Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany

Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh 2003

Workshop 16: Politics and Memory

Eric Langenbacher

Department of Government/Center for German and European Studies

Georgetown University

Washington, DC, USA

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Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany

I. Introduction

Collective memory has become one of the foremost intellectual concerns in recent

years, illuminating numerous analyses of diverse countries. No country, however, has

been affected (or studied) as much as postwar Germany, the quintessential example of

country with a “past that won’t go away.” Indeed, almost all authors writing about that

case emphasize the importance of memory for a proper comprehension of its cultural and

political life (e.g., Brady 1999, Merkl 1999). Despite this substantial attention, the current

corpus of literature has produced neither a full understanding of the dynamics and impact

of memory in general, nor a proper portrait of the evolution of and political influence of

memory in Germany.

Three shortcomings exist. Theoretically, most authors rely on psychological, or more

specifically, psychoanalytic notions like trauma, repression, mourning and working-

through, applied to both individuals and collectivities. Today, however, these concepts

are over-utilized and extremely stretched.1 Apart from unexamined or too hurriedly

dismissed problems intrinsic to the approach, like the questionable application of precepts

developed at and for an individual mind onto a collectivity, these frameworks do not

address several core issues that are essential to understand the evolution and political

impact of memory. The two biggest lacunae are an under-theorization of the dynamics of

discursive competition and the actors that represent memories in public discussions and

debates, and, a failure to disentangle and specify the distinctive components of memory.

Methodologically, almost all analyses employ various types of qualitative data and

interpretive methods, largely abjuring the use of quantitative alternatives.2 This is due, on

1 Particularly problematic works include Dominick La Capra. Revisiting the Historians' Debate: Mourning and Genocide. History and Memory, 1997; Eric L. Santner. Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory and Film in Postwar Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990; Caroline Wied mer. The Claims of Memory: Representations of the Holocaust in Contemporary Germany and France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. For a summary of the problems of these approaches, see Tillmann Moser. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Hält die Diagnose einer Überprüfung stand? Zur psychischen Verarbeitung des Holocausts in der Bundesrepublik. Psyche 46 (5) 1992, pp. 389-405. 2 Notable exceptions include Bodo von Borries. Das Geschichtsbewußtsein Jugendlicher: Eine repräsentative Untersuchung über Vergangenheitsdeutungen, Gegenwartswahrnehmungen und Zukunftserwartungen von Schülerinnen und Schülern in Ost- und Westdeutschland . Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, 1995; Hermann Kurthen. Antisemitism and Xenophobia in United Germany: How the Burden of the Past affects the Present. In Antisemitism and Xenphobia in Germany after Unification , edited by H. Kurthen, W. Bergmann and R. Erb. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; Elisabeth Noelle -Neumann,

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the one hand, to the great resonance memory has received in the more humanistic

disciplines, and, on the other, to the lack of serious attention among social scientists

towards memory and, more generally, towards cultural phenomena. Not surprisingly, the

ability to speak about or generalize for a country as a whole has been circumscribed, even

if ambitious, system-wide statements are constantly proffered. Thus, a quantitative

“corrective” is rather useful and necessary today. 3

Empirically, the German case has been misunderstood and insufficiently analyzed.

Above all, there has been a rather exclusive focus on one memory (of Nazi German

crimes, epitomized by the Holocaust), its repression over much of the postwar period and

the eventual (if only partially successful) process of working-through. 4 The following

table summarizes the dominant view:

Table 1: Dominant Narrative of the Holocaust-centered Memory

Period Dates Characteristics 1. Repression 1949(45)-early

1960s Silence, inability to mourn/second guilt, lingering pathologies, path-dependent deficits

2.Nascent Breakthrough

Early 1960s-1979 Isolated but increasingly frequent flare-ups, slow increase in salience, heroic 68er generational efforts

3.Increasing Visibility

1979-1990 Greater incidence and prominence of public controversies, mediatization, societal extensiveness, real public debate, yet persistence of problematic positions

4.Fragile Prominence

1990-present Greatly increased salience, larger public-political prominence and societal extensiveness, continuous debate and discourse, yet not without problems

Authors have neglected more positive evidence regarding the working through of this

memory in the earlier postwar years, other memories, either of different generative events

or alternative interpretations of the Nazi period, and the competition for dominance

Demoskopische Geschichtsstunde: vom Wartesaal der Geschichte. Osnabruck: Fromm, 1991; Felix Phillip Lutz. Das Geschichtsbewußtsein der Deutschen: Grundlagen der politischen Kultur in Ost und West . Köln: Böhlau, 2000; J. Pennebaker, D. Paez and B. Rime, ed. Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997. 3 Of course, quantitative forms of data and statistical analyses also have limitations, mainly regarding the degree to which nuances of opinion can be captured. Thus, an ideal methodological strategy for issues of memory would be one of “triangulation,” combining and complementing qualitative and quantitative methods. This is exactly the strategy employed in the larger project on which this paper is based, where the statistical analysis of the survey is combined with various discourse analyses and numerous intensive interviews. Space constraints do not allow for a full examination of these data in this paper. 4 Canonical works include: Theodor Adorno. What does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean? In. Bitburg in Moral and Historical Perspective. G. Hartman, ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.; Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich. The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior. New York: Grove Press, 1975.; Ralf Giordano. Die zweite Schuld oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein. Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1987. For an overview of this dominant perspective see: Andrei S. Markovits and Beth Simone Noveck. West Germany. In The World Reacts to the Holocaust , edited by D. S. Wyman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

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among representatives of these memories. Moreover, due to the predominant use of

qualitative forms of data, few, unreliable or overly pessimistic statements regarding the

actual impact of memory on the political values of average Germans exist.5

This paper directly addresses these shortcomings. It introduces a new conceptual

framework that identifies the analytically distinctive elements of memory regimes and

incorporates dynamics of competition and power. The framework also generates several

more specific research questions, which are tested through the statistical analysis of an

original representative survey commissioned in August 2000. In the end, the paper

simultaneously furthers the understanding of memory in Germany today and supports the

more general conclusion that memory is a crucial influence on political life.

II. Memory Regimes

1. Components of Memory Regimes

The basic assumption and point of departure is that political culture and values affect

“real” political outcomes and that memory is both a constitutive component of a political

culture and an important attitudinal influence. Beyond these assumptions, which are also

hypotheses to be tested through the German case, several other preliminary distinctions

are useful. The concept of the “past” captures everything that actually happened before

the present but is a hypothetical category. History, in contrast, is what we actually know

or retrieve from the past. It is communicated to us in written, oral or visual formats. This

distinction is important because not everything that actually happened in the past is

recorded and passed down. History encapsulates the recorded “facts” of the past, coupled

with a thin layer of interpretation and value-based judgment. This “thin” interpretive

element concerns what the writer of history decides to include in the historical account

(selection bias) and how that account is framed, i.e., the historical narrative.

Following Pierre Nora (1989) there is a further distinction between history and

memory. Memory is an intensification of history, consisting of some facts about the past

coupled with “thick” interpretive eleme nts: selection, deeper narrativistic framing, value

dimensions and lessons. Completing this scheme, myth lies beyond memory (Olick and

5 See Micha Brumlik, et.al.. Umkämpftes Vergessen: Walser-Debatte, Holocaust-Mahnmal und neuere deutsche Geschichtspolitik . Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 2000; Mark Fisher. After the Wall: Germany, Germans and the Burden of History . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995; Jane Kramer. The Politics of Memory: Looking for Germany in the New Germany. New York: Random House, 1996.

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Levy 1997). Although myth may have some factual referent or cause in the past, this

empirical link is extremely tenuous, often non-existent. It is almost pure interpretation or

“belief.” It is, of course, rather difficult to achieve mythical status, whereas memory is a

more attainable goal. In a sense, memory is a way of packaging and operationalizing

shared history and becomes the means by which history becomes an influential

conditioning or causal force within a political culture.

If memory starts to become an evocative political force, a variety of other components

arises and accompanies it, which together comprise a memory regime:

Table 2: Components of a Memory Regime

Synchronic Dimension Diachronic Dimension

Collective Memories Master Historical Narrative of Causes of Generative Events

Lessons/Value Connections Master Historical Narrative of the Memory from Generative Events to the Present

Supportive Ethical and Moral Discourse

At any point in time the synchronic dimension contains the specific collective

memories, asserted lessons, value connections and supportive ethical/moral discourses.

The diachronic dimension encapsulates two master historical narratives concerning the

causes of the events that generated the memories and the history of the memory from that

point to the present or the narrative of coming to terms with the past. Although these

elements are distinct, they are also intimately interconnected and essential supports for

the others. For example, the narrative explaining how the generative events arose greatly

influences the supportive ethical discourses that justify retaining the memory in the

present and implies certain lessons.

