Land Titles Day 13 to 15

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

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DAY 13 AND 14 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1067 December 31, 1976

A DECREE INSTITUTING A WATER CODE, THEREBY REVISING AND CONSOLIDATING THE LAWS GOVERNING THE OWNERSHIP, APPROPRIATION, UTILIZATION, EXPLOITATION, DEVELOPMENT, CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES

WHEREAS, Article XIV, Section 8 of the New Constitution of the Philippines provides, inter alia, that all waters of the Philippines belong to the State;

WHEREAS, existing water legislations are piece-meal and inadequate to cope with increasing scarcity of water and changing patterns of water use;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a Water Code based on rational concepts or integrated and multipurpose management of water resources and sufficiently flexible to adequately meet future developments;

WHEREAS, water is vital to national development and it has become increasingly necessary for government to intervene actively in improving the management of water resources;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the enactment of the water Code of the Philippines of 1976, as follows:

CHAPTER I DECLARATION OF OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1. This Code shall be known as The Water Code of the Philippines.

Article 2. The objectives of this Code are:

(a) To establish the basic principles and framework relating to the appropriation, control and conservation of water resources to achieve the optimum development and rational utilization of these resources;

(b) To define the extent of the rights and obligations of water users and owners including the protection and regulation of such rights;

(c) To adopt a basic law governing the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources and rights to land related thereto; and

(d) To identify the administrative agencies which will enforce this Code.

Article 3. The underlying principles of this code are:

(a) All waters belong to the State.

(b) All waters that belong to the State can not be the subject to acquisitive prescription.

(c) The State may allow the use or development of waters by administrative concession.

(d) The utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government through the National Water Resources Council, hereinafter referred to as the Council.

(e) Preference in the use and development of waters shall consider current usages and be responsive to the changing needs of the country.

Article 4. Waters, as used in this Code, refers to water under the grounds, water above the ground, water in the atmosphere and the waters of the sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

CHAPTER II OWNERSHIP OF WATERS

Article 5. The following belong to the State:

(a) Rivers and their natural beds;

(b) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;

(c) Natural lakes and lagoons;

(d) All other categories of surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall whether natural, or artificial, and water from agriculture runoff, seepage and drainage;

(e) Atmospheric water;

(f) Subterranean or ground waters; and,

(g) Seawater.


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Article 6. The following waters found on private lands belong to the State:

(a) Continuous or intermittent waters rising on such lands;

(b) Lakes and lagoons naturally occuring on such lands;

(c) Rain water falling on such lands;

(d) Subterranean or ground waters; and,

(e) Water in swamps and marshes.

The owner of the land where the water is found may use the same for domestic purposes without securing a permit, provided that such use shall be registered, when required by the Council. The Council, however, may regulate such when there is wastage, or in times of emergency.

Article 7. Subject to the provisions of this Code, any person who captures or collects water by means of cisterns, tanks, or pools shall have exclusive control over such water and the right to dispose of the same.

Article 8. Water legally appropriated shall be subject to the control of the appropriator from the moment it reaches the appropriator's canal or aqueduct leading to the place where the water will be used or stored and, thereafter, so long as it is being beneficially used for the purposes for which it was appropriated.

CHAPTER III APPROPRIATION OF WATERS

Article 9. Waters may be appropriated and used in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

Appropriation of water, as used in this Code, is the acquisition of rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by law.

Article 10. Water may be appropriated for the following purposes:

(a) Domestic

(b) Municipal

(c) Irrigation

(d) Power generation

(e) Fisheries

(f) Livestock raising

(g) Industrial

(h) Recreational, and

(i) Other purposes

Use of water for domestic purposes is the utilization of water for drinking, washing, bathing, cooking or other household needs, home gardens, and watering of lawns or domestic animals.

Use of water for municipal purposes is the utilization of water for supplying the water requirements of the community.

Use of water for irrigation is the utilization of water for producing agricultural crops.

Use of water for power generation is the utilization of water for producing electrical or mechanical power.

Use of water for fisheries is the utilization of water for the propagation and culture of fish as a commercial enterprise.

