CASE DIGESTS BY:

Ericson S. Dela Cruz

1. Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 94951, April 22, 1991

2. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v.

Democratic Labor Organization,

G.R. No. L-18353, July 31, 1963

3. Rada v. NLRC

G.R. No. 96078, January 9, 1992

4. National Shipyards And Steel Corporation v. CIR

G.R. No. L-17068, December 30, 1961

5. Caltex Regular Employees v. CALTEX

G.R. No. 111359, August 15, 1995

APEX MINING CO., INC. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 94951, April 22, 1991

NATURE OF THE CASE: this is a petition for review by certiorari on the

NLRC resolution affirming the DOLE decision favoring the herein private

respondent in an issue on whether private respondent should be treated as a

mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee.

FACTS: Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner

Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at

its staff house. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.

However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00

a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she

was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a

stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work.

She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the

amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to

persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return

to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on

February 4, 1988.

She filed a request for assistance with the DOLE. DOLE favored Candida

and ordered Apex Mining to pay her the total amount of P55,161.42 for

salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential

and separation pay. Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which

was subsequently dismissed for lack of merit

ISSUE: Whether the private respondent should be treated as househelper or

a regular employee.

HELD: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI: Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor

Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" is synonymous to the term

"domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female,

who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services

are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment

thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of

the employer's family.

The definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant

who is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the

personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. The definition

cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in

staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the

company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the

employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature

of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home

or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their

circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the

family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single

proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or

similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the

premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are

employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to

the privileges of a regular employee.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed; the appealed decision affirmed.

SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. v.

DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION,

G.R. No. L-18353, July 31, 1963

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on the CIR

decision decreeing that the Eight-hour labor law applies to employees who

worked in the field or engaged in the sale of the company's products outside

its premises.

FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner embodying 12

demands for the betterment of the conditions of employment of its members,

which it eventually confined to specific demands on overtime pay, night-

shift differential pay, attorney’s fees, separation pay, and sick and vacation

leave compensation.

Judge Bautista held, among other things, that the provisions of the Eight-

Hour Labor Law apply to salesmen and should therefore be paid the extra

compensation accorded them by said law in addition to the monthly salary

and commission earned by them, regardless of the meal allowance given to

employees who work up to late at night.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the CIR, which was

denied.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the Eight-Hour Labor Law applies to respondent

workers.

(2) Are the claimants who are watchmen and security guards entitled to extra

pay for work done on Sundays and Holidays?

HELD: No on the first issue; yes on the second

RATIO DECIDENDI:

(On First issue)

The Eight-Hour Labor Law only has application where an employee or

laborer is paid on a monthly or daily basis, or is paid a monthly or daily

compensation, in which case, if he is made to work beyond the requisite

period of 8 hours, he should be paid the additional compensation prescribed

by law. This law has no application when the employee or laborer is paid on

a piece-work, "pakiao", or commission basis, regardless of the time

employed. The philosophy behind this exemption is that his earnings in the

form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. His participation

depends upon his industry so that the more hours he employs in the work the

greater are his gross returns and the higher his commission.

According to a ruling by DOLE on Dec. 9, 1957, field sales personnel

receiving monthly salaries are not subject to the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

Although they are paid on a monthly basis, their commission shall be

considered as payment for extra time he renders in excess of 8 hours.

(On second issue)

They are entitled to such pay. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444

expressly provides that no person, firm or corporation may compel an

employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays unless he is

paid an additional sum of 25% of his regular compensation. This proviso is

mandatory, regardless of the nature of compensation. The only exception is

with regard to public utilities who perform some public service.

DISPOSITIVE: CIR decision modified: the award with regards to extra

work performed by those employed in the outside or field sales force is set

aside. The rest of the decision concerning night differentials and works

performed on Sundays and holidays is affirmed.

RADA v. NLRC

G.R. No. 96078, January 9, 1992

NATURE OF THE CASE: this is a special civil action for certiorari where

petitioner seeks to annul the NLRC decision reversing the ruling of the labor

arbiter which ordered the reinstatement of petitioner with backwages and

awarded him overtime pay. 

FACTS: Petitioner was contracted in 1977 by private respondent Philnor

Consultants and Planners, Inc as a driver and was assigned to a specific

project in Manila for a period of 2.3 years. His task was to drive employees

to the project from 7am to 4pm. He was allowed to bring home the company

vehicle in order to provide a timely transportation service to the other project

workers.

The project he was assigned to was not completed as scheduled so the

company renewed his contract for 10 months on account of his satisfactory

record. 10 months has passed and the project was far from completion.

Several contracts thereafter were made until the project was finished in 1985

and Rada was terminated.

He later sued Philnor for non-payment of separation pay and overtime pay.

ISSUE: Whether Rada is entitled to separation pay and OT pay.

