Upload
daniel-lyons
View
214
Download
1
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Irish Jesuit Province
Labour Comes of AgeAuthor(s): Daniel LyonsSource: The Irish Monthly, Vol. 78, No. 921 (Mar., 1950), pp. 114-120Published by: Irish Jesuit ProvinceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20516136 .
Accessed: 15/06/2014 02:51
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Irish Jesuit Province is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Irish Monthly.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
LABOUR UNIONS IN AMERICA
IL?LABOUR COMES OF AGE
By DANIEL LYONS, SJ.
WHEN Cardinal Gibbons made his great defence of the
Knights of Labour he was fighting for the cause of labour
in general, not merely on behalf of any particular organization. There were several reasons, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, why new labour unions were to replace the Knights. Industrial conditions were changing rapidly, with business passing
more and more into the hands of huge corporations, in a cancerous
growth on society that has never been stopped. The larger corpor ations became, the more capable they were of administering defeat to the unions.
The Knights of Labour was the first large national labour organiz ation in America. While it laid the groundwork for a solid labour
movement, it also made the following tactical errors which led to its
undoing: (1) the Knights admitted everyone, including those who
did not belong to the labouring class, thus making their membership
unwieldy; (2) they concentrated too much on future objectives, such as public ownership of utilities, rather than on immediate betterment of working conditions; (3) their dues were so small that they could not meet an emergency; (4) the Knights engaged prematurely in the
formation of co-operatives, e.g. they started their own coal mine,
only to find that their competitors had enough control over the rail
ways to prevent their coal from being hauled; (5) the Knights made the fatal error, which American labour has never repeated, of sup
porting a labour party; (6) they lacked control over their members and were not able to escape from the stigma of violence and blood
shed; (7) the Knights of Labour failed to appeal to the skilled workers.
It was particularly this last defect which sounded the death knell for the Knights. The skilled labourers found that decisions were
being made which worked against their own interests, and as early as 1881 this conflict between the skilled and the unskilled resulted
114
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AMERICAN LABOUR
in the formation of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labour
Unions. In 1886 this organization became known as the American
Federation of Labour, and as the Knights collapsed during the pro
longed depression of the 1890's, its members rushed into the
A.F. of L. By 1900 the American Federation of Labour had 350,000
members, and it was growing rapidly. The first president of the A.F. of L. was Samuel Gompers. Born
in England of Dutch-Jewish parents, Gompers typifies the cosmo
politan origins of America unionism. An aggressive and uncom
promising leader, he consistently fought for the best conditions
attainable for the unions. As a member of the Cigar Makers' Union,
Gompers was a trade unionist himself and naturally thought in terms
of trade unions. He was convinced that a strong, stable union, under turn-of-the-century conditions, could only be built out of
skilled workers. Such a group would not only contain less radicals and anarchists, but the employers would be unable to replace the
men, in time of strike. Although Gompers began his career with
strong socialistic leanings, he gradually realized that full-blown Socialism was no solution to workingmen's problems. In a stirring attack on the Socialists, at the national A.F. of L. convention in
1903, he declared: ?
" I want to tell you Socialists that I have studied your
philosophy, read your works upon economics, and not the meanest of them; studied your standard works, both in English and in German?not only read but studied them. I have heard
your orators and watched the work of your movement the world over. I have kept close watch upon your doctrines for thirty years; have been closely associated with many of you, and know what you think and what you propose. I know, too, what you have up your sleeve. And I want to say that I am
entirely at variance with your philosophy. Economically, you are unsound; socially, your are wrong; and industrially you are an impossibility."
Samuel Gompers was convinced that if organized labour was ever going to make any progress it would have to live up to its
responsibilities, as well as insist on its rights. He stressed the fact that labour wanted peace, not war, and that the American Federation of Labour wanted to co-operate with employers, in return for a living wage and decent working conditions. He told the employers that
115
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
IRISH MONTHLY
when they advertised for a tradesman they had no way of knowing whether or not the man who applied for the job was skilled at his
work. But when they asked the American Federation of Labour to
send them a carpenter, or a machinist, the A.F. of L. could guarantee that the man they sent was skilled at his trade. Gompers set out to
prove to the employers that unions had something to offer as well
as to ask, and he was determined to make labour unions respectable in the eyes of the public.