Use of water for livestock raising is the utilization of water for large herds or flocks of animals raised as a commercial enterprise.

Use of water for industrial purposes is the utilization of water in factories, industrial plants and mines, including the use of water as an ingredient of a finished product.

Use of water for recreational purposes is the utilization of water for swimming pools, bath houses, boating, water skiing, golf courses and other similar facilities in resorts and other places of recreation.

Article 11. The State, for reasons of public policy, may declare waters not previously appropriated, in whole or in part, exempt from appropriation for any or all purposes and, thereupon, such waters may not be appropriated for those purposes.

Article 12. Waters appropriated for a particular purpose may be applied for another purpose only upon prior approval of the Council and on condition that the new use does not unduly prejudice the rights of other permittees, or require an increase in the volume of water.


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Article 13. Except as otherwise herein provided, no person, including government instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations, shall appropriate water without a water right, which shall be evidenced by a document known as a water permit.

Water right is the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water.

Article 14. Subject to the provisions of this Code concerning the control, protection, conservation, and regulation of the appropriation and use of waters, any person may appropriate or use natural bodies of water without securing a water permit for any of the following:

(a) Appropriation of water by means of handcarried receptacles; and

(b) Bathing or washing, watering or dipping of domestic or farm animals, and navigation of watercrafts or transportation of logs and other objects by flotation.

Article 15. Only citizens of the Philippines, of legal age, as well as juridical persons, who are duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, may apply for water permits.

Article 16. Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an application with the Council who shall make known said application to the public for any protests.

In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council shall consider the following: protests filed, if any; prior permits granted; the availability of water; the water supply needed for beneficial use; possible adverse effects; land-use economics; and other relevant factors.

Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and recorded.

Article 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the application for a water permit in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual use in a case where no permit is required.

Article 18. All water permits granted shall be subject to conditions of beneficial use, adequate standards of design and construction, and such other terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Council.

Such permits shall specify the maximum amount of water which may be diverted or withdrawn, the maximum rate of diversion or withdrawal, the time or times during the year when water may be diverted or withdrawn, the points or points of diversion or location of wells, the place of use, the purposes of which water may be used and such other requirements the Council deems desirable.

Article 19. Water rights may be leaded or transferred in whole or in part to another person with prior approval of the Council, after due notice and hearing.

Article 20. The measure and limit of appropriation of water shall be beneficial use.

Beneficial use of water is the utilization of water in the right amount during the period that the water is needed for producing the benefits for which the water is appropriated.

Article 21. Standards of beneficial use shall be prescribed by the council for the appropriator of water for different purposes and conditions, and the use of waters which are appropriated shall be measured and controlled in accordance therewith.

Excepting for domestic use, every appropriator of water shall maintain water control and measuring devices, and keep records of water withdrawal. When required by the Council, all appropriators of water shall furnish information on water use.

Article 22. Between two or more appropriators of water from the same sources of supply, priority in time of appropriation shall give the better right, except that in times of emergency the use of water for domestic and municipal purposes shall have a better right over all other uses; Provided, the where water shortage is recurrent and the appropriator for municipal use has a lower priority in time of appropriation, then it shall be his duty to find an alternative source of supply in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Council.

Article 23. Priorities may be altered on grounds of greater beneficial use, multi-purpose use, and other similar grounds after due notice and hearing, subject to payment of compensation is proper cases.

Article 24. A water right shall be exercised in such a manner that the rights of third persons or of other appropriators are not prejudiced thereby.

Article 25. A holder of water permit may demand the establishment of easements necessary for the construction and maintenance of the works and facilities needed for the beneficial use of the waters to be appropriated subject to the requirements of just compensation and to the following conditions:

(a) That he is the owner, lessee, mortgagee or one having real right over the land upon which he proposes to use water; and

(b) That the proposed easement is the most convenient and the least onerous to the servient estate.

Easements relating to the appropriation and use of waters may be modified by agreement of the contracting parties provided the same is not contrary to law or prejudicial to third persons.

Article 26. Where water shortage is recurrent, the use of the water pursuant to a permit may, in the interest of equitable distribution of the benefits among legal appropriators, reduce after due notice and hearing.

