Labor Must Read Cases

8/17/2019 Labor Must Read Cases

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Labor Law

MUST READ CASES (LABOR LAW)

LABOR STANDARDS

Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippie D!pli"at#rs$ %"$ G.R. N#. &'*+

De"e,-er $ *

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to bea sword to oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental lawis that the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employerwhen the law is clearly on its side.

Pe#ple #/ the Philippies vs. Teresita 0Tessie1 La#2#. G.R. N#.&3* 4a!ar5 &$ *&&

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code as amended speci!es that recruitment

activities underta"en by non#licensees or non#holders of authority aredeemed illegal and punishable by law. $hen the illegal recruitment iscommitted against three or more persons individually or as a group then itis deemed committed in large scale and carries with it sti%er penalties as thesame is deemed a form of economic sabotage. &ut to prove illegalrecruitment it must be shown that the accused without being dulyauthori'ed by law gave complainants the distinct impression that he had thepower or ability to send them abroad for wor" such that the latter wereconvinced to part with their money in order to be employed. t is importantthat there must at least be a promise or o%er of an employment from theperson posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.

SAMEER O6ERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENC7 %NC. v. CAB%LES$ G.R. N#.&3&89$ A!2!st '$ *&

n errano v. *allant +aritime ervices nc. and +arlow ,avigation Co. nc.this court ruled that the clause -or for three (3) months for every year of theunepired term whichever is less- is unconstitutional for violating the e/ualprotection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. t-confers no rights0 it imposes no duties0 it a%ords no protection0 it creates no

o1ce0 it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.-

$hen a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with theConstitution the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactmentof the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that wasalready declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstanceshave so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.



Labor Law

S5"ip$ G#rres$ 6ela5# : C#,pa5 vs. Car#l De Rae;t. G.R. N#.&&8< 4!e &$ *9

To determine the eistence of an employer#employee relationship case lawhas consistently applied the four#fold test to wit2 (a) the selection and

engagement of the employee0 (b) the payment of wages0 (c) the power of dismissal0 and (d) the employers power to control the employee on themeans and methods by which the wor" is accomplished. The so#called-control test- is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer#employee relationship.

Maila Water C#,pa5$ %". vs. 4#se 4. Dal!,pies. G.R. N#. &3''&<O"t#-er $ *&

t should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the eistenceof the right to control and not necessarily the eercise thereof. t is not

essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties of the employee. t is enough that the former has a right to wield the power.

Ma"arth!r Mali";e, a; =er,ei2il;# >l#res vs. Mar!las %;!strialC#rp#rati#. G.R. N#. *< >e-r!ar5 *$ *&

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is thereasonable connection between the particular activity performed by theemployee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.

?ASAMMA@CCO v. C#!rt #/ Appeals. G.R. N#. &'9+*+< April &9$ *

A casual employee is only casual for one year and it is the passage of timethat gives him a regular status.

4#se 7. S#za vs. ABS@CBN Br#a;"asti2 C#rp#rati#$ G.R. N#.&8+'&$ 4!e &$ *

Television#radio talent is not an employee. 4elationship of a big name talentand a television#radio broadcasting company is one of an independentcontracting arrangement. A&#C&, engaged on'as services speci!cally toco#host the -+el 5 6ay- programs. A&#C&, did not assign any other wor" to

on'a. To perform his wor" on'a only needed his s"ills and talent. 7owon'a delivered his lines appeared on television and sounded on radio wereoutside A&#C&,s control. on'a did not have to render eight hours of wor"per day. The Agreement re/uired on'a to attend only rehearsals and tapingsof the shows as well as pre# and post#production sta% meetings. A&#C&,could not dictate the contents of on'as script.

Gapa5a# v >!l#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9898 (*&8)



Labor Law

arm wor"ers generally fall under the de!nition of seasonal employees. TheCourt has consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered asregular employees. 4egular seasonal employees are those called to wor"from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such

that during the o% season they are temporarily laid o%0 but reemployedduring the summer season or when their services may be needed. They arein regular employment because of the nature of their 9ob and not because of the length of time they have wor"ed.

This rule however is not absolute. easonal wor"ers who have wor"ed forone season only may not be considered regular employees. Also whenseasonal employees are free to contract their services with other farmowners then the former are not regular employees. or regular employees tobe considered as such the primary standard used is the reasonableconnection between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade

or business of the employer.

>6R Sills a; Servi"es Ep#ets$ %". (S?%LLE)$ et al. v. 4#vertSeva$ et al.$ G.R. N#. *+'3$ O"t#-er **$ *&

or an employee to be validly categori'ed as a pro9ect employee it isnecessary that the speci!c pro9ect or underta"ing had been identi!ed and itsperiod and completion date determined and made "nown to the employee atthe time of his engagement. This provision ensures that the employee iscompletely apprised of the terms of his hiring and the corresponding rightsand obligations arising from his underta"ing. ,otably the petitioner:s service

contract with 4obinsons was from 6anuary ; to <ecember 3; =>>8. Therespondents were only as"ed to sign their employment contracts for theirdeployment with 4obinsons halfway through =>>8 when the petitioner:sservice contract was about to epire.

?nder Article ;3@> of the Civil Code contracts where the consent of a partywas vitiated by mista"e violence intimidation undue inuence or fraud arevoidable or annullable. The petitioner:s threat of nonpayment of therespondents: salaries clearly amounted to intimidation. ?nder this situationand the suspect timing when these contracts were eecuted we rule thatthese employment contracts were voidable and were e%ectively /uestioned

when the respondents !led their illegal dismissal complaint. 4espondents arethus regular employees.

Pas#s v Philippie Nati#al C#str!"ti# C#rp#rati#$ G.R. N#.&9*89 (*&8)

Bro9ect employee is deemed regulari'ed if services are etended withoutspecifying duration. $hile for !rst three months petitioner can be



Labor Law

considered a pro9ect employee of B,CC his employment thereafter when hisservices were etended without any speci!cation of as to the duration madehim a regular employee of B,CC. And his status as a regular employee wasnot a%ected by the fact that he was assigned to several other pro9ects andthere were intervals in between said pro9ects since he en9oys security of

tenure.

Al"atel Phils. vs Rel#s$ G.R. N#. &8&'. 4!l5 8$ *9

7owever a pro9ect or wor" pool employee who has been continuouslyrehired by the same employer for the same tas"s that are necessary to theusual business of the employer must be deemed a regular employee.

>!i Televisi# Net#r$ %". v Arlee S. Espirit!$ G.R. N#. *9@'$ 8 De"e,-er *&

An employee can be a regular employee with a !ed#term contract. The lawdoes not preclude the possibility that a regular employee may opt to have a!ed#term contract for valid reasons. This was recogni'ed in &rent2 or aslong as it was the employee who re/uested or bargained that the contracthave a de!nite date of terminationD or that the !ed#term contract befreely entered into by the employer and the employee then the validity of the !ed#term contract will be upheld.

GMA Net#r$ %". v Pa-ri2a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3&9 (*&8)

Betitioners allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what theycall pinch#hitters (which means that they were employed to ta"e the place of regular employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave) does notchange the fact that their 9obs cannot be considered pro9ects within thepurview of the law. Every industry even public o1ces has to deal withsecuring substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. uch tas"swhether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute cannot beconsidered separate and distinct from the other underta"ings of thecompany. $hile it is managements prerogative to device a method to dealwith this issue such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systemswherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their

constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.

Aveli# La,-# vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &&&* O"t#-er *$ &999

There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondentsalthough they were paid not on the basis of time spent on the 9ob butaccording to the /uantity and the /uality of wor" produced by them. There



Labor Law

are two categories of employees paid by results2 (;) those whose time andperformance are supervised by the employer. (7ere there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the wor" is to beperformed. A piece#rate wor"er belongs to this category especially if heperforms his wor" in the company premises.)0 and (=) those whose time and

performance are unsupervised. (7ere the employers control is over theresult of the wor". $or"ers on pa"yao and ta"ay basis belong to this group.)&oth classes of wor"ers are paid per unit accomplished. Biece#rate paymentis generally practiced in garment factories where wor" is done in thecompany premises while payment on pa"yao and ta"ay basis is commonlyobserved in the agricultural industry such as in sugar plantations where thewor" is performed in bul" or in volumes di1cult to /uantify. Betitionersbelong to the !rst category i.e. supervised employees.

PCL Shippi2 Philippie$ %". a; U@Mi2 Marie Trasp#rtC#rp#rati#$ vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &'88&$De"e,-er &$ *

$ith respect however to the award of overtime pay the correct criterion indetermining whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is notwhether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eightwor"ing hours a day but whether they actually rendered service in ecess of said number of hours. n the present case the Court !nds that privaterespondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present anyevidence to prove that he rendered service in ecess of the regular eightwor"ing hours a day.

