Land Titiles: Torrens Cases - Indefeasibility, etc

7/28/2019 Land Titiles: Torrens Cases - Indefeasibility, etc

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TORRENS SYSTEM: INDEFEASIBILITYTHIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 164687. February 12, 2009.]SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. ANGELA V. MADAYAG,respondent.

D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court ofAppeals (CA) dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004,which set aside the lower court's order to suspend the proceedings onrespondent's application for land registration.

On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for registration of aparcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay

Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. 2 Attached to the application was atracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the LandManagement Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel,wrote the Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding thecancellation of the respondent's survey plan because the lot encroached onthe properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despitebeing the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the surveyconducted on June 8, 2001. 3

Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent's application forregistration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of theSolicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respectiveoppositions.

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner allegedthat it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas,Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land RegistrationCommission on August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No.Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. Theseparcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of whichare already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in thename of the previous owners. aHTEIA

On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to thepetitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter,respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner's request for the cancellation of therespondent's survey plan, DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director forLegal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner tofile a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properlyact on the same. 4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR apetition 5 for cancellation of the survey plan sometime in March 2002,alleging the following grounds: aICHEc

I.THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTYWHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS CASE.

II.NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNERAND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THEOWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.

III.THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE

ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438). 6

On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings 7in the land registration case, alleging that the court should await the DENRresolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan "as theadministrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the landregistration case.

On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS instant motion and suspends the proceedings herein. In the meantime, auntil receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.

SO ORDERED. 8

Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in laregistration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the petitioner that cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for laregistration. 9On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent's motion

reconsideration of its order. 10 Respondent thereafter filed a petition certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.

On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse discretion in suspending the proceedings, the CA granted the petition certiorari, thus: SAaTHc

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTEThe challenged Orders dated October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of trespondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.

The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its fidetermination. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by tDENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the Rhas the power to hear and determine all questions arising from an applicatfor registration. 12 TEAaDC

On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution 13 denying the petitionemotion for reconsideration. Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file tpetition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:

I.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDITHAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAREGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING TDETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CABEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCREGION 1. AIDTSE

II.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING FIND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROP

AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.

III.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDITHAT THE LOWER COURT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIIN SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE CASE.

IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING FIND THAT THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RU65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT THE ONPLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE LAW ON THE PART OF HEREIN RESPONDENT. 14

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that, since the respondent's cause of action in the laregistration case depends heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent the RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending the resolution of tpetition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR. 15 It, therefoinsists that recourse to a petition for certiorari was not proper considerthat respondent was not arbitrarily deprived of her right to prosecute application for registration. 16

Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the powinherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases in its dockewith economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants. Bcourts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy dispositionhis case and, thus, should not be too eager to suspend proceedings of cases before them. Hence, every order suspending proceedings must guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to av


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multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,confusion between litigants and courts, 17 or when the rights of parties tothe second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised inthe first action are settled. 18 Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded asan arbitrary exercise of the court's discretion and can be corrected only by apetition for certiorari. AECDHS

None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings ispresent. In fact, to await the resolution of the petition for cancellation wouldonly delay the resolution of the land registration case and undermine thepurpose of land registration.

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree

No. 1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt anyquestion on the legality of the title except claims that were noted on thecertificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequentthereto. Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, ownerscan rest secure on their ownership and possession. 19 aIcTCS

Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issuesthat the herein petitioner raised in its opposition to the respondent'sapplication for registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey plan shouldbe cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that itpurchased from several landowners, which properties are already covered byexisting certificates of title.

Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide thevalidity of the survey plan that was approved by the LMS. 20 It cites Section4 (15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that

the DENR shall: aSCDcH

(15)Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition ofall lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible forclassification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultationwith appropriate agencies.

However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed withadequate authority to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties, and thateven if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land registration court is notby duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on thecancellation of the survey plan. 21

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition forcancellation, we hold that, as an incident to its authority to settle allquestions over the title of the subject property, the land registration courtmay resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlapsthe petitioner's properties without necessarily having to declare the surveyplan as void. aAHISE

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits andto promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in theRTC and the latter's limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a landregistration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decideeven controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involvingsubstantial issues. 22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, thelatter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such

jurisdiction to make it effective. 23 It may, therefore, hear and determine allquestions that arise from a petition for registration.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the dutyto determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter avalid and existing certificate of title. 24 An application for registration of analready titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, 25which is not allowed by law. 26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision ofthe DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determinewhether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titledproperty. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent'ssurvey plan vis--vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and itspredecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establishthe true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel ofland or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, andto forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequentregistration of any adjoining land. 27 EISCaD

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filingadditional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21.Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection.The court may require facts to be stated in the application in additionthose prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may requthe filing of any additional papers. aTIEcA

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land RegistratAuthority to submit a report on whether the subject property has alreabeen registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the court didCarvajal v. Court of Appeals. 28 In that case, we commended such move

the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of tLand Registration Law". 29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The CourtAppeals Decision dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 20are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, PangasinanDIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 ato resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Peralta, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919.]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO GAYARES, petitioners-appellants, RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1.LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The pripurpose of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shallfinal, irrevocable, and indisputable.