Regarding the first synchronic dimension, for collective memories, the “thick”

interpretive aspect is crucial. Collective memories are widely shared interpretations of

specific historical events that contain a strong affective dimension. It is history made

relevant and resonant with individuals: value-laden, emotionalized and politicized

history. Authors also note cognitive, orientational and, especially, identity forming

functions (Lutz 2000). Jan Assmann writes that memory is normative, providing “a sense

of togetherness; one remembers in order to belong and this memory has the character of a

duty” (1995, 52). In all of this, affect and emotion are especially characteristic and

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distinguish memories from other political attitudes and values where the degree of

emotional investment can be much lower.

This thick interpretive characteristic further implies that the perspective of the present,

current values in other domains, greatly determines the over-arching memory: “collective

memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past ... it adapts the images of ancient facts

to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present” (Schwartz 1982, 376). As a result,

contemporary actors always interpret and distort history from their own tendentious

perspective to produce memories, which, consequently, say much more about the present

than the past. But this overstates the case and implies that memory is dependent on other

contemporary values or structures, being neither an autonomous part of the political

culture nor an independent variable. Yet, there are limits to presentist interpretations of

history, boundaries as to what can be made out of a past. Good historical research always

strives to “get into the minds” of historical actors and “empathetically understand” their

motivations, life-world and behaviors, and not (just) apply today’s standards. These

processes of historical verification check “presentist” interpretive excess.

Moreover, collective memories greatly determine many values in the present through

the second synchronic element. These lessons, prescriptions and proscriptions (Olick and

Levy 1997) influence or suggest particular political values. Value conversion and

especially connection (Rochon 1998) are especially operative, processes in which actors

link memories to preferred values and attitudes. Hence, a better conceptualization of the

relationship is one of recursive interplay between history and the present. History through

collective memory influences present values, which in turn, reinforce and re-package

memory within the limits of the historical record.

The third component of the synchronic dimension is supportive ethical and moral

discourses. These are supplemental arguments and justifications for the memories and the

lessons contained in the memory regime. They are perhaps the least distinctive overall

component, using arguments from current values in other political cultural domains, from

the connected historical explanations and narratives or from more general moral and

ethical precepts. Nevertheless, this is where much of the action of a memory regime

surfaces—where the value connections and moralizing take place, as well as some of the

most vigorous debates. For example, many in Germany argue that memory of the

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Holocaust must be sustained because the genocide was a violation of basic civilizational

or ethical norms against murder. Others stress that memory of the Holocaust implies the

necessity of democracy and tolerance, i.e., “progressive” and desirable values.

Turning to the diachronic dimension, the meanings embedded in these memories are

highly accessible because they are based on widely experienced historical events, usually

collectively defining cases of shared trauma like World War II or the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001. Schuman and Scott characterize such events as those that “rip the

larger existential fabric of our being- in-the-world and thus leave an indelible impression”

(1989, 361). As a recent review of social-psychological studies concludes: “collective

memories are most likely to be formed and maintained about events that represent

significant long-term changes to people’s lives” (Pennebaker and Banasik 1997, 17).

Salient memories emerge from these kinds of highly influential, but discrete events, such

as a war or a revolution, rather than large swaths of time, a concept (the state) or a group

(women). This delimited focus, existential importance and emotional content are major

reasons for their comprehensibility and accessibility to all members of a political culture.

Somewhat paradoxically, memories are also always based on and imply a particular

(master) historical narrative that encompasses a grander sweep of history. Memories of

discrete events are a kind of shorthand and trigger for a more detailed historical narrative.

This first master narrative explaining the generative events on which the memory is based

is the first component of the diachronic dimension. Although the interpretation embedded

in such a narrative is thin compared to that of a memory, there is substantial variation in

how authors construct this narrative with divergent implications for the present. For

example, very different memory regimes result from “intentionalist” explanations of the

Holocaust that emphasizes deep political cultural causes versus “functionalist” accounts

of bureaucratic dynamics and contingent events.

The second diachronic component is a narrative of what happened to the collective

memory between the time of the generative events and the present. This is the history of

the memory, its view of itself, or better the view of the elite representatives of the

memory regarding the trials, tribulations, success or failure of the memory over the

course of time since the generative events. This kind of self- image greatly influences the

other elements of the current memory regime. If this narrative is one of previous failure

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of the memory to become widely resonant then the relevant actors may change or

radicalize their views of the causes of the event or the derived lessons. This is an

argument for the necessity of the memory in the present, a tactic in the competition for

cultural dominance, as well as a motivating force for the representatives of the memory.

2. Types of Memories and Actors

Collective memories are inter-subjective or shared interpretations of commonly

experienced historical events.6 Orientational variability, highlighting the essential

diversity and pluralism of any political culture determined by diverse socio-economic and

geographic circumstances, among other factors, means that multiple memories, like

multiple values, circulate. These may be different interpretations of a specific event or

different generative events. For these reasons, Markovits and Reich talk about “memory

clusters” in a country’s memory map (1997, 34) and Young (1993) even advocates

replacing the collective memory term with “collected memory.” Moreover, memories

hang together with an array of other political values and demographic factors, producing

a variety of “memory publics,” differentiated by variables such as education, generation,

region of residence or partisan identification. 7

Pluralism also manifests itself in various types of shared memories. Assmann and

Frevert (1999) note first the communicative memory, at the level of interpersonal

networks of friends, colleagues and families, which is determined through close face-to-

face interaction. A more general variant of communicative memory is the generation or

cohort, where notions of commonly experienced crucial periods, socialization and

entropy are central. Next is collective memory, an intensification of the generational

memory attempting to transcend the generation to gain broader influence. It is political 6 Of course, each individual has memories of what s/he experienced. Halbwachs, the seminal theorist of collective memory, made strong but problematic assertions that only social memories exist because personal memories are nothing without the communal dimension.. He writes: “Our memories remain collective, however, and are recounted to us through others ... in reality we are never alone” (1992, 23). Later: “a person remembers only by situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several groups and one of several currents of collective thought” (33). Halbwachs’ thoughts were path breaking, looking at the importance of affective groups, stressing the social aspect of human memory and intimating the competition that may arise from various group identifications and loyalties. But there are also limitations, especially the extreme group emphasis and the relative absence of the individual.. 7 Non-attitudes, in the context of memory, forgetfulness, are also potential issues. However, in contrast to the distinction between memory and forgetting that permeates much of the literature distinctions should be made between those for whom no collective memories resonate (classical non-attitudes), those who consciously forget a particular memory and those who accept different memories. Determining the composition and proportions of such groups must be central empirical concerns.

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and instrumentalized, necessary simplifications the more ambitious and general the claim

for dominance. Finally there is the cultural memory, which is the most general level

“directed towards a mythical past and strongly ritualized” (Kirsch 1999, 30). It is needed:

... In order to transport experiences and knowledge over the generations, and thereby to build up long-term memory. Whereas the collective memory reaches this stabilization through a radical reduction of content, high symbolic intensity and strong psychic affect, the cultural memory supports itself on external media and institutions (Assmann and Frevert, 49).

This last cultural variant is the first that is explicitly divorced from individual

experiences of some sort, becoming highly abstract, institut ionalized and canonized.

Others prefer terms like “postmemory” (Hirsch 1997), a “hypermediated cultural

construction” of a vicarious past to capture this type (Sicher 2000, Young, 2000). These

conceptualizations also point to the possibility that some variants can be passed on to

posterity once the individuals who experienced the generative historical events pass

away. On the end of the spectrum of hypothetical memory regimes, memory meets myth:

Figure 1: Types of Memories I--------------------------I------------------------I-------------------------I------------------------I Communicative Generational Collective Cultural Myth Memory Memory Memory Memory Low Degree of Generality and Acceptance High

This typology also helps to answer the question as to when shared memories begin,

especially after a traumatic episode. Numerous authors note that a post-traumatic period

of silence, repression or latency is a common individual and collective reaction to a

traumatizing historical episode (Fogelman 1988; Allen 1995). In such contexts collective

memory, based on discourse and verbalization, cannot exist. Eventually, many affected

individuals will verbalize and share their suffering and loss, a development that many see

as central to processes of individual coping and collective healing, rehabilitation and

justice, pointing to a further therapeutic function of memory (Hirsch 1995; Kritz 1995;

Ricoeur 1998; Booth 2001).8 However, given the lingering and often permanent effects

8 A collective dimension is vital to provide the forum necessary for verbalization, concretization, acknowledgment, recognition and empathy of a trauma that a victim experienced. There can be no healing, no working-through without the recognition and valuation that a collective memory provides. Obviously, this therapeutic function is only operative when the historical referent is some sort of traumatic event, or

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of the traumatic past, many victims may feel uncomfortable speaking beyond the

communicative level of the more intimate group, which limits the memory’s potential

resonance in the larger political culture. Often more widely shared memories, such as the

collective variant, need to be represented by proxies or successor generations.

