LAOS

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Capital: Vientiane (Administrative) Luang Prabang (Royal)

Population: 2.5 million

Strategically situated in the heart of the Southeast Asian peninsula, the landlocked King-dom of Laos shares common borders with six other nations, two of which are under Corp-munist regimes: on the north with Communist China (263 miles); on the east a long frontier v/ith North Viet-Narn (818 miles) and with the Republic of Viet-Nam (301 miles); on the south with Cambodia (277 miles); on the south an'd west with Thailand (1,090 miles, of which over 500 are formed by the Mekong River); and on the west v/ith Burma (146 miles).

The climate is monsoonal in nature and seasonally well-defined. There are 6 months of rainfall from J ay to October and 6 months of drought from November through April, Humidity is high most of the year. In April, the warmest rponth, the temperature in Vien-tiane normally ranges betv/cen and 93^F,, and in Januai^y,. the coolest month, between 57®F. and

Total area is approximately 91,000 square miles, or slightly more than Idaho or Great Britain. A large part of the terrain, particu-larly in the n( .rth, is covered by dense jungle and rugged mountains, some of which are over 9,000 feet high.

THE PEOPLE : I V •

The population^is about 2.5 million—an esti-mate, since no atcurate census has eVer been taken. This sparse population is unevenly spread, with the greatest concentration in the Mekong Valley. Tj'he people lack homogeneity. About 49 percent^ are Lao, a people of Thai stock who are fielieved to have migrated orig-inally from southwestern China principally in the 13th century. Mountain tribes, also of Thai stock, ar't found in upper Laos, v/hile a number of other mountain tribes of Indonesian or proto-Mal^y background inhabit central Laos. The lack of common origin, customs, language, tra<^it|bns, and beliefs among the various minorities poses a serious obstacle to the political ^ unification of .the kingdom. There are sizable minorities of Vietnamese and Chinese and smaller groups of Cambodians and Indians, In addition, there are some

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French and other Europeans and Americans, few of whom, however, are permanent resi-dents.

The Lao language belongs to the Thai group. Thai and Lao being mutually comprehensible; it is written in a distinctive script of Indian origin. French serves as the second official language and is comxnonly used in commerce and government. It is estimated that not over 15 percent of the population is literate. The state religion is Buddhism of the southern or "Hinayana" type. V/hile the mountain tribes are primarily animists or spirit worshipers, many of them have adopted Buddhism v,hile retaining a measure of their old beliefs.

'GOVERNMENT

Laos is a constitutional parliamentary mon-"archy. Under the December 1957 revision of the Constitution, originally promulgated by the King in May 1947, the hitherto exclusively male fran^chis e was extended to women. General elections are held every 5 years; the most recent one v/as in the spring of I960.

The bicameral legislature is composed of a National Assembly of 59 Deputies, which possesses^ the real legislative power of the country, and a rather inactive King's Council of 12, elder statesmen, 6 of whom are appointed directly by the King, the other 6 being desig-nated by the National Assembly and confirmed by the King. The Prime Minister is designated by the King on ccm.sultation with the political leadership^.and submits his proposed Cabinet to the National As sembly for approval, a favor-able two-thirds majority of Deputies present being required for investiture. Members of the 'Cabinet nped not be Deputies of the National Assembly. The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be separate and inde-pendent of the executive andlegislative powers.

In mid-tl962, concurrent with the Geneva agreements, a coalition government was formed under Prince Souvanna Phouma, with carefully balanced participation by the three major political factions. This Government of National Union, including the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, is com-posed of 4 conservative, 11 neutralist, and 4 pro-Comn\unist (Pathet Lao) members.

Because- the current legislature was not recognized by the Pathet L.ao (PL) faction on grounds of alleged irregularities in the I960

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elections, Souvanna's cabinct was not invested by the National Assembly in Jvine 1962 but v/as directly confirmed by the King. The A s -sembly has granted full powers to Souvanna's government, extended to October 1964, and is not playing an active role.

The two PL» ministers have riot participated in the government and have absented them-selves from Vie*ntiane since mid-April 1963, The interests of th^ PL. have been preserved by its tv/o secretaries of state with cabinet rank, but the government hac not functioned properly as a coalition and Souvanna has been attempting rwith little success to per-suade the PL to resume active participation.

HISTORY ,j : !