2.ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. The purpose of the offspringthe Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as establishedthe Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purposethe Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1

the Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requirthat the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."

3.ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. Many precautions are taken to guard agaiinjustice.

4.ID.; ID.; ID. After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. Tfirst adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constituthe decision the judgment the decree of the court. The second actiothe declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land RegistratOffice. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt ocopy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. The third and laction devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. For a decree to exist in le

contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-caldecree by the Land Registration Office.

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice publishedthe Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, time for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final. On J23, 1917, before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-catechnical decree, V and G ask that the case be reopened to receive prrelative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial court. HeThat since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 1916, has become final, and since no action was taken within the tiprovided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, Supreme Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.


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7.ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Whether Sections 113 and 513 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.

8.GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. The General Land RegistrationOffice has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment ofthe laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,Sec. 174.)

D E C I S I O NMALCOLM, J p:

The principal question which this appeal presents is When does the

registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especiallyunder the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System,become final, conclusive, and indisputable ? The supplementary questionsare At what stage of the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legalcontemplation? Does it exist from the moment that the court, after hearingthe evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and then, or laterdecrees the land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the Chief of theLand Registration Office transcribes the adjudication in the prescribed form?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran,Province of Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands,on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in the OfficialGazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to allinterested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer

asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners,Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in thismunicipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases,did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had duringSeptember, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued thefollowing decree:

"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, thefollowing lots be adjudged and registered in the names of those personswhose names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with thefollowing conditions: . . .

"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership ofVictoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."

On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoingdecree in the following language:

"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case havingbecome final on September 21, 1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief ofthe General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to thelots adjudged by said decision."An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated asfollows, the decrees thereon, must be suspended until further order by thiscourt:

"Lot No. 521.

Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by theLand Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquezand Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez,

came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth theirright of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "HaciendaSanta Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete ignorance ofthe proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and thatthe case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-motion, asking thecourt to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares.The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being adecree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, thecourt lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that counselfor Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the SupremeCourt, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking ofevidence.

In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear thatcounsel for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as provided for

in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they asked to relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the CodeCivil Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusaneglect. As a matter of fact, they could not well claim fraud because all proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of chicanery. Asmatter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of the Code of CProcedure would not get them anywhere because more than six months helapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case. The issfundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court h

jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemendecree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance on September 1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have become final, petitionmay no bring their appeal before this court, because the time for the filing

their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings did become final until the formal decree was issued by the Land RegistratOffice, then it was proper for them to ask for a reopening of the case, andwould, consequently, be just as proper for this court to order the trial coto permit the same.

OPINION.

The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly statto decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputabIncontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must accordingly taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some goreason, may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at cost of possible cruelty which may result in exceptional cases, it does beconecessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce registration laws. stronger words can be found than those appearing in Section 38 of the La

Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is said that: "Every decreeregistration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . . . It shall conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Governmand all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the applicatinotice, or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it mconcern,' Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infanor other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedingany court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the rigof any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decof registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registrat(Court of First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entrythe decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired interest."

While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, thbecome even more incisive and peremptory when we come to consider toffspring of this system, here known as the Cadastral System. Under Torrens System proper, whether action shall or shall not be taken is optiowith the solicitant. Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on tpart of the Government, titles for all the land within a stated area, aadjudicated whether or not the people living within this district desire to hatitles issued. The purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act (N2259), is to serve the public interests, by requiring that the titles to any lan"be settled and adjudicated."

Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessinterference with private property constitutes due process of law and that

Acts providing for the same are constitutional, a question not here raised, a study of the law indicates that many precautions are taken to guagainst injustice. The proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. Whthe lands have been surveyed and plotted, the Director of Lan

represented by the Attorney General, files a petition in court praying that titles to the lands named be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filingthe petition is then published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazein both the English and Spanish languages. All persons interested are givthe benefit of assistance by competent officials and are informed of thrights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the landsthe various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basesoriginal certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No. 2259, Sec. 1

Aside from this, the commotion caused by the survey and a trial affectordinarily many people, together with the presence of strangers in tcommunity, should serve to put all those affected on their guard.

After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicaownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decisionthe judgment the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial mann


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The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final andits order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the LandRegistration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date ofreceipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. Thisagain is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishmentof the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor, has asone of his duties "to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases."(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 177.) This latter decree contains thetechnical description of the land and may not be issued until a considerable

time after the promulgation of the judgment. The form for the decree usedby the General Land Registration Office concludes with the words: "Witness,the Honorable (name of the judge), on this the (date)." The date that is usedas authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when, after hearingthe evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of theland.

The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, isa judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base ofthe certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land RegistrationOffice is ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated,the date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, beginsthe running of the time for the interposition of a motion for a new trial or forthe perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the titleprepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication hastaken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of the

technical description. If an unknown individual could wait possibly years untilthe day before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a technical descriptionof a piece of land, the defeated party could just as reasonably expect thesame consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the so-called unknownis a party just as much as the known oppositor for notice is to all the world,and the decree binds all the world.

Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of thiscourt in the case of Tambunting vs. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . Thatcase and the instant case are not the same. In the Tambunting case thecontest was really between two parties each claiming to have a Torrens title;here one party has the title and the other is seeking to oust him from hisfortress. In the Tambunting case the declaration of ownership but not thedecree of registration had issued; here both declaration and decree haveissued. The doctrines announced in the decision in Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz([1910], 17 Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the indefensibility of landtitles under the Torrens system are much more applicable and can, with asmuch reason, be applied to the cadastral system.

As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,conclusive and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day periodallowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the

judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having beentaken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution ofthe judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by thechief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provisionproviding for fraud.

Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with ablearguments relative to the applicability of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code ofCivil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the case would

make unprofitable any discussion of this question.

It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of OccidentalNegros of September 21, 1916, has become final, and that no action wastaken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by billof exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal isdismissed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]

CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J p:

What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquireal properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whsole name the properties were registered under the Torrens system? CaAIE

The facts are as follows:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he wassigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austr

company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Ceand worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. Thehe met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of tboys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriendrespondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additioincome to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were hin Antonietta's residence at a squatters' area in Gorordo Avenue.

Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a renthouse in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their ohouse and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In tContracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 1 and March 10, 1986 2 coverthe properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyersDeed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 3 was likewise issuedtheir favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on t

ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable landsthe public domain. Consequently, Jambrich's name was erased from document. But it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hamargin of page 1, beside respondent's signature as buyer on page 3, andthe bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of T(TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issuedrespondent's name alone.

Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons in Sp. Proc. No. MAN, 4 and per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City datMay 5, 1988. 5

However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent founnew boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in DanCity. Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only two months after tbreak up.

Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitionwas engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaispeedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and soaccessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights ainterests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment". 6 On July 26, 19when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovethat titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondeand that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue CPetitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 a

March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buydo not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pa single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; thatwas Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funthat Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, tpetitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of AbsolSale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favIcSEAH

In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a sincentavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "soand exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for purchase price of the subject lots in question", and that Jambrich, being alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.


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At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financialcapacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed coprabusiness. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness anddocumentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrichreceived while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-GrazPanker A.G.

In its decision, the court a quo found

Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase andacquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was stillworking and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not onlysupported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the

defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich's financial capacity toacquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. 7

xxx xxx xxxOn the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant metJambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only working as awaitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month andwas . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area atGorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation ofher children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted. Infact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are allstated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs."G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who preparedthe same when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with theadoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts werenot true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that

during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00as profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievableand impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since itis the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but alsoan expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court inorder to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she wasalready cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . theallowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enoughto maintain the education and maintenance of her children. 8 IDAESH

This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she couldacquire the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount fortheir acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earningP1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00 she couldnot even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safeto conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met andaccepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was abig financial opportunity for her and her children who were alreadyabandoned by her husband. 9

xxx xxx xxx

The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and wasincluded in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10,1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] asbuyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming andexploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich whoat that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitudeshown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything sheneeds, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by

this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the timewhen their relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously. 10[Emphasis supplied.]

The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff andagainst the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:

1)Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house ofstrong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by theRegister of Deeds of Mandaue City;

2)Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds Mandaue City;

3)Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24724791 and 24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar andissue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;

4)Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I", "K" and "L" as avoidinsofar as they appear to convey rights and interests over the propertiesquestion to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar; ATSIED

5)Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount

P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,

6)To pay the costs. 11

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 2002, 12 the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In rulfor the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:

We disagree with the lower court's conclusion. The circumstances involvedthe case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by tSupreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequFilipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted thatsaid cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the namethe alien transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 2citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United ChuBoard for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case

Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacom138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is notthe name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. ThJambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. 13

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner assigns the following errors:

I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHOVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATIOINTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUBY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.

II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDITHAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AMAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AINTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.

III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSITHE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSIDOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTI

APPELLEE). 14 HTScEI

First, who purchased the subject properties?

The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who betwerespondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 19to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,

Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year whhis monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.

On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 19841985 with a monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when tparcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by hduring the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a cobusiness were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actuathe business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one


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standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report 15 submitted bythe Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoptionproceedings of respondent's two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:

Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she wasaccepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had noproblem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are (sic)foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there wereno more foreigners coming because of the situation in the Philippines at thattime. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small roomin a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time ofgreat financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered hera decent place for herself and her children. 16

The DSWD Home Study Report 17 further disclosed that:

[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw AntoniettaDescallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friendswith the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language. Antoniettaaccepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support[her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their sessionwas agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta inthe squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observingthe situation of the family particularly the children who were malnourished.

After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family intoa decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children.

Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that timeaccepted the offer for the sake of the children. 18 aSTECA

Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as thesource of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to constructthe house thereon:

(1)Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-directexamination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minorchildren, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but thathis name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legalconstraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, wherehe signed as buyer.

(2)The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was inpostdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened anyaccount with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were also in thename of Jambrich and respondent.

(3)In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her twochildren for ten months, where she was completely under the support ofJambrich.

(4)Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner,bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.

Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests andparticipation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of

Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings offact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality bythis Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find noreason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate

court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differedonly in their conclusions of law.

Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during thecouple's cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each otheras husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwisecapacitated to marry each other, does not apply. 19 In the instant case,respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich livedtogether. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists betweenthe parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actualcontribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim toany portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution donot apply. 20 DcaCSE

Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the naof respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed houand lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effectregistration of the properties in the name of respondent?

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 21 Ionly a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the woat large. 22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mpossession of a title does not make one the true owner of the properThus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed propertin her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her towner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, 23 and that i

perfect, absolute and indefeasible. 24 However, there are well-definexceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faand did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contributesingle centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of hown at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons wthen fully supported by Jambrich.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private laThis is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, 26 whis basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitutio27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 28 The capacityacquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold landsthe public domain." Private land may be transferred only to individualsentities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain". Only Filipcitizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned

Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus,the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinfrom acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of lesuccession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-MaDevelopment Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have bedeclared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the propertiespetitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for WoMinistries v. Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling innumber of cases 31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien wsubsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flawthe original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transfereerendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the tcourt ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:

[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrarythe Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisitof these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cuthe flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordethe cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioas owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and thrparcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Regisof Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. Ttrial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costssuit. DScTaC

We affirm the Regional Trial Court.

The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for WoMinistries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, 32 is this since the banaliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future generationsFilipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estby aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfmade by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more pubpolicy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keour lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CourtAppeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolutdated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of


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Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 isREINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.

TORRENS SYSTEM: EXCEPTION TO INDEFEASIBILITY (FRAUD)SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 119682. January 21, 1999.]

FRANCISCO BAGUIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,RICARDO T. MICHAEL, in his capacity as Heir-Successor of WILLIAMMICHAEL, SR., and as President of MICHAEL SLIPWAYS, INC., and COURTOF APPEALS, respondents.

Vicente A. Quibranza and Danilo Pilapil for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent Ricardo Michael's predecessor-in-interest, WilliamMichael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease ofthe subject land. The application was recommended for approval. By virtueof the permit granted to him by the Bureau of Lands, William Michael madesome reclamation and other improvements. On February 25, 1968, Michaelfiled a miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed foreshore land.On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for afree patent covering the same land. In his application, petitioner stated thatthe land was agricultural land and not claimed or occupied by any other

person and that he had been in actual and continuous possession andcultivation of the same. Based on these representations, a free patent wasissued to him and on January 10, 1978, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Thereafter,petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use ofland occupied by Michael Slipways Inc. Petitioner Baguio filed an oppositionto Michael's miscellaneous sales application covering the land on the groundthat he was the registered owner thereof. William Michael in turn protestedthe issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free patent to petitioner. Heclaimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 andthat he introduced substantial improvements thereon. The governmentrepresented by the Bureau of Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of titleand/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the Register of Deedsof Cebu. The trial court rendered a decision canceling the free patent and thecertificate of title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land tothe public domain and declaring private respondent Michael the true and

lawful occupant of the land. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appealswhich affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Courtruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by onewho procured the title by means of fraud because public policy demands thatone who obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed tobenefit therefrom. In his free patent application, petitioner declared underoath that the land in question was an agricultural land not claimed oroccupied by any other person, that he had continuously possessed andoccupied it; and that he had introduced improvements thereon. The Court,however, found these declarations, fraudulent. Petitioner is guilty of makingfalse statements in his application for a free patent thus justifying theannulment of his title.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE;INDEFEASIBILITY THEREOF CANNOT BE INVOKED BY ONE WHO PROCUREDTHE TITLE BY MEANS OF FRAUD. It is true that, once a patent isregistered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the landcovered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes privateproperty, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomesindefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance ofsuch patent. However, as held in Director of Lands vs. De Luna, even afterthe lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under Section 101of Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of landwhich has been fraudulent granted to private individuals. Such action is notbarred by prescription, and this is settled law. Indeed, the indefeasibility of acertificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the title by meansof fraud. Public policy demands that one who obtains title to public land

through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Petitioner is guof making false statements in his application for a free patent thus justifythe annulment of his title. The indefeasibility of a title does not attachtitles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patunder the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title. It does vest title where there is none because registration under this system is nomode of acquiring ownership. ATaDHC

2.ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; IN CASE OF DEATH, THE ORIGINAPPLICANT SHALL BE SUCCEEDED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS WITH RESPECT THE LAND APPLIED FOR OR LEASED. Petitioner assails the trial coufinding, as affirmed by the appellate court, that private respondent Michaethe true and lawful possessor of the subject land. He argues that priv

respondent, being a mere heir and successor-in-interest of William Michand not the person who filed the foreshore lease and the miscellaneous saapplications, has no right to the land in dispute. Suffice it to state that it wclearly proven that William Michael had already been in possession of land under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963. Petitioapplied for a free patent only in 1976, thirteen (13) years later. In additiWilliam Michael had filed a sales application covering the land in 1968, eight (8) years before petitioner filed his free patent application. The tcourt and the Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly held William Michael aprivate respondent Ricardo Michael to be the true and rightful possessorsthe land in question. The fact that private respondent Michael is merely successor of the original foreshore lease and sales applicant, William Michadoes not make him any less entitled to the possession of the land. Sec. 1of the Public Land Act provides that, in case of his death, the origiapplicant shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his legal hewith respect to the land applied for or leased.