Two implications follow. First, even if affected individuals are in the latency stage and

unable to directly shape discourses of shared memories, others can represent their voices

from the very outset of the post-traumatic period. For example, many Holocaust survivors

were silent until the 1960s, yet others, like the U.S. and Israeli governments, American

Jews and international organizations provided representation and helped to forge memory

from the outset of the postwar period (Maislinger 1990; Shafir 1999). Second, even if

affected individuals limit their verbalized memories to the communicative arena, others

can contribute to the generational, collective and cultural variants, i.e., various types of

memory circulate simultaneously.

The most important of these proxies or representatives of memory belong to the elite

and are responsible for the majority of visible action and wider influence. Young writes:

If societies remember, it is only insofar as their institutions and rituals organize, shape, even inspire their constituents’ memories. For a society’s memory cannot exist outside of those people who do the remembering—even if such memory happens to be at society’s bidding, in its name (1993, xi)

The privileged interpreters of memory regimes, “memory editors” (Irwin-Zarecki 1994,

179), and socializing agents are politicians, journalists, religious and social leaders,

artists, teachers and intellectuals. Three subsets of the more general elite, their more

specialized arenas and their resulting discourses are especially important. An academic/

intellectual variant conceives of memory more as a theoretical construct, a description

and explanation of the historical events and of the reactions to them. This is the

perspective and domain of the intellectual observer of the memory regime and the textual

products conform to the standards and methodology of academic scholarship. Memories

are also a public-political interpretation of the past that imply various “lessons,” which

are, in turn, applied to political debates of all kinds. This is the view and arena of the

classical politically engaged “critical community” (Rochon), which are central for issues

negative experience that approaches but does not reach traumatic status. Given the frequency of such experiences worldwide and the tendency for countries to dwell on such, this function arises often.

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of memory, given the existential gravity of the generative events, the large degree of

embedded emotion, therapy and interpretation and the centrality of leadership in affecting

the values of mass publics. Memories are quintessential ground for the morally motivated

and engaged vanguard that is characteristic of the “critical community” concept.

These two groups produce slightly different versions of the memory. The political

variant, for example, does not contain the explicit methodological and strong theoretical

components of the intellectual version, even if many residues are visible. However, it is

often difficult to disentangle precisely the two types, given that often many intellectual

practitioners intervene extensively in the public-political sphere and because normative

concerns derived from public-political engagement greatly influence such authors’

academic work, which is true in general, and particularly in the German case. Moreover,

“crit ical” actors often use and need the discursive ammunition produced by more

academic work, for example, in constructing master historical narratives. Thus, although

these two arenas are distinct, actors often intervene in a third, overlapping domain, the

public or media realm (Kirsch 1999; Wolfrum 1999, 2). At the aggregate level, all of

these forces and elite actors converge most visibly in this arena, where the “public

transcript” (Scott 1990) of the memory regime becomes the most visible and influential.

Although most memory regimes and their elites are overwhelmingly national, there

are many cases where international actors participate extensively. Various factors

determine such participation, such as the nature of the generative event (civil strife versus

an international conflagration), whether the victims or their descendants live outside of

the country (and have achieved voice) and the degree of permeability that the political

culture displays. Such influences characterize even more the purer intellectual arena,

given the extensive internationalization of intellectual and academic work.

Whatever their composition, elite actors are the ones that hammer out and validate the

politically acceptable memory regime, the public transcript of memory. How these

leaders interpret and package meaning, as well as how they assert the various lessons and

connected values that ought to flow from the memory greatly affect average citizens

(Zaller 1992). Conversely, elite interpreters respond to the memories and opinions from

below, either from individuals or from particularly aware and interested groups, the

memories and interpretations of which these actors aggregate, interpret and represent.

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There may be a disjunction between the public transcript or elite discourse and a

“hidden,” mass one (Scott). Such a disjunction is one potential source for change if some

members of the elite shift conceptions to correspond better to popular discourses.

3. Competition and Dominance

Precisely because memories are cultural constructs and shared interpretations with

potential influence on political values and outcomes, power and competition are central.

Connerton observes: “For it is surely the case that control of a society’s memory largely

conditions the hierarchy of power ... our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate

a present social order” (1989, 1, 3). Participants in various debates certainly acknowledge

this. Stürmer, a major figure in the German Historians’ Debate, observed: “whoever fills

the memory, forms the concepts and interprets the past wins the future in a land deprived

of history” (Mushaben, 1998, 4). Power stems from the degree of dominance that

representatives of a memory achieve in a political culture. The following typology of

value regimes and power situations also models different memory regimes:

Figure 2: Heuristic Continuum of Value Regime Power9

********* ********* ********* *********

*********

*********

Heterogeneity Competitive Plurality Dominance Hegemony Unanimity non-dominance

Low Degree of Power High

An assessment of power and dominance results from looking at how many memories

circulate, how widely people hold a specific memory and the depth of attachment.

Acceptance among the more general elite and better-educated classes matters immensely,

but also among mass publics, which is the test of the success of the elite actors.

Importantly, this power is premised on a congenial context. A lthough every country

has salient collective memories and memory regimes, in some cases memory may be an

9 In this heuristic model stars represent individuals holding values and boxes represents competing values.

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**

***************

*****

******

************

**

**

**

**

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un-influential force on political values and an unimportant component of a political

culture. These are “low memory” political cultures in contrast to “high memory” ones

where memory is a frequent and influential force on political life. Countries can be

mapped on two continuous dimensions of macro context and memory regime power:

Figure 3: Heuristic Map of Political Cultures and Memory Regimes

High Memory Context

Heterogeneity Unanimity

Low Memory Context

Given a high or even medium memory context, the potential power involved

motivates elite representatives of various memories to compete in pursuit of maximizing

the dominance of their preferred memory. Competition may be between divergent

interpretations of one period or between memories based on different periods, where

much of the action revolves around arguing for the salience of one event versus another.

In addition, in lower memory contexts, “critical” elites may act to change the context in

order to make memory a more resonant and salient concern. Here the clash is more

generally about memory versus forgetting. Indeed, there can be competition over each of

the components of a memory regime and change in one may affect the others. For

example, there has been substantial debate in Germany as to what the overriding lesson

from the memory of the Holocaust is: nie wieder Krieg (never again war), nie wieder

Auschwitz (never again Auschwitz), or, according to current CDU leader Merkl, nie

wieder Sonderwege (never again unilateralism).

In any case, the goal of memory representatives is to achieve the maximum breadth of

acceptance and depth of attachment among the elite more generally and mass publics. It

also means achieving policy objectives and institutionalization in school curricula,

memorials and “texts.” Like any value-based conflict, the competition is vigorous

because the actors believe intensely in what they are representing, their identities often

are invested in them, and compromise is problematic. Moreover, actors use both positive

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and negative tactics and arguments. De-legitimizing and demonizing the opposing

memory and its representatives, i.e., making them taboo, occur frequently. Struggles over

memory may be the most vigorous, zero-sum and uncompromising of all political

cultural conflicts because of the higher degree of emotion involved, the importance of the

generative historical events and the potential power that victory entails.

Normative commitment, existential importance and power are reasons for perpetual

dynamism, for elites to constantly (re) enter discursive struggles. Other sources of

dynamism include generational change based on altered socio -economic structures and

different socialization processes. In fact, most authors assign the greatest weight to

processes of generational change (Platt and Dabag 1995; Mushaben 1998). A particular

memory is always more poignant if individuals personally experienced the generative

events and may lose relevance for younger cohorts with no such experiences. Memories,

in contrast to other inherited attitudes, may be especially prone to losing relevance, given

the on-going saga of history. There is an in-built potential for exogenous change through

more recent and accessible events and the shared memories based on them.

However, there are also important forces of conservation. Because memories are on

the more emotional side of the ideational spectrum (increasing their accessibility), actors

can make them resonate longer and more deeply. Recall also that dominant memories are

based typically on highly traumatic or foundational events, so they can remain relevant

long after the generation of witnesses pass away. Supportive public discourse that

maintains exposure to the memory, coupled with pedagogical measures, can sustain a

particular memory’s dominance for some time. Sanctification and institutionalization are

arguably more easily achieved than for other values, given the importance of memorials.

III. Rethinking the German Case

1. Changing Memory Regimes in Postwar Germany

An application of the memory regime framework, in particular the precept of

competing memories, leads to a substantially different and more comprehensive

perspective of the evolution of postwar German memory. In the years after Unification in

1990, for example, some conservatives tried to push the more recent memory of the East

German dictatorship, purportedly in order to relativize the memory of the Nazi regime.