Article 27. Water users shall bear the diminution of any water supply due to natural causes or force majeure.


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Article 28. Water permits shall continue to be valid as long as water is beneficially used; however, it maybe suspended on the grounds of non-compliance with approved plans and specifications or schedules of water distribution; use of water for a purpose other than that for which it was granted; non-payment of water charges; wastage; failure to keep records of water diversion, when required; and violation of any term or condition of any permit or rules and regulations promulgated by the Council.

Temporary permits may be issued for the appropriation and use of water for short periods under special circumstances.

Article 29. Water permits may be revoked after due notice and hearing on grounds of non-use; gross violation of the conditions imposed in the permit; unauthorized sale of water; willful failure or refusal to comply with rules and regulations of any lawful order; pollution, public nuisance or acts detrimental to public health and safety; when the appropriator is found to be disqualified under the law to exploit and develop natural resources of the Philippines; when, in the case, of irrigation, the land is converted to non-agricultural purposes; and other similar grounds.

Article 30. All water permits are subject to modification or cancellation by the council, after due notice and hearing, in favor of a project of greater beneficial use or for multi-purpose development, and a water permittee who suffers thereby shall be duly compensated by the entity or person in whose favor the cancellation was made.

CHAPTER IV UTILIZATION OF WATERS

Article 31. Preference in the development of water resources shall consider security of the State, multiple use, beneficial effects, adverse effects and costs of development.

Article 32. The utilization of subterranean or ground water shall be coordinated with that of surface waters such as rivers, streams, springs and lakes, so that a superior right in one not adversely affected by an inferior right in the other.

For this purpose the Council shall promulgate rules and regulations and declare the existence of control areas for the coordinated development, protection, and utilization of subterranean or ground water and surface waters.

Control area is an area of land where subterranean or ground water and surface water are so interrelated that withdrawal and use in one similarly affects the other. The boundary of a control area may be altered from time to time, as circumstances warrant.

Article 33. Water contained in open canals, aqueducts or reservoirs of private persons may be used by any person for domestic purpose or for watering plants as long as the water is withdrawn by manual methods without checking the stream or damaging the canal, aqueduct or reservoir; Provided, That this right may be restricted by the owner should it result in loss or injury to him.

Article 34. A water permittee or appropriator may use any watercourse to convey water to another point in the watercourse for the purpose stated in a permit and such water may be diverted or recaptured at that point by said permittee in the same amount less allowance for normal losses in transit.

Article 35. Works for the storage, diversion, distribution and utilization of water resources shall contain adequate provision for the prevention and control of diseases that may be induced or spread by such works when required by the Council.

Article 36. When the reuse of waste water is feasible, it shall be limited as much as possible, to such uses other than direct human consumption. No person or agency shall distribute such water for public consumption until it is demonstrated that such consumption will not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Article 37. In the construction and operation of hydraulic works, due consideration shall be given to the preservation of scenic places and historical relics and, in addition to the provisions of existing laws, no works that would required the destruction or removal of such places or relics shall be undertaken without showing that the distribution or removal is necessary and unaviodable.

Article 38. Authority for the construction of dams, bridges and other structures across of which may interfere with the flow of navigable or flotable waterways shall first be secured from the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.

Article 39. Except in cases of emergency to save life or property, the construction or repair of the following works shall be undertaken only after the plans and specifications therefor, as may be required by the Council, are approved by the proper government agency; dams for the diversion or storage of water; structures for the use of water power, installations for the utilization of subterranean or ground water and other structures for utilization of water resources.

Article 40. No excavation for the purpose of emission of a hot spring or for the enlargement of the existing opening thereof shall be made without prior permit.

Any person or agency who intends to develop a hot spring for human consumption must first obtain a permit from the Department of Health.

Article 41. No person shall develop a stream, lake, or spring for recreational purposes without first securing a permit from the Council.

Article 42. Unless-otherwise ordered by the President of the Philippines and only in time of national calamity or emergency, no person shall induce or restrain rainfall by any method such as cloud seeding without a permit from the proper government emergency.