Many employers were interested in Gompers' proposals. They realized that America's industrial czars had shown themselves utterly
unworthy of the workingman's confidence. They knew that it was
difficult to treat employees fairly when they had to compete with
such unfair employers as Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, and
Marshall Field, who were wont to exact more than seventy hours
of work per week under hazardous conditions and at miserable rates
of pay, and who reduced the pay still further when there was a pool of unemployed on tap. The ordinary employers knew that the
workers were more determined than ever to belong to a union.
With so many socialistic unions around, they naturally preferred a
union that was not opposed to private enterprise. The employers likewise saw that it was to their advantage to have a union only of
the skilled, as they knew that if they could settle with the skilled
they could easily defeat the unskilled, during a strike, through the use
of strikebreakers. Under such conditions, the American Federation of Labour was sure to prosper.
In order to stabilize its membership the A.F. of L. stressed the benevolent as well as the protective functions of unionism. Dues were high enough to provide for emergencies. To weld the member
ship together more firmly, the A.F. of L. insisted on working for
present and tangible results. However lofty its ideals, it indulged in no Utopian dreams, wisely preferring to make haste slowly, through the achievement of pressing needs. By this time labour had learned the debilitating effects of dual unionism, and the American Feder ation of Labour received the whole-hearted support of tradesmen
everywhere. In the first four years of the twentieth century it grew from 350,000 to 1,675,000, with scores of solid national unions
gathered together under its wing. Skilled labour in the various crafts was now taken care of better
than ever before. Public opinion was gradually won over by the
116
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AMERICAN LABOUR
new and improved policies of the unions. At long last organized labour had become a permanent landmark on the American scene.
Some of the gains made by the skilled unions helped all working men. The aggressive fight waged by the American Federation of
Labour for the eight-hour day helped the unskilled workers, as well
as the skilled. But not even ten per cent, of America's work force was unionized, and not many of the hard won gains of the A.F. of L.
filtered down to the rest of labour. The vast army of ten million
unskilled workers was left more helpless than ever, as their employers became more powerful and more hostile.
It was particularly in the mines, mills, and factories that unions were hit the hardest. When Morgan's gigantic United States Steel
Corporation was launched in 1901, the union men in the iron and steel industry soon found they were not wanted. Where many
companies existed in an industry, the employers formed associations
for defeating the unions. Prominent examples were the National
Founders' Association and the National Metal Trades' Association.
These and similar "
employers' unions "
not only refused to bargain collectively with any employees' organizations, they set out to destroy them all. The well-known National Association of Manufacturers
began to fight labour unions at this time, though the N.A.M. often
worked through such names as the National Industrial Council and
the Citizens' Industrial Association.
One of the most effective anti-labour groups formed in the early years of the century was the American Anti-Boycott Association.
This was a secret group of manufacturers who fought unions in the
courts. They were able to attack the union boycott because of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which forbade any "
conspiracy in restraint of trade." The high-handed tactics of Rockefeller and
the railways had led to the passage of the Anti-Trust Act; it was
never meant to apply to labour unions. But clever lawyers plus hostile judges twisted and interpreted the law so as to develop a
whole new edifice of legislation covering labour organizations. The employers reached the peak of their success in the courts
about 1908. It was in this year that the famous Danbury Hatters' case was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. The hatters'
union had carried on a nation-wide boycott against the Loewe Com
pany, of Danbury, Connecticut, and against dealers who handled its
hats. The prosecution, acting for the employers' Anti-Boycott
117
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
IRISH MONTHLY
Association, maintained that the union's boycott constituted a
malicious conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, according to which triple damages were to be paid.
Having won their case, the company got ?25,000 by having the
savings accounts of the union members seized. The homes of 140
of the men were ordered to be sold in order to satisfy the rest of the
judgment. Before the sales could be made, however, the case was
settled by an additional payment of ?60,000, most of which was
contributed by various A.F. of L. unions.
Similar celebrated cases of that era were the Duplex Printing
Company case, the Adair case, and the Buck's Stove and Range case.
In the Duplex case a rigorous injunction was issued forbidding any one from saying anything which might tend to persuade a worker
from striking against the company. In the Adair case the black
listing of employees by employers was declared legal. In the Buck's
Stove case Gompers was imprisoned for thirty days, while president of the A.F. of L., for disregarding the injunction against the boycott. Since that time, however, the blacklist, as well as the
" yellow dog
"
contract, has been declared illegal, labour unions have been exempted from the provisions of the Sherman Act, and the use of the injunction in labour disputes has been restricted.