Today, even though most Germans recognize the nastiness of communism, they believe

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that Nazism was simply much nastier. The more crucial point is that the proffered

memory of communism was thoroughly defeated by representatives of the Holocaust

centered memory, who successfully defended its dominance by convincing most

Germans of the greater severity and importance of their preferred memory. 10

However, there was an earlier and more important victory for advocates of the

Holocaust-centered memory over the memory of German suffering during World War

Two and its aftermath. In the earlier postwar decades this latter memory, based on the

experiences of aerial bombardment of cities and civilians, the ethnic cleansing of about

14 million Germans from then-Eastern Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the

mass rape of German women by members of the Red Army, resonated broadly with the

population (Heinemann 2001; Moeller 2001; Naumann 1998; Nawratil 1999; Neumann

2000). Other studies show that this memory, already declining in the 1970s, was

thoroughly defeated and supplanted by representatives of the Holocaust-centered memory

in the prominent elite- level discursive clashes (like the Historians’ Debate) of the mid -

1980s and defended vociferously ever since by the victors of those discursive

competitions. This re-thinking of the dynamics of postwar memory makes the new

discussions about this memory of German suffering in 2002-2003, spurred by the work of

authors like Grass (2002), Friedrich (2002), Sebald (2003) and a flurry of media

attention, much less difficult to comprehend.11 These discussions are not novel, as many

authors and commentators have asserted, but are rather the re-emergence of never-

completely defeated memories. A modified periodization of the evolution of postwar

memory follows:

10 This memory was also advocated by many Eastern German victims of the Stasi—making for strange bedfellows. Michael Geyer. The Long Good-bye: German Culture Wars in the Nineties. In The Power of Intellectuals in Contemporary Germany, edited by M. Geyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 11 See “Another taboo broken,” The Economist, November 23, 2002; Peter Schneider, “In Their Side of World War II, the Germans Also Suffered,” The New York Times , January 18, 2003. Christopher Rhoads, “Behind Iraq Stance in Germany: Flood of War Memories,” The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2003.

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Table 3: Revised Chronology of Memory Regimes in Postwar Germany

Regime/Phase Dates Characteristics 1. Dominance of German-centered memory

1945-late 60s

Concentration on self, inner-directed working through of German suffering, Germans-as-perpetrators downplayed, establishment of conditions for subsequent extension of processes

2.Introduction of new memory/ Competing, plural memories

Late 50s -late 70s

Beginnings of extension of working through to Nazi victims, generational interventions, greater though limited diffusion of processes through society

3. Battle for Dominance/ Rise of Holocaust-centered memory

Late 70s -1990

Rise to prominence of Holocaust conception of the past, almost dominant, though resis ted—creating public-political debates, mediatization, extensive diffusion; internationalization

4. Dominance of Holocaust-centered memory

1990-2002 Past=Holocaust achieves dominance, older conception of the past withers, constant discourse, wide diffusio n in society, continuous public debate

5. Renewed Competition

2002- Return of German-centered memories; notable for the empathy extended and the resonance amongst leftists; too early to draw firm conclusions

2. The Contemporary Nature and Impact of Memory

A. Preliminary Considerations

Still missing is a quantitative analysis of the nature and impact of memory on the

political values of Germans today, which also tests the utility of the memory regime

framework and, even more generally, the impact of memory in a political culture. What

memories exist, how dominant are they and for whom? Specifically, who subscribes to

the Holocaust-centered memory regime and who to the German-centered one and what

divergent attitudinal effects result? More generally, does memory exert an independent

impact on the political values of contemporary Germans? In order to answer these

questions, I formulated and implemented an original survey of German citizens between

the ages of 14 and 60 in 1999-2000.12

A brief word regarding the most important demographic influences on or correlates of

memory is necessary, as well as the expected relationships. These factors are dually 12 After extensive question formulation and pre-testing efforts conducted over the course of field research in 1999-2000, including several focus groups and trial administrations to high school classes, the public opinion firm FORSA (Berlin) implemented the survey between August 10th and 14 th, 2000. The survey representatively sampled the three age groups discussed above, 14-25, 26-40 and 41-60. Five hundred respondents were tapped in the first and last groups. The middle group was over-sampled with 1000 respondents, for a total “n” of 2000. I then pooled the three samples, using a weighting corresponding to the actual proportion of these cohorts in the total 14-60 population of the Federal Republic (based on 1998 official data), resulting in a data set with a total of 2,746 data points. The reason for not including the oldest (60+) cohort who experienced the Nazi period, is that I am concerned with the transmission and future of memory, divorced from actual experiences, which is quickly occurring as this oldest group passes away.

16

important, largely explaining which types of respondents support various memories in the

first set of analyses, as well as entering the calculations of the possible influence of

memories on political values as control variables. This enables more certain and valid

conclusions regarding the impact of memory through a comparison with the other factors.

Mass-Elite Differences: It is likely that higher education leads to greater exposure to elite messages (through the mass media and “quality press”), leading to greater acceptance of the elite validated memory and political values, even if passively absorbed. Moreover, greater education should lead to a higher likelihood that memory will influence more political values and opinions and will more often arise as an attitudinal influence. Similarly, higher levels of income or higher status occupations (both related to higher levels of education) should also result in greater acceptance of the socially desirable opinions as well as a greater impact of memory on these political values. Education and income are variables that capture class position and thus gr eater proximity to and receptivity towards the elite and its dominant messages.13

Partisan Identification: In previous decades conservatives tended to represent the German-centered memory regime, whereas the Left came to advocate the Holocaust-centered one. In addition, conservatives tended to downplay or minimize the impact of this past, whereas leftists embraced this influence more readily. Thus, I expect that leftists more frequently and more deeply hold the Holocaust-centered memory and conservatives accept it to a lesser extent and confine the Nazi past’s impact to fewer political domains. Given its importance in the past and the possibility that support for collective memories may be a product of partisanship rather than an autonomous attitudinal influence, this background factor may be the one of the most powerful predictors.

Generation: Previous studies strongly suggest that generational differences may also play a prominent explanatory role. Based on data from 2000 and using the ages 15-30 as the critical socialization years, I identify three cohorts from “successor” generations. The youngest is the millennial generation (14-25 years old), socialized after Unification. The centrality of Unification in 1990 characterizes the middle Wende generatio n (26-40). The third and oldest group is the 68er generation (41-60), the old student rebels, even if the younger members of this cohort did not come of age until the 1970s. Previous studies found that older individuals typically accepted the Holocaust-centered memory regime less than younger ones. Of course, the oldest cohort (60+ in 2000) was not included the survey. Even among members of “successor” generations the pattern may still hold because older citizens still had less formal instruction concerning the Third Reich than younger ones. Moreover, younger respondents came of age after the Holocaust-centered interpretation supplanted previously dominant memories. Thus, younger citizens may support the newer memory regime to a greater degree than older ones and it may exert a greater influence on the political thinking of this group.14

13 In the survey, there were 9 income brackets based on monthly income (in Marks), ranging from under DM 1000 to DM 7,500 and more, so that an increase in income indicates a change from the lower to the next higher bracket, e.g., from the 2,500-under 3,500 bracket to the 3,500-under 4,500 one. 14 Conversely, the 68er generation distinguished itself by its radicalism and heightened sensitivity towards issues of memory and, as a consequence, may be closer to the dominant memory regime than younger

17

East-West Residency: Since Unification authors observed substantial attitudinal differences between the populations of the two parts of the country. Western Germans may accept the dominant memory regime (a Western creation) more than Easterners, for whom the communist dictatorship may be the more salient period, or for whom East German anti-fascist socialization may determine historical interpretations today. It is currently difficult to specify expected relationships, given evidence for the shrinking of this divide and the centrality of Nazism in the historical socialization of the GDR. Nevertheless, I expect that Westerners accept the Holocaust-centered memory regime to a greater extent than Easterners.

Other Factors: Several other factors play an explanatory role in related studies. Corresponding to greater rejection of xenophobia and anti-Semitism and a greater acceptance of pacifism and human rights, women may be closer to the elite-validated memory regime than men. Religious affiliation and church attendance could explain some variance,15 given evidence that frequent church-goers are more tolerant towards ethnic minorities, and, thus, may more greatly support other “progressive” views.

B. Investigating and Explaining Tenets of the Memory Regime

i. General Assessments and Salience of Historical Periods

One of the first tasks of representatives of a particular memory is to convince their

audiences that the memory’s generative events ought to be the most influential for the

present. For the Holocaust-centered memory, this means that Germans must accept the

overall salience of the Nazi period and assess this past negatively. Germans today do not

unequivocally condemn the past as completely negative. Forty percent think it is partially

negative and partially positive and a further 35% think it was more positive than

negative. Only 14% think that it is predominantly negative. 16 The oldest cohort (41-60)

has an even more positive view (38% more positive than negative) than the youngest (14-

25) group (30%) and conservatives are slightly more positive than leftists are. Eleven

percent of CDU supporters assess the past “very positively” (confirmed by a significant

correlatio n of r = .125) versus 5.4% of SPD and Green sympathizers.

As for the salience of historical periods, a plurality chose the Third Reich (34%), even

though the questionnaire included the contemporary period (hardly historical), which

respondents. Younger respondents, having thought less about the past and whose reality is more distant from that period, may resist these interpretations and be farther away from the elite-validated view. 15 Affiliation also captures North-South differences (North=Protestant, South=Catholic), another historically important cleavage that periodically exerts strong explanatory power today (von Borries 1995). 16 Based on the relative strengths of statistical software programs, I used SPSS for all calculations except for the logit and multinomial logit models reported later, for which I used the STATA program. I re-coded and transformed many of the raw data for the statistical analysis. Please see the author for more details.