Article 43. No person shall raise or lower the water level of a river stream, lake, lagoon, or marsh nor drain the same without a permit.


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Article 44. Drainage systems shall be so constructed that their outlets are rivers, lakes, the sea, natural bodies of water, or such other water course as may be approved by the proper government agency.

Article 45. When a drainage channel is constructed by a number of persons for their common benefit, the cost of construction and maintenance of the channel shall be borne by each in proportion to the benefits drived.

Article 46. When artificial means are employed to drain water from higher to lower land, the owner of the higher land shall select the routes and methods of drainage that will cause the minimum damage to the lower lands, subject to the requirements of just compensation.

Article 47. When the use, conveyance or storage of waters results in damage to another, the person responsible for the damage shall pay compensation.

Article 48. When a water resources project interferes with the access of landowner to a portion of his property or with the conveyance of irrigation or drainage water, the person or agency constructing the project shall bear the cost of construction and maintenance of the bridges, flumes and other structures necessary for maintaining access, irrigation, or drainage, in addition to paying compensation for land and incidental damages.

Article 49. Any person having an easement for an aqueduct may enter upon the servient land for the purpose of cleaning, repairing or replacing the aqueduct or the removal of obstructions therefrom.

Article 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estate, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate can not construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.

Article 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.

Article 52. The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of easements of water not expressly determined by the provisions of this Code shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.

CHAPTER V CONTROL OF WATERS

Article 53. To promote the best interest and the coordinated protection of flood plain lands, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications may declare flood control areas and promulgate guidelines for governing flood plain management plans in these areas.

Article 54. In declared flood control areas, rules and regulations may be promulgated to prohibit or control activities that may damage or cause deterioration or lakes and dikes, obstruct the flow of water, change the natural flow of the river, increase flood losses or aggravate flood problems.

Article 55. The government may construct necessary flood control structures in declared flood control areas, and for this purpose it shall have a legal easement as wide as may be needed along and adjacent to the river bank and outside of the bed or channel of the river.

Article 56. River beds, sand bars and tidal flats may not be cultivated except upon prior permission from the Secretary of the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and such permission shall not be granted where such cultivation obstructs the flow of water or increase flood levels so as to cause damage to other areas.

Article 57. Any person may erect levees or revetments to protect his property from flood, encroachment by the river or change in the course of the river, provided that such constructions does not cause damage to the property of another.

Article 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private lands, the owners of the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to its former bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its former course. The owners of the land thus affected are not entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each.

The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed at their own expense; Provided, That a permit therefor is secured from the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and work pertaining thereto are commenced within two years from the change in the course of the river or stream.

Article 59. Rivers, lakes and lagoons may, upon the recommendation of the Philippines Coast Guard, be declared navigable either in whole or in part.

Article 60. The rafting of logs and other objects on rivers and lakes which are flotable may be controlled or prohibited during designated season of the year with due regard to the needs of irrigation and domestic water supply and other uses of water.

Article 61. The impounding of water in ponds or reservoirs may be prohibited by the Council upon consultation with the Department of Health if it is dangerous to public health, or it may order that such pond or reservoir be drained if such is necessary for the protection of public health.


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Article 62. Waters of a stream may be stored in a reservoir by a permittee in such amount as will not prejudice the right of any permittee downstream. Whoever operates the reservoir shall, when required, release water for minimum stream flow.

All reservoir operations shall be subject to rules and regulations issued by the Council or any proper government agency.

Article 63. The operator of a dam for the storage of water may be required to employ an engineer possessing qualifications prescribed for the proper operations, maintenance and administration of the dam.

Article 64. The Council shall approve the manner, location, depth, and spacing in which borings for subterranean or ground water may be made, determine the requirements for the registration of every boring or alteration to existing borings as well as other control measures for the exploitation of subterranean or ground water resources, and in coordination with the Professional Regulation Commission prescribe the qualifications of those who would drill such borings.

No person shall drill a well without prior permission from the Council.