Subjected to periodic invasions and external attempts at domination, particularly frorn^ Thailand and Viet-Nam, Laos v/as a tenviously* united kingdom from the mid-14th until the end of the IVth .century, and its territory comprised an area larger than it is today. In the 18th centut-y the country was split into three rival kingdoms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak. With the advent of the French in rlndochin'i, a power strviggle betv/.een France and Thailand for control of the three Lao kingdoms started in the 1880*8 and ended in 1893'When the Thai abandoned their claims to riLaos. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 defined the boundaries of Laos' as they exist today.I;

At the end of World \la.T II the Kingdom of Luang Prabang, Under Japanese auspices, pro-claimed its independence, which 2 months later was extended to include all Laos. The Free Lao nationalist movement sought un-successfully to preve7it the reirnposition of French rule, bi t >y May 1946 the French had reoccupied ^11 of Laos and driven the Free Lao leaders Jnto exile in Thailand. The French then recqgnized the suzerainty of the King of Luang Pr^b^ng over the entire country. In a series of successive steps France grad-ually accorded Laos its independence and, in October 1953, recognized the kingdom as a fully sovereign state though Laos reaffirmed its adherence to the F;-,ench Union. This relation-ship was also dip^plved upon the conclusion of the Geneva jagireements of 1954, which terminated the Indochina V/ar. Final pov/ers were transferred ^o Laos on December 2.9, 1954.

During the Indochina V/ar there was a moderate amouny of guerrilla activity in Laos as an extension^o^, the Communist Viet Minh activity in Viet-Nam. The Pathet Lao (Land of Laojmovcment' \J(as organized in Communist territory in Nortji Viet-Nam in about 1951 under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong. The Communist! Viet Minh forces invaded northern and and brought v/ith

cehtp.l I^oo in 1953^ and 1954 r/ith them a number cf cthnic

Lao military unite as v^ellns a pseudo-govern-ment, callcd the' '/Ivcgistance Government of

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the Pathet Lao." V/itb Viet Minh support, the Pathet Lao (PL) elements entrenchcd them-selves firmly in the northern Lao provinces of 'Sarn Neua and Phong Saly. While the PL v/ere not admitted to the 'Geneva Coilference| of 1954, the agreements designed to restore peace in Indochina provided that those two provinces remain under Pathet Lao control pending the reintegration of its members into the national community. It was not until the end of 1957 that the PL leadership, advised and supported by North Viet-Nam, acccpted in principle such reintegration and for a few months in 1958 two PL representatives held portfolios in a short-lived government of national union.

As part of the integration process tv/o PL battalions were theoretically integrated into the Lao national army, but one mutinied in May 1959 and v/ith North Vietnamese as-sistance promptly resumed guerrilla activities against the government. By late summer 1959.

. military action had intensified and in September the Lao Government appealed to the U.N. on th^ basis that North Viet-Nam was committing aggression on Lao territory. An investigatory sul^committe.e v/as sent to Laos, and the U.N. presence restored a semblance of peace tothe area. J

In August^ i960 a young paratroop com-mander in Vientiane, Captain Kong Le, seized the capital in a coup. In an attempt to avert civil war among the non-Communist elements, Prince Souvanna Phouma, a former Prime Minister, was again called upon to form a government. General Phoumi, leader of the conservative, anti-Communist faction, at first agreed to serve in the government but soon reversed his decision and established a mili -tary headquarters in southern Laos from which he mounted a campaign to retake Vientiane. He recaptured Vientiane in December I960, and Kong Le retreated with his troops to the northeast, ^

Meanwhile, Souvanna had accepted a Soviet aid! offer, and the Soviets started airlifting supplies from the Soviet Union via Hanoi. The Soviets used .this airlift to bring in arms and ammunition not only for the Kong Le forces but also for the PL, Profiting by the general political and military situation, the PL returned to full insurgency. In early January 1961 Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces, supplied by the Soviets and advised and encadred by the North Vietnamese, seized the strategic Plaine des Jarree where they established head-quarters, By the spring of 196Jl, the Pathet Lao insurgents, strongly reinforced by North Vietnamese units and cadres, had scored i m -portant military victories and appeared to be in,a positionlo take over the entire country,

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Geneva Conference—1961-62 I • The United States v/as faced with three

alternatives: the total loss of Laoo to the Com-munists; military intervention, involving U,S. troops and other outsida forces; or eettle-

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menl of Ihc crisis through peaceful interna-tional and internal negotiations to achieve a