18

29% selected. The next most frequent response was the Federal Republic from 1949 to

1990 (24%). An alternative interpretation is that two-thirds of the sample chose periods

other than Nazism, clear evidence for the intrusion of more recent history and for a

recency effect. The expected generational relationship also surfaces: almost 40% of the

youngest group chose the Third Reich versus under 30% for the oldest cohort. Looking at

several correlations,17 other expected relationships appear. Workers (r = -.103) and

people with only a Hauptschulabschluß (high school degree, r = -.115) tend not to choose

this period, whereas students (r =.161) and those with the Abitur (university entrance

exam, r =.114) are more likely to choose it. Although almost all of the partisanship

variables were significantly correlated in expected directions, the sizes of the coefficients

were small—the correlation between the choice of the Nazi period and CDU partisans

was r = -.070, SPD r = .053, but Greens r = .106. There were few other significant or

strong correlations for any of the other historical periods. Partisanship appears as a weak

predictor, which is also the case for other factors like gender and religiosity. 18

Another way to tap the issue of salience is to ask respondents to assess the importance

of the Nazi past for both contemporary Germany and for their personal political

worldviews. Sixty-two percent of the sample (with few cohort or partisan differences, but

with richer respondents more often thinking it is collectively influential) thought the Nazi

past was very or rather important for the country. In contrast, only 40% thought the past

was important for their own political worldviews. Twenty percent of the 41-60 group and

only 13% of the 14-25 one thought it was personally very important. These results

indicate fascinating attitudinal contradictions. Despite evidence that the Nazi period is not

unequivocally salient and more recent periods are gaining resonance, a large majority still

thinks this past is influential for present politics. This recurs in other questions, revealing

a simultaneous personal distancing but support for “impersonal” collective impact.

17 This statistic indicates if observed differences in descriptive statistics are real (significant) or strong (size of coefficient). I used Pearson’s r and report only those statistically significant at the p = .05 level or better. 18 I also ran logit regressions on these responses, transformed into dichotomous variables. Being a type of maximum likelihood estimation, this statistic deals with probabilities. To interpret the coefficients, I use predicted probabilities. For those choosing the Third Reich as the most salient period both income (15%) and younger age (29%) increased the probability of choosing this period, whereas those with a Volksschule education were less likely to (12%) choose it. Assessing the past more negatively (17%), thinking it is more important for the country’s present (19%), seeing it as an unprecedented relapse (13%) and advocating the continuation of debates (23%) all increased the probability of being selected.

19

ii. Memories and Supportive Discourses

Two different question formulations get to the heart of competing memories:

Table 4: Competing Memories (1)

Many Germans consider the Third Reich to be one of, if not the most important period of German history. Nevertheless there are various interpretations of this epoch. With which of the following three statements do you most closely agree? (in %)

Total Sample The Hitler regime was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism and criminality. Many Germans supported the Nazis and were involved with their crimes.

29.6

Countless Germans were victims of the Nazi regime and many Germans experienced suffering, pain and loss.

23.4

The vast majority of Germans were neither victims nor perpetrators, but bystanders, passively standing by, doing little for or against the regime.

39.9

None of the above 2.5 Don’t Know 3.0 No answer 1.6

Table 5: Competing Memories (2)

The Nazi period was a terrible time. Many people suffered. Despite the chronological coincidence many people believe that the nature of suffering of different groups differed substantially. Above all, the suffering that Jewish victims experienced through discrimination, expulsion and murder is considered different than what Germans themselves experienced through dictatorial repression, bombing and expulsion. Which of the following statements do you agree with? (forced choice, in %)

Total Sample Suffering and death are suffering and death. All were victims of the dictatorial and criminal Nazi regime and are comparable.

31.2

A basic difference exists between the experiences of Jews and Germans. They cannot be compared.

59.8

Other (specify) 2.7 Don’t Know 4.3 No answer 2.0

The Holocaust centered memory does not predominate in the first alternative, with a

plurality choosing the more neutral “bystander” interpretation, a kind of safe, “middle”

position. 19 The second question, however, shows twice the number of respondents

choosing the latter option, representing the Holocaust-centered memory rather than the

German-suffering position. A more detailed breakdown of the response distributions for

the second question, crosstabulated with the demographic variables of greatest interest,

shows interesting relationships. Cohort differences are weak, but partisanship on the

extremes (note the slight difference between SPD and CDU sympathizers), education and

income differences appear to be strong differentiating factors.

19 There were no significant relationships between any of the other variables and the “bystander” response option, pointing to the questionable inclusion of this category.

20

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Competing Memories (2) (in %)

Suffering Comparable Basic Difference Total 31.2 59.8 14-25 30.0 63.2 26-40 31.1 59.4 41-60 31.8 59.4 PDS 29.7 65.6 Green 14.8 77.9 SPD 31.9 61.8 FDP 35.2 60.6 CDU 30.1 61.2 CSU 36.5 51.9 Hauptschule 34.9 53.8 Abitur 23.5 67.5 Arbeiter 39.4 48.2 Student 20.2 73.1 East 35.1 53.3 West 30.3 61.3 Male 29.8 62.3 Female 32.8 57.1 2500-3500 DM 38.6 49.2 5500-6500 DM 29.9 65.6 7500 + DM 22.2 70.8

Correlations show that those who answered that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse

into barbarism were wealthier (r = .102), think the past is rather important for Germany (r

= -.113) and believe that there is basic difference between the experiences of Germans

and Jews (r = .157). Moreover, these respondents also advocate a continuation of debates

about the past, rather than a “final line” (r = .213). Again, the partisanship variables were

highly significant and the directions in the expected ways, but the sizes of the coefficients

were rather small (CDU r = -.072, CSU r = -.045, SPD r = .080, Green r = .099).

Conversely, those who choose the “German victim” option tend to think the past is

less important for the present (r = .105), to not choose the Third Reich as the most salient

period (r = -.114), to not see a basic difference between the experiences of Germans and

Jews (r = -.109) and to advocate a final line being drawn over the past (r = .136). This

group is less educated, with those having a Hauptschulabschluß less likely to choose this

option (r = .102). The same partisanship pattern exists as for the other response option,

although fewer significant results pertained, and other expected demographic predictors,

such as gender, religiosity or East-West residency, were insignificant correlates.

21

One of the most crucial supportive ethical and moral discourses of the Holocaust

memory regime regards the disdain of closure and the necessity of continuing discussion

about the Nazi past and Holocaust, which critical actors also assert as a kind of lesson. It

is highly important to study whether respondents think these memories should continue to

be influential in the present, captured in a version of a question regarding the desirability

of drawing a “final line” over the past. This variable also turns out to be the strongest and

most consistently influential historical predictor in many of the subsequent statistical

analyses and thus deserves detailed attention.

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Drawing a Final Line over the Past For many years, there has been quite a lot of discussion about the Nazi past and its impact on the present. One hears quite different positions. On the one side are those who think that continued debate is highly important. On the other side are those who believe that drawing a final line over the past is timely and appropriate, in order to concentrate on the present and future. Which position do you agree with? (in %)20

Continued Debate Final Line over Past Total 41.3 51.0 14-25 36.0 55.2 26-40 38.1 52.3 41-60 46.6 47.4 PDS 73.4 21.9 Green 67.8 26.8 SPD 47.5 47.9 FDP 35.2 62.0 CDU 37.8 56.0 CSU 23.1 69.2 Hauptschule 31.5 59.6 Abitur 49.5 43.8 Arbeiter 27.8 61.3 Student 56.3 38.7 East 43.1 46.9 West 40.3 53.1 Male 41.7 50.9 Female 40.2 51.0 2500-3500 DM 37.8 54.8 5500-6500 DM 46.4 50.4 7500 + DM 50.5 45.4

Overall, the 10-point difference between the two positions mirrors the results from

most surveys over the last 25 years. The additional gap between the youngest and oldest

cohorts in terms of advocating a continuation of debates is perhaps evidence for an

Überdruß (excess) effect. Partisanship, education, occupation and income show very

20 For the total sample, 2.6% were indifferent, 3.4% didn’t know and 1.9% gave no answer.

22

polarized relationships, with leftists, better-educated respondents with higher status

occupations and higher income supporting continued debates. Conservatives, those with

less education, lower status occupations and lower incomes support a final line.

Correlations support these differences. Indeed, no other historical variable was as

significantly or strongly correlated with more variables. Event though the sizes of the

coefficients are small, the directions of the relationship are in expected directions.