Bisi2 Ma22aa sa Tr5"#$ et al. vs. NLRC$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &'&89

O"t#-er &'$ *+

<.F. ,o. =; sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of thebene!ts that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressedwor"wee" scheme thus2The compressed wor"wee" scheme was originallyconceived for establishments wishing to save on energy costs promotegreater wor" e1ciency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism amongothers. $or"ers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings onthe increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (;) day a wee"0savings on meal and snac" epenses0 longer wee"ends or an additional G=o%#days a year that can be devoted to rest leisure family responsibilities

studies and other personal matters and that it will spare them for at leastanother day in a wee" from certain inconveniences that are the normalincidents of employment such as commuting to and from the wor"placetravel time spent eposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes dressing up forwor" etc. Thus under this scheme the generally observed wor"wee" of si(H) days is shortened to !ve (G) days but prolonging the wor"ing hours from+onday to riday without the employer being obliged for pay overtimepremium compensation for wor" performed in ecess of eight (8) hours on





Labor Law

The Fmnibus 4ules mplementing the Labor Code meanwhile provides2

ECTF, ;J. <eduction for loss or damage. # $here the employer isengaged in a trade occupation or business where the practice of

ma"ing deductions or re/uiring deposits is recogni'ed to answer forthe reimbursement of loss or damage to tools materials ore/uipment supplied by the employer to the employee the employermay ma"e wage deductions or re/uire the employees to ma"edeposits from which deductions shall be made sub9ect to thefollowing conditions2(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsiblefor the loss or damage0(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to showcause why deduction should not be made0(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and

shall not eceed the actual loss or damage0 and(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does noteceed => percent of the employee:s wages in a wee".

Betitioner failed to su1ciently establish that Esteban was responsible for thenegative variance it had in its sales for the year =>>G to =>>H and thatEsteban was given the opportunity to show cause why the deduction fromher last salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the petitionersstatement that it is the practice in the retail industry to deduct variancesfrom an employees salary without more.

Lilia P. La-a;a vs. >#rest =ills A"a;e,5. G.R. N#. &3**9' De"e,-er*8$ *+

4especting petitioners claim for holiday pay orest 7ills contends thatpetitioner failed to prove that she actually wor"ed during speci!c holidays.Article @J of the Labor Code provides however that(a) Every wor"er shall bepaid his regular daily wage during regular holidays ecept in retail andservice establishments regularly employing less than ten (;>) wor"ers0 (b) The employer may re/uire an employee to wor" on any holiday but suchemployee shall be paid a compensation e/uivalent to twice his regular rate. The provision that a wor"er is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is

re/uired to wor" on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a wor"er tohis regular rate on holidays applies even if he does not wor".

BP% E,pl#5ees !i#@Dava# Cit5@>UBU v Ba #/ the Philippie%sla;s$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &39&* (*&8)

Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. t is an eercise of business 9udgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the management



Labor Law

acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner the Court will not interfere with theeercise of 9udgment by an employer. &Bs policy of contracting outcashiering and boo""eeping services was considered as a valid eercise of management prerogative which is further authori'ed by the Central &an" inC&B Circular ,o. ;388 eries of ;@@.

Cetral Az!"arera De Tarla" vs. Cetral Az!"arera De Tarla" La-#rUi#@NLU. G.R. N#. &++99$ 4!l5 *$ *&

Article ;>> of the Labor Code otherwise "nown as the ,on#<iminution 4ulemandates that bene!ts given to employees cannot be ta"en bac" or reducedunilaterally by the employer because the bene!t has become part of theemployment contract written or unwritten. The rule against diminution of bene!ts applies if it is shown that the grant of the bene!t is based on anepress policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time andthat the practice is consistent and deliberate. ,evertheless the rule will not

apply if the practice is due to error in the construction or application of adoubtful or di1cult /uestion of law. &ut even in cases of error it should beshown that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error.

Netli C#,p!ter %"#rp#rate; v Eri" Del,#$ G.R. N#. &+*3$ &+ 4!e *&

$ith regard to the length of time the company practice should have beenobserved to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot beunilaterally reduced diminished discontinued or eliminated by theemployer we !nd that 9urisprudence has not laid down any rule re/uiring a

speci!c minimum number of years. n <avao ruits Corporation v. AssociatedLabor ?nions the company practice lasted for si years. n <avao ntegratedBort tevedoring ervices v. Abar/ue' the employer for three years andnine months approved the commutation to cash of the unen9oyed portion of the sic" leave with pay bene!ts of its intermittent wor"ers. n Tiangco v.Leogardo 6r. the employer carried on the practice of giving a !ed monthlyemergency allowance from ,ovember ;@IH to ebruary ;@8> or three yearsand four months. n evilla Trading Company v. emana the employer "eptthe practice of including non#basic bene!ts such as paid leaves for unusedsic" leave and vacation in the computation of their ;3th#month pay for atleast two years.

$ith the payment of ? dollar commissions having ripened into a companypractice there is no way that the commissions due to <elmo were to be paidin ? dollars or their e/uivalent in Bhilippine currency determined at the timeof the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an un9ust diminution of thecommissions due and owing to <elmo.



Labor Law

Baar; E,pl#5ees Ui#@W#rers Allia"e Tra;e Ui#s vs NLRC.G.R. N#. &+9 >e-r!ar5 &3$ *

Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and the newly hired employees to Fur mind said gap is

not signi!cant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of theintentional /uantitative di%erences in the salary rates between the employeegroup. As already stated the classi!cation under the wage structure is basedon the ran" of an employee not on seniority. or this reason wage distortiondoes not appear to eist.

R#2eli# Re5es vs NLRC. G.R. N#. &*88$ A!2!st +$ *3

?nder the 4ules and 4egulations mplementing Bresidential <ecree 8G; thefollowing compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary2

a) Cost#of#living allowances granted pursuant to Bresidential <ecree G=G andLetter of nstruction ,o. ;IJ0b) Bro!t sharing payments0c) All allowances andmonetary bene!ts which are not considered or integrated as part of theregular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the<ecree on <ecember ;H ;@IG.

Pr#;!"ers Ba v. NLRC. G.R. N#. &3&. Mar"h *+$ *&

&onus is not demandable as a matter of right. t is a managementprerogative given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly dueto the recipient.

Philipiie Tele2raph vs. Laplaa. G.R. N#. 3'< 4!l5 *8$ &99&

t is the employers prerogative based on its assessment and perception of its employees /uali!cations aptitudes and competence to move themaround in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertainwhere they will function with maimum bene!t to the company. $hen anemployees transfer is not unreasonable nor inconvenient or pre9udicial tohim and it does not involve a demotion in ran" or diminution of his salariesbene!ts and other privileges the employee may not complain that itamounts to a constructive dismissal.

UE v. PEPAN%O$ G.R. N#. &98+93$ 4a!ar5 *8$ *&8

The re/uirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is notunreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves publicinterest. The government has a right to ensure that only /uali!ed persons inpossession of su1cient academic "nowledge and teaching s"ills are allowedto teach in such institutions. *overnment regulation in this !eld of human



Labor Law

activity is desirable for protecting not only the students but the public aswell from ill#prepared teachers who are lac"ing in the re/uired scienti!c ortechnical "nowledge. They may be re/uired to ta"e an eamination or topossess postgraduate degrees as prere/uisite to employment.

Philippie Airlies$ %". vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &*'39*< N#ve,-er 9$&99+

n legitimate 9ob contracting no employer#employee relation eists betweenthe principal and the 9ob contractor:s employees. The principal is responsibleto the 9ob contractor:s employees only for the proper payment of wages. &utin labor#only contracting an employer#employee relation is created by lawbetween the principal and the labor#only contractor:s employees such thatthe former is responsible to such employees as if he or she had directlyemployed them

6i2illa$ et al. v Philippie C#lle2e #/ Cri,i#l#25$ %".$ G.R. N#.*9 (*&8)

n legitimate 9ob contracting the principal employer becomes 9ointly andseverally liable with the 9ob contractor only for the payment of theemployees: wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Fn theother hand in labor#only contracting the principal employer becomessolidarily liable with the labor#only contractor for all the rightful claims of theemployees. n this case the releases waivers and /uitclaims eecuted byemployees in favor of the labor#only contractor redounded to the bene!t of the principal.

Sa Mi2!el C#rp. vs. MAERC %te2rate; S5ste,s. G.R. N#. &3*< 4!l5 &$ *8

The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to theemployees of the contractor for a more comprehensive purpose (wagesmonetary claims and all other bene!ts in the Labor Code such asK+edicareKBag#big). The labor#only contractor is deemed merely anagent. A !nding that a contractor is a labor#onlyD contractor is e/uivalent todeclaring that there is an E4#EE relationship between the principal and theemployees of the labor#onlyD contractor.

Cher5ll Sat#s Le!s v St. S"h#lasti"aFs C#lle2e West2r#ve$ et al.$G.R. N#. &+3**$ *+ 4a!ar5 *&'

That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per sedoes not absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedloc" isdisgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether thepetitioners pregnancy out of wedloc" is considered disgraceful or immoral in





Labor Law

7alloween invitation sent out by employee for o1ce tric"#or#treating withoutclearance from higher management is considered misbehavior. Thecircumstances in the case were di%erentiated from amson vs. ,L4C wherethe o%ensive remar"s were verbally made during informal Christmasgathering.