^ neutral status for the kingdom that would per-mit it to survive as a nation. The decision •was reached that a peaceful settlement trans-ferring the struggle from the military to the political domain was the most desirable of the possible alternatives. The congressional leadership on a bipartisan basis was con-feulted on this, decision. It was thus that the United States accepted participation in the 14-nation conference convened at Geneva in May 1961 which, after long and difficult negotiations, resulted in the signing of the new Geneva agreements on July 23, 1962, providing certain international guarantees for the independence and neutral status of Laos,

On the internal level the three Lao factions — conservative, neutralist, and pro-Communist Pathet Lao —reached agreement in June 1962 on the formation of a Government-of National Union under the premiership of Prince Sou-vanna Phouma','

Of immediate, importance under the 1962 Geneva agreements was the requirement that all foreign military personnel leave the country v/ithin 75 days o? the signing. Under the super-vision of the Int^^rnational Control Commission (ICC) all 666 military advisory personnel (no U,S, comb|it troops v/ere in Laos) departecl from Laos before the October 7, 1962, dead-line, However, only 40 North Vietnamese troops were withdrawii; through ICC checkpoints. In hia letter of June 20, 1963, to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Prime Minister Souvanna charged that a substantial number of North Vietnamese cadre^s and combat troops remained in Laos, and the Prime Minister has repeated tl^is charge on several'occasions.

Within a fewnrionths of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreerfients, the PL, supported by the North Vietnamfese, began maneuvering to sub-vert or eliminktt3 K ong Le's neutralist military forces, which constituted Souvanna's principal military strength. Minor skirmishing broke into open hostilities in April 1963, whe n the PL

' attacked Kongf'Le's troops in positions they had held jointly with the PL in Xieng Khouang Province. With'", assistance from the troops under General|Phoumi, hov/ever, Kong Le was able to extricate most of his units from these areas a-s well as^from other locations in central Laos and*to maifitain his positions in the west-ern part of the'Plaine des Jarres. These ag-gressive tactics by the PL not only failed to destroy tlie nciutralist forces but r e s u l t e d

> rather in much closer cooperation than before between the neutralists and the conservatives in the political; ^s well as the military, field.

V/ith the ouf^break of fighting in April 1963, the two PL ministers withdrev/from Vientiane, leaving PL representation in the government headed by the. two PL secretaries of state of cabinet rank. Negotiations to effect a cease-fire and to restore the governing coalition have

( A taken pl^ce intermittently during the past nine — moiithe but v/ith ^little re suit. Souvanna has pro-

posed to move! the seat of government at least

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temporarily from Vientiane to a neutralized Luang Prabang, where representatives of the three factions could meet on neutral ground. Details of the arrangements are being nego-tiated, but the fluctuating military situation 1 as so far prevented agreement.

POLITIC/^L CONDITIONS f

J The Kingdom of Laos did not become a geo-graphic entity until 1946 and only achieved

.complete' political independence in 1954, after the first Geneva agreements had brought to an end the Indochina War, Laos has never been a

.national entity in'the real sense, i.e. unified and governed by a stable, effective central authority. The intrinsic barriers to unity and a sense of nationhood de sc ribed earlier have been increased by the internal and external Com-munist threat. The gulf betv/een the central government and the people in the countryside persists {oday, and such efforts as have been made in the few years of independence have been further handicapped by the lack of com-munications, particularly roads.

Governfnent and politics are the preoccupa-* tion of a 'small, educated elite, most of whom are related to each other, and the potential benefits of popular government are only dimly understoo.i;^ by the majority of the population living in isolated villages. The concept of po-litical parties is still nev/ to the Lao, and v/ith the exception of the tightly organized Neo Lao Hak Xat (the political arm of the PL) the parties consisted of loose coalitions ofper soualities or families gather than cohesive parties in the Western ^.ense. Political strength today is pri-marily dif^ided among the leaders of the three factions making up the present Government of National "jLTnion. Although the non-Comrnunist neutralist and conservative e l e m e n t s have drav/n closer together in opposing Pathet Lao

•pressures, they have not succeeded in building disciplined political organizations.-Prince Sou-vanna Phouma and his supporters are en-deavoring to rally the non-Communist elements to the neutralist movement, but little progress has been^made so far in creating a national organization. A parallel attempt made by Gen-eral Phouini to launch a nev/ nationalist party has also rpade little headway. Both parties thus far .are mainly limited to their regular ad-herents. The PL has retained firm control over the areas it occupies and has allowed only a few outsiflers, such as the Prime Minister, to enter on conducted visits.