Table 8 Demographic Correlates for Attitudes towards Final Line over the Past21

Continued Debates Final Line significance coefficient significance coefficient 14-25 .002 -.059 .017 .046 26-40 .022 -.044 41-60 .000 .091 .003 -.058 PDS .000 .102 .000 -.092 Green .000 .130 .000 -.118 SPD .000 .087 .034 -.042 FDP .051 .039 CDU .038 -.041 .007 .053 CSU .005 -.055 .007 .054 Hauptschule .000 -.111 .000 .095 Abitur .000 .072 .002 -.063 Arbeiter .000 -.121 .000 .089 Student .000 .146 .002 -.106 East/West (East=1) .025 -.043 Gender (male =1) Income .000 .099 .003 -.063

iii. Explaining the Memories and Support for the Final Line

Several more sophisticated statistics can determine what factors, both demographic

variables and the other historical questions, drive these memories and opinions regarding

the final line over the past. I expect that the background factors largely explain memories,

but it is also interesting to see if the other historical questions exert influences

independent of the demographic factors. If so, this would be evidence that history and

memory constitute an autonomous part of a political culture. After converting the

responses on the memory and final line questions into dummy variables, I ran logit

regression models.

21 Empty cells denote insignificant correlations. This is a selection of significant correlations.

23

Table 9: Logit Regression on Nazism as Unprecedented Relapse into Barbarism

Independent Variables Coefficients Interpreted Coefficients

P>z

Third Reich as most salient period .296 0.140 .010

Continued debates about the Past are necessary 1.034 0.508 .000

Income .071 0.143 .012

Highest educational level: Volkschule (high school) - .295 -0.125 .048

Partisan Identification (left to right) - .067 -0.120 .050

Constant 5.223 .621

By far the greatest statistical effect is from those advocating the continuation of

debates about the Nazi past, who are 51% more likely to choose this interpretation.

Moderate effects are also apparent from the other historical variables, so that those

choosing the Third Reich as the most salient epoch exhibit a 14% greater likelihood of

choosing the relapse response. An increase in income leads to a 14% greater likelihood of

choosing the relapse into barbarism answer and moving from the left to right on the

partisan identification scale produces a 12% lower probability of selecting this option.

More right-wing people are less likely and wealthier respondents are more likely to

choose this interpretation, confirming expectations. Those with only a Volks- or

Hauptschule education exhibit a 13% lower probability of choosing this memory.

Even more robust results arise from the logit regression on the response option

“Germans were also victims.” Those with the Abitur were 20% less likely to choose it,

whereas those with a Volksschule education exhibited a 20% greater probability.

Advocating a continuation of debates (22% lower probability) and choosing the Third

Reich as the most salient period (30% lower) had quite large effects in the expected

inverse directions. Likewise for the second formulation, and the option “suffering and

death are comparab le,” those who thought that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into

barbarism exhibited a 24% lower likelihood and those advocating continued debates led

to a 31% lower probability of selecting it. Finally, an increase in income leads to a 20%

lower probability of thinking suffering is comparable. As these results indicate, even

though many of the posited background characteristics are influential in the expected

directions, the historical variables also play important and independent explanatory roles.

24

Turning to the “final line” question, taking the response option “support for a

continuation of debates about the Nazi past” as the dependent variable: 22

Table 10: Logit Regression on Support for Continued Debates about the Nazi Past

Independent Variables Coefficients Interpreted Coefficients

P>z

Assessment of the Past (positive to negative) .217 0.193 .000

Third Reich as most salient period .467 0.221 .000

Importance of Past for Germany (high to low) -.553 -0.653 .000

Nazism as unprecedented relapse into barbarism .966 0.441 .000

Suffering and death are comparable -.643 -0.300 .000

Income .060 0.120 .033

Age -.021 -0.269 .000

Highest educational level: Abitur (university entrance) .284 0.104 .062

Highest educational level: Volkschule (high school) -.268 -0.113 .062

Partisan Identification (left to right) -.092 -0.165 .006

Constant 41.033 .000

In this rather robust model, the influences of the demographic variables were all in the

expected directions but the sizes of the effects on the probabilities are much lower than

for the other historical variables included. Thus, on the one hand, higher income (12%)

and having the Abitur (10%) both lead to a greater probability of advocating continued

debates; whereas ha ving only a Volksschule education (11%), a more right wing partisan

identification (17%) and being younger (27%) lead to a lower likelihood. On the other

hand, choosing the Third Reich as the most salient historical period (22%), ascribing

more importance to that period for the present (at a rather impressive 65%), thinking

Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism (another large 44%) all lead to a

greater probability of advocating continued debates. Conversely, thinking that suffering

was comparab le leads to a 30% lower likelihood of advocating continued debates.

22 There were also very strong correlations regarding this question. Those advocating a continuation of debates assigned a greater importance to history in the present (nationally r = -.337 and personally r = -.314). Advocates of the “final line” ascribed less importance to the Nazi past ( nationally r= .331 and personally r = .326). Students (r = .146) and those having studied at the university (r = .165) were more likely to take this position, whereas workers (r = -.121) and those with Hauptschulabschluß ( r =-.111) were less likely.

25

Another logit regression on the second response category (supporting a “final line”)

shows similar relationships. Younger respondents (23%), those with a Volksschule

education (12%) and more right wing individuals (17%) exhibit a greater likelihood of

choosing this response. As before, the historical variables are even stronger predictors.

Choosing the Third Reich as the most salient period and thinking it was a relapse lead to

a 18% and 40% lower probability of choosing the “final line” response. Believing that the

period is less important for the present country (at a quite large 61%) and that suffering

was comparable (at 31%) result in a greater likelihood of selecting this response.

These analyses show that there is a very clear nexus of inter-related demographic

variables, historical factors and memories, especially evident regarding the “final line”

question. The tenets and perspectives of the Holocaust-centered memory regime clearly

hang together in the expected ways for both those who accept and those who resist it.

Education, income, age and partisanship continued to play important explanatory roles

and the results largely support the hypothesized relationships. However, many of the

demographic background variables were either not significant predictors or exerted

influences only as large as other historical variables. These results indicate a large degree

of autonomy for historical and memory factors in mass belief and political cultural

systems.

B. The Impact of the Past on Contemporary Political Values

i. Current Political Attitudes and Values

The first task is to look at current political attitudes and values and to select several

(most likely) political domains where effects of the past plausibly arise. I choose three

domains: foreign policy, domestic constitutional structures and more general political

values. For foreign policy, there are two formulations that look at the role of different and

possibly competing le ssons arising from the past (furtherance of human rights and a just

war against a dictatorial regime) and one taps support for the movement towards

European unity. For domestic and constitutional structures, I look at attitudes towards the

5% electoral threshold, legal bans on Nazi symbols and the use of referendums. Finally,

two questions ask about the connection between the Nazi past and general value

orientations, such as the importance of freedom and democracy or whether Germany

continues to have a special responsibility towards victims of Nazism:

26

Table 11: On a scale of 1-5, where 1 indicates complete agreement and 5 disagreement, what do you think about the following statements?

agree comp -letely

agree some-what

agree moder-ately

agree little

agree not at all

don’t know

no answer

1. Germany should pursue a foreign policy that furthers human rights, peace and freedom.

76.1 12.7 5.5 0.9 0.9 2.0 1.9

2. Freedom is a more important value than pacifism. Sometimes freedom-loving democracies have to fight dictatorships that abuse human rights.

27.0 21.5 24.0 7.1 13.8 3.9 2.8

3. At the federal level, parties need 5% of the votes in order to gain seats in Parliament. This law was created so that radical parties could not enter Parliament. Today Germany is a stable democracy. The 5% law is therefore unnecessary today.

19.7 6.2 9.3 7.8 49.6 4.6 2.8

4. At the federal level, there have been no referendums up to now, because leading politicians thought that only this would hinder extremist positions. Today that is no longer a danger and referendums should be accepted.

42.8 20.2 20.6 5.7 6.1 2.6 2.0

5. Since the establishment of the FRG and former GDR, Nazi symbols, such as the Hitler salute have been banned. Today’s Germany no longer needs such bans.

12.9 3.4 6.2 6.5 65.6 2.9 1.9

6. After WWII, a movement towards European integration was established, among other reasons, in order to anchor Germany internationally. That is still today an important argument why Germany should continue to pursue European integration.

41.6 26.0 19.7 3.3 2.9 3.9 2.6

7. Because of the Nazi past, today’s Germans have a special responsibility towards the victims.

36.6 19.5 20.2 9.1 9.6 2.8 2.1

8. Because of Germany’s Nazi past, freedom, democracy and peace are especially important values.

69.9 15.0 7.6 1.6 2.1 1.5 2.0

27

Large, sometimes massive, majorities agree with the “progressive” or elite-sanctioned

views, i.e., those value connections posited by the (critical) elite.23 Almost 90% agree

completely or somewhat that a human rights-based foreign policy should be pursued and

68% support building “Europe” (although the “just war” question is not as unequivocal).