D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of MandaCity, nullifying Free Patent No. 7757 and Original Certificate of Title No.15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco Baguio. LLphil

The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land, consisting of 5,8sq. m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu. Known as Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, tland was declared by the government public land in 1963.

The evidence shows that, on August 2, 1963, private respondent RicaMichael's predecessor-in-interest, William Michael, filed with the BureauLands an application for foreshore lease of the land. The application wrecommended for approval by the land investigator who also recommendthat the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for oyear from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964.

On October 8, 1963, by virtue of a permit granted to him by the BureauLands, William Michael made some reclamation on the land, built a fenaround the premises, and constructed a bridge over a portion which wunder water. Upon the expiration of the permit on October 4, 1964, Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigarecommended granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore landview of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises. February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application coverthe reclaimed foreshore land.

On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands fofree patent covering the same land. In his application, petitioner stated tthe land was agricultural land and not claimed or occupied by any otperson and that he had been in actual and continuous possession acultivation of the same. On the basis of these representations, a free patwas issued to him and, on January 10, 1978, Original Certificate of Title 0-15457 was issued in his name by the Register of Deeds of Cebu.

On April 6, 1978, petitioner demanded payment of rentals from WilliMichael for the use of the land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc.. On Aug4, 1981, petitioner filed an opposition to Michael's miscellaneous saapplication covering the land on the ground that he was the registered owthereof.

William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands ofree patent to petitioner. He claimed that he had been in actual possession


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the land since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial improvementsthereon.

On February 16, 1989, upon the recommendation of the Land ManagementBureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, thegovernment, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition forcancellation of title and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and theRegister of Deeds of Cebu. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court ofMandaue City which granted private respondent Ricardo Michael leave tointervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and aspresident of Michael Slipways, Inc.

On July 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision canceling the free

patent and the certificate of title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversionof the land to the public domain, and declaring private respondent Michaelthe true and lawful occupant of the land. The trial court ruled that the falsestatements made by petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent hadthe effect of ipso facto canceling the free patent and the title of petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on February 28, 1995,affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner contends that

1.The public respondent erred in not declaring that respondent Republic ofthe Philippines action was already barred by prescription.

2.Granting arguendo that respondent's action was not barred by prescription,nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court, erred in finding that petitioner "acted

in bad faith and procured the issuance of the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 andthe Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 through fraud andmisrepresentation."

3.Granting arguendo that respondent Republic's action should prosper,nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court erred in "(d)eclaring intervenor (privaterespondent herein) as the true and lawful possessor and occupant of theland subject of the intervention."

4.The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the land in question is aforeshore land.

We find these contentions to be without merit.

First. It is true that, once a patent is registered and the correspondingcertificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of thepublic domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issuedpursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one yearfrom the date of issuance of such patent. 2 However, as held in Director ofLands v. De Luna, 3 even after the lapse of one year, the State may stillbring an action under 101 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversionto the public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to privateindividuals. 5 Such action is not barred by prescription, and this is settledlaw.

Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by onewho procured the title by means of fraud. 7 Public policy demands that onewho obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed tobenefit therefrom. 8

Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was

guilty of fraud in procuring the issuance of the free patent and thecorresponding certificate of title. He insists that what he stated in hisapplication for free patent (that the subject land is agricultural land notclaimed or occupied by persons other than himself and that he had been inactual and continuous possession and cultivation of the same) were all true.He also assails the finding of the trial court that the subject land is foreshoreland.

Petitioner puts in issue the findings of fact of the trial court. But the onlyerrors which are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorariof a decision of the Court of Appeals are those allegedly committed by thelatter court and not those of the trial court. Petitioner's assignment of errorsis thus misplaced, and for this reason, the petition should be dismissed.Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari. In the absence of any showing of lack of basis for the conclusionsmade by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not disturb the factual findings

of the appellate court. 9 In this case, petitioner has not shown that tdecision of the Court of Appeals is not supported by substantial evidenceas to justify this Court in departing from the general rule which regards findings of the appellate court as final. LLjur

At any rate, we have decided to consider the issues raised insofar as they pertinent to the appellate court's decision in order to put them to rest onand for all.

In his free patent application, petitioner declared under oath that the landquestion was an agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any otperson; that he had continuously possessed and occupied it; and that he hintroduced improvements thereon. These declarations constitute fraud a

misrepresentation. The government has proven that, contrary to thallegations, as early as September 2, 1963, i.e., thirteen (13) years befothe alleged entry of petitioner on the land, private respondent's predecessin-interest, William Michael, had already filed a foreshore lease applicatover the same; that on February 25, 1968, William Michael filedmiscellaneous sales application over the land; that since 1963 up to tpresent, private respondent has been continuously in possession of the laon which he has been operating a drydocking service under the style Michael Slipways, Inc.; and that private respondent Ricardo Michael hmade improvements thereon consisting of the reclamation of a portion of land, the construction of the fence thereon, and the construction of a bridover a portion under water. In addition, it has been duly established that land in question is foreshore land, not agricultural. The fact that the landbeing used by private respondent Ricardo Michael in his drydockoperations is evidence that the land is foreshore land. Moreover, there wohave been no need to reclaim a portion of the land if it had not been und

seawater.

Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a fpatent thus justifying the annulment of his title. Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 1(Public Land Act) provides:

The statements made in the application shall be considered as essenconditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basissuch application, and any false statement therein or omission of faaltering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forthsuch statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or changethe material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. It shall be the dutythe Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deemadvisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are truewhether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in gofaith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Landshereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum andnecessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In evinvestigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad fafraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential fashall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Direcof Land or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to gdirect and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of supresumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceeding

As already stated, the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to tisecured by fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patent undthe Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's title. It does not v

title where there is none because registration under this system is nomode of acquiring ownership. 10

Third. Petitioner assails the trial court's finding, as affirmed by the appellcourt, that private respondent Michael is the true and lawful possessor of subject land. He argues that private respondent, being a mere heir asuccessor-in-interest of William Michael and not the person who filed tforeshore lease and the miscellaneous sales applications, has no right to tland in dispute.

Suffice it to state that it was clearly proven that William Michael had alreabeen in possession of the land under a provisional permit to occupy the sain 1963. Petitioner applied for a free patent only in 1976, thirteen (13) yelater. In addition, William Michael had filed a sales application covering tland in 1968, i.e., eight (8) years before petitioner filed his free patapplication. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly h


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William Michael and private respondent Ricardo Michael to be the true andrightful possessors of the land in question. The fact that private respondentMichael is merely the successor of the original foreshore lease and salesapplicant, William Michael, does not make him any less entitled to thepossession of the land. Sec. 105 of the Public Land Act provides that, in caseof his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded in his rights andobligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land applied for or leased. 11

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. LLphil

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140243. December 14, 2000.]

MARILYN C. PASCUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Atty. Porfirio Bautista for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Marilyn C. Pascua was charged and convicted of twenty six (26)counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. When the case was called for

promulgation, petitioner failed to appear despite due notice so the decisionwas promulgated in absentia on May 5, 1998. The trial court issued an orderforfeiting the cash bond in favor of the government and the issuance ofwarrant of arrest against petitioner. No motion for reconsideration or noticeof appeal was filed by petitioner. On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed an urgentomnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail bond, as wellas to set anew the promulgation of the subject decision. Petitioner explainedher failure to appear before the trial court on the scheduled date ofpromulgation. The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's urgentomnibus motion and notice of appeal for lack of merit, mentioning that itsFebruary 17, 1998 decision had already become final and executory,Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying forthe nullification of the June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 orders of the trialcourt. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the presentpetition. Petitioner contended that the promulgation in absentia of the

judgment against petitioner was not made in the manner set out in the last.

paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedurewhich then provided that promulgation in absentia shall consist in therecording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall beserved upon the accused or counsel.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. Petitioner has presented evidencesufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance ofofficial duty as regards the procedural requirement of the recording of the

judgment in the criminal docket of the court. The Court considered thecertification attached to the petition dated October 26, 1998 signed by theClerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig stating that they have notyet been furnished with copies of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 85283-306 and 86064-65, entitled People of the Philippines versus Marilyn C.Pascua, which were assigned to Branch 153 of the same court. The Courtconsidered said certification and held that it cannot presume substantialcompliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the criminal

docket, and in the absence of such compliance, there can be no validpromulgation. The Court stressed that without the same, the February 17,1998 decision could not attain finality and become executory and the 15-dayperiod within which to interpose an appeal did not even commence to run.The Court remanded the case to the trial court for proper promulgation of itsdecision in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENTIN ABSENTIA, EXPOUNDED; OLD RULE AND NEW RULE DISTINGUISHED. Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of thedecision of the court (Jacinto, Sr., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on theRevised Rules of Court [Criminal Procedure], 1994 ed., p. 521). In a criminal

case, promulgation of the decision cannot take place until after the clereceives it and enters it into the criminal docket. It follows that when

judge mails a decision through the clerk of court, it is not promulgatedthe date of mailing but after the clerk of court enters the same in criminal docket (Ibid., citing People v. Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 58[1956]). According to the first paragraph of Section 6 of the aforesaid R(of both the 1985 and 2000 versions), the presence in person of the accusat the promulgation of judgment is mandatory in all cases except where conviction is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appthrough counsel or representative. Under the third paragraph of the formand present Section 6, any accused, regardless of the gravity of the offencharged against him, must be given notice of the promulgation of judgmand the requirement of his presence. He must appear in person or in t

case of one facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel representative. The present Section 6 adds that if the accused was triedabsentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, notice promulgation shall be served at his last known address. Significantly, boversions of said section set forth the rules that become operative if accused fails to appear at the promulgation despite due notice: promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the crimidocket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused at his lknown address or through his counsel; and (b) if the judgment is conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cauthe court shall further order the arrest of the accused. Here lies difference in the two versions of the section. The old rule automatically githe accused 15 days from notice (of the decision) to him or his counwithin which to appeal. In the new rule, the accused who failed to appwithout justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules agaithe judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, t

accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of theremedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was fo

justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 dfrom notice.