There were many attempts of various natures made to weaken
unions in the early 1900's. Three of the most common were: (1)
profit sharing through stock ownership; (2) welfare plans; (3) the
sliding scale of wages. Although profit sharing through stock
ownership is recommendable under normal conditions, it was repre hensible as practised by such organizations as the United States Steel Corporation. To begin with, nearly half of the stock floated
by U.S. Steel was watered. Moreover, no premiums were to be
paid on stock bought by the employees for five years, and anyone who stopped work or went on strike would receive no premium whatever. The plan was another link in the chain used to tie men to their job, twelve hours a day, seven days a week, at extremely low wages, with no union to better their conditions.
The second type of system used at this time was some form of welfare plan. Most of these plans were integrally connected with the employers' drive against unions. An outstanding example was the welfare plan started at the close of 1908 by the Lake Carriers'
Association, on the Great Lakes. Applicants could obtain welfare
118
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AMERICAN LABOUR
plan certificates only by renouncing all union affiliation and pledging that they would not participate in any strike. Benefits from the
plan mainly consisted in a life insurance policy. It is indicative of
the times that when some of the shipowners wanted to deal with a
union representing their employees, U.S. Steel threatened them with a loss of trade if they did so.
The third scheme used by employers in the early part of the
century was the sliding scale of wages. According to this system, which was used in mines and textile mills, wages were to rise or fall as the price of the coal, metal, or textile involved went up or down.
But labour soon found that it was no match for the employers. Trying to draw up a fair contract under such a system was like
trying to play cards blindfolded. Wages were dragged so low by the sliding scale of wages that the system provoked violence,
dynamiting, and arson, before it was finally eliminated.
During the first World War the employers' anti-union drive took a nap because of the labour shortage and because of the lavish
profits that were paid on war contracts. From 1904 until 1917 the A.F. of L. had hardly increased its membership twenty per cent., but in the three years following 1917 it doubled the membership, bringing it to four million strong. The employers at the end of the war were alarmed by this sudden growth in unionism, as well as
by the fact that wages had increased 55 per cent, during the war.
Although prices had risen 104 per cent., it was wages that the
employers were determined to roll back. Their mass offensive was
known as the American Plan. The plan purported to be a drive for
the open shop, but it was actually a campaign for shops that would
be closed to union men. Impetus was given to the movement by the rash of strikes which broke out as a post-war reaction to the
no-strike clause that ended with the Armistice. Manufacturers'
associations, chambers of commerce, builders' and bankers' associa
tions, and the farmers' Grange all united in promoting the so-called
American Plan. As the depression of 1921-1922 set in, union after
union succumbed. A series of wage cuts was combined with black
listing of union men. Big Steel led the drive. The Big Five meat
packing companies reverted to the open shop. Even the building trades, organized labour's fortress, were split asunder, partly due to
the discovery of several racketeers among the ranks of union leaders.
Gompers remained president of the American Federation of Labour
119
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
IRISH MONTHLY
until his death in 1924. Although he had continued to solidify the
A.F. of L. along craft lines, he failed to realize sufficiently that the
organization should have been altered to fit the changing times. The
forward march of mass production was using more and more unskilled
workers as machinery increased, and exclusively craft unionism was
becoming as out-of-date as the horse and buggy. Entire industries, such as automobile and rubber, were left unorganized. Union
membership was not only dropping, it was in a rather smug decline.
Under such conditions it was inevitable that the American Federation
of Labour should one day give birth to what it had always feared as a monster: dual unionism.
Two factors kept the non-union workers from spontaneously
organizing more than they did. Firstly, prices remained unusually stable, fluctuating less than four per cent, from 1923 to 1929.
Secondly, employers in the 1920's made widespread use of welfare
plans, group medical care, life insurance, and pensions for their
employees. Capable personnel managers reduced the number of workers' complaints, while bona fide stock ownership was strongly encouraged. By 1928 more than one million employees had pur chased ?400 million worth of stocks and bonds from corporations for which they worked. Various forms of employee representation
plans were also put into effect which covered nearly two million men.
Many of these associations, however, were merely servile unions, fathered and dominated by the companies.
A slight foretaste of the epoch-making labour legislation that was to come with the New Deal was foreshadowed as early as 1926, when the United States Congress passed the Railroad Act. This measure
strongly encouraged employers to bargain collectively with those unions which represented a majority of their employees. In 1932, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a Democratic congress proclaimed the right of workers to form their own unions. Congress further declared that collective bargaining was the public policy of the United States. Such action augured well for the future.
{To be concluded)
120
This content downloaded from 195.78.108.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 02:51:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions