[1] 32
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)
37/50
5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivateSecurity
Arecentstudy,WatchingtheWatchmen:StateRegulationofPrivateSecurity,19concludedthattherehasbeenatrendtowardanincreaseinstatutoryregulationforthehiringofprivatesecurityofficersbutminimalchangestostateregulationsregardingtrainingforsuchstaffbetween1982and1998.Thestudyfoundthatthenumberofstatesrequiringbackgroundcriminalchecksforprospectiveemployeesincreasedfrom13to20overthe16yearsthatstatutesweretracked.Thestudyfoundlittlechange,however,instateregulationsregardingprivatesecurityofficertraining:justoneadditionalstateaddedsucharegulationbetween1982and1998.
Tradeorganizationshavepromotedtheadoptionofstandardsforhiringandtrainingofprivatesecurityofficers.Recently,ASISInternational20publishedguidelinesthatsetforthminimumcriteriathatregulatingbodiesandcompaniesintheUnitedStatescanusetoassistinrecommendinglegislationandpoliciesfortheselectionandtrainingofprivatesecurityofficers.Theguidelinescontaintemplatesforstatestouseindevelopingorenhancingtheirlegislationregardingprivatesecurityofficers.
Still,priorto9/11,theprivatesecurityindustryintheU.S.wasnotsubjecttoextensiveregulationbythegovernment.Therewerenofederallawsgoverningtheindustry.Stateregulationwasspottyatbest,enforcementofregulationswasweak,andmoststateshadnorequirementsregardinghiringandtraining.
Theeventsof9/11/2001highlightedtheimportantroleofprivatesecurityindetectinganddeterringdomesticterrorismatcriticalinfrastructuresites.Thissectionexamineswhethergovernmentstandardsforprivatesecurityhaveincreasedinthe3yearssince9/11.
StaffoftheJusticeandSafetyCenteratEasternKentuckyUniversityanalyzedstatutesinthe50statesplustheDistrictofColumbiaregardingregulationofprivatesecuritytodeterminehowlegislationmayhavechangedsince9/11.ThiscontentanalysisusedWestlawAcademicUniversetoreviewstatutesinsixareas:
Requirementsforbackgroundchecksofprospectivesecurityofficers Educationorexperiencerequirements Trainingrequirements Oversightofthequalityorcontentoftrainingprograms Statutesgrantingsecurityofficersthepowertodetainandsearchsuspects
19Hemmens,C.,Maahs,J.,Scarborough,K.E.,Collins,P.A.,(2001)WatchingtheWatchmen:State
RegulationofPrivateSecurity1982-1998.SecurityJournal,Vol.14,No.4,pp17-28.20ASISInternational(2004).PrivateSecurityOfficerSelectionandTrainingGuideline,2004.http://
www.asisonline.org
final%20report%2dedited[1] 33
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are tho