L#res Realt5 Eterprises$ %". v. 6ir2iia E. Pa"ia$ Mar"h *&&

Betitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare chec"s forpayment of petitioners obligations. 4espondent did not immediately complywith the instruction since petitioner employer had no su1cient funds tocover the chec"s. Betitioner employer dismissed respondent employee forwillful disobedience. The Court held that respondent employee was illegallydismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioneremployer to prepare chec"s in payment of petitioners obligationsrespondent employees initial reluctance to prepare the chec"s although

seemingly disrespectful and de!ant was for honest and well intentionedreasons. Brotecting the petitioner employer from liability under the &ouncingChec"s Law was foremost in her mind. t was not wrongful or willful. ,eithercan it be considered an obstinate de!ance of company authority. The Courttoo" into consideration that respondent employee despite her initialreluctance eventually did prepare the chec"s on the same day she wastas"ed to do it.

G#zales vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &8&'8< Mar"h *$ *&

The act constituting the breach must be wor"#relatedD such as would show

the employee concerned to be un!t to continue wor"ing for the employer.

4ar;ie Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. N#. &9&'< A!2!st 8&$ &998

or abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employmentthere must be a deliberate un9usti!ed refusal of the employee to resume hisemployment. This refusal must be clearly shown. +ere absence is notsu1cient0 it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that theemployee simply does not want to wor" anymore.

SME Ba$ %".$ et al. v De G!z,a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+'&3 (*&8)

$hile resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that theemployees were not coerced into resignation this fact alone is notconclusive proof that they intelligently freely and voluntarily resigned. Torule that resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are bythemselves conclusive proof that the employees intended to relin/uish theirposts would open the oodgates to possible abuse. n order to withstand the



Labor Law

test of validity resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intentionof relin/uishing the o1ce coupled with an act of relin/uishment. Thereforein order to determine whether the employees truly intended to resign fromtheir respective posts we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignationletters but must ta"e into consideration the totality of circumstances in each

particular case.

Sa#h >!lt# Phils.$ %".$ et al. v Berar;#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &+3*&(*&8)

A lull caused by lac" of orders or shortage of materials must be of suchnature as would severely a%ect the continued business operations of theemployer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly addressed. anohasserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out of the$ire Condenser <epartment which triggered retrenchment. anoh

presented the letters of cancellation given by +atsushita and anyo asevidence of cancelled orders. The evidence presented by anoh barelyestablished the connection between the cancelled orders and the pro9ectedbusiness losses that may be incurred by anoh.

=#"he2 Philippies C#rp#rati# v At#i# M. >arrales$ G.R. N#.*&&93$ &+ Mar"h *&'

Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employerif proven by substantial evidence is a cause analogous to seriousmisconduct. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and

aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. uchmisconduct however serious must nevertheless be in connection with theemployees wor" to constitute 9ust cause for his separation.

E,erit!s Se"!rit5 a; Maitea"e S5ste,s$ %". v 4arie C. Daili2$G.R. N#. *3&$ * April *&

A oating status of a security guard for more than si months constitutesconstructive dismissal. The temporary inactivity or -oating statusof security guards should continue only for si months. Ftherwise the securityagency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of

petitioner to give respondent a wor" assignment beyond the reasonable si#month period ma"es it liable for constructive dismissal.

E#"et Se"!rit5 a; Allie; Servi"es C#rp#rati# a;H#r Ma. TeresaMar"el# v Ar,a;# D. Serra#$ G.R. N#. &9+'8+$ *9 Septe,-er *&

t is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the merelapse of the si#month period of oating status as a case of constructive



Labor Law

dismissal without loo"ing into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in thesecurity guards failure to assume another post. This is especially true in thepresent case where the security guards own refusal to accept a non#MBdetail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the si#month period. The security agency Eocet should not then be held liable for

constructive dismissal.

Philippie Sheet Metal W#rersF Ui# vs. C%R. G.R. N#. L@**+< April*+$ &99

4eduction of the number of wor"ers in a companys factory made necessaryby the introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products is 9usti!ed. There can be no /uestion as to the right of the manufacturer to usenew labor#saving devices with a view to e%ecting more economy ande1ciency in its method of production.

Orietal Petr#le!, : Mierals C#rp. vs. >!etes. G.R. N#. &'&+&+.O"t#-er &$ *'

tandards to 6ustify 4etrenchment2;. The losses epected should be substantial and not merely de minimis

in etent0=. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. t be

reasonably necessary and li"ely to e%ectively prevent the epectedlosses0

3. The employer should have ta"en other measures prior or parallel toretrenchment to forestall losses0

J. The alleged losses if already reali'ed and the epected imminentlosses must be proved by su1cient and convincing evidence.

BP% v. BP% EMPLO7EES UN%ON DA6AO$ G.R. N#. &8&$ O"t#-er &9$*&&

&y upholding the automatic assumption of the non#surviving corporationseisting employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger theCourt strengthens 9udicial protection of the right to security of tenure of employees a%ected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the statusof their various bene!ts which were among the chief ob9ections of our

dissenting colleagues. 7owever nothing in this 4esolution shall impair theright of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbedemployees for a lawful or authori'ed cause or the right of such an employeeto resign retire or otherwise sever his employment whether before or afterthe merger sub9ect to eisting contractual obligations. n this manner 6ustice &rions theory of automatic assumption may be reconciled with thema9oritys concerns with the successor employers prerogative to choose itsemployees and the prohibition against involuntary servitude.



Labor Law

?i2 #/ ?i2s Trasp#rt vs. Ma,a". G.R. N#. &*+. 4!e *9$ *3

n order to intelligently prepare the employees for their eplanation anddefenses the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and

circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge against theemployee N a general description of the change will not su1ce.

Es2!erra vs. 6alle 6er;e C#!tr5 Cl!-. G.R. N#. &38&*. 4!e &8$*&*

The law does not re/uire that an intention to terminate ones employmentshould be included in the !rst notice. t is enough that employees areproperly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properlyprepare their defenses0 it is only during the second notice that the intentionto terminate ones employment should be eplicitly stated

Lava;#r vs. 041 Mareti2 C#rp#rati# a; S#5a#. G.R. N#. &'33'3< 4!e *+$ *'

A hearing or conference should be held during which the employeeconcerned with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires isgiven the opportunity to respond to the charge present his evidence or rebutthe evidence presented against him.

AGABON v. NLRC$ G.R. N#. &'+98$ N#ve,-er &3$ *

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the privaterespondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominaldamages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretionof the court ta"ing into account the relevant circumstances. Considering theprevailing circumstances in the case at bar we deem it proper to ! it atB3>>>>.>>. $e believe this form of damages would serve to deteremployers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least it provides a vindication or recognition of thisfundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and itsmplementing 4ules.

4aa >##; Pr#"essi2 v. Pa"#t. G.R. N#. &'&83+.Mar"h *+$ *'

f the dismissal is based on a 9ust cause under Article =8= but the employerfailed to comply with the notice re/uirement the sanction to be imposedupon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was in e%ectinitiated by an act imputable to the employee. Fn the other hand if thedismissal is based on an authori'ed cause under Article =83 but theemployer failed to comply with the notice re/uirement the sanction should



Labor Law

be sti%er because the dismissal process was initiated by the employerseercise of his management prerogative.

Ta22a@a v Philippie Tras,arie Carriers$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#.&+8 (*&8)

Article =I@ of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full bac"wagesshall be inclusive of allowances and other bene!ts or their monetarye/uivalent. t is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissedemployee or wor"er the whole amount of the salaries or wages plus all otherbene!ts and bonuses and general increases to which he would have beennormally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped wor"ing.

Re5es$ et al. v RP G!ar;iaFs Se"!rit5 A2e"5$ %".$ G.R. N# &983'

(*&8)

&ac"wages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an

illegally dismissed employee in order to alleviate the economic damage

brought about by the employees dismissal. 4einstatement is a restoration

to a state from which one has been removed or separatedD while the

payment of bac"wages is a form of relief that restores the income that was

lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal.D Therefore the award of one does

not bar the other.

Crisat# >. Castr#$ 4r. vs Atee# De Na2a Uiversit5$ et al.$ G.R. N#.

&3'*98$ *8 4!l5 *&

The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was notrendered moot and academic. 7e remained entitled to accrued salaries fromnotice of the LA:s order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. n slri' Trading v. Capada we even clari!ed that the employee could be barred fromclaiming accrued salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was withoutthe fault of the employer.

Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in ,ovember=>>= and that their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground they

were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of theLA (i.e. eptember 3 =>>;) until his reinstatement in ,ovember =>>=. t didnot matter that the respondents had yet to eercise their option to choosebetween actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of reinstatement was immediately eecutory.