Three separate and distinct Lao armies exist: 1) the neutralist forces under Kong Le; 2) the former national army (known as the FAR or Forces Arrnees du Royaume) under Gen-eral Phoumi; and 3) the PL forces under the field com^mand of General Singkapo. Although various units under Kong Le and Phoumi have cooperated at times in military action against PL attacV.s, each army has been careful to preserve; its identity as the locus of strength within its political faction. Integration of all

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three armed forced into a national army does I not appear possible in the near future.

The three-member International Control Commission (ICC) plays an important role in the current political situation. Originally ere-Tted to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Ger.eva agreements, the ICC v.as rjven addi-tional duties by the 1962 agreements to super-vise the neutralization of Laos and preserve the pcacc. Despite obstructionism by the Polish member, who has' alv/ays sided with the PL, the ICC under its Indian chairman has taken significant steps to preserve the 1962 agree-ments and to help stabilize the political-military situation. Its action by majority de-cision (Indian and Cc-inadian) to station a team on the Plaine des Jarres has served as a de-terrent to large-scale PL attacks in that area. The Polish member, hov/ever, acting in con-junction v/ith PL representatives, has so far thv/arted all efforts, to institute an investiga- i tion into the prcscnce of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. - t

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ECONOMY

• An. underdeveloi^ed c o u n t r y with limited natural resources; Laos has alv/ays suffered from its geographic isolation and rugged topo-graphy. Ninety percent of the people are still engaged in subsistetice agriculture, supplying the bulk of their own, needs, including textiles; the gross national product is estimated at less than $50 per capita. Industrial enterprises are confined to a fev/ftransport undertakings, one tin-mining operatio^i, some sav/milling, one soft-drink bottlingi pjant, and small-scale local manufacturing. Laos must therefore import almost all manufactvired products and, being landlocked, is dependent upon the good v/ill of neighboring countries, principally Thailand, to facilitate transshipnient of svich goods, t Annual production-of glutinous rice, the most important food crop, has in the past averaged about 500,000 tons. Corn, tobacco, and tea are grown in small quantiticp. Disease has dras-tically curtailed the production of coffee, for-merly one of the country*s few exports. Cattle-raising and the reasonably profitable export ot hides and skins have ,been seriously affected by depredations and losses in V/orld V/ar II and ^ e Indochina V/ar...Laos is one of the principal Southeast Asian sopr^ces of opium, cultivated by mountain tribesme^i, then sold and smuggled abroad, ^ , Approximately two-thirds of Laos is cove red $y forests, roughly half of which is of com-mercial interest. ; F^brest products (timber, ^ticklac, benzoin) J h- ve formed a substantial proportion of Lao e,xports. Mineral output thus f?r has been limited ^o tin and rock salt. Geo-, logical surveys give, some indication of other possible deposits,, but it is not knov/ii v/h.:thcr tjiese are sub.-Jtautial enough to warrant ex-ploitation. . '

The lack o? interno.1 transport and the high cost of trans-shipment to and from the ports of

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other Southeast Asian nations pose a serious obstacle to econom.ic development. There are few roads and no railroads. The Mekong Riverj is navigable by small craft almost its entire lengtli in Laos; rapids and falls, however, re-quire frequent portage.

Laos was tied economically to Cambodia, Viet-Nam, and France until 1954, At that time it gained control over its central banking, for-eign exchange, and tariff schedule; its foreign economic relations since then have been bi-lateral in nature. The Lao currency is pegged to the dollar;'since the d e v a l u a t i o n of Jan-uary 1, 1964, the official rate of exchange has been 240 kip to the dollar.

The Lao economy has been at a virtual stand•• still in the past several years because of the gravity of the political-military situation. Even in the preceding post-World War II years ex-ports had failed to attain their prewar level. Normally Laos i s able to produce enough food to satisfy its own limited needs; but this has not beep possible under v/artime conditions. Rice cultjivation, fqr example, has been suspended in many areas, necessitating imports fromThcii-land. The plight of isolated tribal peoples has required air-drops of food and other neces-sities. The United States has assisted in this activity as v/ell as the supplying of thousands of refugees from PL-held areas.

Foreign Aid

For the past 9 years the United States has given substantial amounts of military and eco-nomic aid to assist Laos in maintaining its independence, in the face of almost continual external and internal Communist pressures. From 1955 to date, the United States contributed over $300 million in economic assistance alone, the greater part to budgetary support, and less -er but still considerable amounts for econom-ic projects as jointly determined by the U,S, and the Lao Governments.