Except for the greater use of referendums, which is supported by most, majorities are for

the retention of restrictions such as the 5% electoral threshold. The questions regarding

whether Germany continues to have a special obligation to the victims of Nazism and

whether freedom and democracy are important values, are particularly clear as the impact

of the Nazi past is already included in the question. Here, 56% and 85% agree completely

or somewhat. In fact, when the responses for all eight questions are aggregated, out of a

possible score of 40, indicating complete agreement with “progressive” views, the mean

is 30.4, the median is 31 and the mode is 32. For the index used in later calculations, out

of a possible score of 25, the mean was 20.4 and both the median and mode were 21. Few

demographic differences arise with two exceptions:

Table 12: Advocacy of Human Rights-Based Foreign Policy (in %) completely

agree somewhat

agree moderately

agree agree little Agree not at all

Total 76.1 12.7 5.5 0.9 0.9 14-25 67.0 18.6 8.6 1.6 0.6 26-40 74.0 13.4 5.9 0.8 0.7 41-60 82.4 9.2 3.6 0.6 1.2 PDS 90.6 7.8 1.6 Green 88.6 8.7 2.0 0.7 SPD 83.6 11.4 3.4 0.5 1.1 FDP 84.5 12.7 2.8 CDU 78.5 15.0 5.3 0.6 0.6 CSU 92.3 5.8 1.9 Hauptschule 74.8 13.4 8.6 1.3 2.0 Abitur 82.3 12.6 3.9 1.0 0.3 Arbeiter 75.7 14.6 6.3 0.4 3.0 Student 82.9 12.0 4.3 0.9 East 83.4 9.7 5.1 0.2 1.6 West 78.3 14.2 5.6 1.1 0.8 Male 80.4 12.9 5.1 0.8 0.9 Female 78.2 13.8 5.9 1.0 1.1 2500-3500 DM 78.0 14.2 5.5 1.3 1.0 5500-6500 DM 81.9 12.2 4.1 0.5 1.4 7500 + DM 89.6 7.5 1.4 1.4

23 Determining the “progressive” response option was straightforward for most questions, but, for some I made plausible judgments. I coded a just war against a dictatorial regime “progressive,” as well as supporting restrictions on referendums and advocating the continuation of a ban on Nazi symbols.

28

Table 13: Building Europe Still Important completely

agree somewhat

agree moderately

agree agree little agree not at all

Total 41.6 26.0 19.7 3.3 2.9 14-25 33.8 30.6 24.6 5.0 2.0 26-40 34.2 29.1 22.9 3.3 3.0 41-60 53.4 21.0 14.6 2.4 3.2 PDS 50.0 16.1 24.2 3.2 6.5 Green 47.2 38.2 14.1 2.1 1.4 SPD 48.6 28.4 18.0 2.8 2.2 FDP 52.1 32.4 9.9 4.2 1.4 CDU 53.1 22.4 19.5 2.9 2.1 CSU 29.4 41.2 29.4 Hauptschule 43.7 26.0 22.1 2.6 5.5 Abitur 45.8 29.6 20.4 3.1 1.0 Arbeiter 42.3 28.5 18.8 3.8 6.5 Student 38.9 35.4 20.4 4.4 0.9 East 44.8 22.3 24.5 5.3 3.1 West 44.5 288.8 20.4 3.3 3.0 Male 44.7 28.4 18.2 4.5 4.2 Female 44.3 26.6 24.1 3.0 2.0 2500-3500 DM 39.3 33.6 19.1 3.3 4.6 5500-6500 DM 49.3 22.9 18.4 6.7 2.7 7500 + DM 57.4 20.6 17.2 1.4 3.3

It appears that income and age differences are the most important here, as well as

some partisan effects. Regarding human rights-oriented foreign policy, there is a 15-point

gap between the youngest and the oldest groups (with the middle one almost exactly half

way between) strongly agreeing, whereas there is only a 5-point gap between CDU and

SPD voters, but an 11-point gap between the lowest and highest income brackets. In the

building Europe question, there is a 20 point gap between youngest two groups and

oldest, with the older respondents more strongly agreeing, an almost 20 point gap

between the highest pro-Europe and the lowest rather anti-Europe income brackets, but

only a 4 point one between CDU and SPD sympathizers. Similarly there are 13- and 17-

point differences in the last two general value questions, with the middle cohort closer to

the youngest in terms of special responsibility to victims and closer to the older on the

importance of freedom and democracy (but few other differences). Thus, it appears that

the older cohort is significantly closer to elite-validated positions.

ii. Testing the Impact of Memory

I carried out several sets of analyses to look at the potential causal influences of the

memories on current political attitudes. Initial correlational analysis showed that attitudes

29

in many of the political domains are related to each other and to various background

variables. The exceptions for which few significant correlations arose are the questions

regarding the tradeoff between pacifism and just wars, the 5% electoral threshold and on

continuing the ban on Nazi symbols. Further statistical analyses using these questions as

dependent variables (multinomial logistic regressions) confirmed these initial findings,

with the memory and historical variables remaining statistically insignificant.24 The

remaining political value questions exhibited numerous and strong correlations with each

other and with demographic and historical variables.25 A factor analysis substantiated

these findings, pointing to the existence of three factors. The strongest, loading on the

“continued responsibility towards victims of Nazism” question, also contained the two

foreign policy questions, the “Europe” question and the “freedom and democracy”

general value question. The 5% threshold and ban on Nazi symbols comprised the second

factor and the third was simply the referendum question. 26

Testing explicitly for impact of memory, I constructed an index from the five political

value questions that comprised the first factor presented above with higher scores

24 These findings may disconfirm the expectations that memory affects attitudes in these overlooked political domains, in particular those regarding domestic constitutional structures. However, the situation may be more complicated. Large proportions and even majorities support the socially desirable views informed by the Holocaust-centered memory regime. Moreover, few correlations or statistically significant regressors of any kind emerged for these questions. For example, neither age, nor education, nor partisan identification were correlated or significant predictors. 25 For example, regarding human rights in foreign policy, those assigning a greater importance of the past for the present country (r = .107), those advocating the building of Europe (r =.325), responsibility towards victims (r = .194), peaceful values (r= .334) and the continuation of debates (r = -.161, “final line,” r = .119) supported the furtherance of human rights, as did those with higher income ( r = -.104) and having studied at the university (r = -.105). High school students and those with a Hauptschulabschluß did not. Building Europe (6) was correlated with people seeing history more positively (r = -.108), assigning a greater importance to history in the present country (r = .110), as well as accepting responsibility towards victims (r= .274), and supporting peaceful values (r = .289). Furthermore, those seeing a basic difference between German and Jewish suffering (r = -.100) and advocating the continuation of debates (r = -.158) supported the European project. 26 I used principal component analysis with the varimax roation method and Kaiser normalizations, which converged in 6 iterations. The factor scores for the first factor were .708 for the responsibility question, .683 for building Europe, .560 for human rights foreign policy, .489 for democracy as an important value and .426 for the just war question. For second factor, the values were .803 for the 5% threshold and .726 for the ban on Nazi symbols. The third factor produced a score of .860 for the referendum question. Various regressions on these other factors proved to be extremely weak, perhaps due to the lack of variation in the dependent variables (the indices).

30

indicating greater support for “progressive,“ elite-validated attitudes.27 Using this index

as the dependent variable, I ran a multivariate linear regression model.28

Table 14: Linear Regression on Current Political Value Index

Beta (Standardized) Significance

Importance of Nazi Past for Present Country -.122 .008

Importance of Nazi Past for Personal Worldview -.072 .112

Sex (Male=1) .074 .110

Age -.146 .000

Income .051 .222

Suffering is Comparable -.061 .125

Continuation of Debates about the Nazi Past .186 .000

Housewife/husband .085 .092

Highest educational attainment: Abitur .049 .236

Adjusted R²= .131

The findings are clear: the historical variables perform as well as often as the

demographic ones. Those who think that the Nazi past is important for the present

country also hold more “progressive” attitudes. The strongest and most significant effect

on values comes from those who advocate a continuation of debates. Regarding the

demographic controls, the negative coefficient for age indicates that older people are

closer to elite validated positions (partisanship was so insignificant that it was eliminated

from later models). Income and education do not play big explanatory roles, but the

German-centered memory variable does (approaching statistical significance).

As another test of the influence of memory, I ran multinomial logit models29 for each

of the individual value questions, the findings from several of which I report below. 30

27 Reliability analysis obtained an adequate Cronbach alpha score of .5144. The score increased to .5659 when question 2 (the just war) was eliminated, but I decided to leave it, in order to have greater variation on the dependent variable. The basic multivariate linear regression model is: Y= α + ßX1 + ... ßXn + e. 28 This a powerful statistic with high validity and reliabilty for large databases, that allows for the inclusion of many independent variables and that is appropriate for this kind of dependent variable.I ran various models that included a full range of demographic controls, as well as the historical and memory variables of greatest theoretical interest. The model presented here is the most parsimonious one, containing only the most significant regressors and the highest possible R². 29Again, these models achieve the maximum and parsimonious explanatory power. I present only the interpreted results; the full sets of results are available upon request. This technique simultaneously estimates binary logits for all comparisons among outcome categories. Another possible statistical

31

Regarding the furtherance of human rights in foreign policy:

• Age is significant and the interpreted coefficient shows a rather large positive effect in each category. Younger respondents exhibit a 53% greater probability of only agreeing somewhat (category 2) versus agreeing completely (category 1). Thus younger people are less likely to advocate a foreign policy based on the furtherance of human rights.