Philippie Airlies$ %". v. Re5al;# 6. Paz$ G.R. N#. &9*9*$ *N#ve,-er *&



Labor Law

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salariesnotwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. Thetest is two#fold2 (;) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not eecuted prior to its reversal0 and (=)

the delay must not be due to the employers un9usti!ed act or omission. f the delay is due to the employers un9usti!ed refusal the employer may stillbe re/uired to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LaborArbiters decision.

A scrutiny of the circumstances however will show that the delay inreinstating the respondent was not due to the un9usti!ed refusal of BAL toabide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. The inopportune event of BALs entering rehabilitation receivership 9usti!esthe delay or failure to comply with the reinstatement order of the LA. n lightof the fact that BALs failure to comply with the reinstatement order was

9usti!ed by the eigencies of corporation rehabilitation the respondent mayno longer claim salaries which he should have received during the periodthat the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until itwas overturned by the ,L4C.

Gl#-e Ma"a5 v. NLRC. G.R. N#. +*'&&< Mar"h 8$ &99*

$hen the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice#versa orthere were imputations of bad faith to each other reinstatement could note%ectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions whichre/uire trust and con!dence.

Wephil C#rp#rati# vs. A-i2$ G.R. N#. *39+8$ 3 April *&

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into themundane realities of human eperience the -refund doctrine- easilydemonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harmmore than help a dismissed employee. The employee to ma"e both endsmeet would necessarily have to use up the salaries received during thependency of the appeal only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a!nal unfavorable decision. t is mirage of a stop#gap leading the employee toa ris"y cli% of insolvency.

Uilever Philippies v Rivera$ G.R. N#. *&3& (*&8)

As a general rule an employee who has been dismissed for any of the 9ustcauses enumerated under Article =8= of the Labor Code is not entitled to aseparation pay. n eceptional cases however the Court has grantedseparation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social 9usticeDor on e/uitable grounds.D n both instances it is re/uired that the dismissal



Labor Law

(;) was not for serious misconduct0 and (=) did not reect on the moralcharacter of the employee. n this case the transgressions were seriouso%enses that warranted employees dismissal from employment. 7enceemployee is not entitled to separation pay.

A2ri"!lt!ral a; %;!strial S!pplies C#rp. et al vs. 4!e-er P. Siazar$G.R. N#. &3393 A!2!st *'$ *&

n awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement the amount to be awarded shall be e/uivalent to one monthsalary for every year of service rec"oned from the !rst day of employmentuntil the !nality of the decision. Bayment of separation pay is in addition topayment of bac"wages. And if separation pay is awarded instead of reinstatement bac"wages shall be computed from the time of illegaltermination up to the !nality of the decision.

Ieai;a Paz v N#rther T#-a""# Re;r5i2 C#.$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#.&99''$ &+ >e-r!ar5 *&'

The award of !nancial assistance to an employee who rendered almost threedecades of dedicated service to an employer without a single transgressionor malfeasance of any company rule or regulation coupled with her old ageand in!rmity which now wea"en her chances of employment is 9usti!ed andallowed under special circumstances. These circumstances indubitably merite/uitable concessions via the principle of compassionate 9usticeD for thewor"ing class.

Cetral Pa2asia Ele"tri" C##perative %". vs NLRC. G.R. N#.&8'&$ 4!l5 *$ *3

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the awardof separation bene!ts or some form of !nancial assistance to mitigate thee%ects of termination this case is not the appropriate instance for generosityunder the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that privaterespondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negativerecord prior to his dismissal in our view of this case does not call for suchaward of bene!ts since his violation reects a regrettable lac" of loyalty andworse betrayal of the company. f an employees length of service is to be

regarded as a 9usti!cation for moderating the penalty of dismissal suchgesture will actually become a pri'e for disloyalty distorting the meaning of social 9ustice and undermining the e%orts of labor to cleanse its ran"s of undesirables.



Labor Law

C#ra;# A. Li, v. =MR Philippies$ %".$ et al.$ G.R. N#. *&+8$ A!2!st *&

,o essential change is being made (in a !nal 9udgment) by a recomputationbecause such is a necessary conse/uence which ows from the nature of the

illegality of the dismissal. To reiterate a recomputation or an originalcomputation if no previous computation was made as in the present case isa part of the law that is read into the decision namely Article =I@ of theLabor Code and established 9urisprudence. Article =I@ provides for theconse/uences of illegal dismissal one of which is the payment of fullbac"wages until actual reinstatement /uali!ed only by 9urisprudence whenseparation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed where the !nality of theillegal dismissal decision instead becomes the rec"oning point.

The nature of an illegal dismissal case re/uires that bac"wages continue toadd on until full satisfaction. The computation re/uired to reect full

satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the !naldecision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. Thus inthe present case a computation of bac"wages until actual reinstatement isnot a violation of the principle of immutability of !nal 9udgments.

I!elli2 Phar,a C#rp#rati# v Si-al$ et al.$ G.R. NO. &38'+3 (*&8)

n the present case the C&A contains speci!c provisions which e%ectivelybar the availment of retirement bene!ts once the employees have chosenseparation pay or vice versa. ection = of Article OM eplicitly states thatany payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against separation

pay. Clearly respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity andseparation pay as selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. Toillustrate the mechanics of how ection = of Article OM bars double recoveryif the employees choose to retire whatever amount they will receive asretirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they wouldhave received had their separation from employment been for a causewhich would entitle them to severance pay. These causes are enumerated inection 3 Article OM of the C&A (i.e. retrenchment closure of businessmerger redundancy or installation of labor#saving device). 7owever if thecause of the termination of their employment was any of the causesenumerated in said ection 3 they could no longer claim retirement gratuity

as the fund from which the same would be ta"en had already been used inpaying their separation pay. But di%erently employees who were separatedfrom the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation payas there is only one fund from which said bene!ts would be ta"en.narguably ection = of Article OM e%ectively disallows recovery of bothseparation pay and retirement gratuity. Conse/uently respondents areentitled only to one. ince they have already chosen and accepted



Labor Law

redundancy pay and have eecuted the corresponding 4elease andPuitclaim they are now barred from claiming retirement gratuity.

Gra"e Christia =i2h S"h##l$ represete; -5 its Pri"ipal$ Dr. 4a,esTa v >ilipias A. Lava;era$ G.R. N#. &33+'$ * A!2!st *&

4A IHJ; which was enacted on <ecember @ ;@@= amended Article =8I of the Labor Code providing for the rules on retirement pay to /uali!ed privatesector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in theestablishment. The said law states that an employees retirement bene!tsunder any collective bargaining Qagreement (C&A)R and other agreementsshall not be less than those providedD under the same N that is at least one#half (S) month salary for every year of service a fraction of at least si (H)months being considered as one whole year N and that QuRnless the partiesprovide for broader inclusions the term one#half (S) month salary shallmean !fteen (;G) days plus one#twelfth (;K;=) of the ;3 th month pay and the

cash e/uivalent of not more than !ve (G) days of service incentive leaves.D

The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no C&A or otherapplicable agreement providing for retirement bene!ts to employees or (b)there is a C&A or other applicable agreement providing for retirementbene!ts but it is below the re/uirement set by law. Merily the determiningfactor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority interms of bene!ts provided.

The Court in the case of Elegir v. Bhilippine Airlines nc. has recentlya1rmed that one#half (S) month salary means ==.G days2 ;G days plus =.G

days representing one#twelfth (;K;=) of the ;3th month pay and theremaining G days for QLR.D The Court sees no reason to depart from thisinterpretation. *C7 argument therefore that the G days L should beli"ewise pro#rated to their ;K;= e/uivalent must fail.

N#riel R. M#tierr# v Ri",ers Marie A2e"5 Phils.$ %".$ G.R. N#.*&8$ 4a!ar5 &$ *&'

$hen a seafarer sustains a wor"#related illness or in9ury while on board thevessel his !tness for wor" shall be determined by the company#designatedphysician. The physician has ;=> days or =J> days if validly etended to

ma"e the assessment. f the physician appointed by the seafarer disagreeswith the assessment of the company#designated physician the opinion of athird doctor may be agreed 9ointly between the employer and the seafarerwhose decision shall be !nal and binding on them.

Sealaes Marie Servi"es$ %".$ et al. v Arel G. Dela T#rre$ G.R. N#.*&&8*$ &+ >e-r!ar5 *&'



Labor Law

or the purpose of determining temporary total disabilityD the seafarer shallsubmit himself to a post#employment medical eamination by a company#designated physician within three wor"ing days upon his return ecept whenhe is physically incapacitated to do so in which case a written notice to theagency within the same period is deemed as compliance. ailure of the

seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting re/uirement shall result inhis forfeiture of the right to claim the above bene!ts. f a doctor appointedby the seafarer disagrees with the assessment a third doctor may be agreed 9ointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decisionshall be !nal and binding on both parties.