Article 65. Water from one river basin may be transferred to another river basin only with approval of the Council. In considering any request for such transfer, the Council shall take into account the full costs of the transfer, the benefits that would accrue to the basin of origin without the transfer, the benefits would accrue to the receiving basin on account of the transfer, alternative schemes for supplying water to the receiving basin, and other relevant factors.

CHAPTER VI CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WATERS AND WATERSHEDS AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES

Article 66. After due notice and hearing when warranted by circumstances, minimum stream flows for rivers and streams, and minimum water levels for lakes may be established by the Council under such conditions as may be necessary for the protection of the environment, control of pollution, navigation, prevention of salt damage, and general public use.

Article 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may declared by the Department of Natural Resources as protected area Rules and regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.

Article 68. It shall be the duty of any person in control of a well to prevent the water from flowing on the surface of the land, or into any surface water, or any porous stratum under neath the surface without being beneficially used.

Article 69. It shall be the duty of any person in control of a well containing water with minerals or other substances injurious to man, animals, agriculture, and vegetation to prevent such waters from flowing on the surface of the land or into any surface water or into any other aquifer or porous stratum.

Article 70. No person shall utilize an existing well or pond or spread waters for recharging substerranean or ground water supplies without prior permission of the Council.

Article 71. To promote better water conservation and usage for irrigation purposes, the merger of irrigation associations and the appropriation of waters by associations instead of by individuals shall be encouraged.

No water permit shall be granted to an individual when his water requirement can be supplied through an irrigation association.

Article 72. In the consideration of a proposed water resource project, due regard shall be given to ecological changes resulting from the construction of the project in order to balance the needs of development and the protection of the environment.

Article 73. The conservation of fish and wildlife shall receive proper consideration and shall be coordinated with other features of water resources development programs to insure that fish and wildlife values receive equal attention with other project purposes.

Article 74. Swamps and marshes which are owned by the State and which primary value for waterfowl propagation or other wildlife purposes may be reserved and protected from drainage operation and development.

Article 75. No person shall, without prior permission from the National Pollution Control Commission, build any works that may produce dangerous or noxious substances or perform any act which may result in the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any pollutant into any source of water supply.

Water pollution is the impairment of the quality of water beyond a certain standard. This standard may vary according to the use of the water and shall be set by the National Pollution Control Commission.

Article 76. The establishment of cemeteries and waste disposal areas that may affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Health.

Article 77. Tailings from mining operations and sediments from placer mining shall not be dumped into rivers and waterways without prior permission from the Council upon recommendation by the National Pollution Control Commission.

Article 78. The application of agricultural fertilizers and pesticides may be prohibited or regulated by the National Pollution Control Commission in the areas where such application may cause pollution of a source of water supply.


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CHAPTER VII ADMINISTRATION OF WATERS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE

Article 79. The Administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code, including the granting of permits and the imposition of penalties for administrative violations hereof, are hereby vested in the Council, and except in regard to those functions which under this Code are specifically conferred upon other agencies of the government, the Council is hereby empowered to make all decisions and determinations provided for in this Code.

Article 80. The Council may deputize any official or agency of the government to perform any of its specific functions or activities.

Article 81. The Council shall provide a continuing program for data collection, research and manpower development needed for the appropriation, utilization, exploitation, conservation, and protection of the water resources of the country.

Article 82. In the implementation of the provisions of this code, the Council shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations which may provide for penalties consisting of a fine not exceeding One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and/or suspension or revocation of the water permit or other right to the use of water. Violations of such rules and regulations may be administratively dealt with by the Council.

Such rules and regulations prescribed by any government agency that pertain to the utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, or protection of water resources shall, if the Council so requires, be subject to its approval.

Article 83. The Council is hereby authorized to impose and collect reasonable fees or charges for water resources development from water appropriators, except when it is for purely domestic purposes.

Article 84. The Council and other agencies authorized to enforce this Code are empowered to enter upon private lands, with previous notice to the owner, for the purpose of conducting surveys and hydrologic investigations, and to perform such other acts as are necessary in carrying out their functions including the power to exercise the right of eminent domain.

Article 85. No program or project involving the appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, or protection of water resources may be undertaken without prior approval of the Council, except those which the Council may, in its discretion, exempt.

