FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J:

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?

The Case

These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]

The Facts

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus:[3]

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.

As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.

After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5]

Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree:[6]

In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:

On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;

After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;

The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;

On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;

On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;

After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;

After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.

For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x.

In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.

After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]

x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.

On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9]

With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.

It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).

Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.

Issue

Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]

Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.[13]

On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which held:[16]

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring supplied.)

We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.

First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17]

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.

In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:

SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).

However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void.

It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21]

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:

As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.

In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.

Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act

The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]

Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:

Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).

Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.[25] But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.

A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.[28]

In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs.ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision2 and the July 22, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E C I S I O N of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from, as follows:

"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in question, being an innocent purchaser for value therefor;

"2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit:

As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:

1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages;2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;4. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and5. Cost of suit.

As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:

1. P50,000.00 as moral damages;2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;3. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;4. Cost of suit."4

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:

"As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial court:

On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees.

On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.

Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.

On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo].

On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.

On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.5

"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].

"After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.

"Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA]."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.7 Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.

The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.8

Hence, this Petition.9

Issues

Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:

"1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.

"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser for value in good faith.

"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question."10

In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Main Issue:

Better Right over the Property

Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to her.11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.12

Law on Double Sale

The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent Romana de Vera.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:

"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."

Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.

This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration.15 Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.16

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344.17 For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system18 because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.19

Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x."20

We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522.21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias name.22 As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent.

Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:

"Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.

"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,27 this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.

"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale."28

Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.29 All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.30

Good-Faith Requirement

We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.31 Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.32 We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,33 which we quote:

"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession."34 (Italics supplied)

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate.35 Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.36 Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.37

Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she registered the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C. Vitug:

"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).

x x x x x x x x x

"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)

Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,40 which held:

"Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. x x x."41

Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.42 There was no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land.43 Such registration was therefore considered effectual.

Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale.44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue.45

As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.

We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:

"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"46

Respondent in Good Faith

The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.47 After its factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus:

"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x."48

We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession.49

This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property.50 The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, good faith on respondents part stands.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago*, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public landsaccording to alienabilityWhether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

. . . .

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nt Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question