LABOR RELAT%ONS

Sta. L!"ia East C#,,er"ial C#rp#rati# vs. =#. Se"retar5 #/ La-#ra; E,pl#5,et$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &*8''$ A!2!st &$ *9

Article =;=(g) of the Labor Code de!nes a labor organi'ation as any union orassociation of employees which eists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms andconditions of employment.D ?pon compliance with all the documentaryre/uirements the 4egional F1ce or &ureau shall issue in favor of theapplicant labor organi'ation a certi!cate indicating that it is included in theroster of legitimate labor organi'ations. Any applicant labor organi'ationshall ac/uire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights andprivileges granted by law to legitimate labor organi'ations upon issuance of the certi!cate of registration.

T:= Sh#ptters C#rp#rati#HGi J!ee C#rp#rati#$ et al. v T:=Sh#ptters C#rp#rati# C#rp#rati#HGi J!ee W#rers Ui#$ etal.$ G.R. N#. &9&3& (*&)

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employeesin the eercise of their right to self#organi'ation is whether the employerhas engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interferewith the free eercise of employees rights0 and that it is not necessary thatthere be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated orcoerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonableinference that the anti#union conduct of the employer does have an adverse

e%ect on self#organi'ation and collective bargaining.

Sta. L!"ia East C#,,er"ial C#rp#rati# vs. =#. Se"retar5 #/ La-#ra; E,pl#5,et$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &*8''$ A!2!st &$ *9

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees consistent with e/uity to



Labor Law

the employer indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rightsand duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of thelaw.D The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collectivebargaining unit are2(;) the will of the employees (*lobe <octrine)0(=) a1nity and unity of the

employees interest such as substantial similarity of wor" and duties orsimilarity of compensation and wor"ing conditions (ubstantial +utualnterests 4ule)0(3) prior collective bargaining history0 and(J) similarity of employment status.

C#astal S!-i" Ba5 Ter,ial$ %".$ vs DOLE. G.R. N#.&'3&&3$N#ve,-er *$ *

?nder Article =JG of the Labor Code supervisory employees are not eligiblefor membership in a labor union of ran"#and#!le employees. The supervisoryemployees are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to

9oin the ran"#and#!le union because of potential conicts of interest. urtherto avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the ran"#and#!le orwhere the supervisors labor union would represent conicting interests alocal supervisors union should not be allowed to a1liate with the nationalfederation of unions of ran"#and#!le employees where that federationactively participates in the union activity within the company. Thus thelimitation is not con!ned to a case of supervisors wanting to 9oin a ran"#and#!le union. The prohibition etends to a supervisors local union applying formembership in a national federation the members of which include localunions of ran"#and#!le employees.

Sa Mi2!el >##;s$ %". vs. Sa Mi2!el C#rp. S!pervis#rs a; Ee,ptUi#. G.R. N#. &*. A!2!st &$ *&&

The general rule is that an employer has no standing to /uestion the processof certi!cation election since this is the sole concern of the wor"ers. Law andpolicy demand that employers ta"e a strict hands#o% stance in certi!cationelections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen freefrom any etraneous inuence of management. The only eception is wherethe employer itself has to !le the petition pursuant to Article =G8 of theLabor Code because of a re/uest to bargain collectively.

=#l5 Chil; Cath#li" S"h##l v =#. St# T#,as$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &39&(*&8)

A certi!cation election is the sole concern of the wor"ers ecept when theemployer itself has to !le the petition pursuant to Article =G@ of the LaborCode as amended but even after such !ling its role in the certi!cationprocess ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lac"s



Labor Law

the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at alltherein.

nclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organi'ation see"ing torepresent the bargaining unit of ran"#and#!le employees does not divest it of

its status as a legitimate labor organi'ation.

NUW=RA%N K MP=C v. SLE. G.R. N#. &+&'8&$ 4!l5 8&$ *9

t is wellsettled that under the double ma9ority ruleD for there to be a validcerti!cation election ma9ority of the bargaining unit must have voted andthe winning union must have garnered ma9ority of the valid votes cast.ollowing the ruling that all the probationary employees votes should bedeemed valid votes while that of the supervisory Ees should be ecluded itfollows that the number of valid votes cast would increase. ?nder Art. =GH of the LC the union obtaining the ma9ority of the valid votes cast by the eligible

voters shall be certi!ed as the sole eclusive bargaining agent of all thewor"ers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This ma9ority is G>U V ;.

Be2!et C#s#li;ate; %". v. BC% Ees a; W#rerFs Ui#KPA>LU.G.R. N#. LK*3&&$ April &9+

The Er cannot revo"e the validly eecuted C& contract with their Er by thesimple epedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent mustrespect the contract. t cannot be invo"ed to support the contention that anewly certi!ed C& agent automatically assumes all the personalunderta"ings of the former agentli"e the no stri"e clauseD in the C&A

eecuted by the latter.

Taata Philippies C#rp#rati# vs B!rea! #/ La-#r Relati#s$ G.R.N#. &9*3$ 4!e *&

or the purpose of de#certifying a union such as respondent it must beshown that there was misrepresentation false statement or fraud inconnection with the adoption or rati!cation of the constitution and by#laws oramendments thereto the minutes of rati!cation0 or in connection with theelection of o1cers the minutes of the election of o1cers the list of votersor failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly

elected#appointed o1cers and their postal addresses to the &L4.

The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those whoparticipated in the organi'ational meeting would not to our mind provide avalid reason to cancel respondents certi!cate of registration. Thecancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimensionon the right of labor to self#organi'ation. or fraud and misrepresentation tobe grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code the



Labor Law

nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compellingenough to vitiate the consent of a ma9ority of union members.

Cirte E,pl#5ees La-#r Ui#@>e;erati# #/ >ree #rers vs. Cirte Ele"tr#i"s$ %".$ G.R. N#. &9'&'. 4!e $ *&&

A local union may disa1liate at any time from its mother federation absentany showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rules. uchdisa1liation however does not result in it losing its legal personality. A localunion does not owe its eistence to the federation with which it is a1liated. tis a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the willof its members. The mere act of a1liation does not divest the local union of its own personality neither does it give the mother federation the license toact independently of the local union. t only gives rise to a contract of agencywhere the former acts in representation of the latter. n the present casewhether the $ went against the will of its principal (the member#

employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the +FA is not forthe Court nor for respondent employer to determine but for the ?nion and$ to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal#agent relationship.+oreover the issue of disa1liation is an intra#union dispute which must beresolved in a di%erent forum in an action at the instance of either or both the$ and the union or a rival labor organi'ation but not the employer as inthis case.

Le2e; %terati#al Res#rts Li,ite; v. ?il!sa2 Ma22a2aa 2Le2e;a. G.R. N#. &93'$ >e-r!ar5 *8$ *&&

The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does notpreclude collective bargaining and that an order to hold a certi!cationelection is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of theunions registration because at the time the respondent union !led itspetition it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an ordercancelling its registration. The legitimacy of the legal personality of respondent cannot be collaterally attac"ed in a petition for certi!cationelection proceeding but only through a separate action instituted particularlyfor the purpose of assailing it.

The mplementing 4ules stipulate that a labor organi'ation shall be deemed

registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of itscerti!cate of registration. Fnce a certi!cate of registration is issued to aunion its legal personality cannot be sub9ect to a collateral attac". t may be/uestioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordancewith ection G of4ule M &oo" M of the mplementing 4ules.



Labor Law

Ta-a2a# Shell Reer5 E,pl#5ees Ass#"iati# v Pilipias ShellPetr#le!, C#rp#rati#$ G.R. N#. &33$ 3 April *&

The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or toma"e any concession. $hile the purpose of collective bargaining is the

reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employees unionresulting in a binding contract between the parties the failure to reach anagreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does notmean lac" of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collectivebargaining contract but do not compel one. or after all a C&A li"e anycontract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such theduty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

Sa,aha2 Ma22a2aa sa T#p >#r, Ma!/a"t!ri2KUite; W#rers#/ the Phils v. NLRC. G.R. N#. &&8+'$ Sept. 3$ &99+

There is no perfect test of good faith (*) in bargaining. The * or & is aninference to be drawn from the facts and is largely a matter for the ,L4Csepertise. The charge of & should be raised while the bargaining is inprogress. $ith the eecution of the C&A & can no longer be imputed uponany of the parties thereto. All provisions in the C&A are supposed to havebeen 9ointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not acase where private respondent ehibited an indi%erent attitude towards C&because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The C&A is good enough that private respondent eerted reasonable e%ortof * bargaining.

>6C La-#r Ui#@Philippie Trasp#rt a; Geeral W#rersOr2aizati# (>6CLU@PTGWO) 6s. Sa,a@sa,a2 Na2aaisa2Ma22a2aa sa >6C@S#li;arit5 #/ %;epe;et a; Geeral La-#rOr2aizati# (SANAMA@>6C@S%GLO. G.R. N#. &3*9$ N#ve,-er *3$*9

$hile the parties may agree to etend the C&As original !ve#year termtogether with all other C&A provisions any such amendment or term inecess of !ve years will not carry with it a change in the unions eclusivecollective bargaining status. &y epress provision of the above#/uoted Article=G3#A the eclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond !ve years and the

representation status is a legal matter not for the wor"place parties to agreeupon. n other words despite an agreement for a C&A with a life of morethan !ve y ears either as an original provision or by amendment thebargaining unions eclusive bargaining status is e%ective only for !ve yearsand can be challenged within sity (H>) days prior to the epiration of theC&As !rst !ve years.



Labor Law

Mi;aa# Ter,ial a; Br#era2e Servi"es %".$ v. C#/ess#r. G.R.N#. &&&+9$ Ma5 '$ &993

The signing of the C&A does not determine whether the agreement wasentered into within the H month period from the date of epiration of the old

C&A. n the present case there was already a meeting of the minds betweenthe company and the union prior to the end of the H month period after theepiration of the old C&A. 7ence such meeting of the mind is su1cient toconclude that an agreement has been reached within the H month period asprovided under Art. =G3A of the LC.

Te#;#r# S. Mira;a$ 4r. vs. Asia Ter,ials$ %". a; C#!rt #/ Appeals$ G.R. N#. &38&$ 4!e *8$ *9

A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the unionand not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a

shop department or plant and serves as representative of the unioncharged with negotiating and ad9ustment of grievances of employees withthe supervisor of the employer. 7e is the representative of the unionmembers in a building or other wor"place. &lac"s Law <ictionary de!nes ashop steward as a union o1cial elected to represent members in a plant orparticular department. 7is duties include collection of dues recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A 9udgment of reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union hopteward would have no practical legal e%ect since it cannot be enforced.&ased on the re/uirements imposed by law and the ABC$?#AT C&A and inthe nature of things the subse/uent separation of the petitioner from

employment with respondent AT has made his reinstatement to union hopteward incapable of being enforced.

=er,ii2il;# %2!ill#,$ et al. vs. >irst Philippie S"ales$ %".$ et al.G.R. N#. &'3$ 4!e '$ *9

?nion securityD is a generic term which is applied to and comprehendsclosed shopD union shopD maintenance of membershipD or any otherform of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to ac/uireor retain union membership as a condition a%ecting employment. There isunion shop when all new regular employees are re/uired to 9oin the union

within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. Thereis maintenance of membership shop when employees who are unionmembers as of the e%ective date of the agreement or who thereafterbecome members must maintain union membership as a condition forcontinued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of thebargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed#shop on the otherhand may be de!ned as an enterprise in which by agreement between theemployer and his employees or their representatives no person may be



Labor Law

employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless heor she is becomes and for the duration of the agreement remains amember in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which theemployees in interest are a part.

n terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the ?nionecurity Clause the employer needs only to determine and prove that2(;) the union security clause is applicable0(=) the union is re/uesting for the enforcement of the union securityprovision in the C&A0 and(3) there is su1cient evidence to support the unions decision to epel theemployee from the union or company.

Sta;ar; Chartere; Ba v. C#/ess#r. G.R. N#. &&93$ 4!e &$*

$hether or not the union is engaged in blues"y bargaining is determined bythe evidence presented by the union as to its economic demands. Thus if the union re/uires eaggerated or unreasonable economic demands then itis guilty of ?LB. n order to be considered as unfair labor practice there mustbe proof that the demands made by the union were eaggerated orunreasonable. n the minutes of the meeting show that the union based itseconomic proposals on data of ran"#and#!le employees and the prevailingeconomic bene!ts received by ban" employees from other foreign ban"sdoing business in the Bhilippines and other branches of the ban" in the Asianregion. 7ence it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ?LB for blue#s"ybargaining.

Geeral Sat#s C#"a C#la Plat >ree W#rers Ui#@T!pas vs. COCA@COLA BOTTLERS P=%LS.$ %NC. G.R. N#. &3+3. >e-. &8$ *3

?nfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the wor"ers right toorgani'e.D The prohibited acts are related to the wor"ers right to self#organi'ation and to the observance of a C&A. $ithout that element the actseven if unfair are not unfair labor practices.

Arella# Uiversit5 E,pl#5ees a; W#rers Ui# vs C#!rt #/ Appeals$ G.R. N#. &899$ Septe,-er &9$ *

To constitute ?LB however violations of the C&A must be gross. *rossviolation of the C&A under Article =H; of the Labor Code means agrantandKor malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof.Evidently the ?niversity can not be faulted for ?LB as it in good faith merelyheeded the above#said re/uest of ?nion members.

Sal!2a v. C%R. G.R. N#. LK**'$ Sep. *3$ &93





Labor Law

unsettled until the lapse of the re/uisite number of days from the !ling of thenoticeD this clearly implies that the union may not stri"e before the lapse of the coolingo% period. The coolingo% period is for the +inistry of Labor andEmployment to eert all e%orts at mediation and conciliation to e%ect avoluntary settlement. The mandatory character of the Iday stri"e ban is

manifest in the provision that in every caseD the union shall furnish the+FLE with the results of the voting at least I days before the intendedstri"e.D This period is to give time to verify that a stri"e vote was actuallyheld.

n the event the result of the stri"eKloc"out ballot is !led within the coolingo% period the Iday re/uirement shall be counted from the day following theepiration of the coolingo% period.

Mala5a2 Sa,aha 2 ,2a Ma22a2aa sa Greeel; v. Ra,#s.G.R. N#. &&893$ >e-. *+$ *

A no stri"eKloc"out clause is legal but it is applicable only to economicstri"es not ?LB stri"es. As a provision in the C&A it is a valid stipulationalthough the clause may be invo"ed by an employer (Er) only when thestri"e is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or otherconcessions from the Er that are not mandated to be granted by the lawitself. t would be inapplicable to prevent a stri"e which is grounded on ?LB.

%terphil La-#rat#ries Ees Ui#K>>W v. %terphil La-#rat#ries$ %".G.R. N#. &*+*$ De". &9$ *&

The concept of a slowdown is a -stri"e on the installment plan.- t is a willfulreduction in the rate of wor" by concerted action of wor"ers for the purposeof restricting the output of the employer (Er) in relation to a labor dispute0 asan activity by which wor"ers without a complete stoppage of wor" retardproduction or their performance of duties and functions to compelmanagement to grant their demands. uch a slowdown is generallycondemned as inherently illicit and un9usti!able because while theemployees (Ees) -continue to wor" and remain at their positions and acceptthe wages paid to them- they at the same time -select what part of theirallotted tas"s they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly orsecretly to the Er:s damage to do other wor"0- in other words they -wor" on

their own terms.

Ba2#2 Pa2aaisa 2 Ma22a2aa 2 Tri!,ph %terati#al$ et al.vs. Se"retar5 #/ Depart,et #/ La-#r a; E,pl#5,et$ etal.HTri!,ph %terati#al (phils.)$ %". vs. Ba2#2 Pa2aaisa 2Ma22a2aa 2 Tri!,ph %terati#al$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3&$ 4!l5'$ *&



Labor Law

The assumption of 9urisdiction powers granted to the Labor ecretary underArticle =H3(g) is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of stri"e orloc"out that may have preceded the stri"e or loc"out0 nor is it limited to theincidents of the stri"e or loc"out that in the meanwhile may have ta"enplace. As the term assume 9urisdictionD connotes the intent of the law is to

give the Laborecretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gaverise to or which arose out of the stri"e or loc"out including cases over whichthe labor arbiter has eclusive 9urisdiction.

Sar,iet# v. T!i"#. G.R. N#s. 3'*3&K38$ 4!e *3$ &9++

$here the return to wor" order is issued pending the determination of thelegality of the stri"e it is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the stri"e is legal and may be disregarded if illegal. Brecisely the purpose of the return to wor" order is to maintain the status /uo while the

determination is being made.

Maila Dia,#; =#tel Ees Ui# v. SLE$ G.R. N#. &'&+$ De". &$*

Bayroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must beshowing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatementimpracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the lawin providing for assumption of 9urisdiction by the LE in a labor dispute thata%ects the national interest.

S#li; Ba C#rp. Erest# U. Ga,ier$ et al. a; S#li; Ba C#rp.$ etal. vs. S#li; Ba Ui# a; its Dis,isse; O"ers a; Me,-ers$ etal. G.R. N#. &'9 a; G.R. N#. &'9&$ N#ve,-er &'$ *&

?nder Article =HJ (a) of the Labor Code as amended a stri"e that isunderta"en despite the issuance by the ecretary of Labor of an assumptionorder andKor certi!cation is illegal. o is a declaration of a stri"e during thependency of cases involving the same grounds for the stri"e. n the presentcase there is no dispute that when respondents conducted their massactions on April 3 to H =>>> the proceedings before the ecretary of Laborwere still pending as both parties !led motions for reconsideration of the

+arch =J =>>> Frder. Clearly respondents "nowingly violated the aforesaidprovision by holding a stri"e in the guise of mass demonstration.

4a"-ilt %;!stries$ %". 6s. 4a"-ilt E,pl#5ees W#rers Ui#@Na!@?MU$ G.R. N#. &3&&+@&9$ Mar"h &8$ *9

Article =HJ(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in pic"etingfrom obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the employers



Labor Law

premises. ince respondent was found in the 6uly ;I ;@@8 decision of the,L4C to have prevented the free entry into and eit of vehicles frompetitioners compound respondents o1cers and employees clearlycommitted illegal acts in the course of the +arch @ ;@@8 stri"e. The use of unlawful means in the course of a stri"e renders such stri"e illegal.

Therefore pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of 9udgment the+arch @ ;@@8 stri"e was ipso facto illegal. The !ling of a petition to declarethe stri"e illegal was thus unnecessary.

7#lit# >a;ri!ela$ et al. vs. M#tere5 >##;s C#rp#rati#HM#tere5>##;s C#rp#rati# v. B!l!ra 2 ,2a Ma22a2aa sa M#tere5@%LAW$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3+9HG.R. N#. &3+8$ 4!e +$ *&&

A distinction eists between the ordinary wor"ers liability for illegal stri"eand that of the union o1cers who participated in it. The ordinary wor"ercannot be terminated for merely participating in the stri"e. There must be

proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. Fn the other hand aunion o1cer can be terminated upon mere proof that he "nowinglyparticipated in the illegal stri"e. +oreover the participating union o1cershave to be properly identi!ed. n the present case with respect to thoseunion o1cers whose identity and participation in the stri"e having beenproperly established the termination was legal.

G#l; Cit5 %te2rate; P#rt Servi"es$ %". v. NLRC. G.R. N#. +$Sep. *&$ &99

,o bac"wages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their

participation in the illegal stri"e. As for the union o1cers for "nowinglyparticipating in an illegal stri"e the law mandates that a union o1cer maybe terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief.

MS> Tire : R!--er v. CA$ G.R. &*+8*$ A!2. '$ &999

The innocent by stander must show2 Compliance with the grounds speci!edin 4ule G8 of the 4ules of Court and That it is entirely di%erent from withoutany connection whatsoever to either party to the dispute and therefore itsinterests are totally foreign to the contet thereof.

6i"t#r Mete#r#$ et al. v. Creative Creat!res$ %". G.R N#. &3&*3'$ 4!l5&8$ *9

n sum respondent contested the !ndings of the labor inspector during andafter the inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitatedthe eamination of evidentiary matters not veri!able in the normal course of inspection. 7ence the 4egional <irector was divested of 9urisdiction andshould have endorsed the case to the appropriate Arbitration &ranch of the



Labor Law

,L4C. Considering however that an illegal dismissal case had been !led bypetitioners wherein the eistence or absence of an employer#employeerelationship was also raised the CA correctly ruled that such endorsementwas no longer necessary.

=#;a Cars Philippies$ %". v. =#;a Cars Te"hi"al Spe"ialist a;S!pervis#rs Ui#$ G.R. N#. *&*$ &9 N#ve,-er *&

The Moluntary Arbitrator has no 9urisdiction to settle ta matters. TheMoluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taability of the gasallowance and on the propriety of the withholding of ta. These issues areclearly ta matters and do not involve labor disputes. To be eact theyinvolve ta issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to /uestionsof law on the application of ection 33 (A) of the ,4C. They do not re/uirethe application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the +FA andKorcompany personnel policies.

The Uiversit5 #/ the %,,a"!late C#"epti#$ et al. vs. NLRC$ et al.$G.R. N#. &+&&$ 4a!ar5 *$ *&&

Article =;I of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices andtermination disputes fall within the original and eclusive 9urisdiction of theLabor Arbiter. As an eception under Article =H= the Moluntary Arbitratorupon agreement of the parties shall also hear and decide all other labordisputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadloc"s. or theeception to apply there must be agreement between the parties clearlyconferring 9urisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. uch agreement may be

stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. 7owever in the absence of acollective bargaining agreement it is enough that there is evidence onrecord showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.

Sa,ar@Me; Distri-!ti# v Nati#al La-#r Relati#s C#,,issi#$ G.R.N#. &*8+' (*&8)

The non#inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did notnecessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal could not be an issue. Therules of the ,L4C re/uire the submission of veri!ed position papers by theparties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement and bar the

inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or positionpaper from the time of their submission by the parties. n view of thisrespondents cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of hiscomplaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both hiscomplaint and position paper.

Easter Me;iterraea Mariti,e Lt;.$ et al. vs. Estaisla# S!ri#$ etal. G.R. N#. &'*&8$ A!2!st *8$ *&*



Labor Law

Although 4epublic Act ,o. 8>J= through its ection ;> transferred theoriginal and eclusive 9urisdiction to hear and decide money claims involvingoverseas ilipino wor"ers from the BFEA to the Labor Arbiters the law didnot remove from the BFEA the original and eclusive 9urisdiction to hear and

decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative incharacter involving such wor"ers. The obvious intent of 4epublic Act ,o.8>J= was to have the BFEA focus its e%orts in resolving all administrativematters a%ecting and involving such wor"ers. The ,L4C had no appellate 9urisdiction to review the decision of the BFEA in disciplinary cases involvingoverseas contract wor"ers.

Pe#pleFs Br#a;"asti2 Servi"e vs. The Se"retar5 #/ La-#r a;E,pl#5,et. G.R. N#. &39'*$ Mar"h $ *&*

f the <FLE !nds that there is no employer#employee relationship the

9urisdiction is properly with the ,L4C. f a complaint is !led with the <FLEand it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement the 9urisdiction isproperly with the Labor Arbiter under Art. =;I(3) of the Labor Code whichprovides that the Labor Arbiter has original and eclusive 9urisdiction overthose cases involving wages rates of pay hours of wor" and other termsand conditions of employment if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.f a complaint is !led with the ,L4C and there is still an eisting employer#employee relationship the 9urisdiction is properly with the <FLE. The!ndings of the <FLE however may still be /uestioned through a petition forcertiorari under 4ule HG of the 4ules of Court.

R#la;# L. Cervates vs. PAL Mariti,e C#rp#rati# a;H#r WesterShippi2 A2e"ies. G.R. N#. &3'*9. 4a!ar5 &$ *&8

There was substantial compliance with the ,L4C 4ules of Brocedure whenthe respondents BAL +aritime Corporation and $estern hipping AgenciesBte. Ltd. !led albeit belatedly the 6oint <eclaration ?nder Fath which isre/uired when an employer appeals from the Labor Arbiters decisiongranting a monetary award and posts a surety bond. ?nder the ,L4C rulesthe following re/uisites are re/uired to perfect the employers appeal2 (;) itmust be !led within the reglementary period0 (=) it must be under oath withproof of payment of the re/uired appeal fee and the posting of a cash or

surety bond0 and (3) it must be accompanied by typewritten or printedcopies of the memorandum of appeal stating the grounds relied upon thesupporting arguments the reliefs prayed for and a statement of the date of receipt of the appealed decision with proof of service on the other party of said appeal. f the employer posts a surety bond the ,L4C rules furtherre/uire the submission by the employer his or her counsel and the bondingcompany of a 9oint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond



Labor Law

posted is genuine and that it shall be in e%ect until the !nal disposition of thecase.

n the case at bar the respondents posted a surety bond e/uivalent to themonetary award and !led the notice of appeal and the appeal memorandum

within the reglementary period. $hen the ,L4C subse/uently directed the!ling of a 6oint <eclaration ?nder Fath the respondents immediatelycomplied with the said order. There was only a late submission of the 6oint<eclaration. Considering that there was substantial compliance with therules the same may be liberally construed. The application of technical rulesmay be relaed in labor cases to serve the demands of substantial 9ustice.

M"-!rie v Gaz#$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &3+8 (*&8)

$hile the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer this is sub9ect

to the conditions that (;) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based onmeritorious grounds0 and (=) a reasonable amount in relation to themonetary award is posted by the appellant otherwise the !ling of the motionto reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The /uali!cation e%ectively re/uires that unless the ,L4C grants thereduction of the cash bond within the ;>#day reglementary period theemployer is still epected to post the cash or surety bond securing the fullamount within the said ;>#day period. f the ,L4C does eventually grant themotion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed the correctrelief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by theemployer within the ;>#day period.

AGG Tr!"i2 a;H#r Ale A2 Gaei; vs. Melai# B. 7!a2. G.R. N#.&9'88$ O"t#-er &*$ *&&

Fn the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Betition for Certiorari despitethe prescribed +otion for 4econsideration with the ,L4C the C found thatthe CA committed error when it entertained the petition for certiorari andeplained that when respondent failed to !le a +otion for 4econsideration of the ,L4Cs 3> ,ovember =>>H 4esolution within the reglementary periodthe 4esolution attained !nality and could no longer be modi!ed by the Court

of Appeals. ?ntimeliness in !ling motions or petitions is not a mere technicalor procedural defect as leniency regarding this re/uirement will impinge onthe right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from the laying torest of the controversy.