HELD: Rada was not entitled to Separation pay. He was entitled to

Overtime pay.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

On Separation Pay:

The Court held that although petitioner worked with Philnor as a driver for

eight years, the fact that his services were rendered only for a particular

project which took that same period of time to complete categorizes him as a

project employee. Petitioner was employed for one specific project.

The private respondent was a project employees whose work was

coterminous with the project for which he was hired. Project employees, as

distinguished from regular or non-project employees, are mentioned in

section 281 of the Labor Code as those "where the employment has been

fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of

which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee."

Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated

as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which

they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have

been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the

company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in

connection with such termination.

On Overtime Pay:

The Court held that petitioner was entitled to such pay. The fact that he picks

up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along EDSA in going to

the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from

the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely

incidental to petitioner's job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation

arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the

employees, but primarily for the benefit of the employer, herein private

respondent.

DISPOSITIVE: the decision appealed from is affirmed.

NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION VS CIR

G.R. No. L-17068, December 30, 1961

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition filed by the NASSCO to review certain

orders of the CIR requiring it to pay its bargeman overtime service of 16

hours a day for a certain period.

FACTS: The petitioner NASSCO, a GOCC, is the owner of several barges

and tugboats used in the transportation of cargoes and personnel in

connection with its business of shipbuilding and repair. It required its

bargemen to stay in their respective barges—or to be detailed on board—so

they could be called to duty at any time.

On April 15, 1957, 39 crew members of petitioner's tugboat service,

including therein respondent Dominador Malondras, filed with the CIR a

complaint for the payment of overtime compensation. NASSCO admitted it

did not pay for the OT compensation. The CIR issued an order directing the

court examiner to compute the OT compensation due the claimants.

The CIR found that Malondras and the others has rendered an average OT

service of five hours each day for certain period. Upon order by the Court,

all the claimants, including Malondras, were paid their overtime

compensation by the NASSCO.

On April 30, 1958, the court examiner submitted his second partial report

covering another period, again giving each crewman an average of five OT

hours each day. Malondras was not, however, included in this report as his

daily time sheets were not then available. Again upon approval by the Court,

the crewmen concerned were paid their OT compensation.

Because of his exclusion from the second report of the examiner, Malondras

asked the CIR to order for his compensation. Nassco opposed Malondras

arguing that its records do not indicate the actual number of working hours

rendered by him. After examining the documents, the chief examiner

credited Malondras five OT hours for the period in question.

On February 20, 1960, the Court ordered the examiner to make a re-

examination of the records with a view to determining Malondras' total

overtime service from two periods. After looking at the documents, the

examiner, this time, credited Malondras a total of 16 OT hours a day.

The NASSCO moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court en

banc. Whereupon, the NASSCO appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Malondras should be credited for 16 hours of OT for being

“detailed on board.”

HELD: No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The court examiner interpreted the words "Detail"

or "Detailed on Board" to mean that as long as respondent Malondras was in

his barge for twenty-four hours, he should be paid overtime for sixteen hours

a day or the time in excess of the legal eight working hours that he could not

leave his barge.

The Court did not agree with the CIR that respondent Malondras should be

paid OT compensation for every hour in excess of the regular working hours

that he was on board his vessel or barge each day, irrespective of whether or

not he actually put in work during those hours. Seamen are required to stay

on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this

reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free

living quarters and subsistence allowances when required to be on board. It

could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to pay

them overtime even when they are not actually working; otherwise, every

sailor on board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each

day, even if he had spent all those hours resting or sleeping in his bunk, after

his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether or not

sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on

board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day,

but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of

hours.

While Malondras' daily time sheets do not show his actual working hours,

nevertheless, petitioner has already admitted in the Stipulation of Facts in

this case that Malondras and his co-claimants did render service beyond

eight hours a day when so required by the exigencies of the service; and in

fact, Malondras was credited and already paid for five hours daily overtime

work during the period covered by the first report of the examiner. Since

Malondras has been at the same job since 1954, it can be reasonably inferred

that the overtime service he put in whenever he was required to be aboard

his barge all day from 1954 to 1957 would be more or less consistent. In

truth, the other claimants who served with Malondras under the same

conditions and period have been finally paid for an overtime of 5 hours a

day, and no substantial difference exists between their case and the present

one, which was not covered by the same award only because Malondras'

time records not found until later.

DISPOSITIVE: The order appealed from is modified in the sense that

respondent Malondras should be credited five overtime hours instead of 16

hours a day for the periods covered by the examiner's report.

CALTEX REGULAR EMPLOYEES v. CALTEX

G.R. No. 111359, August 15, 1995

NATURE OF THE CASE: this was a petition for certiorari where the

petitioner sought to annul the NLRC decision which reversed the Labor

Arbiter who ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the employees were

given two days of rest and that work performed on the first day of rest

should be compensated.