The Council may require consultation with the public prior to the implementation of certain water resources development projects.

Article 86. When plans and specifications of a hydraulic structure are submitted for approval, the government agency whose functions embrace the type of project for which the structure is intended, shall review the plans and specifications and recommended to the Council proper action thereon and the latter shall approve the same only when they are inconformity with the requirements of this Code and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Council. Notwithstanding such approval, neither the engineer who drew up the plans and specifications of the hydraulic structure, nor the constructor who built it, shall be relieved of his liability for damages in case of failure thereof by reason of defect in plans and specifications, or failure due to defect in construction, within ten (10) years from the completion of the structure.

Any action recover such damages must be brought within five (5) years following such failure.

Article 87. The Council or its duly authorized representatives, in the exercise of its power to investigate and decide cases brought to its cognizance, shall have the power to administer oaths, compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena and the production of relevant documents by subpoena duces tecum.

Non-compliance of violation of such orders or subpoena and subpoena duces tecum shall be punished in the same manner as indirect contempt of an inferior court upon application by the aggrieved party with the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of Rules 71 of the Rules of the Court.

Article 88. The Council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes to relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the meaning and context of the provisions of this Code.

The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be immediately executory and the enforcement thereof may be suspended only when a bond, in a amount fixed by the Council to answer for damages occasioned by the suspension or stay of execution, shall have been filed by the appealing party, unless the suspension is virtue of an order of a competent court.

All dispute shall be decided within sixty (60) days after the parties submit the same for decision or resolution.

The Council shall have the power to issue writs of execution and enforce its decisions with the assistance of local or national police agencies.

Article 89. The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies may be appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following grounds; (1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law.

CHAPTER VIII PENAL PROVISIONS

Article 90. The following acts shall be penalized by suspension or revocation of the violator's water permit or other right to the use of water and/or a fine of not exceeding One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), in the discretion of the Council:


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(a)Appropriation of subterranean or ground water for domestic use by an overlying landowner without registration required by the Council.

(b) Non-observance of any standard of beneficial use of water.

(c) Failure of the appropriator to keep a record of water withdrawal, when required.

(d) Failure to comply with any of the terms or conditions in a water permit or a water rights grant.

(e) Unauthorized use of water for a purpose other than that for which a right or permit was granted.

(f) Construction or repair of any hydraulic work or structure without duly approved plans and specifications, when required.

(g) Failure to install a regulating and measuring device for the control of the volume of water appropriated, when required.

(h) Unauthorized sale, lease, or transfer of water and/or water rights.

(i) Failure to provide adequate facilities to prevent or control diseases when required by the Council in the construction of any work for the storage, diversion, distribution and utilization of water.

(j) Drilling of a well without permission of the Council.

(k) Utilization of an existing well or ponding or spreading of water for recharging subterranean or ground water supplies without permission of the Council.

(l) Violation of or non-compliance with any order, rules, or regulations of the Council.

(m) Illegal taking or diversion of water in an open canal, aqueduct or reservoir.

(n) Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structure valued at not exceeding P5,000.00.

Article 91. A. A fine of not exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) or imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed upon any person who commits any of the following acts:

1. Appropriation of water without a water permit, unless such person is expressly exempted from securing a permit by the provisions of this Code.

2. Unauthorized obstruction of an irrigation canal.

3. Cultivation of a river bed, sand bar or tidal flat without permission.

4. Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structure valued at not exceeding Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).

B. A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos P3,000.00) but not more than Six Thousand Pesos P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed on any person who commits any of the following acts:

1. Distribution for public consumption of water which adversely affects the health and safety of the public.

2. Excavation or enlargement of the opening of a hot spring without permission.

3. Unauthorized obstruction of a river or waterway, or occupancy of a river bank or seashore without permission.

4. Establishment of a cemetery or a waste disposal area near a source of water supply or reservoir for domestic municipal use without permission.

5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned, works that produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of water supply.

6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers of waterways without permission.

7. Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structure valued more than Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) but at not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Peso (100,000.00).