• Income, for several response options, exerts rather large effects in the expected direction: greater income (meaning moving from a lower to a higher monthly income bracket) leads to greater probability of agreeing more strongly with a human rights-oriented foreign policy.

• Thinking Nazism was an unprecedented relapse to barbarism leads to a 14% lower likelihood of agreeing somewhat versus strongly whereas believing suffering was comparable leads to a 29% higher probability of agreeing only moderately (category 3) with the human rights-based foreign policy.

• Ascribing less importance to the Nazi past in the present country, leads to a greater likelihood of disagreeing, with a 38% greater probability of agreeing moderately and a 82% greater probability of strongly disagreeing versus strongly agreeing.

For the question on building “Europe,” the demographic control variables exert a

rather marked influence:

• Younger people tend to disagree more than older respondents do. For the young, there is a 54% greater probability of only somewhat versus completely agreeing. Higher income leads to a greater acceptance of “Europe.”

However, here too, the historical variables exert influence.

• Those who think that the Third Reich was an unprecedented relapse express a greater probability of strongly agreeing with the European project, whereas believing suffering was comparable leads to greater disagreement. Ascribing less importance to the Nazi period leads to a 20% greater probability of only moderately agreeing and a 35% greater probability of agreeing not at all with “Europe.”

technique is ordered probit, which produce broadly similar results. I chose to report the multinomial logit results because they are a little more intuitive, and also safer. 30 This is an appropriate and unbiased statistic for ordinal dependent variables with only a few response options, even if the low number of predictors the models can accommodate constrains efficiency. The number of parameters is exceptionally large and it will take only a small number of independent variables (in contrast to conventional linear regression models), in a sense, forcing parsimony. This statistic calculates the effect of the independent variable on the probability of whatever category being chosen in relation to the baseline (1) category, holding all other independent variables constant. I again use predicted probabilities to interpret the coefficients, even though the interpretation is less clear than with binary logit models: the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable on the outcome category being chosen in relation to the baseline (1=strongly agree) category.

32

Finally, for the question on whether freedom, democracy and peace are especially

important values because of the Nazi past:

• Again, younger respondents tend to disagree that because of the past, freedom, democracy and peace are especially important values for contemporary Germany. Greater income leads to a 42% lower probability of agreeing little versus strongly agreeing.

• Believing that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism prompts respondents to agree more strongly with this value. It leads to rather large decreases in the probability of somewhat (26%), moderately (21%) agreeing and somewhat disagreeing (58%) in relation to strongly agreeing. On the other hand, believing that suffering is comparable led to an 18% greater likelihood of agreeing only somewhat and a 31% greater probability of agreeing not at all, versus strongly agreeing. Finally, ascribing less importance to the past led to a greater probability of somewhat agreeing (17%), somewhat disagreeing (71%) and strongly disagreeing (62%), versus the strongly agreeing baseline category.

These analyses reveal strong substantiation tha t memory is an important influence on

the political values and attitudes of contemporary Germans. In almost all of the statistical

calculations using the foreign policy, support for “Europe” and general value questions,

the memory and historical variables exerted autonomous influences, despite the inclusion

of multiple control variables. In many cases the memory variables perform as well or

better than the demographic factors. Moreover, almost all of the relationships (with the

exception of age) are in directions expected by the representatives of the dominant

memory regime: greater acceptance of the Holocaust-centered memory leads to more

“progressive” values. In sum, the major theoretical contention of this paper, that memory

is an important influence on current political values, has been substantiated.

C. Summary

The most important findings from this quantitative analysis are the following:

1. The Nazi period is the most salient period for a plurality (about 35%) of Germans

today. Almost two-thirds chose more recent periods, which, however, included the

current period (the unified country from 1990). This shows that more recent historical

periods are starting to intrude on the shared memories of contemporary generations.

2. There is also evidence for the existence of competing memories. A quarter to a third

of respondents chose the German-centered memory in the two formulations (that

33

Germans were also victims of Nazism and that the suffering of Germans was comparable

to other groups). Nevertheless, there is also support for the partial dominance of the

Holocaust-centered memory, with two-thirds of the sample believing that there was a

basic difference between the experiences of Germans and Jews during the Third Reich.

3. These memories, especially the Holocaust-centered one, are not superficially but

rather intensely held, as the questions ascribing importance to the past for the present

country attest, and as the strong causal role many of these questions played in subsequent

statistical calculations reveals.

4. As for demographic variables, in almost every case, the direction of the relationship

was as expected. More leftist, better-educated respondents with higher incomes and

higher status occupations were closer to elite-validated or “progressive” views and vice

versa. Indeed, age/generation, income and education turned out to be the most important

background factors in the various statistical analyses. This is clear evidence that the

mass-elite difference is salient regarding acceptance of the current memory regime and

that generation is still a powerful differentiating force. It bears repeating that the

partisanship variable was a surprisingly weak explanatory factor. Any real differences are

on the extremes—with Green and PDS sympathizers closer to the “progressive” views.

Although CDU voters do not fully accept this memory regime, the distance is slight, as is

that with the other catchall party, the SPD. It appears that the effects of partisanship have

weakened and are washed out by elite-mass and generational differences. Other factors

like East-West residence, gender and religiosity played similarly weak roles.31

6. Finally and perhaps, most importantly is the issue of the impact of the various

memories and other historical variables on the political values and attitudes in the

political domains. Here the evidence is unequivocal: these factors greatly influence the

political thinking of contemporary generations of Germans especially in the realms of

foreign policy and general political worldviews. Many of the historical and memory

questions, especially the “final line” question, were consistently statistically significant

and exhibited substantial effects, as the coefficients demonstrated. In fact, these effects

were often as strong if not stronger than the most important demographic predictors.

31 Space constraints do not allow for a full presentation of these data, or better, these “non-relationships.”

34

III. Conclusions

This empirical analysis of the German case strongly supports the various theoretical

contentions outlined previously, above all, that memory strongly and independently

influences current political value orientations. The tenets of multiple and competing

memories proved valid, producing a much more detailed and complex picture of the

evolution of memory regimes over the postwar period and the degree of dominance of the

current memory regime in Germany. Moreover, representatives of the dominant discourse

are either correct or have been extremely successful in arguing their position: those who

accept the dominant discourse and memories are also much more “progressive” in their

political value orientations. They also tend to be better educated, richer and older.

The Holocaust-centered memory appears influential, but only for a (large) minority of

the population, i.e., it does not appear to be as clearly and unequivocally dominant as

many observers conclude. Actually, mixed evidence emerges from the quantitative

analysis. For example, only a small plurality chose the Third Reich as the most salient

period, yet large majorities believe it plays a substantial role in the politics of their

country and a sizable plurality thinks so for their personal political worldviews.

Moreover, the final line question was greatly divided, even though big majorities in other

questions supported the continuation of many (educational) efforts and advocated special

responsibility towards victims. Above all, it is paradoxical that so few people chose the

Holocaust-centered memory in the first formulation (Nazism was an unprecedented

relapse into barbarism) and that, in the second formulation, even 30% thought suffering

was comparable, yet rather big majorities chose the “progressive” elite sanctioned

responses in the political value question battery.

This last point is key. When explicitly asked about values because of the past (in the

questions concerning special responsibility towards victims and the importance of

freedom and democracy) or when the role of the past was only implicit, big majorities

accepted the “progressive” view, because of the Nazi past. There are various resolutions

to this paradox. Some respondents may support progressive values independently of any

collective memories they may share. Others may support alternative memories or an

advocacy of a “final line” because they have already reflected on, worked through or

35

internalized the Holocaust centered memory, not because they want to repress or evade it.

Finally, instead of having the Germans -as-bystanders/German victim interpretations of

the Nazi period in mind when, for example, they support the continuation of the ban on

Nazi symbols, they may actually have been thinking of the Holocaust-centered memory.

This is to say that many respondents may have switched interpretations of the Nazi past

sometime between the earlier and later questions of the survey, a finding t hat was

substantiated by the more qualitative forms of data not reported here.

In sum, Germans have been convinced by elite representatives of the Holocaust-

centered memory regime to support and internalize it to a very large degree.

Nevertheless, this dominance faces some threat from the older memory of German

suffering. The continued support for this memory goes a long way to explain the

resonance that the renewed discussions of these memories elicited in 2002-2003. These

findings also incidentally support the contentions of the predominately leftist leaders of

these discussions, that the (far) right has monopolized representation and interpretation of

the German-centered memories which need to be re-appropriated and connected to more

progressive values and ends.

Finally, this analysis supports the utility of the memory regime framework, both in

furthering understanding of the German case and making the case for the more general

importance of memory as an influence on political values and culture. It should be

applied to an array of other countries, producing similar advances in knowledge.

36

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