2.ID.; ID,; ID., ID.; ID.; PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIA IS ALLOWED BY TRULES REGARDLESS OF THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE. It appears tthe judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the presence of accused, except where it is for a light offense, in which case it may pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative (DimsonElepao, 99 Phil. 733 [1956]), and except where the judgment is acquittal, in which case the presence of the accused is not necessary (Cetc., et al. v. Cinco, et al., 96 Phil. 31 [1954]). Notably, one of the conditioof the bail given for the provisional liberty of an accused in a criminal casethat he shall surrender himself (or the bondsman shall surrender accused) for execution of the final judgment (Section 2[d], Rule 114, RevisRules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, it follows that it is the responsibilitythe accused to make himself available to the court upon promulgation o

judgment of conviction, and such presence is secured by his bail bond. Tamplifies the need for the presence of the accused during the promulgatof a judgment of conviction, especially if it is for a grave offense. Obviousa judgment of conviction cannot be executed and thesentence metedthe accused cannot be servedwithout his presence. Besides, where thereno promulgation of the judgment, the right to appeal does not acc(People v. ]aranilla, 55 SCRA 565 [1974]). Jurisprudence further dictates tthe absence of counsel during the promulgation will not result in a violatof any substantial right of the accused, and will not affect the validity of tpromulgation of the judgment (Bernardo v. Abeto, CA-G. R. No. 6076, January 1940; Gonzales v. Judge, 186 SCRA 101 [1990]). In the vintage caof Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al. (supra), the Court citing U S. v. Beecha

(28 Phil. 258 [1914]), stated the reasons for requiring the attendance of taccused in case of conviction for a grave or less grave offense, to wit: "...Tcommon law required, when any corporal punishment was to be inflictedthe defendant, that he should be personally present before the court at ttime of pronouncing the sentence. (1 Chitty's Crim. Law [5th Am. ed.], 6696.) Reasons given for this are, that the defendant may be identified by court as the real party adjudged to be punished (Holt, 399); that tdefendant may have a chance to plead or move in arrest of judgment (Kvs. Speke, 3 Salk., 358); that he may have an opportunity to say what can say why judgment should not be given against him (2 Hale's Pleas of Crown, 401, 402); and that the example of the defendants, who have beguilty of misdemeanors of a gross and public kind, being brought up for animadversion of the court and the open denunciation of punishment, mtend to deter others from the commission of similar offenses (Chitty's CrLaw [5th ed.], 693, 696) . . . Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regardlof the gravity of the offense, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allow


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under the Rules. The only essential elements for its validity are: (a) that thejudgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereofshall be served upon the accused or counsel.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S NON-RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE OFPROMULGATION WAS DUE TO HER OWN FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY FILE ANOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS WITH THE TRIAL COURT. Petitioner'sfirst argument that she was not properly notified of the date of promulgationis devoid of merit. In the first place, her non-receipt of the notice ofpromulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice ofchange of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides,promulgation could be properly done even in her absence, subject to theservice of a copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the recording

of the judgment in the criminal docket.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATIVE ACT OF RECORDING IN THE CRIMINAL DOCKETNOT COMPLIED WITH MAKING THE PROMULGATION IN ABSENTIAINVALID; AS A CONSEQUENCE THEREOF THE PERIOD OF APPEAL DID NOTBEGIN TO RUN; CASE AT BAR. As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals(supra), the rules allow promulgation of judgment in absentiato obviate thesituation where juridical process could be subverted by the accused jumping.bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make promulgation in absentia aformal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever he may be, canbe notified of the judgment rendered against him. As discussed earlier, thesentence imposed by the trial court cannot be served in the absence of theaccused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the absentaccused know of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by theRules are: (1) the act of giving notice to all persons or the act of recording orregistering the judgment in the criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally

mentions first showing its importance; and (2) the act of serving a copythereof upon the accused (at his last known address) or his counsel. In ascenario where the whereabouts of the accused are unknown (as when he isat large), the recording satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused ofthe decision wherever he may be. Thus, on May 5, 1998, although thesecond kind of notification was satisfied when defense counsel Atty. Ariasreceived a copy of the February 17, 1998 decision, the solemn and operativeact of recording was not done, making the promulgation in absentia invalid.This being so, the period to appeal did not begin to run.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; LATER RECEIPT OF THE COPY OF THE DECISION DOES NOTIN ANY WAY CURE AN INVALID PROMULGATION; CASE AT BAR. The nextmatter we have to consider is the effect of the service of a copy of the

judgment upon petitioner, who admits having received a copy thereof onJune 17, 1998. Did the 15-day period to appeal begin to run on said date ofreceipt? We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of thedecision does not in any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if saiddecision be recorded in the criminal docket later, such piece-meal compliancewith the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation which wasinvalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in the provision ofboth requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means thatthey indeed must concur.