C. A fine exceeding Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) but not more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed upon any person who commits any of the following acts:

1. Misrepresentation of citizenship in order to qualify for water permit.

2. Malicious destruction of a hydraulic works or structure, valued at more than One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Article 92. If the offense is committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any other juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the President, General Manager, and other guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust firm, partnership, association or entity,


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without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against said juridical person. If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported after serving his sentence, without further proceedings.

After final judgment of conviction, the Court upon petition of the prosecution attorney in the same proceedings, and after due hearing, may, when the public interest so requires, order suspension of or dissolution of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or juridical person.

Article 93. All actions for offenses punishable under Article 91 of this Code shall be brought before the proper court.

Article 94. Actions for offenses punishable under this Code by a fine of not more than Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) or by an imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, shall prescribe in five (5) years; those punishable by a fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or an imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not more than six (6) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, shall prescribe in seven (7) years; and those punishable by a fine exceeding Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) but not more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

CHAPTER IX TRANSITORY AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 95. Within two (2) years from the promulgation of this Code, all claims for a right to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974 shall be registered with the Council which shall confirm said rights in accordance with the provisions of this Code, and shall set their respective priorities.

When priority in time of appropriation from a certain source of supply cannot be determined, the order of preference in the use of the waters shall be as follows:

(a) Domestic and municipal use

(b) Irrigation

(c) Power generation

(d) Fisheries

(e) Livestock raising

(f) Industrial use, and

(g) Other uses.

Any claim not registered within said period shall be considered waived and the use of the water deemed abandoned, and the water shall thereupon be available for disposition as unappropriated waters in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

Article 96. No vested or acquired right to the use of water can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.

Article 97. Acts and contract under the regime of old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall be respected, subject to the limitations established in this Code. Any modification or extension of these acts and contracts after the promulgation of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions hereof.

Article 98. Interim rules and regulations promulgated by the Council shall continue to have binding force and effect, when not in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Article 99. If any provision or part of this Code, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is declared unconstitutional or invalid for any reason, the other provisions or parts therein shall not be affected.

Article 100. The following laws, parts and/or provisions of laws are hereby repealed:

(a) The provisions of the Spanish Law on Waters of August 3, 1866, the Civil Code of Spain of 1889 and the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386) on ownership of waters, easements relating to waters, use of public waters and acquisitive prescription on the use of waters, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code;

(b) The provisions of R.A. 6395, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of National Power Corporation, particularly section 3, paragraph (f), and section 12, insofar as they relate to the appropriation of waters and the grant thereof;

(c) The provisions of Act No. 2152, as amended, otherwise known as the Irrigation Act, section 3, paragraphs (k) and (m) of P.D. No. 813, R.A. 2056; Section 90, C.A. 137; and,

(d) All Decree, Laws, Acts, parts of Acts, rules of Court, executive orders, and administrative regulations which are contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Code.

Article 101. This Code shall take effect upon its promulgation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of December, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-Six.


10

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.] HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent. [G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.] ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons. These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.cralawnad Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name. During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.


11

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre. Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . . ". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown. "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application; the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment; "IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants. The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.


12

The petition is without merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition. The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain. In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest. Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding. WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION


13

[G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land? The Case These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals[1] Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said questions in the negative.[2] Respondent Courts Decision dismissed[3] petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608. In turn, the Regional Trial Courts decision dismissed petitioners complaint for cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof to the public domain. The Facts The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the following facts:[5] Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974 Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended). Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was constructed. On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records). After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint. In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and not the land itself. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition.[6] The Issues Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court:[7] I Respondent Court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title. II Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a foreshore land.