ST. MART%N >UNERAL =OME v. NLRC$ G.R. N#. &8+$ Septe,-er&$ &99+



Labor Law

Therefore all references in the amended ection @ of &.B. ,o. ;=@ tosupposed appeals from the ,L4C to the upreme Court are interpreted andhereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under 4ule HG.Conse/uently all such petitions should hence forth be initially !led in theCourt of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of

courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Maila Pavili# =#tel$ et". vs. =er5 Dela;a. G.R. N#. &+993$ 4a!ar5 *'$ *&&

n ime <arby Bilipinas nc. v. <eputy Administrator +agsalin the upremeCourt ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary 9urisdiction andauthority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scopeof his own authority N sub9ect only in a proper case to the certiorari 9urisdiction of this Court. t was also held in that case that the failure of theparties to speci!cally limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the

arbitrator to assume 9urisdiction over the related issue. n Ludo 5 LuymCorporation v. aornido the upreme Court recogni'ed that voluntaryarbitrators are generally epected to decide only those /uestions epresslydelineated by the submission agreement0 that nevertheless they canassume that they have the necessary power to ma"e a !nal settlement onthe related issues since arbitration is the !nal resort for the ad9udication of disputes. Thus the upreme Court ruled that even if the speci!c issuebrought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the /uestion of whether anemployee was discharged for 9ust causeD they could reasonably assume thattheir powers etended beyond the determination thereof to include thepower to reinstate the employee or to grant bac" wages. n the same vein if

the speci!c issue brought before the arbitrators referred to the date of regulari'ation of the employee law and 9urisprudence gave them enoughleeway as well as ade/uate prerogative to determine the entitlement of theemployees to higher bene!ts in accordance with the !nding of regulari'ation.ndeed to re/uire the parties to !le another action for payment of thosebene!ts would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene theconstitutional mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy labor 9ustice.

Philippie Ele"tri" C#rp#rati# v C#!rt #/ Appeals$ et al.$ G.R. N#.&+&*$ & De"e,-er *&

The rule is that a Moluntary Arbitrators award or decision shall be appealedbefore the Court of Appeals within ;> days from receipt of the award ordecision. hould the aggrieved party choose to !le a motion forreconsideration with the Moluntary Arbitrator the motion must be !led withinthe same ;>#day period since a motion for reconsideration is !led within theperiod for ta"ing an appeal.



Labor Law

Pe#pleFs Br#a;"asti2 (B#,-# Ra;5# Phils) v. Se"retar5 #/ La-#r$ etal.GR N#. &39'*$ Ma5 +$ *9

t can be assumed that the <FLE in the eercise of its visitorial and

enforcement power somehow has to ma"e a determination of the eistenceof an employer#employee relationship. uch prerogatival determinationhowever cannot be coetensive with the visitorial and enforcement poweritself. ndeed such determination is merely preliminary incidental andcollateral to the <FLEs primary function of enforcing labor standardsprovisions. The determination of the eistence of employer#employeerelationship is still primarily lodged with the ,L4C. This is the meaning of theclause in cases where the relationship of employer#employee still eistsD inArt. ;=8(b).

Thus if a complaint is brought before the <FLE to give e%ect to the labor

standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation and there isa !nding by the <FLE that there is an eisting employer#employeerelationship the <FLE eercise 9urisdiction to the eclusion of the ,L4C. f the <FLE !nds that there is no employer#employee relationship the 9urisdiction is properly with the ,L4C. f a complaint is !led with the <FLE and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement the 9urisdiction isproperly with the Labor Arbiter under Art. =;I(3) of the Labor Code whichprovides that the Labor Arbiter has original and eclusive 9urisdiction overthose cases involving wages rates of pay hours of wor" and other termsand conditions of employment if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.f a complaint is !led with the ,L4C and there is still an eisting employer#

employee relationship the 9urisdiction is purely with the <FLE. The !ndingsof the <FLE however may still be /uestioned through a petition for certiorariunder 4ule HG of the 4ules of Court.

Ma#lit# Barles$ et al. v. =#. Bee;i"t# Bit#i#$ et al. GR N#.&**3$ 4!e &$ &999

The &L4 shall have original and eclusive authority to act at their owninitiative or upon re/uest of either or both parties on all inter#union andintra#union conicts. As already held by the Court in La Tondena $or"ers

?nion v. ecretary of Labor intra#union conicts such as eaminations of accoutns are under the 9urisdiction of the &L4. 7owever the 4ules of Brocedure on +ediation#Arbitration purpose and epressly separated ordistinguished eaminations of union accounts from the genus of intra#unionconict and provided a di%erent procedure for the resolution of the same.Friginal 9urisdiction over complaints for eaminations of union accounts isvested on the 4egional <irector and appellate 9urisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with the &L4. This is apparent from ections 3 and J of



Labor Law

the +ed#Arbitration 4ules as already mentioned. Contrast these two sectionsfrom ection = and ection GH of the same rules. ection = epressly vestsupon +ed#Arbiters original and eclusive 9urisdiction to hear and decide interalia all other inter#union or internal union disputes.D ection G states thatthe decisions of the +ed#Arbiter shall be appealable to the <FLE ecretary.

$ithout a doubt the rules of Brocedure on +ediation#Arbitration did notamend or supplant substantive law but implemented and !lled in details of procedure left vacuous or ambiguous by the Labor Code and itsmplementing 4ules.

Ara!ll# v O"e #/ the O,-!;s,a$ et al.$ G.R. N#. &9&9 (*&8)

The $rit of Eecution in the instant case was procedurally irregular as it pre#empted the ,L4C 4ules which re/uire that where further computation of theaward in the decision is necessary during the course of the eecution

proceedings no $rit of Eecution shall be issued until after the computationhas been approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the partieshave been duly noti!ed and heard on the matter. $hen the writ was issuedthere was as yet no order approving the computation made by the ,L4CComputation and Eamination ?nit and there was a pending and unresolved+otion to 4ecompute !led by Club ilipino. A cursory eamination of themotion reveals that it raised valid issues that re/uired determination in orderto arrive at a 9ust resolution so that none of the parties would be un9ustlyenriched.

6ir2ili# Aa-e v. Asia C#str!"ti#. GR N#. &+8*88$ De"e,-er *8$*9

To properly construe Article =@; of the Labor Code it is essential to ascertainthe time when the third element of a cause of action transpired. tateddi%erently in the computation of the three#year prescriptive period adetermination must be made as to the period when the act constituting aviolation of the wor"ers right to the bene!ts being claimed was committed.or if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the !lingof the money claim said cause of action has already prescribed inaccordance with Article =@;.

Ge#r2e A. Arri#la v Pilipi# Star .N2a5#$ %". a;H#r Mi2!el G.Bel,#t$ G.R. N#. &3'+9$ &8 A!2!st *&

This court ruled that Callantas complaint for illegal dismissal had not yetprescribed. Although illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code it is notthe -o%ense- contemplated in Article =@>. Article =@> refers to illegal actspenali'ed under the Labor Code including committing any of the prohibited





Labor Law

Cornelios adoption of 6ohn without more does not deprive petitioner of theright to receive the bene!ts stemming from 6ohns death as a dependentparent given Cornelios untimely demise during 6ohns minority. ince theparent by adoption already died then the death bene!ts under theEmployees: Compensation Brogram shall accrue solely to herein petitioner

6ohn:s sole remaining bene!ciary. The rule limiting death bene!ts claims tothe legitimate parents is contrary to law.

The phrase -dependent parents- should therefore include all parentswhether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.

=a"ie;a Cata5a$ et al. v R#sari# L#rez#$ G.R. N#. &39$ &+Mar"h *&')

To be eempted from the coverage of Law on the basis of casualemployment the services must not merely be irregular temporary or

intermittent but the same must not also be in connection with the businessor occupation of the employer. The primary standard therefore of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between theparticular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usualbusiness or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usuallynecessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Theconnection can be determined by considering the nature of the wor"performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or tradein its entirety.

GS%S vs. De Le#. G.R. N#. &+'< N#ve,-er &3$ *&

Thus where the employee retires and meets the eligibility re/uirements heac/uires a vested right to bene!ts that is protected by the due processclause. 4etirees en9oy a protected property interest whenever they ac/uire aright to immediate payment under pre#eisting law. Thus a pensionerac/uires a vested right to bene!ts that have become due as provided underthe terms of the public employees pension statute. ,o law can deprive suchperson of his pension rights without due process of law that is withoutnotice and opportunity to be heard.

GS%S vs. C#!rt #/ Appeals. G.R. N#. &*+'*< April *$ &999

The =J#hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts andcircumstances causing the death of a police o1cer but only to those whichalthough not on o1cial line of duty are nonetheless basically police servicein character.

%l#il# D#" : E2ieeri2 C#. vs. ECC. G.R. N#. L@*8&. N#v. *3$&9+



Labor Law

$hen the in9ury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from hiswor" on the premises of the employer the in9ury is compensable.

Ea# v. ECC G.R. N#. L@< April '$ &9+'

The company which provides the means of transportation in going to orcoming from the place of wor" is liable to the in9ury sustained by theemployees while on board said means of transportation.

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