The U.S. aid program today is designed to strengthen the government and at the same time lead the. country toward a more viable economy. A large portion of our economic assistance in - Laos consists of a commodity import program (the U.S. Import Program or USIP) to meet essential import requirements and thus assist the government to overcome its great deficiencies in foreign .exchange and internal revenues. The U.S. aid program also includes a project sector which concentrates on rural deyclppment but also covers education, health, agricujture, transportation, and techni-cal assistance,

V/e have also strongly urged other free-world nations to help support the government, France, the United Kingdom, and Australia currently provide significant amounts of technical assist-ance and financial support, particularly to tlie Lao^Govcrnment's monetary stabilization pro-gram through the Foreign Excliange Operations Fund (FLOF),' in which the United States alr o participates.

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o;; CUmiENT PROBLEMS

The immediate and essential task in Laos is to insure tlie continued viability of Souvanna's GovernTiient of National Union. Souvanna's role as Prime Minister in a coalition governiDent is so c lose l / interwoven with the implementa-tion of the 1962 Geneva agreements that the collapse of his government would probably unravel the peace that has been precariously constructed in that country, v/ith the danger Laos would again become the arena for a big power confrontation. The 1962 Geneva agree-ments were designed to enable this small but strategically situated nation to preserve its neutral status and thereby survive as a sover-eign, independent, non-Communist state and a buffer betv/een Communist China and North Viet-Nam and the free nations of Thailand, Cambodia, and the'llepublic of Viet-Nam. P r e s -ervation of this neutral posture has required and v/ill continue to require substantial free-world support to enable the government to re -sist pressures being exerted by the PL and its supporters to undermine the Geneva settlement.

The United States has taken every occasion to make abundantly clear its support, of the Geneva agreements and Souvanna's govern-ment. V/e have ^encouraged other free-world countries to adopt, a similar position. As ap-propriate, v/c have'made the U.S. position clear to the Soviet leaders and have called on them and the Communist bloc generally to honor their commitments under the agreements.

V/hcn Prince . Souvanna visited the United States in July 19b2^and again in September 1963, he received assurances of U.S. confidence and support from the 'President, the Secretary of State, and other high-ranking o f f i c i a l s . In Vientiane the U^S, Ambassador and his staff maintain very clbse contact with the Prime Minister and hjis,'^govcrnment. Oar principal allies in Laos — Australia, France, and the United Kingdorn—^are also giving substantial support to strengthen the government.

External backing, however, will not be suf-ficient to insure jtfie stability of the gove rnment or its capacity to resist Communist pressures. Equally necessary are the loyalty and support of the non-Communist Lao leaders and the people. Some progress is evident in this direc-tion as Souyanila and General Phoumi have been able to v/ofk together in the national interest and in an eff'oi't to preserve the coalition and the Geneva framework. The United States has been encouraging all non-Communist elements to join forces in support of Souvanna during thir. critical period.

Reunification of the country remains an un-solved problem. PL-held territory has re-mained closed to free circulation by others, leaving the Communists unhampered in their program to indoctrinate the population they control, largely through intimidation and ter-rorist tactics. PL intransigence on this subject has proved to be the major obstacle to Sou-vanna's efforts to unite his people and extend the central administration into every province •

BASIC OBJECTIVES OF LAO GOVERNMENT I

In the domestic sphere the Lao Gove rnment * s objectives are to achieve national reconcilia-tion and necessary economic, social, and ad-ministrative reforms in order to extend gov-ernmental infUience effectively throughout the country. On the international plane Laos wishes to remain independent, enjoy friendly relations with its neighbors and other governments re-gardless oj political system, and maintain a policy of st.rict neutrality in the conflict betv/een the Communist bloc and the free world. ^

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Chief of State—King Sri Savang Vatthana Inspector General of the Kingdom (chiefly an

honorary position) —Prince BOUN OUM Na Champassac (Champassak)^

Prime Minister, Minister of National De-: fense. Veterans Affairs , and Social Action,

Minister of F'o r e i g n A f f a i r s—Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA^

Deputy Prime Minister, 'Minister of Economy ; and of the P l a n - P r i n c e SOUPHANOUVONG^"

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance-General PHOUMI Nosavan^

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS '

A^mbassador—Leonard Unger Counselor (Deputy Chief of Mission) —Philip H.

Chadbourn, Jr. Army Attache —Col. William Law Director, \J,S. AID Mission—Charles A. Mann Public Affairs Officer (U.S. Information Serv-

. ice)—Gerard M. Gert

1 - Conservative 2 - Neutralist 3 - Pro-Cornmunist

PROPERTY OF

March 1B54

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ACEMCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENt . ,OUA KHONG PROVINCE, lAOS