14

The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held:[8] x x x. As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. x x. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203). Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act. Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from filing an action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengo v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as follows: But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p. 204). Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It alleges that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months and eight (8) days after the grant of the patent, Respondent Morato, in violation of the terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion of the land to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the five-year prohibitory period, Respondent Morato leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on the subject land.[9] Further, petitioner argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is inaccurate. The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato contains the seeds of its own cancellation: such certificate specifically states on its face that it is subject to the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended.[10] Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a portion of the land was previously leased, it resulted from the fact that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land without [her] prior consent. The mortgage executed over the improvement cannot be considered a violation of the said grant since it can never affect the ownership.[11] She states further: x x x. the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of indefeasibility of title but mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the alleged violations of respondent Morato. The records of this case will readily show that although petitioner was able to establish that Morato committed some acts during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal thereof will also show that what petitioner was able to prove never constituted a violation of the grant.[12] Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract they entered into with Respondent Morato can never be considered as [an] alienation inasmuch as the ownership over the property remains with the owner.[13] Besides, it is the director of lands and not the Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in this case, contrary to the provision of the Public Land Act which states that actions for reversion should be instituted by the solicitor general in the name of Republic of the Philippines.[14] We find for petitioner. Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act: Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.


15

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As amended by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.) x x x x x x x x x Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved May 5, 1941) Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated or transferred, except to persons, corporations, association, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefore by their charters. Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, Id.) x x x x x x x x x Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Underscoring supplied.) The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property. It may be a legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; an embarrassment of the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an estate.[15] Do the contracts of lease and mortgage executed within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent constitute an encumbrance and violate the terms and conditions of such patent? Respondent Court answered in the negative:[16] From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of the land, subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. B) executed by and between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters, whereas the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear from this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly affect Moratos ownership and possession. Above all, the circumstances under which the lease was executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the conditions provided for in the patent issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into that contract of lease out of sympathy and the goodness of her heart to accommodate a fellow man. x x x It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently meets the definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, because such contract impairs the use of the property by the grantee. In a contract of lease which is consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily grants the use of his or her property to another who undertakes to pay rent therefor.[17] During the term of the lease, the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any portion of such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the nullification of the award. Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her heart without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.[18] Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an encumbrance. Indeed, we do not find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.[19] Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.[20]


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Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five years from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a free patent to an applicant, the law requires that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead violates that condition.[21] The prohibition against the encumbrance -- lease and mortgage included -- of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:[22] It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute. By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with the policy of the law, any transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the State. The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely, when a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof.[24] However, for Respondent Moratos title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title over the property was incomplete. Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title. Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly stipulated that its award was subject to the conditions provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Because she violated Section 118, the reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124. Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to the Public Domain There is yet another reason for granting this petition. Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless sustained the award thereof to Respondent Morato:[25] First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands. The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows: Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the extraordinary action of nature, rainful, for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property. A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows: ... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides x x x x (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423) The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539). The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in question reads: Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in 1937 up to 1955 due to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the land. From 1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation was undertaken by the lumber company owned by


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the Moratos. Having thus restored the land thru mostly human hands employed by the lumber company, the area continued to be utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in 1965. On or about March 17, 1973, there again was a strong earthquake unfortunately causing destruction to hundreds of residential houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of concrete materials. The catastrophe totally caused the sinking of a concrete bridge at Sumulong river also in the municipality of Calauag, Quezon. On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named Unding wrought havoc as it lashed the main land of Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than that which the area suffered in 1937. The Court noted with the significance of the newspaper clipping entitled Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng Dagat (Exh. 11). x x x x x x x x x Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972 defendant Josefina L. Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent application. The defendant Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land after the demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced improvement and continued developing the area, planted it to coconut trees. Having applied for a free patent, defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. 9) based on the cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. 10) was secured. The area was declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. 8) and the corresponding realty taxes religiously paid as shown by Exh. 8-A). (pp. 12-14, DECISION). Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause which would warrant disturbance, the afore-cited findings of the lower court, must be respected. Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore land: Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject land was invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended up to a portion of the questioned land. While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the court-appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in 1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1; E-14). In fact, in its decision dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the land was caused by natural calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18).[26] Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will be deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for reasons not her own doing.[27] As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabagis[29] explained the rationale for this proscription: Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads: Art. 339. Property of public ownership is 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. * * * * * * * * Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows: ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use: * * * * * * * *


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3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests. In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code just quoted, this Court said: We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become property of public ownership. as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the playa (shore of the sea), rada (roadstead), or the like. * * * In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following: With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the shore or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity. In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. W

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Land Titles Day 13 to 15