6.ID.; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE TRIALCOURT THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET BEEN FURNISHED WITH COPIESOF THE DECISION IN THE CRIMINAL CASES CONSIDERED BY THE COURT;SAID PIECE OF EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO CONTROVERT THEPRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY ASREGARDS THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF THE RECORDING OF THEJUDGMENT IN THE CRIMINAL DOCKET OF THE TRIAL COURT. In line withpetitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented evidence sufficient to

controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty asregards the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in thecriminal docket of the court. Attached to the petition is a piece of evidencethat cannot be ignored by this Court a certification dated October 26, 1998signed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. We take

judicial notice of said certification and hold that in view thereof, we cannotpresume substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a

judgment in the criminal docket. And in the absence of such compliance,there can be no valid promulgation. Without the same, the February 17,1998 decision could not attain finality and become executory. This meansthat the 15-day period within which to interpose an appeal did not evencommence. CAaDSI

D E C I S I O NMELO, J p:

What constitutes a valid promulgation in absentia? In case of supromulgation, when does the accused's right to appeal accrue?

Before us is a petition that calls for a ruling on the aforestated issuparticularly seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals daJune 17, 1999 and its order dated September 28, 1999 denyreconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiounder Rule 65 filed by petitioner which questioned the legality of the orddated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 issued by Branch 153 of tRegional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in PaCity.

The antecedent facts may be briefly chronicled as follows:

Petitioner was charged under 26 Informations for violation of BaPambansa Blg. 22. The Informations alleged that in 1989, petitioner issu26 Philippine National Bank (PNB) checks to apply on account or for valuefavor of Lucita Lopez, with the knowledge that at the time of issue, petitiodid not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for tpayment of the face value of the checks in full. Upon presentment of subject checks, they were dishonored by the drawee bank for having bedrawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.

After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered on February 17, 19disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILbeyond reasonable doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of BaPambansa Bilang 22, and hereby sentences her to suffer ONE (1) YE

imprisonment in each case and to pay the private complainant, LUCLOPEZ in the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P605,000.0Philippine Currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

SO ORDERED.

(p. 41, Rollo.)The judgment was initially scheduled for promulgation on March 31, 19However. considering that the presiding judge was on leave, promulgation was reset to May 5, 1998.

When the case was called on May 5, 1998, Public Prosecutor RogelioSescon and defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias appeared and manifestheir readiness for the promulgation of judgment, although the latintimated that petitioner would be late. Hence, the case was set for secocall. After the lapse of two hours, petitioner still had not appeared. The tcourt again asked the public prosecutor and the defense counsel if they wready for the promulgation of judgment. Both responded in the affirmatiThe dispositive portion of the decision was thus read in open cou

Afterwards, the public prosecutor, the defense counsel, and privcomplainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copiesthe subject decision by signing at the back of the original copy of tdecision on file with the record of the case.

Forthwith, the public prosecutor moved for the forfeiture of the cash boposted by petitioner as well as for the issuance of a warrant for her arre

Acting on the motion, the trial court issued, also on May 5, 1998, following order:

When this case was called for the promulgation of judgment, the accufailed to appear despite due notice. Upon motion of the Public Prosecut

that the cash bond posted for her provisional liberty be forfeited in favorthe government, being well-taken, the same is hereby granted. Likewise, a warrant of arrest be issued against her.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 42, Rollo.)

No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitionwithin 15 days from May 5, 1998.

On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner wthe trial court, sent through a private messengerial firm. On the same dawithout terminating the services of her counsel of record, Atty. Marcel

Arias, the one who received the copy of the judgment of convictipetitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty. Rolando Bernardo, filed


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urgent omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail bond,as well as to set anew the promulgation of the subject decision on thefollowing allegations: that petitioner failed to appear before the trial court onthe scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she failed to getthe notices sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City;that she had no intention of evading the processes of the trial court; that inFebruary 1998, she transferred residence to Olongapo City by reason of anejectment case filed against her by her landlord concerning her formerresidence in Quezon City; and that due to the abrupt dislocation of theirfamily life as a result of the transfer of their residence to Olongapo City,there were important matters that she overlooked such as the filing of anotice of change of address to inform the trial court of her new place ofresidence. cHCaIE

The motion was set for hearing on June 11, 1998 but on said date, neitherpetitioner nor assisting counsel was present. On June 22, 1998, petitionerfiled a notice of appeal. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig filed itscomment on the motion for reconsideration arguing that: the promulgation ofthe subject decision was made by the trial court on May 5, 1998 in thepresence of the accused's (herein petitioner's) counsel; that the subjectdecision is already final and executory, there having been no appealinterposed by the accused within the reglementary period; that there is nosuch thing as repromulgation of a decision; that before the accused could askfor relief from the trial court, she, being a convict, should submit herself firstto the lawful order thereof, that is, to surrender to the police authorities.

On June 22, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's urgentomnibus motion and notice of appeal for lack of merit, mentioning that itsFebruary 17, 1998 decision had already become final and executory.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, thi

Documents

Land Titiles: Torrens Cases - Indefeasibility, etc