FACTS: Petitioner union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against

respondent company alleging violations of the CBA. Union charged Caltex

with shortchanging its employees when it compensated work performed on

the first 2 ½ hours of Saturday, an employee’s day of rest, at regular rates,

when it should be paying at day-off rates. This was grounded on the

contention that, according to the union, the CBA granted employees two day

offs.

Another point raised by the union was that Caltex was guilty of violating the

statutory prohibition against offsetting undertime for overtime work on

another day on the ground that the employees had been required to render

“overtime work” on a Saturday but compensated only at regular rates of pay,

because they had not completed the eight hours work period daily from

Monday thru Friday.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, which was reversed by the

NLRC upon appeal. The NLRC concluded that CBA granted only one day

of rest (which was Sunday).

ISSUE: Whether the CBA granted the employees two days of rest.

Corollarily, whether the union is correct in charging that rate on Saturday

should be for a day-off rate as against the normal rate.

HELD: No on both issues.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

(On First Issue)

After carefully examining the language of Article III, in relation to Annex

"B" of the 1985 CBA, quoted in limine, as well as relevant portions of

earlier CBAs between the parties, The Court agreed with the NLRC that the

intention of the parties to the 1985 CBA was to provide the employees with

only one (1) day of rest. The plain and ordinary meaning of the language of

Article III is that Caltex and the Union had agreed to pay "day of rest" rates

for work performed on "an employee's one day of rest". To the Court's mind,

the use of the word "one" describing the phrase "day of rest [of an

employee]" emphasizes the fact that the parties had agreed that only a single

day of rest shall be scheduled and shall be provided to the employee.

The Court also noted that the contract clauses governing hours of work in

previous CBAs executed between private respondent Caltex and petitioner

Union in 1973, 1976, 1979 and 1982 contained provisions parallel if not

identical to those set out in Article III of the 1985 CBA. In all these CBAs

(1973, 1976, 1979, 1982), Article III provided that only "work on an

employee's one day of rest "shall be paid on the basis of "day of rest rates".

The relevant point here was that petitioner Union had never suggested that

more than 1 day of rest had been agreed upon, and certainly Caltex had

never treated Article III or any other portion of the CBAs as providing two

(2) days of rest. It is well settled that the contemporaneous and subsequent

conduct of the parties may be taken into account by a court called upon to

interpret and apply a contract entered into by them.

The Court agreed with Respondent that the mathematical formulae contained

in Annex "B" are not all applicable to all classes of employees.Thus, "First

Day-off rates" and "Second Day-off rates" are applicable only to employees

stationed at the refinery and associated facilities like depots and terminals

which must be in constant twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a

week, operation, hence necessitating the continuous presence of operations

personnel. The work of such operations personnel required them to be on

duty for six (6) consecutive days. Upon the other hand, "First Day-off rates"

and "Second Day-off rates" are not applicable to personnel of the Manila

Office which consisted of other groups or categories of employees (e.g.,

office clerks, librarians, computer operators, secretaries, collectors,

etc.), since  the nature of their work did not require them to be on duty for

six (6) consecutive days.

(On Second Issue)

The company practice of allowing employees to leave thirty (30) minutes

earlier than the scheduled off-time had been established primarily for the

convenience of the employees most of whom have had to commute from

work place to home and in order that they may avoid the heavy rush hour

vehicular traffic. There is no allegation here by petitioner Union that such

practice was resorted to by Caltex in order to escape its contractual

obligations. This practice, while it effectively reduced to 37-1/2 the number

of hours actually worked by employees who had opted to leave ahead of off-

time, is not be construed as modifying the other terms of the 1985 CBA. As

correctly pointed out by private respondent, the shortened work period did

not result in likewise shortening the work required for purposes of

determining overtime pay, as well as for purposes of determining premium

pay for work beyond forty (40) hours within the calendar week. It follows

that an employee is entitled to be paid premium rates, whether for work in

excess of eight (8) hours on any given day, or for work beyond the forty

(40)-hour requirement for the calendar week, only when the employee

had, in fact already rendered the requisite number of hours — 8 or 40 —

prescribed in the 1985 CBA.

In recapitulation, the parties in the 1985 CBA stipulated that employees at

the Manila Office, as well as those similarly situated at the Legazpi and

Marinduque Bulk Depots, shall be provided only one (1) day of rest;

Sunday, and not Saturday, was designated as this day of rest. Work

performed on a Saturday is accordingly to be paid at regular rates of pay, as

a rule, unless the employee shall have been required to render work in

excess of forty (40) hours in a calendar week. The employee must, however,

have in fact rendered work in excess of forty (40) hours before

hours subsequently worked become payable at premium rates. The Court

concluded that the NLRC correctly set aside the palpable error committed by

the Labor Arbiter, when the latter imposed upon one of the parties to the

1985 CBA, an obligation which it had never assumed.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.